

GDOI Update
Draft -08

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What Happened?

- Draft -07 completed WG last call following Beijing
 - Vincent provided us with a comprehensive review
 - IANA discovered some minor issues with the *GDOI Payloads* registry
 - Authors discovered some issues with the counter mode logic
 - Cleaned up the Security Considerations text
- Draft -08 was published in early March

Miscellaneous

- Added an *Acronyms and Abbreviations* section to increase reading comprehension.
- Moved sections not critical to understanding the protocol to Appendices
 - Requirements on extending the protocol
 - Discussion of applications
- Made terminology consistent
 - (GM, GCKS) replaces (Initiator, Receiver) everywhere now

Additions

- Centralized the GCKS counter modes procedures in Section 3.5 *Counter-modes of operation*
- Added Section 7.4.2 *Backward Access Control Requirements* section
- Added Section 7.5 *Derivation of keying material* section clarifying requirements on keying material

IANA Changes

- Improper IANA terms used
- Many namespaces are 2-byte values, yet only values 0-255 was described.

Type	Value
-----	-----
RESERVED	0
KEK_ALG_DES	1
KEK_ALG_3DES	2
KEK_ALG_AES	3
Standards Action	4-127
Private Use	128-255
Unassigned	256-32767

Allocation of SIDs (old)

- In -07 a GM would request Sender ID (SID) values in the 2nd message using a GAP payload
 - This was before it knew whether or not there would be counter modes in the policy
 - This is awkward: does it predict that needs SIDs, and if so how many?
- There are two cases where a GM might want more than 1 SID
 - It has a high-speed interface and will burn through its sequence number too quickly
 - It will be installing SAs in >1 encryption engine

Allocation of SIDs (new)

- Upon receipt of the SA payload, the GM now detects the use of a counter mode. It then can determine how many SIDs it might need. If it needs more than 1, it will add a GAP payload requesting that many.
- Upon receipt of the GAP payload, the GCKS allocates the requested # of SIDs, and returns them in the KD payload. Otherwise, it returns one SID in the KD payload

Group Member		GCKS
-----		----
HDR*, HASH(1), Ni, ID	-->	
	<--	HDR*, HASH(2), Nr, SA
HDR*, HASH(3) [,GAP]	-->	
	<--	HDR*, HASH(4), [SEQ,] KD

Allocation of SIDs (GCKS)

- Recall: an SID *must* be allocated to one GM only, and the GCKS *must* do so reliably.
- We clarified the allocation method in the draft, *keeping it simple*.
- Claim:
“Using the method [on the next slide], at no time can two group members use the same IV values with the same Data-Security SA key.”

Allocation of SIDs (GCKS details)

1. Initialize a counter to 0
2. Increment the counter once per SID.
3. Give each sender 1 SID, or as many as they require
4. Allocate an SID in every GROUPKEY-PULL
5. When the SID counter reaches its last value, reset to 0, create new SAs, delete old SAs, distribute new SAs
6. In a rekey, send a DELETE to delete all old SAs, which causes GMs to re-register and get new SIDs and new SAs.

Next Steps

- Re-review
- Send to AD