Location Configuration Extensions for Policy Management
draft-barnes-geopriv-policy-uri-02

Abstract

Current location configuration protocols are capable of provisioning an Internet host with a location URI that refers to the host’s location. These protocols lack a mechanism for the target host to inspect or set the privacy rules that are applied to the URIs they distribute. This document extends the current location configuration protocols to provide hosts with a reference to the rules that are applied to a URI, so that the host can view or set these rules.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on May 13, 2011.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.

publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ............................................. 3
2. Definitions ............................................ 4
3. Policy URIs ............................................. 4
   3.1. Policy URI Usage .................................. 4
   3.2. Policy URI Allocation .............................. 5
4. Location Configuration Extensions ...................... 6
   4.1. HELD ............................................. 6
   4.2. DHCP ............................................. 7
5. Examples ................................................ 8
   5.1. HELD ............................................. 8
   5.2. DHCP ............................................. 8
   5.3. Basic access control policy ....................... 9
6. Acknowledgements ........................................ 11
7. IANA Considerations ...................................... 12
   7.1. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
   7.2. XML Schema Registration ............................ 12
   7.3. DHCP LuriType Registration ....................... 13
8. Operational Considerations ............................. 13
9. Security Considerations .................................. 14
   9.1. Integrity and Confidentiality for Authorization Policy
        Data ................................................ 14
   9.2. Access Control for Authorization Policy ............ 14
   9.3. Location URI Allocation ........................... 15
10. References .............................................. 16
   10.1. Normative References ............................... 16
   10.2. Informative References ............................ 17
Authors’ Addresses ........................................... 18
1. Introduction

A critical step in enabling Internet hosts to access location-based services is to provision those hosts with information about their own location. This is accomplished via a Location Configuration Protocol (LCP) [RFC5687], which allows a location provider (e.g., a local access network) to inform a host about its location.

There are two basic patterns for location configuration, namely configuration "by value" and "by reference" [RFC5808]. Configuration by value provisions a host directly with its location, by providing it location information that is directly usable (e.g., coordinates or a civic address). Configuration by reference provides a host with a URI that references the host’s location, i.e., one that can be dereferenced to obtain the location (by value) of the host.

In some cases, location by reference offers a few benefits over location by value. From a privacy perspective, the required dereference transaction provides a policy enforcement point, so that the opaque URI itself can be safely conveyed over untrusted media (e.g., SIP through untrusted proxies [RFC5606]). If the target host is mobile, an application provider can use a single reference to obtain the location of the host multiple times, saving bandwidth to the host. For some configuration protocols, the location object referenced by a location URI provides a much more expressive syntax for location values than the configuration protocol itself (e.g., DHCP geodetic location [I-D.ietf-geopriv-rfc3825bis] versus GML in a PIDF-LO [RFC4119]).

From a privacy perspective, however, current LCPs are limited in their flexibility, in that they do not provide the Device (the client in an LCP) with a way to inform the Location Server with policy for how his location information should be handled. This document addresses this gap by defining a simple mechanism for referring to and manipulating policy, and by extending current LCPs to carry policy references. Using the mechanisms defined in this document, an LCP server (acting for the Location Server) can inform a client as to which policy document controls a given location resource, and the LCP client (in its Rule Maker role) can inspect this document and modify it as necessary.

The remainder of this document is structured as follows: After introducing a few relevant terms, we define policy URIs as a channel for referencing, inspecting, and updating policy documents. We then define extensions to the HELD protocol and the DHCP option for location by reference to allow these protocols to carry policy URIs. Examples are given that demonstrate how policy URIs are carried in these protocols and how they can be used by clients.
2. Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. Policy URIs

A policy URI is an HTTP [RFC2616] URI that identifies a policy resource that contains the authorization policy for a linked location resource. Access to the location resource is governed by the contents of the authorization policy.

A policy URI identifies an HTTP resource that a Rule Maker can use to inspect and install policy documents that tell a Location Server how it should protect the associated location resource. A policy URI always identifies a resource that can be represented as a common-policy document [RFC4745] (possibly including some extensions; e.g., for geolocation policy [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy]).

Note: RFC 3693 [RFC3693] identified the Rule Holder role as the one that stores policy information. In this document, the Location Server is also a Rule Holder.

3.1. Policy URI Usage

A Location Server that is the authority for policy URIs MUST support GET, PUT, and DELETE requests to these URIs, in order to allow clients to inspect, replace, and delete policy documents. Clients support the three request methods as they desire to perform these operations.

Knowledge of the policy URI can be considered adequate evidence of authorization. A Location Server SHOULD allow all requests, but it MAY deny certain requests based on local policy. For instance, a Location Server might allow clients to inspect policy (GET), but not to update it (PUT).

A GET request to a policy URI is a request for the referenced policy information. If the request is authorized, then the Location Server sends an HTTP 200 response containing the complete policy identified by the URI.

A PUT request to a policy URI is a request to replace the current policy. The entity-body of a PUT request includes a complete policy document. When a Location Server receives a PUT request, it MUST validate the policy document included in the body of the request. If
the request is valid and authorized, then the Location Server replaces the current policy with the policy provided in the request.

A DELETE request to a policy URI is a request to delete the referenced policy document and terminate access to the protected resource. If the request is authorized, then the Location Server deletes the policy referenced by the URI and disallows any further access to the location resource it governs.

The Location Server MUST support policy documents in the common-policy format [RFC4745], as identified by the MIME media type of "application/auth-policy+xml". The common-policy format MUST be provided as the default format in response to GET requests that do not include specific "Accept" headers, but content negotiation MAY be used to allow for other formats.

This usage of HTTP is generally compatible with the use of XCAP [RFC4825] or WebDAV [RFC4918] to manage policy documents, but this document does not define or require the use of these protocols.

3.2. Policy URI Allocation

A Location Server creates a policy URI for a specific location resource at the time that the location resource is created; that is, a policy URI is created at the same time as the location URI that it controls. The URI of the policy resource MUST be different to the location URI.

A policy URI is provided to a target device as part of the location configuration process. A policy URI MUST NOT be provided to an entity that is not authorized to view or set policy. A location server that provides a location configuration in addition to other location services (e.g., answering dereferencing requests [I-D.ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol] or requests from third parties [I-D.ietf-geopriv-held-identity-extensions]) MUST only include policy URIs in response to location configuration requests.

Each location URI has either one policy URI or no policy URI. A location server MUST NOT allocate multiple policy URIs controlling the same location URI. The initial policy that is referenced by a policy URI MUST be identical to the policy that would be applied in the absence of a policy URI. A client that does not support policy URIs can continue to use the location URI as they would have if no policy URI were provided.

Without a policy URI, clients have no way to know what this default policy is. The safest assumption for clients is that the default policy grants any request to dereference a location URI,
regardless of the requester’s identity. With a policy URI, a client can ask the server to describe the default policy (with a GET request), or update the policy with a PUT request, prior to distributing the location URI.

A Location Server chooses whether or not to provide a policy URI based on local policy. A HELD-specific extension also allows a requester to specifically ask for a policy URI.

A policy URI is a shared secret between Location Server and its clients. Knowledge of a policy URI is all that is required to perform any operations allowed on the policy. Thus, a policy URI is constructed so that it is hard to predict (see Section 9).

4. Location Configuration Extensions

Location configuration protocols can provision hosts with location URIs that refer to the host’s location. If the target host is to control policy on these URIs, it needs a way to access the policy that the Location Server uses to guide how it serves location URIs. This section defines extensions to LCPs to carry policy URIs that the target can use to control access to location resources.

4.1. HELD

The HELD protocol [I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery] defines a "locationUriSet" element, which contain a set of one or more location URIs that reference the same resource and share a common access control policy. The schema in Figure 1 defines two extension elements for HELD: an empty "requestPolicyUri" element that is added to a location request to indicate that a Device desires that a policy URI be allocated; and a "policyUri" element that is included as a sub-element of the HELD "locationResponse" element.
Figure 1

The URI carried in a "policyUri" element refers to the common access control policy for requests for the target’s location, including dereference requests for location URIs in the location response as well as third-party requests. The URI MUST be a policy URI as described in Section 3. A policy URI MUST use the "http:" or "https:" scheme, and the Location Server MUST support the specified operations on the URI.

A HELD request MAY contain an explicit request for a policy URI. The presence of the "requestPolicyUri" element in a location request indicates that a policy URI is desired. A location server may provide a policy URI regardless of the presence of this element.

4.2. DHCP

The DHCP location by reference option [I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option] provides location URIs in sub-options called LuriElements. This document defines a new LuriElement type for policy URIs.

LuriType=TBD Policy-URI - This is a policy URI that refers to the access control policy for the location URIs.

[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please replace TBD above with the assigned LuriType value and remove this note]

A Policy-URI LuriElement uses a UTF-8 character encoding.

A Policy-URI LuriElement identifies the policy resource for all location URIs included in the location URI option. The URI MUST be a policy URI as described in Section 3: It MUST use either the "http:"
or "https:" scheme, and the Location Server MUST support the specified operations on the URI.

5. Examples

In this section, we provide some brief illustrations of how policy URIs are delivered to target hosts and used by those hosts to manage policy.

5.1. HELD

A HELD request that explicitly requests the creation of a policy URI has the following form:

```xml
<locationRequest xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held">
  <locationType exact="true">locationURI</locationType>
  <requestPolicyUri xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy"/>
</locationRequest>
```

A HELD response providing a single "locationUriSet", containing two URIs under a common policy, would have the following form:

```xml
<locationResponse xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held">
  <locationUriSet expires="2011-01-01T13:00:00.0Z">
    <locationURI>
      https://ls.example.com:9768/357yc6s64ceyoiuy5ax3o
    </locationURI>
    <locationURI>
      sip:9769+357yc6s64ceyoiuy5ax3o@ls.example.com:
    </locationURI>
  </locationUriSet>
  <policyUri xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy">
    https://ls.example.com:9768/policy/357lp6f64pr1bvhl5nk3b
  </policyUri>
</locationResponse>
```

5.2. DHCP

A DHCP option providing one of the location URIs and the corresponding policy URI from the previous example would have the following form:
5.3. Basic access control policy

Consider a user that gets the policy URI
<https://ls.example.com:9768/policy/357lp6f64pribh15nk3b>, as in the above LCP example. The first thing this allows the user to do is inspect the default policy that the LS has assigned to this URI:
GET /policy/357lp6f64prlbvh15nk3b HTTP/1.1
Host: ls.example.com:9768

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-type: application/auth-policy+xml
Content-length: 388

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<ruleset xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
  xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geolocation-policy">
  <rule id="AA56ia9">
    <conditions>
      <validity>
        <until>2011-01-01T13:00:00.0Z</until>
      </validity>
    </conditions>
    <actions/>
    <transformations>
      <gp:provide-location/>
      <gp:set-retransmission-allowed>
        false
      </gp:set-retransmission-allowed>
      <gp:set-retention-expiry>0</gp:set-retention-expiry>
    </transformations>
  </rule>
</ruleset>

This policy allows any requester to obtain location information, as long as they know the location URI. If the user disagrees with this policy, and prefers for example, to only provide location to one friend, at a city level of granularity, then he can install this policy on the Location Server:
PUT /policy/357lp6f64pribvh15nk3b HTTP/1.1
Host: ls.example.com:9768
Content-type: application/auth-policy+xml
Content-length: 462

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<ruleset xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy">
  <rule id="f3g44r1">
    <conditions>
      <identity>
        <one id="sip:friend@example.com"/>
      </identity>
      <validity>
        <until>2011-01-01T13:00:00.0Z</until>
      </validity>
    </conditions>
    <actions/>
    <transformations>
      <gp:provide-location
        profile="civic-transformation">
        <lp:provide-civic>city</lp:provide-civic>
      </gp:provide-location>
    </transformations>
  </rule>
</ruleset>

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Finally, after using the URI for a period, the user wishes to permanently invalidate the URI.

DELETE /policy/357lp6f64pribvh15nk3b HTTP/1.1
Host: ls.example.com:9768

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

6. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Mary Barnes, Alissa Cooper, and Hannes Tschofenig for providing critical commentary and input on the ideas described in this document.
7. IANA Considerations

This document requires several IANA registrations, detailed below.

7.1. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy

This section registers a new XML namespace, "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:policy", per the guidelines in [RFC3688].

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:grip

Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Richard Barnes (rbarnes@bbn.com).

XML:

BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head>
<title>HELD Policy URI Extension</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Namespace for HELD Policy URI Extension</h1>
[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please replace XXXX with the RFC number for this specification.]
<p>See RFCXXXX</p>
</body>
</html>
END

7.2. XML Schema Registration

This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group (geopriv@ietf.org), Richard Barnes (rbarnes@bbn.com)
7.3. DHCP LuriType Registration

IANA is requested to add a value to the LuriTypes registry, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LuriType</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBD*</td>
<td>Policy-URI</td>
<td>RFC XXXX**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* TBD is to be replaced with the assigned value
** RFC XXXX is to be replaced with this document’s RFC number.

8. Operational Considerations

Associating a user’s privacy preferences with a location URI can have a performance impact on the location configuration process, both in terms of protocol execution time and the state that a location server is required to store. There are additional protocol interactions (as described above), and the location server must store the user’s privacy policies in addition to purely location-related state.

The mechanism that this document defines for installing policy conducts policy management actions through a separate set of interactions from the main location configuration transaction, rather than carrying policy-management messages in existing location configuration messages. This design decision imposes the cost of at least one an additional HTTP transaction on endpoints that wish to configure privacy policies. At the same time, however, it minimizes the changes that need to be made to a location configuration protocol, so that both HELD and DHCP can support policy management in basically the same fashion.

A server that supports this extension must store additional state for a location URI. By default, a location server only needs to keep location-related state for a location URI, so that it can compute location values to return in response to dereference requests. A server supporting this extension also has to store policy information. Such a server can mitigate the impact of this requirement by not storing policy information explicitly for each location URI. Until a user supplies his own policies, the server will apply a default policy, which doesn’t need to be described separately for each location URI. So the amount of policy state that a server has to maintain scales as the number of users that actually
supply their own policy information. If policy URIs are constructed so that they can be associated with their corresponding location URIs algorithmically, then the server doesn’t even need to maintain a table to store these associations.

Finally, a server that does not wish to be subject to any of these costs can opt not to support this extension at all. Such a server would simply never provide a "policyUri" element in a response, silently ignoring any "requestPolicyUri" element it might receive in a request.

9. Security Considerations

There are two main classes of risks associated with access control policy management: The risk of unauthorized disclosure of the protected resource via manipulation of the policy management process, and the risk of disclosure of policy information itself.

Protecting the policy management process from manipulation entails two primary requirements: First, the policy URI has to be faithfully and confidentially transmitted to the client, and second, the policy document has to be faithfully and confidentially transmitted to the Location Server. The mechanism also needs to ensure that only authorized entities are able to acquire or alter policy.

9.1. Integrity and Confidentiality for Authorization Policy Data

Each LCP ensures integrity and confidentiality through different means (see [I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery] and [I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option]). These measures ensure that a policy URI is conveyed to the client without modification or interception.

To protect the integrity and confidentiality of policy data during management, the Location Server SHOULD provide policy URIs with the "https:" scheme and require the use of HTTP over TLS [RFC2818]. The cipher suites required by TLS [RFC5246] provide both integrity protection and confidentiality. If other means of protection are available, an "http:" URI MAY be used.

9.2. Access Control for Authorization Policy

Access control for the policy resource is based on knowledge of its URI. The URI of a policy resource operates under the same constraints as a possession model location URI [RFC5808] and is subject to the same constraints:
Knowledge of a policy URI MUST be restricted to authorized Rule Makers. Confidentiality is required for its conveyance in the location configuration protocol, and in the requests that are used to inspect, change or delete the policy resource.

The Location Server MUST ensure that the URI cannot be easily predicted. The policy URI MUST NOT be derived solely from information that might be public, including the Target identity or any location URI. The addition of random entropy increases the difficulty of guessing a policy URI.

Additional requestor authentication MAY be used for policy resources. For instance, in the particular case where the Device is identified to the Location Server by its IP address, the Location Server could use IP return routability as an additional authentication mechanism.

9.3. Location URI Allocation

A policy URI enables the authorization by access control lists model [RFC5808] for associated location URIs. Under this model, it might be possible to more widely distribute a location URI, relying on the authorization policy to constrain access to location information.

To allow for wider distribution, authorization by access control lists places additional constraints on the construction of location URIs.

If multiple Targets share a location URI, an unauthorized location recipient that acquires location URIs for the Targets can determine that the Targets are at the same location by comparing location URIs. With shared policy URIs, Targets are able to see and modify authorization policy for other Targets.

To allow for the creation of Target-specific authorization policies that are adequately privacy-protected, every location URI and policy URI that is issued to a different Target MUST be different. That is, no two client can receive the same location URI or policy URI.

In some deployments it is not always apparent to a LCP server that two clients are different. In particular, where a middlebox [RFC3234] exists two or more clients might appear as a single client. An example of a deployment scenario of this nature is described in [RFC5687]. An LCP server MUST create a different location URI and policy URI for every request, unless the requests can be reliably identified as being from the same client.

Conversely, if a location server chooses to provide the same location URI and policy URI to multiple endpoints, then it MUST use a
restricted profile of the above protocol for policy management.  (A server might do this to mitigate problems with link-layer confidentiality, e.g., for multiple clients on a shared medium.) Such a server MAY allow GET requests to allow clients to know the default policy, but it MUST NOT allow PUT or DELETE requests to control policy unless it has an out-of-band mechanism to distinguish and separately authorize clients.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option]

[I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery]


10.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol]

[I-D.ietf-geopriv-held-identity-extensions]

[I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy]

[I-D.ietf-geopriv-rfc3825bis]


Authors' Addresses

Richard Barnes
BBN Technologies
9861 Broken Land Parkway
Columbia, MD 21046
US

Phone: +1 410 290 6169
Email: rbarnes@bbn.com

Martin Thomson
Andrew Corporation
Andrew Building (39)
Wollongong University Campus
Northfields Avenue
Wollongong, NSW 2522
AU

Phone: +61 2 4221 2915
Email: martin.thomson@andrew.com

James Winterbottom
Andrew Corporation
Andrew Building (39)
Wollongong University Campus
Northfields Avenue
Wollongong, NSW 2522
AU

Phone: +61 242 212938
Email: james.winterbottom@andrew.com
Abstract

This document describes several security challenges involved with the increasingly common practice of third-party hosting of applications, in particular the inability to know with a high level of assurance that the hosting provider is authorized to offer an application on behalf of an organization or individual.
described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 3
2. Security Challenges of Hosted Applications ................. 3
3. Security Considerations ........................................ 4
4. IANA Considerations ............................................ 4
5. Informative References ......................................... 4
Authors’ Addresses .................................................. 5
1. Introduction

Internet applications such as websites, email services, and instant messaging (IM) services are increasingly offered by third-party hosting providers (e.g., "apps.example.net"). However, an organization that contracts with such a hosting provider typically wants its applications to be associated with its DNS domain name (e.g., "example.com") instead of the hosting provider's name. This introduces a problem that we call "High Assurance Re-Direction" (HARD): how can a user or peer of the application securely know that the hosting provider is authorized to offer that application on behalf of the organization?

This is indeed a HARD problem, to which no good solutions currently exist. To help technologists find such solutions, this document describes the problem and suggests some possible paths to solutions.

2. Security Challenges of Hosted Applications

Let us assume that a company called Example.com wishes to offload responsibility for its corporate instant messaging service ("im.example.com") to a hosting provider called Apps.Example.Net using the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol [XMPP]. The company sets up DNS service location records [DNS-SRV] that point im.example.com at apps.example.net:

```
_xmpp-client._tcp.im.example.com. 90 IN SRV 0 0 5222 apps.example.net
_xmpp-server._tcp.im.example.com. 90 IN SRV 0 0 5269 apps.example.net
```

When a user juliet@example.com attempts to log in to the IM service at im.example.com, her client discovers apps.example.net and resolves that name to an IP address and port. However, Juliet wants to be sure that the connection is encrypted using Transport Layer Security [TLS] so her client checks the certificate offered by the XMPP service at the resolved IP address and port.

Her client expects the server identity in the certificate to be "im.example.com" (or perhaps "*.example.com"). But what if the identity is, instead, "apps.example.net" or "*.example.net"? Now her client will need to prompt Juliet to accept this certificate mismatch either temporarily or permanently. Because such security warnings are unnerving to end users, the owners of the company would prefer that the IM service offer a certificate with an identity of "im.example.com". Unfortunately, the IM server software used by the hosting provider probably needs runtime access to the private key associated with the certificate. This makes both the security personnel at Example.com and the lawyers at Apps.Hosting.Net...
uncomfortable. There are several possible solutions (see for instance [XMPP-DNA]):

- Terminate the hosting agreement. However, this is unpalatable to the company (IM is not their core competence) and the hosting provider (less revenue).
- Deploy DNS security extensions [DNSSEC] so that users can be sure that the redirect has not been tampered with. However, DNSSEC is not yet widely deployed, so the Example.com admins discover that this option is not available.
- Deploy the IM service using attribute certificates (ACs) instead of public key certificates (PKCs). However, the hosting provider’s software does not support ACs and there are no tools available that would enable Example.com to generate such ACs.

The same problem exists in a number of other technologies, including the Hypertext Transport Protocol [HTTP], the Internet Message Access Protocol [IMAP], the Location-to-Service Translation Protocol [LOST], and the discovery of Location Information Servers [LIS].

3. Security Considerations

This entire memo is about security.

4. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for the IANA.

5. Informative References


Authors’ Addresses

Richard Barnes
BBN Technologies
9861 Broken Land Parkway
Columbia, MD 21046
USA

Phone: +1 410 290 6169
Email: rbarnes@bbn.com

Peter Saint-Andre
Cisco Systems, Inc.
1899 Wyknoop Street, Suite 600
Denver, CO 80202
USA

Phone: +1-303-308-3282
Email: psaintan@cisco.com
A Location Dereferencing Protocol Using HELD
draft-ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol-07

Abstract

This document describes how to use the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) over Transport Layer Security (TLS) as a dereferencing
protocol to resolve a reference to a Presence Information Data Format
Location Object (PIDF-LO). The document assumes that a Location
Recipient possesses a URI that can be used in conjunction with the
HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD) protocol to request the
location of the Target.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on January 15, 2013.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
1. Introduction

A location URI [RFC5808] identifies a resource that contains the location of an entity. This document specifies how a holder of an "http:" or "https:" location URI uses that URI to retrieve location information.

A location URI can be acquired using a location configuration protocol, such as HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD) [RFC5985] or the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) location URI option [I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option].

A Location Recipient that dereferences a location URI acquires location information in the of a Presence Information Data Format - Location Object (PIDF-LO) document [RFC4119]. HELD parameters allow for specifying the type of location information, though some constraints are placed on allowable parameters.

Location URIs compatible with HELD dereferencing use the "https:" or "http:" scheme. HELD can be used by Location Recipients that are aware of the fact that the URI is a location URI. Mandatory support for an HTTP GET request ensures that the URI can be used even if it is not recognized as a location URI.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

This document uses key terminology from several sources:

- terms for the GEOPRIV reference model defined in [RFC6280];
- the term Location Information Server (LIS), from [RFC5687], is a node in the access network that provides location information to an end point; a LIS provides location URIs;
- the term Location Server (LS), from [RFC6280], is used to identify the role that responds to a location dereference request; this might be the same entity as the LIS, but the model in [RFC5808] allows for the existence of separate - but related - entities; and
- the term location URI is coined in [RFC5808].
3. HELD Dereference Protocol

This section describes how HELD can be used to dereference a location URI. This process can be applied when a Location Recipient is in possession of a location URI with a "https:" or "http:" URI scheme.

This document does not describe a specific authentication mechanism. This means that authorization policies are unable to specifically identify authorized Location Recipients.

A Location Recipient that wishes to dereference an "https:" or "http:" URI performs a HELD request on HTTP to the identified resource.

Note: In many cases, an "http:" URI does not provide sufficient security for location URIs. The absence of the security mechanisms provided by TLS means that the Rule Maker has no control over who receives location information and the Location Recipient has no assurance that the information is correct.

The Location Recipient establishes a connection to the LS, as described in [RFC2818].

The scheme of a location URI determines whether or not TLS is used on a given dereference transaction. Location Servers MUST be configured to issue only HTTPS URIs and respond to only to HTTPS dereference requests, unless confidentiality and integrity protection are provided by some other mechanism. For example, the server might only accept requests from clients within a trusted network, or via an IPsec-protected channel. When TLS is used, the TLS ciphersuite TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL MUST NOT be used and the LS MUST be authenticated [RFC6125] to ensure that the correct server is contacted.

A Location Server MAY reject a request and request that a Location Recipient provide authentication credentials if authorization is dependent on the Location Recipient identity. Future specifications could define an authentication mechanism and a means by which Location Recipients are identified in authorization policies. This document provides definitions for neither item.

3.1. HELD Usage Profile

Use of HELD as a location dereference protocol is largely the same as its use as a location configuration protocol. Aside from the restrictions noted in this document, HELD semantics do not differ from those established in [RFC5985].
The HELD "locationRequest" is the only request permitted by this specification. Similarly, request parameters other than the following MUST NOT be accepted by the LS: "responseTime", "locationType" (including the associated "exact" attribute).

Parameters and requests that do not have known behaviour for dereference requests MUST NOT be used. The LS MUST ignore any parameters that it does not understand unless it knows the parameters to be invalid. If parameters are understood by the LS and known to be invalid, the LS MAY generate a HELD error response. For instance, those defined in [RFC6155] are always invalid and can be rejected.

The LS MUST NOT generate location URIs or provide a "locationUriSet" in response to a dereference request. If the location request contains a "locationType" element that includes "locationURI", this parameter is either ignored or rejected as appropriate, based on the associated "exact" attribute.

3.2. HTTP GET Behavior

GET is the method assumed by generic HTTP user agents, therefore unless context identifies an "https:" URI as a HELD URI, such a user agent might simply send an HTTP GET. Rather than providing an HTTP 405 (Method Not Allowed) response indicating that POST is the only permitted method, a LIS MUST provide a HELD location response if it receives an HTTP GET request.

An HTTP GET request to a HELD URI produces a HELD response as if the following HELD request had been sent using HTTP POST:

```
<locationRequest xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held">
  <locationType exact="false">
    geodetic civic
  </locationType>
</locationRequest>
```

Figure 1: GET Request Equivalent Location Request

HTTP GET requests MUST be safe and idempotent [RFC2616] - that is, there are no side-effects of making the request and a repeated request has no more effect than a single request. Repeating a HELD request might result in a different location, but only as a result of a change in the state of the resource: the location of the Target.

Only the creation of a location URI as a result of receiving a request causes a HELD request to have side-effects. A request to a location URI can be both safe and idempotent, since a location URI cannot be produced in response to a request to a location URI.
A Location Recipient MAY infer from a response containing the HELD content type, "application/held+xml", that a URI references a resource that supports HELD.

Content negotiation MAY be supported to produce a presence document in place of a HELD location response. Where the presence document would otherwise be included in a "locationResponse" document, it can be included in the body of the HTTP response directly by including an "Accept" header that includes "application/pidf+xml".

4. Authorization Models

This section discusses two extreme types of authorization models for dereferencing with HELD URIs, namely "Authorization by Possession" and "Authorization by Access Control". In the subsequent subsections we discuss the properties of these two models. Figure 2, from [RFC5808], shows the model applicable to location configuration, conveyance and dereference.

It is important to note that this document does not mandate a specific authorization model. It is possible to combine aspects of both models. However, no authentication framework is provided, which limits the policy options available when the "Authorization by Access Control" model is used.

For either authorization model, the overall process is similar. The following steps are followed, with minor alterations:
1. The Target acquires a location URI from the LIS. This uses a location configuration protocol (LCP), such as HELD or DHCP.

2. The Target then conveys the location URI to a third party, the Location Recipient (for example using SIP as described in [RFC6442]). This step is shown in (2) of Figure 2.

3. The Location Recipient then needs to dereference the location URI in order to obtain the Location Object (3). An "https:" or "http:" URI is dereferenced as described in this document; other URI schemes might be dereferenced using another method.

In this final step, the Location Server (LS) or LIS makes an authorization decision. How this decision is reached depends on the authorization model.

4.1. Authorization by Possession

In this model, possession - or knowledge - of the location URI is used to control access to location information. A location URI might be constructed such that it is hard to guess (see C8 of [RFC5808]) and the set of entities that it is disclosed to can be limited. The only authentication this would require by the LS is evidence of possession of the URI. The LS could immediately authorize any request that indicates this URI.

Authorization by possession does not require direct interaction with a Rule Maker; it is assumed that the Rule Maker is able to exert control over the distribution of the location URI. Therefore, the LIS can operate with limited policy input from a Rule Maker.

Limited disclosure is an important aspect of this authorization model. The location URI is a secret; therefore, ensuring that adversaries are not able to acquire this information is paramount. Encryption, such as might be offered by TLS [RFC5246] or S/MIME [RFC5751], protects the information from eavesdroppers.

Use of authorization by possession location URIs in a hop-by-hop protocol such as SIP [RFC3261] adds the possibility of on-path adversaries. Depending on the usage of the location URI for certain location based applications (e.g., emergency services, location based routing) specific treatment is important, as discussed in [RFC6442].

Using possession as a basis for authorization means that, once granted, authorization cannot be easily revoked. Cancellation of a location URI ensures that legitimate users are also affected; application of additional policy is theoretically possible, but could be technically infeasible. Expiration of location URIs limits the
usable time for a location URI, requiring that an attacker continue

to learn new location URIs to retain access to current location

information.

A very simple policy might be established at the time that a location
URI is created. This policy specifies that the location URI expires
after a certain time, which limits any inadvertent exposure of
location information to adversaries. The expiration time of the
location URI might be negotiated at the time of its creation, or it
might be unilaterally set by the LIS.

4.2. Authorization via Access Control

Use of explicit access control provides a Rule Maker greater control
over the behaviour of an LS. In contrast to authorization by
possession, possession of this form of location URI does not imply
authorization. Since an explicit policy is used to authorize access
to location information, the location URI can be distributed to many
potential Location Recipients.

Either before creation or dissemination of the location URI, the Rule
Maker establishes an authorization policy with the LS. In reference
to Figure 2, authorization policies might be established at creation
(Step 1), and need to be established before the location URI is
published (Step 2) to ensure that the policy grants access to the
desired Location Recipients. Depending on the mechanism used, it
might also be possible to change authorization policies at any time.

A possible format for these authorization policies is available with
GEOPRIV Common Policy [RFC4745] and Geolocation Policy
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy]. Additional constraints might be
established by other means.

The LS enforces the authorization policy when a Location Recipient
dereferences the URI. Explicit authorization policies allow a Rule
Maker to specify how location information is provided to Location
Recipients.

4.3. Access Control with HELD Deference

This document does not describe a specific authentication mechanism;
therefore, the authorization by access control model is not an
option. Instead, this document assumes the authorization by
possession model.

Other policy mechanisms, such as those described in
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy], can be applied for different Location
Recipients if each recipient is given a different location URIs.
Each location URI can be assigned different authorization policy. Selective disclosure used in this fashion can be used in place of identity-based authorization.

How policy is associated with a location URI is not defined by this document. [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy-uri] describes one possible mechanism.

Use of identity-based authorization policy is not precluded. A Location Server MAY support an authentication mechanism that enables identity-based authorization policies to be used. Future specifications might define means of identifying recipients.

Note: Policy frameworks like [RFC4745] degrade in a way that protects privacy if features are not supported. If a policy specifies a rule that is conditional on the identity of a recipient and the protocol does not (or cannot) provide an assertion identity of the recipient, the rule has no effect and the policy defaults to providing less information.

5. Examples

An example scenario envisioned by this document is shown in Figure 3. This diagram shows how a location dereference protocol fits with location configuration and conveyance. [RFC5808] contains more information on this scenario and others like it.
The example in Figure 4 shows the simplest form of dereferencing request using HELD to the location URI "https://ls.example.com:49152/uri/w3g61nf5n66p0". The only way that this differs from the example in Section 10.1 of [RFC5985] is in the request URI and the source of the URI.

POST /uri/w3g61nf5n66p0 HTTP/1.1
Host: ls.example.com:49152
Content-Type: application/held+xml
Content-Length: 87

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<locationRequest xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held" />

Figure 4: Minimal Dereferencing Request

Figure 5 shows the response to the previous request listing both civic and geodetic location information of the Target’s location.
Again, this is identical to the response in Section 10.1 of [RFC5985] — unless policy specifies otherwise, the Location Recipient receives the same information as the Device.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Example LIS
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2011 03:42:29 GMT
Expires: Tue, 11 Jan 2011 03:42:29 GMT
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: application/held+xml
Content-Length: 676

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<locationResponse xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held">
<presence xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf"
    entity="pres:3650n87934c@ls.example.com">
    <tuple id="b650sf789nd">
        <status>
            <geopriv xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10"
                xmlns:gbp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10:basic-policy">
                <location-info>
                    <Point xmlns="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
                        srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326">
                        <pos>-34.407 150.88001</pos>
                    </Point>
                </location-info>
                <usage-rules>
                    <gbp:retransmission-allowed>
                        false</gbp:retransmission-allowed>
                    <gbp:retention-expiry>
                        2011-01-11T03:42:29+00:00</gbp:retention-expiry>
                </usage-rules>
                <method>Wiremap</method>
            </geopriv>
        </status>
        <timestamp>2006-01-10T03:42:28+00:00</timestamp>
    </tuple>
</presence>
</locationResponse>

Figure 5: Response with Location Information
The following GET request is treated in an equivalent fashion. The LS treats this request as though it were a location request of the form shown in Figure 1. The same response might be provided.

GET /uri/w3g61nf5n66p0 HTTP/1.1
Host: ls.example.com:49152
Accept: application/held+xml

Figure 6: GET Request

The following GET request uses content negotiation to indicate a preference for a presence document.

GET /uri/w3g61nf5n66p0 HTTP/1.1
Host: ls.example.com:49152
Accept: application/pidf+xml,application/held+xml;q=0.5

Figure 7: GET Request with Content Negotiation

The response only differs from a normal HELD location response to a POST request in that the "locationResponse" element is omitted and the "Content-Type" header reflects the changed content.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Example LIS
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2011 03:42:29 GMT
Expires: Tue, 11 Jan 2011 03:42:29 GMT
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: application/pidf+xml
Content-Length: 591

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<pres xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf"
     entity="pres:3650n87934c@ls.example.com"/>

<!-- PIDF contents are identical to the previous example -->
</presence>

Figure 8: GET Response with PIDF-LO

6. Security Considerations

Privacy of location information is the most important security consideration for this document. Two measures in particular are used to protect privacy: TLS and authorization policies. TLS provides a means of ensuring confidentiality of location information through
encryption and mutual authentication. An authorization policy allows a Rule Maker to explicitly control how location information is provided to Location Recipients.

