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Example call flows using Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) security
mechanisms
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Abstract

This document shows example call flows demonstrating the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS), and Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). It also provides information that helps implementers build interoperable SIP software. To help facilitate interoperability testing, it includes certificates used in the example call flows and processes to create certificates for testing.

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1. Introduction

This document is informational and is not normative on any aspect of SIP.

SIP with TLS ([RFC5246]) implementations are becoming very common. Several implementations of the S/MIME ([RFC5751]) portion of SIP ([RFC3261]) are also becoming available. After several interoperability events, it is clear that it is difficult to write these systems without any test vectors or examples of "known good" messages to test against. Furthermore, testing at the events is often hindered due to the lack of a commonly trusted certificate authority to sign the certificates used in the events. This document addresses both of these issues by providing messages that give detailed examples that implementers can use for comparison and that can also be used for testing. In addition, this document provides a common certificate and private key that can be used to set up a mock Certificate Authority (CA) that can be used during the SIP interoperability events. Certificate requests from the users will be signed by the private key of the mock CA. The document also provides some hints and clarifications for implementers.

A simple SIP call flow using SIPS URIs and TLS is shown in Section 3. The certificates for the hosts used are shown in Section 2.2, and the CA certificates used to sign these are shown in Section 2.1.

The text from Section 4.1 through Section 4.3 shows some simple SIP call flows using S/MIME to sign and encrypt the body of the message. The user certificates used in these examples are shown in Section 2.3. These host certificates are signed with the same mock CA private key.

Section 5 presents a partial list of items that implementers should consider in order to implement systems that will interoperate.

Scripts and instructions to make certificates that can be used for interoperability testing are presented in Appendix A, along with methods for converting these to various formats. The certificates used while creating the examples and test messages in this document are made available in Appendix B.

Binary copies of various messages in this document that can be used for testing appear in Appendix C.

2. Certificates

2.1. CA Certificates

The certificate used by the CA to sign the other certificates is shown below. This is a X509v3 certificate. Note that the X.509v3 Basic Constraints in the certificate allows it to be used as a CA, certificate authority. This certificate is not used directly in the TLS call flow; it is used only to verify user and host certificates.

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

96:a3:84:17:4e:ef:8a:4c

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit,
OU=Sipit Test Certificate Authority

Validity

Not Before: Jan 27 18:36:05 2011 GMT

Not After : Jan 3 18:36:05 2111 GMT

Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit,
OU=Sipit Test Certificate Authority

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)

Modulus (2048 bit):

00:ab:1f:91:61:f1:1c:c5:cd:a6:7b:16:9b:b7:14:
79:e4:30:9e:98:d0:ec:07:b7:bd:77:d7:d1:f5:5b:
2c:e2:ee:e6:b1:b0:f0:85:fa:a5:bc:cb:cc:cf:69:
2c:4f:fc:50:ef:9d:31:2b:c0:59:ea:fb:64:6f:1f:
55:a7:3d:fd:70:d2:56:db:14:99:17:92:70:ac:26:
f8:34:41:70:d9:c0:03:91:6a:ba:d1:11:8f:ac:12:
31:de:b9:19:70:8d:5d:a7:7d:8b:19:cc:40:3f:ae:
ff:de:1f:db:94:b3:46:77:6c:ae:ae:ff:3e:d6:84:
5b:c2:de:0b:26:65:d0:91:c7:70:4b:c7:0a:4a:bf:
c7:97:04:dd:ba:58:47:cb:e0:2b:23:76:87:65:c5:
55:34:10:ab:27:1f:1c:f8:30:3d:b0:9b:ca:a2:81:
72:4c:bd:60:fe:f7:21:fe:0b:db:0b:db:e9:5b:01:
36:d4:28:15:6b:79:eb:d0:91:1b:21:59:b8:0e:aa:
bf:d5:b1:6c:70:37:a3:3f:a5:7d:0e:95:46:f6:f6:
58:67:83:75:42:37:18:0b:a4:41:39:b2:2f:6c:80:
2c:78:ec:a5:0f:be:9c:10:f8:c0:0b:0d:73:99:9e:
0d:d7:97:50:cb:cc:45:34:23:49:41:85:22:24:ad:
29:c3

Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

95:45:7E:5F:2B:EA:65:98:12:91:04:F3:63:C7:68:9A:58:16:77:27

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

95:45:7E:5F:2B:EA:65:98:12:91:04:F3:63:C7:68:9A:58:16:77:27

X509v3 Basic Constraints:

CA:TRUE

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption

06:5f:9e:ae:a0:9a:bc:b5:b9:5b:7e:97:33:cc:df:63:98:98:
 94:cb:0d:66:a9:83:e8:aa:58:2a:59:a1:9e:47:31:a6:af:5c:
 3f:a2:25:86:f8:df:05:92:b7:db:69:a1:69:72:87:66:c5:ab:
 35:89:01:37:19:c9:74:eb:09:d1:3f:88:7b:24:13:42:ca:2d:
 fb:45:e6:cc:4b:f8:21:78:f3:f5:97:ec:09:92:24:a2:f0:e6:
 94:8d:97:4a:00:94:00:bd:25:b8:17:2c:52:53:5d:cc:5c:48:
 a4:a1:1d:2d:f6:50:55:13:a4:d3:b2:a2:f4:f1:b9:6d:48:5e:
 5c:f3:de:e0:fc:59:09:a1:d9:14:61:65:bf:d8:3f:b9:ba:2e:
 7c:ed:5c:24:9b:6b:ca:aa:5f:f1:c1:1e:b0:a8:da:82:0f:fb:
 4c:71:3b:4d:7b:38:c8:e3:8a:2a:19:34:44:26:0b:ea:f0:47:
 38:46:28:65:04:e2:01:52:dd:ec:3d:e5:f5:53:74:77:74:75:
 6d:c6:d9:c2:0a:ac:3b:b8:98:5c:55:53:34:74:52:a8:26:b1:
 2f:30:22:d0:8b:b7:f3:a0:dd:68:07:33:d5:ae:b7:81:b2:94:
 58:72:4e:7c:c6:72:2f:bd:6c:69:fb:b5:17:a8:2a:8d:d7:2c:
 91:06:c8:0c

The certificate content shown above and throughout this document was rendered by the OpenSSL "x509" tool. These dumps are included only as informative examples. Output may vary among future revisions of the tool. At the time of this document's publication, there were some irregularities in the presentation of Distinguished Names (DN). In particular, note that in the "Issuer" and "Subject" fields, it appears the intent is to present DNs in Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) format. If this was intended, the spaces should have been omitted after the delimiting commas, and the elements should have been presented in order of most-specific to least-specific. Please refer to Appendix A of [RFC4514]. Using the "Issuer" DN from above as an example and following guidelines in [RFC4514], it should have instead appeared as:

Issuer: OU=Sipit Test Certificate Authority,O=sipit,L=San Jose,
 ST=California,C=US

The ASN.1 parse of the CA certificate is shown below.

```
0:l= 949 cons: SEQUENCE
4:l= 669 cons: SEQUENCE
8:l= 3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
10:l= 1 prim: INTEGER :02
13:l= 9 prim: INTEGER :96A384174EEF8A4C
24:l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
26:l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha1WithRSAEncryption
```

```

37:l= 0 prim: NULL
39:l= 112 cons: SEQUENCE
41:l= 11 cons: SET
43:l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE
45:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :countryName
50:l= 2 prim: PRINTABLESTRING :US
54:l= 19 cons: SET
56:l= 17 cons: SEQUENCE
58:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :stateOrProvinceName
63:l= 10 prim: UTF8STRING
43 61 6c 69 66 6f 72 6e-69 61 California
75:l= 17 cons: SET
77:l= 15 cons: SEQUENCE
79:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :localityName
84:l= 8 prim: UTF8STRING
53 61 6e 20 4a 6f 73 65- San Jose
94:l= 14 cons: SET
96:l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE
98:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :organizationName
103:l= 5 prim: UTF8STRING
73 69 70 69 74 sipit
110:l= 41 cons: SET
112:l= 39 cons: SEQUENCE
114:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :organizationalUnitName
119:l= 32 prim: UTF8STRING
53 69 70 69 74 20 54 65-73 74 20 43 65 72 74 69 Sipit Test Certi
66 69 63 61 74 65 20 41-75 74 68 6f 72 69 74 79 ficate Authority
153:l= 32 cons: SEQUENCE
155:l= 13 prim: UTCTIME :110127183605Z
170:l= 15 prim: GENERALIZEDTIME :21110103183605Z
187:l= 112 cons: SEQUENCE
189:l= 11 cons: SET
191:l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE
193:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :countryName
198:l= 2 prim: PRINTABLESTRING :US
202:l= 19 cons: SET
204:l= 17 cons: SEQUENCE
206:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :stateOrProvinceName
211:l= 10 prim: UTF8STRING
43 61 6c 69 66 6f 72 6e-69 61 California
223:l= 17 cons: SET
225:l= 15 cons: SEQUENCE
227:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :localityName
232:l= 8 prim: UTF8STRING
53 61 6e 20 4a 6f 73 65- San Jose
242:l= 14 cons: SET
244:l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE
246:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :organizationName

```

```

251:l= 5 prim: UTF8STRING
      73 69 70 69 74 sipit
258:l= 41 cons: SET
260:l= 39 cons: SEQUENCE
262:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :organizationalUnitName
267:l= 32 prim: UTF8STRING
      53 69 70 69 74 20 54 65-73 74 20 43 65 72 74 69 Sipit Test Certi
      66 69 63 61 74 65 20 41-75 74 68 6f 72 69 74 79 ficate Authority
301:l= 290 cons: SEQUENCE
305:l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
307:l= 9 prim: OBJECT :rsaEncryption
318:l= 0 prim: NULL
320:l= 271 prim: BIT STRING
      00 30 82 01 0a 02 82 01-01 00 ab 1f 91 61 f1 1c .0.....a..
      c5 cd a6 7b 16 9b b7 14-79 e4 30 9e 98 d0 ec 07 ...{....y.0....
      b7 bd 77 d7 d1 f5 5b 2c-e2 ee e6 b1 b0 f0 85 fa ..w...[,.....
      a5 bc cb cc cf 69 2c 4f-fc 50 ef 9d 31 2b c0 59 .....i,O.P..l+.Y
      ea fb 64 6f 1f 55 a7 3d-fd 70 d2 56 db 14 99 17 ..do.U.=.p.V....
      92 70 ac 26 f8 34 41 70-d9 c0 03 91 6a ba d1 11 .p.&.4Ap....j...
      8f ac 12 31 de b9 19 70-8d 5d a7 7d 8b 19 cc 40 ...l...p.].}...@
      3f ae ff de 1f db 94 b3-46 77 6c ae ae ff 3e d6 ?.....Fwl...>.
      84 5b c2 de 0b 26 65 d0-91 c7 70 4b c7 0a 4a bf .[...&e...pK..J.
      c7 97 04 dd ba 58 47 cb-e0 2b 23 76 87 65 c5 55 .....XG...+#v.e.U
      34 10 ab 27 1f 1c f8 30-3d b0 9b ca a2 81 72 4c 4...'...0=.....rL
      bd 60 fe f7 21 fe 0b db-0b db e9 5b 01 36 d4 28 .`...!.....[.6.(
      15 6b 79 eb d0 91 1b 21-59 b8 0e aa bf d5 b1 6c .ky....!Y.....l
      70 37 a3 3f a5 7d 0e 95-46 f6 f6 58 67 83 75 42 p7.?.}..F..Xg.uB
      37 18 0b a4 41 39 b2 2f-6c 80 2c 78 ec a5 0f be 7...A9./l.,x....
      9c 10 f8 c0 0b 0d 73 99-9e 0d d7 97 50 cb cc 45 .....s.....P..E
      34 23 49 41 85 22 24 ad-29 c3 02 03 01 00 01 4#IA."$.).....
595:l= 80 cons: cont [ 3 ]
597:l= 78 cons: SEQUENCE
599:l= 29 cons: SEQUENCE
601:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Subject Key Identifier
606:l= 22 prim: OCTET STRING
      04 14 95 45 7e 5f 2b ea-65 98 12 91 04 f3 63 c7 ...E~_+.e.....c.
      68 9a 58 16 77 27 h.X.w'
630:l= 31 cons: SEQUENCE
632:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Authority Key Identifier
637:l= 24 prim: OCTET STRING
      30 16 80 14 95 45 7e 5f-2b ea 65 98 12 91 04 f3 0....E~_+.e.....
      63 c7 68 9a 58 16 77 27- c.h.X.w'
663:l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE
665:l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Basic Constraints
670:l= 5 prim: OCTET STRING
      30 03 01 01 ff 0....
677:l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
679:l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha1WithRSAEncryption
    
```

```

690:l= 0 prim: NULL
692:l= 257 prim: BIT STRING
00 06 5f 9e ae a0 9a bc-b5 b9 5b 7e 97 33 cc df .._.....[~.3..
63 98 98 94 cb 0d 66 a9-83 e8 aa 58 2a 59 a1 9e c.....f....X*Y..
47 31 a6 af 5c 3f a2 25-86 f8 df 05 92 b7 db 69 G1..\?%.%.....i
a1 69 72 87 66 c5 ab 35-89 01 37 19 c9 74 eb 09 .ir.f..5..7..t..
d1 3f 88 7b 24 13 42 ca-2d fb 45 e6 cc 4b f8 21 .?.{$.B.-.E..K.!
78 f3 f5 97 ec 09 92 24-a2 f0 e6 94 8d 97 4a 00 x.....$.%.....J.
94 00 bd 25 b8 17 2c 52-53 5d cc 5c 48 a4 a1 1d ...%...RS].\H...
2d f6 50 55 13 a4 d3 b2-a2 f4 f1 b9 6d 48 5e 5c -.PU.....mH^\
f3 de e0 fc 59 09 a1 d9-14 61 65 bf d8 3f b9 ba ....Y....ae..?..
2e 7c ed 5c 24 9b 6b ca-aa 5f f1 c1 le b0 a8 da .|\$.k._.....
82 0f fb 4c 71 3b 4d 7b-38 c8 e3 8a 2a 19 34 44 ...Lq;M{8...*.4D
26 0b ea f0 47 38 46 28-65 04 e2 01 52 dd ec 3d &...G8F(e...R.=
e5 f5 53 74 77 74 75 6d-c6 d9 c2 0a ac 3b b8 98 ..Stwtum.....i..
5c 55 53 34 74 52 a8 26-b1 2f 30 22 d0 8b b7 f3 \US4tR.&./0"....
a0 dd 68 07 33 d5 ae b7-81 b2 94 58 72 4e 7c c6 ..h.3.....XrN|.
72 2f bd 6c 69 fb b5 17-a8 2a 8d d7 2c 91 06 c8 r/.li....*.....
0c .

