

DRAFT-ABFAB-GSS-EAP

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CHANGES SINCE 00

- Defined name format for GSS-EAP names
- Defined requirements for EAP mechanisms
- Defined interactions with channel binding

NAME FORMAT

- Mostly compatible with Kerberos
- Compatible with NAI for usernames

```
service-specifics = service-specific 0* ( '/' service-specifics )  
name = user-or-service '/' host [ '/' service-specifics ] [ '@'  
    realm ]
```

EAP METHOD REQUIREMENTS

- Dictionary attack resistance always required
- When per-message services are requested key derivation is required.
- When mutual authentication is requested:
 - Mutual auth is required
 - Channel binding is required

CHANGES REQUIRED

- Empty target_name
- Server name indication
- Requirement: extensible tokens

PROPOSED SOLUTION

- TLV encoding for each token
- State machine manages what tokens are allowed at each state
- Tokens to send acceptor names

REQUIREMENT FOR MIC

- Should we have integrity protection over the entire exchange
- If so, problematic for partial contexts and constrained clients
- Extension requiring protection: GSS flags to acceptor