The process by which a Rule Maker establishes an authorization policy is not covered by this document; several methods are possible, for instance: [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy-uri], [RFC4825].

TLS MUST be used for dereferencing location URIs unless confidentiality and integrity are provided by some other mechanism, as discussed in Section 3. Location Recipients MUST authenticate the host identity using the domain name included in the location URI, using the procedure described in Section 3.1 of [RFC2818]. Local policy determines what a Location Recipient does if authentication fails or cannot be attempted.

The authorization by possession model (Section 4.1) further relies on TLS when transmitting the location URI to protect the secrecy of the URI. Possession of such a URI implies the same privacy considerations as possession of the PIDF-LO document that the URI references.

Location URIs MUST only be disclosed to authorized Location Recipients. The GEOPRIV architecture [RFC6280] identifies the Rule Maker role as being the entity that authorizes disclosure of this nature.

Protection of the location URI is necessary, since the policy attached to such a location URI permits any who have the URI to view it. This aspect of security is covered in more detail in the specification of location conveyance protocols, such as [RFC6442].

The LS MUST NOT provide any information about the Target except its location, unless policy from a Rule Maker allows otherwise. In particular, the requirements in [RFC5808] mandate this measure to protect the identity of the Target. To this end, an unlinked pseudonym MUST be provided in the "entity" attribute of the PIDF-LO document.

Further security considerations and requirements relating to the use of location URIs are described in [RFC5808].

7. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request of IANA.

[[IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please remove this section before publication.]]
8. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Barbara Stark and Guy Caron for providing early comments. Thanks to Rohan Mahy for constructive comments on the scope and format of the document. Thanks to Ted Hardie for his strawman proposal that provided assistance with the security section of this document. Richard Barnes made helpful observations on the application of authorization policy. Bernard Aboba and Julian Reschke contributed constructive reviews.

The participants of the GEOPRIV interim meeting 2008 provided significant feedback on this document.

James Polk provided input on security in June 2008.

Martin Dawson was an original author of this document. Sadly, he passed away prior to its publication.

9. References

9.1. Normative References


[RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
9.2. Informative references

[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option]

[I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy]

[I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy-uri]


Appendix A. GEOPRIV Using Protocol Compliance

This section describes how use of HELD as a location dereference protocol complies with the GEOPRIV requirements described in [RFC3693].

Req. 1. (Location Object generalities):

This section relates to the PIDF-LO [RFC4119] document, which is used by HELD. These requirements are addressed by [RFC4119] and [RFC5491].

Req. 2. (Location Object fields):

This section relates to the PIDF-LO [RFC4119] document, which is used by HELD. These requirements are addressed by [RFC4119] and [RFC5491].

Req. 3. (Location Data Types):

This section relates to the PIDF-LO [RFC4119] document, which is used by HELD. These requirements are addressed by [RFC4119] and [RFC5491].

Section 7.2 of [RFC3693] details the requirements of a "Using Protocol". These requirements are restated, followed by a statement of compliance:
Req. 4. "The using protocol has to obey the privacy and security instructions coded in the Location Object and in the corresponding Rules regarding the transmission and storage of the LO."

Compliant: This specification describes the use of HTTP over TLS for carrying the PIDF-LO from the LS to the Location Recipient. The sending and receiving parties are expected to comply with the instructions carried inside the object.

Though discouraged, using unsecured http: URIs is permitted. Using unsecured HTTP is likely to result in non-compliance with this requirement.

Req. 5. "The using protocol will typically facilitate that the keys associated with the credentials are transported to the respective parties, that is, key establishment is the responsibility of the using protocol."

Compliant: This document specifies that authentication of the LS uses the established public key infrastructure used by HTTP over TLS [RFC2818]. Authentication of Location Recipients is either based on distribution of a secret (the location URI) using a conveyance protocol (for instance, [RFC6442]), allowances are made for later work to define alternative methods.

Req. 6. "(Single Message Transfer) In particular, for tracking of small target devices, the design should allow a single message/packet transmission of location as a complete transaction."

Not Compliant: The XML encoding specified in [RFC4119] is not suited to single packet transfers. Use of compressed content encoding [RFC2616] might allow this condition to be met.

Section 7.3 of [RFC3693] details the requirements of a "Rule based Location Data Transfer". These requirements are restated where they are applicable to this document:

Req. 7. "(LS Rules) The decision of a Location Server to provide a Location Recipient access to Location Information MUST be based on Rule Maker-defined Privacy Rules."

Compliant: This document describes two alternative methods by which a Rule Maker is able to control access to location information. Rule Maker policy is enforced by the LS when
a location URI is dereferenced. However, this document does not describe how a location URI is created, or how a Rule Maker associates policy with a location URI. These are covered by other specifications.

Req. 8. (LG Rules) Not Applicable: This relationship between LS and the source of its information (be that Location Generator (LG) or LIS) is out of scope for this document.

Req. 9. "(Viewer Rules) A Viewer does not need to be aware of the full Rules defined by the Rule Maker (because a Viewer SHOULD NOT retransmit Location Information), and thus a Viewer SHOULD receive only the subset of Privacy Rules necessary for the Viewer to handle the LO in compliance with the full Privacy Rules (such as, instruction on the time period for which the LO can be retained)."

Compliant: The Rule Maker might define (via mechanisms outside the scope of this document) which policy rules are disclosed to other entities. For instance, if [RFC4745] is used to convey authorization policies from Rule Maker to LS, this is possible using the parameters specified in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy].

In order to comply with these rules, a Location Recipient MUST NOT redistribute a location URI without express permission. Depending on the access control model, the location URI might be secret (see Section 3.3 of [RFC5808]).

Req. 10. (Full Rule language) Not Applicable: Note however that Geopriv has defined a rule language capable of expressing a wide range of privacy rules (see [RFC4745] and [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy]).

Req. 11. (Limited Rule language) Not Applicable: This requirement applies to (and is addressed by) PIDF-LO [RFC4119].

Section 7.4 of [RFC3693] details the requirements of "Location Object Privacy and Security". These requirements are restated where they are applicable to this document:

Req. 12. (Identity Protection) Compliant: Identity protection of the Target is provided as long as both of the following conditions are true:
(a) the location URI is not associated with the identity
of the Target in any context, and

(b) the PIDF-LO does not contain information about the
identity of the Target.

For instance, this requirement is complied with if the
protocol that conveys the location URI does not link the
identity of the Target to the location URI and the LS
doesn’t include meaningful identification information in
the PIDF-LO document. Section 6 recommends that an
unlinked pseudonym is used by the LS.

Req. 13. (Credential Requirements) Compliant: The primary security
mechanism specified in this document is Transport Layer
Security. TLS offers the ability to use different types of
credentials, including symmetric, asymmetric credentials or
a combination of them.

Req. 14. (Security Features) Compliant: Geopriv defines a few
security requirements for the protection of Location
Objects such as mutual end-point authentication, data
object integrity, data object confidentiality and replay
protection. The ability to use Transport Layer security
fulfills most of these requirements. Authentication of
Location Recipients in this document relies on proof of a
shared secret - the location URI. This does not preclude
the addition of more robust authentication procedures.

Req. 15. (Minimal Crypto) Compliant: The mandatory to implement
ciphersuite is provided in the TLS layer security
specification.

Appendix B. Compliance to Location Reference Requirements

This section describes how HELD complies to the location reference
requirements stipulated in [RFC5808]. Compliance of [RFC5985] to the
Location Configuration Protocol is included.

Note that use of HELD as a location dereference protocol does not
necessarily imply that HELD is the corresponding LCP. This
document is still applicable to HTTP location URIs that are
acquired by other means.
B.1. Requirements for a Location Configuration Protocol

C1. "Location URI support: The location configuration protocol MUST support a location reference in URI form."

Compliant: HELD only provides location references in URI form.

C2. "Location URI expiration: When a location URI has a limited validity interval, its lifetime MUST be indicated."

Compliant: HELD indicates the expiry time of location URIs using the "expires" attribute. [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy-uri] provides a way to control expiration of a location URI.

C3. "Location URI cancellation: The location configuration protocol MUST support the ability to request a cancellation of a specific location URI."

Compliant with Extension: [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy-uri] describes how a location URI can be cancelled through the application of policy. Without extensions, HELD does not provide a method for cancelling location URIs.

C4. "Location Information Masking: The location URI MUST ensure, by default, through randomization and uniqueness, that the location URI does not contain location information specific components."

Compliant: The HELD specification explicitly references this requirement in providing guidance on the format of the location URI.

C5. "Target Identity Protection: The location URI MUST NOT contain information that identifies the Target (e.g., user or device)."

Compliant: The HELD specification provides specific guidance on the anonymity of the Target with regards to the generation of location URIs. Section 6 expands on this guidance.

C6. "Reuse indicator: There SHOULD be a way to allow a Target to control whether a location URI can be resolved once only, or multiple times."

Not Compliant: Specific extensions to the protocol or authorization policy formats is needed to alter the default behavior, which allows unlimited resolution of the location URI.
C7. "Selective disclosure: The location configuration protocol MUST provide a mechanism that allows the Rule Maker to control what information is being disclosed about the Target."

Compliant with Extension: Use of policy mechanisms and [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy-uri] enable this capability. Note that this document recommends that only location information be provided.

C8. "Location URI Not guessable: As a default, the location configuration protocol MUST return location URIs that are random and unique throughout the indicated lifetime. A location URI with 128-bits of randomness is RECOMMENDED."

Compliant: HELD specifies that location URIs conform to this requirement. The amount of randomness is not specifically identified since it depends on a number of factors that change over time, such as the number of valid location URIs, the validity period of those URIs and the rate that guesses can be made.

C9. "Location URI Options: In the case of user-provided authorization policies, where anonymous or non-guessable location URIs are not warranted, the location configuration protocol MAY support a variety of optional location URI conventions, as requested by a Target to a location configuration server, (e.g., embedded location information within the location URI)."

Not Compliant: HELD does not support Device-specified location URI forms.

B.2. Requirements for a Location Dereference Protocol

D1. "Location URI support: The location dereference protocol MUST support a location reference in URI form."

Compliant: HELD only provides location references in URI form.

D2. "Authentication: The location dereference protocol MUST include mechanisms to authenticate both the client and the server."

Partially Compliant: TLS provides means for mutual authentication. This document only specifies the required mechanism for server authentication. Client authentication is not precluded.
D3. "Dereferenced Location Form: The value returned by the dereference protocol MUST contain a well-formed PIDF-LO document."

Compliant: HELD requires that location objects are in the form of a PIDF-LO that complies with [RFC5491].

D4. "Location URI Repeated Use: The location dereference protocol MUST support the ability for the same location URI to be resolved more than once, based on dereference server configuration."

Compliant: A Location Recipient may access and use a location URI as many times as desired until URI expiration results in the URI being invalidated. Authorization policies might include rules that modify this behavior.

D5. "The location dereference protocol MUST support confidentiality protection of messages sent between the Location Recipient and the location server."

Compliant: This document strongly recommends the use of TLS for confidentiality and HELD mandates its implementation. Unsecured HTTP is permitted: the associated risks are described in Section 3.

Authors’ Addresses

James Winterbottom
Commscope
Andrew Building (39)
Wollongong University Campus
Northfields Avenue
Wollongong, NSW 2522
AU

Phone: +61 242 212938
Email: james.winterbottom@commscope.com
Hannes Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
Linnoitustie 6
Espoo 02600
Finland

Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at

Henning Schulzrinne
Columbia University
Department of Computer Science
450 Computer Science Building, New York, NY 10027
US

Phone: +1 212 939 7004
Email: hgs@cs.columbia.edu
URI: http://www.cs.columbia.edu

Martin Thomson
Microsoft
3210 Porter Drive
Palo Alto, CA 94304
US

Phone: +1 650-353-1925
Email: martin.thomson@skype.net
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) IPv4 and IPv6 Option for a Location Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lbyr-uri-option-19

Abstract

This document creates a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Option for transmitting a client’s geolocation Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). This Location URI can then be dereferenced in a separate transaction by the client or sent to another entity and dereferenced to learn physically where the client is located, but only while valid.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2013.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
1. Introduction

This document creates a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Option for transmitting a client’s geolocation Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) [RFC3986]. In this scenario, the DHCP client is a Geopriv Target (i.e., the entity whose geolocation is associated with the location URI). The DHCP implementation of the client can then make this location information available to other applications for their usage. This location URI points to a Location Server [RFC5808] which has the geolocation of the client (e.g., previously uploaded into a wiremap database then the client attaches to a known wall-jack, or by means of 802.11 geolocation mechanisms).

Applications within the Target can then choose to dereference this location URI and/or transmit the URI to another entity as a means of conveying where the Target is located. Both Conveying and Dererferencing a location URI is described in [RFC6442]. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] is not the only protocol that can dereference a location URI; there is also HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD) [RFC6753] and HTTP [RFC2616].

A Location Server (LS) stores the Target’s location as a presence document, called a Presence Information Data Format - Location Object (PIDF-LO), defined in RFC 4119 [RFC4119]. The Location Server is the entity contacted during the act of dereferencing a Target’s location. If the dereferencing entity has permission, defined in [RFC6772], the location of the target will be received. The LS will grant permission to location inquiries based on the rules established by a Rule Holder [RFC3693]. The LS has the ability to challenge any request for a target’s location, thereby providing additive security properties before location revelation.
Possessing a location URI has advantages over having a PIDF-LO, especially when a target’s location changes. With a location URI, when a target moves, the location URI does not change (at least within the same domain). The location URI can still be given out as the reference to the Target’s current location. The opposite is true if the location is conveyed by value in a message. Once the Target moves, the previously given location is no longer valid, and if the Target wants to inform another entity about its location, it has to send the PIDF-LO to the location recipient (again).

A problem exists within existing RFCs that provide location to the UA ([RFC6225] and [RFC4776]). Those DHCP Options for geolocation values require an update of the entire location information (LI) every time a client moves. Not all clients will move frequently, but some will. Refreshing location values every time a client moves does not scale in certain networks/environments, such as IP-based cellular networks, enterprise networks or service provider networks with mobile endpoints. An 802.11 based access network is one example of this. Constantly updating Location Configuration Information (LCI) to endpoints might not scale in mobile (residential or enterprise or municipal) networks in which the client is moving through more than one network attachment point, perhaps as a person walks or drives with their client down a neighborhood street or apartment complex or a shopping center or through a municipality (that has IP connectivity as a service).

If the client was provided a location URI reference to retain and hand out when it wants or needs to convey its location (in a protocol other than DHCP), a location URI that would not change as the client’s location changes (within a domain). Scaling issues would be significantly reduced to needing an update of the location URI only when a client changes administrative domains – which is much less often. This delivery of an indirect location has the added benefit of not using up valuable or limited bandwidth to the client with the constant updates. It also relieves the client from having to determine when it has moved far enough to consider asking for a refresh of its location.

In enterprise networks, if a known location is assigned to each individual Ethernet port in the network, a device that attaches to the network, such as a wall-jack (directly associated with a specific Ethernet Switch port) will be associated with a known location via a unique circuit-ID that’s used by the Relay Agent Information Option (RAIO) defined in RFC 3046 [RFC3046]. This assumes wall-jacks have an updated wiremap database. RFC 6225 [RFC6225] and RFC 4776 [RFC4776] would return an LCI value of location for either IPv4 or IPv6. This document specifies how a location URI is returned using DHCP. The location URI points to a PIDF-LO contained on an LS. Performing a dereferencing transaction, that Target’s PIDF-LO will be returned. If local configuration has the requirement of only assigning unique location URIs to each client at the same attachment point to the network (i.e., same RJ-45
jack or same 802.11 Access Point - except when triangulation is used), then unique location URIs will be given out. They will all have the same location at the record, relieving the backend Sighter or LS from individually maintaining each location independently.

The location URI Option can be useful in IEEE 802.16e connected endpoints or IP cellular endpoints. The location URI Option can be configured on a router, such as a residential home gateway, such that the router receives this Location URI Option as a client with the ability to communicate to downstream endpoints as a server.

How an LS responds to a dereference request can vary, and a policy established by a Ruleholder [RFC3693] for a Location Target as to what type of challenge(s) is to be used, how strong a challenge is used or how precise the location information is given to a Location Recipient (LR). This document does not provide mechanisms for the LS to tell the client about policies or for the client to specify a policy for the LS. While an LS should apply an appropriate access-control policy, clients must assume that the LS will provide location in response to any request (following the possession model [RFC5808]). For further discussion of privacy, see the Security Considerations.

This document IANA-registers the new IPv4 and IPv6 DHCP Options for a location URI and Valid-For.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Format of the DHCP LocationURI Option

2.1 Overall Format of LocationURI Option in IPv4

The LocationURI Option format for IPv4 is as follows:

```
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| Code XXX         | Length=XX       | Valid-For       |
| Valid-For (Cont’d) | LocationURI... |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
```

Figure 1. IPv4 Fields for this LocationURI Option

Code XXX: The code for this DHCPv4 option (IANA assigned).
Length=XX: The length of this option, counted in bytes - not counting the Code and Length bytes. This is a variable length Option, therefore the length value will change based on the length of the URI within the Option.

Valid-For: The time, in seconds, the LocationURI is to be considered valid for dereferencing. The Valid-For is always represented as a four-byte unsigned integer.

LocationURI: Location URI - This field, in bytes, is the URI pointing at the location record where the PIDF-LO for the Location Target resides. The LocationURI is always represented in ASCII.

2.2 Overall Format of LocationURI Option in IPv6

The LocationURI Option format for IPv6 is as follows:

```
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
|   option-code     |   option-len      |       Valid-For    |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
|                     |                   |                   |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
|                   |                   | LocationURI...    |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
|                   |                   |                   |
```

Figure 2. IPv6 fields of this LocationURI Option

option-code: The code for this DHCPv6 option (IANA assigned).

option-len: The length of this option, counted in bytes - not counting the option-code and option-len bytes. This is a variable length Option, therefore the length value will change based on the length of the URI within the Option.

Valid-For: see Section 2.1

LocationURI: see Section 2.1

2.3 Rules for the LocationURI Option

The LocationURI Option has the following rules:

- Implementation of the Location URI Option is REQUIRED on the DHCP server and client.
Clients SHOULD be expected to have to request the Location URI Option from servers. Although local policy can have servers perform an unsolicited push of a Location URI Option to a client.

Applications on a client can use the Location URI (value) until the Valid-For value reaches zero. If there is no Valid-For Option value, then the counter did not ever start (a null value), and applications on a client continue to use the Location URI value until given a new Location URI Option (with or without a Valid-For value) which overwrites any previous Location URI and Valid-For Option values.

A Location URI Option with a non-zero Valid-For field MUST NOT transmit the Location URI once the Valid-For field counts down to zero.

A received Location URI Option containing all zeros in the Valid-For field means that Location URI has no lifetime, and not "no lifetime left". All zeros in the Valid-For field equates to a null value.

Receipt of the Location URI Option containing all zeros in the Valid-For field MUST NOT cause any error in handling the Location URI.

When the Valid-For timer reaches zero, the client MUST purge any location URI received via DHCP from its memory.

The choice of the Valid-For value is a policy decision for the operator of the DHCP server. Like location URIs themselves, it can be statically configured on the DHCP server or provisioned dynamically (via an out-of-band exchange with a Location Information Server) as requests for location URIs are received.

Clients receiving a Location URI Option start the Valid-For timer upon receipt of the DHCP message containing the Option.

Clients MUST NOT trigger an automatic DHCP refresh on expiry of the Valid-For timer; rather, they MUST follow normal DHCP mechanics.

If the Valid-For timer is set to expire before the lease refresh, the client will not have the ability to hand out its location until the lease refresh, inadvertently allowing a gap of coverage. If the Valid-For timer is set to expire after the lease refresh, some wayward application on the client can divulge that location URI after it is no longer valid, meaning the location could be stale or just plain wrong.

Servers SHOULD set the Valid-For timer to that of the lease refresh, or bad things can happen.
3. DHCP Option Operation

The [RFC3046] RAIO can be utilized to provide the appropriate indication to the DHCP Server where this DISCOVER or REQUEST message came from, in order to supply the correct response.

Caution SHOULD always be used involving the creation of large Options, meaning that this Option may need to be in its own INFORM, OPTION or ACK message. DHCP messages are limited in size, and long URIs will require the use of multiple messages and concatenation [RFC3396]. It is, therefore, best to limit the total length of a URI, including any parameters, to 220 bytes.

Location URIs MUST NOT reveal identity information of the user of the device, since DHCP is a cleartext delivery protocol. For example, creating a location URI such as

sips:34LKJH534663J54@example.com

is better than a location URI such as

sips:aliceisat123mainstatlantageorgiaus@example.com

The username portion of the first example URI provides no direct identity information (in which 34LKJH534663J54 is considered to be a random number in this example).

In the <presence> element of a PIDF-LO document, there is an ‘entity’ attribute that identifies what entity ‘this’ presence document (including the associated location) refers to. It is up to the PIDF-LO generator, either Location Server or an application in the endpoint, to insert the identity in the ‘entity’ attribute. This can be seen in [RFC4119]. The considerations for populating the entity attribute value in a PIDF-LO document are independent from the considerations for avoiding exposing identification information in the username part of a location URI.

This Option is used only for communications between a DHCP client and a DHCP server. It can be solicited (requested) by the client, or it can be pushed by the server without a request for it. DHCP Options not understood MUST be ignored [RFC2131]. A DHCP server supporting this Option might or might not have the location of a client. If a server does not have a client’s location, but needs to provide this Location URI Option to a client (for whatever reason), an LS is contacted. This server-to-LS transaction is not DHCP, therefore it is out of scope of this document. Note that this server-to-LS transaction could delay the DHCP messaging to the client. If the server fails to have location before it transmits its message to the client, location will not be part of that DHCP message. Any timers involved here are a matter of local configuration.
The dereference of a target’s location URI would not involve DHCP, but an application layer protocol, such as SIP or HTTP, therefore dereferencing is out of scope of this document.

In the case of residential gateways being DHCP servers, they usually perform as DHCP clients in a hierarchical fashion up into a service provider’s network DHCP server(s), or learn what information to provide via DHCP to residential clients through a protocol, such as PPP. In these cases, the location URI would likely indicate the residence’s civic address to all wired or wireless clients within that residence.

4. Architectural Assumptions

The following assumptions are made once the client has obtained a location URI, and not about DHCP operation specifics (in no particular order):

- Any user control (what [RFC3693] calls a ‘Ruleholder’) for access to the dereferencing step is assumed to be out of scope of this document. An example authorization policy is in [RFC6772].

- The authorization security model vs. possession security model discussion can be found in [RFC5606], describing what is expected in each model of operation. It should be assumed that a location URI attained using DHCP will operate under a possession model by default. An authorization model can be instituted as a matter of local policy. An authorization model means possessing the location URI does not give that entity the right to view the PIDF-LO of the target whose location is indicated in a presence document. The dereference transaction will be challenged by the Location Server only in an authorization model. The nature of this challenge is out of scope of this document.

- This document does not prevent some environments from operating in an authorization model, for example - in less tightly controlled networks. The costs associated with authorization vs. possession models are discussed in Section 3.3.2 of [RFC5606].

4.1 Harmful URIs and URLs

There are, in fact, some types of URIs that are not good to receive, due to security concerns. For example, any URLs that can have scripts, such as "data:" URLs, and some "HTTP:" URLs that go to web pages that have scripts. Therefore,

- URIs received via this Option SHOULD NOT be automatically sent to a general-browser to connect to a web page, because they could have harmful scripts, unless
the browser has been set up to defend against harmful scripts,
or
the browser does not run scripts automatically.

This Option MUST NOT contain "data:" URLs [RFC2397], because they could contain harmful scripts.

4.2 Valid Location URI Schemes or Types

URIs carried by this DHCP Option MUST have one of the following URI schemes:

1. sip:
2. sips:
3. pres:
4. http:
5. https:

URIs using the "pres" scheme are dereferenced using the presence event package for SIP [RFC3856], so they will reference a PIDF-LO document when location is available. Responses to requests for URIs with other schemes ("sip", "sips", "http", and "https") MUST have media type 'application/pidf+xml' [RFC4119]. Alternatively, HTTP and HTTPS URIs MAY refer to information with media type 'application/held+xml', in order to support HELD dereferencing [RFC6753]. Clients can indicate which media types they support using the "Accept" header field in SIP [RFC3261] or HTTP [RFC2616].

See RFC 3922 [RFC3922] for using the "pres:" URI with XMPP.

It is RECOMMENDED that implementers follow Section 4.6 of RFC 6442 [RFC6442] as guidance regarding which Location URI schemes to provide in DHCP. That document discusses what a receiving entity does when receiving a URI scheme that is not understood. Awareness to the two URI types there is important for conveying location, if SIP is used to convey a Location URI provided by DHCP.

5. IANA Considerations

5.1 The IPv4 Option number for the Location URI Option

This document IANA registers the DHCP Location URI Option Number in the BOOTP Vendor Extensions and DHCP Options subregistry of the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) and Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) Parameters registry located.
The authors have no preference at this time on what number IANA chooses.

5.2 The IPv6 Option-Code for the Location URI Option

This document IANA registers the DHCPv6 Option Code in the DHCP Option Codes subregistry of the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) registry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XX</td>
<td>OPTION_GEOLOCATION_URI</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The authors have no preference at this time on what number IANA chooses.

5.3 Valid Location URI Schemes

This document creates a new IANA registry (Valid Location URI Schemes) of acceptable location URI schemes (or types) for this DHCP Location URI Option of the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) and Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) Parameters registry.

Initial values are given below; new assignments are to be made following the "IETF Review" policies [RFC5226].

"Valid Location URI Schemes"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location URI Scheme</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sip:</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sips:</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pres:</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>http:</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>https:</td>
<td>[this document]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Security Considerations

Where critical decisions might be based on the value of this location URI option, DHCP authentication as defined in "Authentication for DHCP Messages" [RFC3118] and "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)" [RFC3315] SHOULD be used to protect the integrity of the DHCP options.
A real concern with RFC 3118 or RFC 3315 is that neither is widely deployed because each requires pre-shared keys to successfully work (i.e., in the client and in the server). Most implementations do not accommodate this.

DHCP, initially, is a broadcast request (a client looking for a server), and a unicast response (answer from a server) type of protocol. There is no privacy protection for DHCP messages, an eavesdropper who can monitor the link between the DHCP server and requesting client can discover the Location URI.

Once a client has a Location URI, it needs information on how the location server will control access to dereference requests. A client might treat a tightly access-controlled URI differently from one that can be dereferenced by anyone on the Internet (i.e., one following the "possession model"). Since the client does not know what policy will be applied during this validity interval, clients MUST handle location URIs as if they could be dereferenced by anybody until they expire. For example, such open location URIs should only be transmitted in encrypted channels. Nonetheless, location servers SHOULD apply appropriate access control policies, for example by limiting the number of queries that any given client can make, or limiting access to users within an enterprise.

Extensions to this option, such as [ID-POLICY-URI] can provide mechanisms for accessing and provisioning policy. Giving users access to policy information will allow them to make more informed decisions about how to use their location URIs. Allowing users to provide policy information to the LS will enable them to tailor access control policies to their needs (within the bounds of policy that the LS will accept).

As to the concerns about the location URI itself, as stated in the document (see Section 3), it MUST NOT have any user identifying information in the URI user-part/string itself. The location URI also needs to be hard to guess that it belongs to a specific user.

In some cases a DHCP server may be implemented across an uncontrolled network. In those cases, it would be appropriate for a network administrator to perform a threat analysis (see RFC 3552) and take precautions as needed.

Link-layer confidentiality and integrity protection may also be employed to reduce the risk of location disclosure and tampering.

7. Acknowledgements

Thanks to James Winterbottom, Marc Linsner, Roger Marshall and Robert Sparks for their useful comments. And to Lisa Dusseault for her concerns about the types of URIs that can cause harm. To
Richard Barnes for inspiring a more robust Security Considerations section, and for offering the text to incorporate HTTP URIs. To Hannes Tschofenig and Ted Hardie for riding me to comply with their concerns, including a good scrubbing of the nearly final doc.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


[RFC6442] Polk, J., Rosen, B., and J. Peterson, "Location Conveyance
8.2. Informative References


Authors’ Address

James Polk
3913 Treemont Circle
Colleyville, Texas 76034
USA

Email: jmpolk@cisco.com
Using Device-provided Location-Related Measurements in Location Configuration Protocols
draft-ietf-geopriv-held-measurements-09

Abstract

This document describes a protocol for a Device to provide location-related measurement data to a Location Information Server (LIS) within a request for location information. Location-related measurement information are observations concerning properties related to the position of a Device, which could be data about network attachment or about the physical environment. A LIS is able to use the location-related measurement data to improve the accuracy of the location estimate it provides to the Device. A basic set of location-related measurements are defined, including common modes of network attachment as well as assisted Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) parameters.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on March 10, 2014.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 4
2. Conventions used in this document ............................. 5
3. Location-Related Measurements in LCPs ........................ 5
4. Location-Related Measurement Data Types ....................... 7
   4.1. Measurement Container ................................... 7
       4.1.1. Time of Measurement ................................. 8
       4.1.2. Expiry Time on Location-Related Measurement Data .. 8
   4.2. RMS Error and Number of Samples .......................... 8
       4.2.1. Time RMS Error .................................... 9
   4.3. Measurement Request ...................................... 10
   4.4. Identifying Location Provenance ........................... 11
5. Location-Related Measurement Data Types ....................... 13
   5.1. LLDP Measurements ...................................... 14
   5.2. DHCP Relay Agent Information Measurements ............... 15
   5.3. 802.11 WLAN Measurements ................................ 15
       5.3.1. Wifi Measurement Requests .......................... 19
   5.4. Cellular Measurements ................................... 19
       5.4.1. Cellular Measurement Requests ....................... 22
   5.5. GNSS Measurements ....................................... 22
       5.5.1. GNSS System and Signal ............................. 24
       5.5.2. Time .............................................. 24
       5.5.3. Per-Satellite Measurement Data ..................... 24
       5.5.4. GNSS Measurement Requests ........................... 25
   5.6. DSL Measurements ....................................... 25
       5.6.1. L2TP Measurements .................................. 26
       5.6.2. RADIUS Measurements ................................ 26
       5.6.3. Ethernet VLAN Tag Measurements ...................... 27
       5.6.4. ATM Virtual Circuit Measurements ................... 28
6. Privacy Considerations ........................................... 28
   6.1. Measurement Data Privacy Model ............................ 28
   6.2. LIS Privacy Requirements .................................. 29
   6.3. Measurement Data and Location URIs ........................ 29
   6.4. Third-Party-Provided Measurement Data ..................... 30
7. Security Considerations ......................................... 30
   7.1. Threat Model ............................................. 30
       7.1.1. Acquiring Location Information Without Authorization 31

Thomson & Winterbottom Expires March 10, 2014 [Page 2]
7.1.2. Extracting Network Topology Data .................................. 32
7.1.3. Exposing Network Topology Data .................................... 32
7.1.4. Lying By Proxy ....................................................... 32
7.1.5. Measurement Replay ................................................ 33
7.1.6. Environment Spoofing ............................................... 34
7.2. Mitigation ............................................................ 35
7.2.1. Measurement Validation ............................................. 36
7.2.1.1. Effectiveness .................................................... 36
7.2.1.2. Limitations (Unique Observer) .................................. 37
7.2.2. Location Validation ................................................ 38
7.2.2.1. Effectiveness .................................................... 38
7.2.2.2. Limitations ...................................................... 38
7.2.3. Supporting Observations .......................................... 39
7.2.3.1. Effectiveness .................................................... 39
7.2.3.2. Limitations ...................................................... 40
7.2.4. Attribution ........................................................ 40
7.2.5. Stateful Correlation of Location Requests ....................... 41
7.3. An Unauthorized or Compromised LIS ................................ 42
8. Measurement Schemas ..................................................... 42
8.1. Measurement Container Schema ......................................... 42
8.2. Measurement Source Schema ........................................... 44
8.3. Base Type Schema ...................................................... 45
8.4. LLDP Measurement Schema ............................................. 48
8.5. DHCP Measurement Schema ............................................ 49
8.6. WiFi Measurement Schema ............................................ 50
8.7. Cellular Measurement Schema ........................................ 54
8.8. GNSS Measurement Schema ............................................ 56
8.9. DSL Measurement Schema ............................................. 58
9. IANA Considerations ..................................................... 60
9.1. IANA Registry for GNSS Types ......................................... 60
9.2. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
9.3. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm ........................................ 62
9.4. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
9.5. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:lldp .................................... 63
9.6. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:dhcp .................................... 64
9.7. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:wifi .................................... 65
9.8. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:cell .................................... 65
9.9. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
9.10. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:.dsl ..................................... 67
1. Introduction

A Location Configuration Protocol (LCP) provides a means for a Device to request information about its physical location from an access network. A location information server (LIS) is the server that provides location information that is available due to the knowledge it has about the network and physical environment.

As a part of the access network, the LIS is able to acquire measurement results related to Device location from network elements. The LIS also has access to information about the network topology that can be used to turn measurement data into location information. This information can be further enhanced with information acquired from the Device itself.

A Device is able to make observations about its network attachment, or its physical environment. The location-related measurement data might be unavailable to the LIS; alternatively, the LIS might be able to acquire the data, but at a higher cost, in time or an other metric. Providing measurement data gives the LIS more options in determining location, which could improve the quality of the service provided by the LIS. Improvements in accuracy are one potential gain, but improved response times and lower error rates are possible.

This document describes a means for a Device to report location-related measurement data to the LIS. Examples based on the HELD [RFC5985] location configuration protocol are provided.
2. Conventions used in this document

The terms LIS and Device are used in this document in a manner consistent with the usage in [RFC5985].

This document also uses the following definitions:

Location Measurement: An observation about the physical properties of a particular Device’s position in time and space. The result of a location measurement — "location-related measurement data", or simply "measurement data" given sufficient context — can be used to determine the location of a Device. Location-related measurement data does not directly identify a Device, though it could do indirectly. Measurement data can change with time if the location of the Device also changes.

Location-related measurement data does not necessarily contain location information directly, but it can be used in combination with contextual knowledge and/or algorithms to derive location information. Examples of location-related measurement data are: radio signal strength or timing measurements, Ethernet switch and port identifiers.

