We address the problem of computing the UDP checksum on tunneling IPv6 packets when using lightweight tunneling protocols.
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1. Introduction

The origin of this I-D is the problem raised by the draft titled "Automatic IP Multicast Without Explicit Tunnels", also known as "AMT". See draft-ietf-mboned-auto-multicast-09, Section 6.6. That draft used UDP as the transport layer protocol for tunneling packets; that is, the outer packet carrying a tunneled (inner) packet is a UDP packet. The draft specifies that for packets carrying tunneled multicast data only, the UDP checksum in the UDP header of the outer packet SHOULD be 0.

However RFC 2460 [RFC2460] explicitly states that IPv6 receivers MUST discard UDP packets with a 0 checksum. So, while sending a UDP packet with a 0 checksum is permitted in IPv4 packets, it is explicitly forbidden in IPv6 packets. The reason that this prohibition exists is that there is no header checksum in the IPv6 header. The computation of an additional checksum, when the inner packet(s) are already adequately protected, is seen to be an unwarranted burden on nodes implementing lightweight tunneling protocols. However, there are issues with a UDP checksum of zero in IPv6 packets; these issues are described in detail in [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero]

Since the first version of this draft, the need for an efficient, lightweight UDP tunneling mechanism has increased. Indeed, other workgroups, notably LISP [I-D.ietf-lisp] and Softwires [RFC5619] have also expressed a need to have exceptions to the RFC 2460 prohibition. More recently, a discussion on the DCCP mailing list covered the UDP over IPv6 checksum issues. Other users of UDP as a tunneling protocol, for example, L2TP and Softwires may benefit from a relaxation of the RFC 2460 restriction.

1.1. Some Terminology

For the remainder of this draft, we discuss only IPv6, since this problem does not exist for IPv4. So any reference to 'IP' should be understood as a reference to IPv6.

Although we will try to avoid them when possible, we may use the terms "tunneling" and "tunneled" as adjectives when describing packets. When we refer to 'tunneling packets' we refer to the outer packet header that provides the tunneling function. When we refer to 'tunneled packets' we refer to the inner packet, i.e. the packet being carried in the tunnel.
1.2. Problem Statement

The argument made by the draft authors is that since in the case of AMT multicast packets already have a UDP header with a checksum, there is no additional benefit and indeed some cost to nodes to both compute and check the UDP checksum of the outer (encapsulating) header. Consequently, IPv6 should make an exception to the rule that the UDP checksum MUST not be 0, and allow tunneling protocols to set the checksum field of the outer header only to 0 and skip both the sender and receiver computation.

1.3. Discussion

The draft [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero] does an excellent job of discussing all the issues related to allowing UDP over IPv6 to have a valid checksum of zero. We will not repeat that work here.

In Section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero], the authors propose nine (9) constraints on the usage of a zero checksum for UDP over IPv6. We agree with the restrictions proposed, and in fact proposed some of those restrictions ourselves in the previous version of the current draft. These restrictions are incorporated into the proposed changes below.

As has been pointed out in [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero] and in many mailing lists, there is still the possibility of deep-inspection firewall devices or other middleboxes actually checking the UDP checksum field of the outer packet and discarding the tunneling packets. This is would be an issue also for legacy systems which have not implemented the change in the IPv6 specification. So in any case, there may be packet loss of lightweight tunneling packets because of mixed new-rule and old-rule nodes.

As an example, we discuss how can errors be detected and handled in a lightweight UDP tunneling protocol when the checksum protection is disabled. Note that other (non-tunneling) protocols may have different approaches. We suggest that the following could be an approach to this problem:

- Context (i.e. tunneling state) should be established via application PDUs that are carried in checksummed UDP packets. That is, any control packets flowing between the tunnel endpoints should be protected by UDP checksums. The control packets can also contain any negotiation that is necessary to set up the endpoint/adapters to accept UDP packets with a zero checksum.

- Only UDP packets containing tunneled packets should have a UDP checksum equal to zero.
- UDP keep-alive packets with checksum zero can be sent to validate paths, given that paths between tunnel endpoints can change and so middleboxes in the path may vary during the life of the association. Paths with middleboxes that are intolerant of a UDP checksum of zero will drop the keep-alives and the endpoints will discover that. Note that this need only be done per tunnel endpoint pair, not per tunnel context.

