


# SAVI for Delegated IPv6 Prefixes

draft-kaippallimalil-savi-dhcp-pd-00.txt

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July 2009


# Architecture Context \*\*



# Problem Statement

- CPE-R obtains delegated prefix from Access Router using RFC 3633, provides individual prefixes to hosts.  
(CPE-R may also obtain other addresses using SLAAC, DHCP).
- How to validate IPv6 source address of upstream packets initiated by host, forwarded by CPE-R to Access Router (AR).
- Switch (in between CPE-R, AR) may ensure that IPv6 address and lower binding anchor are not spoofed.

# Provider Network Architecture



CPE **Router** forwards  
host packets to  
Access **Router**

SAVI solution in switch to  
prevent host in one customer  
network spoofing host in  
another customer network

# Solution

- Solution based on snooping RFC 3633, builds binding state information  
[section 2.3]
- Determine Prefix ownership:  
Switch snoops RFC 3633 and binds an IPv6 prefix with lower level binding anchor (Line ID, MAC).  
[section 2.4 - 2.6]
- Filter Upstream Traffic:  
Switch inspects upstream traffic based on filtering rules.  
[section 3]

# Solution Applicability

- Proposed solution satisfies Broadband Forum filtering for delegated prefixes:  
“..AN SHOULD inspect upstream and downstream DHCPv6 (RFC3315, RFC3633) and ND (RFC4861, 4862) per user port, discover the mapping of IPv6 prefix to MAC address and populate its IP Anti-spoofing table accordingly” (WT-177)
- Applies to access provider networks, and complies with SAVI scope:  
“...the WG is already chartered to work also on a solution for Ethernet-based broadband access networks that are used in DSL environments.”  
[SAVI Charter]

- Comments?
- Interest to adopt as WG draft?

Thank you