Simple Security in IPv6 Residential Gateway CPE

draft-ietf-v6ops-cpe-simple-security

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- Applications developers to benefit if vendors of residential CPE have more detailed recommendations.

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- May be deployed by users with no significant expertise in internetworking.
- May be integrated with IPv4/NAT functions that users are familiar with today.
- IPv6 simple security intended to be functionally similar to IPv4/NAT simple security.

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- Some application protocols, e.g. FTP, RTSP, SIP, want transparency helpers. Not discussed in the draft.
- Alternatively, techniques like STUN and TURN will work.
- Hole-punching for passive listeners, i.e. UPnP IGD or its alternatives. Not much in this draft about them.

Special IPv6 Considerations

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- 3-tuple states for unrecognized upper-layer transport.

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- Added a some normative and informative references.
- Many editorial changes.

Open Issues

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- Are there any other remaining troubles?

The IETF Protocol Stack

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

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

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

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