- Corruption of the encapsulating IPv6 source address, destination address and/or the UDP source port, destination port fields: If the 9 restrictions in [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero] are followed, the inner packets (tunneled packets) should be protected and run the usual (presumably small) risk of having undetected corruption(s). If lightweight tunneling protocol contexts contain (at a minimum) source and destination IP addresses and source and destination ports, there are 16 possible corruption outcomes. We note that not only are these outcomes not equally likely, most require multiple bit errors with errored bits in separate fields. The possible corruption outcomes fall out this way:

  * Half of the 16 possible corruption combinations have a corrupted destination address. If the incorrect destination is reached and the node doesn’t have an application for the destination port, the packet will be dropped. If the application at the incorrect destination is the same lightweight tunneling protocol and if it has a matching context (we assume a very small probability event) the inner packet will be decapsulated and forwarded. If it is some other application, with very high probability, the application will not recognize the contents of the packet.

  * Half of the 8 possible corruption combinations with a correct destination address have a corrupted source address. If the tunnel contexts contain all elements of the address-port 4-tuple, then the likelihood is that this corruption will be detected.

  * Of the remaining 4 possibilities, with valid source and destination IPv6 addresses, 1 has all 4 fields valid, the other three have one or both ports corrupted. Again, if the tunneling endpoint context contains sufficient information, these error should be detected with high probability.

- Corruption of source-fragmented encapsulating packets: In this case, a tunneling protocol may reassemble fragments associated with the wrong context at the right tunnel endpoint, or it may reassemble fragments associated with a context at the wrong tunnel endpoint, or corrupted fragments may be reassembled at the right
context at the right tunnel endpoint. In each of these cases, the IPv6 length of the encapsulating header may be checked (though [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero] points out the weakness in this check). In addition, if the encapsulated packet is protected by a transport (or other) checksum, these errors can be detected (with some probability).

While this is not a perfect solution, it can reduce the risks of relaxing the UDP checksum requirement for IPv6.

1.4. Recommended Solution

There is a need that a UDP checksum of zero could be allowed on the outer encapsulating packet of a lightweight tunneling protocol. This would imply that UDP endpoints handling that protocol must change their behavior and not discard UDP packets received with a 0 checksum on the outer packet. We also recommend that the constraints in Section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero] be adopted.

Specifically, this draft proposes that the text in [RFC2460] Section 8.1, 4th bullet be amended. We refer to the following text:

"Unlike IPv4, when UDP packets are originated by an IPv6 node, the UDP checksum is not optional. That is, whenever originating a UDP packet, an IPv6 node must compute a UDP checksum over the packet and the pseudo-header, and, if that computation yields a result of zero, it must be changed to hex FFFF for placement in the UDP header. IPv6 receivers must discard UDP packets containing a zero checksum, and should log the error."

This item should be taken out of the bullet list and should be modified as follows:

Whenever originating a UDP packet, an IPv6 node SHOULD compute a UDP checksum over the packet and the pseudo-header, and, if that computation yields a result of zero, it must be changed to hex FFFF for placement in the UDP header. IPv6 receivers SHOULD discard UDP packets containing a zero checksum, and SHOULD log the error. However, some protocols, such as lightweight tunneling protocols that use UDP as a tunnel encapsulation, MAY omit computing the UDP checksum of the encapsulating UDP header and set it to zero, subject to the following constraints (from [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero]). In cases, where the encapsulating protocol uses a zero checksum for UDP, the receiver of packets in the allowed port range MUST NOT discard packets with a UDP checksum of zero. Note that these constraints apply only to encapsulating protocols that omit calculating the UDP checksum and set it to zero. An encapsulating protocol can always choose to
compute the UDP checksum, in which case, its behavior should be as specified above.

1. IPv6 protocol stack implementations SHOULD NOT by default allow the new method. The default node receiver behaviour MUST discard all IPv6 packets carrying UDP packets with a zero checksum.

2. Implementations MUST provide a way to signal the set of ports that will be enabled to receive UDP datagrams with a zero checksum. An IPv6 node that enables reception of UDP packets with a zero-checksum, MUST enable this only for a specific port or port-range. This may be implemented via a socket API call, or similar mechanism.

