Abstract

This document describes the use of the Security Assertion Mark-up Language (SAML) with RADIUS in the context of the ABFAB architecture. It defines two RADIUS attributes, a SAML binding, a SAML name identifier format, two SAML profiles, and two SAML confirmation methods. The RADIUS attributes permit encapsulation of SAML assertions and protocol messages within RADIUS, allowing SAML entities to communicate using the binding. The two profiles describe the application of this binding for ABFAB authentication and assertion query/request, enabling a Relying Party to request authentication of, or assertions for, users or machines (Clients). These Clients may be named using a NAI name identifier format. Finally, the subject confirmation methods allow requests and queries to be issued for a previously authenticated user or machine without needing to explicitly identify them as the subject. The use of the artifacts defined in this document is not exclusive to ABFAB. They can be applied in any AAA scenario, such as the network access control.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ............................................. 3
   1.1. Terminology ......................................... 4
2. Conventions .............................................. 5
3. RADIUS SAML Attributes .................................... 5
   3.1. SAML-Assertion attribute .............................. 5
   3.2. SAML-Protocol attribute .............................. 6
4. SAML RADIUS Binding ....................................... 7
   4.1. Required Information .................................. 7
   4.2. Operation ............................................ 7
   4.3. Processing of names ................................... 9
   4.3.1. AAA names .......................................... 9
   4.3.2. SAML names ......................................... 9
   4.3.3. Mapping of AAA names in SAML metadata .............. 10
   4.3.4. Example of SAML metadata including AAA names .... 12
   4.4. Use of XML Signatures ................................ 13
   4.5. Metadata Considerations ............................... 13
5. Network Access Identifier Name Identifier Format .......... 13
6. RADIUS State Confirmation Method Identifiers .............. 13
7. ABFAB Authentication Profile ............................. 14
   7.1. Required Information ................................ 14
   7.2. Profile Overview ..... ............................... 14
   7.3. Profile Description ................................ 16
   7.3.1. Client Request to Relying Party .................... 16
   7.3.2. Relying Party Issues <saml:AuthnRequest> to Identity
          Provider ............................................. 16
   7.3.3. Identity Provider Identifies Client ............... 17
   7.3.4. Identity Provider Issues <samlp:Response> to Relying
          Party ................................................ 17
   7.3.5. Relying Party Grants or Denies Access to Client ... 17
1. Introduction

Within the ABFAB (Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond web) architecture [I-D.ietf-abfab-arch] it is often desirable to convey Security Assertion Mark-up Language (SAML) assertions and protocol messages.

SAML typically only considers the use of HTTP-based transports, known as bindings [OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os], which are primarily intended for use with the SAML V2.0 Web Browser Single Sign-On Profile [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os]. However the goal of ABFAB is to extend the applicability of federated identity beyond the Web to other applications by building on the AAA framework. Consequently there exists a requirement for SAML to integrate with the AAA framework and protocols such as RADIUS [RFC2865] and Diameter [RFC6733], in addition to HTTP.

In summary this document specifies:
o Two RADIUS attributes to encapsulate SAML assertions and protocol messages respectively.

o A SAML RADIUS binding that defines how SAML assertions and protocol messages can be transported by RADIUS within a SAML exchange.

o A SAML name identifier format in the form of a Network Access Identifier.

o A profile of the SAML Authentication Request Protocol that uses the SAML RADIUS binding to effect SAML-based authentication and authorization.

o A profile of the SAML Assertion Query And Request Protocol that uses the SAML RADIUS binding to effect the query and request of SAML assertions.

o Two SAML Subject Confirmation Methods for indicating that a user or machine client is the subject of an assertion.

This document adheres to the guidelines stipulated by [OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os] and [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os] for defining new SAML bindings and profiles respectively, and other conventions applied formally or otherwise within SAML. In particular, this document provides a 'Required Information' section for the binding and profiles that enumerate:

o A URI that uniquely identifies the protocol binding or profile.

o Postal or electronic contact information for the author.

o A reference to previously defined bindings or profiles that the new binding updates or obsoletes.

o In the case of a profile, any SAML confirmation method identifiers defined and/or utilized by the profile.

1.1. Terminology

This document uses terminology from a number of related standards, which tend to adopt different terms for similar or identical concepts. In general the document uses, when possible, the ABFAB term for the entity, as described in [I-D.ietf-abfab-arch]. For reference we include this table which maps the different terms into a single view.
Table 1. Terminology

2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. RADIUS SAML Attributes

The RADIUS SAML binding defined in Section 4 of this document uses two attributes to convey SAML assertions and protocol messages [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]. Owing to the typical size of these structures, these attributes use the Long Extended Type format [RFC6929] to encapsulate their data. RADIUS entities MUST NOT include both attributes in the same RADIUS message, as they represent exclusive alternatives to convey SAML information.