```

2.2. Host Certificates

The certificate for the host example.com is shown below. Note that the Subject Alternative Name is set to example.com and is a DNS type. The certificates for the other hosts are shown in Appendix B.

```

Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
    96:a3:84:17:4e:ef:8a:4f
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit,
    OU=Sipit Test Certificate Authority
Validity
    Not Before: Feb  7 19:32:17 2011 GMT
    Not After  : Jan 14 19:32:17 2111 GMT
Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit, CN=example.com
Subject Public Key Info:
    Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
    RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
    Modulus (2048 bit):
        00:dd:74:06:02:10:c2:e7:04:1f:bc:8c:b6:24:e7:
        9b:94:a3:48:37:85:9e:6d:83:12:84:50:1a:8e:48:
        b1:fa:86:8c:a7:80:b9:be:52:ec:a6:ca:63:47:84:
        ad:f6:74:85:82:16:7e:4e:36:40:0a:74:2c:20:a9:
        6a:0e:6a:7f:35:cf:70:71:63:7d:e9:43:67:81:4c:
        ea:b5:1e:b7:4c:a3:35:08:7b:21:0d:2a:73:07:63:
        9d:8d:75:bf:1f:d4:8e:e6:67:60:75:f7:ea:0a:7a:

```

```

6c:90:af:92:45:e0:62:05:9a:8a:10:98:dc:7c:54:
8b:e4:61:95:3b:04:fc:10:50:ef:80:45:ba:5e:84:
97:76:c1:20:25:c1:92:1d:89:0a:f7:55:62:64:fa:
e8:69:a2:62:4c:67:d3:08:d9:61:b5:3d:16:54:b6:
b7:44:8d:59:2b:90:d4:e9:fb:c7:7d:87:58:c3:12:
ac:33:78:00:50:ba:07:05:b3:b9:01:1a:63:55:6c:
e1:7a:ec:a3:07:ae:3b:02:83:a1:69:e0:c3:dc:2d:
61:e9:b2:e3:b3:71:c8:a6:cf:da:fb:3e:99:c7:e5:
71:b9:c9:17:d4:ed:bc:a0:47:54:09:8c:6e:6d:53:
9a:2c:c9:68:c6:6f:f1:3d:91:1a:24:43:77:7d:91:
69:4b

```

Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:

DNS:example.com, URI:sip:example.com

X509v3 Basic Constraints:

CA:FALSE

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

CC:06:59:5B:8B:5E:D6:0D:F2:05:4D:1B:68:54:1E:FC:F9:43:19:17

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

95:45:7E:5F:2B:EA:65:98:12:91:04:F3:63:C7:68:9A:58:16:77:27

X509v3 Key Usage:

Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment

X509v3 Extended Key Usage:

TLS Web Server Authentication, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.20

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption

```

6a:9a:d1:db:00:4b:90:86:b0:53:ea:6f:30:31:89:1e:9b:09:
14:bd:6f:b9:02:aa:6f:58:ee:30:03:b8:a1:fd:b3:41:72:ff:
b3:0d:cb:76:a7:17:c6:57:38:06:13:e5:f3:e4:30:17:4d:f7:
97:b5:f3:74:e9:81:f8:f4:55:a3:0d:f5:82:38:c3:98:43:52:
1f:84:cd:1a:b4:a3:45:9f:3d:e2:31:fd:cb:a2:ad:ed:60:7d:
fa:d2:aa:49:2f:41:a9:80:01:bb:ed:b6:75:c9:97:69:7f:0c:
91:60:f1:c4:5a:36:e8:5c:ac:e1:a8:e7:9a:55:e5:e0:cd:01:
f4:de:93:f4:38:6c:c1:71:d2:fd:cd:1b:5d:25:eb:90:7b:31:
41:e7:37:0e:e5:c0:01:48:91:f7:34:dd:c6:1f:74:e6:34:34:
e6:cd:93:0f:3f:ce:94:ad:91:d9:e2:72:b1:9f:1d:d3:a5:7d:
5e:e2:a4:56:c5:b1:71:4d:10:0a:5d:a6:56:e6:57:1f:48:a5:
5c:75:67:ea:ab:35:3e:f6:b6:fa:c1:f3:8a:c1:80:71:32:18:
6c:33:b5:fa:16:5a:16:e1:a1:6c:19:67:f5:45:68:64:6f:b2:
31:dc:e3:5a:1a:b2:d4:87:89:96:fd:87:ba:38:4e:0a:19:07:
03:4b:9b:b1

```

The example host certificate above, as well as all the others presented in this document, are signed directly by a root CA. These certificate chains have a length equal to two: the root CA and the host certificate. Non-root CAs exist and may also sign certificates.

The certificate chains presented by hosts with certificates signed by non-root CAs will have a length greater than two. For more details on how certificate chains are validated, see Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of [RFC5280].

2.3. User Certificates

User certificates are used by many applications to establish user identity. The user certificate for fluffy@example.com is shown below. Note that the Subject Alternative Name has a list of names with different URL types such as a sip, im, or pres URL. This is necessary for interoperating with a Common Profile for Instant Messaging (CPIM) gateway. In this example, example.com is the domain for fluffy. The message could be coming from any host in *.example.com, and the AOR in the user certificate would still be the same. The others are shown in Appendix B.1. These certificates make use of the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension discussed in [RFC5924]. Note that the X509v3 Extended Key Usage attribute refers to the SIP OID introduced in [RFC5924], which is 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.20

```
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
    96:a3:84:17:4e:ef:8a:4d
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit,
    OU=Sipit Test Certificate Authority
Validity
    Not Before: Feb  7 19:32:17 2011 GMT
    Not After  : Jan 14 19:32:17 2111 GMT
Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit,
    CN=fluffy
Subject Public Key Info:
    Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
    RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
    Modulus (2048 bit):
        00:a3:2c:59:0c:e9:bc:e4:ec:d3:9e:fb:99:02:ec:
        b1:36:3a:b7:d3:1d:4d:c3:3a:b6:ae:50:bd:5f:55:
        08:77:8c:7e:a4:e9:f0:68:31:28:8f:23:32:56:19:
        c3:22:97:a7:6d:fd:a7:22:2a:01:b5:af:61:bd:5f:
        7e:c1:14:e5:98:29:b4:34:4e:38:8a:26:ee:0d:da:
        db:27:b9:78:d6:ac:ac:04:78:32:98:c2:75:e7:6a:
        b7:2d:b3:3c:e3:eb:97:a5:ef:8b:59:42:50:17:7b:
        fe:a7:81:af:37:a7:e7:e3:1f:b0:8d:d0:72:2f:6c:
        14:42:c6:01:68:e1:8f:fd:56:4d:7d:cf:16:dc:aa:
        05:61:0b:0a:ca:ca:ec:51:ec:53:6e:3d:2b:00:80:
        fe:35:1b:06:0a:61:13:88:0b:44:f3:cc:fd:2b:0e:
        b4:a2:0b:a0:97:84:14:2e:ee:2b:e3:2f:c1:1a:9e:
        86:9a:78:6a:a2:4c:57:93:e7:01:26:d3:56:0d:bd:
```

```

    b0:2f:f8:da:c7:3c:01:dc:cb:2d:31:8c:6c:c6:5c:
    b4:63:e8:b2:a2:40:11:bf:ad:f8:6d:12:01:97:1d:
    47:f8:6a:15:8b:fb:27:96:73:44:46:34:d7:24:1c:
    cf:56:8d:d4:be:d6:94:5b:f0:a6:67:e3:dd:cf:b4:
    f2:d5
    Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
  X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
    URI:sip:fluffy@example.com, URI:im:fluffy@example.com,
    URI:pres:fluffy@example.com
  X509v3 Basic Constraints:
    CA:FALSE
  X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
    85:97:09:B8:D3:55:37:24:8A:DC:DE:E3:91:72:E4:22:CF:98:87:52
  X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
    95:45:7E:5F:2B:EA:65:98:12:91:04:F3:63:C7:68:9A:58:16:77:27

  X509v3 Key Usage:
    Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment
  X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
    E-mail Protection, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.20
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
a8:a9:8f:d8:8a:0b:88:ed:ff:4f:bf:e5:cd:8f:9e:7b:b8:e6:
f2:2c:aa:e3:23:5b:9a:71:5e:fd:20:a3:dd:d9:d3:c1:f2:e8:
f0:be:77:db:33:cc:8a:7b:4f:91:2b:8d:d6:f7:14:c3:8d:e0:
60:d3:34:50:bc:be:67:22:cd:f5:74:7b:f4:9a:68:a2:52:2b:
81:2f:46:d3:09:9f:25:c3:20:e8:10:d5:ef:38:7b:d1:17:d4:
f1:d7:54:67:56:f1:13:cf:2f:fc:8b:83:fc:14:e7:01:82:59:
83:cc:b1:8d:f0:c7:da:4e:b1:dc:cc:54:cf:6c:3b:47:47:59:
87:d9:16:ec:af:af:e1:12:13:23:1e:0a:db:f5:b5:ff:5d:ab:
15:0e:e3:25:91:00:0e:90:db:d8:07:11:90:81:01:3a:48:a8:
aa:9e:b0:62:d3:36:f0:0c:b7:2f:a7:17:92:52:36:29:14:0a:
d6:65:86:67:73:74:6e:aa:3c:ee:47:38:1e:c8:6e:06:81:85:
1c:2e:f0:b6:04:7d:6c:38:db:81:9c:b8:07:e3:07:be:f5:2f:
09:68:63:04:6b:87:0e:36:b9:a1:a3:fb:c8:30:0c:a0:63:8d:
6d:ab:0a:f8:44:b0:78:19:1a:38:7e:fa:6a:a1:d4:4b:4b:75:
75:bf:6f:09
```

Versions of these certificates that do not make use of EKU are also included in Appendix B.2

3. Callflow with Message Over TLS

3.1. TLS with Server Authentication

The flow below shows the edited SSLDump output of the host example.com forming a TLS [RFC5246] connection to example.net. In this example mutual authentication is not used. Note that the client proposed three protocol suites including TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA defined in [RFC5246]. The certificate returned by the server contains a Subject Alternative Name that is set to example.net. A detailed discussion of TLS can be found in SSL and TLS [EKR-TLS]. For more details on the SSLDump tool, see the SSLDump Manual [ssldump-manpage].

This example does not use the Server Extended Hello (see [RFC5246]).