Location-related measurement data can be considered sighting information, based on the definition in [RFC3693].

Location Estimate: A location estimate is an approximation of where the Device is located. Location estimates are derived from location measurements. Location estimates are subject to uncertainty, which arise from errors in measurement results.

GNSS: Global Navigation Satellite System. A satellite-based system that provides positioning and time information. For example, the US Global Positioning System (GPS) or the European Galileo system.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Location-Related Measurements in LCPs

This document defines a standard container for the conveyance of location-related measurement parameters in location configuration protocols. This is an XML container that identifies parameters by type and allows the Device to provide the results of any measurement it is able to perform. A set of measurement schemas are also defined that can be carried in the generic container.
A simple example of measurement data conveyance is illustrated by the example message in Figure 1. This shows a HELD location request message with an Ethernet switch and port measurement taken using LLDP [IEEE.8021AB].

```xml
<locationRequest xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held">
  <locationType exact="true">civic</locationType>
  <measurements xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm"
      time="2008-04-29T14:33:58">
    <lldp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:lldp">
      <chassis type="4">0a01003c</chassis>
      <port type="6">c2</port>
    </lldp>
  </measurements>
</locationRequest>
```

Figure 1: HELD Location Request with Measurement Data

This LIS can ignore measurement data that it does not support or understand. The measurements defined in this document follow this rule: extensions that could result in backward incompatibility MUST be added as new measurement definitions rather than extensions to existing types.

Multiple sets of measurement data, either of the same type or from different sources, can be included in the "measurements" element. See Section 4.1.1 for details on repetition of this element.

A LIS can choose to use or ignore location-related measurement data in determining location, as long as rules regarding use and retention (Section 6) are respected. The "method" parameter in the Presence Information Data Format – Location Object (PIDF-LO) [RFC4119] SHOULD be adjusted to reflect the method used. A correct "method" can assist location recipients in assessing the quality (both accuracy and integrity) of location information, though there could be reasons to withhold information about the source of data.

Measurement data is typically only used to serve the request that it is included in. There may be exceptions, particularly with respect to location URIs. Section 6 provides more information on usage rules.
Location-related measurement data need not be provided exclusively by Devices. A third party location requester (for example, see [RFC6155]) can request location information using measurement data, if the requester is able to acquire measurement data and authorized to distribute it. There are specific privacy considerations relating to the use of measurements by third parties, which are discussed in Section 6.4.

Location-related measurement data and its use presents a number of privacy and security challenges. These are described in more detail in Section 6 and Section 7.

4. Location-Related Measurement Data Types

A common container is defined for the expression of location measurement data, as well as a simple means of identifying specific types of measurement data for the purposes of requesting them.

The following example shows a measurement container with measurement time and expiration time included. A WiFi measurement is enclosed.

```xml
<lm:measurements xmlns:lm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm"
    time="2008-04-29T14:33:58"
    expires="2008-04-29T17:33:58">
    <wifi xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:wifi">
        <ap serving="true">
            <bssid>00-12-F0-A0-80-EF</bssid>
            <ssid>wlan-home</ssid>
        </ap>
    </wifi>
</lm:measurements>
```

Figure 2: Measurement Example

4.1. Measurement Container

The "measurements" element is used to encapsulate measurement data that is collected at a certain point in time. It contains time-based attributes that are common to all forms of measurement data, and permits the inclusion of arbitrary measurement data. The elements that are included within the "measurements" element are generically referred to as "measurement elements".

This container can be added to a request for location information in any protocol capable of carrying XML, such as a HELD location request [RFC5985].
4.1.1. Time of Measurement

The "time" attribute records the time that the measurement or observation was made. This time can be different to the time that the measurement information was reported. Time information can be used to populate a timestamp on the location result, or to determine if the measurement information is used.

The "time" attribute SHOULD be provided whenever possible. This allows a LIS to avoid selecting an arbitrary timestamp. Exceptions to this, where omitting time might make sense, include relatively static types of measurement (for instance, the DSL measurements in Section 5.6) or for legacy Devices that don’t record time information (such as the Home Location Register/Home Subscriber Server for cellular).

The "time" attribute is attached to the root "measurement" element. Multiple measurements can often be given the same timestamp, even when the measurements were not actually taken at the same time (consider a set of measurements taken sequentially, where the difference in time between observations is not significant). Measurements cannot be grouped if they have different types, or there is a need for independent time values on each measurement. In these instances, multiple measurement sets are necessary.

4.1.2. Expiry Time on Location-Related Measurement Data

A Device is able to indicate an expiry time in the location measurement using the "expires" attribute. Nominally, this attribute indicates how long information is expected to be valid, but it can also indicate a time limit on the retention and use of the measurement data. A Device can use this attribute to request that the LIS not retain measurement data beyond the indicated time.

Note: Movement of the Device might result in the measurement data being invalidated before the expiry time.

A Device is advised to set the "expires" attribute to earlier of: the time that measurements are likely to be unusable, and the time that it desires to have measurements discarded by the LIS. A Device that does not desire measurement data to be retained can omit the "expires" attribute. Section 6 describes more specific rules regarding measurement data retention.

4.2. RMS Error and Number of Samples
Often a measurement is taken more than once. Reporting the average of a number of measurement results mitigates the effects of random errors that occur in the measurement process.

Reporting each measurement individually can be the most effective method of reporting multiple measurements. This is achieved by providing multiple measurement elements for different times.

The alternative is to aggregate multiple measurements and report a mean value across the set of measurements. Additional information about the distribution of the results can be useful in determining location uncertainty.

Two attributes are provided for use on some measurement values:

**rmsError**: The root-mean-squared (RMS) error of the set of measurement values used in calculating the result. RMS error is expressed in the same units as the measurement, unless otherwise stated. If an accurate value for RMS error is not known, this value can be used to indicate an upper bound or estimate for the RMS error.

**samples**: The number of samples that were taken in determining the measurement value. If omitted, this value can be assumed to be large enough that the RMS error is an indication of the standard deviation of the sample set.

For some measurement techniques, measurement error is largely dependent on the measurement technique employed. In these cases, measurement error is largely a product of the measurement technique and not the specific circumstances, so RMS error does not need to be actively measured. A fixed value MAY be provided for RMS error where appropriate.

The "rmsError" and "samples" elements are added as attributes of specific measurement data types.

4.2.1. Time RMS Error

Measurement of time can be significant in certain circumstances. The GNSS measurements included in this document are one such case where a small error in time can result in a large error in location. Factors such as clock drift and errors in time synchronization can result in small, but significant, time errors. Including an indication of the quality of time measurements can be helpful.
A "timeError" attribute MAY be added to the "measurement" element to indicate the RMS error in time. "timeError" indicates an upper bound on the time RMS error in seconds.

The "timeError" attribute does not apply where multiple samples of a measurement are taken over time. If multiple samples are taken, each SHOULD be included in a different "measurement" element.

4.3. Measurement Request

A measurement request is used by a protocol peer to describe a set of measurement data that it desires. A "measurementRequest" element is defined that can be included in a protocol exchange.

For instance, a LIS can use a measurement request in HELD responses. If the LIS is unable to provide location information, but it believes that a particular measurement type would enable it to provide a location, it can include a measurement request in an error response.

The "measurement" element of the measurement request identifies the type of measurement that is requested. The "type" attribute of this element indicates the type of measurement, as identified by an XML qualified name. An "samples" attribute MAY be used to indicate how many samples of the identified measurement are requested.

The "measurement" element can be repeated to request multiple (or alternative) measurement types.

Additional XML content might be defined for a particular measurement type that is used to further refine a request. These elements either constrain what is requested or specify non-mandatory components of the measurement data that are needed. These are defined along with the specific measurement type.

In the HELD protocol, the inclusion of a measurement request in an error response with a code of "locationUnknown" indicates that providing measurements would increase the likelihood of a subsequent request being successful.

The following example shows a HELD error response that indicates that WiFi measurement data would be useful if a later request were made. Additional elements indicate that received signal strength for an 802.11n access point is requested.
<error xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held"
code="locationUnknown">
  <message xml:lang="en">Insufficient measurement data</message>
  <measurementRequest
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm"
    <measurement type="wifi:wifi">
      <wifi:type>n</wifi:type>
      <wifi:parameter context="ap">wifi:rcpi</wifi:parameter>
    </measurement>
  </measurementRequest>
</error>

Figure 3: HELD Error Requesting Measurement Data

A measurement request that is included in other HELD messages has
undefined semantics and can be safely ignored. Other specifications
might define semantics for measurement requests under other
conditions.

4.4. Identifying Location Provenance

An extension is made to the PIDF-LO [RFC4119] that allows a location
recipient to identify the source (or sources) of location information
and the measurement data that was used to determine that location
information.

The "source" element is added to the "geopriv" element of the PIDF-
LO. This element does not identify specific entities. Instead, it
identifies the type of source.

The following types of measurement source are identified:

lis: Location information is based on measurement data that the LIS
or sources that it trusts have acquired. This label MAY be used
if measurement data provided by the Device has been completely
validated by the LIS.

device: A LIS MUST include this value if the location information is
based (in whole or part) on measurement data provided by the
Device and if the measurement data isn’t completely validated.

other: Location information is based on measurement data that a
third party has provided. This might be an authorized third party
that uses identity parameters [RFC6155] or any other entity. The
LIS MUST include this, unless the third party is trusted by the
LIS to provide measurement data.
No assertion is made about the veracity of the measurement data from sources other than the LIS. A combination of tags MAY be included to indicate that measurement data from multiple types of sources was used.

For example, the first tuple of the following PIDF-LO indicates that measurement data from a LIS and a device was combined to produce the result, the second tuple was produced by the LIS alone.
<presence xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf"
   xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10"
   xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
   xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
   entity="pres:lm@example.com">
  <tuple id="deviceLoc">
    <status>
      <gp:geopriv>
        <gp:location-info>
          <gs:Circle srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326">
            <gml:pos>7.34324 134.47162</gml:pos>
            <gs:radius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">850.24</gs:radius>
          </gs:Circle>
        </gp:location-info>
      </gp:geopriv>
    </status>
  </tuple>
  <tuple id="lisLoc">
    <status>
      <gp:geopriv>
        <gp:location-info>
          <gs:Circle srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326">
            <gml:pos>7.34379 134.46484</gml:pos>
            <gs:radius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">9000</gs:radius>
          </gs:Circle>
        </gp:location-info>
      </gp:geopriv>
    </status>
  </tuple>
</presence>

PIDF-LO document with source labels

5. Location-Related Measurement Data Types

This document defines location-related measurement data types for a range of common network types.

Thomson & Winterbottom   Expires March 10, 2014       [Page 13]
All included measurement data definitions allow for arbitrary extension in the corresponding schema. New parameters that are applicable to location determination are added as new XML elements in a unique namespace, not by adding elements to an existing namespace.

5.1. LLDP Measurements

Link-Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) [IEEE.8021AB] messages are sent between adjacent nodes in an IEEE 802 network (e.g. wired Ethernet, WiFi, 802.16). These messages all contain identification information for the sending node, which can be used to determine location information. A Device that receives LLDP messages can report this information as a location-related measurement to the LIS, which is then able to use the measurement data in determining the location of the Device.

Note: The LLDP extensions defined in LLDP Media Endpoint Discovery (LLDP-MED) [ANSI-TIA-1057] provide the ability to acquire location information directly from an LLDP endpoint. Where this information is available, it might be unnecessary to use any other form of location configuration.

Values are provided as hexadecimal sequences. The Device MUST report the values directly as they were provided by the adjacent node. Attempting to adjust or translate the type of identifier is likely to cause the measurement data to be useless.

Where a Device has received LLDP messages from multiple adjacent nodes, it should provide information extracted from those messages by repeating the "lldp" element.

An example of an LLDP measurement is shown in Figure 4. This shows an adjacent node (chassis) that is identified by the IP address 192.0.2.45 (hexadecimal c000022d) and the port on that node is numbered using an agent circuit ID [RFC3046] of 162 (hexadecimal a2).

```
<measurements xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm"
time="2008-04-29T14:33:58">
  <lldp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:lldp">
    <chassis type="4">c000022d</chassis>
    <port type="6">a2</port>
  </lldp>
</measurements>
```

Figure 4: LLDP Measurement Example
IEEE 802 Devices that are able to obtain information about adjacent network switches and their attachment to them by other means MAY use this data type to convey this information.

5.2. DHCP Relay Agent Information Measurements

The DHCP Relay Agent Information option [RFC3046] provides measurement data about the network attachment of a Device. This measurement data can be included in the "dhcp-rai" element.

The elements in the DHCP relay agent information options are opaque data types assigned by the DHCP relay agent. The three items MAY be omitted if unknown: circuit identifier ("circuit", circuit [RFC3046], Interface-Id [RFC3315]), remote identifier ("remote", Remote ID [RFC3046], or remote-id [RFC4649]) and subscriber identifier ("subscriber", subscriber-id [RFC3993], Subscriber-ID [RFC4580]). The DHCPv6 remote-id has an associated enterprise number [IANA.enterprise] as an XML attribute.

```xml
<measurements xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm"
time="2008-04-29T14:33:58">
    <giaddr>192.0.2.158</giaddr>
    <circuit>108b</circuit>
  </dhcp-rai>
</measurements>
```

Figure 5: DHCP Relay Agent Information Measurement Example

The "giaddr" is specified as a dotted quad IPv4 address or an RFC 4291 [RFC4291] IPv6 address, using the forms defined in [RFC3986]; IPv6 addresses SHOULD use the form described in [RFC5952]. The enterprise number is specified as a decimal integer. All other information is included verbatim from the DHCP request in hexadecimal format.

The "subscriber" element could be considered sensitive. This information MUST NOT be provided to a LIS that is not authorized to receive information about the access network. See Section 7.1.3 for more details.

5.3. 802.11 WLAN Measurements

In WiFi, or 802.11 [IEEE.80211], networks a Device might be able to provide information about the access point (AP) that it is attached to, or other WiFi points it is able to see. This is provided using the "wifi" element, as shown in Figure 6, which shows a single complete measurement for a single access point.
<measurements xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm"
time="2011-04-29T14:33:58">
  <wifi xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:wifi">
    <nicType>Intel(r)PRO/Wireless 2200BG</nicType>
    <ap serving="true">
      <bssid>AB-CD-EF-AB-CD-EF</bssid>
      <ssid>example</ssid>
      <channel>5</channel>
      <location>
        <gml:Point xmlns:gml="http://opengis.net/gml">
          <gml:pos>-34.4 150.8</gml:pos>
        </gml:Point>
      </location>
      <type>a</type>
      <band>5</band>
      <regclass country="AU">2</regclass>
      <antenna>2</antenna>
      <flightTime rmsError="4e-9" samples="1">2.56e-9</flightTime>
      <apSignal>
        <transmit>23</transmit>
        <gain>5</gain>
        <rcpi dBm="true" rmsError="12" samples="1">-59</rcpi>
        <rsni rmsError="15" samples="1">23</rsni>
      </apSignal>
      <deviceSignal>
        <transmit>10</transmit>
        <gain>9</gain>
        <rcpi dBm="true" rmsError="9.5" samples="1">-98.5</rcpi>
        <rsni rmsError="6" samples="1">7.5</rsni>
      </deviceSignal>
    </ap>
  </wifi>
</measurements>

Figure 6: 802.11 WLAN Measurement Example

A wifi element is made up of one or more access points, and a
"nicType" element, which MAY be omitted. Each access point is
described using the "ap" element, which is comprised of the following
fields:

bssid: The basic service set identifier. In an Infrastructure BSS
network, the bssid is the 48 bit MAC address of the access point.

The "verified" attribute of this element describes whether the
device has verified the MAC address or it authenticated the access
point or the network operating the access point (for example, a
captive portal accessed through the access point has been
authenticated). This attribute defaults to a value of "false" when omitted.

ssid: The service set identifier (SSID) for the wireless network served by the access point.

The SSID is a 32-octet identifier that is commonly represented as an ASCII [ASCII] or UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded string. To represent octets that cannot be directly included in an XML element, escaping is used. Sequences of octets that do not represent a valid UTF-8 encoding can be escaped using a backslash ('\') followed by two case-insensitive hexadecimal digits representing the value of a single octet.

The canonical or value-space form of an SSID is a sequence of up to 32 octets that is produced from the concatenation of UTF-8 encoded sequences of unescaped characters and octets derived from escaped components.

channel: The channel number (frequency) that the access point operates on.

location: The location of the access point, as reported by the access point. This element contains any valid location, using the rules for a "location-info" element, as described in [RFC5491].

type: The network type for the network access. This element includes the alphabetic suffix of the 802.11 specification that introduced the radio interface, or PHY; e.g. "a", "b", "g", or "n".

band: The frequency band for the radio, in gigahertz (GHz). 802.11 [IEEE.80211] specifies PHY layers that use 2.4, 3.7 and 5 gigahertz frequency bands.

regclass: The operating class (regulatory domain and class in older versions in 802.11), see Annex E of [IEEE.80211]. The "country" attribute optionally includes the applicable two character country identifier (dot11CountryString), which can be followed by an 'O', 'I' or 'X'. The element text content includes the value of the regulatory class: an 8-bit integer in decimal form.

antenna: The antenna identifier for the antenna that the access point is using to transmit the measured signals.

flightTime: Flight time is the difference between the time of departure (TOD) of signal from a transmitting station and time of arrival (TOA) of signal at a receiving station, as defined in
Measurement of this value requires that stations synchronize their clocks. This value can be measured by access point or Device; because the flight time is assumed to be the same in either direction - aside from measurement errors - only a single element is provided. This element permits the use of the "rmsError" and "samples" attributes. RMS error might be derived from the reported RMS error in TOD and TOA.

**apSignal:** Measurement information for the signal transmitted by the access point, as observed by the Device. Some of these values are derived from 802.11v [IEEE.80211] messages exchanged between Device and access point. The contents of this element include:

- **transmit:** The transmit power reported by the access point, in dBm.
- **gain:** The gain of the access point antenna reported by the access point, in dB.
- **rcpi:** The received channel power indicator for the access point signal, as measured by the Device. This value SHOULD be in units of dBm (with RMS error in dB). If power is measured in a different fashion, the "dBm" attribute MUST be set to "false". Signal strength reporting on current hardware uses a range of different mechanisms; therefore, the value of the "nicType" element SHOULD be included if the units are not known to be in dBm and the value reported by the hardware should be included without modification. This element permits the use of the "rmsError" and "samples" attributes.
- **rsni:** The received signal to noise indicator in dB. This element permits the use of the "rmsError" and "samples" attributes.

**deviceSignal:** Measurement information for the signal transmitted by the device, as reported by the access point. This element contains the same child elements as the "ap" element, with the access point and Device roles reversed.

The only mandatory element in this structure is "bssid".

The "nicType" element is used to specify the make and model of the wireless network interface in the Device. Different 802.11 chipsets report measurements in different ways, so knowing the network interface type aids the LIS in determining how to use the provided measurement data. The content of this field is unconstrained and no mechanisms are specified to ensure uniqueness. This field is unlikely to be useful, except under tightly controlled circumstances.
5.3.1. Wifi Measurement Requests

Two elements are defined for requesting WiFi measurements in a measurement request:

type: The "type" element identifies the desired type (or types that are requested).

parameter: The "parameter" element identifies measurements that are requested for each measured access point. An element is identified by its qualified name. The "context" parameter can be used to specify if an element is included as a child of the "ap" or "device" elements; omission indicates that it applies to both.

Multiple types or parameters can be requested by repeating either element.

5.4. Cellular Measurements

Cellular Devices are common throughout the world and base station identifiers can provide a good source of coarse location information. Cellular measurements can be provided to a LIS run by the cellular operator, or may be provided to an alternative LIS operator that has access to one of several global cell-id to location mapping databases.

A number of advanced location determination methods have been developed for cellular networks. For these methods a range of measurement parameters can be collected by the network, Device, or both in cooperation. This document includes a basic identifier for the wireless transmitter only; future efforts might define additional parameters that enable more accurate methods of location determination.

The cellular measurement set allows a Device to report to a LIS any LTE (Figure 7), UMTS (Figure 8), GSM (Figure 9) or CDMA (Figure 10) cells that it is able to observe. Cells are reported using their global identifiers. All 3GPP cells are identified by public land mobile network (PLMN), which is formed of mobile country code (MCC) and mobile network code (MNC); specific fields are added for each network type.

Formats for 3GPP cell identifiers are described in [TS.3GPP.23.003]. Bit-level formats for CDMA cell identifiers are described in [TIA-2000.5]; decimal representations are used.
MCC and MNC are provided as decimal digit sequences; a leading zero in an MCC or MNC is significant. All other values are decimal integers.

Figure 7: Example LTE Cellular Measurement

Universal mobile telephony service (UMTS) cells are identified by 12- or 16-bit radio network controller (rnc) id and a 16-bit cell id (cid).

Figure 8: Example UMTS Cellular Measurement
Global System for Mobile communication (GSM) cells are identified by a 16-bit location area code (lac) and 16-bit cell id (cid).

Figure 9: Example GSM Cellular Measurement

  <cellular xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:cell">
    <servingCell>
      <sid>15892</sid><nid>4723</nid><baseid>12</baseid>
    </servingCell>
    <observedCell>
      <sid>15892</sid><nid>4723</nid><baseid>13</baseid>
    </observedCell>
  </cellular>
</measurements>

Code division multiple access (CDMA) cells are not identified by PLMN, instead these use a 15-bit system id (sid), a 16-bit network id (nid) and a 16-bit base station id (baseid).

Figure 10: Example CDMA Cellular Measurement

In general, a cellular Device will be attached to the cellular network and so the notion of a serving cell exists. Cellular network also provide overlap between neighbouring sites, so a mobile Device can hear more than one cell. The measurement schema supports sending both the serving cell and any other cells that the mobile might be able to hear. In some cases, the Device could simply be listening to cell information without actually attaching to the network, mobiles without a SIM are an example of this. In this case the Device could report cells it can hear without identifying any particular cell as serving cell. An example of this is shown in Figure 11.

  <cellular xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:cell">
    <observedCell>
      <mcc>465</mcc><mnc>20</mnc>
      <rnc>2000</rnc><cid>65000</cid>
    </observedCell>
    <observedCell>
      <mcc>465</mcc><mnc>06</mnc>
      <lac>16383</lac><cid>32767</cid>
    </observedCell>
  </cellular>
</measurements>
5.4.1. Cellular Measurement Requests

Two elements can be used in measurement requests for cellular measurements:

type: A label indicating the type of identifier to provide: one of "gsm", "umts", "lte", or "cdma".

network: The network portion of the cell identifier. For 3GPP networks, this is the combination of MCC and MNC; for CDMA, this is the network identifier.

Multiple identifier types or networks can be identified by repeating either element.

5.5. GNSS Measurements

A Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) uses orbiting satellites to transmit signals. A Device with a GNSS receiver is able to take measurements from the satellite signals. The results of these measurements can be used to determine time and the location of the Device.

Determining location and time in autonomous GNSS receivers follows three steps:

Signal acquisition: During the signal acquisition stage, the receiver searches for the repeating code that is sent by each GNSS satellite. Successful operation typically requires measurement data for a minimum of 5 satellites. At this stage, measurement data is available to the Device.

Navigation message decode: Once the signal has been acquired, the receiver then receives information about the configuration of the satellite constellation. This information is broadcast by each satellite and is modulated with the base signal at a low rate; for instance, GPS sends this information at about 50 bits per second.

Calculation: The measurement data is combined with the data on the satellite constellation to determine the location of the receiver and the current time.
A Device that uses a GNSS receiver is able to report measurements after the first stage of this process. A LIS can use the results of these measurements to determine a location. In the case where there are fewer results available than the optimal minimum, the LIS might be able to use other sources of measurement information and combine these with the available measurement data to determine a position.

Note: The use of different sets of GNSS _assistance data_ can reduce the amount of time required for the signal acquisition stage and obviate the need for the receiver to extract data on the satellite constellation. Provision of assistance data is outside the scope of this document.

Figure 12 shows an example of GNSS measurement data. The measurement shown is for the GPS system and includes measurement data for three satellites only.

```
<measurements xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm"
    time="2008-04-29T14:33:58" timeError="2e-5">
  <gnss xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:gnss"
      system="gps" signal="L1">
    <sat num="19">
      <doppler>499.9395</doppler>
      <codephase rmsError="1.6e-9">0.87595747</codephase>
      <cn0>45</cn0>
    </sat>
    <sat num="27">
      <doppler>378.2657</doppler>
      <codephase rmsError="1.6e-9">0.56639479</codephase>
      <cn0>52</cn0>
    </sat>
    <sat num="20">
      <doppler>-633.0309</doppler>
      <codephase rmsError="1.6e-9">0.57016835</codephase>
      <cn0>48</cn0>
    </sat>
  </gnss>
</measurements>
```

Figure 12: Example GNSS Measurement

Each "gnss" element represents a single set of GNSS measurement data, taken at a single point in time. Measurements taken at different times can be included in different "gnss" elements to enable iterative refinement of results.

GNSS measurement parameters are described in more detail in the following sections.
5.5.1. GNSS System and Signal

The GNSS measurement structure is designed to be generic and to apply to different GNSS types. Different signals within those systems are also accounted for and can be measured separately.

The GNSS type determines the time system that is used. An indication of the type of system and signal can ensure that the LIS is able to correctly use measurements.

Measurements for multiple GNSS types and signals can be included by repeating the "gnss" element.

This document creates an IANA registry for GNSS types. Two satellite systems are registered by this document: GPS [GPS.ICD] and Galileo [Galileo.ICD]. Details for the registry are included in Section 9.1.

5.5.2. Time

Each set of GNSS measurements is taken at a specific point in time. The "time" attribute is used to indicate the time that the measurement was acquired, if the receiver knows how the time system used by the GNSS relates to UTC time.

Alternative to (or in addition to) the measurement time, the "gnssTime" element MAY be included. The "gnssTime" element includes a relative time in milliseconds using the time system native to the satellite system. For the GPS satellite system, the "gnssTime" element includes the time of week in milliseconds. For the Galileo system, the "gnssTime" element includes the time of day in milliseconds.

The accuracy of the time measurement provided is critical in determining the accuracy of the location information derived from GNSS measurements. The receiver SHOULD indicate an estimated time error for any time that is provided. An RMS error can be included for the "gnssTime" element, with a value in milliseconds.

5.5.3. Per-Satellite Measurement Data

Multiple satellites are included in each set of GNSS measurements using the "sat" element. Each satellite is identified by a number in the "num" attribute. The satellite number is consistent with the identifier used in the given GNSS.

Both the GPS and Galileo systems use satellite numbers between 1 and 64.
The GNSS receiver measures the following parameters for each satellite:

doppler: The observed Doppler shift of the satellite signal, measured in meters per second. This is converted from a value in Hertz by the receiver to allow the measurement to be used without knowledge of the carrier frequency of the satellite system. This value permits the use of RMS error attributes, also measured in meters per second.

codephase: The observed code phase for the satellite signal, measured in milliseconds. This is converted from the system-specific value of chips or wavelengths into a system independent value. Larger values indicate larger distances from satellite to receiver. This value permits the use of RMS error attributes, also measured in milliseconds.

cn0: The signal to noise ratio for the satellite signal, measured in decibel-Hertz (dB-Hz). The expected range is between 20 and 50 dB-Hz.

mp: An estimation of the amount of error that multipath signals contribute in meters. This parameter MAY be omitted.

cq: An indication of the carrier quality. Two attributes are included: "continuous" can be either "true" or "false"; direct can be either "direct" or "inverted". This parameter MAY be omitted.

adr: The accumulated Doppler range, measured in meters. This parameter MAY be omitted and is not useful unless multiple sets of GNSS measurements are provided or differential positioning is being performed.

All values are converted from measures native to the satellite system to generic measures to ensure consistency of interpretation. Unless necessary, the schema does not constrain these values.

5.5.4. GNSS Measurement Requests

Measurement requests can include a "gnss" element, which includes the "system" and "signal" attributes. Multiple elements can be included to indicate a requests for GNSS measurements from multiple systems or signals.

5.6. DSL Measurements

Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) networks rely on a range of network technologies. DSL deployments regularly require cooperation between
multiple organizations. These fall into two broad categories: infrastructure providers and Internet service providers (ISPs). For the same end user, an infrastructure and Internet service can be provided by different entities. Infrastructure providers manage the bulk of the physical infrastructure including cabling. End users obtain their service from an ISP, which manages all aspects visible to the end user including IP address allocation and operation of a LIS. See [DSL.TR025] and [DSL.TR101] for further information on DSL network deployments and the parameters that are available.

Exchange of measurement information between these organizations is necessary for location information to be correctly generated. The ISP LIS needs to acquire location information from the infrastructure provider. However, since the infrastructure provider could have no knowledge of Device identifiers, it can only identify a stream of data that is sent to the ISP. This is resolved by passing measurement data relating to the Device to a LIS operated by the infrastructure provider.

5.6.1. L2TP Measurements

Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) [RFC2661] is a common means of linking the infrastructure provider and the ISP. The infrastructure provider LIS requires measurement data that identifies a single L2TP tunnel, from which it can generate location information. Figure 13 shows an example L2TP measurement.

<measurements xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm"
    time="2008-04-29T14:33:58">
    <dsl xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:dsl">
        <l2tp>
            <src>192.0.2.10</src>
            <dest>192.0.2.61</dest>
            <session>528</session>
        </l2tp>
    </dsl>
</measurements>

Figure 13: Example DSL L2TP Measurement

5.6.2. RADIUS Measurements
When authenticating network access, the infrastructure provider might employ a RADIUS [RFC2865] proxy at the DSL Access Module (DSLAM) or Access Node (AN). These messages provide the ISP RADIUS server with an identifier for the DSLAM or AN, plus the slot and port that the Device is attached to. These data can be provided as a measurement, which allows the infrastructure provider LIS to generate location information.

The format of the AN, slot and port identifiers are not defined in the RADIUS protocol. Slot and port together identify a circuit on the AN, analogous to the circuit identifier in [RFC3046]. These items are provided directly, as they were in the RADIUS message. An example is shown in Figure 14.

```xml
  <dsl xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:dsl">
    <an>AN-7692</an>
    <slot>3</slot>
    <port>06</port>
  </dsl>
</measurements>
```

Figure 14: Example DSL RADIUS Measurement

5.6.3. Ethernet VLAN Tag Measurements

For Ethernet-based DSL access networks, the DSL Access Module (DSLAM) or Access Node (AN) provide two VLAN tags on packets. A C-TAG is used to identify the incoming residential circuit, while the S-TAG is used to identify the DSLAM or AN. The C-TAG and S-TAG together can be used to identify a single point of network attachment. An example is shown in Figure 15.

```xml
  <dsl xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:dsl">
    <stag>613</stag>
    <ctag>1097</ctag>
  </dsl>
</measurements>
```

Figure 15: Example DSL VLAN Tag Measurement

Alternatively, the C-TAG can be replaced by data on the slot and port that the Device is attached to. This information might be included in RADIUS requests that are proxied from the infrastructure provider to the ISP RADIUS server.
5.6.4. ATM Virtual Circuit Measurements

An ATM virtual circuit can be employed between the ISP and infrastructure provider. Providing the virtual port ID (VPI) and virtual circuit ID (VCI) for the virtual circuit gives the infrastructure provider LIS the ability to identify a single data stream. A sample measurement is shown in Figure 16.

```xml
<measurements xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm"
  time="2008-04-29T14:33:58">
  <dsl xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:dsl">
    <vpi>55</vpi>
    <vci>6323</vci>
  </dsl>
</measurements>
```

Figure 16: Example DSL ATM Measurement

6. Privacy Considerations

Location-related measurement data can be as privacy sensitive as location information [RFC6280].

Measurement data is effectively equivalent to location information if the contextual knowledge necessary to generate one from the other is readily accessible. Even where contextual knowledge is difficult to acquire, there can be no assurance that an authorized recipient of the contextual knowledge is also authorized to receive location information.

In order to protect the privacy of the subject of location-related measurement data, measurement data MUST be protected with the same degree of protection as location information. The confidentiality and authentication provided by TLS MUST be used in order to convey measurement data over HELD [RFC5985]. Other protocols MUST provide comparable guarantees.

6.1. Measurement Data Privacy Model

It is not necessary to distribute measurement data in the same fashion as location information. Measurement data is less useful to location recipients than location information. A simple distribution model is described in this document.
In this simple model, the Device is the only entity that is able to distribute measurement data. To use an analogy from the GEOPRIV architecture, the Device - as the Location Generator, or the Measurement Data Generator - is the sole entity that can act for the role of both Rule Maker and Location Server.

A Device that provides location-related measurement data, MUST only do so as explicitly authorized by a Rule Maker. This depends on having an interface that allows Rule Makers (for instance, users or administrators) to control where and how measurement data is provided.

No entity is permitted to redistribute measurement data. The Device directs other entities in how measurement data is used and retained.

The GEOPRIV model [RFC6280] protects the location of a Target using direction provided by a Rule Maker. For the purposes of measurement data distribution, this model relies on the assumptions made in Section 3 of HELD [RFC5985]. These assumptions effectively declare the Device to be a proxy for both Target and Rule Maker.

### 6.2. LIS Privacy Requirements

A LIS MUST NOT reveal location-related measurement data to any other entity. A LIS MUST NOT reveal location information based on measurement data to any other entity unless directed to do so by the Device.

By adding measurement data to a request for location information, the Device implicitly grants permission for the LIS to generate the requested location information using the measurement data. Permission to use this data for any other purpose is not implied.

As long as measurement data is only used in serving the request that contains it, rules regarding data retention are not necessary. A LIS MUST discard location-related measurement data after servicing a request, unless the Device grants permission to use that information for other purposes.

### 6.3. Measurement Data and Location URIs

A LIS MAY use measurement data provided by the Device to serve requests to location URIs, if the Device permits it. A Device permits this by including measurement data in a request that explicitly requests a location URI. By requesting a location URI, the Device grants permission for the LIS to use the measurement data in serving requests to that location URI. The LIS cannot provide location recipients with measurement data, as defined in Section 6.1.
Note: In HELD, the "any" type is not an explicit request for a location URI, though a location URI might be provided.

The usefulness of measurement data that is provided in this fashion is limited. The measurement data is only valid at the time that it was acquired by the Device. At the time that a request is made to a location URI, the Device might have moved, rendering the measurement data incorrect.

A Device is able to explicitly limit the time that a LIS retains measurement data by adding an expiry time to the measurement data. A LIS MUST NOT retain location-related measurement data in memory, storage or logs beyond the time indicated in the "expires" attribute (Section 4.1.2). A LIS MUST NOT retain measurement data if the "expires" attribute is absent.

