Internationalization in Names and Other Identifiers

IAB

Goals

- The plenary's goal is to inform the community
 - Internationalization is often understood by a relatively small number of experts, but affects a large number of protocols
- IAB draft contains some recommendations regarding choice of encodings
 - draft-iab-idn-encoding-01.txt still in progress
- More work is needed and should continue

Why is Internationalization Important and Timely?

Introduction

 Names can have non-ASCII characters and are embedded in various ways:

```
    Hostname / IDN: café.com
    (Internationalized Domain Name)
```

– Email: 例え@テスト.com

- URL (actually IRI): http://مثال إختبار //
 - (Internationalized Resource Identifier)
- UNC path: \例えテスト\public\file.doc
 (Universal Naming Convention = file paths common in Windows-based environments)
- Users want to browse the web, etc. in their own language
 - Imagine typing in a name in a script & language you don't know

Situation Today/Soon

- China uses IDNs for all govt. sites and has IDN TLDs (.中国, .公司 and .网络)
 - But are not in the public root today
- 35.2% of Taiwan domains are IDNs
- 13.7% of Korean domains are IDNs
- Vocal demand from the Arabic-script world
- ICANN is expected to start issuing IDN country-code Top Level Domains soon

Introduction and Terminology

Some Unicode Terminology

- Unicode: A set of integer code points
 in the range 1 1,114,111 (1 0x10FFFF)
 where each code point represents (with some
 exceptions) a human-meaningful visual "character"
- UTF-32: Each Unicode integer code point stored using a single 32-bit integer (so endianness matters)
- **UTF-16:** Each Unicode integer code point encoded using one or two 16-bit integers (so endianness matters)
- **UTF-8:** Each Unicode integer code point encoded using one to four 8-bit integers (so no endianness problems)

RFC 2277: IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages

January 1998

Protocols MUST be able to use the UTF-8 charset

UTF-8

- Code points 0x00 0x7F same as ASCII
 - Code points 0x00 0x7F encoded using octet values 0x00 – 0x7F
 - So all current 7-bit ASCII files are also valid UTF-8
 - with the same meaning
 - Existing files already assigning other meanings to octet values 0x80 - 0xFF (e.g. ISO 8859-1) are not automatically compatible
- Higher code points use multi-octet sequences
 - Multi-octet sequences use octet values 0x80 0xF4

UTF-8 Multi-Octet Sequences

First octet of

Single octet ASCII character (Code points 1-127)

2, 3, 4-octet sequences

Continuation octets of multi-octet sequences

0 X X X X X X X

110XXXXX

10 X X X X X X

1110XXXX

11110XXX

UTF-8 Multi-Octet Sequences

00000 – 0007F	0 X X X X X X			
00080 – 007FF	110XXXX	10XXXXX		
00800 – 0FFFF	1110XXXX	10XXXXX	10XXXXX	
10000 –	11110XXX	10XXXXX	10XXXXX	10XXXXX

UTF-8 Properties

- No mid-string zero octets
- Stateless character boundary detection
 - Robust to insertions, deletions, errors, etc.
- Strong heuristic detection
 - E.g. Any lone octet with top bit set signals text as not valid UTF-8
- Byte-wise, sorts same order as raw Unicode

Compactness:

How many octets does it take to represent a string?

- Everyone creating their own 'optimal' solution (optimal in some specific context) comes at a high price in terms of interoperability
- Relative compactness for different encodings is not nearly as important on today's systems as in the past
 - Text is tiny compared to today's other data:
 - Images, Audio, Video
- Even international text often contains ASCII markup
 - E.g. HTML tags in otherwise international text file

Case Study: Localization Strings in Apple's Mail.app

- /Applications/Mail.app/Contents /Resources/Japanese.lproj/Localizable.strings
- UTF-16: 117,624 bytes
- UTF-8: 68,693 bytes

```
"UNDO_MARK_READ" = "開封済みにする";
```

Punycode

- Used for Internationalized Domain Names
- A method of encoding a string of Unicode integer code points using only the following octet values:
 - > 0x2D
 - \triangleright 0x30 0x39
 - > 0x61 0x7A
- i.e. octet values that, if (mis)interpreted as US ASCII, correspond to the following US ASCII characters:
 - > Hyphen
 - \triangleright Digits 0-9
 - ➤ Letters a z

A Question of Interpretation: ASCII or not?