3. RFC 2460 specifies that IPv6 nodes should log UDP datagrams with a zero-checksum. This should remain the case for any datagram received on a port that does not explicitly enable zero-checksum processing. A port for which zero-checksum has been enabled MUST NOT log the datagram.

4. A stack may separately identify UDP datagrams that are discarded with a zero checksum. It SHOULD NOT add these to the standard log, since the endpoint has not been verified.

5. UDP Tunnels that encapsulate IP MUST rely on the inner packet integrity checks provided that the tunnel will not significantly increase the rate of corruption of the inner IP packet. If a significantly increased corruption rate can occur, then the tunnel MUST provide an additional integrity verification mechanism. An integrity mechanism is always recommended at the tunnel layer to ensure that corruption rates of the inner most packet are not increased.

6. Tunnels that encapsulate Non-IP packets MUST have a CRC or other mechanism for checking packet integrity, unless the Non-IP packet specifically is designed for transmission over lower layers that do not provide any packet integrity guarantee. In particular, the application must be designed so that corruption of this information does not result in accumulated state or incorrect processing of a tunneled payload.

7. UDP applications that support use of a zero-checksum, SHOULD NOT rely upon correct reception of the IP and UDP protocol information (including the length of the packet) when decoding
and processing the packet payload. In particular, the application must be designed so that corruption of this information does not result in accumulated state or incorrect processing of a tunneled payload.

8. If a method proposes recursive tunnels, it MUST provide guidance that is appropriate for all use-cases. Restrictions may be needed to the use of a tunnel encapsulations and the use of recursive tunnels (e.g. Necessary when the endpoint is not verified).

9. IPv6 nodes that receive ICMPv6 messages that refer to packets with a zero UDP checksum MUST provide appropriate checks concerning the consistency of the reported packet to verify that the reported packet actually originated from the node, before acting upon the information (e.g. validating the address and port numbers in the ICMPv6 message body).

Middleboxes MUST allow IPv6 packets with UDP checksum equal to zero to pass. Implementations of middleboxes MAY allow configuration of specific port ranges for which a zero UDP checksum is valid and may drop IPv6 UDP packets outside those ranges.

1.5. Additional Observations

The persistence of this issue among a significant number of protocols being developed in the IETF requires a definitive policy. The authors would like to make the following observations:

- An empirically-based analysis of the probabilities of packet corruptions (with or without checksums) has not (to our knowledge) been conducted since about 2000. It is now 2010. We strongly suggest that an empirical study is in order, along with an extensive analysis of IPv6 header corruption probabilities.

- A key cause of this issue generally is the lack of protocol support in middleboxes. Specifically, new protocols, such as DCCP, are being forced to use UDP tunnels just to traverse an end-to-end path successfully and avoid having their packets dropped by middleboxes. If this were not the case, the use of UDP-lite might become more viable for some (but not necessarily all) lightweight tunneling protocols.

- Another cause of this issue is that the UDP checksum is overloaded with the task of protecting the IPv6 header for UDP flows (as it the TCP checksum for TCP flows). Protocols that do not use a pseudo-header approach to computing a checksum or CRC have
essentially no protection from misdelivered packets. We suggest that decoupling IPv6 header protection from transport generally should be studied in this workgroup. One approach might be to consider an extension header for IPv6 containing (at least) a header checksum. However, that is beyond the scope of this draft.

2. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request of IANA.

Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an RFC.

3. Security Considerations

It is of course less work to generate zero-checksum attack packets than ones with full UDP checksums. However, this does not lead to any significant new vulnerabilities as checksums are not a security measure and can be easily generated by any attacker, as properly configured tunnels should check the validity of the inner packet and perform any needed security checks, regardless of the checksum status, and finally as most attacks are generated from compromised hosts which automatically create checksummed packets (in other words, it would generally be more, not less, effort for most attackers to generate zero UDP checksums on the host).

4. Acknowledgements

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5. Normative References


[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate


Authors’ Addresses

Marshall Eubanks
Iformata Communications

Phone: +1-703-501-4376
Fax:
Email: marshall.eubanks@iformata.com
URI:

P.F. Chimento
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
11100 Johns Hopkins Road
Laurel, MD 20723
USA

Phone: +1-443-778-1743
Fax:
Email: Philip.Chimento@jhuapl.edu
URI: