

The RPKI & Origin Validation

sidr - Stockholm

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

Rob Austein <sra@isc.org>

<<http://archive.psg.com/090730.sidr-rpki.pdf>>






Origin Validation

- Prevent YouTube incident
- Prevent 7007 accident
- Prevents most accidental announcements
- Does not prevent malicious path attacks such as the Kapela/Pilosov attack
- That requires "Path Validation" and locking the data plane to the control plane, the next steps

[Hardware]
Signing Module





RPKI Engine




Prototype of Basic Back End

IR Back End



Business Key/Cert Management


Distributed RPKI DataBase




*A Player (CA) Publishes
All Certificates Which
They Generate
in Their Own Unique
Publication Point*

RCynic Cache Gatherer

(cynical rsync)




Reliability Issue



Expensive
To Fetch &
Unreliable

Reliability Via Hosted Publication




Reducing the
Number of Publication
Points Makes RSync
Much More Efficient


Allocation in Reality




My Infrastructure



BGP Cust




Static (non BGP) Cust




Unused

ROA Use




Customer ROAs

I Generate for
'Lazy' Customer




My Infrastructure



BGP Cust




Static (non BGP) Cust




Unused

RPKI -> Router


The Fourth Protocol
(origin validation only)




Typical Exchange




Serial Query



IPv4 Prefix



IPv6 Prefix



End of Data

