

Some Remarks on ISoc Roundtable

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- RPKI is only known proposal for solidly securing address and routing info (regardless of routing protocol!!! – but protocol needed for *full* benefits)
- policies and implementations need serious attention
- what are threats of directly/indirectly using RPKI info in actual routing?
 - only unexpected invalidation?
- can we convince community to actually go there?
- use practical improvements without or before

some things to do ...

- continue clarifying operator needs...
- minimize threats of unexpected invalidation
 - RIR RPKI policies (CPS +...)
 - control tools for relying parties
 - ??? add info to CRLs???
- how to get folks to create/publish certificates?

... more to do

- software requirements/develop common tools
- plan for
 - origin validation (see draft-ymbk-rpki-rtr-protocol + talk to vendors...)
 - ROA₂RPSL for enhancing routing policies
- describe advanced *practical* deployment