New TCP connection #1: example.com(50738) <-> example.net(5061)

```
1 1 0.0004 (0.0004) C>SV3.1(101) Handshake
  ClientHello
    Version 3.1
    random[32]=
      4c 09 5b a7 66 77 eb 43 52 30 dd 98 4d 09 23 d3
      ff 81 74 ab 04 69 bb 79 8c dc 59 cd c2 1f b7 ec
    cipher suites
    TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
    TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
    TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA
    TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
    TLS_DSS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA
    TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
    TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
    TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
    TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
    TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
    TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA
    TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA
    TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
    TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
    TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
    TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
    TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
    TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
    TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
    TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
    TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
    TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
    TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
    TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
```

```

        TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
        TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
        compression methods
            NULL
1 2 0.0012 (0.0007) S>CV3.1(48) Handshake
    ServerHello
    Version 3.1
    random[32]=
        4c 09 5b a7 30 87 74 c7 16 98 24 d5 af 35 17 a7
        ef c3 78 0c 94 d4 94 d2 7b a6 3f 40 04 25 f6 e0
    session_id[0]=

        cipherSuite          TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
        compressionMethod    NULL
1 3 0.0012 (0.0000) S>CV3.1(1858) Handshake
    Certificate
1 4 0.0012 (0.0000) S>CV3.1(14) Handshake
    CertificateRequest
        certificate_types    rsa_sign
        certificate_types    dss_sign
        certificate_types    unknown value
    ServerHelloDone
1 5 0.0043 (0.0031) C>SV3.1(7) Handshake
    Certificate
1 6 0.0043 (0.0000) C>SV3.1(262) Handshake
    ClientKeyExchange
1 7 0.0043 (0.0000) C>SV3.1(1) ChangeCipherSpec
1 8 0.0043 (0.0000) C>SV3.1(48) Handshake
1 9 0.0129 (0.0085) S>CV3.1(170) Handshake
1 10 0.0129 (0.0000) S>CV3.1(1) ChangeCipherSpec
1 11 0.0129 (0.0000) S>CV3.1(48) Handshake
1 12 0.0134 (0.0005) C>SV3.1(32) application_data
1 13 0.0134 (0.0000) C>SV3.1(496) application_data
1 14 0.2150 (0.2016) S>CV3.1(32) application_data
1 15 0.2150 (0.0000) S>CV3.1(336) application_data
1 16 12.2304 (12.0154) S>CV3.1(32) Alert
1 12.2310 (0.0005) S>C TCP FIN
1 17 12.2321 (0.0011) C>SV3.1(32) Alert

```

3.2. MESSAGE Transaction Over TLS

Once the TLS session is set up, the following MESSAGE request (as defined in [RFC3428] is sent from fluffy@example.com to kumiko@example.net. Note that the URI has a SIPS URL and that the VIA indicates that TLS was used. In order to format this document, the <allOneLine> convention from [RFC4475] is used to break long lines. The actual message does not contain the line breaks contained within those tags.

```
MESSAGE sips:kumiko@example.net:5061 SIP/2.0
<allOneLine>
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS 192.0.2.2:15001;
    branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-c785a077a9a8451b-1---d8754z-;
    rport=50738
</allOneLine>
Max-Forwards: 70
To: <sips:kumiko@example.net:5061>
From: <sips:fluffy@example.com:15001>;tag=1a93430b
Call-ID: OTZmMDE2OWNlYTVjNDkzYzBhMWRlMDU4NDExZmU4ZTQ.
CSeq: 4308 MESSAGE
<allOneLine>
Accept: multipart/signed, text/plain, application/pkcs7-mime,
        application/sdp, multipart/alternative
</allOneLine>
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Length: 6
```

Hello!

When a User Agent (UA) goes to send a message to example.com, the UA can see if it already has a TLS connection to example.com and if it does, it may send the message over this connection. A UA should have some scheme for reusing connections as opening a new TLS connection for every message results in awful performance. Implementers are encouraged to read [RFC5923] and [RFC3263].

The response is sent from example.net to example.com over the same TLS connection. It is shown below.

```
SIP/2.0 200 OK
<allOneLine>
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS 192.0.2.2:15001;
    branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-c785a077a9a8451b-1---d8754z-;
    rport=50738
</allOneLine>
To: <sips:kumiko@example.net:5061>;tag=0d075510
From: <sips:fluffy@example.com:15001>;tag=1a93430b
Call-ID: OTZmMDE2OWNlYTVjNDkzYzBhMWRlMDU4NDExZmU4ZTQ.
CSeq: 4308 MESSAGE
Content-Length: 0
```

4. Callflow with S/MIME-secured Message

4.1. MESSAGE Request with Signed Body

Below is an example of a signed message. The values on the Content-Type line (multipart/signed) and on the Content-Disposition line have been broken across lines to fit on the page, but they are not broken across lines in actual implementations.

```
MESSAGE sip:kumiko@example.net SIP/2.0
<allOneLine>
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.0.2.2:15001;
    branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-3a922b6dc0f0ff37-1---d8754z-;
    rport=50739
</allOneLine>
Max-Forwards: 70
To: <sip:kumiko@example.net>
From: <sip:fluffy@example.com>;tag=ef6bad5e
Call-ID: N2NiZjI0NjRjNDQ0MTY1NDRjNWNmMGU1MDA2MDRhYmI.
CSeq: 8473 MESSAGE
<allOneLine>
Accept: multipart/signed, text/plain, application/pkcs7-mime,
        application/sdp, multipart/alternative
</allOneLine>
<allOneLine>
Content-Type: multipart/signed;boundary=3b515e121b43a911;
             micalg=sha1;protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"
</allOneLine>
Content-Length: 774

--3b515e121b43a911
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary

Hello!
--3b515e121b43a911
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature;name=smime.p7s
<allOneLine>
Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required;
                    filename=smime.p7s
</allOneLine>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary

*****
* BINARY BLOB 1 *
*****
--3b515e121b43a911--
```

It is important to note that the signature ("BINARY BLOB 1") is computed over the MIME headers and body, but excludes the multipart boundary lines. The value on the Message-body line ends with CRLF. The CRLF is included in the boundary and is not part of the signature computation. To be clear, the signature is computed over data starting with the "C" in the "Content-Type" and ending with the "!" in the "Hello!".

```
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
```

Hello!

Following is the ASN.1 parsing of encrypted contents referred to above as "BINARY BLOB 1". Note that at address 30, the hash for the signature is specified as SHA-1. Also note that the sender's certificate is not attached as it is optional in [RFC5652].

```

0 472: SEQUENCE {
4   9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER signedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 2)
15 457:  [0] {
19 453:    SEQUENCE {
23   1:      INTEGER 1
26  11:      SET {
28   9:        SEQUENCE {
30   5:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1 (1 3 14 3 2 26)
37   0:          NULL
:           }
:         }
39  11:      SEQUENCE {
41   9:        OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1)
:       }
52 420:    SET {
56 416:      SEQUENCE {
60   1:        INTEGER 1
63 125:        SEQUENCE {
65 112:          SEQUENCE {
67  11:            SET {
69   9:              SEQUENCE {
71   3:                OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
76   2:                PrintableString 'US'
:                 }
:               }
80  19:            SET {
82  17:              SEQUENCE {
84   3:                OBJECT IDENTIFIER
:                  stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8)
89  10:                UTF8String 'California'

```

```

:           }
:           }
101 17:     SET {
103 15:     SEQUENCE {
105  3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER localityName (2 5 4 7)
110  8:     UTF8String 'San Jose'
:         }
:         }
120 14:     SET {
122 12:     SEQUENCE {
124  3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER
:         organizationName (2 5 4 10)
129  5:     UTF8String 'sipit'
:         }
:         }
136 41:     SET {
138 39:     SEQUENCE {
140  3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER
:         organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
145 32:     UTF8String 'Sipit Test Certificate
:         Authority'
:         }
:         }
:         }
179  9:     INTEGER 00 96 A3 84 17 4E EF 8A 4D
:         }
190  9:     SEQUENCE {
192  5:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1 (1 3 14 3 2 26)
199  0:     NULL
:         }
201 13:     SEQUENCE {
203  9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER
:         rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
214  0:     NULL
:         }
216 256:    OCTET STRING
:         74 4D 21 39 D6 E2 E2 2C 30 5A AA BC 4E 60 8D 69
:         A7 E5 79 50 1A B1 7D 4A D3 C1 03 9F 19 7D A2 76
:         97 B3 CE 30 CD 62 4B 96 20 35 DB C1 64 D9 33 92
:         96 CD 28 03 98 6E 2C 0C F6 8D 93 40 F2 88 DA 29
:         AD 0B C2 0E F9 D3 6A 95 2C 79 6E C2 3D 62 E6 54
:         A9 1B AC 66 DB 16 B7 44 6C 03 1B 71 9C EE C9 EC
:         4D 93 B1 CF F5 17 79 C5 C8 BA 2F A7 6C 4B DC CF
:         62 A3 F3 1A 1B 24 E4 40 66 3C 4F 87 86 BF 09 6A
:         7A 43 60 2B FC D8 3D 2B 57 17 CB 81 03 2A 56 69
:         81 82 FA 78 DE D2 3A 2F FA A3 C5 EA 8B E8 0C 36
:         1B BC DC FD 1B 8C 2E 0F 01 AF D9 E1 04 0E 4E 50
:         94 75 7C BD D9 0B DD AA FA 36 E3 EC E4 A5 35 46

```

```

:           BE A2 97 1D AD BA 44 54 3A ED 94 DA 76 4A 51 BA
:           A4 7D 7A 62 BF 2A 2F F2 5C 5A FE CA E6 B9 DC 5D
:           EA 26 F2 35 17 19 20 CE 97 96 4E 72 9C 72 FD 1F
:           68 C1 6A 5C 86 42 F2 ED F2 70 65 4C C7 44 C5 7C
:           }
:         }
:       }
:     }
:   }

```

SHA-1 parameters may be omitted entirely, instead of being set to NULL, as mentioned in [RFC3370]. The above dump of Blob 1 has SHA-1 parameters set to NULL. Below are the same contents signed with the same key, but omitting the NULL according to [RFC3370]. This is the preferred encoding. This is covered in greater detail in Section 5.

```

0 468: SEQUENCE {
4   9:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER signedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 2)
15 453:   [0] {
19 449:     SEQUENCE {
23   1:       INTEGER 1
26   9:       SET {
28   7:         SEQUENCE {
30   5:           OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1 (1 3 14 3 2 26)
:             }
:         }
37  11:       SEQUENCE {
39   9:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1)
:       }
50 418:     SET {
54 414:       SEQUENCE {
58   1:         INTEGER 1
61 125:         SEQUENCE {
63 112:           SEQUENCE {
65  11:             SET {
67   9:               SEQUENCE {
69   3:                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
74   2:                 PrintableString 'US'
:                 }
:             }
78  19:           SET {
80  17:             SEQUENCE {
82   3:               OBJECT IDENTIFIER
:                 stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8)
87  10:               UTF8String 'California'
:             }
:           }

```

```

99 17:          SET {
101 15:          SEQUENCE {
103  3:            OBJECT IDENTIFIER localityName (2 5 4 7)
108  8:            UTF8String 'San Jose'
      :          }
      :          }
118 14:          SET {
120 12:          SEQUENCE {
122  3:            OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      :            organizationName (2 5 4 10)
127  5:            UTF8String 'sipit'
      :          }
      :          }
134 41:          SET {
136 39:          SEQUENCE {
138  3:            OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      :            organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
143 32:            UTF8String 'Sipit Test Certificate
      :              Authority'
      :          }
      :          }
      :          }
177  9:          INTEGER 00 96 A3 84 17 4E EF 8A 4D
      :          }
188  7:          SEQUENCE {
190  5:            OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1 (1 3 14 3 2 26)
      :          }
197 13:          SEQUENCE {
199  9:            OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      :            rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
210  0:            NULL
      :          }
212 256:         OCTET STRING
      :          74 4D 21 39 D6 E2 E2 2C 30 5A AA BC 4E 60 8D 69
      :          A7 E5 79 50 1A B1 7D 4A D3 C1 03 9F 19 7D A2 76
      :          97 B3 CE 30 CD 62 4B 96 20 35 DB C1 64 D9 33 92
      :          96 CD 28 03 98 6E 2C 0C F6 8D 93 40 F2 88 DA 29
      :          AD 0B C2 0E F9 D3 6A 95 2C 79 6E C2 3D 62 E6 54
      :          A9 1B AC 66 DB 16 B7 44 6C 03 1B 71 9C EE C9 EC
      :          4D 93 B1 CF F5 17 79 C5 C8 BA 2F A7 6C 4B DC CF
      :          62 A3 F3 1A 1B 24 E4 40 66 3C 4F 87 86 BF 09 6A
      :          7A 43 60 2B FC D8 3D 2B 57 17 CB 81 03 2A 56 69
      :          81 82 FA 78 DE D2 3A 2F FA A3 C5 EA 8B E8 0C 36
      :          1B BC DC FD 1B 8C 2E 0F 01 AF D9 E1 04 0E 4E 50
      :          94 75 7C BD D9 0B DD AA FA 36 E3 EC E4 A5 35 46
      :          BE A2 97 1D AD BA 44 54 3A ED 94 DA 76 4A 51 BA
      :          A4 7D 7A 62 BF 2A 2F F2 5C 5A FE CA E6 B9 DC 5D
      :          EA 26 F2 35 17 19 20 CE 97 96 4E 72 9C 72 FD 1F