6.4. Third-Party-Provided Measurement Data

An authorized third-party request for the location of a Device (see [RFC6155]) can include location-related measurement data. This is possible where the third-party is able to make observations about the Device.

A third-party that provides measurement data MUST be authorized to provide the specific measurement for the identified device. A third-party MUST either be trusted by the LIS for the purposes of providing measurement data of the provided type, or the measurement data MUST be validated (see Section 7.2.1) before being used.

How a third-party authenticates its identity or gains authorization to use measurement data is not covered by this document.

7. Security Considerations

Use of location-related measurement data has privacy considerations that are discussed in Section 6.

7.1. Threat Model

The threat model for location-related measurement data concentrates on the Device providing falsified, stolen or incorrect measurement data.

A Device that provides location-related measurement data might use data to:

- acquire the location of another Device, without authorization;
o extract information about network topology; or

o coerce the LIS into providing falsified location information based on the measurement data.

Location-related measurement data describes the physical environment or network attachment of a Device. A third party adversary in the proximity of the Device might be able to alter the physical environment such that the Device provides measurement data that is controlled by the third party. This might be used to indirectly control the location information that is derived from measurement data.

7.1.1. Acquiring Location Information Without Authorization

Requiring authorization for location requests is an important part of privacy protections of a location protocol. A location configuration protocol usually operates under a restricted policy that allows a requester to obtain their own location. HELD identity extensions [RFC6155] allows other entities to be authorized, conditional on a Rule Maker providing sufficient authorization.

The intent of these protections is to ensure that a location recipient is authorized to acquire location information. Location-related measurement data could be used by an attacker to circumvent such authorization checks if the association between measurement data and Target Device is not validated by a LIS.

A LIS can be coerced into providing location information for a Device that a location recipient is not authorized to receive. A request identifies one Device (implicitly or explicitly), but measurement data is provided for another Device. If the LIS does not check that the measurement data is for the identified Device, it could incorrectly authorize the request.

By using unverified measurement data to generate a response, the LIS provides information about a Device without appropriate authorization.

The feasibility of this attack depends on the availability of information that links a Device with measurement data. In some cases, measurement data that is correlated with a target is readily available. For instance, LLDP measurements (Section 5.1) are broadcast to all nodes on the same network segment. An attacker on that network segment can easily gain measurement data that relates a Device with measurements.
For some types of measurement data, it’s necessary for an attacker to know the location of the target in order to determine what measurements to use. This attack is meaningless for types of measurement data that require that the attacker first know the location of the target before measurement data can be acquired or fabricated. GNSS measurements (Section 5.5) share this trait with many wireless location determination methods.

7.1.2. Extracting Network Topology Data

Allowing requests with measurements might be used to collect information about network topology.

Network topology can be considered sensitive information by a network operator for commercial or security reasons. While it is impossible to completely prevent a Device from acquiring some knowledge of network topology if a location service is provided, a network operator might desire to limit how much of this information is made available.

Mapping a network topology does not require that an attacker be able to associate measurement data with a particular Device. If a requester is able to try a number of measurements, it is possible to acquire information about network topology.

It is not even necessary that the measurements are valid; random guesses are sufficient, provided that there is no penalty or cost associated with attempting to use the measurements.

7.1.3. Exposing Network Topology Data

A Device could reveal information about a network to entities outside of that network if it provides location measurement data to a LIS that is outside of that network. With the exception of GNSS measurements, the measurements in this document provide information about an access network that could reveal topology information to an unauthorized recipient.

A Device MUST NOT provide information about network topology without a clear signal that the recipient is authorized. A LIS that is discovered using DHCP as described in LIS discovery [RFC5986] can be considered to be authorized to receive information about the access network.

7.1.4. Lying By Proxy
Location information is a function of its inputs, which includes measurement data. Thus, falsified measurement data can be used to alter the location information that is provided by a LIS.

Some types of measurement data are relatively easy to falsify in a way that causes the resulting location information to be selected with little or no error. For instance, GNSS measurements are easy to use for this purpose because all the contextual information necessary to calculate a position using measurements is broadcast by the satellites [HARPER].

An attacker that falsifies measurement data gains little if they are the only recipients of the result. The attacker knows that the location information is bad. The attacker only gains if the information can somehow be attributed to the LIS by another location recipient. By coercing the LIS into providing falsified location information, any credibility that the LIS might have - that the attacker does not - is gained by the attacker.

A third-party that is reliant on the integrity of the location information might base an evaluation of the credibility of the information on the source of the information. If that third party is able to attribute location information to the LIS, then an attacker might gain.

Location information that is provided to the Device without any means to identify the LIS as its source is not subject to this attack. The Device is identified as the source of the data when it distributes the location information to location recipients.

Location information is attributed to the LIS either through the use of digital signatures or by having the location recipient directly interact with the LIS. A LIS that digitally signs location information becomes identifiable as the source of the data. Similarly, the LIS is identified as a source of data if a location recipient acquires information directly from a LIS using a location URI.

7.1.5. Measurement Replay
The value of some measured properties do not change over time for a single location. For properties of a network, time-invariance is often directly as a result of the practicalities of operating the network. Limiting the changes to a network ensures greater consistency of service. A largely static network also greatly simplifies the data management tasks involved with providing a location service. However, time invariant properties allow for simple replay attacks, where an attacker acquires measurements that can later be used without being detected as being invalid.

Measurement data is frequently an observation of an time-invariant property of the environment at the subject location. For measurements of this nature, nothing in the measurement itself is sufficient proof that the Device is present at the resulting location. Measurement data might have been previously acquired and reused.

For instance, the identity of a radio transmitter, if broadcast by that transmitter, can be collected and stored. An attacker that wishes it known that they exist at a particular location, can claim to observe this transmitter at any time. Nothing inherent in the claim reveals it to be false.

7.1.6. Environment Spoofing

Some types of measurement data can be altered or influenced by a third party so that a Device unwittingly provides falsified data. If it is possible for a third party to alter the measured phenomenon, then any location information that is derived from this data can be indirectly influenced.

Altering the environment in this fashion might not require involvement with either Device or LIS. Measurement that is passive – where the Device observes a signal or other phenomenon without direct interaction – are most susceptible to alteration by third parties.

Measurement of radio signal characteristics is especially vulnerable since an adversary need only be in the general vicinity of the Device and be able to transmit a signal. For instance, a GNSS spoofer is able to produce fake signals that claim to be transmitted by any satellite or set of satellites (see [GPS.SPOOF]).

Measurements that require direct interaction increases the complexity of the attack. For measurements relating to the communication medium, a third party cannot avoid direct interaction, they need only be on the communications path (that is, man in the middle).
Even if the entity that is interacted with is authenticated, this does not provide any assurance about the integrity of measurement data. For instance, the Device might authenticate the identity of a radio transmitter through the use of cryptographic means and obtain signal strength measurements for that transmitter. Radio signal strength is trivial for an attacker to increase simply by receiving and amplifying the raw signal; it is not necessary for the attacker to be able to understand the signal content.

Note: This particular "attack" is more often completely legitimate. Radio repeaters are commonplace mechanism used to increase radio coverage.

Attacks that rely on altering the observed environment of a Device require countermeasures that affect the measurement process. For radio signals, countermeasures could include the use of authenticated signals, or altered receiver design. In general, countermeasures are highly specific to the individual measurement process. An exhaustive discussion of these issues is left to the relevant literature for each measurement technology.

A Device that provides measurement data is assumed to be responsible for applying appropriate countermeasures against this type of attack.

Where a Device is the sole recipient of location information derived from measurement data, a LIS might choose to provide location information without any validation. The responsibility for ensuring the veracity of the measurement data lies with the Device.

Measurement data that is susceptible to this sort of influence SHOULD be treated as though it were produced by an untrusted Device for those cases where a location recipient might attribute the location information to the LIS. GNSS measurements and radio signal strength measurements can be affected relatively cheaply, though almost all other measurement types can be affected with varying costs to an attacker, with the largest cost often being a requirement for physical access. To the extent that it is feasible, measurement data SHOULD be subjected to the same validation as for other types of attacks that rely on measurement falsification.

Note: Altered measurement data might be provided by a Device that has no knowledge of the alteration. Thus, an otherwise trusted Device might still be an unreliable source of measurement data.

7.2. Mitigation
The following measures can be applied to limit or prevent attacks. The effectiveness of each depends on the type of measurement data and how that measurement data is acquired.

Two general approaches are identified for dealing with untrusted measurement data:

1. Require independent validation of measurement data or the location information that is produced.

2. Identify the types of sources that provided the measurement data that location information was derived from.

This section goes into more detail on the different forms of validation in Section 7.2.1, Section 7.2.2, and Section 7.2.3. The impact of attributing location information to sources is discussed in more detail in Section 7.2.4.

Any costs in validation are balanced against the degree of integrity desired from the resulting location information.

7.2.1. Measurement Validation

Detecting that measurement data has been falsified is difficult in the absence of integrity mechanisms.

Independent confirmation of the veracity of measurement data ensures that the measurement is accurate and that it applies to the correct Device. When it’s possible to gather the same measurement data from a trusted and independent source without undue expense, the LIS can use the trusted data in place of what the untrusted Device has sent. In cases where that is impractical, the untrusted data can provide hints that allow corroboration of the data (see Section 7.2.1.1).

Measurement information might contain no inherent indication that it is falsified. On the contrary, it can be difficult to obtain information that would provide any degree of assurance that the measurement device is physically at any particular location. Measurements that are difficult to verify require other forms of assurance before they can be used.

7.2.1.1. Effectiveness

Measurement validation MUST be used if measurement data for a particular Device can be easily acquired by unauthorized location recipients, as described in Section 7.1.1. This prevents unauthorized access to location information using measurement data.
Validation of measurement data can be significantly more effective than independent acquisition of the same. For instance, a Device in a large Ethernet network could provide a measurement indicating its point of attachment using LLDP measurements. For a LIS, acquiring the same measurement data might require a request to all switches in that network. With the measurement data, validation can target the identified switch with a specific query.

Validation is effective in identifying falsified measurement data (Section 7.1.4), including attacks involving replay of measurement data (Section 7.1.5). Validation also limits the amount of network topology information (Section 7.1.2) made available to Devices to that portion of the network topology that they are directly attached.

Measurement validation has no effect if the underlying effect is being spoofed (Section 7.1.6).

7.2.1.2. Limitations (Unique Observer)

A Device is often in a unique position to make a measurement. It alone occupies the point in space-time that the location determination process seeks to determine. The Device becomes a unique observer for a particular property.

The ability of the Device to become a unique observer makes the Device invaluable to the location determination process. As a unique observer, it also makes the claims of a Device difficult to validate and easily to spoof.

As long as no other entity is capable of making the same measurements, there is also no other entity that can independently check that the measurements are correct and applicable to the Device. A LIS might be unable to validate all or part of the measurement data it receives from a unique observer. For instance, a signal strength measurement of the signal from a radio tower cannot be validated directly.

Some portion of the measurement data might still be independently verified, even if all information cannot. In the previous example, the radio tower might be able to provide verification that the Device is present if it is able to observe a radio signal sent by the Device.

If measurement data can only be partially validated, the extent to which it can be validated determines the effectiveness of validation against these attacks.
The advantage of having the Device as a unique observer is that it makes it difficult for an attacker to acquire measurements without the assistance of the Device. Attempts to use measurements to gain unauthorized access to measurement data (Section 7.1.1) are largely ineffectual against a unique observer.

7.2.2. Location Validation

Location information that is derived from location-related measurement data can also be verified against trusted location information. Rather than validating inputs to the location determination process, suspect locations are identified at the output of the process.

Trusted location information is acquired using sources of measurement data that are trusted. Untrusted location information is acquired using measurement data provided from untrusted sources, which might include the Device. These two locations are compared. If the untrusted location agrees with the trusted location, the untrusted location information is used.

Algorithms for the comparison of location information are not included in this document. However, a simple comparison for agreement might require that the untrusted location be entirely contained within the uncertainty region of the trusted location.

There is little point in using a less accurate, less trusted location. Untrusted location information that has worse accuracy than trusted information can be immediately discarded. There are multiple factors that affect accuracy, uncertainty and currency being the most important. How location information is compared for accuracy is not defined in this document.

7.2.2.1. Effectiveness

Location validation limits the extent to which falsified – or erroneous – measurement data can cause an incorrect location to be reported.

Location validation can be more efficient than validation of inputs, particularly for a unique observer (Section 7.2.1.2).

Validating location ensures that the Device is at or near the resulting location. Location validation can be used to limit or prevent all of the attacks identified in this document.

7.2.2.2. Limitations
The trusted location that is used for validation is always less accurate than the location that is being checked. The amount by which the untrusted location is more accurate, is the same amount that an attacker can exploit.

For example, a trusted location might indicate a five kilometer radius uncertainty region. An untrusted location that describes a 100 meter uncertainty within the larger region might be accepted as more accurate. An attacker might still falsify measurement data to select any location within the larger uncertainty region. While the 100 meter uncertainty that is reported seems more accurate, a falsified location could be anywhere in the five kilometer region.

Where measurement data might have been falsified, the actual uncertainty is effectively much higher. Local policy might allow differing degrees of trust to location information derived from untrusted measurement data. This might be a boolean operation with only two possible outcomes: untrusted location information might be used entirely or not at all. Alternatively, untrusted location could be combined with trusted location information using different weightings, based on a value set in local policy.

7.2.3. Supporting Observations

Replay attacks using previously acquired measurement data are particularly hard to detect without independent validation. Rather than validate the measurement data directly, supplementary data might be used to validate measurements or the location information derived from those measurements.

These supporting observations could be used to convey information that provides additional assurance that the Device was acquired at a specific time and place. In effect, the Device is requested to provide proof of its presence at the resulting location.

For instance, a Device that measures attributes of a radio signal could also be asked to provide a sample of the measured radio signal. If the LIS is able to observe the same signal, the two observations could be compared. Providing that the signal cannot be predicted in advance by the Device, this could be used to support the claim that the Device is able to receive the signal. Thus, the Device is likely to be within the range that the signal is transmitted. A LIS could use this to attribute a higher level of trust in the associated measurement data or resulting location.

7.2.3.1. Effectiveness
The use of supporting observations is limited by the ability of the LIS to acquire and validate these observations. The advantage of selecting observations independent of measurement data is that observations can be selected based on how readily available the data is for both LIS and Device. The amount and quality of the data can be selected based on the degree of assurance that is desired.

Use of supporting observations is similar to both measurement validation and location validation. All three methods rely on independent validation of one or more properties. Applicability of each method is similar.

Use of supporting observations can be used to limit or prevent all of the attacks identified in this document.

7.2.3.2. Limitations

The effectiveness of the validation method depends on the quality of the supporting observation: how hard it is to obtain at a different time or place, how difficult it is to guess, and what other costs might be involved in acquiring this data.

In the example of an observed radio signal, requesting a sample of the signal only provides an assurance that the Device is able to receive the signal transmitted by the measured radio transmitter. This only provides some assurance that the Device is within range of the transmitter.

As with location validation, a Device might still be able to provide falsified measurements that could alter the value of the location information as long as the result is within this region.

Requesting additional supporting observations can reduce the size of the region over which location information can be altered by an attacker, or increase trust in the result, but each additional measurement imposes an acquisition cost. Supporting observations contribute little or nothing toward the primary goal of determining the location of the Device.

7.2.4. Attribution

Lying by proxy (Section 7.1.4) relies on the location recipient being able to attribute location information to a LIS. The effectiveness of this attack is negated if location information is explicitly attributed to a particular source.
This requires an extension to the location object that explicitly identifies the source (or sources) of each item of location information.

Rather than relying on a process that seeks to ensure that location information is accurate, this approach instead provides a location recipient with the information necessary to reach their own conclusion about the trustworthiness of the location information.

Including an authenticated identity for all sources of measurement data presents a number of technical and operational challenges. It is possible that the LIS has a transient relationship with a Device. A Device is not expected to share authentication information with a LIS. There is no assurance that Device identification is usable by a potential location recipient. Privacy concerns might also prevent the sharing identification information, even if it were available and usable.

Identifying the type of measurement source allows a location recipient to make a decision about the trustworthiness of location information without depending on having authenticated identity information for each source. An element for this purpose is defined in Section 4.4.

When including location information that is based on measurement data from sources that might be untrusted, a LIS SHOULD include alternative location information that is derived from trusted sources of measurement data. Each item of location information can then be labelled with the source of that data.

A location recipient that is able to identify a specific source of measurement data (whether it be LIS or Device) can use this information to attribute location information to either or both entity. The location recipient is then better able to make decisions about trustworthiness based on the source of the data.

A location recipient that does not understand the "source" element is unable to make this distinction. When constructing a PIDF-LO document, trusted location information MUST be placed in the PIDF-LO so that it is given higher priority to any untrusted location information according to Rule #8 of [RFC5491].

Attribution of information does nothing to address attacks that alter the observed parameters that are used in location determination (Section 7.1.6).

7.2.5. Stateful Correlation of Location Requests
Stateful examination of requests can be used to prevent a Device from attempting to map network topology using requests for location information (Section 7.1.2).

Simply limiting the rate of requests from a single Device reduces the amount of data that a Device can acquire about network topology. A LIS could also make observations about the movements of a Device. A Device that is attempting to gather topology information is likely to be assigned a location that changes significantly between subsequent requests, possibly violating physical laws (or lower limits that might still be unlikely) with respect to speed and acceleration.

7.3. An Unauthorized or Compromised LIS

A compromised LIS, or a compromise in LIS discovery [RFC5986] could lead to an unauthorized entity obtaining measurement data. This information could then be used or redistributed. A Device MUST ensure that it authenticate a LIS, as described in Section 9 of [RFC5985].

An entity that is able to acquire measurement data can, in addition to using those measurements to learn the location of a Device, also use that information for other purposes. This information can be used to provide insight into network topology (Section 7.1.2).

Measurement data might also be exploited in other ways. For example, revealing the type of 802.11 transceiver that a Device uses could allow an attacker to use specific vulnerabilities to attack a Device. Similarly, revealing information about network elements could enable targeted attacks on that infrastructure.

8. Measurement Schemas

The schema are broken up into their respective functions. There is a base container schema into which all measurements are placed, plus definitions for a measurement request (Section 8.1). A PIDF-LO extension is defined in a separate schema (Section 8.2). There is a basic types schema, that contains various base type definitions for things such as the "rmsError" and "samples" attributes IPv4, IPv6 and MAC addresses (Section 8.3). Then each of the specific measurement types is defined in its own schema.

8.1. Measurement Container Schema

```xml
<xs:schema
 xmlns:lm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm"
```
This schema defines a framework for location measurements.

-- [[NOTE TO RFC-EDITOR: Please replace above URL with URL of published RFC and remove this note.]] --

This schema defines a framework for location measurements.
8.2. Measurement Source Schema

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified"
attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

<xs:annotation>
<xs:appinfo
</xs:appinfo>
<xs:documentation source="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt">

Measurement Container Schema

<!-- PIDF-LO extension for source -->
<xs:element name="source" type="lm:sourceType"/>
<xs:simpleType name="sourceType">
  <xs:list>
    <xs:simpleType>
      <xs:restriction base="xs:token">
        <xs:enumeration value="lis"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="device"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="other"/>
      </xs:restriction>
    </xs:simpleType>
  </xs:list>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>
This schema defines an extension to PIDF-LO that indicates the type of source that produced the measurement data used in generating the associated location information.

Measurement Source PIDF-LO Extension Schema

8.3. Base Type Schema

Note that the pattern rules in the following schema wrap due to length constraints. None of the patterns contain whitespace.

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:basetypes"
  elementFormDefault="qualified"
  attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
  <xs:annotation>
    <xs:documentation source="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt">
      <!-- [[NOTE TO RFC-EDITOR: Please replace above URL with URL of published RFC and remove this note.]] -->
      This schema defines a set of base type elements.
    </xs:documentation>
  </xs:annotation>
  <xs:element name="source" type="lmsrc:sourceType"/>
  <xs:simpleType name="sourceType">
    <xs:list>
      <xs:simpleType>
        <xs:restriction base="xs:token">
          <xs:enumeration value="lis"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="device"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="other"/>
        </xs:restriction>
      </xs:simpleType>
    </xs:list>
  </xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>
<xs:simpleType name="byteType">
   <xs:restriction base="xs:integer">
      <xs:minInclusive value="0"/>
      <xs:maxInclusive value="255"/>
   </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="twoByteType">
   <xs:restriction base="xs:integer">
      <xs:minInclusive value="0"/>
      <xs:maxInclusive value="65535"/>
   </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="nonNegativeDouble">
   <xs:restriction base="xs:double">
      <xs:minInclusive value="0.0"/>
   </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="positiveDouble">
   <xs:restriction base="bt:nonNegativeDouble">
      <xs:minExclusive value="0.0"/>
   </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:complexType name="doubleWithRMSError">
   <xs:simpleContent>
      <xs:extension base="xs:double">
         <xs:attribute name="rmsError" type="bt:positiveDouble"/>
         <xs:attribute name="samples" type="xs:positiveInteger"/>
      </xs:extension>
   </xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="nnDoubleWithRMSError">
   <xs:simpleContent>
      <xs:restriction base="bt:doubleWithRMSError">
         <xs:minInclusive value="0"/>
      </xs:restriction>
   </xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:simpleType name="ipAddressType">
   <xs:union memberTypes="bt:IPv6AddressType bt:IPv4AddressType"/>
</xs:simpleType>

<!-- IPv6 format definition -->
An IP version 6 address, based on RFC 4291.
</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
</xs:restriction base="xs:token">
<!-- Fully specified address -->
</xs:pattern value="([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4})([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}){7}"/>
</xs:annotation>
</xs:simpleType>
<!-- IPv4 format definition -->
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:restriction>
<xs:simpleType name="macAddressType">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:token">
    <xs:pattern value="\{2\}(-\{2\})\{5\}(-\{2\})?"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<!-- Base Type Schema -->

8.4. LLDP Measurement Schema

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema
  xmlns:lldp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:lldp"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:lldp"
  elementFormDefault="qualified"
  attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
  <xs:annotation>
    <xs:appinfo
      source="urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:geopriv:lm:lldp">
    </xs:appinfo>
    <xs:documentation source="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt">
      <!-- [NOTE TO RFC-EDITOR: Please replace above URL with URL of published RFC and remove this note.]} -->
      This schema defines a set of LLDP location measurements.
    </xs:documentation>
  </xs:annotation>
  
  <xs:element name="lldp" type="lldp:lldpMeasurementType"/>
  <xs:complexType name="lldpMeasurementType">
    <xs:complexContent>
      <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
        <xs:sequence>
          <xs:element name="chassis" type="lldp:lldpDataType"/>
          <xs:element name="port" type="lldp:lldpDataType"/>
          <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
            minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        </xs:sequence>
        <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##any" processContents="lax"/>
      </xs:restriction>
    </xs:complexContent>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:schema>
LLDP measurement schema

8.5. DHCP Measurement Schema

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema
 xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
 targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:dhcp"
 elementFormDefault="qualified"
 attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
  <xs:annotation>
    <xs:appinfo
      source="urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:geopriv:lm:dhcp">
    </xs:appinfo>
    <xs:documentation
      source="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt">
      "-- [[NOTE TO RFC-EDITOR: Please replace above URL with URL of published RFC and remove this note.]] -->
      This schema defines a set of DHCP location measurements.
    </xs:documentation>
  </xs:annotation>

  <!-- DHCP Relay Agent Information Option -->
  <xs:element
    name="dhcp-rai"
    type="dhcp:dhcpType"/>
</xs:schema>

Thomson & Winterbottom   Expires March 10, 2014    [Page 49]
<xs:complexType name="dhcpType">
  <xs:complexContent>
    <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
      <xs:sequence>
        <xs:element name="giaddr" type="bt:ipAddressType"/>
        <xs:element name="circuit" type="xs:hexBinary" minOccurs="0"/>
        <xs:element name="remote" type="dhcp:dhcpRemoteType" minOccurs="0"/>
        <xs:element name="subscriber" type="xs:hexBinary" minOccurs="0"/>
      </xs:sequence>
      <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="dhcpRemoteType">
  <xs:simpleContent>
    <xs:extension base="xs:hexBinary">
      <xs:attribute name="enterprise" type="xs:positiveInteger" use="optional"/>
    </xs:extension>
  </xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:schema>

DHCP measurement schema

8.6. WiFi Measurement Schema

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema
 xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:wifi"
 elementFormDefault="qualified"
 attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
  <xs:annotation>
    <xs:appinfo
      source="urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:geopriv:lm:wifi">
      802.11 location measurements
    </xs:appinfo>
  </xs:annotation>
</xs:schema>
This schema defines a basic set of 802.11 location measurements.

```xml
<xs:element name="wifi" type="wifi:wifiNetworkType"/>
<xs:complexType name="wifiNetworkType">
  <xs:complexContent>
    <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
      <xs:sequence>
        <xs:element name="nicType" type="xs:token" minOccurs="0"/>
        <xs:element name="ap" type="wifi:wifiType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xs:sequence>
      <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##any" processContents="lax"/>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="wifiType">
  <xs:complexContent>
    <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
      <xs:sequence>
        <xs:element name="bssid" type="wifi:bssidType"/>
        <xs:element name="ssid" type="wifi:ssidType" minOccurs="0"/>
        <xs:element name="channel" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" minOccurs="0"/>
        <xs:element name="location" minOccurs="0" type="xs:anyType"/>
        <xs:element name="type" type="wifi:networkType" minOccurs="0"/>
        <xs:element name="regclass" type="wifi:regclassType" minOccurs="0"/>
        <xs:element name="antenna" type="wifi:octetType" minOccurs="0"/>
        <xs:element name="flightTime" minOccurs="0" type="bt:nnDoubleWithRMSError"/>
        <xs:element name="apSignal" type="wifi:signalType" minOccurs="0"/>
      </xs:sequence>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
```
<xs:element name="deviceSignal" type="wifi:signalType"
  minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="serving" type="xs:boolean"
  default="false"/>
<xs:anyAttribute namespace="##any" processContents="lax"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:complexType>

<xsl:complexType name="bssidType">
  <xs:simpleContent>
    <xs:extension base="bt:macAddressType">
      <xs:attribute name="verified" type="xs:boolean"
        default="false"/>
    </xs:extension>
  </xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>

<!-- Note that this pattern does not prevent multibyte UTF-8 sequences that result in a SSID longer than 32 octets. -->
<xsl:simpleType name="ssidType">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:token">
    <xs:pattern value="(\\[da-fA-F]{2}|[^\\]){0,32}"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:complexType>

<xsl:complexType name="networkType">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:token">
    <xs:pattern value="[a-zA-Z]+"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:complexType>

<xsl:complexType name="regclassType">
  <xs:simpleContent>
    <xs:extension base="wifi:octetType">
      <xs:attribute name="country">
        <xs:simpleType>
          <xs:restriction base="xs:token">
            <xs:pattern value="[A-Z]{2}[OIX]?"/>
          </xs:restriction>
        </xs:simpleType>
      </xs:attribute>
    </xs:extension>
  </xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="octetType">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:nonNegativeInteger">
        <xs:maxInclusive value="255"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:complexType name="signalType">
    <xs:complexContent>
        <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
            <xs:sequence>
                <xs:element name="transmit" type="xs:double" minOccurs="0"/>
                <xs:element name="gain" type="xs:double" minOccurs="0"/>
                <xs:element name="rcpi" type="wifi:rssiType" minOccurs="0"/>
                <xs:element name="rsni" type="bt:doubleWithRMSError" minOccurs="0"/>
                <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
            </xs:sequence>
        </xs:restriction>
    </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="rssiType">
    <xs:simpleContent>
        <xs:extension base="bt:doubleWithRMSError">
            <xs:attribute name="dBm" type="xs:boolean" default="true"/>
        </xs:extension>
    </xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>

<!-- Measurement Request elements -->
<xs:element name="type" type="wifi:networkType"/>
<xs:element name="parameter" type="wifi:parameterType"/>

<xs:complexType name="parameterType">
    <xs:simpleContent>
        <xs:extension base="xs:QName">
            <xs:attribute name="context" use="optional">
                <xs:simpleType>
                    <xs:restriction base="xs:token">
                        <xs:enumeration value="ap"/>
                        <xs:enumeration value="device"/>
                    </xs:restriction>
                </xs:simpleType>
            </xs:attribute>
        </xs:extension>
    </xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>

<!-- Measurement Request elements -->
<xs:element name="type" type="wifi:networkType"/>
<xs:element name="parameter" type="wifi:parameterType"/>
8.7. Cellular Measurement Schema

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema
xmlns:cell="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:cell"
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:cell"
   elementFormDefault="qualified"
   attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
<xs:annotation>
<xs:appinfo
<xs:documentation source="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt">
   <!-- [NOTE TO RFC-EDITOR: Please replace above URL with URL of
   published RFC and remove this note.]} -->
   This schema defines a set of cellular location measurements.
</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:element name="cellular" type="cell:cellularType"/>
<xs:complexType name="cellularType">
   <xs:complexContent>
      <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
         <xs:sequence>
            <xs:choice>
               <xs:element name="servingCell" type="cell:cellType"/>
               <xs:element name="observedCell" type="cell:cellType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
            </xs:choice>
         </xs:sequence>
         <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##any" processContents="lax"/>
      </xs:restriction>
   </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="cellType">
   <xs:complexContent>
      <xs:restriction base="xs:diType">
         <xs:attribute name="latitude" type="xs:float" use="optional"/>
         <xs:attribute name="longitude" type="xs:float" use="optional"/>
      </xs:restriction>
   </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
  <xs:choice>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element name="mcc" type="cell:mccType"/>
      <xs:element name="mnc" type="cell:mncType"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:choice>
      <xs:sequence>
        <xs:element name="rnc" type="cell:cellIdType"/>
        <xs:element name="lac" type="cell:cellIdType"/>
      </xs:sequence>
      <xs:element name="cid" type="cell:cellIdType"/>
    </xs:choice>
    <xs:element name="eucid" type="cell:cellIdType"/>
  </xs:choice>
  <xs:choice>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element name="sid" type="cell:cellIdType"/>
      <xs:element name="nid" type="cell:cellIdType"/>
      <xs:element name="baseid" type="cell:cellIdType"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
      minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  </xs:choice>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:simpleType name="mccType">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:token">
    <xs:pattern value="[0-9]{3}"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="mncType">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:token">
    <xs:pattern value="[0-9]{2,3}"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="cellIdType">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:nonNegativeInteger">
    <xs:maxInclusive value="268435455"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:simpleType>

</xs:element>

<!-- Measurement Request elements -->

<xsl:element name="type" type="cell:typeType"/>
<xsl:complexType name="typeType">
  <xsl:restriction base="xs:token">
    <xsl:enumeration value="gsm"/>
    <xsl:enumeration value="umts"/>
    <xsl:enumeration value="lte"/>
    <xsl:enumeration value="cdma"/>
  </xsl:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xsl:element name="network" type="cell:networkType"/>
<xsl:complexType name="networkType">
  <xsl:complexContent>
    <xsl:restriction base="xs:anyType">
      <xsl:choice>
        <xsl:sequence>
          <xsl:element name="mcc" type="cell:mccType"/>
          <xsl:element name="mnc" type="cell:mncType"/>
        </xsl:sequence>
        <xsl:element name="nid" type="cell:cellIdType"/>
      </xsl:choice>
    </xsl:restriction>
  </xsl:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>

</xs:schema>

Cellular measurement schema

8.8. GNSS Measurement Schema

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xsl:schema
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:gnss"
  elementFormDefault="qualified"
  attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

<xsl:annotation>
  <xsl:appinfo
</xsl:appinfo>
This schema defines a set of GNSS location measurements.

```xml
<xsd:documentation source="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt">
<!-- 
[[NOTE TO RFC-EDITOR: Please replace above URL with URL of 
published RFC and remove this note.]] -->
This schema defines a set of GNSS location measurements
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>


<!-- GNSS -->
<xsd:element name="gnss" type="gnss:gnssMeasurementType">
  <xsd:selector xpath="sat"/>
  <xsd:field xpath="#num"/>
</xsd:unique>
</xsd:element>

<xsd:complexType name="gnssMeasurementType">
  <xsd:complexContent>
    <xsd:restriction base="xsd:anyType">
      <xsd:sequence>
        <xsd:element name="gnssTime" type="bt:nnDoubleWithRMSError"
                     minOccurs="0"/>
        <xsd:element name="sat" type="gnss:gnssSatelliteType"
                     minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="64"/>
        <xsd:any namespace="#other" processContents="lax"
                    minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xsd:sequence>
      <xsd:attribute name="system" type="xsd:token" use="required"/>
      <xsd:attribute name="signal" type="xsd:token"/>
      <xsd:anyAttribute namespace="#any" processContents="lax"/>
    </xsd:restriction>
  </xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>

<xsd:complexType name="gnssSatelliteType">
  <xsd:complexContent>
    <xsd:restriction base="xsd:anyType">
      <xsd:sequence>
        <xsd:element name="doppler" type="bt:doubleWithRMSError"/>
        <xsd:element name="codephase" type="bt:nnDoubleWithRMSError"/>
        <xsd:element name="cn0" type="bt:nonNegativeDouble"/>
        <xsd:element name="mp" type="bt:positiveDouble"
                     minOccurs="0"/>
        <xsd:element name="cq" type="gnss:codePhaseQualityType"
                     minOccurs="0"/>
        <xsd:element name="adr" type="xs:double" minOccurs="0"/>
      </xsd:sequence>
    </xsd:restriction>
  </xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
```
8.9. DSL Measurement Schema

<?xml version="1.0"?>
          xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
          targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:dsl"
          elementFormDefault="qualified"
          attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

<xs:annotation>
    DSL measurement definitions
  </xs:appinfo>
  <xs:documentation source="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt">
    <!-- [NOTE TO RFC-EDITOR: Please replace above URL with URL of published RFC and remove this note.] -->
    This schema defines a basic set of DSL location measurements.
  </xs:documentation>

</xs:schema>
</xs:annotation>


<xs:element name="dsl" type="dsl:dslVlanType"/>
<xs:complexType name="dslVlanType">
 <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
  <xs:choice>
   <xs:element name="l2tp">
    <xs:complexType>
     <xs:complexContent>
      <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
       <xs:sequence>
        <xs:element name="src" type="bt:ipAddressType"/>
        <xs:element name="dest" type="bt:ipAddressType"/>
        <xs:element name="session" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger"/>
       </xs:sequence>
      </xs:restriction>
     </xs:complexContent>
    </xs:complexType>
   </xs:element>
   <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element name="an" type="xs:token"/>
    <xs:group ref="dsl:dslSlotPort"/>
   </xs:sequence>
   <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element name="stag" type="dsl:vlanIDType"/>
    <xs:choice>
     <xs:element name="ctag" type="dsl:vlanIDType"/>
     <xs:group ref="dsl:dslSlotPort" minOccurs="0"/>
    </xs:choice>
   </xs:sequence>
   <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element name="vpi" type="bt:byteType"/>
    <xs:element name="vci" type="bt:twoByteType"/>
   </xs:sequence>
   <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  </xs:restriction>
 </xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="vlanIDType">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:nonNegativeInteger">
    <xs:maxInclusive value="4095"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:group name="dslSlotPort">
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element name="slot" type="xs:token"/>
    <xs:element name="port" type="xs:token"/>
  </xs:sequence>
</xs:group>

DSL measurement schema

9. IANA Considerations

This section creates a registry for GNSS types (Section 5.5) and registers the namespaces and schema defined in Section 8.