A Question of Interpretation: ASCII or not?

XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	(XXXX	xxxxxxxxxxx	XXXX	(XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	xxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxx	(XXXX	xxxxxxxxxx	xxxx	(XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	xxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxx	(XXXX	xxxxxxxxxx	xxxx	(XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	xxxxxxxxxxx
XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	xxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXX	(XXXX	xxxxxxxxxxx	XXXX	«xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxx
XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	xxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXX	(XXXX	xxxxxxxxxxx	XXXX	«xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxx
XXXXXXXXX								XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX							CX	XXXXXXXXXXX
xxxxxxxx		xxxxx	xxxx			X	xxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx
XXXXXXXX		XXXXX	XXXXXX			X:	CXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX		XXXXX	XXXXXX			X:	CXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX		XXXXX	XXXXXX			X:	XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
xxxxxxxx	x	XXXXX	xxxxx			X	CXXXXXXX	xxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxx	XXXXX	XXXXX	xxxx		ХX	X	CXXXXXXX	xxxxxxxxxx
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXX	XXXX	X	XXXX	X:	CXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXX	XXXX >	(XXXX	XXXXXXX	XXX	CXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXX	XXXX	XXX	XXXXXXXX	XXX	CXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXX	XXXX	XXX	XXXXXXXX	XXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	xxxxxxx	XXXX	X:	XXXXXXXXXX	XXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXX	XX	:	XXXXXXXXXXX	XXX	KXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXX	XX		XXXXXXXXXXX	XXXX	XXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXX	XXXXXXX	XX		XXXXXXXXXXX	XXXX	XXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXX	xxxxxxx	xx		XXXXXXXXX	XXXX	XXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXX	xxxxxxx	xx		XXXXXX	XXXX	KXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXX	XXXXXXX	XXXX		XXXXXX	XXXX	KXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXX	XXXXXXX	XXXX		XXXXX	XXXX	KXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXX	XXXXXXX	XXXXXX		XXXXX	XXXX	KXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXX	XXXXXXX	XXXXXX		XXXXX	XXXX	CXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX		XXXXXXX					CXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX			XXXXXXXX		***************************************		CXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXXX	xxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXX	CX	XXXXXXXX	XXXX	KXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXX	CXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX		XXXXXX		xxxxxxxxxxx	х	xxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxx
XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXX	Α.	XXXXXX		XXXXXXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXX
xxxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXXXXXX		XXX		xxxxxxxxxx		xxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXXXX				xxxxxxxxx		XXXXXX	xxxxxxxxxx
	XXXXXXXXXXXXX)		XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX		xxxx	XXXXXXXXXXX
xxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxx		2	(XXXX	XXXXXXX			xxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxx	XXXXXXX				XXXXXX			xxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxx	xxx			xxx	xxxx			xxxxxxxxxx
XXXXXXXXX					xx		xxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxx
XXXXXXXXX								xxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxx								xxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxx								xxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxx								xxxxxxxxx
XXXXXXXXX							***************************************	XXXXXXX