```

```

:           68 C1 6A 5C 86 42 F2 ED F2 70 65 4C C7 44 C5 7C
:           }
:         }
:       }
:     }
:   }

```

4.2. MESSAGE Request with Encrypted Body

Below is an example of an encrypted text/plain message that says "Hello!". The binary encrypted contents have been replaced with the block "BINARY BLOB 2".

```

MESSAGE sip:kumiko@example.net SIP/2.0
<allOneLine>
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.0.2.2:15001;
    branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-c276232b541dd527-1---d8754z-;
    rport=50741
</allOneLine>
Max-Forwards: 70
To: <sip:kumiko@example.net>
From: <sip:fluffy@example.com>;tag=7a2e3025
Call-ID: MDYyMDhhODA3NWE2ZjEyYzAwOTZlMjExNWl2ZWQwZGM.
CSeq: 3260 MESSAGE
<allOneLine>
Accept: multipart/signed, text/plain, application/pkcs7-mime,
        application/sdp, multipart/alternative
</allOneLine>
<allOneLine>
Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required;
                    filename=smime.p7
</allOneLine>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
<allOneLine>
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime;smime-type=enveloped-data;
             name=smime.p7m
</allOneLine>
Content-Length: 565

*****
* BINARY BLOB 2 *
*****

```

Following is the ASN.1 parsing of "BINARY BLOB 2". Note that at address 454, the encryption is set to aes128-CBC.

```

0 561: SEQUENCE {

```

```

4      9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER envelopedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 3)
15  546:  [0] {
19  542:    SEQUENCE {
23    1:      INTEGER 0
26  409:    SET {
30  405:      SEQUENCE {
34    1:        INTEGER 0
37  125:      SEQUENCE {
39  112:        SEQUENCE {
41    11:          SET {
43    9:            SEQUENCE {
45    3:              OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
50    2:                PrintableString 'US'
      :                }
      :              }
54  19:        SET {
56  17:          SEQUENCE {
58    3:            OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      :              stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8)
63  10:              UTF8String 'California'
      :              }
      :            }
75  17:        SET {
77  15:          SEQUENCE {
79    3:            OBJECT IDENTIFIER localityName (2 5 4 7)
84    8:              UTF8String 'San Jose'
      :              }
      :            }
94  14:        SET {
96  12:          SEQUENCE {
98    3:            OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      :              organizationName (2 5 4 10)
103   5:              UTF8String 'sipit'
      :              }
      :            }
110  41:        SET {
112  39:          SEQUENCE {
114    3:            OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      :              organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
119  32:              UTF8String 'Sipit Test Certificate
      :                Authority'
      :              }
      :            }
      :          }
153  9:        INTEGER 00 96 A3 84 17 4E EF 8A 4E
      :      }
164  13:    SEQUENCE {
166  9:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER

```

```

:           rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
177 0:      NULL
:          }
179 256:    OCTET STRING
:          B9 12 8F 32 AB 4A E2 38 C1 E0 53 69 88 D6 25 E7
:          40 03 B1 DE 79 21 A3 E8 23 5A 1B CB FB 58 F4 97
:          48 A7 C8 F0 3D DF 41 A3 5A 90 32 70 82 FA B0 DE
:          D8 94 7C 6C 2E 01 FE 33 BD 62 CB 07 4F 58 DE 6F
:          EA 3F EF B4 FB 46 72 58 9A 88 A0 85 BC 23 D7 C8
:          09 0B 90 8D 4A 5F 3F 96 7C AC D4 E2 19 E8 02 B6
:          0E F3 0D F2 91 4A 67 A9 EE 51 6A 97 D7 86 6D EC
:          78 6E C6 E0 83 7C E1 00 1F 5A 40 59 60 0C D7 EB
:          A3 FB 04 B3 C9 A5 EB 79 ED B3 56 F8 F6 51 B2 5E
:          58 E2 D8 17 28 33 A6 B8 35 8C 0E 14 7F 90 D0 7B
:          03 00 6C 3D 81 29 F5 D7 E5 AC 75 5E E0 F0 DD E3
:          3E B2 06 97 D6 49 A9 CB 38 08 F1 84 05 F5 C0 BC
:          55 A6 D4 C9 D8 FD A4 AC 40 9F 9D 51 5B F7 3A C3
:          C3 CD 3A E7 6D 21 05 D0 50 75 4F 14 D8 77 76 C6
:          13 A6 48 12 7B 25 CC 22 5D 73 BD 40 E4 15 02 A2
:          39 4A CB D9 55 08 A4 EE 4E 8A 5E BA C4 4A 46 9C
:          }
:        }
439 124:    SEQUENCE {
441 9:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1)
452 29:    SEQUENCE {
454 9:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER
:          aes128-CBC (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 2)
465 16:    OCTET STRING
:          CA 35 CA BD 1E 78 83 D9 20 6C 47 B9 9F DC 91 88
:          }
483 80:    [0]
:          1B AE 12 C4 0E 55 96 AB 99 CC 1C 7F B5 98 A4 BF
:          D2 D8 7F 94 BB B5 38 05 59 F2 38 A1 CD 29 75 17
:          1D 63 1B 0B B0 2D 88 06 7F 78 80 F3 5A 3E DC 35
:          BF 22 1E 03 32 59 98 DA FD 81 5F D9 41 63 3A 18
:          FD B5 84 14 01 46 0B 40 EB 56 29 86 47 8B D1 EE
:          }
:        }
:      }
:    }

```

4.3. MESSAGE Request with Encrypted and Signed Body

In the example below, some of the header values have been split across multiple lines. Where the lines have been broken, the <allOneLine> convention has been used. This was only done to make it fit in the RFC format. Specifically, the application/pkcs7-mime

Content-Type line is one line with no whitespace between the "mime;" and the "smime-type". The values are split across lines for formatting, but are not split in the real message. The binary encrypted content has been replaced with "BINARY BLOB 3", and the binary signed content has been replaced with "BINARY BLOB 4".

```
MESSAGE sip:kumiko@example.net SIP/2.0
<allOneLine>
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.0.2.2:15001;
    branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-97a26e59b7262b34-1---d8754z-;
    rport=50742
</allOneLine>
Max-Forwards: 70
To: <sip:kumiko@example.net>
From: <sip:fluffy@example.com>;tag=379f5b27
Call-ID: MjYwMzdjYTY3YWRkYzgzMjU0MGI4Mzc2Njk1YzJlNzE.
CSeq: 5449 MESSAGE
<allOneLine>
Accept: multipart/signed, text/plain, application/pkcs7-mime,
        application/sdp, multipart/alternative
</allOneLine>
<allOneLine>
Content-Type: multipart/signed;boundary=e8df6e1ce5d1e864;
              micalg=sha1;protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"
</allOneLine>
Content-Length: 1455

--e8df6e1ce5d1e864
<allOneLine>
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime;smime-type=enveloped-data;
              name=smime.p7m
</allOneLine>
<allOneLine>
Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required;
                    filename=smime.p7
</allOneLine>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary

*****
* BINARY BLOB 3 *
*****
--e8df6e1ce5d1e864
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature;name=smime.p7s
<allOneLine>
Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required;
                    filename=smime.p7s
</allOneLine>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary

*****
* BINARY BLOB 4 *
*****
--e8df6e1ce5d1e864--
```

Below is the ASN.1 parsing of "BINARY BLOB 3".

```

0 561: SEQUENCE {
4   9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER envelopedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 3)
15 546:  [0] {
19 542:    SEQUENCE {
23  1:      INTEGER 0
26 409:      SET {
30 405:        SEQUENCE {
34  1:          INTEGER 0
37 125:          SEQUENCE {
39 112:            SEQUENCE {
41 11:              SET {
43  9:                SEQUENCE {
45  3:                  OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
50  2:                  PrintableString 'US'
:
:                }
54 19:              SET {
56 17:                SEQUENCE {
58  3:                  OBJECT IDENTIFIER
:                    stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8)
63 10:                  UTF8String 'California'
:
:                }
75 17:              SET {
77 15:                SEQUENCE {
79  3:                  OBJECT IDENTIFIER localityName (2 5 4 7)
84  8:                  UTF8String 'San Jose'
:
:                }
94 14:              SET {
96 12:                SEQUENCE {
98  3:                  OBJECT IDENTIFIER
:                    organizationName (2 5 4 10)
103 5:                  UTF8String 'sipit'
:
:                }
110 41:              SET {
112 39:                SEQUENCE {
114  3:                  OBJECT IDENTIFIER
:                    organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
119 32:                  UTF8String 'Sipit Test Certificate
:                    Authority'
:
:                }
:
:              }
153 9:            INTEGER 00 96 A3 84 17 4E EF 8A 4E

```

```

:           }
164 13:     SEQUENCE {
166  9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER
:           rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
177  0:     NULL
:           }
179 256:    OCTET STRING
:           49 11 0B 11 52 A9 9D E3 AA FB 86 CB EB 12 CC 8E
:           96 9D 85 3E 80 D2 7C C4 9B B7 81 4B B5 FA 13 80
:           6A 6A B2 34 72 D8 C0 82 60 DA B3 43 F8 51 8C 32
:           8B DD D0 76 6D 9C 46 73 C1 44 A0 10 FF 16 A4 83
:           74 85 21 74 7D E0 FD 42 C0 97 00 82 A2 80 81 22
:           9C A2 82 0A 85 F0 68 EF 9A D7 6D 1D 24 2B A9 5E
:           B3 9A A0 3E A7 D9 1D 1C D7 42 CB 6F A5 81 66 23
:           28 00 7C 99 6A B6 03 3F 7E F6 48 EA 91 49 35 F1
:           FD 40 54 5D AC F7 84 EA 3F 27 43 FD DE E2 10 DD
:           63 C4 35 4A 13 63 0B 6D 0D 9A D5 AB 72 39 69 8C
:           65 4C 44 C4 A3 31 60 79 B9 A8 A3 A1 03 FD 41 25
:           12 E5 F3 F8 47 CE 8C 42 D9 26 77 A5 57 AF 1A 95
:           BF 05 A5 E9 47 F2 D1 AEDC 13 7E 1B 83 5C 8C C4
:           1F 31 BC 59 E6 FD 6E 9A B0 91 EC 71 A6 7F 28 3E
:           23 1B 40 E2 C0 60 CF 5E 5B 86 08 06 82 B4 B7 DB
:           00 DD AC 3A 39 27 E2 7C 96 AD 8A E9 C3 B8 06 5E
:           }
:         }
439 124:    SEQUENCE {
441  9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1)
452 29:     SEQUENCE {
454  9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER
:           aes128-CBC (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 2)
465 16:     OCTET STRING
:           88 9B 13 75 A7 66 14 C3 CF CD C6 FF D2 91 5D A0
:           }
483 80:     [0]
:           80 0B A3 B7 57 89 B4 F4 70 AE 1D 14 A9 35 DD F9
:           1D 66 29 46 52 40 13 E1 3B 4A 23 E5 EC AB F9 35
:           A6 B6 A4 BE C0 02 31 06 19 C4 39 22 7D 10 4C 0D
:           F4 96 04 78 11 85 4E 7E E3 C3 BC B2 DF 55 17 79
:           5F F2 4E E5 25 42 37 45 39 5D F6 DA 57 9A 4E 0B
:           }
:         }
:       }
:     }

```

Below is the ASN.1 parsing of "BINARY BLOB 4".

```
0 472: SEQUENCE {
```

```
4      9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER signedData (1 2 840 113549 1 7 2)
15    457: [0] {
19    453:   SEQUENCE {
23      1:     INTEGER 1
26     11:     SET {
28      9:       SEQUENCE {
30      5:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1 (1 3 14 3 2 26)
37      0:         NULL
          :       }
          :     }
39     11:   SEQUENCE {
41      9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER data (1 2 840 113549 1 7 1)
          :     }
52    420:   SET {
56    416:     SEQUENCE {
60      1:       INTEGER 1
63     125:       SEQUENCE {
65     112:         SEQUENCE {
67      11:           SET {
69      9:             SEQUENCE {
71      3:               OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
76      2:               PrintableString 'US'
          :             }
          :           }
80     19:         SET {
82     17:           SEQUENCE {
84      3:             OBJECT IDENTIFIER
          :               stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8)
89     10:             UTF8String 'California'
          :           }
          :         }
101    17:       SET {
103    15:         SEQUENCE {
105     3:           OBJECT IDENTIFIER localityName (2 5 4 7)
110     8:           UTF8String 'San Jose'
          :         }
          :       }
120    14:     SET {
122    12:       SEQUENCE {
124     3:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER
          :           organizationName (2 5 4 10)
129     5:         UTF8String 'sipit'
          :       }
          :     }
136    41:   SET {
138    39:     SEQUENCE {
140     3:       OBJECT IDENTIFIER
          :           organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
```


5. Observed Interoperability Issues

This section describes some common interoperability problems. These were observed by the authors at SIPit interoperability events. Implementers should be careful to verify that their systems do not introduce these common problems, and, when possible, make their clients forgiving in what they receive. Implementations should take extra care to produce reasonable error messages when interacting with software that has these problems.

