

# Host Identifier Revocation in HIP

draft-zhang-hip-hi-revocation-00

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# Background

- The security strength of cryptographic keys is a critical factor affecting the capability of a security mechanism (e.g., HIP) in tolerating attacks.
- After HIP has been in use for a certain period, the strength of keys will be reduced
- Key revocation mechanisms are then needed for HIP

# Key Revocation in HIP

- Essential objectives of key revocation includes:
  - Discarding obsolete keys
  - Using newly generated keys to take place of obsolete ones
  - Prevent attackers from taking advantages of revoked keys
- Transient key revocation has been achieved in HIP basic exchange. However, many issues with HI revocation are left for further exploration

# HI Revocation in HIP

- **An HI revocation mechanism for HIP needs to:**
  - deal with the lack of trust between communicating HIP hosts
  - support Large amount of HIP hosts
  - be efficient
  - consider HIP-aware middle boxes which are transparent to the HIP-aware systems by design

# Motivation

- Analyze different key revocation solutions and find out their advantages and limits when they are used in HI revocation
- Inspire discussion on the issues with HI revocation

# Implicit HI Revocation

- Implicit key revocation does not need any additional operations to revoke a cryptographic key
  - Associate an HI with a life period, the HI is discarded when the period expires
- Candidate Solutions:
  - Self-signing certificates — only work when communicating hosts trust each other
  - PGP style solutions — low efficient
  - PKI style solutions — lack successful examples of global deployment before

# Explicit HI Revocation

- Explicit HI Revocation without Third Parties
  - It is efficient, if a host only has a small group of collaborating partners and the relationship between the host and its partners is stable
- Explicit HI Revocation with Third Parties
  - Delegate revoking operations to trusted third parties
  - Enable both the “pull” and “push” modes
  - DNS, RVS, PKI can be candidates

# Conclusion

- An HI revocation mechanism should enable both implicit and explicit key revocation
- There is no silver bullet in HI revocation
- We need to find a tradeoff between security and performance

# Next Step

- Analyzing issues introduced by middle-boxes which are transparent to HIP hosts
- Analyzing security requirements to resolution systems introduced by HI revocation
- Looking for co-authors

Any Comments?