XX		xxxxxxx				
XXXXXX		xxxxxxxxxx	XXX			
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx		XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	xxx			
xxxxxxxxxx		xxxxxxxxxx				
xxxxxxxxxx		xxxxxxxxxx				
xxxxxxxxxx	ĸ	xxxxxxxx	XXXX			
xxxxxxxxx	K		xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx			
xxxxxxxxx			xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx			
xxxxxxxxxx			xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx			
xxxxxxxxx			xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx			
xxxxxxxxx	XXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	xxxxxxxxx			
xxxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX			
XXXXXXXX		xxxxxxxxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXXX			
xxxxxxxxx		xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxx			
xxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxx	xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxx			
xxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxx	xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx			
xxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	XXXXX XXXXXXXXX	x xxxxxxxxxx			
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxx xxxx	xxxx xxxxxx	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX			
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx			XXXXXXXXXXXXXX			
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx			XXXXXXXXXXXX			
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx			XXXXXXXXXXXX			
	XXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXXXXXX			
XXXXXX		xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx				
XXXXXX		***************************************				
XXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX				
xxxxxxxxx		xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX			
xxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	XXXXX		
xxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	XXX		
xxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxxxx	x		
xxxxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXXX			
			xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx			
******************			KXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX			
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX			
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	xxxxxxxx	XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX			
*******		******				
			XXXXXXXXX			
		XXXXXXXX	xxxxxxxxx			
		xxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxx			
	xxxxxxx	xxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxx			
***************************************	XXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXX			
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX			
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX	NAMALALAKAN NAMANANAKAN NAMANAKANA NAMANAKANA NAMANAKAN NAMANAKAN NAMANAKANA NAMANAKANA			
**************************************	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX			
**************************************	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX	MANAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAM			
**************************************	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX	MANAGEMENTA MANA MANAGEMENTA MANA MANAGEMENTA MANA MANAGEMENTA MANA MANAGEMENTA MANA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAG			
**************************************	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX	MANAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAMAM			
**************************************	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX	MANAMATAN MANA MANAMATAN MANAMA			
**************************************	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX	MANAGEMENT AND			
**************************************	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	NAMANANA NAMANANANANANANANANANANANANANAN	MANAMANANANANANANANANANANANANANANANANAN			
**************************************	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	NAMES AND ASSESSED AS A SECOND	MANAGEMENTA MANA MANAGEMENTA MANA MANAGEMENTA MANA MANAGEMENTA MANA MANAGEMENTA MANA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAGEMENTA MANAG			

A Question of Interpretation: ASCII or not?

XXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXX	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXX	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXX	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXX	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXX	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX				
XXXXXXXXX				XX
XXXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX	X	XXXXXXXXXX		XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXXXXX	XX	XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX

Today's Text Chaos


Technical Details

- Stackable ¿ Easily stacks with the Apple Mac mini and Airport Extreme or additional Iomega MiniMax hard drives
- . Secure ¿ Micro security slot designed to allow drive to be anchored to a desk
- Convenient ¿ FireWire 1394a 3-port repeater/hub

Technical Details

- Stackable ¿ Easily stacks with the A
- Secure ¿ Micro security slot designe
- Convenient & FireWire 1394a 3-port

Today's Text Chaos





IDNs in Other Identifiers

There can be many ways to get to the same file. For example...

Using HTTP:

- http://dthαler/Public/test.htm
- 2. http://xn--dthler-rxe/Public/test.htm
- 3. http://dth%CE%B1ler/Public/test.htm
- 4. http://dthαler/Public/test.htm

Using CIFS/SMB (file system protocols using UNC):

- 1. file://dthαler/Public/test.htm
- 2. file://xn--dthler-rxe/Public/test.htm
- 3. file://dth%CE%B1ler/Public/test.htm
- 4. file://dthα:ler/Public/test.htm
- \\dthαler\Public\test.htm
- 6. \\xn--dthler-rxe\Public\test.htm

Plenary Announcement to ietf-announce@ietf.org

smooth and interoperable functioning
 of the Internet depends on text strings
 being interpreted in the same way
 by all systems connected to it.

How Many Layers of Encoding?

How do we encode:

 A domain name...
 in an email address...
 in a "mailto" URL...
 in a web page?

- Do we use:
 - Punycode ("xn--...") encoding for the domain name?
 - Email Quoted-Printable ("=XX") encoding?
 - URL percent ("%XX") escaping?
 - HTML ampersand ("&#xxxx;") codes?
- All of the above?