Some SIP clients incorrectly only do SSLv3 and do not support TLS. See Section 26.2.1 of [RFC3261].

Many SIP clients were found to accept expired certificates with no warning or error. See Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280].

When used with SIP, TLS and S/MIME provide the identity of the peer that a client is communicating with in the Subject Alternative Name in the certificate. The software checks that this name corresponds to the identity the server is trying to contact. Normative text describing path validation can be found in Section 7 of [RFC5922] and Section 6 of [RFC5280]. If a client is trying to set up a TLS connection to good.example.com and it gets a TLS connection set up with a server that presents a valid certificate but with the name evil.example.com, it will typically generate an error or warning of some type. Similarly with S/MIME, if a user is trying to communicate with sip:fluffy@example.com, one of the items in the Subject Alternate Name set in the certificate will need to match according to the certificate validation rules in Section 23 of [RFC3261] and Section 6 of [RFC5280].

Some implementations used binary MIME encodings while others used base64. It is advisable that implementations send only binary and are prepared to receive either. See Section 3.2 of [RFC5621].

In several places in this document, the messages contain the encoding for the SHA-1 digest algorithm identifier. The preferred form for encoding as set out in Section 2 of [RFC3370] is the form in which the optional AlgorithmIdentifier parameter field is omitted. However, [RFC3370] also says the recipients need to be able to receive the form in which the AlgorithmIdentifier parameter field is present and set to NULL. Examples of the form using NULL can be found in Section 4.2 of [RFC4134]. Receivers really do need to be able to receive the form that includes the NULL because the NULL form, while not preferred, is what was observed as being generated by most implementations. Implementers should also note that if the algorithm is MD5 instead of SHA-1, then the form that omits the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field is not allowed and the sender

has to use the form where the NULL is included.

The preferred encryption algorithm for S/MIME in SIP is AES as defined in [RFC3853].

Observed S/MIME interoperability has been better when UAs did not attach the senders' certificates. Attaching the certificates significantly increases the size of the messages, which should be considered when sending over UDP. Furthermore, the receiver cannot rely on the sender to always send the certificate, so it does not turn out to be useful in most situations.

Please note that the certificate path validation algorithm described in Section 6 of [RFC5280] is a complex algorithm for which all of the details matter. There are numerous ways in which failing to precisely implement the algorithm as specified in Section 6 of [RFC5280] can create a security flaw, a simple example of which is the failure to check the expiration date that is already mentioned above. It is important for developers to ensure that this validation is performed and that the results are verified by their applications or any libraries that they use.

6. Additional Test Scenarios

This section provides a non-exhaustive list of tests that implementations should perform while developing systems that use S/MIME and TLS for SIP.

Much of the required behavior for inspecting certificates when using S/MIME and TLS with SIP is currently underspecified. The non-normative recommendations in this document capture the current folklore around that required behavior, guided by both related normative works such as [RFC4474] (particularly, Section 13.4 Domain Names and Subordination) and informative works such as [RFC2818] Section 3.1. To summarize, test plans should:

- o For S/MIME secured bodies, assure that the peer's URI (address-of-record, as per [RFC3261] Section 23.3) appears in the subjectAltName of the peer's certificate as a uniformResourceIdentifier field.
- o For TLS, assure that the peer's hostname appears as described in [RFC5922]. Also:
 - * assure an exact match in a dNSName entry in the subjectAltName if there are any dNSNames in the subjectAltName. Wildcard matching is not allowed against these dNSName entries. See Section 7.1 of [RFC5922].
 - * assure that the most specific CommonName in the Subject field matches if there are no dNSName entries in the subjectAltName at all (which is not the same as there being no matching dNSName entries). This match can be either exact, or against an entry that uses the wildcard matching character '*'

The peer's hostname is discovered from the initial DNS query in the server location process [RFC3263].

- o IP addresses can appear in subjectAltName ([RFC5280]) of the peer's certificate, e.g. "IP:192.168.0.1". Note that if IP addresses are used in subjectAltName, there are important ramifications regarding the use of Record-Route headers that also need to be considered. See Section 7.5 of [RFC5922]. Use of IP addresses instead of domain names is inadvisable.

For each of these tests, an implementation will proceed past the verification point only if the certificate is "good". S/MIME protected requests presenting bad certificate data will be rejected. S/MIME protected responses presenting bad certificate information will be ignored. TLS connections involving bad certificate data will

not be completed.

1. S/MIME : Good peer certificate
2. S/MIME : Bad peer certificate (peer URI does not appear in subjectAltName)
3. S/MIME : Bad peer certificate (valid authority chain does not end at a trusted CA)
4. S/MIME : Bad peer certificate (incomplete authority chain)
5. S/MIME : Bad peer certificate (the current time does not fall within the period of validity)
6. S/MIME : Bad peer certificate (certificate, or certificate in authority chain, has been revoked)
7. S/MIME : Bad peer certificate ("Digital Signature" is not specified as an X509v3 Key Usage)
8. TLS : Good peer certificate (hostname appears in dNSName in subjectAltName)
9. TLS : Good peer certificate (no dNSNames in subjectAltName, hostname appears in CN of Subject)
10. TLS : Good peer certificate (CN of Subject empty, and subjectAltName extension contains an ipAddress stored in the octet string in network byte order form as specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791])
11. TLS : Bad peer certificate (no match in dNSNames or in the Subject CN)
12. TLS : Bad peer certificate (valid authority chain does not end at a trusted CA)
13. TLS : Bad peer certificate (incomplete authority chain)
14. TLS : Bad peer certificate (the current time does not fall within the period of validity)
15. TLS : Bad peer certificate (certificate, or certificate in authority chain, has been revoked)
16. TLS : Bad peer certificate ("TLS Web Server Authentication" is not specified as an X509v3 Key Usage)

17. TLS : Bad peer certificate (Neither "SIP Domain" nor "Any Extended Key Usage" specified as an X509v3 Extended Key Usage, and X509v3 Extended Key Usage is present)

7. IANA Considerations

No IANA actions are required.

8. Acknowledgments

Many thanks to the developers of all the open source software used to create these call flows. This includes the underlying crypto and TLS software used from openssl.org, the SIP stack from www.resiprocate.org, and the SIMPLE IMPP agent from www.sipimp.org. The TLS flow dumps were done with SSLDump from <http://www.rtfm.com/ssldump>. The book "SSL and TLS" [EKR-TLS] was a huge help in developing the code for these flows. It's sad there is no second edition.

Thanks to Jim Schaad, Russ Housley, Eric Rescorla, Dan Wing, Tat Chan, and Lyndsay Campbell who all helped find and correct mistakes in this document.

Vijay Gurbani and Alan Jeffrey contributed much of the additional test scenario content.

9. Security Considerations

Implementers must never use any of the certificates provided in this document in anything but a test environment. Installing the CA root certificates used in this document as a trusted root in operational software would completely destroy the security of the system while giving the user the impression that the system was operating securely.

This document recommends some things that implementers might test or verify to improve the security of their implementations. It is impossible to make a comprehensive list of these, and this document only suggests some of the most common mistakes that have been seen at the SIPit interoperability events. Just because an implementation does everything this document recommends does not make it secure.

This document does not show any messages to check certificate revocation status (see Sections 3.3 and 6.3 of [RFC5280]) as that is not part of the SIP call flow. The expectation is that revocation status is checked regularly to protect against the possibility of certificate compromise or repudiation. For more information on how certificate revocation status can be checked, see [RFC2560] (Online Certificate Status Protocol) and [RFC5055] (Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol).

10. Changelog

(RFC Editor: remove this section)

-02 to -03

- * Re-worded "should" and "must" so that the document doesn't sound like it is making normative statements. Actual normative behavior is referred to in the respective RFCs.
- * Section 5: re-worded paragraphs 4 and 5 regarding subjectAltName, and added references.
- * Section 6: added references, clarified use of IP addresses, and clarified which From/To URI is used for comparison (from section 23.2). Added an EKU test case.
- * Section 9: added text about certificate revocation checking.
- * Appendix B.3: new section to present certificate chains longer than 2 (non-root CA).
- * Made examples consistently use <allOneLine> convention.
- * CSeq looks more random.
- * Serial numbers in certificates are non-zero.
- * All flows re-generated using new certificates. IP addresses conform to RFC 5737.
- * Updated references.

-01 to -02

- * Draft is now informational, not standards track. Normative-sounding language and references to RFC 2119 removed.
- * Add TODO: change "hello" to "Hello!" in example flows for consistency.
- * Add TODO: Fix subjectAltName DNS:com to DNS:example.com and DNS:net to DNS:example.net.
- * Add TODO: use allOneLine convention from RFC4475.
- * Section 3: updated open issue regarding contact headers in MESSAGE.

- * Section 3.2: added some text about RFC 3263 and connection reuse and closed open issue.
- * Section 5: clarified text about sender attaching certs, closed issue.
- * Section 5: clarified text about observed problems, closed issue.
- * Section 5: closed issue about clients vs. servers vs. proxies.
- * Section 6: updated section text and open issue where IP address is in subjectAltName.
- * Section 6: added normative references and closed "folklore" issue.
- * Section 6: added cases about cert usage and broken chains, updated OPEN ISSUE: we need a SIP ECU example.
- * References: updated references to drafts and re-categorized informative vs. normative.
- * Section 9: added some text about revocation status and closed issue.
- * Appendix B: open issue: do we need non-root-CA certs and host certs signed by them for help in testing cases in Section 6?
- * Miscellaneous minor editorial changes.

-00 to -01

- * Addition of OPEN ISSUES.
- * Numerous minor edits from mailing list feedback.

to -00

- * Changed RFC 3369 references to RFC 3852.
- * Changed draft-ietf-sip-identity references to RFC 4474.
- * Added an ASN.1 dump of CMS signed content where SHA-1 parameters are omitted instead of being set to ASN.1 NULL.
- * Accept headers added to messages.

- * User and domain certificates are generated with EKU as specified in Draft SIP EKU.
- * Message content that is shown is computed using certificates generated with EKU.
- * Message dump archive returned.
- * Message archive contains messages formed with and without EKU certificates.

prior to -00

- * Incorporated the Test cases from Vijay Gurbani's and Alan Jeffrey's Use of TLS in SIP draft
- * Began to capture the folklore around where identities are carried in certificates for use with SIP
- * Removed the message dump archive pending verification (will return in -02)

11. References

11.1. Normative References

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- [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.
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- [RFC3370] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
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Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 5621, September 2009.

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- [RFC5922] Gurbani, V., Lawrence, S., and A. Jeffrey, "Domain Certificates in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 5922, June 2010.
- [RFC5923] Gurbani, V., Mahy, R., and B. Tate, "Connection Reuse in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 5923, June 2010.
- [RFC5924] Lawrence, S. and V. Gurbani, "Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) X.509 Certificates", RFC 5924, June 2010.
- [X.509] International Telecommunications Union, "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks", ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2005), ISO/IEC 9594-8:2005.
- [X.683] International Telecommunications Union, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications", ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002), ISO/IEC 8824-4:2002, 2002.

11.2. Informative References

- [EKR-TLS] Rescorla, E., "SSL and TLS - Designing and Building Secure Systems", 2001.
- [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
- [RFC4134] Hoffman, P., "Examples of S/MIME Messages", RFC 4134, July 2005.
- [RFC4475] Sparks, R., Hawrylyshen, A., Johnston, A., Rosenberg, J., and H. Schulzrinne, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Torture Test Messages", RFC 4475, May 2006.
- [RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC 4514, June 2006.

[ssldump-manpage]

Rescorla, E., "SSLDump manpage".

Appendix A. Making Test Certificates

These scripts allow you to make certificates for test purposes. The certificates will all share a common CA root so that everyone running these scripts can have interoperable certificates. WARNING - these certificates are totally insecure and are for test purposes only. All the CA created by this script share the same private key to facilitate interoperability testing, but this totally breaks the security since the private key of the CA is well known.

The instructions assume a Unix-like environment with openssl installed, but openssl does work in Windows too. OpenSSL version 0.9.8j was used to generate the certificates used in this document. Make sure you have openssl installed by trying to run "openssl". Run the makeCA script found in Appendix A.1; this creates a subdirectory called demoCA. If the makeCA script cannot find where your openssl is installed you will have to set an environment variable called OPENSSLDIR to whatever directory contains the file openssl.cnf. You can find this with a "locate openssl.cnf". You are now ready to make certificates.

To create certificates for use with TLS, run the makeCert script found in Appendix A.2 with the fully qualified domain name of the proxy you are making the certificate for. For example, "makeCert host.example.net domain eku". This will generate a private key and a certificate. The private key will be left in a file named domain_key_example.net.pem in Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) format. The certificate will be in domain_cert_example.net.pem. Some programs expect both the certificate and private key combined together in a Public-key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #12 format file. This is created by the script and left in a file named example.net.p12. Some programs expect this file to have a .pfx extension instead of .p12 - just rename the file if needed. A file with a certificate signing request, called example.net.csr, is also created and can be used to get the certificate signed by another CA.