9.1. IANA Registry for GNSS Types

This document establishes a new IANA registry for "Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) types". The registry includes tokens for the GNSS type and for each of the signals within that type. Referring to [RFC5226], this registry operates under "Specification Required" rules. The IESG will appoint an Expert Reviewer who will advise IANA promptly on each request for a new or updated GNSS type.

Each entry in the registry requires the following information:

GNSS name: the name of the GNSS

Brief description: a brief description of the GNSS

GNSS token: a token that can be used to identify the GNSS

Signals: a set of tokens that represent each of the signals that the system provides

Documentation reference: a reference to one or more stable, public specifications that outline usage of the GNSS, including (but not limited to) signal specifications and time systems

The registry initially includes two registrations:

GNSS name: Global Positioning System (GPS)
Brief description: a system of satellites that use spread-spectrum transmission, operated by the US military for commercial and military applications

GNSS token: gps

Signals: L1, L2, L1C, L2C, L5

Documentation reference: Navstar GPS Space Segment/Navigation User Interface [GPS.ICD]

GNSS name: Galileo

Brief description: a system of satellites that operate in the same spectrum as GPS, operated by the European Union for commercial applications

GNSS Token: galileo

Signals: L1, E5A, E5B, E5A+B, E6

Documentation Reference: Galileo Open Service Signal In Space Interface Control Document (SIS ICD) [Galileo.ICD]

9.2. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for


This section registers a new XML namespace, "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10:lmsrc", as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

XML:

BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
  "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head>
  <title>Measurement Source for PIDF-LO</title>
</head>
<body>
  <h1>Namespace for Location Measurement Source</h1>
9.3. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm

This section registers a new XML namespace, "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm", as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

XML:

BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
 "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head>
<title>Measurement Container</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Namespace for Location Measurement Container</h1>
<h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm</h2>
[[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please update RFC URL and replace XXXX with the RFC number for this specification.]]
<p>See <a href="[[RFC URL]]">RFCXXXX</a>.</p>
</body>
</html>
END
9.4. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for

This section registers a new XML namespace, "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:basetypes", as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

XML:

BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head>
  <title>Base Device Types</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Namespace for Base Types</h1>
<h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:basetypes</h2>
[[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please update RFC URL and replace XXXX with the RFC number for this specification.]]
<p>See <a href="[[RFC URL]]">RFCXXXX</a>.</p>
</body>
</html>

END

9.5. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for

This section registers a new XML namespace, "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:lldp", as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

XML:
Internet-Draft  Location Measurements  September 2013

BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
 "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head>
<title>LLDP Measurement Set</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Namespace for LLDP Measurement Set</h1>
<h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:lldp</h2>
[[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please update RFC URL and replace XXXX
with the RFC number for this specification.]]
<p>See <a href="[RFC URL]">RFCXXXX</a>.</p>
</body>
</html>
END

9.6. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for

This section registers a new XML namespace,
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:dhcp", as per the guidelines in
[RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group,
(geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

XML:

BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
 "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head>
<title>DHCP Measurement Set</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Namespace for DHCP Measurement Set</h1>
[[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please update RFC URL and replace XXXX
with the RFC number for this specification.]]
<p>See <a href="[RFC URL]">RFCXXXX</a>.</p>
</body>
</html>
END
9.7. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for


This section registers a new XML namespace, "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:wifi", as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

XML:

BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head>
<title>WiFi Measurement Set</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Namespace for WiFi Measurement Set</h1>
[[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please update RFC URL and replace XXXX with the RFC number for this specification.]]
<p>See <a href="[RFC URL]">RFCXXXX</a>.</p>
</body>
</html>
END

9.8. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for


This section registers a new XML namespace, "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:cell", as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).
9.9.  URN Sub-Namespace Registration for

This section registers a new XML namespace,
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:gnss", as per the guidelines in
[RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group,
(geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

XML:

BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
 "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head>
<title>GNSS Measurement Set</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Namespace for GNSS Measurement Set</h1>
[[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please update RFC URL and replace XXXX
with the RFC number for this specification.]]
<p>See <a href="[[RFC URL]]">RFCXXXX</a>.</p>
</body>
</html>
END
9.10. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for

This section registers a new XML namespace,
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:dsl", as per the guidelines in
[RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group,
(geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

XML:
BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head>
<title>DSL Measurement Set</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Namespace for DSL Measurement Set</h1>
<h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:lm:dsl</h2>
[[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please update RFC URL and replace XXXX
with the RFC number for this specification.]]
<p>See <a href="[[RFC URL]]">RFCXXXX</a>.</p>
</body>
</html>
END

9.11. XML Schema Registration for Measurement Source Schema

This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in
[RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group,
(geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).
Schema: The XML for this schema can be found in Section 8.2 of this document.


This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:lm

Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

Schema: The XML for this schema can be found in Section 8.1 of this document.

9.13. XML Schema Registration for Base Types Schema

This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

Schema: The XML for this schema can be found in Section 8.3 of this document.


This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

Schema: The XML for this schema can be found in Section 8.4 of this document.

9.15. XML Schema Registration for DHCP Schema

This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].

9.16. XML Schema Registration for WiFi Schema

This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

Schema: The XML for this schema can be found in Section 8.5 of this document.

9.17. XML Schema Registration for Cellular Schema

This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

Schema: The XML for this schema can be found in Section 8.6 of this document.

9.18. XML Schema Registration for GNSS Schema

This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

Schema: The XML for this schema can be found in Section 8.7 of this document.

9.19. XML Schema Registration for DSL Schema
This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@commscope.com).

Schema: The XML for this schema can be found in Section 8.9 of this document.

10. Acknowledgements

Thanks go to Simon Cox for his comments relating to terminology that have helped ensure that this document is aligned with ongoing work in the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC). Thanks to Neil Harper for his review and comments on the GNSS sections of this document. Thanks to Noor-E-Gagan Singh, Gabor Bajko, Russell Priebe, and Khalid Al-Mufti for their significant input to and suggestions for improving the 802.11 measurements. Thanks to Cullen Jennings for feedback and suggestions. Bernard Aboba provided review and feedback on a range of measurement data definitions. Mary Barnes and Geoff Thompson provided a review and corrections. David Waitzman and John Bressler both noted shortcomings with 802.11 measurements. Keith Drage, Darren Pawson provided expert LTE knowledge.

11. References

11.1. Normative References


[IEEE.80211]


11.2. Informative References


Authors’ Addresses

Martin Thomson
Microsoft
3210 Porter Drive
Palo Alto, CA 94304
US

Phone: +1 650-353-1925
Email: martin.thomson@skype.net

James Winterbottom
Unaffiliated
AU

Email: a.james.winterbottom@gmail.com
Relative Location Representation
draft-ietf-geopriv-relative-location-00

Abstract

This document defines an extension to PIDF-LO (RFC 4119) for the expression of location information that is defined relative to a reference point. The reference point may be expressed as a geodetic or civic location, and the relative offset may be one of several shapes. Optionally, a reference to a secondary document (such as a map image) can be included, along with the relationship of the map coordinate system to the reference/offset coordinate system to allow display of the map with the reference point and the relative offset. Also included in this document is a Type/Length/Value (TLV) representation of the relative location for use in other protocols that use TLVs.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2011.

Copyright Notice
1. Introduction ................................................. 4
2. Conventions used in this document ........................... 4
3. Overview .................................................. 4
4. Binary Format .............................................. 7
5. Relative Location .......................................... 7
  5.1. Reference TLV ........................................... 8
  5.2. Orientation of Relative Offset Coordinate Reference
       System .................................................. 8
6. Shape Encoding ............................................. 9
  6.1. Units of Measure ....................................... 9
  6.2. Coordinates .......................................... 9
  6.3. On Uncertainty and Encoding ............................ 10
7. Shapes .................................................. 10
  7.1. Point ................................................ 10
  7.1.1. XML encoding ....................................... 10
  7.1.2. TLV encoding ....................................... 10
  7.2. Circle or Sphere Shape ................................ 11
  7.2.1. XML encoding ....................................... 11
  7.2.2. TLV encoding ....................................... 12
  7.3. Ellipse or Ellipsoid Shape ............................. 12
  7.3.1. XML encoding ....................................... 13
  7.3.2. TLV encoding ....................................... 14
  7.4. Polygon or Prism Shape ................................ 14
  7.4.1. XML Encoding ....................................... 15
  7.4.2. TLV Encoding ....................................... 16
  7.5. Arc-Band Shape ....................................... 17
  7.5.1. XML encoding ....................................... 18
  7.5.2. TLV Encoding ....................................... 18
8. Secondary Map Metadata .................................... 18
  8.1. Map URL .............................................. 19
  8.2. Map Coordinate Reference System ....................... 19
     8.2.1. Map Reference Point Offset ....................... 19
     8.2.2. Map Orientation .................................. 20
1. Introduction

This document describes a format for the expression of relative location information.

The location is given relative to a reference, which is expressed with a civic or geodetic representation, with the relative offset as described in this document. The offset is expressed in meters, and a directional vector is either implied to be earth North/East or supplied explicitly. Also defined is an optional URI to a document that can contain a map/floorplan/illustration (‘map’) upon which the relative location can be plotted as well as an optional angle, offset and scale defining the Coordinate Reference System (CRS) of the map.

Two formats are included: an XML form that is intended for use in PIDF-LO [RFC4119] and a TLV format for use in other protocols such as those that already convey binary representation of location information defined in [RFC4776].

2. Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Numeric values in this scheme are all represented using floating point values [IEEE.754]. Single precision values are 32-bit values with a sign bit, 8 exponent bits and 23 fractional bits. Double precision values are 64-bit values with a sign bit, 11 exponent bits and 52 fractional bits.

3. Overview

This document describes an update to PIDF-LO [RFC4119] as updated by [RFC5139] and [RFC5491], to allow the expression of a location as an offset relative to a reference.

This extension effectively allows the creator of a location object to include two location values plus an offset. The "baseline" location that is given outside of the <relative-location> element is what will be visible to a client that does not understand that extension (i.e., one that ignores the <relative-location> element). A client that does understand this extension will interpret the location within the relative element as a refinement of the baseline location, which gives the reference location for the relative offset.

Creators of location objects with relative location thus have a choice of how much information to put into the "baseline" location.
and how much to put into the "reference" location. For example, all location information could be put inside the <relative-location> element, so that clients that do not understand relative location would receive no location information at all. Alternatively, the baseline location value could be precise enough to specify a building that contains the relative location, and the reference location could specify a point within the building from which the offset is measured.

In any case, it is RECOMMENDED that the baseline location be general enough to describe both the reference location and the relative location (reference plus offset). In particular, while it is possible to put all location information into the "reference" location (leaving an universally broad "baseline"), location objects SHOULD NOT have all location information in the baseline location. Doing this would cause clients that do not understand relative location to incorrectly interpret the baseline location (i.e., the reference point) as the actual, precise location of the client.

Both the baseline and the reference location are defined either as a geodetic location [OGC.GeoShape] or a civic address [RFC4776]. If the baseline location was expressed as a geodetic location, the reference MUST be geodetic. If the baseline location was expressed as a civic address, the reference MUST be a civic.

The relative location can be expressed using a point (2- or 3-dimensional), or a shape that includes uncertainty: circle, sphere, ellipse, ellipsoid, polygon, prism or arc-band. Descriptions of these shapes can be found in [RFC5491].

Optionally, a reference to a 'map' document can be provided. The reference is a URI. The document could be an image or dataset that represents a map, floorplan or other form. The type of document the URI points to is described as a MIME media type. Metadata in the relative location can include the location of the reference point in the map as well as an orientation (angle from North) and scale to align the document CRS with the WGS-84 CRS. The document is assumed to be useable by the application receiving the PIDF with the relative location to locate the reference point in the map. This document does not describe any mechanisms for displaying or manipulating the document other than providing the reference location, orientation and scale.

As an example, consider a relative location expressed as a point, relative to a civic location:

<dm:device id="relative1">
  <gp:geopriv>
    <gp:location-info>
      <ca:civicAddress xml:lang="en-AU">
        <ca:country>AU</ca:country>
        <ca:A1>NSW</ca:A1>
        <ca:A3>Wollongong</ca:A3>
        <ca:A4>North Wollongong</ca:A4>
        <ca:RD>Flinders</ca:RD>
        <ca:STS>Street</ca:STS>
        <ca:HNO>123</ca:HNO>
      </ca:civicAddress>
      <rel:relative-location>
        <rel:reference>
          <ca:civicAddress xml:lang="en-AU">
            <ca:INT N="Door" R="A">Front</ca:INT>
          </ca:civicAddress>
        </rel:reference>
        <rel:offset>
          <gml:Point xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
            srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d">
            <gml:pos>100 50</gml:pos>
          </gml:Point>
        </rel:offset>
      </rel:relative-location>
    </gp:location-info>
    <gp:usage-rules/>
    <gp:method>GPS</gp:method>
    <rel:map>
      <rel:url type="image/png">
        http://example.com/location/map.png
      </rel:url>
      <rel:offset>20. 120.</rel:offset>
      <rel:orientation>29.</rel:orientation>
      <rel:scale>20. -20.</rel:scale>
    </rel:map>
  </gp:geopriv>
  <dm:deviceID>mac:1234567890ab</dm:deviceID>
</dm:device>
</presence>
4. Binary Format

This document describes a way to encode the relative location in a binary TLV form for use in other protocols that use TLVs to represent location.

A type-length-value encoding is used.

```
+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
| Type |   Length    |  Value                         ...
+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
|   X  |      N      |  Value label                   ...
+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
```

Figure 1: TLV-tuple format

Type field (X) is defined as a single byte. The type codes used are registered an IANA managed ‘RLtypes’ registry defined by this document, and restricted to not include the values defined by the CAtypes registry. This restriction permits a location reference and offset to be coded with unique TLVs.

The Length field (N) is defined as an unsigned integer that is two bytes in length. This field can encode values from 0 to 65535. The length field describes the number of bytes in the Value. Length does not count the bytes used for the Type or Length. Note that the length field of a TLVs using the CAtypes registry (such as those defined in [RFC5139] are one byte. Since the type codes defined here are restricted to be different from the CAtypes, the difference in the length field can be accommodated.

The value field is defined explicitly for each shape in this document.

5. Relative Location

Relative location is a shape (point, circle, ellipse...). The shape is defined with a CRS that has a datum defined as the reference (which appears as a civic address or geodetic location in the tuple), and the shape coordinates as meter offsets North/East of the datum measured in meters (with an optional Z offset relative to datum altitude). An optional angle allows the reference CRS be to rotated with respect to North.

The CRS for 2-D is denoted with an SRSname of urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d, while the 3-D CRS is urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:3d. A 2D offset MUST NOT be used with a 3D reference, and a 3D offset MUST NOT be used with a 2D
reference

The baseline of the reference location is represented as <location-info> like a normal PIDF-LO. Relative location adds a new <relative-location> element to <location-info> Within <relative-location> <reference> and <offset> elements are described. Within <offset> are shape elements described below.

The individual elements of the relative location have unique TLV assignments. A relative location encoded in TLV would have the baseline location reference TLDs followed by an outer reference TLD which contains within it the reference refinement TLVs. The reference TLD is followed by the relative offset, and optional map TLDs described in this document.

More than one relative shape MUST NOT be included in either a PIDF-LO or TLV encoding of location for a given reference point. Any error in the reference point transfers to the location described by the relative location. Any errors arising from an implementation not supporting or understanding elements of the reference point directly increases the error (or uncertainty) in the resulting location.

5.1. Reference TLV

When a reference is encoded in TLV, the refinement of the baseline location is represented in a reference TLV, inside of which are civic CAtype TLVs (if the baseline was a civic) or geo TLVs (if the baseline was a geo).

+------------------------+------------------------+
|       111               |     Length             |
| Reference TLVs         |                        |
+------------------------+------------------------+

Reference TLV

5.2. Orientation of Relative Offset Coordinate Reference System

The relative location element may contain an optional angle relative to North that defines the CRS of the offset. The offset CRS scale is always meters, and the datum is the reference. The angle is encoded as a single precision floating point degrees, with 0.0 representing North. In xml, the angle is contained in an <ro-angle> element, example <ro-angle>50.0</ro-angle>. In TLV encoding:

+------------------------+------------------------+
|       112               |     Length             |
| Angle                  |                        |
+------------------------+------------------------+
6. Shape Encoding

Shape data is used to represent regions of uncertainty in the relative CRS.

The description of each shape type includes a description of how that type is encoded in Geography Markup Language (GML) [OGC.GML-3.1.1], consistent with the rules in [RFC5491], but with a relative CRS. The CRS is identified by a distinguished urn --tbd-- defined by this document.

6.1. Units of Measure

All distance measures used in shapes are expressed in meters using single precision floating point values.

All orientation angles used in shapes are expressed in degrees using single precision floating point values. Orientation angles are measured from WGS84 Northing to Easting with zero at Northing. Orientation angles in the relative coordinate system start from the second coordinate axis (y or Northing) and increase toward the first axis (x or Easting).

6.2. Coordinates

Coordinates are a sequence of numeric values. These are encoded as a sequence of double precision floating point numbers.

Coordinates are represented using a single precision floating point value as described in IEEE 754 [IEEE.754].

Every CRS MUST define how many values are present in each set of coordinates, the axes that each value applies to, the order of axes, and the units that are used for each axis.

For the two-dimensional CRS, coordinates are made of two values. The first value corresponds to latitude (Easting). The second value corresponds to longitude (Northing). Both axes are rotated relative to North by the ro-angle, if present.

For the three-dimensional CRS, coordinates are made of three values, the first two of which are the same as for the two-dimensional CRS. The third value corresponds to the altitude above the plane of the horizontal at the reference location and is measured in meters.
6.3. On Uncertainty and Encoding

Binary-encoded coordinate values are considered to be a single value without uncertainty. When encoding a value that cannot be exactly represented, the best approximation is chosen according to [Clinger1990].

7. Shapes

Nine shape type codes are defined.

7.1. Point

A point "shape" describes a single point with unknown uncertainty. It consists of a single set of coordinates.

In a two-dimensional CRS, the coordinate includes two values; in a three-dimensional CRS, the coordinate includes three values.

7.1.1. XML encoding

A point is represented in GML using the following template:

```xml
<gml:Point xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
    srsName="$CRS-URN$">
    <gml:pos>$Coordinate-1 $Coordinate-2 $Coordinate-3</gml:pos>
</gml:Point>
```

GML Point Template

Where "$CRS-URN$" is replaced by a
urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relativel:2d or
urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relativel:3d and "$Coordinate-3$" is omitted if the CRS is two-dimensional.

7.1.2. TLV encoding

The point shape is introduced by a TLV of 113 for a 2D point and 114 for a 3D point.

```
+----------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>113/4</th>
<th>Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3D-only) Coordinate-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Section 7.2. Circle or Sphere Shape

A circle or sphere describes a single point with a single uncertainty value in meters.

In a two-dimensional CRS, the coordinate includes two values and the resulting shape forms a circle. In a three-dimensional CRS, the coordinate includes three values and the resulting shape forms a sphere. The uncertainty radius is specified as a single precision floating point value (32 bits: 1 sign bit, 8 exponent bits, 23 fractional bits in binary).

The circle size is defined as a radius in meters encoded as single precision floating point value.

### 7.2.1. XML encoding

A circle is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:

```xml
<gs:Circle xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
    xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
    srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d">
    <gml:pos>$Coordinate-1$ $Coordinate-2$</gml:pos>
    <gs:radius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">$Radius$</gs:radius>
</gs:Circle>
```

**GML Circle Template**

A sphere is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:

```xml
<gs:Sphere xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
    xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
    srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:3d">
    <gml:pos>$Coordinate-1$ $Coordinate-2$ $Coordinate-3$</gml:pos>
    <gs:radius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">$Radius$</gs:radius>
</gs:Sphere>
```

**GML Sphere Template**
7.2.2. TLV encoding

A circular shape is introduced by a type code of 115. A spherical shape is introduced by a type code of 116.

+-----+--------+--------+
| 115 | Length  |
| 6   | Coordinate-1 |
|     | Coordinate-2 |
|     | (3D-only) Coordinate-3 |
|     | Radius    |

Circle or Sphere Encoding

7.3. Ellipse or Ellipsoid Shape

A ellipse or ellipsoid describes a point with an elliptical or ellipsoidal uncertainty region.

In a two-dimensional CRS, the coordinate includes two values, plus a semi-major axis, a semi-minor axis, a semi-major axis orientation (clockwise from North). In a three-dimensional CRS, the coordinate includes three values and in addition to the two-dimensional values, an altitude uncertainty (semi-vertical) is added.

Distance and angular measures are defined in meters and degrees respectively. Both are encoded as single precision floating point values.
7.3.1. XML encoding

An ellipse is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:

```xml
<gs:Ellipse xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
    xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
    srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d">
  <gml:pos>$Coordinate-1 $Coordinate-2$</gml:pos>
  <gs:orientation uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9102">$Orientation$</gs:orientation>
</gs:Ellipse>
```

GML Ellipse Template

An ellipsoid is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:

```xml
<gs:Ellipsoid xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
    xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
    srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:3d">
  <gml:pos>$Coordinate-1 $Coordinate-2$ $Coordinate-3$</gml:pos>
  <gs:orientation uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9102">$Orientation$</gs:orientation>
</gs:Ellipsoid>
```

GML Ellipsoid Template
7.3.2. TLV encoding

An ellipse is introduced by a type code of 117 and an ellipsoid is introduced by a type code of 118.

+------|-------------+
| 117/8|    Length   |
+------|-------------+
|     | Coordinate-1|
+------|-------------+
|     | Coordinate-2|
+------|-------------+
|     | (3D-only) Coordinate-3|
+--------------------------------+++|
| Semi-Major Axis | Semi-Minor Axis|
+----------------+----------------+
| Orientation | (3D) Semi-Vertical Axis |
+--------------------------------+++|

Ellipse or Ellipsoid Encoding

7.4. Polygon or Prism Shape

A polygon or prism include a number of points that describe the outer boundary of an uncertainty region. A prism also includes an altitude and prism height.

At least 3 points MUST be included in a polygon. In order to interoperate with existing systems, an encoding SHOULD include 15 or fewer points, unless the recipient is known to support larger numbers.

The height of the prism is encoded as a single precision floating point value.
7.4.1. XML Encoding

A polygon is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:

```xml
<gml:Polygon xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
             srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d">
  <gml:exterior>
    <gml:LinearRing>
      <gml:posList>
       $Coordinate1-1$ $Coordinate1-2$
       $Coordinate2-1$ $Coordinate2-2$
       $Coordinate3-1$ ...
       ...
       $CoordinateN-1$ $CoordinateN-2$
       $Coordinate1-1$ $Coordinate1-2$
     </gml:posList>
    </gml:LinearRing>
  </gml:exterior>
</gml:Polygon>
```

GML Polygon Template

Alternatively, a series of "pos" elements can be used in place of the single "posList". Each "pos" element contains two coordinate values.

Note that the first point is repeated at the end of the sequence of coordinates and no explicit count of the number of points is provided.

A GML polygon that includes altitude cannot be represented completely in binary. When converting to the binary representation, a two dimensional CRS is used and altitude is removed from each coordinate.
A prism is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:

```xml
<gs:Prism xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
          xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
          srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:3d">
  <gs:base>
    <gml:Polygon>
      <gml:exterior>
        <gml:LinearRing>
          <gml:posList>
            $Coordinate1-1$ $Coordinate1-2$ $Coordinate1-3$
            $Coordinate2-1$ $Coordinate2-2$ $Coordinate2-3$
            ...
            ...
            $CoordinateN-1$ $CoordinateN-2$ $CoordinateN-3$
            $Coordinate1-1$ $Coordinate1-2$ $Coordinate1-3$
          </gml:posList>
        </gml:LinearRing>
      </gml:exterior>
    </gml:Polygon>
  </gs:base>
  <gs:height uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">$Height$</gs:height>
</gs:Prism>
```

GML Prism Template

Alternatively, a series of "pos" elements can be used in place of the single "posList". Each "pos" element contains three coordinate values.

7.4.2. TLV Encoding

A polygon is introduced with a type code of 119. A prism is introduced with a type code of 120.
Note that unlike the polygon representation in GML, the first and last points are not required to be the same in the TLV representation. An explicit count of the number of points is provided in ‘Count’.

7.5. Arc-Band Shape

A arc-band describes a region constrained by a range of angles and distances from a predetermined point. This shape can only be provided for a two-dimensional CRS.

Distance and angular measures are defined in meters and degrees respectively. Both are encoded as single precision floating point values.
7.5.1. XML encoding

An arc-band is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:

```xml
<gs:ArcBand xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
            xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
            srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d">
    <gml:pos>$Coordinate-1 $Coordinate-2$</gml:pos>
    $Inner-Radius$
    </gs:innerRadius>
    <gs:outerRadius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">
    $Inner-Radius$
    </gs:outerRadius>
    <gs:startAngle uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9102">
    $Start-Angle$
    </gs:startAngle>
    <gs:openingAngle uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9102">
    $Opening-Angle$
    </gs:openingAngle>
</gs:Ellipsoid>
```

GML Arc-Band Template

7.5.2. TLV Encoding

An arc-band is introduced by a type code of 122.

```
+----------+----------+
| 121      |  Length  |
|----------+----------|
| Coordinate| Coordinate|
|----------+----------|
| Inner Radius | Outer Radius |
|----------+----------|
| Start Angle | Opening Angle |
|----------+----------|
```

Arc-Band Encoding

8. Secondary Map Metadata

The optional "map" URL can be used to provide a user of relative location with a visual reference for the location information. This document does not describe how the recipient uses the map nor how it
locates the reference or offset within the map. Maps can be simple images, vector files, 2-D or 3-D geospatial databases, or any other form of representation understood by both the sender and recipient.

8.1. Map URL

In XML, the map is a <map> element defined within <relative-location> and contains the URL. The URL is encoded as a UTF-8 encoded string. An "http:" or "https:" URL MUST be used unless the entity creating the PIDF-LO is able to ensure that authorized recipients of this data are able to use other URI schemes. A "map-type" attribute MUST be present and specifies the kind of map the URL points to. Map types are specified as mime media types as recorded in the IANA Media Types registry. For example <map map-type="image/png">https://www.example.com/floorplans/123South/floor-2</map>. In binary, the map-type is a separate TLV from the map URL:

```
+------+------+------+------+--+--
|  122 |   Length    |   maptype         ...
+------+------+------+------+--+--
|  123 |   Length    |   Map Image URL   ...
+------+------+------+------+--+--
```

Map URL TLVs

8.2. Map Coordinate Reference System

The CRS used by the map depends on the type of map. For example, a map described by a 3-D geometric model of the building may contain a complete CRS description in it. For some kinds of maps, typically described as images, the CRS used within the map must define the following:

- The CRS origin
- The CRS axes used and their orientation
- The unit of measure used

This document provides elements that allow for a mapping between the local coordinate reference system used for the relative location and the coordinate reference system used for the map where they are not the same.

8.2.1. Map Reference Point Offset

This optional element identifies the coordinates of the reference point as it appears in the map. This value is measured in a map-type
dependent manner, using the coordinate system of the map.

For image maps, coordinates start from the upper left corner and coordinates are first counted by column with positive values to the right; then rows are counted with positive values toward the bottom of the image. For such an image, the first item is columns, the second rows and any third value applies to any third dimension used in the image coordinate space.

The `<map-offset>` element contains 2 (or 3) coordinates similar to a GML "pos", For example:

```xml
<map-offset> 2670.0 1124.0 1022.0</map-offset>
```

Map Reference Point Example XML

```
+------+-------------+
| 124  |    Length   |
+------+------+------+------+
| Coordinate-1             |
+------+------+------+------+
| Coordinate-2             |
+------+------+------+------+
| (3D-only) Coordinate-3   |
+------+------+------+------+
```

Map Reference Point Coordinates TLV

The encoding for coordinates is described in Section 6.2.

If omitted, a value containing all zeros is assumed. If the coordinates provided contain fewer values than are needed, the first value from the set is applied in place of any missing values.

8.2.2. Map Orientation

The map orientation includes the orientation of the map direction ('UP') in relation to the Earth. Map orientation is expressed relative to the orientation of the relative coordinate system. This means that map orientation with respect to WGS84 North is the sum of the two orientation fields. Both values default to zero if no value is specified.

This type uses a single precision floating point value of degrees relative to North.

In XML, the `<orientation>` element contains a single floating point
value, example <orientation>67.00</orientation>. In TLV form:

+-------------+------------+-------------+-----------+-------------+------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>125</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Angle</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
+-------------+------------+-------------+----------+-------------+------------+

Map Orientation TLV

8.2.3.  Map Scale

The optional map scale describes the relationship between the units of measure used in the map, relative to the meters unit used in the relative coordinate system.

This type uses a sequence of IEEE 754 [IEEE.754] single precision floating point values to represent scale as a sequence of numeric values. The units of these values is map-type dependent, and could for example be pixels per meter in image map-types.

A scaling factor is provided for each axis in the coordinate system. For a two-dimensional coordinate system, two values are included to allow for different scaling along the x and y axes independently. For a three-dimensional coordinate system, three values are specified for the x, y and z axes.

Alternatively, a single scaling value MAY be used to apply the same scaling factor to all coordinate components.

Images that use a rows/columns coordinate system often use a left-handed coordinate system. A negative value for the y/rows-axis scaling value can be used to account for any change in direction between the y-axis used in the relative coordinate system and the rows axis of the image coordinate system.

In XML, the <scale> element may contain the single scale value, or may contain 2 (or 3) values similar to a GML "pos" with separate scale values. In TLV form:

+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>126</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Scales</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
+-------------+------------+-------------+----------+-------------+------------+

Map Scale TLV
8.3. Map Example

An example of expressing a map is:

```
<rel:map>
  <rel:url type="image/jpeg">
    http://example.com/map.jpg
  </rel:url>
  <rel:offset>200 210</rel:offset>
  <rel:orientation>68</rel:orientation>
  <rel:scale>2.90 -2.90</rel:scale>
</rel:map>
```

Map Example

9. Examples

9.1. Civic PIDF with Polygon Offset

```
<pres xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf"
      xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10"
      xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
      xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
      entity="pres:ness@example.com">
  <dm:device id="nesspc-1">
    <gp:geopriv>
      <gp:location-info>
        <ca:civicAddress xml:lang="en-AU">
          <ca:country>AU</ca:country>
          <ca:A1>NSW</ca:A1>
          <ca:A3>Wollongong</ca:A3>
          <ca:A4>North Wollongong</ca:A4>
          <ca:RD>Flinders</ca:RD>
          <ca:STS>Street</ca:STS>
          <ca:HNO>123</ca:HNO>
        </ca:civicAddress>
        <rel:relative-location>
          <rel:reference>
            <ca:civicAddress xml:lang="en-AU">
              <ca:INT N="Building">A</ca:INT>
              <ca:INT N="Level">1</ca:INT>
              <ca:INT N="Suite">113</ca:INT>
              <ca:INT N="Door" R="A">Front</ca:INT>
            </ca:civicAddress>
          </rel:reference>
        </rel:relative-location>
      </gp:location-info>
    </gp:geopriv>
  </dm:device>
</pres>
```
9.2. Geo PIDF with Circle Offset

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<pres xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf"
     xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10"
     xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
     entity="pres:point2d@example.com">
<dm:device id="point2d">
<gp:geopriv>
<gp:location-info>
<gml:Circle srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326">
<gml:pos>-34.407 150.883</gml:pos>
<gs:radius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">50.0</gs:radius>
</gml:Circle>
</gp:location-info>
<rel:relative-location>
<rel:reference>
<gml:Point srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326">
<gml:pos>-34.407 150.883</gml:pos>
</gml:Point>
</rel:reference>
</rel:relative-location>
</gp:geopriv>
</dm:device>
</presence>
</gml:Point>
</rel:reference>
<rel:offset>
<gml:Circle xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
    srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d">
    <gml:pos>500.0 750.0</gml:pos>
    <gml:radius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">5.0</gml:radius>
</gml:Circle>
</rel:circle>
</rel:relative-location>
<map:map>
    <map:urltype="image/png">
        https://www.example.com/flrpln/123South/flr-2</map:urltype>
    <map:offset>2670.0 1124.0 1022.0</map:offset>
    <map:orientation>67.00</map:orientation>
    <map:scale>10</map:scale>
</map:map>
</gp:location-info>
<gp:usage-rules/>
<gp:method>Wiremap</gp:method>
</gp:geopriv>
<dm:deviceID>mac:1234567890ab</dm:deviceID>
</dm:device>
</gp:geopriv>
</status>
<timestamp>2003-06-22T20:57:29Z</timestamp>
</tuple>
</presence>
9.3. Civic TLV with Point Offset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>en</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Wacker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Drive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>3400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>BBuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>AFloor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>BSuite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>ADoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>100 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>image/png</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td><a href="http://maps.example.com/3400Wacker/A6">http://maps.example.com/3400Wacker/A6</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>0.0 4120.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>113.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Schema Definition

