Using the IPv6 flow label for equal cost multipath routing and link aggregation in tunnels
draft-carpenter-flow-ecmp-03

Abstract

The IPv6 flow label has certain restrictions on its use. This document describes how those restrictions apply when using the flow label for load balancing by equal cost multipath routing, and for link aggregation, particularly for tunneled traffic.

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1. Introduction

When several network paths between the same two nodes are known by the routing system to be equally good (in terms of capacity and latency), it may be desirable to share traffic among them. Two such techniques are known as equal cost multipath routing (ECMP) and link aggregation (LAG) [IEEE802.1AX]. There are of course numerous possible approaches to this, but certain goals need to be met:

- Roughly equal share of traffic on each path.
- Work-conserving method (no idle time when queue is non-empty).
- Minimize or avoid out-of-order delivery for individual traffic flows.

There is some conflict between these goals: for example, strictly avoiding idle time could cause a small packet sent on an idle path to overtake a bigger packet from the same flow, causing out-of-order delivery.

One lightweight approach to ECMP or LAG is this: if there are N equally good paths to choose from, then form a modulo(N) hash [RFC2991] from a consistent set of fields in each packet header, and use the resulting value to select a particular path. If the hash function is chosen so that the hash values have a uniform statistical distribution, this method will share traffic roughly equally between the N paths. If the header fields included in the hash are consistent, all packets from a given flow will generate the same hash, so out-of-order delivery will not occur. Assuming a large number of unique flows are involved, it is also probable that the method will be work-conserving, since the queue for each link will remain non-empty.

The question with such a method is which IP header fields are chosen to identify a flow and, consequently, are used as input keys to a modulo(N) hash algorithm.

In the remainder of this document, we will use the term "flow" to represent a sequence of packets that may be identified by either the source and destination IP addresses alone (2-tuple) or the source and destination IP addresses, protocol and source and destination port numbers (5-tuple). It should be noted that the latter is more specifically referred to as a "microflow" in [RFC2474], but this term is not used in connection with the flow label in [RFC3697].

The question with such a method, then, is which IP header fields to include to identify a flow. A minimal choice in the routing system is simply to use a hash of the source and destination IP addresses, i.e., the 2-tuple. This is necessary and sufficient to avoid out-of-order delivery, and with a wide variety of sources and destinations,
as one finds in the core of the network, sometimes sufficient to
achieve work-conserving load sharing. In practice, implementations
often use the 5-tuple {dest addr, source addr, protocol, dest port,
source port} as input keys to the hash function, to maximize the
probability of evenly sharing traffic over the equal cost paths.
However, including transport layer information as input keys to a
hash may be a problem for IPv4 fragments [RFC2991]. In addition,
protocol and destination port numbers in the hash will not only make
the hash slightly more expensive to compute, but will not
particularly improve the hash distribution, due to the prevalence of
well known port numbers and popular protocol numbers. Ephemeral
ports, on the other hand, are quite well distributed [Lee10]. In the
case of IPv6, protocol numbers are particularly inconvenient due to
the variable placement of and variable length of next-headers. In
addition, [RFC2460] recommends that all next-headers, except hop-by-
hop options, should not be inspected by intermediate nodes in the
network, presumably to make introduction of new next-headers more
straightforward.

The situation is different in tunneled scenarios. Identifying a flow
inside the tunnel is more complicated, particularly because nearly
all hardware can only identify flows based on information contained
in the outermost IP header. Assume that traffic from many sources to
destinations is aggregated in a single IP-in-IP tunnel from
tunnel end point (TEP) A to TEP B (see figure). Then all the packets
forming the tunnel have outer source address A and outer destination
address B. In all probability they also have the same port and
protocol numbers. If there are multiple paths between routers R1 and
R2, and ECMP or LAG is applied to choose a particular path, the
5-tuple and its hash will be constant and no load sharing will be
achieved. If there is much tunnel traffic, this will result in a
high probability of congestion on one of the paths between R1 and R2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEP</th>
<th>R1</th>
<th>R2</th>
<th>TEP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ECMP or LAG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tunnel</td>
<td>here</td>
<td>tunnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also, for IPv6, the total number of bits in the 5-tuple is quite
large (296), as well as inconvenient to extract due to the next-
header placement. This may be challenging for some hardware
implementations, raising the potential that network equipment vendors
might sacrifice the length of the fields extracted from an IPv6
header. The question therefore arises whether the 20-bit flow label
in IPv6 packets would be suitable for use as input to an ECMP or LAG
hash algorithm. If it could be used in place of the port numbers and
protocol number in the 5-tuple, the hash calculation would be simplified.