IDNs in Email

- Two test emails
- From: user@chεshίrε stuartcheshire.org
- In each email, address appears in two places:
 - in "From" line
 - and in body text
- First email encoded IDN using Punycode:
 - -xn--chshr-38d3be
- Second email encoded IDN using direct UTF-8
 - cheshíre

Punycode Email

Subject: Punycode

From: user@xn--chshr-38d3be.stuartcheshire.org

The "From" address for this email was "user@xn--chshr-38d3be.stuartcheshire.org" (i.e. using punycode encoding)_

Header

UTF-8 Email

Subject: UTF-8

From: user@chεshίrε.stuartcheshire.org

The "From" address for this email was "user@chɛshírɛ.stuartcheshire.org" (i.e. using direct UTF-8 encoding)

Punycode Email: xn--chshr-38d3be

Client	From (Punycode)	Body (Punycode)
Gmail / IE	xnchshr-38d3be	xnchshr-38d3be
Gmail / Firefox 3	xnchshr-38d3be	xnchshr-38d3be
Apple Mail	xnchshr-38d3be	xnchshr-38d3be
Penelope	xnchshr-38d3be	xnchshr-38d3be
Mulberry 4.08	xnchshr-38d3be	xnchshr-38d3be
Thunderbird 2.0.0.16	xnchshr-38d3be	xnchshr-38d3be
Eudora 6 on Mac OS X	xnchshr-38d3be	xnchshr-38d3be
Lotus Notes 7.03 & 8.01	xnchshr-38d3be	xnchshr-38d3be
Outlook 2007	cheshíre	xnchshr-38d3be
Outlook E-Mail (WM6)	xnchshr-38d3be	xnchshr-38d3be
Outlook Web Access / IE	xnchshr-38d3be	xnchshr-38d3be

UTF-8 Email: cheshίrε

Client	From (UTF-8)

Gmail / IE xn--chshr-38d3be

Gmail / Firefox 3 xn--chshr-38d3be

Apple Mail cheshire

Penelope cheshire

Mulberry 4.08 cheshire

Thunderbird 2.0.0.16 cheshire

Eudora 6 on Mac OS X chîµshî rîµ

Lotus Notes 7.03 & 8.01 chîµshî rîµ

Outlook 2007 ch??sh??r??

Outlook E-Mail (WM6 ch??sh??r??

Outlook Web Access / IE ch??sh??r??

Body (UTF-8)

cheshire

More Terminology in this Presentation

- Mapping: converting one string to another "equivalent" string
 - "CONTOSO.com" ⇒ "contoso.com"
- Matching: checking two strings for equivalence
 - "CONTOSO.com" ~ "contoso.COM"
 - "möhringen.de" ≠ "moehringen.de"
- Sorting: determining which string comes first
 - "contoso.com" < "Microsoft.com"</p>
- Encoding: same string can be encoded in different ways
 - including issues of combining characters: é vs e + ´

IDN Identifier Space

IDNA-valid string:

no invalid characters, legal length, etc.

• **U-label:** a Unicode IDNA-valid string

• A-label: "xn--" followed by

Punycode-encoded IDNA-valid string

More Variety Brings More Ambiguity

Computer Systems: 2 (binary)

Telephone Numbers: 10 (0-9)

ASCII Domain Names: 37 (A-Z, 0-9, -)

International Domain Names: Tens of thousands

Matching

Confusable Strings (1/4)

Two strings that are easily confused by a human

ETHIOPIA.com ← ETHIOPIA.com More confusion

Greek alphabet! Plain "ASCII" confusion

- Lower-casing will reveal the ETHIOPIA issue
 - ετηιορια is fairly distinctive
 - current trend is to deprecate upper-case and other mapping-required forms in IRIs etc.
 - IDNA2008 treats these characters as DISALLOWED

Confusable Strings (2/4)

Another example:



- "jessica" actually uses Cyrillic characters from two separate languages
 - A registry may restrict registrations to only characters in their language
- Other examples exist without mixing languages
 - epoxy.py ← epoxy.py

Confusable Strings (3/4)

- People see what they expect to see
 - Russian restaurant: "ресторан"
 - Non-Russians might read "pectopah"
- Given sufficiently creative use of fonts forced by style sheets etc., confusion can be easy

It Depends on What You Know – and Expect



Is the second character "A"? If you were not familiar with Latin script, or didn't know what to expect, would you be sure? Could it be a star of some sort? Are you sure that the first character is an ASCII dot (the DNS cares – a lot)?