```xml
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema
    xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
    xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
    targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10:relative"
```
elementFormDefault="qualified"
attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

<!-- [NOTE TO RFC-EDITOR: Please replace all instances of the URL 'http://ietf.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt' with the URL of published document and remove this note.]] -->

<xsl:annotation>
  <xs:appinfo
    Relative Location for PIDF-LO
  </xs:appinfo>
  <xs:documentation source="http://ietf.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt">
    This schema defines a location representation that allows for the description of locations that are relative to another. An optional map reference is also defined.
  </xs:documentation>
</xsl:annotation>

<xsl:import namespace="http://www.opengis.net/gml"/>

<xsl:element name="relative-location" type="rel:relativeType"/>

<xsl:complexType name="relativeType">
  <xs:complexContent>
    <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
      <xs:sequence>
        <xs:element name="reference" type="rel:referenceType"/>
        <xs:element name="offset" type="rel:offsetType"/>
        <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
          minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xs:sequence>
      <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:complexContent>
</xsl:complexType>

<xsl:complexType name="referenceType">
  <xs:complexContent>
    <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
      <xs:sequence>
        <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
          minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xs:sequence>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:complexContent>
</xsl:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="offsetType">
  <xs:complexContent>
    <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
      <xs:sequence>
        <xs:element ref="gml:_Geometry"/>
        <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
               minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xs:sequence>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:element name="map" type="rel:mapType"/>
<xs:complexType name="mapType">
  <xs:complexContent>
    <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
      <xs:sequence>
        <xs:element name="url" type="rel:mapUrlType"/>
        <xs:element name="offset" type="rel:doubleList"
                    minOccurs="0"/>
        <xs:element name="orientation" type="rel:doubleList"
                    minOccurs="0"/>
        <xs:element name="scale" type="rel:doubleList"
                    minOccurs="0"/>
      </xs:sequence>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="mapUrlType">
  <xs:simpleContent>
    <xs:extension base="xs:anyURI">
      <xs:attribute name="type" type="rel:mimeType"
                    default="application/octet-stream"/>
    </xs:extension>
  </xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>

<!-- From draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-09, excluding
      the obsolete parts -->
<xs:simpleType name="mimeType">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:token">
    <xs:pattern value="[!#$%&’\*\-\.\dA-Z^’_a-z\-]+"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
11. Security Considerations

This document describes a data format. To a large extent, security properties of this depend on how this data is used.

Privacy for location data is typically important. Adding relative location may increase the precision of the location, but does not otherwise alter its privacy considerations, which are discussed in [RFC4119]

[[Not that interesting, but it could be relevant ?]] The fractional bits in IEEE 754 [IEEE.754] floating point values can be used as a covert channel. For values of either zero or infinity, non-zero fraction bits could be used to convey information. If the presence of covert channels is not desired then the fractional bits MUST be set to zero. There is no need to represent NaN (not a number) in this encoding.

12. IANA Considerations

12.1. Relative Location Registry

This document creates a new registry called ‘RLtypes’. As defined in [RFC5226], this registry operates under "IETF Consensus" rules.

The content of this registry includes:

RLtype: Numeric identifier, assigned by IANA.

Brief description: Short description identifying the meaning of the element.

Reference to published specification: A stable reference to an RFC which describes the value in sufficient detail so that interoperability between independent implementations is possible.

IANA is requested to not permit values to be assigned into this registry which conflict with values assigned in the CAtypes registry or to permit values to be assigned into the CAtypes registry which conflict with values assigned to this registry unless the IANA
considerations section for the new value explicitly overrides this prohibition, and the document defining the value describes how conflicting TLV codes will be interpreted by implementations.

The values defined are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RLtype</th>
<th>description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>relative location reference</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>relative location angle</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>relative location shape 2D point</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>relative location shape 3D point</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>relative location shape circular</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>relative location shape spherical</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>relative location shape elliptical</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>relative location shape ellipsoid</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>relative location shape arc-band</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>relative location shape polygon</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>relative location shape prism</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>relative location map type</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>relative location map URI</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>relative location map coordinates</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>relative location map angle</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>relative location map scale</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12.2. URN Sub-Namespace Registration

This document registers a new XML namespace, as per the guidelines in [RFC3688]) that has been registered with IANA.

Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@andrew.com).

XML:

BEGIN
  <?xml version="1.0"?>
  <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
  <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
    <head>
      <title>GEOPRIV Relative Location</title>
    </head>
    <body>
      <h1>Format for representing relative location in GEOPRIV</h1>
    </body>
  </html>

12.3. XML Schema Registration

This section registers an XML schema as per the procedures in [RFC3688].


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@andrew.com).

The XML for this schema can be found as the entirety of Section 7 of this document.

12.4. CRS public identifier registration

This section registers two public identifiers as per the procedures in [RFC3688].

Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group (geopriv@ietf.org),
Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@andrew.com).

XML:

BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
 "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head>
<title>GEOPRIV Relative Location 2d CRS</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Identifier for a 2D CRS in GEOPRIV relative location</h1>
</body>
</html>

<!-- [[NOTE TO RFC-EDITOR: Please replace all instances of RFCXXXX
 with the number of the published document
 and remove this note.]] -->

END


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group (geopriv@ietf.org),
Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@andrew.com).

XML:

BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
 "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head>
<title>GEOPRIV Relative Location 3d CRS</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Identifier for a 3D CRS in GEOPRIV relative location</h1>
</body>
</html>

<!-- [[NOTE TO RFC-EDITOR: Please replace all instances of RFCXXXX
 with the number of the published document
 and remove this note.]] -->
13. Acknowledgements

This is the product of a design team on relative location. Besides the authors, this team included: Marc Linsner, James Polk, and James Winterbottom.

14. References

14.1. Normative References


[OGC.GeoShape] Thomson, M. and C. Reed, "GML 3.1.1 PIDF-LO Shape Application Schema for use by the Internet"
14.2. Informative References


Authors’ Addresses

Martin Thomson
Andrew Corporation
Andrew Building (39)
Wollongong University Campus
Northfields Avenue
Wollongong, NSW 2522
AU
EMail: martin.thomson@andrew.com

Brian Rosen
Neustar
470 Conrad Dr
Mars, PA 16046
US
EMail: br@brianrosen.net
Dorothy Stanley
Aruba Networks
1322 Crossman Ave
Sunnyvale, CA  94089
US
EMail: dstanley@arubanetworks.com

Gabor Bajko
Nokia
323 Fairchild Drive
Mountain View, CA  94043
US
EMail: gabor.bajko@nokia.com

Allan Thomson
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA  95134
US
EMail: althomso@cisco.com
Relative Location Representation

draft-ietf-geopriv-relative-location-08

Abstract

This document defines an extension to PIDF-LO (RFC4119) for the expression of location information that is defined relative to a reference point. The reference point may be expressed as a geodetic or civic location, and the relative offset may be one of several shapes. An alternative binary representation is described.

 Optionally, a reference to a secondary document (such as a map image) can be included, along with the relationship of the map coordinate system to the reference/offset coordinate system to allow display of the map with the reference point and the relative offset.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on March 10, 2014.

Copyright Notice
1. Introduction

This document describes a format for the expression of relative location information.

A relative location is formed of a reference location, plus a relative offset from that reference location. The reference location can be represented in either civic or geodetic form. The reference location can also have dynamic components such as velocity. The relative offset is specified in meters using a Cartesian coordinate system.

In addition to the relative location, an optional URI can be provided to a document that contains a map, floorplan or other spatially oriented information. Applications could use this information to display the relative location. Additional fields allow the map to be oriented and scaled correctly.

Two formats are included: an XML form that is intended for use in PIDF-LO [RFC4119] and a TLV format for use in other protocols such as those that already convey binary representation of location information defined in [RFC4776].

2. Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Overview

This document describes an extension to PIDF-LO [RFC4119] as updated by [RFC5139] and [RFC5491], to allow the expression of a location as an offset relative to a reference.
This extension allows the creator of a location object to include two location values plus an offset. The two location values, named "baseline" and "reference", combine to form the origin of the offset. The final, relative location is described relative to this reference point.

The "baseline" location is included outside of the <relative-location> element. The baseline location is visible to a client that does not understand relative location (i.e., it ignores the <relative-location> element).

A client that does understand relative location will interpret the location within the relative element as a refinement of the baseline location. This document defines both a "reference" location, which serves as a refinement of the baseline location and the starting point; and an offset, which describes the location of the Target based on this starting point.

Creators of location objects with relative location thus have a choice of how much information to put into the "baseline" location and how much to put into the "reference" location. For example, the baseline location value could be precise enough to specify a building...
that contains the relative location, and the reference location could specify a point within the building from which the offset is measured.

Location objects SHOULD NOT have all location information in the baseline location. Doing this would cause clients that do not understand relative location to incorrectly interpret the baseline location (i.e., the reference point) as the actual, precise location of the client. The baseline location is intended to carry a location that encompasses both the reference location and the relative location (i.e., the reference location plus offset).

It is possible to provide a valid relative location with no information in the baseline. However, this provides recipients who do not understand relative location with no information. A baseline location SHOULD include sufficient information to encompass both the reference and relative locations while providing a baseline that is as accurate as possible.

Both the baseline and the reference location are defined either as a geodetic location [OGC.GeoShape] or a civic address [RFC4776]. If the baseline location was expressed as a geodetic location, the reference MUST be geodetic. If the baseline location was expressed as a civic address, the reference MUST be a civic.

Baseline and reference locations MAY also include dynamic location information [RFC5962].

The relative location can be expressed using a point (2- or 3-dimensional), or a shape that includes uncertainty: circle, sphere, ellipse, ellipsoid, polygon, prism or arc-band. Descriptions of these shapes can be found in [RFC5491].

Optionally, a reference to a 'map' document can be provided. The reference is a URI [RFC3986]. The document could be an image or dataset that represents a map, floorplan or other form. The type of document the URI points to is described as a MIME media type [RFC2046]. Metadata in the relative location can include the location of the reference point in the map as well as an orientation (angle from North) and scale to align the document Co-ordinate Reference System (CRS) with the WGS84 [WGS84] CRS. The document is assumed to be useable by the application receiving the PIDF with the relative location to locate the reference point in the map. This document does not describe any mechanisms for displaying or manipulating the document other than providing the reference location, orientation and scale.

As an example, consider a relative location expressed as a point,
relative to a civic location:

<presence xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf"
  xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10"
  xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
  xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
  entity="pres:relative@example.com">
<dm:device id="relative1">
  <gp:geopriv>
    <gp:location-info>
      <ca:civicAddress xml:lang="en-AU">
        <ca:country>AU</ca:country>
        <ca:A1>NSW</ca:A1>
        <ca:A3>Wollongong</ca:A3>
        <ca:A4>North Wollongong</ca:A4>
        <ca:RD>Flinders</ca:RD>
        <ca:STS>Street</ca:STS>
        <ca:HNO>123</ca:HNO>
      </ca:civicAddress>
      <rel:relative-location>
        <rel:reference>
          <ca:civicAddress xml:lang="en-AU">
            <ca:LMK>Front Door</ca:LMK>
          </ca:civicAddress>
        </rel:reference>
        <rel:offset>
          <gml:Point xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
            srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d">
            <gml:pos>100 50</gml:pos>
          </gml:Point>
        </rel:offset>
      </rel:relative-location>
    </gp:location-info>
    <gp:usage-rules/>
    <gp:method>GPS</gp:method>
    <rel:map>
      <rel:url type="image/png">
        http://example.com/location/map.png
      </rel:url>
      <rel:offset>20. 120.</rel:offset>
      <rel:orientation>29.</rel:orientation>
      <rel:scale>20. -20.</rel:scale>
    </rel:map>
  </gp:geopriv>
<dm:deviceID>mac:1234567890ab</dm:deviceID>
</dm:device>
4. Relative Location

Relative location is a shape (e.g., point, circle, ellipse). The shape is defined with a CRS that has a datum defined as the reference (which appears as a civic address or geodetic location in the tuple), and the shape coordinates as meter offsets North/East of the datum measured in meters (with an optional Z offset relative to datum altitude). An optional angle allows the reference CRS be to rotated with respect to North.

4.1. Relative Coordinate System

The relative coordinate reference system uses a coordinate system with two or three axes.

The baseline and reference locations are used to define a relative datum. The reference location defines the origin of the coordinate system. The centroid of the reference location is used when the reference location contains any uncertainty.

The axes in this coordinate system are originally oriented based on the directions of East, North and Up from the reference location: the first (x) axis increases to the East, the second (y) axis points North, and the optional third (z) axis points Up. All axes of the coordinate system use meters as a basic unit.

Any coordinates in the relative shapes use the described Cartesian coordinate system. In the XML form, this uses a URN of "urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d" for two-dimensional shapes and "urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:3d" for three-dimensional shapes. The binary form uses different shape type identifiers for 2D and 3D shapes.

Dynamic location information [RFC5962] in the baseline or reference location alters relative coordinate system. The resulting Cartesian coordinate system axes are rotated so that the "y" axis is oriented along the direction described by the <orientation> element. The coordinate system also moves as described by the <speed> and <heading> elements.

The single timestamp included in the tuple (or equivalent) element applies to all location elements, including all three components of a relative location: baseline, reference and relative. This is
particularly important when there are dynamic components to these items. A location generator is responsible for ensuring the consistency of these fields.

4.2. Placement of XML Elements

The baseline of the reference location is represented as <location-info> like a normal PIDF-LO. Relative location adds a new <relative-location> element to <location-info>. Within <relative-location>, <reference> and <offset> elements are described. Within <offset> are the shape elements described below. This document extends PIDF-LO as described in [RFC6848].

4.3. Binary Format

This document describes a way to encode the relative location in a binary TLV form for use in other protocols that use TLVs to represent location.

A type-length-value encoding is used.

+-----------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
| Type | Length | Value  | ...   |
| T    | N      | Value  | ...   |
+-----------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+

Figure 1: TLV-tuple format

Type field (T) is an 8-bit unsigned integer. The type codes used are registered an IANA-managed "Relative Location Parameters" registry defined by this document, and restricted to not include the values defined by the "CAtypes" registry. This restriction permits a location reference and offset to be coded within the same object without type collisions.

The Length field (N) is defined as an 8-bit unsigned integer. This field can encode values from 0 to 255. The length field describes the number of bytes in the Value. Length does not count the bytes used for the Type or Length.

The Value field is defined separately for each type.

Each element of the relative location has a unique TLV assignment. A relative location encoded in TLV form includes both baseline and reference location TLVs and a reference location TLVs. The reference TLVs are followed by the relative offset, and optional map TLDs described in this document.
4.4. Distances and Angles

All distance measures used in shapes are expressed in meters.

All orientation angles used in shapes are expressed in degrees. Orientation angles are measured from WGS84 Northing to Easting with zero at Northing. Orientation angles in the relative coordinate system start from the second coordinate axis (y or Northing) and increase toward the first axis (x or Easting).

4.5. Value Encoding

The binary form uses single-precision floating point values IEEE 754 [IEEE.754] to represent coordinates, distance and angle measures. Single precision values are 32-bit values with a sign bit, 8 exponent bits and 23 fractional bits. This uses the interchange format defined in [IEEE.754] and Section 3.6 of [RFC1014], that is: sign, biased exponent and significand, with the most significant bit first.

Binary-encoded coordinate values are considered to be a single value without uncertainty. When encoding a value that cannot be exactly represented, the best approximation MUST be selected according to [Clinger1990].

4.6. Relative Location Restrictions

More than one relative shape MUST NOT be included in either a PIDF-LO or TLV encoding of location for a given reference point.

Any error in the reference point transfers to the location described by the relative location. Any errors arising from an implementation not supporting or understanding elements of the reference point directly increases the error (or uncertainty) in the resulting location.

4.7. Baseline TLVs

Baseline locations are described using the formats defined in [RFC4776] or [RFC6225].

4.8. Reference TLV

When a reference is encoded in binary form, the baseline and reference locations are combined in a reference TLV. This TLV is identified with the code 111 and contains civic address TLVs (if the baseline was a civic) or geo TLVs (if the baseline was a geo).
4.9. Shapes

Shape data is used to represent regions of uncertainty for the reference and relative locations. Shape data in the reference location uses a WGS84 [WGS84] CRS. Shape data in the relative location uses a relative CRS.

The XML form for shapes uses Geography Markup Language (GML) [OGC.GML-3.1.1], consistent with the rules in [RFC5491]. Reference locations use the CRS URNs specified in [RFC5491]; relative locations use either a 2D CRS (urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d), or a 3D (urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:3d), depending on the shape type.

The binary form of each shape uses a different shape type for 2d and 3d shapes.

Nine shape type codes are defined.

4.9.1. Point

A point "shape" describes a single point with unknown uncertainty. It consists of a single set of coordinates.

In a two-dimensional CRS, the coordinate includes two values; in a three-dimensional CRS, the coordinate includes three values.

4.9.1.1. XML encoding

A point is represented in GML using the following template:

```xml
<gml:Point xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
    srsName="$CRS-URN$">
    <gml:pos>$Coordinate-1 $Coordinate-2$ $Coordinate-3$</gml:pos>
</gml:Point>
```

GML Point Template

Where "$CRS-URN$" is replaced by a urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d or urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:3d and "$Coordinate-3$" is omitted if the CRS is two-dimensional.
4.9.1.2. TLV encoding

The point shape is introduced by a TLV of 113 for a 2D point and 114 for a 3D point.

```
+--------++--------+
| 113/4   |Length    |
+--------++--------+
| Coordinate-1 |
+--------++--------+
| Coordinate-2 |
+--------++--------+
| (3D-only) Coordinate-3 |
+--------++--------+
```

Point Encoding

4.9.2. Circle or Sphere Shape

A circle or sphere describes a single point with a single uncertainty value in meters.

In a two-dimensional CRS, the coordinate includes two values and the resulting shape forms a circle. In a three-dimensional CRS, the coordinate includes three values and the resulting shape forms a sphere.

4.9.2.1. XML encoding

A circle is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:

```
<gs:Circle xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
           xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
           srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d">
  <gml:pos>$Coordinate-1 $Coordinate-2$</gml:pos>
  <gs:radius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">
    $Radius$
  </gs:radius>
</gs:Circle>
```

GML Circle Template

A sphere is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:
<gs:Sphere xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
    srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:3d">
  <gml:pos>$Coordinate-1 $Coordinate-2$ $Coordinate-3$</gml:pos>
  <gs:radius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">$Radius$</gs:radius>
</gs:Sphere>

GML Sphere Template

4.9.2.2. TLV encoding

A circular shape is introduced by a type code of 115. A spherical shape is introduced by a type code of 116.

+--------+
| 115/6  |
|Length   |
+---------+
| Coordinate-1 |
+---------+
| Coordinate-2 |
+---------+
| (3D-only) Coordinate-3 |
+---------+
| Radius   |
+---------+

Circle or Sphere Encoding

4.9.3. Ellipse or Ellipsoid Shape

A ellipse or ellipsoid describes a point with an elliptical or ellipsoidal uncertainty region.

In a two-dimensional CRS, the coordinate includes two values, plus a semi-major axis, a semi-minor axis, a semi-major axis orientation (clockwise from North). In a three-dimensional CRS, the coordinate includes three values and in addition to the two-dimensional values, an altitude uncertainty (semi-vertical) is added.

4.9.3.1. XML encoding

An ellipse is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:
GML Ellipse Template

An ellipsoid is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:

```
<gs:Ellipsoid xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
    xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
    srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:3d">
    <gml:pos>$Coordinate-1 $Coordinate-2$ $Coordinate-3$</gml:pos>
    <gs:orientation uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9102">$Orientation$</gs:orientation>
</gs:Ellipsoid>
```

GML Ellipsoid Template

4.9.3.2. TLV encoding

An ellipse is introduced by a type code of 117 and an ellipsoid is introduced by a type code of 118.

```
+--------+-
| 117/8 |Length|
+--------+-+--------+
```
4.9.4. Polygon or Prism Shape

A polygon or prism include a number of points that describe the outer boundary of an uncertainty region. A prism also includes an altitude for each point and prism height.

At least 3 points MUST be included in a polygon. In order to interoperate with existing systems, an encoding SHOULD include 15 or fewer points, unless the recipient is known to support larger numbers.

4.9.4.1. XML Encoding

A polygon is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:

```xml
<gml:Polygon xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
    srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d">
    <gml:exterior>
        <gml:LinearRing>
            <gml:posList>
                $Coordinate1-1$ $Coordinate1-2$
                $Coordinate2-1$ $Coordinate2-2$
                $Coordinate3-1$ ...
                ...
                $CoordinateN-1$ $CoordinateN-2$
                $Coordinate1-1$ $Coordinate1-2$
            </gml:posList>
        </gml:LinearRing>
    </gml:exterior>
</gml:Polygon>
```

GML Polygon Template
Alternatively, a series of "pos" elements can be used in place of the single "posList". Each "pos" element contains two or three coordinate values.

Note that the first point is repeated at the end of the sequence of coordinates and no explicit count of the number of points is provided.

A GML polygon that includes altitude cannot be represented perfectly in TLV form. When converting to the binary representation, a two dimensional CRS is used and altitude is removed from each coordinate.

A prism is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:

```xml
<gs:Prism xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
          xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
          srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:3d">
  <gs:base>
    <gml:Polygon>
      <gml:exterior>
        <gml:LinearRing>
          <gml:posList>
            $Coordinate1-1$ $Coordinate1-2$ $Coordinate1-3$
            $Coordinate2-1$ $Coordinate2-2$ $Coordinate2-3$
            $Coordinate2-1$ ... ...
            ...
            $CoordinateN-1$ $CoordinateN-2$ $CoordinateN-3$
            $Coordinate1-1$ $Coordinate1-2$ $Coordinate1-3$
          </gml:posList>
        </gml:LinearRing>
      </gml:exterior>
    </gml:Polygon>
  </gs:base>
  <gs:height uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">$Height$</gs:height>
</gs:Prism>
```

GML Prism Template

Alternatively, a series of "pos" elements can be used in place of the single "posList". Each "pos" element contains three coordinate values.

4.9.4.2. TLV Encoding
A polygon containing 2D points uses a type code of 119. A polygon with 3D points uses a type code of 120. A prism uses a type code of 121. The number of points can be inferred from the length of the TLV.

```
+--------+------+
|119-21  |Length|
+--------+------+
|  (3D-only) Height          |
+--------+------+
|  Coordinate1-1             |
+--------+------+
|  Coordinate1-2             |
+--------+------+
|  (3D-only) Coordinate1-3  |
+--------+------+
|  Coordinate2-1             |
+--------+------+
|                        ...
+--------+------+
|  CoordinateN-1             |
+--------+------+
|  CoordinateN-2             |
+--------+------+
|  (3D-only) CoordinateN-3  |
+--------+------+
```

Polygon or Prism Encoding

Note that unlike the polygon representation in GML, the first and last points are not the same point in the TLV representation. The duplicated point is removed from the binary form.

4.9.5. Arc-Band Shape

A arc-band describes a region constrained by a range of angles and distances from a predetermined point. This shape can only be provided for a two-dimensional CRS.

Distance and angular measures are defined in meters and degrees respectively. Both are encoded as single precision floating point values.
4.9.5.1. XML encoding

An arc-band is represented in and converted from GML using the following template:

```xml
<gs:ArcBand xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
            xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
            srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d">
  <gml:pos>$Coordinate-1$ $Coordinate-2$</gml:pos>
  $Inner-Radius$
</gs:innerRadius>
<gs:outerRadius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">
  $Outer-Radius$
</gs:outerRadius>
<gs:startAngle uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9102">
  $Start-Angle$
</gs:startAngle>
<gs:openingAngle uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9102">
  $Opening-Angle$
</gs:openingAngle>
</gs:ArcBand>
```

GML Arc-Band Template

4.9.5.2. TLV Encoding

An arc-band is introduced by a type code of 122.

```
+-------+-------+
| 122   |Length  |
+-------+-------+
| Coordinate                        |
+----------------------------------+
| Coordinate                        |
+----------------------------------+
| Inner Radius | Outer Radius |
+----------------+------------------+
| Start Angle     | Opening Angle    |
+-----------------+------------------+
```

Arc-Band Encoding
4.10. Dynamic Location TLVs

Dynamic location elements use the definitions in [RFC5962].

4.10.1. Orientation

The orientation of the target is described using one or two angles. Orientation uses a type code of 123.

```
+--------+
| 123    |
| Length |
+--------+
```

Dynamic Orientation TLVs

4.10.2. Speed

The speed of the target is a scalar value in meters per second. Speed uses a type code of 124.

```
+--------+
| 124    |
| Length |
+--------+
```

Dynamic Speed TLVs

4.10.3. Heading

The heading, or direction of travel, is described using one or two angles. Heading uses a type code of 125.

```
+--------+
| 125    |
| Length |
+--------+
```

Dynamic Heading TLVs
4.11. Secondary Map Metadata

The optional "map" URL can be used to provide a user of relative location with a visual reference for the location information. This document does not describe how the recipient uses the map nor how it locates the reference or offset within the map. Maps can be simple images, vector files, 2-D or 3-D geospatial databases, or any other form of representation understood by both the sender and recipient.

4.11.1. Map URL

In XML, the map is a <map> element defined within <relative-location> and contains the URL. The URL is encoded as a UTF-8 encoded string. An "http:" ([RFC2616]) or "https:" ([RFC2818]) URL MUST be used unless the entity creating the PIDF-LO is able to ensure that authorized recipients of this data are able to use other URI schemes. A "type" attribute MUST be present and specifies the kind of map the URL points to. Map types are specified as MIME media types as recorded in the IANA Media Types registry. For example <map type="image/png">https://www.example.com/floorplans/123South/floor-2</map>.

In binary, the map type is a separate TLV from the map URL. The media type uses a type code of 126; the URL uses a type code of 127.

+------+------+------+------+------+--  --+------+
| 126 |Length|   Map Media Type               ...  
+------+------+------+------+------+--  --+------+
| 127 |Length|   Map Image URL                ... 
+------+------+------+------+------+--  --+------+

Map URL TLVs

Note that the binary form restricts data to 255 octets. This restriction could be problematic for URLs in particular. Applications that use the XML form, but cannot guarantee that a binary form won’t be used, are encouraged to limit the size of the URL to fit within this restriction.

4.11.2. Map Coordinate Reference System

The CRS used by the map depends on the type of map. For example, a map described by a 3-D geometric model of the building may contain a complete CRS description in it. For some kinds of maps, typically described as images, the CRS used within the map must define the following:

- The CRS origin
This document provides elements that allow for a mapping between the local coordinate reference system used for the relative location and the coordinate reference system used for the map where they are not the same.

### 4.11.2.1. Map Reference Point Offset

This optional element identifies the coordinates of the reference point as it appears in the map. This value is measured in a map-type dependent manner, using the coordinate system of the map.

For image maps, coordinates start from the upper left corner and coordinates are first counted by column with positive values to the right; then rows are counted with positive values toward the bottom of the image. For such an image, the first item is columns, the second rows and any third value applies to any third dimension used in the image coordinate space.

The `<offset>` element contains 2 (or 3) coordinates similar to a GML "pos". For example:

```xml
<offset> 2670.0 1124.0 1022.0</offset>
```

**Map Reference Point Example XML**

The map reference point uses a type code of 129.

| +----------+
| 129  Length |
| +----------+
| Coordinate-1 |
| +----------+
| Coordinate-2 |
| +----------+
| (3D-only) Coordinate-3 |
| +----------+

**Map Reference Point Coordinates TLV**

If omitted, a value containing all zeros is assumed. If the coordinates provided contain fewer values than are needed, the first value from the set is applied in place of any absent values. Thus, if a single value is provided, that value is used for Coordinate-2 and Coordinate-3 (if required). If two values are provided and three
are required, the value of Coordinate-1 is used in place of Coordinate-3.

4.11.2.2. Map Orientation

The map orientation includes the orientation of the map direction in relation to the Earth. Map orientation is expressed relative to the orientation of the relative coordinate system. This means that map orientation with respect to WGS84 North is the sum of the orientation field, plus any orientation included in a dynamic portion of the reference location. Both values default to zero if no value is specified.

This type uses a single precision floating point value of degrees relative to North.

In XML, the <orientation> element contains a single floating point value, example <orientation>67.00</orientation>. In TLV form map orientation uses the code 130:

+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
| 130 | Length | Angle |
+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+

Map Orientation TLV

4.11.2.3. Map Scale

The optional map scale describes the relationship between the units of measure used in the map, relative to the meters unit used in the relative coordinate system.

This type uses a sequence of IEEE 754 [IEEE.754] single precision floating point values to represent scale as a sequence of numeric values. The units of these values are dependent on the type of map, and could for example be pixels per meter for an image.

A scaling factor is provided for each axis in the coordinate system. For a two-dimensional coordinate system, two values are included to allow for different scaling along the x and y axes independently. For a three-dimensional coordinate system, three values are specified for the x, y and z axes. Decoders can determine the number of scaling factors by examining the length field.

Alternatively, a single scaling value MAY be used to apply the same scaling factor to all coordinate components.
Images that use a rows/columns coordinate system often use a left-handed coordinate system. A negative value for the y/rows-axis scaling value can be used to account for any change in direction between the y-axis used in the relative coordinate system and the rows axis of the image coordinate system.

In XML, the <scale> element MAY contain a single scale value, or MAY contain 2 (or 3) values in XML list form. In TLV form, scale uses a type code of 131. The length of the TLV determines how many scale values are present:

```
+--------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
| 131    | Length | Scale(s)         | ...               | Scale(s)         | ...               |
+--------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
```

Map Scale TLV

4.11.3. Map Example

An example of expressing a map is:

```xml
<rel:map>
  <rel:url type="image/jpeg">
    http://example.com/map.jpg
  </rel:url>
  <rel:offset>200 210</rel:offset>
  <rel:orientation>68</rel:orientation>
  <rel:scale>2.90 -2.90</rel:scale>
</rel:map>
```

Map Example

5. Examples

The examples in this section combine elements from [RFC3863], [RFC4119], [RFC4479], [RFC5139], and [OGC.GeoShape].

5.1. Civic PIDF with Polygon Offset

```xml
<pres xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf"
      xmlns:dm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:dm"
      xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:gp"
      xmlns:ca="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:ca"
      xmlns:rel="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:rel"
      xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
      xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
      entity="pres:ness@example.com">
<dm:device id="nesspc-1">
```

5.2. Geo PIDF with Circle Offset

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<presence xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf"
  xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10"
  xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
  xmlns:gs="http://www.opengis.net/pidflo/1.0"
  entity="pres:point2d@example.com">
  <dm:device id="point2d">
    <gp:geopriv>
      <gp:location-info>
        <gs:Circle srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326">
          <gml:pos>-34.407 150.883</gml:pos>
          <gs:radius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">50.0</gs:radius>
        </gs:Circle>
        <rel:relative-location>
          <rel:reference>
            <gml:Point srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326">
              <gml:pos>-34.407 150.883</gml:pos>
            </gml:Point>
          </rel:reference>
          <rel:offset>
            <gs:Circle xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
              srsName="urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d">
              <gml:pos>500.0 750.0</gml:pos>
              <gs:radius uom="urn:ogc:def:uom:EPSG::9001">5.0</gs:radius>
            </gs:Circle>
          </rel:offset>
          <rel:map>
            <rel:url type="image/png">
              https://www.example.com/flrpln/123South/flr-2
            </rel:url>
            <rel:offset>2670.0 1124.0 1022.0</rel:offset>
            <rel:orientation>67.00</rel:orientation>
            <rel:scale>10 -10</rel:scale>
          </rel:map>
        </rel:relative-location>
      </gp:location-info>
      <gp:usage-rules/>
      <gp:method>Wiremap</gp:method>
    </gp:geopriv>
    <dm:deviceID>mac:1234567890ab</dm:deviceID>
  </dm:device>
</presence>
```
5.3. Civic TLV with Point Offset

+--------+-------------------------------------------------+
| Type   | Value                                           |
+--------+-------------------------------------------------+
| 0      | en                                              |
| 1      | IL                                              |
| 3      | Chicago                                         |
| 34     | Wacker                                          |
| 18     | Drive                                           |
| 19     | 3400                                            |
| 112    | Reference                                       |
| 25     | Building A                                      |
| 27     | Floor 6                                         |
| 26     | Suite 213                                       |
| 28     | Reception Area                                  |
| 115    | 100 70                                          |
| 126    | image/png                                       |
| 127    | http://maps.example.com/3400Wacker/A6           |
| 129    | 0.0 4120.0                                      |
| 130    | 113.0                                           |
| 131    | 10.6                                            |
+--------+-------------------------------------------------+

6. Schema Definition
<xs:schema
   xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
   xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
   targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10:relative"
   elementFormDefault="qualified"
   attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

<!-- [[NOTE TO RFC-EDITOR: Please replace all instances of the URL
'http://ietf.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt' with the URL of published
document and remove this note.]] -->

<xs:annotation>
   <xs:appinfo
      Relative Location for PIDF-LO
   </xs:appinfo>
   <xs:documentation source="http://ietf.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt">
      This schema defines a location representation that allows for
      the description of locations that are relative to another.
      An optional map reference is also defined.
   </xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>

<xs:import namespace="http://www.opengis.net/gml"/>

<xs:element name="relative-location" type="rel:relativeType"/>

<xs:complexType name="relativeType">
   <xs:complexContent>
      <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
         <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element name="reference" type="rel:referenceType"/>
            <xs:element name="offset" type="rel:offsetType"/>
            <xs:any namespace="##any" processContents="lax"
               minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
         </xs:sequence>
      </xs:restriction>
   </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="referenceType">
  <xs:complexContent>
    <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
      <xs:sequence>
        <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
                  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xs:sequence>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="offsetType">
  <xs:complexContent>
    <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
      <xs:sequence>
        <xs:element ref="gml:Geometry"/>
        <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
                  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xs:sequence>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:element name="map" type="rel:mapType"/>

<xs:complexType name="mapType">
  <xs:complexContent>
    <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
      <xs:sequence>
        <xs:element name="url" type="rel:mapUrlType"/>
        <xs:element name="offset" type="rel:doubleList"
                   minOccurs="0"/>
        <xs:element name="orientation" type="rel:doubleList"
                    minOccurs="0"/>
        <xs:element name="scale" type="rel:doubleList"
                    minOccurs="0"/>
      </xs:sequence>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="mapUrlType">
  <xs:simpleContent>
    <xs:extension base="xs:anyURI">
      <xs:attribute name="type" type="rel:mimeType"
                    default="application/octet-stream"/>
    </xs:extension>
  </xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
xml schema relative-location

7. Security Considerations

This document describes a data format. To a large extent, security properties of this depend on how this data is used.

Privacy for location data is typically important. Adding relative location may increase the precision of the location, but does not otherwise alter its privacy considerations, which are discussed in [RFC4119].

The map URL provided in a relative location could accidentally reveal information if a Location Recipient uses the URL to acquire the map. The coverage area of a map, or parameters of the URL itself, could provide information about the location of a Target. In combination with other information that could reveal the set of potential Targets that the Location Recipient has location information for, acquiring a map could leak significant information. In particular, it is important to note that the Target and Location Recipient are often the same entity.