The flow label is left experimental by [RFC2460] but is better defined by [RFC3697]. We quote three rules from that RFC:
1. "The Flow Label value set by the source MUST be delivered unchanged to the destination node(s)."
2. "IPv6 nodes MUST NOT assume any mathematical or other properties of the Flow Label values assigned by source nodes."
3. "Router performance SHOULD NOT be dependent on the distribution of the Flow Label values. Especially, the Flow Label bits alone make poor material for a hash key."

These rules, especially the last one, have caused designers to hesitate about using the flow label in support of ECMP or LAG. The fact is today that most nodes set a zero value in the flow label, and the first rule definitely forbids the routing system from changing the flow label once a packet has left the source node. Considering normal IPv6 traffic, the fact that the flow label is typically zero means that it would add no value to an ECMP or LAG hash. But neither would it do any harm to the distribution of the hash values. If the community at some stage agrees to set pseudo-random flow labels in the majority of traffic flows, this would add to the value of the hash.

However, in the case of an IP-in-IPv6 tunnel, the TEP is itself the source node of the outer packets. Therefore, a TEP may freely set a flow label in the outer IPv6 header of the packets it sends into the tunnel. In particular, it may follow the [RFC3697] suggestion to set a pseudo-random value.

The second two rules quoted above need to be seen in the context of [RFC3697], which assumes that routers using the flow label in some way will be involved in some sort of method of establishing flow state: "To enable flow-specific treatment, flow state needs to be established on all or a subset of the IPv6 nodes on the path from the source to the destination(s)." The RFC should perhaps have made clear that a router that has participated in flow state establishment can rely on properties of the resulting flow label values without further signaling. If a router knows these properties, rule 2 is irrelevant, and it can choose to deviate from rule 3.

In the tunneling situation sketched above, routers R1 and R2 can rely on the flow labels set by TEP A and TEP B being assigned by a known method. This allows a safe ECMP or LAG method to be based on the flow label without breaching [RFC3697].
2. Normative Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Guidelines

We assume that the routers supporting ECMP or LAG (R1 and R2 in the above figure) are unaware that they are handling tunneled traffic. If it is desired to include the IPv6 flow label in an ECMP or LAG hash in the tunneled scenario shown above, the following guidelines apply:

- Inner packets MUST be encapsulated in an outer IPv6 packet whose source and destination addresses are those of the tunnel end points (TEPs).
- The flow label in the outer packet SHOULD be set by the sending TEP to a pseudo-random 20-bit value in accordance with [RFC3697]. The same flow label value MUST be used for all packets in a single user flow, as determined by the IP header fields of the inner packet.
  * Note that this rule is a SHOULD rather than a MUST, to permit individual implementers to take an alternative approach if they wish to do so. Such an alternative MUST conform to [RFC3697].
- The sending TEP MUST classify all packets into flows, once it has determined that they should enter a given tunnel, and then write the relevant flow label into the outer IPv6 header. A user flow could be identified by the ingress TEP most simply by its (destination, source) address pair (coarse) or by its 5-tuple (dest addr, source addr, protocol, dest port, source port) (fine). This is an implementation detail in the sending TEP.
  * It might be possible to make this classifier stateless, by using a suitable 20 bit hash of the inner IP header’s 2-tuple or 5-tuple as the pseudo-random flow label value.
- At intermediate router(s) that perform load distribution of tunneled packets whose source address is a TEP, the hash algorithm used to determine the outgoing component-link in an ECMP and/or LAG toward the next-hop MUST minimally include the triple {dest addr, source addr, flow label} to meet the [RFC3697] rules.
  * Intermediate router(s) MAY also include {protocol, dest port, source port} as input keys to the ECMP and/or LAG hash algorithms, to provide sufficient entropy in cases where the flow-label is currently set to zero.
4. Security Considerations

The flow label is not protected in any way and can be forged by an on-path attacker. Off-path attackers are unlikely to guess a valid flow label if a pseudo-random value is used. In either case, the worst an attacker could do against ECMP or LAG is to attempt to selectively overload a particular path. For further discussion, see [RFC3697].