Are these two strings identical?
Are you sure? Would you be sure if you didn't know Latin script or the organization involved?

Confusable Strings (4/4)

- Other kinds of "equivalence" equality in some contexts
- 中国 and 中國 Two code points, same concept
- السعودية and السعودية Two code points for same letter (more or less)

Are the Following Equivalent?

Arabic-Indic

Eastern Arabic-Indic

Chinese Suzhou

European (ASCII)

Devanagari (Hindi)

Tibetan

Tamil

. 1 7 7 2 0 7 7 1 9

· 1 7 7 7 0 9 V A 9

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

०१२३४५६७८९

0123046046

0 க உ ௩ ச (ந கூ எ அ கூ

"Suspect" Names

- Potential for phishing attacks
 - but could be innocent or accidental
- Names with scripts not used by the user's locale
- Names with mixed scripts (e.g. Cyrillic + Latin)
- UI might want to warn the user when displaying any of these from an untrusted source
 - Some browsers display A-labels ("xn--...") in address bar, but that confuses humans

Universal Confusable String

- Few user systems have all possible characters and display fonts for them installed.
- If character cannot be represented locally, a six-character string might appear as
 - ? ? ? ? ? ? or- □ □ □ □ □ □
- This should be a warning (but remember what users do when they see a warning they don't understand)

Mapping

Why Mapping?

- Instead of intelligent matching algorithm:
 - Map each string to a defined canonical form
 - Simple test if canonical forms are bitwise identical
 - Does not permit "close enough" or other fuzzy matching
- Conversion of one visual form to another that is more locally understandable
 - E.g. Traditional Chinese (中國)to Simplified (中国)

Mapping


- Mapping inherently loses information
 - Case conversion, half/full width, NFC/NFKC/etc
- Upper/lower casing differs by language
- tolower('l') = ???
- toupper('i') = ???
- tolower(toupper('ı')) ≠ 'ı'
- Turks aren't too happy about this...

Mapping


- Summary:
 - Never roll your own mapping
 - Correct mapping for user depends on language context, which we often don't know

Encodings draft-iab-idn-encoding-01.txt

(Over) Simplified Architecture



Realistic Network Architecture



Other Name Resolution Protocols

- Many defined to use the same syntax
 - Hosts file, DNS, mDNS, NetBIOS-over-TCP, etc.
- Name resolution library decides what protocols to try in what order
 - Apps cannot tell from the name what protocols will be used for resolution
 - Different libraries may use different order and hence find different name targets
- Different protocols specify use of different encodings
 - Apps cannot tell what encodings will be needed for resolution

What's a Legal Name?

- In 1985, RFC 952 defined the format of the hosts file:
 - "Internet host/net/gateway/domain name"
 contains ASCII letters, digits, hyphens (LDH)
- In 1989, RFC 1035 defined DNS:
 - "Preferred name syntax": LDH
 - But does "preferred" mean MAY/SHOULD/MUST?

Legal DNS Names

- In 1997, RFC 2181 clarified:
 - Any binary string whatever can be used as the label of any resource record
 - Any binary string can serve as the value of any record that includes a domain name
 - Applications can have restrictions imposed on what particular values are acceptable in their environment
- Same year:
 - IETF policy on character sets and languages...

IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages (RFC 2277)

- It says:
 - Protocols MUST be able to use the UTF-8 charset
 - Protocols MAY specify, in addition, how to use other charsets or other character encoding schemes
 - Using a default other than UTF-8 is acceptable
- Silent on different *forms* within UTF-8 (e.g. case, encoding of combining characters, sort order)
 - Two Unicode strings often cannot be compared to yield results users expect without additional processing
- Per RFC 2181, DNS complies

Use of Different Encodings in DNS

- Starting that year (1997), some systems began using UTF-8 in DNS in private name spaces
 - Private name space here means names are not resolvable from outside the specific network
- About five years later, IDNA development (including Punycode) began for use in the public DNS name space

Length Issues


- DNS names have
 - 63 octets per label
 - 255 octets per name (not counting zero at the end)
- Most application APIs use NULL-terminated strings
- Non-ASCII characters use a variable number of octets in UTF-8, UTF-16 and Punycode
 - 256 UTF-16 octets ≠ 256 UTF-8 octets ≠ 256 A-label octets
- Some names can be represented (within length) in Punycode A-labels but not in UTF-8
- Some names can be represented (within length) in UTF-8 but not in Punycode A-labels

Let's Recap Where We Are...

- Multiple encodings of same Unicode characters:
 - U-labels: مثال .إختبار
 - A-labels: xn--mgbh0f.xn--kgbechtv
- Different encodings used:
 - By different protocols
 - On different networks with DNS
 - Punycode A-labels used on Internet, UTF-8 in intranets
 - By different applications
- Results:
 - Failure or worse launching one app from another
 - Competitor switching incentives, and poor user experience when one app works and competitor doesn't

Example "IDN-aware" app:

Browser picks encoding based on intranet vs. Internet




Inconsistent Experience Across Applications IDN Aware App Non-IDN Aware App

Non-IDN Aware App ? X Document Workspace name: Open URL Document1 Enter the URL or path to a media file on the Internet. your computer, or your network that you want to play. Location for new workspace: مثال.إختبار//.http مثال.إختبار//:http مثال إختبار //:http مثال إختيار //:http xn--mgbh0fb.xn--kgbechtv مثال. إختبار (UTF-16) Name Resolution Name Resolution مثال. إختبار (UTF-8) xn--mgbh0fb.xn--kgbechtv Phishing attacks possible **IETF 76 Technical Plenary**

Other IDN-Aware Apps

Lack consistency, causing non-deterministic experience



Basic Principle

 Conversion to A-labels, UTF-8, or whatever other encoding, can be done only by an entity that knows which protocol and name space will be used

Hard Issues 1 of 2

- Client has to guess or learn what encoding a {HTTP,DNS,SMTP,...} server expects for an identifier
- Names appear inside many other types of identifiers, e.g. email address, URLs, UNC paths, network access identifiers (NAIs)
 - Each identifier type has its own encoding conventions
 - Today, apps that extract host names need to convert encodings

Hard Issues 2 of 2

- Use of a single encoding is the easy part
 - Sufficient only if the only intent is to display
 - Comparison, matching, lookup, sorting, etc., all require more work.
 - Just as RFC 952 defined an ASCII subset for "hostname" identifiers, we need to define Unicode subsets for other types of identifiers.
- Optimal subset for one protocol may not be optimal for another.
- Interpretation and display of some strings may differ by operating systems – usually a bug, but sometimes no agreement as to which variation is the bug.

Conclusions

- Smooth and interoperable functioning of the Internet depends on text strings being interpreted in the same way by all systems connected to it
- The IETF has recognized this since RFC 20 specified ASCII for use in interchange in 1969 the suggestions in this presentation extend and update that understanding as well as the understanding in RFCs 2277 and 5198

Conclusions

- To avoid confusion and ambiguity,
 it is not enough merely to support UTF-8
 as one of the text encoding options
 - Text in protocols on the wire should be in UTF-8 and only in UTF-8
- For user-visible text in protocols:
 - If you don't use UTF-8, why not?
- For protocol identifiers not seen by users:
 - If you do allow the full Unicode character range, why?