Access to map URLs MUST be secured with TLS [RFC5246] (that is, restricting the map URL to be an https URI), unless the map URL cannot leak information about the Target’s location. This restricts information about the map URL to the entity serving the map request. If the map URL conveys more information about a target than a map server is authorized to receive, that URL MUST NOT be included in the PIDF-LO.

8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Relative Location Registry

This document creates a new registry called "Relative Location Parameters". This shares a page, entitled "Civic and Relative Location Parameters" with the existing "Civic Address Types Registry (CAtypes)" registry. As defined in [RFC5226], this new registry operates under "IETF Review" rules.

The content of this registry includes:

Relative Location Code: Numeric identifier, assigned by IANA.

Brief description: Short description identifying the meaning of the element.

Reference to published specification: A stable reference to an RFC which describes the value in sufficient detail so that interoperability between independent implementations is possible.

Values requested to be assigned into this registry MUST NOT conflict with values assigned in the "Civic Address Types Registry (CAtypes)" registry or vice versa, unless the IANA considerations section for the new value explicitly overrides this prohibition and the document defining the value describes how conflicting TLV codes will be interpreted by implementations. To ensure this, the CAtypes entries are explicitly reserved in the initial values table below. Those reserved entries can be changed, but only with caution as explained here.

To make this clear for future users of the registry, the following note is added to the "Civic Address Types Registry (CAtypes)"; The registration of new values should be accompanied by a corresponding reservation in the "Relative Location Parameters" registry. Similarly, the "Relative Location Parameters" registry bears the note: The registration of new values should be accompanied by a corresponding reservation in the "Civic Address Types Registry (CAtypes)" registry.

The values defined are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RLtype</th>
<th>description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-40</td>
<td>RESERVED by CAtypes registry</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td>&amp; RFC4776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>relative location reference</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>relative location shape 2D point</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>relative location shape 3D point</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>relative location shape circular</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>relative location shape spherical</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>relative location shape elliptical</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>relative location shape ellipsoid</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>relative location shape 2D polygon</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>relative location shape 3D polygon</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>relative location shape prism</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>relative location shape arc-band</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>relative location dynamic orientation</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>relative location dynamic speed</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>relative location dynamic heading</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>relative location map type</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>relative location map URI</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>relative location map coordinates</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>relative location map angle</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>relative location map scale</td>
<td>this RFC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.2. URN Sub-Namespace Registration

This document registers a new XML namespace, as per the guidelines in [RFC3688]).


Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group (geopriv@ietf.org),
Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@skype.net).

XML:

```
BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
<head>
  <title>GEOPRIV Relative Location</title>
</head>
<body>
  <h1>Format for representing relative location</h1>
</body>
</html>
```
8.3. XML Schema Registration

This section registers an XML schema as per the procedures in [RFC3688].


Registratant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group  
(geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@skype.net).

Schema The XML for this schema is found in Section 6 of this document.

8.4. Geopriv Identifiers Registry

This section registers two URNs for use in identifying relative coordinate reference systems. These are added to a new "Geopriv Identifiers" registry according to the procedures in Section 4 of [RFC3553]. The "Geopriv Identifiers" registry is entered under the "Uniform Resource Name (URN) Namespace for IETF Use" category.

Registrations in this registry follow the IETF Review [RFC5226] policy.

Registry name: Geopriv Identifiers

URN Prefix: urn:ietf:params:geopriv:

Specification: RFCXXXX (this document)

Repository: [Editor/IANA note: please include a link to the registry location.]

Index value: Values in this registry are URNs or URN prefixes that start with the prefix "urn:ietf:params:geopriv:". Each is registered independently.

Each registration in the "Geopriv Identifiers" registry requires the following information:

URN The complete URN that is used, or the prefix for that URN.
Description: A summary description for the URN or URN prefix.

Specification: A reference to a specification describing the URN or URN prefix.

Contact: Email for the person or groups making the registration.

Index value: As described in [RFC3553], URN prefixes that are registered include a description of how the URN is constructed. This is not applicable for specific URNs.

The "Geopriv Identifiers" registry has two initial registrations, included in the following sections.

8.4.1. Registration of Two-Dimensional Relative Coordinate Reference System URN

This section registers the "urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d" URN in the "Geopriv Identifiers" registry.

URN urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:2d

Description: A two-dimensional relative coordinate reference system

Specification: RFCXXXX (this document)

Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@skype.net).

Index value: N/A.

8.4.2. Registration of Three-Dimensional Relative Coordinate Reference System URN

This section registers the "urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:3d" URN in the "Geopriv Identifiers" registry.

URN urn:ietf:params:geopriv:relative:3d

Description: A three-dimensional relative coordinate reference system

Specification: RFCXXXX (this document)

Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group (geopriv@ietf.org), Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@skype.net).

Index value: N/A.
9. Acknowledgements

This is the product of a design team on relative location. Besides the authors, this team included: Marc Linsner, James Polk, and James Winterbottom.

10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


Authors’ Addresses

Martin Thomson
Microsoft
3210 Porter Drive
Palo Alto, CA 94304
US

Phone: +1 650-353-1925
EMail: martin.thomson@skype.net

Brian Rosen
Neustar
470 Conrad Dr
Mars, PA 16046
US

EMail: br@brianrosen.net

Dorothy Stanley
Aruba Networks
1322 Crossman Ave
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
US

EMail: dstanley@arubanetworks.com
Gabor Bajko  
Nokia  
323 Fairchild Drive  
Mountain View, CA  94043  
US  

EMail: gabor.bajko@nokia.com  

Allan Thomson  
Cisco Systems, Inc.  
170 West Tasman Drive  
San Jose, CA  95134  
US  

EMail: althomso@cisco.com
Abstract

This document defines an extension to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) to convey geographic location information from one SIP entity to another SIP entity. The SIP extension covers end-to-end conveyance as well as location-based routing, where SIP intermediaries make routing decisions based upon the location of the Location Target.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

This Internet-Draft will expire on Mar 4, 2012.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the BSD License.

This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English.

Table of Contents

1. Conventions and Terminology used in this document . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Overview of SIP Location Conveyance . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   3.1 Location Conveyed by Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   3.2 Location Conveyed as a Location URI . . . . . . . . . 5
   3.3 Location Conveyed though a SIP Intermediary . . . . . 5
   3.4 SIP Intermediary Replacing Bad Location . . . . . . . . 7
4. SIP Modifications for Geolocation Conveyance . . . . . . . . 8
   4.1 The Geolocation Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   4.2 The Geolocation-Routing Header Field . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.2.1 Explaining Geolocation-Routing header-value States . 11
   4.3 424 (Bad Location Information) Response Code . . . . . 13
   4.4 The Geolocation-Error Header Field . . . . . . . . . . 14
   4.5 Location URIs in Message Bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   4.6 Location Profile Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. Geolocation Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   5.1 Location-by-value (Coordinate Format) . . . . . . . . . 18
   5.2 Two Locations Composed in Same Location Object Example . 20
6. Geopriv Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   8.1 IANA Registration for New SIP Geolocation Header Field . 24
   8.2 IANA Registration for New SIP Geolocation-Routing Header
      Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   8.3 IANA Registration for New SIP Option Tags . . . . . . . . 25
   8.4 IANA Registration for New 424 Response Code . . . . . . 25
   8.5 IANA Registration for New SIP Geolocation-Error Header
      Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   8.6 IANA Registration for New SIP Geolocation-Error Codes . 26
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Conventions and Terminology used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. This document furthermore uses numerous terms defined in RFC 3693 [RFC3693], including Location Object, Location Recipient, Location Server, Target, Rulemaker and Using Protocol.

2. Introduction

Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] creates, modifies and terminates multimedia sessions. SIP carries certain information related to a session while establishing or maintaining calls. This document defines how SIP conveys geographic location information of a Target to a Location Recipient (LR). SIP acts as a Using Protocol of location information, as defined in RFC 3693.

In order to convey location information, this document specifies three new SIP header fields, Geolocation, Geolocation-Routing and Geolocation-Error, which carry a reference to a Location Object (LO), grant permission to route a SIP request based on the location-value and provide error notifications specific to location errors respectively. The Location Object (LO) may appear in a MIME body attached to the SIP request, or it may be a remote resource in the network.

A Target is an entity whose location is being conveyed, per RFC 3693. Thus, a Target could be a SIP user agent (UA), some other IP device (a router or a PC) that does not have a SIP stack, a non-IP device (a person or a black phone) or even a non-communications device (a building or store front). In no way does this document assume that the SIP user agent client which sends a request containing a location object is necessarily the Target. The location of a Target conveyed within SIP typically corresponds to that of a device controlled by the Target, for example, a mobile phone, but such devices can be separated from their owners, and moreover, in some cases the user agent may not know its own location.

In the SIP context, a location recipient will most likely be a SIP UA, but due to the mediated nature of SIP architectures, location information conveyed by a single SIP request may have multiple recipients, as any SIP proxy server in the signaling path that inspects the location of the Target must also be considered a Location Recipient. In presence-like architectures, an intermediary
that receives publications of location information and distributes them to watchers acts as a Location Server per RFC 3693. This location conveyance mechanism can also be used to deliver URIs pointing to such Location Servers where prospective Location Recipients can request Location Objects.

3. Overview of SIP Location Conveyance

An operational overview of SIP location conveyance can be shown in 4 basic diagrams, with most applications falling under one of the following basic use cases. Each is separated into its own subsection here in section 3.

Each diagram has Alice and Bob as UAs. Alice is the Target, and Bob is an LR. A SIP intermediary appears in some of the diagrams. Any SIP entity that receives and inspects location information is an LR, therefore in any of the diagrams the SIP intermediary that receives a SIP request is potentially an LR - though that does not mean such an intermediary necessarily has to route the SIP request based on the location information. In some use cases, location information passes through the LS on the right of each diagram.

3.1 Location Conveyed by Value

We start with the simplest diagram of Location Conveyance, Alice to Bob, where no other layer 7 entities are involved.

```
+--------+          +--------+          +--------+
| Alice  |          | SIP Intermediary |          | Bob    |
| Request w/Location |             | Response |             |        |
+-------------------+          +--------+          +--------+
```

Figure 1. Location Conveyed by Value

In Figure 1, Alice is both the Target and the LS that is conveying her location directly to Bob, who acts as an LR. This conveyance is point-to-point - it does not pass through any SIP-layer intermediary. A Location Object appears by-value in the initial SIP request as a MIME body, and Bob responds to that SIP request as appropriate. There is a 'Bad Location Information' response code introduced within this document to specifically inform Alice if she conveys bad location to Bob (e.g., Bob "cannot parse the location provided", or "there is not enough location information to determine where Alice is").
3.2 Location Conveyed as a Location URI

Here we make Figure 1 a little more complicated by showing a diagram of indirect Location Conveyance from Alice to Bob, where Bob’s entity has to retrieve the location object from a 3rd party server.

![SIP Intermediary Diagram](image)

**Figure 2. Location Conveyed as a Location URI**

In Figure 2, location is conveyed indirectly, via a Location URI carried in the SIP request (more of those details later). If Alice sends Bob this Location URI, Bob will need to dereference the URI – analogous to Content Indirection [RFC4483] – in order to request the location information. In general, the LS provides the location value to Bob instead of Alice directly for conveyance to Bob. From a user interface perspective, Bob the user won’t know that this information was gathered from an LS indirectly rather than culled from the SIP request, and practically this does not impact the operation of location-based applications.

The example given in this section is only illustrative, not normative. In particular, applications can choose to dereference a location URI at any time, possibly several times, or potentially not at all. Applications receiving a Location URI in a SIP transaction need to be mindful of timers used by different transactions. In particular, if the means of dereferencing the Location URI might take longer than the SIP transaction timeout (Timer C for INVITE transactions, Timer F for non-INVITE transactions), then it needs to rely on mechanisms other than the transaction’s response code to convey location errors, if returning such errors are necessary.

3.3 Location Conveyed though a SIP Intermediary
In Figure 3, we introduce the idea of a SIP intermediary into the example to illustrate the role of proxying in the location architecture. This intermediary can be a SIP proxy or it can be a back-to-back-user-agent (B2BUA). In this message flow, the SIP intermediary could act as a LR, in addition to Bob. The primary use case for intermediaries consuming location information is location-based routing. In this case, the intermediary chooses a next hop for the SIP request by consulting a specialized location service which selects forwarding destinations based on geographical location.

![Figure 3. Location Conveyed through a SIP Intermediary](image)

However, the most common case will be one in which the SIP intermediary receives a request with location information (conveyed either by-value or by-reference) and does not know or care about Alice’s location, or support this extension, and merely passes it on to Bob. In this case, the intermediary does not act as a Location Recipient. When the intermediary is not an LR, this use case is the same as the one described in Section 3.1.

Note that an intermediary does not have to perform location-based routing in order to be a Location Recipient. It could be the case that a SIP intermediary which does not perform location-based routing does care when Alice includes her location; for example, it could care that the location information is complete or that it correctly identifies where Alice is. The best example of this is intermediaries that verify location information for emergency calling, but it could also be for any location based routing - e.g., contacting your favorite local pizza delivery service, making sure that organization has Alice’s proper location in the initial SIP request.

There is another scenario in which the SIP intermediary cares about location and is not an LR, one in which the intermediary inserts another location of the Target, Alice in this case, into the request, and forwards it. This secondary insertion is generally not
This document takes a "you break it, you bought it" approach to dealing with second locations placed into a SIP request by an intermediary entity. That entity becomes completely responsible for all location within that SIP request (more on this in Section 4).

3.4 SIP Intermediary Replacing Bad Location

If the SIP intermediary rejects the message due to unsuitable location information, the SIP response will indicate there was 'Bad Location Information' in the SIP request, and provide a location specific error code indicating what Alice needs to do to send an acceptable request (see Figure 4 for this scenario).

![Figure 4. SIP Intermediary Replacing Bad Location](image)

In this last use case, the SIP intermediary wishes to include a Location Object indicating where it understands Alice to be. Thus, it needs to inform her user agent what location it will include in any subsequent SIP request that contains her location. In this case, the intermediary can reject Alice’s request and, through the SIP response, convey to her the best way to repair the request in order for the intermediary to accept it.

Overriding location information provided by the user requires a deployment where an intermediary necessarily knows better than an end user - after all, it could be that Alice has an on-board GPS, and the SIP intermediary only knows her nearest cell tower. Which is more accurate location information? Currently, there is no way to
tell which entity is more accurate, or which is wrong - for that
matter. This document will not specify how to indicate which
location is more accurate than another.

As an aside, it is not envisioned that any SIP-based emergency
services request (i.e., IP-911, or 112 type of call attempt) will
receive a corrective 'Bad Location Information' response from an
intermediary. Most likely, the SIP intermediary would in that
scenario act as a B2BUA and insert into the request by-value any
appropriate location information for the benefit of Public Safety
Answering Point (PSAP) call centers to expedite call reception by
the emergency services personnel; thereby, minimizing any delay in
call establishment time. The implementation of these specialized
deployments is, however, outside the scope of this document.

4. SIP Extensions for Geolocation Conveyance

The following sections detail the extensions to SIP for location
conveyance.

4.1 The Geolocation Header Field

This document defines "Geolocation" as a new SIP header field
registered by IANA, with the following ABNF [RFC5234]:

message-header /= Geolocation-header ; (message-header from 3261)
Geolocation-header = "Geolocation" HCOLON locationValue
                   *( COMMA locationValue )
locationValue    = LAQUOT locationURI RAQUOT
                  *(SEMI geoloc-param)
locationURI      = sip-URI / sips-URI / pres-URI
                  / http-URI / https-URI
                  / cid-url ; (from RFC 2392)
                  / absoluteURI ; (from RFC 3261)
geoloc-param     = generic-param; (from RFC 3261)

HCOLON, COMMA, LAQUOT, RAQUOT, and SEMI are defined in RFC3261
[RFC3261].
sip-URI, sips-URI and absoluteURI are defined according to [RFC3261].
The pres-URI is defined in [RFC3859].

http-URI and https-URI are defined according to [RFC2616] and
[RFC2818], respectively.
The cid-url is defined in [RFC2392] to locate message body parts.
This URI type is present in a SIP request when location is conveyed
as a MIME body in the SIP message.

GEO-URIs [RFC5870] are not appropriate for usage in the SIP
Geolocation header, because it does not include retention and re-transmission flags as part of the location information. Other URI schemes used in the location URI MUST be reviewed against the RFC 3693 [RFC3693] criteria for a Using Protocol. Section 4.6 discusses how URI schemes are communicated using this SIP extension, and what to do if a URI scheme is received that cannot be supported.

The generic-param in the definition of locationValue is included as a mechanism for future extensions that might require parameters. This document defines no parameters for use with locationValue. If a Geolocation header field is received that contains generic-params, each parameter SHOULD be ignored, and SHOULD NOT be removed when forwarding the locationValue. If a need arises to define parameters for use with locationValue, a revision/extension to this document is required.

The Geolocation header field MUST have at least one locationValue. A SIP intermediary SHOULD NOT add location to a SIP request that already contains location. This will quite often lead to confusion within LRs. However, if a SIP intermediary adds location, even if location was not previously present in a SIP request, that SIP intermediary is fully responsible for addressing the concerns of any 424 (Bad Location Information) SIP response it receives about this location addition, and MUST NOT pass on (upstream) the 424 response. A SIP intermediary that adds a locationValue MUST position the new locationValue as the last locationValue within the Geolocation header field of the SIP request.

This document defines the Geolocation header field as valid in the following SIP requests:

- INVITE [RFC3261],
- REGISTER [RFC3261],
- OPTIONS [RFC3261],
- BYE [RFC3261],
- UPDATE [RFC3311],
- INFO [RFC6086],
- MESSAGE [RFC3428],
- REFER [RFC3515],
- SUBSCRIBE [RFC3265],
- NOTIFY [RFC3265],
- PUBLISH [RFC3903]

The Geolocation header field MAY be included in any one of the above listed requests by a UA, and a 424 response to any one of the requests sent above. Fully appreciating the caveats/warnings mentioned above, a SIP intermediary MAY add the Geolocation header field.

A SIP intermediary MAY add a Geolocation header field if one is not present - for example, when a user agent does not support the Geolocation mechanism but their outbound proxy does and knows the Target’s location, or any of a number of other use cases (see Section 3).

The Geolocation header field MAY be present in a SIP request or response without the presence of a Geolocation-Routing header
(defined in Section 4.2). As stated in Section 4.2, the default value of Geolocation-Routing header-value is "no", meaning SIP intermediaries MUST NOT view (i.e., process, inspect or actively dereference) any direct or indirect location within this SIP message. This is for at least two fundamental reasons,

1) to make the possibility of retention of the Target’s location moot (because it was not viewed in the first place); and

2) to prevent a different treatment of this SIP request based on the contents of the Location Information in the SIP request.

Any locationValue MUST be related to the original Target. This is equally true for the location information in a SIP response, i.e., from a SIP intermediary back to the Target as explained in Section 3.4. SIP intermediaries SHOULD NOT modify or delete any existing locationValue(s). A use-case in which this would not apply would be where the SIP intermediary is an anonymizer. The problem with this scenario is that the geolocation included by the Target then becomes useless for the purpose or service they wanted to use (include) it for. For example, 911/emergency calling or finding the nearest (towing company/pizza delivery/dry cleaning) service(s) will not yield intended results if the Location Information were to be modified or deleted from the SIP request.

4.2 The Geolocation-Routing Header Field

This document defines "Geolocation-Routing" as a new SIP header field registered by IANA, with the following ABNF [RFC5234]:

```plaintext
message-header /= Georouting-header ; (message-header from 3261)
Georouting-header = "Geolocation-Routing" HCOLON
   ( "yes" / "no" / generic-value )
generic-value = generic-param; (from RFC 3261)
```

HCOLON is defined in RFC3261 [RFC3261].

The only defined values for the Geolocation-Routing header field are "yes" or "no". When the value is "yes", the locationValue can be used for routing decisions along the downstream signaling path by intermediaries. Values other than "yes" or "no" are permitted for future extensions. Implementations not aware of an extension MUST treat any other received value the same as "no".

If no Geolocation-Routing header field is present in a SIP request, a SIP intermediary MAY insert this header. Without knowledge from a Rulemaker, the SIP intermediary inserting this header-value SHOULD NOT set the value to "yes", as this may be more permissive than the originating party intends. An easy way around this is to have the Target always insert this header-value as "no".
When this Geolocation-Routing header-value is set to "no", this means no locationValue (inserted by the originating UAC or any intermediary along the signaling path) can be used by any SIP intermediary to make routing decisions. Intermediaries that attempt to use the location information for routing purposes in spite of this counter indication could end up routing the request improperly as a result. Section 4.4 describes the details on what a routing intermediary does if it determines it needs to use the location in the SIP request in order to process the message further. The practical implication is that when the Geolocation-Routing header-value is set to "no", if a cid:url is present in the SIP request, intermediaries MUST NOT view the location (because it is not for intermediaries to consider when processing the request), and if a location URI is present, intermediaries MUST NOT dereference it. UAs are allowed to view location in the SIP request even when the Geolocation-Routing header-value is set to "no". An LR MUST by default consider the Geolocation-Routing header-value as set to "no", with no exceptions, unless the header field value is set to "yes".

A Geolocation-Routing header-value that is set to "no" has no special security properties. It is at most a request for behavior within SIP intermediaries. That said, if the Geolocation-Routing header-value is set to "no", SIP intermediaries are still to process the SIP request and send it further downstream within the signaling path if there are no errors present in this SIP request.

The Geolocation-Routing header field satisfies the recommendations made in section 3.5 of RFC 5606 [RFC5606] regarding indication of permission to use location-based routing in SIP.

SIP implementations are advised to pay special attention to the policy elements for location retransmission and retention described in RFC 4119.

The Geolocation-Routing header field cannot appear without a header-value in a SIP request or response (i.e., a null value is not allowed). The absence of a Geolocation-Routing header-value in a SIP request is always the same as the following header field:

          Geolocation-Routing: no

The Geolocation-Routing header field MAY be present without a Geolocation header field in the same SIP request. This concept is further explored in Section 4.2.1.

4.2.1 Explaining Geolocation-Routing header-value States

The Geolocation header field contains a Target’s location, and MUST NOT be present if there is no location information in this SIP request. The location information is contained in one or more
locationValues. These locationValues MAY be contained in a single Geolocation header field, or distributed among multiple Geolocation header fields. (See section 7.3.1 of RFC3261.)

The Geolocation-Routing header field indicates whether or not SIP intermediaries can view and then route this SIP request based on the included (directly or indirectly) location information. The Geolocation-Routing header field MUST NOT appear more than once in any SIP request, and MUST NOT lack a header-value. The default or implied policy of a SIP request that does not have a Geolocation-Routing header field is the same as if one were present and the header-value were set to "no".

There are only 3 possible states regarding the Geolocation-Routing header field

- "no"
- "yes"
- no header-field present in this SIP request

The expected results in each state are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If the Geolocation-Routing</th>
<th>Only possible interpretations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;no&quot;</td>
<td>SIP intermediaries MUST NOT process included geolocation information within this SIP request. SIP intermediaries inserting a locationValue into a Geolocation header field (whether adding to an existing header-value or inserting the Geolocation header field for the first time) MUST NOT modify or delete the received &quot;no&quot; header-value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;yes&quot;</td>
<td>SIP intermediaries can process included geolocation information within this SIP request, and can change the policy to &quot;no&quot; for intermediaries further downstream.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geolocation-Routing absent</td>
<td>If a Geolocation header field exists (meaning a locationValue is already present), a SIP intermediary MUST interpret the lack of a Geolocation-Routing header field as if there were one present and the header-value is set to &quot;no&quot;.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If there is no Geolocation header field in this SIP request, the default Geolocation-Routing is open and can be set by a SIP intermediary or not at all.

4.3 424 (Bad Location Information) Response Code

This SIP extension creates a new location-specific response code, defined as follows,

424 (Bad Location Information)

The 424 (Bad Location Information) response code is a rejection of the request due to its location contents, indicating location information that was malformed or not satisfactory for the recipient’s purpose, or could not be dereferenced.

A SIP intermediary can also reject a location it receives from a Target when it understands the Target to be in a different location. The proper handling of this scenario, described in Section 3.4, is for the SIP intermediary to include the proper location in the 424 Response. This SHOULD be included in the response as a MIME message body (i.e., a location value), rather than as a URI; however, in cases where the intermediary is willing to share location with recipients but not with a user agent, a reference might be necessary.

As mentioned in Section 3.4, it might be the case that the intermediary does not want to chance providing less accurate location information than the user agent; thus it will compose its understanding of where the user agent is in a separate <geopriv> element of the same PIDF-LO [RFC4119] message body in the SIP response (which also contains the Target’s version of where it is). Therefore, both locations are included - each with different <method> elements. The proper reaction of the user agent is to generate a new SIP request that includes this composed location object, and send it towards the original LR. SIP intermediaries can verify that subsequent requests properly insert the suggested location information before forwarding said requests.

SIP intermediaries that are forwarding (as opposed to generating) a 424 response MUST NOT add, modify, or delete any location appearing in that response. This specifically applies to intermediaries that are between the 424 response generator and the original UAC. Geolocation and Geolocation-Error header fields and PIDF-LO body parts MUST remain unchanged, never added to or deleted.

Section 4.4 describes a Geolocation-Error header field to provide more detail about what was wrong with the location information in the request. This header field MUST be included in the 424 response.
It is only appropriate to generate a 424 response when the responding entity needs a locationValue and there are no values in the request that are usable by the responder, or when the responder has additional location information to provide. The latter case is shown in Figure 4 of section 3.4. There, a SIP intermediary is informing the upstream UA which location to include in the next SIP request.

A 424 MUST NOT be sent in response to a request that lacks a Geolocation header entirely, as the user agent in that case may not support this extension at all. If a SIP intermediary inserted a locationValue into a SIP request where one was not previously present, it MUST take any and all responsibility for the corrective action if it receives a 424 to a SIP request it sent.

A 424 (Bad Location Information) response is a final response within a transaction, and MUST NOT terminate an existing dialog.

4.4 The Geolocation-Error Header Field

As discussed in Section 4.3, more granular error notifications specific to location errors within a received request are required if the location inserting entity is to know what was wrong within the original request. The Geolocation-Error header field is used for this purpose.