5. IANA Considerations

This document requests no action by IANA.

6. Acknowledgements

This document was suggest by corridor discussions at IETF76. Joel Halpern made crucial comments on an early version. We are grateful to Qinwen Hu for general discussion about the flow label. Valuable comments and contributions were made by Jarno Rajahalme, Brian Haberman, Sheng Jiang, and others.

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7. Change log

draft-carpenter-flow-ecmp-03: clarifications after further comments, 2010-10-07

draft-carpenter-flow-ecmp-02: updated after IETF77 discussion, especially adding LAG, changed to BCP language, added second author, 2010-04-14

draft-carpenter-flow-ecmp-01: updated after comments, 2010-02-18

draft-carpenter-flow-ecmp-00: original version, 2010-01-19

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References

[IEEE802.1AX]


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Abstract

This document discusses the security implications of the IPv6 "Flow Label" header field, and analyzes possible schemes for selecting the Flow Label value of IPv6 packets.

Status of this Memo

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1. Introduction

The flow label is a 20-bit field that allows a source to label sequences of packets for which it requests special handling by IPv6 routers (e.g., non-default quality of service). It is specified in [RFC6437]. RFC 6438 [RFC6438] specifies the use of the Flow Label for Equal Cost Multipath Routing and Link Aggregation in Tunnels.

The Flow Label was originally loosely specified in RFC 2460 [RFC2460], and then later refined in [RFC3697]. Its specification has been recently revised by RFC 6437 [RFC6437]. [RFC6436] discusses the rationale for the update to the Flow Label specification in [RFC6437].

Section 2.1 [RFC6437] Section 2.2 [RFC6437]
2. Vulnerability analysis

2.1. RFC3697-compliant implementations

2.1.1. DoS resulting from verification of Flow Label consistency

[RFC2460] states that hosts and routers that do not support the functions of the Flow Label field are required to set this field to zero, pass the field unchanged when forwarding a packet, and ignore the field when forwarding a packet.

If any packet belonging to a flow includes a Hop-by-Hop Options header, then all packets of that flow must contain a Hop-by-Hop Options header with the same contents (excluding the Next Header field of the Hop-by-Hop Options header). If any packet belonging to a flow contains a Routing Header, then all packets of that flow must have the same contents in all Extension Headers up to and including the Routing Header (but excluding the Next Header field of the Routing header).

Appendix A of [RFC2460] states that routers and destinations are permitted, but not required, to verify that these conditions are satisfied. In order to perform this verification, the Hop-by-Hop Options header (and possibly the Destination Options header and the Routing header) used for the packets of each of the different flows should be kept in memory. This requirement, by itself, would open the door to at least two Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerabilities.

Firstly, an attacker could forge a large number of packets with different values for the Flow Label field, thus leading the attacked system to record the Hop-by-Hop Options header (and possibly a Destination Options header and a Routing header) for each of the forged "flows". This might exhaust the attacked system's memory, and thus lead to a system crash or a Denial of Service (DoS) to legitimate flows.

If a control protocol is used to convey the special handling for the flow, then such information could be recorded only upon receipt of the first packet belonging to a flow for which this "flow setup" has been completed. And thus this particular threat would be somewhat mitigated.

If the nature of the special handling for the flow were carried in a hop-by-hop option, the system performing the aforementioned information would have to record the Hop-by-Hop Options header (and possibly a Destination Options header and a Routing header) of each packet belonging to a "new" flow. As a result, an attacker could simply send a large number of forged packets belonging to different
flows, thus leading the attacked system to tie memory for each of these forged flows. This might exhaust the attacked system’s memory, and thus lead to a system crash or the Denial of Service (DoS) to legitimate flows.

Secondly, rather than aiming at exhausting system resources, an attacker could send forged packets with the intent of having the attacked system record their headers, so that future legitimate packets are discarded as a result of not including the same extension headers that had been recorded upon receipt of the forged packets.

Therefore, while this verification might be of help to mitigate some blind attacks by obfuscation, we believe the drawbacks of performing such verification outweigh the potential benefits, and thus recommend systems to not perform such verification.