A second argument indicating the number of days for which the certificate should be valid can be passed to the makeCert script. It is possible to make an expired certificate using the command "makeCert host.example.net 0".

Anywhere that a password is used to protect a certificate, the password is set to the string "password".

The root certificate for the CA is in the file root_cert_fluffyCA.pem.

For things that need DER format certificates, a certificate can be

converted from PEM to DER with "openssl x509 -in cert.pem -inform PEM -out cert.der -outform DER".

Some programs expect certificates in PKCS #7 format (with a file extension of .p7c). You can convert these from PEM format to PKCS #7 with "openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile cert.pem -certfile demoCA/cacert.pem -outform DER -out cert.p7c"

IE (version 8), Outlook Express (version 6), and Firefox (version 3.5) can import and export .p12 files and .p7c files. You can convert a PKCS #7 certificate to PEM format with "openssl pkcs7 -in cert.p7c -inform DER -outform PEM -out cert.pem".

The private key can be converted to PKCS #8 format with "openssl pkcs8 -in a_key.pem -topk8 -outform DER -out a_key.p8c"

In general, a TLS client will just need the root certificate of the CA. A TLS server will need its private key and its certificate. These could be in two PEM files, a single file with both certificate and private key PEM sections, or a single .p12 file. An S/MIME program will need its private key and certificate, the root certificate of the CA, and the certificate for every other user it communicates with.

A.1. makeCA script

```
#!/bin/sh
set -x

rm -rf demoCA

mkdir demoCA
mkdir demoCA/certs
mkdir demoCA/crl
mkdir demoCA/newcerts
mkdir demoCA/private
# This is done to generate the exact serial number used for the RFC
echo "4902110184015C" > demoCA/serial
touch demoCA/index.txt

# You may need to modify this for where your default file is
# you can find where yours in by typing "openssl ca"
for D in /etc/ssl /usr/local/ssl /sw/etc/ssl /sw/share/ssl; do
    CONF=${OPENSSLDIR:=$D}/openssl.cnf
    [ -f ${CONF} ] && break
done

CONF=${OPENSSLDIR}/openssl.cnf
```

```
if [ ! -f $CONF ]; then
    echo "Can not find file $CONF - set your OPENSSLDIR variable"
    exit
fi

cp $CONF openssl.cnf

cat >> openssl.cnf <<EOF
[ sipdomain_cert ]
subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME}
basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
keyUsage = nonRepudiation,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment
extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.20

[ sipdomain_req ]
basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME}
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash

[ sipuser_cert ]
subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME}
basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
keyUsage = nonRepudiation,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment
extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.20

[ sipuser_req ]
basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME}
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash

[ sipdomain_noeku_cert ]
subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME}
basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
keyUsage = nonRepudiation,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment

[ sipdomain_noeku_req ]
basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME}
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash

[ sipuser_noeku_cert ]
subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME}
```

```

basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
keyUsage = nonRepudiation,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment

```

```

[ sipuser_noeku_req ]
basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
subjectAltName=\${ENV::ALTNAME}
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash

```

```

EOF

```

```

cat > demoCA/private/cakey.pem <<EOF
-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----
EOF

```

```

cat > demoCA/cacert.pem <<EOF
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

```

```

MIIDtTCCAp2gAwIBAgIJAJa jhBd074pMMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAXCzAJBgNV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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

EOF

uncomment the following lines to generate your own key pair

```

# openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -passin pass:password \
#   -passout pass:password -set_serial 0x96a384174eef8a4c \
#   -sha1 -x509 -keyout demoCA/private/cakey.pem \
#   -out demoCA/cacert.pem -days 36500 -config ${CONF} <<EOF
# US
# California
# San Jose
# sipit
# Sipit Test Certificate Authority
#
#
# EOF

```

```

# either randomly generate a serial number, or set it manually
# hexdump -n 4 -e '4/1 "%04u"' /dev/random > demoCA/serial
echo 96a384174eef8a4d > demoCA/serial

```

```
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile demoCA/cacert.pem \
```

```
-outform DER -out demoCA/cacert.p7c
cp demoCA/cacert.pem root_cert_fluffyCA.pem
```

A.2. makeCert script

```
#!/bin/sh
set -x

# Make a symbolic link to this file called "makeUserCert"
# if you wish to use it to make certs for users.

# ExecName=$(basename $0)
#
# if [ ${ExecName} == "makeUserCert" ]; then
#   ExtPrefix="sipuser"
# elif [ ${ExecName} == "makeEkuUserCert" ]; then
#   ExtPrefix="sipuser_eku"
# elif [ ${ExecName} == "makeEkuCert" ]; then
#   ExtPrefix="sipdomain_eku"
# else
#   ExtPrefix="sipdomain"
# fi

if [ $# == 3 ]; then
  DAYS=36500
elif [ $# == 4 ]; then
  DAYS=$4
else
  echo "Usage: makeCert test.example.org user|domain eku|noeku [days]"
  echo "      makeCert alice@example.org [days]"
  echo "days is how long the certificate is valid"
  echo "days set to 0 generates an invalid certificate"
  exit 0
fi

ExtPrefix="sip"${2}

if [ $3 == "noeku" ]; then
  ExtPrefix=${ExtPrefix}"_noeku"
fi

DOMAIN=`echo $1 | perl -ne '{print "$1\n" if (/(\w+\..*)$/)}'`
```

```
USER=`echo $1 | perl -ne '{print "$1\n" if ((/\w+)\@(\w+\..*)$/)}' `
ADDR=$1
echo "making cert for $DOMAIN ${ADDR}"

if [ $2 == "user" ]; then
    CNVALUE=$USER
else
    CNVALUE=$DOMAIN
fi

rm -f ${ADDR}_*.pem
rm -f ${ADDR}.p12

case ${ADDR} in
*:*) ALTNAME="URI:${ADDR}" ;;
*@*) ALTNAME="URI:sip:${ADDR},URI:im:${ADDR},URI:pres:${ADDR}" ;;
*) ALTNAME="DNS:${DOMAIN},URI:sip:${ADDR}" ;;
esac

rm -f demoCA/index.txt
touch demoCA/index.txt
rm -f demoCA/newcerts/*

export ALTNAME

openssl genrsa -out ${ADDR}_key.pem 2048
openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -reqexts ${ExtPrefix}_req \
    -sha1 -key ${ADDR}_key.pem \
    -out ${ADDR}.csr -days ${DAYS} <<EOF
US
California
San Jose
sipit

${CNVALUE}

EOF

if [ $DAYS == 0 ]; then
openssl ca -extensions ${ExtPrefix}_cert -config openssl.cnf \
    -passin pass:password -policy policy_anything \
    -md sha1 -batch -notext -out ${ADDR}_cert.pem \
    -startdate 990101000000Z \
    -enddate 000101000000Z \
    -infile ${ADDR}.csr
else
```

```
openssl ca -extensions ${ExtPrefix}_cert -config openssl.cnf \  
  -passin pass:password -policy policy_anything \  
  -md sha1 -days ${DAYS} -batch -notext -out ${ADDR}_cert.pem \  
  -infiles ${ADDR}.csr  
fi  
  
openssl pkcs12 -passin pass:password \  
  -passout pass:password -export \  
  -out ${ADDR}.p12 -in ${ADDR}_cert.pem \  
  -inkey ${ADDR}_key.pem -name ${ADDR} -certfile demoCA/cacert.pem  
  
openssl x509 -in ${ADDR}_cert.pem -noout -text  
  
case ${ADDR} in  
  *@*) mv ${ADDR}_key.pem user_key_${ADDR}.pem; \  
        mv ${ADDR}_cert.pem user_cert_${ADDR}.pem ;;  
  *)   mv ${ADDR}_key.pem domain_key_${ADDR}.pem; \  
        mv ${ADDR}_cert.pem domain_cert_${ADDR}.pem ;;  
esac
```

Appendix B. Certificates for Testing

This section contains various certificates used for testing in PEM format.

B.1. Certificates Using EKU

These certificates make use of the EKU specification described in [RFC5924].

Fluffy's user certificate for example.com:

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

Fluffy's private key for user certificate for example.com:

```

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

```

Kumiko's user certificate for example.net:

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIEGTCCAwGgAwIBAgIJAJa jhBd074pOMA0GCSqGSIB3DQEBBQUAMHAXCzAJBgNV
BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHDAhTYW4gSm9zZTEO
MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcG10IFRlc3QgQ2VydG1maWNhdGUg
QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTEwNzE5MzIxN1oYDzIxMTEwMTE0MTkzMjE3WjBWMQsw
CQYDVQQGEWJVVzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcms5pYTERMA8GA1UEBxMIU2FuIEpv
c2UxDjAMBgNVBAoTBXNpcG10MQ8wDQYDVQQDEWZrdW1pa28wggEiMA0GCSqGSIB3
DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQL5odVdA3gFf/MuGIqbMY8Kl7g7kUfexWkpXbT
ptx1xf2D8hzUX8/PUn2XXcTbP019DqA+MkMiX4NNGpDZyeoIrcquKUXK7UQlRoKy
Q6Val1Di jHTqdPTWFIrRhbrUHPjj0WvG1AFPYRRG/IZfRQcH8Aw1w8XSp614mlmY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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

Kumiko's private key for user certificate for example.net:

```

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAy+aHVXQN4BX/zLhiKmzGPCpe405FH3sVpKV206bcZcX9g/Ic
1F/Pz1J9113E2z9NfQ6gPjJDil+DTRqQ2cnqCK3KrilFyu1EJUaCsk0lWtdQ4ox0
6nt01hSK0YW0VIT449FrxtQBT2EURvyGX0UHB/AMNcPF0qeteJtZmPV8C+S7hzYp
gIIwAxzK0pNaG5h8LNLVVPZ1dLdVBTUgNZQN9iWV/NW6ig4N06tR6H7ClNxsKAWR
udO5VRuW3FdgcgOR5whaRXg0w2BNT9felEi4akbSKq8ca+uEhaPQ5z9JmB+nt5Ub
3gGYXSiGwh4BmiqiK+/kmQ5y3Qsig6xUjwv5WwIDAQABAoIBAHCXmrGgRS0xWLBW
PLbKm+iLSRsR14+bqwbG663SHTAB1Yzvu+W2Bo2oMnvMJrEe0o40712J6bJoZzVf
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W0vuVQSYFFX4BhvdXZesyRwCqn3x0pPSff95Ad+vuJd5CYuFZCuyGksZQ3fi+Nia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U11Xg8aaM73rUJLXhW7ZH68rA16jQnI4tpcNW5S/pr5ln0UYI/hXkT7psPIZA08w
OV8lkQKBgQDAgZCYC/6WumGJUerVCzZd/H6+E3ntZmtz273c8+wV89oRtZzUoJY4
bVNrYFs9iKFxLtNGRECEU2VzDXHUAguqe05rbzPudAZ4wSsrNchUyW8LkIXHDckt
pVLs0vhRK2gW/W2I+p2exSPQPt3Uy8tT6IsB9ZbNg/H4D160heHkuQ==
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

```

Domain certificate for example.com:

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIID9DCCAtygAwIBAgIJAJa jhBd074pPMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAXCzAJBgNV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kfc03cYfdOY0NOBNkw8/zpStkdnicrGfHdOlfV7ipFbFsXFNEApdplbmVx9IpVx1
Z+qrNT72tvrB84rBgHEyGGwztfowWwhbhoWwZZ/VFaGRvsjHc41oastSHiZb9h7o4
TgoZBwNLM7E=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

Private key for domain certificate for example.com:

```

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAA3XQGAhDC5wQfvIy2JOeblKNIN4WebYMSHFaa jkix+oaMp4C5
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M3gAULOHBbO5ARpjVWzheuyjB647AoOhaeDD3C1h6bLjs3HIps/a+z6Zx+VxuckX
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asuDuqxU+TiewS0ircrkIyzQmCclfnfBJh5y6GukpUk8HdLLkA29fV3ZJe+Y4ZbL
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aGRCKyzASGANZmqgXCP/pImU+tJb2OCgQ6/3gsxi/191LwtRhFgx/ptYCgZWlpbz
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+Bmd4fBUB9tQOzUC9desRtoK3+wLJKHEPjm/0FxtQqi9ogHEN4e6P9jOwXJNkSsa
GjGUfzQ3Vm2baeNMg7sH8C5mQ9nskDuCzdlVAB2bMp23oPl6cvPIb0E=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

```

Domain certificate for example.net:

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIID9DCCAtygAwIBAgIJAJa jhBd074pQMA0GCSqGSIB3DQEBBQUAMHAXCzAJBgNV
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MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcG10IFRlc3QgQ2VydG1maWNhdGUg
QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTEwNzE5MzIxOFoYDzIxMTEwMTE0MTkzMjE4WjBbMQsw
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c2UxDjAMBGNVBAoTBXNpcG10MRQwEgYDVQQDEWtleGFtcGx1Lm5ldDCCASIwDQYJ
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MBaAFJVFf18r6mWYEpEE82PHaJpYFncnMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIF4DAdBgNVHSUEFjAU
BggrBgEFBQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAXQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAHUzR2H2IWrQ
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YGfy3PzRoAMQmRZieAXArsIxEfkaC4Dtox/D4XLvY7njBFv8H6wqlvQyDsKXWlUH
8dS9i/3wFEpQytymUUEXwk8gzf2yT6hgrX70s6BLy/IeRU+wLJ3k5YZpopQZjDm1
fNQG/O8TJlQ=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

Private key for domain certificate for example.net:

