EAP-Only Authentication in IKEv2

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Motivation

- Client auth using certificates is hard to do
- Even server auth requires some provisioning
- IKE shared secret often abused for password authentication
- EAP-only auth is often more practical
  - E.g. EAP-AKA (long shared secret)
  - EAP-EKE, EAP-PWD (password)

- Current IKEv2 requires authentication of the server cert, even when you’re doing EAP
  - Regardless of the assurances of the EAP method
  - AUTH payload in message 4
Proposed Solution

- Prerequisite: a mutual authenticating, key generating EAP method

- Add an `EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION` notification to message 3

- Responder cert is not required, AUTH payloads computed using the EAP MSK

- If the responder does not understand, initiator validates cert-derived AUTH payload as usual (new in -00)
Message Sequence

**Initiator**

1. HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni, [N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP), N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)]
2. HDR, SK { IDi, [IDr], SAi2, TSi, TSr, N(EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION), [CP(CFG_REQUEST)]}
3. HDR, SK {EAP(Response)}
4. HDR, SK {EAP(Response)}
5. HDR, SK {AUTH}

**Responder**

- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ], [N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP), N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)]
- HDR, SK {IDr, EAP(Request)}
- HDR, SK {EAP(Request)}
- HDR, SK {EAP(Success)}
- HDR, SK {AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr, [CP(CFG_REPLY)]}
Channel Binding

- EAP should authenticate the identity of the IKE Responder
  - Otherwise a rogue Access Point can masquerade as a VPN gateway
- This means:
  - The EAP method should be mutually authenticating and key generating (MSK)
  - The EAP exchange should include both parties’ IKE identities
  - These identities should be crypto-bound into MSK
  - We trust the AAA server to include the correct gateway identity in EAP

- Not (yet) discussed in -00
New in -00

- An explicit list (and IANA registry) of allowed EAP methods
  - Non-expert implementers do not have to sift through available methods
  - The list does *not* include any tunneled (X-in-TLS) methods
- Both peers MUST ensure use of legal methods
Thank You!