2.1.2. Covert channels

As virtually every protocol header field, the Flow Label could be used to implement a covert channel. In those network environments in which the Flow Label is not used, middle-boxes such as packet scrubbers could eliminate this covert channel by resetting the Flow Label with zero, at the expense of disabling the use of the Flow Label for e.g., load-balancing. Such a policy should be carefully evaluated before being enabled, as it would prevent the deployment of any legitimate technology that makes use of the Flow Label field.

It should be stress that is very difficult to eliminate all covert channels in a communications protocol, and thus the enforcement of the aforementioned policy should only be applied after careful evaluation.

2.1.3. QoS theft

If a network identifies flows that will receive a specific QoS by means of the Flow Label, an attacker could forge the packets with specific Flow Label values such that those packets receive that QoS treatment.

2.1.4. Information Leaking

If a host selects the Flow Label values of outgoing packets such that the resulting sequence of Flow Label values is predictable, this could result in an information leakage. Specifically, if a host sets the Flow Label value of outgoing packets from a system-wide counter, the number of "outgoing flows" would be leaked. This could in turn be used for purposes such as "stealth port scanning" (see Section 3.5 of [CPNI-IP]).
2.2. RFC6437-compliant implementations

The security-wise main changes introduced in [RFC6437] are:

- Since Section 6 and Appendix A of RFC 2460 has been essentially obsoleted, the revised specification does not describe any verification for consistency of the Flow Label values of different packets of the same "flow". Therefore, the vulnerability described in Section 2.1.1 has been eliminated.

- The revised specification recommends that Flow Label values are not easily predictable, and therefore the vulnerabilities described in Section 2.1.3 and Section 2.1.4 are mitigated.

Note: the issue of "covert channels" described in Section 2.1.2 remains essentially the same. That is, unless the Flow Label value is rewritten, it may be exploited as a covert channel. However, [RFC6437] mentions this issue, and notes how this could be mitigated in those network scenarios in which covert channels might be a concern.
3. Selecting Flow Label values

[RFC6437] specifies the requirements for a Flow Label generation algorithm. Essentially:

- The Flow Label value must not be easily predictable by a third-party.
- Flow Labels (together with the Source Address and the Destination Address) are meant to uniquely identify a packet "flow". Hence, to the extent that is possible each flow should result in a unique {Source Address, Destination Address, Flow Label} set of values at any given time.
- In order to help with the use of the Flow Label for Equal Cost Multipath Routing (ECMP) and Link Aggregation (LAG) in Tunnels, Flow Labels should (ideally) have a uniform distribution.

Section 3.1 specifies the RECOMMENDED algorithm for selecting Flow Label values. Section 3.2 specifies an alternative algorithm that MAY be used by those implementations concerned about the Flow Label reuse frequency of the RECOMMENDED algorithm.

3.1. Recommended algorithm

Considering that the Flow Label is a 20-bit field, that Flow Label values must be unique for each (Source Address, Destination Address) pair at any given time, and that [RFC6437] relaxed the requirement of uniqueness that was enforced in [RFC3697], we RECOMMEND that the Flow Label of each flow be selected according to a PRNG. That is, each Flow Label would be selected with:

\[
\text{Flow Label} = \text{random()}
\]

where:

\[
\text{random()}: \\
\text{Is a a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG).}
\]

3.2. Alternative Algorithm

Implementations concerned with the Flow Label reuse frequency of the algorithm specified in Section 3.1 MAY use the following alternative scheme, which aims at minimizing the Flow Label reuse frequency by producing per-destination monotonically-increasing Flow Label values.

\[
\text{Flow Label} = F(\text{Source Address, Destination Address, Secret Key2}) + \\
\text{table}[G(\text{Source Address, Destination Address, Secret Key1})]
\]
where:

table:
   Is an array of counters that are initialized to random values upon system bootstrapping. The larger the array, the greater the separation of the "increments" space.

F():
   Is a hash function that should take as input both the Source Address and the Destination Address of the flow, and a secret key. The result of F() should not be computable without knowledge of all the parameters of the hash function.
   
   If random numbers are used as the only source of the secret key, they should be chosen in accordance with the recommendations given in [RFC4086].

G():
   Is a hash function that should take as input both the Source Address and the Destination Address of the flow, and a secret key. The result of G() should not be computable without knowledge of all the parameters of the hash function.
   