```

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEogIBAAKCAQEA7Cx2A9VI8zB4tawEMdRjclLpWTqm7oqxWDwhYx/WDRNZM9zm
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2VIHwAM9QtWWDpRyE7Tom+sYW3Wf20C0x/kLfx5hgampcGWpk5XxajQanpWWd3gu
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xc8rJ6ddf fmwHnZ83K037aozxujhA99NmUavHQIDAQABAoIBABfBYR2BlpTfi0S6
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PVN4GE0Ms8TTJyvxVkpogQ36VLw/Wr0jUm+Z+dv1TilFWTas8RNmdZHMv0LvFEe
Qu2fTI68l2d/L9GBMUCYa/sucX5E9q+3LC+Qo9jw8ehWjQZsWYER4dsCgYEA8WYX
AqDdKjHRqu2h248gZsuogizq05iuzXhk2VTQoim92mu8m1Htak+eov3/3wojqxuw
TAQbf/t8EfQ7LIGjaKqAua7mgG/aNB6MGGwdpBAPUZDL+DuKfbDbzTOL/IuaW0Fp
40RC0Up5nTU9wzIKB7a6n5S5R0KXxiGUiPhfcGcCgYA6IYdPmziUOfxJ79ZrBUgV
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+SG7Zgkbl46p34WvUbGdMhHGcNsh0+3tJM/jagG1tmzwbWmV7+MwtNT7vI3vH6uJ
EuUkUlbiHsXv53zAbWekHwKBgBy5HwFLCEXbA62o9NdhImPY28YQuClRQ4tjReyu
MNz6AIQayahZiTxbGO8f9fAeDrxvYPzKiFMkI1EnlFrpWf4803DcpMSninklIVpO
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JMMFAoGAHb+k+C4e8WrW+jXbbG/DgAkSokK5vZwZLHeWBig9bEi626xN/ofEQVXp
zqwyNo6zQaofmS6anT6P2M7NclSGJxh27eBTiTLp1NCXlGTWAQEtXmYtnvAZNzXC
5Ur0wvS5bLx0nbhJwN8ZBwzJhYup0kU3pn99GcF+vkj5Eg7Zftg=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

```

B.2. Certificates NOT Using EKU

These certificates do not make use of the EKU specification described in [RFC5924]. Most existing certificates fall in this category.

Fluffy's user certificate for example.com:

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIID+jCCAuKgAwIBAgIJAJa jhBd074pRMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAXCzAJBgNV
BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHDAhTYW4gSm9zZTEO
MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcGl0IFRlc3QgQ2VydGhmaWNhdGUg
QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTEwNzE5MzIxOFoYDzIxMTEwMTE0MTkzMjE4WjBWMQsw
CQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcmlpYTERMA8GA1UEBxMIU2FuIEpv
c2UxDjAMBgNVBAoTBXNpcGl0MQ8wDQYDVQQDEwZmbHVmZnkwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3
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UWQoZS3hQurFidOu4gkCspblzaMoty7lnUexbFxUKdbJOWGmCb2hrezJ+6rWJPK/
bf5YDi jVtVqMRd5lv/Ni5yzteHfrMszWnz3t+ojgak4XTjBJmP2RO0T67GUpEbFV
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RReJYrjoJR/rBDElxbK+ONdFXPlwji/TRPMpvUYraWgtJj18tXISgF1htaa/Y1K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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

Fluffy's private key for user certificate for example.com:

```

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEogIBAAKCAQEaulcjiD+lADV8u+uih4mA8cjQWBBW6Cyb+khLcFFkKGUt4ULq
xYnTruIJArKW5c2jKLcu5Z1HsWxcVCnWyTlhjHAdoa3syfuq8CTyv2xeWA4o1bVa
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mwwEem3+iXW2tiug55pMU+Ua+qGCRyAKWG7m5NvGrAUDehBgQYDxDkUXiWK46CUf
6wQw3tW8SvjXRvz5cIyP00TzKb1GK2loE4ydfLVyEoBdYbWmv2NSmD+/WLP9jzf
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8uP2CgJoDBi5UY2UR97GVK98x8k2Sf6kDT32mQMCgYB/KH3R8VY7jOiKcqtclUWl
J1E3/gB4S+wQ8YELth0FVCP0sDsLuZdlItfRw7OfUraa01k/SHeSifiJdIghN6mz
oDFMQ+7vh47zUWurZPCg95n4nk5ihIkNRlnV9elJTudjLcWS3pFyC2JU3XIObE+n
k66zufFoUuWFSCi2juibqwKBgCT6RHe1JjkDe2FniX8r7D88y/W9wXVtDWgqiE4x
XQ/OfP8A6IjBKtaQ5qcp2zBAXbdZPjc7Veta21A8FvQPXVZCrsAAFXha4413zVsO
WYblLlTI7ZA2yvU8wW/Gnds00zUliTRGX6W+sAY0rll/M8k/tOknA5HfeEYsEbg
Y/w3AoGASjoc9Fjy2aBvH8SQaimn/Rx3hOFR4myOGWtHxrXmezo02YdcMO1d8rlz
A/sQRvVofHRwyoaIkZkALprEGyxEqCdMmEslh9xYAcxfW23Rfqc39DYb9RTrRkwa
ArJmcEdRESOsIYhhXGfElQMgiwj1UXMWeYcLtqQKWiLLDTYYfQE=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

```

Kumiko's user certificate for example.net:

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

Kumiko's private key for user certificate for example.net:

```

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAxP0Fte58Qw7uaL+m9HJhyBR/dyoTW0xMgorIq4uDnlAYgr/X
YEYDwV336yCFUHSJQqA3iw7rB3bAvRHxVr4PqUZS1RA4MHHDtBeQFW6tzCt jY5mu
SNJcKSGtEV2ENCv/6F//o2XmpIRbcv0fcng9Cml1nS0XeirZ3CEros/axYZUwfZR
4OrzSVDffl6J23LO7I12496mXYW+6IqSOD6EJV1XrcrvkswFXujLFOZcC5qUKSM0
HUrCcsWgLFvgLmsbp4Vloj2fPPFDOL142nGbo/BryfMN144CYpUL1bPKI1 jCpwBi
2ke4K0wZhkPdHuvnIO4VrqBgZUANEdIfM1kM+QIDAQABAoIBADuLR+kwp3sVr1cX
Z34IfSofmBALNeKpA4+KJ/JCr7xQ9bfACXhecZAnuWLnZ6TUNRFgoKl2DvEookYE
gHD57n36dcf9KR7rph5xiOoRlJNcoiRfNeFpRNZiCZBwNiAXFLnHGtznVnpwT7xI
axMNqsrU6epi00/quAPkOu5x6e0+j+j3ZauI4EfD1w2R6moBMUtATauZEEyLuC9A
6bFz2AFDchPVLws jNMu0tAJc8Fss8xKls9HUXGS22eUfHxWfkCGwChuW60obGmas
E7GS7h4g9QvvQ4hGSVy9/MmQ88GmT0LynOyzFBCpuwjOQTHwsD674ldMSL4kXYVK
jcnTAKkCgYEA4bjN2ILis3uWTjvTNnrmWn1QoZBZDhg1LuNs5o1XtOJ7CdkckUvs
nqqQYOzNk/9N8vUs12ds3csXHypuuGrJwAVf648RSPDUUQ2X0oPSL9NeuZt5V1fT
1VyVWanKCBZ5sztISNVpt7Pu8DtGLHch4S/7M+gEUQB1Ogz7fyJHvFsCgYEA32mE
6lN67aHkqMLa06ZI9Jik/3SsFIPpjwZ4tk+sQCqEzawPvkt7qF2+U81Vt0XXXJZL
aexsopsULCGS86TEAPoYt jjk91p6ZZj8mgRZLU55g+gRdTpAFhXMgIctU7U6cDIw
SPa6UxJp9XCa/Gf6Ylfas9VBhc/8OC7I4yglLdsCgYEAAG7yuM/CSY3MRrARw8f
f4W9qkIgHtwnP2gjobt jEk8GXOkvcl4QQ9aJoiY6HPZM8hp06kUIuSCzyXGcKF
s33Yzc+Or9zTqzuX3blQA4tNFtlS0POf0En28KhXSirmbXxbG+LmMjNUF6yluSW+
cuQxAli6ye0Gjes63Phl0i0CgYEAuEcILGQpTGMAYWgC93n5Vu6ir+Ix089sgyL
ewlirhakLiWYTsTxsyGHwQKb4i0IWOEHwVp7DPDPPhcs3tCIezhN8Wkm7KtAFj1HO
YZfemsFU99lutPwUKmNWqFlXqOkeR7cOhtDsRWM15Q45uKJnYmmkSptHjYFNsGXe
q4fK40sCgYBoAYtsLfMlqt7s3htx4hZSMFbLP/iMGW2DMMAzDW+Xxsvw86ibrcWY
8c3hbohuJBpyAzba4QoR2G+gtRmodLca+tQFMrObETHFglNCY+WoHRSNRImbCS8w
dsszPgHWflnrXBLBiDFLHZwSqBztLyBjPlHJ+fTiPNo6UTx8aDQ4Pw==
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

```

Domain certificate for example.com:

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIDlTCCAr2gAwIBAgIJAJa jhBd074pTMA0GCSqGSIB3DQEBBQUAMHAXCzAJBgNV
BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHDAhTYW4gSm9zZTEO
MAwGA1UECgwFc2lwaXQxKTAnBgNVBAsMIFNpcGl0IFRlc3QgQ2VydGhmaWNhdGUg
QXV0aG9yaXR5MCAXDTEwNzE5MzIxOVoyDzIxMTEwMTE0MTkzMjE5WjBbMQsw
CQYDVQQGEWJlVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcmlpYTERMA8GA1UEBxMIU2FuIEpv
c2UxDjAMBgNVBAoTBXNpcGl0MRQwEgYDVQQDEWtleGFtcGx1LmNvbTCCASIwDQYJ
KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKEVuYyZlaqfqs9u9yWQRp9WfI+VsQg
GpJH3vAfastElCdxlBV7+R2CaQ/GnXDnE0lAC5SiKRcvPHq50Lx1VnDADMMwmcXBv
wK5nlzN+7MUCy/MISMr7E2Nd+py8Ft3XhjWDIuUl jAh4HDO4fxS/BFy8zozADxvP
Ofpe40EABF5a j7e+xjtkErdkMybAcSYyo53IHP3wDPxmMzCsOw/fi8bfy9 j1GiUD
uz01F9qT/Opz9K1snxgT1IK6GRlktG4JawSiohW1QbARf j9//hr7ZgeB0g06LLGX
cGXdl87JdA4ZHMZNinN4Cv8ctZYSQZ3dbtlpRRbGtq7elPskiinDuUkCAwEAaA0B
hDCBgTANBgNVHREEIDAeggtleGFtcGx1LmNvbYYPc2lwOmV4YWlwbGUuY29tMAkG
A1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFNu6 jHPsItA+vy/Jqv81MW7wLJpMB8GA1UdIwQY
MBaAFJVFf18r6mWYEpEE82PHaJpYFncnMASGA1UdDwQEAWIF4DANBgkqhkiG9w0B
AQUFAAOCAQEANH+wX56VJd0vVB9+MeflxItWrSQUyNYZZCBq+y/5vIoOp6Chaupn
xjTjwf50zg6CK8yKBWq8pG1G45GTUx+uCx+nVibHpyTT5+YDDUz1IhhAUzIOOB33
Fd/XI/1PK5p5ftuJIYXU0rGuaoH8ud/p2nhIf9mwicUHxViTX3PUw1FC7eMbevBo
8/dMYnHb2i40ug6hsiYggsmQDbhHLVLo/yqkpvzPLSSlkXS4sv2oIoJ/ISuSjhP
QkQ7mh7h01ct/LOa53qWfbCVogQDhMEqPTVdPm+JzTrMlWeZdrk4KbnXGp64Jtptu
xTVI4GcVAGWUT0cmpspDmHbPOKm5kcltkg==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

Private key for domain certificate for example.com:

```

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

```

Domain certificate for example.net:

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIDlTCCAr2gAwIBAgIJAJa jhBdO74pUMA0GCSqGSIB3DQEBBQUAMHAXCzAJBgNV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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

Private key for domain certificate for example.net:

```

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAgbHyDUpucZfZgQ5etuh3altHR+mRhZXS7+0hYd12X4AIuWq
o08pKYirAAVtna5/tL3k6ReGSBEkbDcG6B+1QlLvMOGpWqJ2A8sxQ+t3OkVrN6H8
DAGNzTA0HP/q2RReubvL8XDDNoKgrD7xCbghufYTds2paWaLIo5edi3gsabLonl7
riF9DdWp7TN7lx8spykFuMX9MXvm6lucfbnMTQL+jVv7HV93DIOOwfQ034DVkWs j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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

```

B.3. Certificate Chaining with a Non-Root CA

Following is a certificate for a non-root CA in example.net. The certificate was signed by the root CA shown in Section 2.1. As indicated in Sections 4.2.1.9 and 4.2.1.3 [RFC5280], "cA" is set in Basic Constraints, and "keyCertSign" is set in Key Usage. This identifies the certificate holder as a signing authority.

