


TCP-AO Crypto Goo


IETF74

Monday, March 23, 2009


Gregory M. Lebovitz
Juniper
gregory.ietf@gmail.com



Intellectual Property




- No IPR on this document about which I'm aware.



Current Requirements


Requirement	Authentication Algorithm
MUST -	HMAC-SHA-1-96 [RFC2404]
SHOULD +	AES-128-CMAC-96 [RFC4493]
Requirement	Key Derivation Function (KDF)
MUST -	KDF_HMAC_SHA1
SHOULD +	KDF_AES_128_CMAC



Key Derivation Function

Derived_Key =
KDF(Master_Key, Input, Output_Length)


- Master_Key - PSK in manual key mode
- Input See next slide



KDF's “Input”


(i || Label || 0x00 || Context || Output_Length)

- i: A counter,
- Label: ASCII string "TCP-AO" (FIPS140 conformance)
- 0x00: Eight zero bits, or 0 represented in byte form
- Context : Conn_Block
- Output_Length: in bits, of the key that the KDF will produce.



KDF_HMAC_SHA1


- PRF: HMAC-SHA1 [RFC2404]
- Input:
 - i: "0" [ASCII "0" (0x30) or a NUL (0x00)?]
 - Label: "TCP-AO"
 - Context: Conn_Block
 - Output_Length 160
 - Result: Conn_Key



KDF_AES_128_CMAC

- PRF: AES-CMAC-PRF-128 [RFC4615]
- Input:
 - i: "0" [ASCII "0" (0x30) or a NUL (0x00)?]
 - Label: "TCP-AO"
 - Context: Conn_Block
 - Output_Length 128
- And ... (see next slide)


Make sure you get a 128bit input to AES-128



- Input: MK (variable len Master_Key)
- Output: TK (128 bit output of the KDF, Traffic_Key)
- Step 1: $K := \text{AES-CMAC}(0^{128}, \text{MK}, \text{MKlen})$;
- Step 2: $\text{TK} := \text{AES-CMAC}(K, I, \text{len})$;
- Done only once at very beginning of connection, then used for all keys gen'd for that connection.

Issues


ID#1 – Reqs




- SHOULD +, MUST – bad idea. Use:
 - HMAC-SHA1 in both MUST
 - AES-128-CMAC in both cases SHOULD
- WG: Decide and move on.

Issues

ID#2 – Labels, Ditch them?




- Pro:
 - Be forward looking. Will be needed once we get to using a KMP (down the road) and PSK, vs PKI and new KDF's get defined as time goes on.
- Con:
 - We only have manual keying and 2 KDF's now. Don't introduce complexity until it's absolutely needed.



Others

- 3.1 Clarify Output length stuff with text provide.
- Clean up text explaining KDF_AES_128_CMAC
- Change Conn_key to Traffic_Key throughout




Wrap Up

- Accept as WG document?
- More review from crypto community

GOAL

- | | |
|---------------|--------|
| • Get reviews | May 1 |
| • WG Rev-00 | May 15 |
| • Go to WG LC | June 1 |

Advertisement: KMART Roadmap



draft-lebovitz-kmart-roadmap-01

(<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lebovitz-kmart-roadmap-01>)

- Goal: Improve security of routing protocol transports by beefing up authentication/integrity
- How:
 - Step 1 - Improve existing manual key mechanisms for “modern” practice
 - Step 2 – Add automatic key management protocol to make operations easier
- Where: kmart@ietf.org

Feedback?