The Geolocation-Error header field is used to convey location-specific errors within a response. The Geolocation-Error header field has the following ABNF [RFC5234]:

```plaintext
message-header          /= Geolocation-Error
                         ; (message-header from 3261)
Geolocation-Error       = "Geolocation-Error" HCOLON
                         locationErrorValue
locationErrorValue      = location-error-code
                         *(SEMI location-error-params)
location-error-code     = 1*3DIGIT
location-error-params   = location-error-code-text
                         / generic-param ; from RFC3261
location-error-code-text = "code" EQUAL quoted-string ; from RFC3261
HCOLON, SEMI, and EQUAL are defined in RFC3261 [RFC3261]. DIGIT is defined in RFC5234 [RFC5234].

The Geolocation-Error header field MUST contain only one locationErrorValue to indicate what was wrong with the locationValue the Location Recipient determined was bad. The locationErrorValue contains a 3-digit error code indicating what was wrong with the
location in the request. This error code has a corresponding quoted error text string that is human understandable. The text string is OPTIONAL, but RECOMMENDED for human readability, similar to the string phrase used for SIP response codes. That said, the strings are complete enough for rendering to the user, if so desired. The strings in this document are recommendations, and are not standardized - meaning an operator can change the strings - but MUST NOT change the meaning of the error code. Similar to how RFC 3261 specifies, there MUST NOT be more than one string per error code.

The Geolocation-Error header field MAY be included in any response to one of the SIP Methods mentioned in Section 4.1, so long as a locationValue was in the request part of the same transaction. For example, Alice includes her location in an INVITE to Bob. Bob can accept this INVITE, thus creating a dialog, even though his UA determined the location contained in the INVITE was bad. Bob merely includes a Geolocation-Error header value in the 200 OK to the INVITE informing Alice the INVITE was accepted but the location provided was bad.

If, on the other hand, Bob cannot accept Alice’s INVITE without a suitable location, a 424 (Bad Location Information) is sent. This message flow is shown in Figures 1, 2 or 3 in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.

If Alice is deliberately leaving location information out of the LO because she does not want Bob to have this additional information, implementations should be aware that Bob could error repeatedly in order to receive more location information about Alice in a subsequent SIP request. Implementations MUST be on guard for this, by not allowing continually more information to be revealed unless it is clear that any LR is permitted by Alice to know all that Alice knows about her location. A limit on the number of such rejections to learn more location information SHOULD be configurable, with a RECOMMENDED maximum of 3 times for each related transaction.

A SIP intermediary that requires Alice’s location in order to properly process Alice’s INVITE also sends a 424 with a Geolocation-Error code. This message flow is shown in Figure 4 of Section 3.4.

If more than one locationValue is present in a SIP request and at least one locationValue is determined to be valid by the LR, the location in that SIP request MUST be considered good as far as location is concerned, and no Geolocation-Error is to be sent.

Here is an initial list of location based error code ranges for any SIP response, including provisional responses (other than 100 Trying) and the new 424 (Bad Location Information) response. These error codes are divided into 3 categories, based on how the response receiver should react to these errors. There MUST be no more than one Geolocation-Error code in a SIP response, regardless of how many
locationValues there are in the correlating SIP request. There is no
guidance given in this document as to which locationValue, when more
than one was present in the SIP request, is related to the
Geolocation-Error code; meaning that, somehow not defined here, the
LR just picks one to error.

- 1XX errors mean the LR cannot process the location within the
request

A non-exclusive list of reasons for returning a 1XX is
- the location was not present or could not be found,
- there was not enough location information to determine
  where the Target was,
- the location information was corrupted or known to be
  inaccurate,

- 2XX errors mean some specific permission is necessary to process
the included location information.

- 3XX errors mean there was trouble dereferencing the Location URI
sent.

Dereference attempts to the same request SHOULD be limited to 10
attempts within a few minutes. This number SHOULD be configurable,
but result in a Geolocation-Error: 300 error once reached.

It should be noted that for non-INVITE transactions, the SIP
response will likely be sent before the dereference response has
been received. This document does not alter that SIP protocol
reality. This means the receiver of any non-INVITE response to a
request containing location SHOULD NOT consider a 200 OK to mean the
act of dereferencing has concluded and the dereferencer (i.e., the
LR) has successfully received and parsed the PIDF-LO for errors and
found none. The end of section 3.2 discusses how transaction timing
considerations lead to this requirement.

Additionally, if an LR cannot or chooses not to process location
from a SIP request, a 500 (Server Internal Error) SHOULD be used
with or without a configurable Retry-After header field. There is no
special location error code for what already exists within SIP
today.

Within each of these ranges, there is a top level error as follows:

Geolocation-Error: 100 ; code="Cannot Process Location"

Geolocation-Error: 200 ; code="Permission To Use Location
Information"

Geolocation-Error: 300 ; code="Dereference Failure"
If an error recipient cannot process a specific error code (such as the 201 or 202 below), perhaps because it does not understand that specific error code, the error recipient SHOULD process the error code as if it originally were a top level error code where the X in X00 matches the specific error code. If the error recipient cannot process a non-100 error code, for whatever reason, then the error code 100 MUST be processed.

There are two specific Geolocation-Error codes necessary to include in this document, both have to do with permissions necessary to process the SIP request; they are

Geolocation-Error: 201 ; code="Permission To Retransmit Location Information to a Third Party"

This location error is specific to having the Presence Information Data Format (PIDF-LO) [RFC4119] <retransmission-allowed> element set to "no". This location error is stating it requires permission (i.e., PIDF-LO <retransmission-allowed> element set to "yes") to process this SIP request further. If the LS sending the location information does not want to give this permission, it will not change this permission in a new request. If the LS wants this message processed with the <retransmission-allowed> element set to "yes" it MUST choose another logical path (if one exists) for this SIP request.

Geolocation-Error: 202 ; code="Permission to Route based on Location Information"

This location error is specific to having the Geolocation-Routing header value set to "no". This location error is stating it requires permission (i.e., the Geolocation-Routing header value set to "yes") to process this SIP request further. If the LS sending the location information does not want to give this permission, it will not change this permission in a new request. If the LS wants this message processed with the <retransmission-allowed> element set to "yes" it MUST choose another logical path (if one exists) for this SIP request.

4.5 Location URIs in Message Bodies

In the case where an LR sends a 424 response and wishes to communicate suitable location by reference rather than by value, the 424 MUST include a content-indirection body per RFC 4483.

4.6 Location Profile Negotiation

The following is part of the discussion started in Section 3, Figure 2, which introduced the concept of sending location indirectly.
If a location URI is included in a SIP request, the sending user agent MUST also include a Supported header field indicating which location profiles it supports. Two option tags for location profiles are defined by this document: "geolocation-sip" and "geolocation-http". Future specifications MAY define further location profiles per the IANA policy described in Section 8.3.

The "geolocation-sip" option tag signals support for acquiring location information via the presence event package of SIP ([RFC3856]). A location recipient who supports this option can send a SUBSCRIBE request and parse a resulting NOTIFY containing a PIDF-LO object. The URI schemes supported by this option include "sip", "sips" and "pres".

The "geolocation-http" option tag signals support for acquiring location information via an HTTP ([RFC2616]). A location recipient who supports this option can request location with an HTTP GET and parse a resulting 200 response containing a PIDF-LO object. The URI schemes supported by this option include "http" and "https". A failure to parse the 200 response, for whatever reason, will return a "Dereference Failure" indication to the original location sending user agent to inform it that location was not delivered as intended.

If the location URI receiver does not understand the URI scheme sent to it, it will return an Unsupported header value of the option-tag from the SIP request, and include the option-tag of the preferred URI scheme in the response’s Supported header field.

See [ID-GEO-FILTERS] or [ID-HELD-DEREF] for more details on dereferencing location information.

5. Geolocation Examples

5.1 Location-by-value (in Coordinate Format)

This example shows an INVITE message with a coordinate location. In this example, the SIP request uses a sips-URI [RFC3261], meaning this message is protected using TLS on a hop-by-hop basis.

INVITE sips:bob@biloxi.example.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIPS/2.0/TLS pc33.atlanta.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK74bf9
Max-Forwards: 70
To: Bob <sips:bob@biloxi.example.com>
From: Alice <sips:alice@atlanta.example.com>;tag=9fxced76sl
Call-ID: 3848276298220188511@atlanta.example.com
Geolocation: <cid:target123@atlanta.example.com>
Geolocation-Routing: no
Accept: application/sdp, application/pidf+xml
CSeq: 31862 INVITE
Contact: <sips:alice@atlanta.example.com>
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=boundary1
Content-Length: ...

--boundary1

Content-Type: application/sdp

...SDP goes here

--boundary1

Content-Type: application/pidf+xml

Content-ID: <target123@atlanta.example.com>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<presence

xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf"

xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10"


xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"


text="pres:alice@atlanta.example.com">

<dm:device id="target123-1">

<gp:geopriv>

<gp:location-info>

<gml:location>

<gml:Point srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326">

<gml:pos>32.86726 -97.16054</gml:pos>

</gml:Point>

</gml:location>

</gp:location-info>

<gp:usage-rules>

<gbp:retransmission-allowed>false

<gbp:retransmission-allowed>

<gbp:retention-expiry>2010-11-14T20:00:00Z

<gbp:retention-expiry>

<gp:usage-rules>

<gp:method>802.11</gp:method>

<dm:deviceID>mac:1234567890ab</dm:deviceID>

<dm:timestamp>2010-11-04T20:57:29Z</dm:timestamp>

</dm:device>

</presence>

--boundary1--

The Geolocation header field from the above INVITE:

Geolocation: <cid:target123@atlanta.example.com>

... indicates the content-ID location [RFC2392] within the multipart message body of where location information is. The other message body part is SDP. The "cid:" eases message body parsing and disambiguates multiple parts of the same type.
If the Geolocation header field did not contain a "cid:" scheme, for example, it could look like this location URI:

Geolocation: <sips:target123@server5.atlanta.example.com>

... the existence of a non-"cid:" scheme indicates this is a location URI, to be dereferenced to learn the Target’s location. Any node wanting to know where the target is located would subscribe to the SIP presence event package [RFC3856] at

sips:target123@server5.atlanta.example.com

(see Figure 2 in Section 3.2 for this message flow).

5.2 Two Locations Composed in Same Location Object Example

This example shows the INVITE message after a SIP intermediary rejected the original INVITE (say, the one in section 5.1). This INVITE contains the composed LO sent by the SIP intermediary which includes where the intermediary understands Alice to be. The rules of RFC 5491 [RFC5491] are followed in this construction.

This example is here, but ought not be taken as occurring very often. In fact, this example is believed to be a corner case of location conveyance applicability.

INVITE sips:bob@biloxi.example.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIPS/2.0/TLS pc33.atlanta.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK74bf0
Max-Forwards: 70
To: Bob <sips:bob@biloxi.example.com>
From: Alice <sips:alice@atlanta.example.com>;tag=9fxced76sl
Call-ID: 3848276298220188512@atlanta.example.com
Geolocation: <cid:target123@atlanta.example.com>
Geolocation-Routing: no
Accept: application/sdp, application/pidf+xml
CSeq: 31863 INVITE
Contact: <sips:alice@atlanta.example.com>
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=boundary1
Content-Length: ...

--boundary1
Content-Type: application/sdp

...SDP goes here

--boundary1

Content-Type: application/pidf+xml
Content-ID: <target123@atlanta.example.com>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<pres
 xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf"
 xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10"
 xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
 entity="pres:alice@atlanta.example.com">
 <dm:device id="target123-1">
  <gp:geopriv>
   <gp:location-info>
    <gml:location>
     <gml:Point srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326">
      <gml:pos>32.86726 -97.16054</gml:pos>
     </gml:Point>
    </gml:location>
   </gp:location-info>
   <gp:usage-rules>
    <gbp:retransmission-allowed>false
    </gbp:retransmission-allowed>
    <gbp:retention-expiry>2010-11-14T20:00:00Z
    </gbp:retention-expiry>
   </gp:usage-rules>
   <gp:method>802.11</gp:method>
  </gp:geopriv>
  <dm:deviceID>mac:1234567890ab</dm:deviceID>
  <dm:timestamp>2010-11-04T20:57:29Z</dm:timestamp>
 </dm:device>
 <dm:person id="target123">
  <gp:geopriv>
   <gp:location-info>
    <cl:civicAddress>
     <cl:country>US</cl:country>
     <cl:A1>Texas</cl:A1>
     <cl:A3>Colleyville</cl:A3>
     <cl:RD>Treemont</cl:RD>
     <cl:STS>Circle</cl:STS>
     <cl:HNO>3913</cl:HNO>
     <cl:FLR>1</cl:FLR>
     <cl:NAM>Haley's Place</cl:NAM>
     <cl:PC>76034</cl:PC>
    </cl:civicAddress>
   </gp:location-info>
   <gp:usage-rules>
    <gbp:retransmission-allowed>false
    </gbp:retransmission-allowed>
    <gbp:retention-expiry>2010-11-14T20:00:00Z
    </gbp:retention-expiry>
   </gp:usage-rules>
   <gp:method>triangulation</gp:method>
  </gp:geopriv>
</dm:person>
</presence>
6. Geopriv Privacy Considerations

Location information is considered by most to be highly sensitive information, requiring protection from eavesdropping and altering in transit. [RFC3693] originally articulated rules to be followed by any protocol wishing to be considered a "Using Protocol", specifying how a transport protocol meets those rules. [RFC6280] updates the guidance in RFC3693 to include subsequently introduced entities and concepts in the geolocation architecture.

RFC5606 explores the difficulties inherent in mapping the GEOPRIV architecture onto SIP elements. In particular, the difficulties of defining and identifying recipients of location information are given in that document, along with guidance in Section 3.3.2 on the use of location by-reference mechanisms to preserve confidentiality of location information from unauthorized recipients.

In a SIP deployment, location information may be added by any of several elements, including the originating user agent or a proxy server. In all cases, the Rule Maker associated with that location information decides which entity adds location information and what access control rules apply. For example, a SIP user agent that does not support the Geolocation header may rely on a proxy server under the direction of the Rule Maker adding a Geolocation header with a reference to location information. The manner in which the Rule Maker operates on these devices is outside the scope of this document.

The manner in which SIP implementations honor the Rule Maker’s stipulations for access control rules (including retention and retransmission) is application-specific and not within the scope of SIP protocol operations. Entities in SIP networks that fulfill the architectural roles of the Location Server or Location Recipient treat the privacy rules associated with location information per the guidance in [RFC6280] section 4.2.1. In particular, RFC4119 (especially 2.2.2) gives guidance for handling access control rules; SIP implementations should furthermore consult the emendations in RFC5606.

7. Security Considerations

Conveyance of physical location of a UA raises privacy concerns, and depending on use, there probably will be authentication and integrity concerns. This document calls for conveyance to be accomplished through secure mechanisms, like S/MIME encrypting
Internet Draft         Location Conveyance in SIP             Sept 2011

message bodies (although this is not widely deployed), TLS protecting the overall signaling or conveyance location by-reference and requiring all entities that dereference location to authenticate themselves. In location-based routing cases, encrypting the location payload with an end-to-end mechanism such as S/MIME is problematic, because one or more proxies on the path need the ability to read the location information to retarget the message to the appropriate new destination UAS. Data can only be encrypted to a particular, anticipated target, and thus if multiple recipients need to inspect a piece of data, and those recipients cannot be predicted by the sender of data, encryption is not a very feasible choice. Securing the location hop-by-hop, using TLS, protects the message from eavesdropping and modification in transit, but exposes the information to all proxies on the path as well as the endpoint. In most cases, the UA has no trust relationship with the proxy or proxies providing location-based routing services, so such end-to-middle solutions might not be appropriate either.

When location information is conveyed by reference, however, one can properly authenticate and authorize each entity that wishes to inspect location information. This does not require that the sender of data anticipate who will receive data, and it does permit multiple entities to receive it securely, but it does not however obviate the need for pre-association between the sender of data and any prospective recipients. Obviously, in some contexts this pre-association cannot be presumed; when it is not, effectively unauthenticated access to location information must be permitted. In this case, choosing pseudo-random URIs for location by-reference, coupled with path encryption like SIPS, can help to ensure that only entities on the SIP signaling path learn the URI, and thus restores rough parity with sending location by-value.

Location information is especially sensitive when the identity of its Target is obvious. Note that there is the ability, according to [RFC3693] to have an anonymous identity for the Target’s location. This is accomplished by use of an unlinkable pseudonym in the "entity=" attribute of the <presence> element [RFC4479]. Though, this can be problematic for routing messages based on location (covered in the document above). Moreover, anyone fishing for information would correlate the identity at the SIP layer with that of the location information referenced by SIP signaling.

When a UA inserts location, the UA sets the policy on whether to reveal its location along the signaling path – as discussed in Section 4, as well as flags in the PIDF-LO [RFC4119]. UAC implementations MUST make such capabilities conditional on explicit user permission, and MUST alert the user that location is being conveyed.

This SIP extension offers the default ability to require permission to process location while the SIP request is in transit. The default for this is set to "no". There is an error explicitly
describing how an intermediary asks for permission to view the
Target’s location, plus a rule stating the user has to be made aware
of this permission request.

There is no end-to-end integrity on any locationValue or
locationErrorValue header field parameter (or middle-to-end if the
value was inserted by a intermediary), so recipients of either
header field need to implicitly trust the header field contents, and
take whatever precautions each entity deems appropriate given this
situation.

8. IANA Considerations

The following are the IANA considerations made by this SIP
extension. Modifications and additions to all these registrations
require a standards track RFC (Standards Action).

[Editor’s Note: RFC-Editor – within the IANA section, please
replace "this doc" with the assigned RFC number,
if this document reaches publication.]

8.1 IANA Registration for the SIP Geolocation Header Field

The SIP Geolocation Header Field is created by this document, with
its definition and rules in Section 4.1 of this document, and should
be added to the IANA sip-parameters registry with the following
actions

1. Update the Header Fields registry with

Registry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Name</th>
<th>compact</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geolocation</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.2 IANA Registration for the SIP Geolocation-Routing Header Field

The SIP Geolocation-Routing Header Field is created by this document,
with its definition and rules in Section 4.2 of this document, and
should be added to the IANA sip-parameters registry with the
following action

1. Update the Header Fields registry with

Registry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Name</th>
<th>compact</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geolocation-Routing</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.3 IANA Registration for Location Profiles

This document defines two new SIP option tags: "geolocation-sip" and "geolocation-http" to be added to the IANA sip-parameters Options Tags registry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>geolocation-sip</td>
<td>The &quot;geolocation-sip&quot; option tag signals support for acquiring location information via the presence event package of SIP (RFC 3856). A location recipient who supports this option can send a SUBSCRIBE request and parse a resulting NOTIFY containing a PIDF-LO object. The URI schemes supported by this option include &quot;sip&quot;, &quot;sips&quot; and &quot;pres&quot;.</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>geolocation-http</td>
<td>The &quot;geolocation-http&quot; option tag signals support for acquiring location information via an HTTP ([RFC2616]). A location recipient who supports this option can request location with an HTTP GET and parse a resulting 200 response containing a PIDF-LO object. The URI schemes supported by this option include &quot;http&quot; and &quot;https&quot;.</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The names of profiles are SIP option-tags, and the guidance in this document does not supersede the option-tag assignment guidance in [RFC3261] (which requires a Standards Action for the assignment of a new option tag). This document does however stipulate that option-tags included to convey the name of a location profile per this definition MUST begin with the string "geolocation" followed by a dash. All such option tags should describe protocols used to acquire location by reference: these tags have no relevance to location carried in SIP requests by value, which use standard MIME typing and negotiation.

8.4 IANA Registration for 424 Response Code

In the SIP Response Codes registry, the following is added

Reference: RFC-XXXX (i.e., this document)
Response code: 424 (recommended number to assign)
Default reason phrase: Bad Location Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registry:</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response Code</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request Failure 4xx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
424 Bad Location Information

This SIP Response code is defined in section 4.3 of this document.

8.5 IANA Registration of New Geolocation-Error Header Field

The SIP Geolocation-error header field is created by this document, with its definition and rules in Section 4.4 of this document, to be added to the IANA sip-parameters registry with two actions.

1. Update the Header Fields registry with

   Registry:
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Name</th>
<th>compact</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geolocation-Error</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. In the portion titled "Header Field Parameters and Parameter Values", add

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field</th>
<th>Parameter Name</th>
<th>Predefined Values</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geolocation-Error</td>
<td>code</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.6 IANA Registration for the SIP Geolocation-Error Codes

This document creates a new registry for SIP, called "Geolocation-Error Codes." Geolocation-Error codes provide reason for the error discovered by Location Recipients, categorized by action to be taken by error recipient. The initial values for this registry are shown below.

- Registry Name: Geolocation-Error Codes
- Reference: [this doc]
- Registration Procedures: Specification Required

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Default Reason Phrase</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>&quot;Cannot Process Location&quot;</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>&quot;Permission To Use Location Information&quot;</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>&quot;Permission To Retransmit Location Information to a Third Party&quot;</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>&quot;Permission to Route based on Location Information&quot;</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>&quot;Dereference Failure&quot;</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Details of these error codes are in Section 4.4 of this document.

9. Acknowledgements

To Dave Oran for helping to shape this idea.

To Dean Willis for guidance of the effort.

To Allison Mankin, Dick Knight, Hannes Tschofenig, Henning Schulzrinne, James Winterbottom, Jeroen van Bemmel, Jean-Francois Mule, Jonathan Rosenberg, Keith Drage, Marc Linsner, Martin Thomson, Mike Hammer, Ted Hardie, Shida Shubert, Umesh Sharma, Richard Barnes, Dan Wing, Matt Lepinski, John Elwell, Thomas Stach, Jacqueline Lee and Adam Roach for constructive feedback and nits checking.

Special thanks to Paul Kyzivat for his help with the ABNF in this document and to Robert Sparks for many helpful comments and the proper construction of the Geolocation-Error header field.

And finally, to Spencer Dawkins for giving this doc a good scrubbing to make it more readable.

10. References

10.1 Normative References


Instant Messaging”, RFC 3428, December 2002


10.2 Informative References


Appendix A. Requirements for SIP Location Conveyance

The following subsections address the requirements placed on the UAC, the UAS, as well as SIP proxies when conveying location. This is from the original requirements draft that has since evolved into the solution document (that is above). This has been kept for historical reasons.

If a requirement is not obvious in intent, a motivational statement is included below it.

A.1 Requirements for a UAC Conveying Location

UAC-1 The SIP INVITE Method [RFC3261] must support location conveyance.

UAC-2 The SIP MESSAGE method [RFC3428] must support location conveyance.

UAC-3 SIP Requests within a dialog should support location conveyance.

UAC-4 Other SIP Requests may support location conveyance.

UAC-5 There must be one, mandatory to implement means of transmitting location confidentially.

Motivation: to guarantee interoperability.

UAC-6 It must be possible for a UAC to update location conveyed at any time in a dialog, including during dialog establishment.

Motivation: if a UAC has moved prior to the establishment of a dialog between UAs, the UAC must be able to send location information. If location has been conveyed, and the UA moves, the UAC must be able to update the location previously conveyed to other parties.

UAC-7 The privacy and security rules established within [RFC3693] that would categorize SIP as a 'Using Protocol' MUST be met.

UAC-8 The PIDF-LO [RFC4119] is a mandatory to implement format for location conveyance within SIP.

Motivation: interoperability with other IETF location protocols and Mechanisms.

UAC-9 There must be a mechanism for the UAC to request the UAS send its location.

UAC-9 has been DEPRECATED by the SIP WG, due to the many problems this requirement would have caused if implemented. The solution is for the above UAS to send a new request to the original UAC with the UAS’s location.

UAC-10 There must be a mechanism to differentiate the ability of the UAC to convey location from the UACs lack of knowledge of its location.
Motivation: Failure to receive location when it is expected can happen because the UAC does not implement this extension, or because the UAC implements the extension, but does not know where the Target is. This may be, for example, due to the failure of the access network to provide a location acquisition mechanism the UAC supports. These cases must be differentiated.

UAC-11 It must be possible to convey location to proxy servers along the path.

Motivation: Location-based routing.

A.2 Requirements for a UAS Receiving Location

The following are the requirements for location conveyance by a UAS:

UAS-1 SIP Responses must support location conveyance.

The SIPCORE WG reached consensus that this be allowed, but not to communicate the UAS’s location; rather for a SIP intermediary to inform the UAC which location to include in its next SIP request (as a matter of correcting what was originally sent by the UAC).

UAS-2 There must be a unique 4XX response informing the UAC it did not provide applicable location information.

In addition, requirements UAC-5, 6, 7 and 8 also apply to the UAS.

A.3 Requirements for SIP Proxies and Intermediaries

The following are the requirements for location conveyance by a SIP proxies and intermediaries:

Proxy-1 Proxy servers must be capable of adding a Location header field during processing of SIP requests.

Motivation: Provide network assertion of location when UACs are unable to do so, or when network assertion is more reliable than UAC assertion of location

Note: Because UACs connected to SIP signaling networks can have widely varying access network arrangements, including VPN tunnels and roaming mechanisms, it can be difficult for a network to reliably know the location of the endpoint. Proxies SHOULD NOT assert location of an endpoint unless the SIP signaling network has reliable knowledge of the actual location of the Targets.
Proxy-2  There must be a unique 4XX response informing the UAC it
did not provide applicable location information.
Location Information Server (LIS) Discovery using IP address and Reverse DNS
draft-thomson-geopriv-res-gw-lis-discovery-04

Abstract

The residential gateway is a device that has become an integral part of home networking equipment. Discovering a Location Information Server (LIS) is a necessary part of acquiring location information for location-based services. However, discovering a LIS when a residential gateway is present poses a configuration challenge, requiring a method that is able to work around the obstacle presented by the gateway.

This document describes a solution to this problem. The solution provides alternative domain names as input to the LIS discovery process based on the network addresses assigned to a Device.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on March 11, 2011.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal
Table of Contents

1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
2.  Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
3.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.1.  Residential Gateway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.2.  Use of Discovery for Third Party Queries . . . . . . . .  7
   3.3.  Additional and Optional Constraints . . . . . . . . . . .  7
4.  IP-based DNS Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.1.  Identification of IP Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.2.  Domain Name Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.3.  When To Use This Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.4.  Necessary Assumptions and Restrictions . . . . . . . . . 11
   4.5.  Failure Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   4.6.  Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.  IAB Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors’ Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction

A Location Information Server (LIS) is a service provided by an access network. The LIS uses knowledge of the access network topology and other information to generate location for Devices. Devices within an access network are able to acquire location information from a LIS.

The relationship between a Device and an access network might be transient. Configuration of the correct LIS at the Device ensures that accurate location information is available. Without location information, some network services are not available.

The configuration of a LIS address on a Device requires some automated configuration process. This is particularly relevant when it is considered that Devices might move between different access networks. LIS Discovery [I-D.ietf-geopriv-lis-discovery] describes a method that employs the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4 [RFC2131], DHCPv6 [RFC3315]) as input to U-NAPTR [RFC4848] discovery.

A residential gateway, or home router, provides a range of networking functions for Devices within the network it serves. In most cases, these functions effectively prevent the successful use of DHCP for LIS discovery.

The drawback with DHCP is that universal deployment of a new option takes a considerable amount of time. Often, networking equipment needs to be updated in order to support the new option. Of particular concern are the millions of residential gateway devices used to provide Internet access to homes and businesses. While [I-D.ietf-geopriv-lis-discovery] describes functions that can be provided by residential gateways to support LIS discovery, gateways built before the publication of this specification do not (and cannot) provide these functions.

This document explores the problem of configuring Devices with a LIS address when a residential gateway is interposed between the Device and access network. Section 3 defines the problem and Section 4 describes a method for determining a domain name that can be used for discovery of the LIS.

In some cases, the solution described in this document is based on a UNilateral Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) [RFC3424] method. For those cases, this solution is considered transitional until such time as the recommendations for residential gateways in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-lis-discovery] are more widely deployed. Considerations relating to UNSAF applications are described in Section 7.
2. Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

This document uses terminology established in [RFC3693] and [RFC5012].
3. Problem Statement

Figure 1 shows a simplified network topology for fixed wire-line Internet access. This arrangement is typical when wired Internet access is provided. The diagram shows two network segments: the access network provided by an internet service provider (ISP), and the residential network served by the residential gateway.

There are a number of variations on this arrangement, as documented in Section 3.1 of [RFC5687]. In each of these variations the goal of LIS discovery is to identify the LIS in the access network.

A particularly important characteristic of this arrangement is the relatively small area served by the residential gateway. Given a small enough area, it is reasonable to delegate the responsibility for providing Devices within the residential network with location...
information to the ISP. The ISP is able to provide location information that identifies the residence, which should be adequate for a wide range of purposes.

A residential network that covers a larger area might require a dedicated LIS, a case that is outside the scope of this document.

The goal of LIS discovery is to identify a LIS that is able to provide the Device with accurate location information. In the network topology described, this means identifying the LIS in the access network. The residential gateway is a major obstacle in achieving this goal.

3.1. Residential Gateway

A residential gateway can encompass several different functions including: modem, Ethernet switch, wireless access point, router, network address translation (NAT), DHCP server, DNS relay and firewall. Of the common functions provided, the NAT function of a residential gateway has the greatest impact on LIS discovery.

An ISP is typically parsimonious about their IP address allocations; each customer is allocated a limited number of IP addresses. Therefore, NAT is an extremely common function of gateways. NAT enables the use of multiple Devices within the residential network. However NAT also means that Devices within the residence are not configured by the ISP directly.

When it comes to discovering a LIS, the fact that Devices are not configured by the ISP causes a significant problem. Configuration is the ideal method of conveying the information necessary for discovery. Devices attached to residential gateways are usually given a generic configuration that includes no information about the ISP network. For instance, DNS configuration typically points to a DNS relay on the gateway device. This approach ensures that the local network served by the gateway is able to operate without a connection to the ISP, but it also means that Devices are effectively ignorant of the ISP network.

[I-D.ietf-geopriv-lis-discovery] describes several methods that can be applied by a residential gateway to assist Devices in acquiring location information. For instance, the residential gateway could forward LIS address information to hosts within the network it serves. Such an active involvement in the discovery process only works for new residential gateway devices that implement these recommendations.

Where residential gateways already exist, direct involvement of the
gateway in LIS discovery requires that the residential gateway be updated or replaced. The cost of replacement is difficult to justify to the owner of the gateway, especially when it is considered that the gateway still fills its primary function: Internet access.

Existing residential gateways have proven to be quite reliable devices, some operating continuously for many years without failure. As a result, there are many operational gateways that are of a considerable age, some well outside the period of manufacturer support. Updating the software in such devices is not feasible in many cases. Even if software updates were made available, many residential gateways cannot be updated remotely, inevitably leading to some proportion that is not updated.

This document therefore describes a method which can be used by Devices to discover their LIS without any assistance from the network.

3.2. Use of Discovery for Third Party Queries

It is desirable that any discovery mechanism is capable of being used by hosts outside of the access network. This facilitates third party queries (see [I-D.ietf-geopriv-held-identity-extensions]) by enabling identification of the appropriate LIS.

For example, in some jurisdictions, interim solutions for emergency services require that a voice service provider (VSP) or public safety answering point (PSAP) be able to request location information from the access network provider. These architectures mandate third party queries to accommodate calling devices that are unable to acquire their own location information and subsequently convey [I-D.ietf-sipcore-location-conveyance] that information within call signalling.

This document therefore describes a method which may also be used by third parties to discover the appropriate LIS based on the network address of the Device.

Note that an access network that fully supports DHCP-based LIS discovery [I-D.ietf-geopriv-lis-discovery] might not need to provide a secondary discovery mechanism. However this method SHOULD be provided for the benefit of third parties and for Devices that are unable to use DHCP-based LIS discovery.

3.3. Additional and Optional Constraints

Certain other properties of residential gateways constrain the potential solutions to this problem.
A network firewall function is often provided by residential gateways as a security measure. Security features like intrusion detection systems help protect users from attacks. Amongst these protections is a port filter that prevents both inbound and outbound traffic on certain TCP and UDP ports. Therefore, any solution needs to consider the likelihood of traffic being blocked.
4. IP-based DNS Solution

LIS discovery [I-D.ietf-geopriv-lis-discovery] uses a DNS-based Dynamic Delegation Discovery Service (DDDS) system as the basis of discovery. Input to this process is a domain name. Use of DHCP for acquiring the domain name is specified, but alternative methods of acquisition are permitted.

This document specifies a means for a device to discover several alternative domain names that can be used as input to the DDDS process. These domain names are based on the IP address of the Device. Specifically, the domain names are a portion of the reverse DNS trees - either the ".in-addr.arpa." or ".ip6.arpa." tree.

A Device might be reachable at one of a number of IP addresses. In the process described, a Device first identifies each IP address that it is potentially reachable from. From each of these addresses, the Device then selects up to three domain names for use in discovery. These domain names are then used as input to the DDDS process.

4.1. Identification of IP Addresses

A Device identifies a set of potential IP addresses that currently result in packets being routed to it. These are ordered by proximity, with those addresses that are used in adjacent network segments being favoured over those used in public or remote networks. The first addresses in the set are those that are assigned to local network interfaces.

A Device can use the Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [RFC5389] to determine its public reflexive transport address. The host uses the "Binding Request" message and the resulting "XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS" parameter that is returned in the response.

Alternative methods for determining other IP addresses MAY be used by the host. Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) [UPnP-IGD-WANIPConnection1] and NAT Port Mapping Protocol (NAT-PMP) [I-D.cheshire-nat-pmp] are both able to provide the external address of a residential gateway device when enabled. These as well as proprietary methods for determining other addresses might also be available. Because there is no assurance that these methods will be supported by any access network these methods are not mandated. Note also that in some cases, methods that rely on the view of the network from the residential gateway device could reveal an address in a private address range (see Section 4.4).

In many instances, the IP address produced might be from a private address range. For instance, the address on a local network
interface could be from a private range allocated by the residential gateway. In other cases, methods that rely on the view of the network (UPnP, NAT-PMP) from the residential gateway device could reveal an address in a private address range if the access network also uses NAT. For a private IP address, the derived domain name is only usable where the DNS server used contains data for the corresponding private IP address range.

4.2. Domain Name Selection

The domain name selected for each resulting IP address is the name that would be used for a reverse DNS lookup. The domain name derived from an IP version 4 address is in the ".in-addr.arpa." tree and follows the construction rules in Section 3.5 of [RFC1035]. The domain name derived from an IP version 6 address is in the ".ip6.arpa." tree and follows the construction rules in Section 2.5 of [RFC3596].

Additional domain names are added to allow for a single record to cover a larger set of addresses. If the search on the domain derived from the full IP address does not produce a NAPTR record with the desired service tag (e.g., "LIS:HELD"), a similar search is repeated based on a shorter domain name, using a part of the IP address:

- For IP version 4, the resulting domain name SHOULD be shortened successively by one and two labels and the query repeated. This corresponds to a search on a /24 or /16 network prefix. This allows for fewer DNS records in the case where a single access network covering an entire /24 or /16 network is served by the same LIS.

- For IP version 6, the resulting domain SHOULD be shortened successively by 16, 20 and 24 labels and the query repeated. This corresponds to a search on a /64, /48 or /32 network prefix.

DNS queries on other prefixes than those listed above SHOULD NOT be performed to limit the number of DNS queries performed by Devices. If no LIS is discovered by this method, no more than four U-NAPTR resolutions are invoked for each IP address.

4.3. When To Use This Method

The DHCP method described in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-lis-discovery] SHOULD be attempted on all local network interfaces before attempting this method. This method is employed either because DHCP is unavailable, when the DHCP server does not provide a value for the access network domain name option, or if a request to the resulting LIS results in a HELD "notLocatable" error or equivalent.
This method can also be used to facilitate third party queries, as described in Section 3.2. Based on a known IP address, the LIS that serves that address can be identified as long as the corresponding NAPTR records are provided.

4.4. Necessary Assumptions and Restrictions

When used by a Device for LIS discovery this is an UNSAF application and is subject to the limitations described in Section 7.

It is not necessary that the IP address used is unique to the Device, only that the address can be somehow related to the Device or the access network that serves the Device. This allows a degree of flexibility in determining this value, although security considerations (Section 6) might require that the address be verified to prevent falsification.

Addresses from private address space [RFC1918] MAY be used as input to this method. However, it is assumed that a DNS server with a view of the same address space is used in order to provide the corresponding DNS mappings; the public DNS does not contain useful records for all possible address spaces.

This does not preclude the use of private address spaces; use of a private address space in discovery can provide an access network operator more granular control over discovery. This assumes that the DNS server used in the U-NAPTR resolution is able to view the address realm. Addresses from the public address space are more likely to be able to be resolved by any DNS server. Thus, use of the public reflexive transport addresses acquired from a STUN server provide better chance of the DNS server being able to produce a usable result. Therefore, access to a STUN server that is able to view addresses from the public Internet is necessary.

This solution assumes that the public reflexive transport address used by a Device is in some way controlled by their ISP, or some other related party. This implies that the corresponding ".in-addr.arpa." or ".ip6.arpa." record can be updated by that entity to include a useful value for the LIS address.

4.5. Failure Modes

Successful use of private addresses relies on a DNS server that is able to see the private address space; therefore, a means to determine a public IP address is necessary. This document relies on STUN to provide the Device with a public reflexive transport address. Configuration of STUN server is necessary to ensure that this is successful.
Alternative methods for discovering external IP addresses are possible, including UPnP and NAT-PMP. However, these methods might not be enabled on the residential gateway; thus, these methods cannot be relied upon.

In cases where a virtual private network (VPN) or other tunnel is used, the entity providing a public IP address might not be able to provide the Device with location information. It is assumed that this entity is able to identify this problem and indicate this to the Device (using the "notLocatable" HELD error, or similar). This problem is described in more detail in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery].

4.6. Deployment Considerations

An access network provider SHOULD provide NAPTR records for each public IP address that is used for Devices within the access network. If the access network provider uses NAT, any DNS internal to that NAT SHOULD also include records for the private address range.

NAPTR records can be provided for individual IP addresses. To limit the proliferation of identical records, a single record can be placed at a the higher nodes of the tree (corresponding to /24 and /16 for IPv4; /64, /48 and /32 for IPv6). A record at a higher point in the tree (those with a shorter prefix) applies to all addresses lower in the tree (those with a longer prefix); records at the lower point override those at higher points, allowing for exceptions to be provided for at the lower point.
5. IANA Considerations

[RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to publication.]

This document has no IANA actions.
6. Security Considerations

The security considerations described in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-lis-discovery] apply to the discovery process as a whole. The primary security concern is with the potential for an attacker to impersonate a LIS.

The added ability for a third party to discover the identity of a LIS does not add any concerns, since the identity of a LIS is considered public information.

In addition to existing considerations, this document introduces further security considerations relating to the identification of the IP address. It is possible that an attacker could attempt to provide a falsified IP addresses in an attempt to subvert the rest of the process.

[RFC5389] describes attacks where an attacker is able to ensure that a Device receives a falsified reflexive address. Even if the STUN server is trusted, an attacker might be able to ensure that a falsified address is provided to the Device.

This attack is an effective means of denial of service, or a means to provide a deliberately misleading service. Notably, any LIS that is identified based on a falsified IP address could still be a valid LIS for the given IP address, just not one that is useful for providing the Device with location information. In this case, the LIS provides a HELD "notLocatable" error, or an equivalent. If the falsified IP address is under the control of the attacker, it is possible that misleading (but verifiable) DNS records could indicate a malicious LIS that provides false location information.

In all cases of falsification, the best remedy is to perform some form of independent verification of the result. No specific mechanism is currently available to prevent attacks based on falsification of reflexive addresses; it is suggested that Devices attempt to independently verify that the reflexive transport address provided is accurate.

Use of private address space effectively prevents use of the usual set of trust anchors for DNSSEC. Only a DNS server that is able to see the same private address space can provide useful records. A Device that relies on DNS records in the private address space portion of the ".in-addr.arpa." or ".ip6.arpa." trees MUST either use an alternative trust anchor for these records or rely on other means of ensuring the veracity of the DNS records.
7. IAB Considerations

The IAB has studied the problem of Unilateral Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) [RFC3424], which is the general process by which a client attempts to determine its address in another realm on the other side of a NAT through a collaborative protocol reflection mechanism, such as STUN.

This section only applies to the use of this method of LIS discovery by Devices and does not apply to its use for third-party LIS discovery.

The IAB requires that protocol specifications that define UNSAF mechanisms document a set of considerations.

1. Precise definition of a specific, limited-scope problem that is to be solved with the UNSAF proposal.

   Section 3 describes the limited scope of the problem addressed in this document.

2. Description of an exit strategy/transition plan.

   [I-D.ietf-geopriv-lis-discovery] describes behaviour that residential gateways require in order for this short term solution to be rendered unnecessary. When implementations of the recommendations in LIS discovery are widely available, this UNSAF mechanism can be made obsolete.

3. Discussion of specific issues that may render systems more "brittle".

   A description of the necessary assumptions and limitations of this solution are included in Section 4.4.

   Use of STUN for discovery of a reflexive transport address is inherently brittle in the presence of multiple NATs or address realms. In particular, brittleness is added by the requirement of using a DNS server that is able to view the address realm that contains the IP address in question. If address realms use overlapping addressing space, then there is a risk that the DNS server provides information that is not useful to the Device.

4. Identify requirements for longer term, sound technical solutions; contribute to the process of finding the right longer term solution.

   A longer term solution is already provided in
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-lis-discovery]. However, that solution relies on widespread deployment. The UNSAF solution provided here is provided as an interim solution that enables LIS access for Devices that are not able to benefit from deployment of the recommendations in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-lis-discovery].

5. Discussion of the impact of the noted practical issues with existing deployed NATs and experience reports.

The UNSAF mechanism depends on the experience in deployment of STUN [RFC5389]. On the whole, existing residential gateway devices are able to provide access to STUN and DNS service reliably, although regard should be given to the size of the DNS response (see [RFC5625]).
8. References

8.1. Normative References


[I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery]

[I-D.ietf-geopriv-lis-discovery]

8.2. Informative References


[RFC4848] Daigle, L., "Domain-Based Application Service Location Using URIs and the Dynamic Delegation Discovery Service
(DDDS)", RFC 4848, April 2007.


Authors’ Addresses

Martin Thomson
Andrew Corporation
PO Box U40
Wollongong University Campus, NSW 2500
AU

Phone: +61 2 4221 2915
Email: martin.thomson@andrew.com
URI: http://www.andrew.com/

Ray Bellis
Nominet UK
Edmund Halley Road
Oxford OX4 4DQ
United Kingdom

Phone: +44 1865 332211
Email: ray.bellis@nominet.org.uk
URI: http://www.nominet.org.uk/