```

Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
    96:a3:84:17:4e:ef:8a:52
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit,
        OU=Sipit Test Certificate Authority
Validity
    Not Before: Feb  7 20:21:13 2011 GMT
    Not After  : Jan 14 20:21:13 2111 GMT
Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit,
        OU=Test CA for example.net, CN=example.net
Subject Public Key Info:

```

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)

Modulus (2048 bit):

```
00:d4:46:65:51:f8:84:1c:b5:93:47:a5:15:14:06:
ec:dc:2a:77:93:11:5e:75:14:d2:88:54:bd:16:50:
dd:41:3f:7e:2a:e4:26:d5:a3:33:b0:5e:37:1d:e5:
96:37:1c:1c:69:80:a4:ef:fd:22:78:d7:ce:d3:c3:
de:96:fb:87:30:88:bc:06:14:80:5d:f3:ab:d7:64:
3e:07:31:dc:97:c5:d6:19:26:bc:7d:0b:f8:de:5e:
f9:0f:dc:9a:45:0f:28:8d:dd:fa:15:56:d5:35:17:
28:80:d2:fc:1f:d6:95:95:42:0e:2c:47:38:53:ad:
fd:0e:24:fd:a3:43:33:83:52:65:54:da:48:d8:dc:
86:42:d5:26:ac:1d:52:54:08:52:e5:3f:4a:76:95:
77:8d:c6:f2:33:f0:18:87:c8:fc:5b:54:5d:dd:65:
f1:5c:f5:c8:f4:36:54:8a:b6:7b:6f:f8:55:f8:d8:
d8:df:a9:7b:40:45:4c:92:0f:aa:b2:2c:a1:a8:64:
d5:99:22:1e:28:78:a0:d8:e5:51:64:3f:03:14:a9:
12:47:61:84:d6:b0:69:1a:6b:a3:6e:d8:ca:ce:43:
50:ad:57:96:2b:87:15:d9:c2:11:03:b0:82:d4:f0:
80:bf:dd:44:f4:f6:39:0a:2b:e3:4d:d3:f5:e7:aa:
34:e5
```

Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Basic Constraints:

CA:TRUE

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

72:70:CF:66:1E:23:A5:38:FC:6F:40:8F:86:8A:AF:E0:B9:6F:E9:C3

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

95:45:7E:5F:2B:EA:65:98:12:91:04:F3:63:C7:68:9A:58:16:77:27

X509v3 Key Usage:

Certificate Sign

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption

```
70:73:c0:65:9c:2f:09:39:39:d6:a4:5b:95:e7:7b:43:34:b5:
b9:b2:5d:76:eb:ef:87:e0:25:b6:68:ab:ee:f8:f7:85:c4:21:
47:bb:6c:68:62:ff:f8:84:1e:44:5a:30:4e:ce:97:91:cc:3d:
43:4a:8b:b7:25:26:08:63:c6:71:4a:c1:94:35:81:66:de:23:
9d:e3:37:de:31:80:ed:58:b7:07:a7:ea:87:d3:cc:da:1b:62:
c9:82:c2:17:e6:2d:20:e4:b2:69:14:cb:05:43:34:6f:b5:2c:
60:d8:44:43:f9:e6:e9:3d:7c:54:a2:b9:d9:1e:7d:67:bb:3f:
32:31:0d:c1:88:78:a8:67:39:f5:d2:3e:08:f7:38:84:a6:8f:
c2:3e:00:ce:5f:b4:c8:da:a1:b5:2f:c2:89:60:a4:3a:2b:be:
98:e0:44:34:af:ec:7f:73:26:f1:94:5b:39:09:b9:9f:93:c2:
9d:7a:96:2f:82:66:c8:4d:f6:db:87:00:8e:bc:2a:b9:51:73:
6c:cc:ff:e5:31:25:b1:4a:d0:9a:a9:c3:65:35:21:89:76:3d:
39:f8:84:42:a6:03:0e:b5:c9:2f:5d:18:bc:9d:b9:82:f6:83:
dd:2b:29:6c:8d:2c:8c:47:d4:7d:be:de:32:13:85:92:32:bc:
61:62:6b:e5
```

Robert's certificate was signed by the non-root CA in example.net:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

96:a3:84:17:4e:ef:8a:53

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit,
OU=Test CA for example.net,
CN=example.net

Validity

Not Before: Feb 7 20:21:13 2011 GMT

Not After : Jan 14 20:21:13 2111 GMT

Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=sipit, CN=robert

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)

Modulus (2048 bit):

00:d3:dc:14:69:6b:71:09:2c:0b:0f:9d:95:08:c1:
64:20:66:ef:9f:9c:30:06:30:39:eb:14:16:da:19:
cc:41:4d:b1:cf:f8:53:5b:a5:0d:76:ec:97:ba:16:
10:9f:ed:57:b5:fb:6d:4b:9f:8f:d0:9f:0e:15:a7:
3e:88:c4:e4:ef:35:d1:63:91:20:68:18:f4:8e:3b:
b4:0f:03:3e:a0:00:d6:c3:26:e7:57:8e:21:92:a3:
7a:2d:21:44:48:db:01:b9:54:e8:dc:d6:e3:d1:b3:
f2:4b:26:0f:3f:d4:99:63:e4:7e:14:0a:b2:73:1c:
5f:3b:41:36:e9:9a:70:be:f7:4f:08:6b:4a:db:44:
02:e8:bb:50:66:2c:98:94:45:9e:7e:01:0e:9d:c3:
a9:03:b7:28:15:28:c3:cd:a2:ad:ab:07:f6:ff:69:
f4:ec:ba:7f:4b:bd:9b:28:8c:0d:87:e2:66:d1:24:
34:e5:77:be:89:f1:c9:76:4c:37:34:3a:bc:d9:9c:
36:f5:28:60:01:29:5c:f4:1e:7a:15:19:34:81:1c:
cf:1a:06:5c:0f:f9:81:67:dc:50:09:e2:a8:d7:9d:
9f:35:6e:ff:a6:a8:80:74:6c:f8:a1:0a:f3:bb:2b:
b6:51:8c:21:bc:06:72:59:d0:95:42:d3:02:2c:ce:
f9:23

Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:

URI:sip:robert@example.net, URI:im:robert@example.net,
URI:pres:robert@example.net

X509v3 Basic Constraints:

CA:FALSE

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

A6:42:BD:62:0D:6B:BF:EE:67:D4:C7:BC:09:3F:0B:3A:12:AB:19:CE

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

72:70:CF:66:1E:23:A5:38:FC:6F:40:8F:86:8A:AF:E0:B9:6F:E9:C3

X509v3 Key Usage:


```

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

```

Robert's certificate:

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIEJjCCAw6gAwIBAgIJAJaJhBd074pTMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMH0xCzAJBgNV
BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlhMREwDwYDVQQHEWhTYW4gSm9zZTEO
MAwGA1UEChMfc2lwaXQxIDAeBgNVBAStF1Rlc3QgQ0EgZm9yIGV4YW1wbGUubmV0
MRQwEgYDVQQDEWtleGFtcGxlLm5ldDAgFw0xMTAyMDcyMDIxMTNaGA8yMTEExMDEx
NDIwMjExMlowVjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAGTCkNhbgG1mb3JuaWEExETAP
BgNVBACTCFNhbiBkb3NlMQ4wDAYDVQQKEVZaXBPdDEPMA0GA1UEAxMGcm9iZXJ0
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAA09wUaWtxCSwLD52VCMFk
IGbvn5wWbja56xQW2hnMQU2xz/hTW6UNduyXuhYQn+1XtfttS5+P0J8OFac+iMTk
7zXRY5Egabj0jju0DwM+oADWwybnV44hkqN6LSFESNsBuVTo3Nbj0bPySyYPP9SZ
Y+R+FAqycxxf00E26ZpwvvdPCGtK20QC6LtQZiyYlEWefgEOncOpA7coFSjdZaKt
qwf2/2n07Lp/S72bKIwNh+Jm0SQ05Xe+ifHJdkw3NDq82Zw29ShgASlc9B56FRk0
gRzPGgZcD/mBZ9xQCeKo152fNW7/pqiAdGz4oQrzuyu2UYwhvAZyWdCVQtMCLM75
IwIDAQBo4HNMIHKMFEGA1UdeEQRKMEiGFNnpcDpyb2JlcnRAZXhbbXBsZS5uZXSG
FWltOnJvYmVydEbleGFtcGxlLm5ldIYXCHJlczyb2JlcnRAZXhbbXBsZS5uZXQw
CQYDVR0TBAlwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpkK9Yg1rv+5n1Me8CT8LohKrGc4wHwYDVR0j
BBgwFoAUcnDPZh4jpTj8b0CPhoqv4Llv6cMwCwYDVR0PBAQDAGXgMB0GA1UdJQQW
MBQGCCsGAQUFBwMEBggrBgEFBQcDFDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAJZnqGh6W
bU6xnFpDd+o6p6G3Itu5lJoeF/cTLrLKgN3JpdthQcaLZa40/JpGdxbg4j0dIDz1
leC4A0FP52m/4EzdzMRRsdovrVjh7cZbBoer5qJzb5gPJowUX+ZWmtcjlrUuM61
izF0cLPMXASQ2I22dVX7wdjo2889gOSNL365K6Kenx5v0E5u9/CmYTuem0t4a4Q3
rZMZDX9GWhh0iYuoGnW/298lQ0tXq6EZLnx7ubVQ7ywfXBiPbGaDYesloyGBLGE7
7owYGomaKQ1cWzjzcT1h8D+AM5DyYFNI+3plyV8fo+h1QkLlrdtgKcYPPGgAeis4
28cXuU7YkNhSvA==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

Robert's private key:

```
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
```

Appendix C. Message Dumps

This section contains a base64 encoded gzipped, compressed tar file of various Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) messages used in this document. Saving the data in a file foo.tgz.b64 then running a command like "openssl base64 -d -in foo.tgz.b64 | tar xzf -" would recover the CMS messages and allow them to be used as test vectors.

-- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE --

H4sIAIpaUE0CA+ybeUATxx7HCSCIHIpqSIQvFECu5tsDhAEDATQhCsQExTZ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MrHrwd92p8EQoopRoAM/PmwcK0lURWlffsPbN+2BwzW33rxfh79xkxbtOFAK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H1KtuBdqepaMG+w9Fn8y8krfg0ZDhjr1PcK2W385634htWhFRL3aEne7xP2b
u4blewyC5s1GzZ/Pt/LaHLkhZNaNd2YF9k604RuOKkWaQTtOVP5UOGTKnAvB
MxPUO5e9HvBypdfIE7tcIT/uSkud8v/A/2/kfyP7US1PES9Xofx2VgBt8R/C

k5rxn6it6uJ/J+A/SsaDFDJERPB8PpEIEFvhP9wh/Af5EB8gkD7hv8gXr5X7
 AIMZDdIlgQCbfALVatEgg+YXxWCFxPmz6ABd5B3F0PA+8B8PEYF/iv//A9L+
 FNHagm6DLZfG1UGlvcQVlcaiYpkc5e00SwTyKYklf1QSMBFupKYu+BGJepnJ
 ugOlVTa6GB0tHVdo6bhUe/hP0zGoBSjuo1ZeP9XrMm7+knrDUIfaOa jut iR+
 1V3a4n2njLBOoePccHmXneaWvBez59noD3vlpzFMfBpaqZd229hH1D1sCMOD
 o7vxgaEUfRl33svcUzD95IYZc0PDjqzPej56ZblXwcnKhcJdgUOTVdhizi77
 bUfNr48KjZ0gsN+jCs1aBizgpe9Q7xylet+m11+dHXyROEVgrS800f1457vt
 tW/N3Q5gfpyvd9ku0U6j/7Vmh5GqICyAIApP8JwVysod4jd9p/skL/eTD49W
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