   If random numbers are used as the only source of the secret key, they should be chosen in accordance with the recommendations given in [RFC4086].

This scheme should be invoked when a new flow is to be created (e.g., when a new TCP connection is to be created). Once a Flow Label value for such flow is selected, the Flow Label field of all the IPv6 packets corresponding to that flow would be set to the selected value (until the flow is terminated).

The following figure illustrates this algorithm in pseudo-code:
/* Initialization at system boot time */
for(i = 0; i < TABLE_LENGTH; i++)
    table[i] = random();

/* Flow Label selection function */
offset = F(local_IP, remote_IP, secret_key1);
index = G(local_IP, remote_IP, secret_key2);
count = 1048576;
do {
    flowlabel = (offset + table[index]) % 1048576;
    table[index]++;
    if(three-tuple is unique)
        return flowlabel;
    count--;
} while (count > 0);

/* Set the Flow Label to 0 if there is no unused Flow Label */
return 0;

Figure 1

The following table shows a sample output of this algorithm:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1</td>
<td>2001:db8::1</td>
<td>2001:db8::2</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2</td>
<td>2001:db8::1</td>
<td>2001:db8::2</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3</td>
<td>2001:db8::1</td>
<td>2001:db8::4</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4</td>
<td>2001:db8::1</td>
<td>2001:db8::4</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5</td>
<td>2001:db8::1</td>
<td>2001:db8::2</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Sample output of the double-hash algorithm
3.2.1. Secret-key considerations

Every complex manipulation (like MD5) is no more secure than the input values, and in the case of ephemeral ports, the secret key. If an attacker is aware of which cryptographic hash function is being used by the victim (which we should expect), and the attacker can obtain enough material (e.g. Flow Label values selected by the victim), the attacker may simply search the entire secret key space to find matches.

To protect against this, the secret key should be of a reasonable length. Key lengths of 128 bits should be adequate.

Another possible mechanism for protecting the secret key is to change it after some time. If the host platform is capable of producing reasonably good random data, the secret key can be changed automatically.

Changing the secret will cause abrupt shifts in the selected Flow Label values, and consequently collisions may occur. That is, upon changing the secret, the "offset" value used for each tuple (Source Address, Destination Address) will be different from that computed with the previous secret, thus possibly leading to the selection of a Flow Label value recently used for the same tuple (Source Address, Destination Address).

Thus the change in secret key should be done with consideration and could be performed whenever one of the following events occur:

- The system is being bootstrapped.
- Some predefined/random time has expired.
- The secret has been used N times (i.e. we consider it insecure).
- There is little traffic (the performance overhead of collisions is tolerated).
- There is enough random data available to change the secret key (pseudo-random changes should not be done).
4. Security Considerations

This document provides a security assessment of the IPv6 Flow Label header field, and possible strategies to mitigate them.
5. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA registries within this document. The RFC-Editor can remove this section before publication of this document as an RFC.
6. Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Shane Amante, Ran Atkinson, Steven Blake, and Brian Carpenter for providing valuable feedback on earlier versions of this document.

The offset function used by the algorithm in Section 3.1 was inspired by the mechanism proposed by Steven Bellovin in [RFC1948] for defending against TCP sequence number attacks.

This document is heavily based on the document "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)" [CPNI-IPv6] written by Fernando Gont on behalf of the UK Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI).

Fernando Gont would like to thank CPNI (http://www.cpni.gov.uk) for their continued support.
7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


[CPNI-TCP]


Appendix A. Survey of Flow Label selection algorithms in use by some popular implementations

A.1. FreeBSD

A.2. Linux

A.3. NetBSD

A.4. OpenBSD

A.5. OpenSolaris
Appendix B. Changes from previous versions of the draft (to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication of this document as a RFC)

B.1. Changes from draft-gont-6man-flowlabel-security-02

- The document now recommends randomized Flow Labels as the default approach, and describes the hash-based approach as an alternative method to be used if there are concerns about the Flow Label reuse frequency.
- Minor editorial changes.

B.2. Changes from draft-gont-6man-flowlabel-security-01

- The document has been updated to contain an analysis of the revised Flow Label specification [RFC6437].
- Minor editorial changes.

B.3. Changes from draft-gont-6man-flowlabel-security-00

- Clarified *when* Flow Labels are selected, in response to Shane Amante’s feedback.
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