ISMS – SNMP over DTLS

draft-ietf-isms-dtls-tm

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Overview

• Current Status
• Open Issues
• Requirements
Status
Current Status

• Draft -01 published in October
  • (-00 was new since last meeting too)

• WG Last Call
  • Started: Oct 29th
  • Ends: Nov 14th

• Please read the draft and send in comments!
  • Thanks to those that already have done so!
Major Changes Since -(-1)

• MIB Changes
  • Single Fingerprint TC (was 2)
  • SubjectAltName type selection (includes “any”)
  • Added Notifications
    – Server certificate not valid, server authentication failure

• Wording Cleanups
  • Moved TLS/X.509 introduction text to appendices
  • Synchronized further with ISMS' SSH RFC
  • Text changes from readers
Current TLS Vulnerability

- Recent new attack on TLS
  - Uses renegotiation to trick the client and server
  - New man-in-the-middle attack

- Effect on SNMP:
  - Allows attacker to insert arbitrary PDUs into stream
  - Can't see responses though
  - Useful to fake SETs or notifications

- The TLS WG will take care of this
Open Issues
Incoming Connection Refresher

- Client opens (D)TLS Connection
- Client presents X.509 certificate
  - Contains a “subjectAltName” extension
- Server derives the snmpSecurityName from it

- Multiple subjectAltName types:
  - rfc822Name, dNSName, ipAddress, otherName
  - MIB has option for “any” (take the first found)
  - securityName derived from first value of correct type
X.509 Identity / securityName

3 issues:

#1: Client-side Mapping
securityName = “Wes”

#2: Server Sends its Certificate
The Client Ensures it’s Connecting to the Right Server

#3: Server-side Mapping

O = IETF
OU = ISMS
CN = Wes Hardaker
...

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Issue #1: OtherName Mapping

- “OtherName” choice added after last meeting
- Issue with “otherName”:
  - X.509 SubjectName type “OtherName”
  - An arbitrary field to convert to secName
    - ASN.1: SEQUENCE { OBJECT IDENTIFIER, EXPLICIT }
- Choices for mapping to a securityName
  1) Mapping is implementation dependent.
     - Current Draft
  2) OID selector and direct mapping?
  3) Proposal: Don't do OtherName mapping at all
#2: X.509 Certificate Path Validation

- Two choices when doing X.509 Certificate Validation:
  - Direct FingerPrint specifications
  - Full Path Validation to a trust anchor
- WG Decided to:
  - Provide fingerprint mappings
  - Configuration/definition of full Trust Anchor validation and Configuration is out of scope.

- Proposal: I'll try to make this more clear
DTLS Demultiplexing

Software Architecture #1

Software Architecture #2
#3: Keep UDP Session Handling

- Section 5.5.1+ describes demultiplexing UDP
  - Mandates Unique src/dest addr/port combinations
  - Was written because architecture #1 appears common today
    - May not be in the future?
  - Specifies that the demultiplexing EoP are optional
    - IE: it's “Implementation Guidance”

- Proposal: Leave it.
#4: securityName case sensitivity

- When mapping to a security name we should specify case sensitivity
- **Proposal:**
  - IPv6: Lower Case
    - 2002855d18a500050222faafffeff174c
  - dNSName: Lower Case
    - isms.example.com
  - rfc822name: Lower Case
    - wes@example.com
    - (Pasi proposed just the domain name portion, but 5280 says everything)
#5: Port > || < 1024

- Pasi requested we use a port > 1024
- I'm fine with this

- Proposal: Request > 1024 from IANA
#6: 3 TransportDomains/Addresses

- Pasi wondered why:
  - We have 3 Transport Domains
  - We have 3 Transport Addresses with identical text
  - We can't reuse 1 transport address multiple times for the same TransportDomain identifier

- Answer, unfortunately:
  - “Furthermore, MIB authors SHOULD define a separate TransportAddressType or TransportDomain object for each TransportAddress object.”
    -- TransportAddress TC
  - IE: That's the way it's always been done in SMIv2

- **Proposal**: keep as is
#7: FingerPrint Crypto Value

- The current TC text says the Fingerprint shouldn't be used as a comparison alternative
  - IE: you must compare the full presented certificate against the fully stored certificate; not just hashes
- Originally allowed for “cheap” (insecure) fingerprints
  - But now we're using only secure hashes
- **Proposal**: drop the last sentence limiting Fingerprint Usage.
  - IE, allow implementations to just compare hash values
#8: Drop (D)TLS ASIs?

- Draft contains:
  - tlsRead
  - tlsWrite
- I think this derives from early SSH drafts

- Proposal: Not really needed, so drop it.
#9: failure counter in notification

- TLstmServerAuthFailure notification
  - Include TLstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates?

- Proposal: Sure
#10 CreateAndGo vs Active

- Examples currently assume new row creation
  - E.G. sets to createAndGo for creating a row
  - Apparently 3414 uses active instead

- **Proposal**: umm.....
#11: Dead-Peer Detection

- Pasi wondered if we should say something about when one side drops a DTLS connection if the client should try and detect this?
  - But notes that DTLSTM shouldn't know about PDUs
- Draft currently says (section 8):
  
  A "broken" session (one side up and one side down) can result if one side of a session is brought down abruptly (i.e., reboot, power outage, etc.). Whenever possible, implementations SHOULD provide graceful session termination through the use of disconnect messages. Implementations SHOULD also have a system in place for dealing with "broken" sessions.
#12: Fate Sharing

- Currently:
  - Can create TLSTM-MIB entries in advance of TARGET-MIB entries being created
  - When TARGET-MIB entries are deleted, corresponding TLSTM-MIB entries are deleted

- Juergen finds this inconsistent.
  - Second bullet decided in previous WG

- Proposal: leave as is
Questions?