3.1. SAML-Assertion attribute

This attribute is used to encode a SAML assertion. The following figure represents the format of this attribute.

Howlett, et al.
Expires July 14, 2016
245 (To be confirmed by IANA)

Length

>= 5

Extended-Type

TBD1

M (More)

As described in [RFC6929].

Reserved

As described in [RFC6929].

Value

One or more octets encoding a SAML assertion.

3.2. SAML-Protocol attribute

This attribute is used to encode a SAML protocol message. The following figure represents the format of this attribute.

```
+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
|     Type       |     Length     | Extended-Type  |     M        |     Reserved   |
|----------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+---------------|
+----------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+---------------|
|     Value...   |----------------+----------------+-------------+---------------|
+----------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+---------------|
```

Figure 2: SAML-Protocol format

Type

245 (To be confirmed by IANA)

Length

>= 5

Extended-Type

TBD2
M (More)

As described in [RFC6929].

Reserved

As described in [RFC6929].

Value

One or more octets encoding a SAML protocol message.

4. SAML RADIUS Binding

The SAML RADIUS binding defines how RADIUS [RFC2865] can be used to enable a RADIUS client and server to exchange SAML assertions and protocol messages.

4.1. Required Information

Identification: urn:ietf:params:abfab:bindings:radius

Contact information: iesg@ietf.org

Updates: None.

4.2. Operation

In this specification, the Relying Party MUST trust any statement in the SAML messages from the IdP in the same way that it trusts information contained in RADIUS attributes. These entities MUST trust the RADIUS infrastructure to provide integrity of the SAML messages.

Hence, it is REQUIRED that the RADIUS exchange is protected using TLS encryption for RADIUS [RFC6614] to provide confidentiality and integrity protection, unless alternative methods to ensure them are used, such as IPSEC tunnels or a sufficiently secure internal network.

Implementations of this profile can take advantage of mechanisms to permit the transport of longer SAML messages over RADIUS transports, such as the Support of fragmentation of RADIUS packets [RFC7499] or Larger Packets for RADIUS over TCP [I-D.ietf-radext-bigger-packets].

There are two system models for the use of SAML over RADIUS. The first is a request-response model, using the RADIUS SAML-Protocol
attribute defined in Section 3 to encapsulate the SAML protocol messages.

1. The RADIUS client, acting as a Relying Party (RP), transmits a SAML request element within a RADIUS Access-Request message. This message MUST include a single instance of the RADIUS User-Name attribute whose value MUST conform to the Network Access Identifier [RFC7542] scheme. The Relying Party MUST NOT include more than one SAML request element.

2. The RADIUS server, acting as an Identity Provider (IdP), returns a SAML protocol message within a RADIUS Access-Accept or Access-Reject message. These messages necessarily conclude a RADIUS exchange and therefore this is the only opportunity for the Identity Provider to send a response in the context of this exchange. The Identity Provider MUST NOT include more than one SAML response. An IdP that refuses to perform a message exchange with the Relying Party can silently discard the SAML request (this could subsequently be followed by a RADIUS Access-Reject, as the same conditions that cause the IdP to discard the SAML request may also cause the RADIUS server to fail to authenticate).

The second system model permits a RADIUS server acting as an Identity Provider to use the RADIUS SAML-Assertion attribute defined in Section 3 to encapsulate an unsolicited SAML assertion. This attribute MUST be included in a RADIUS Access-Accept message. When included, the attribute MUST contain a single SAML assertion.

RADIUS servers MUST NOT include both the SAML-Protocol and the SAML-Assertion attribute in the same RADIUS message. If an IdP is producing a response to a SAML request, then the first system model is used. An IdP MAY ignore a SAML request and send an unsolicited assertion using the second system model using the RADIUS SAML-Assertion attribute.

In either system model, Identity Providers SHOULD return a RADIUS state attribute as part of the Access-Accept message so that future SAML queries or requests can be run against the same context of an authentication exchange.

This binding is intended to be composed with other uses of RADIUS, such as network access. Therefore, other arbitrary RADIUS attributes MAY be used in either the request or response.

In the case of a SAML processing error, the RADIUS server MAY include a SAML response message with an appropriate value for the <samlp:Status> element within the Access-Accept or Access-Reject
packet to notify the client. Alternatively, the RADIUS server can respond without a SAML-Protocol attribute.

4.3. Processing of names

SAML entities using profiles making use of this binding will typically possess both the SAML and AAA names of their correspondents. Frequently these entities will need to apply policies using these names; for example, when deciding to release attributes. Often these policies will be security-sensitive, and so it is important that policy is applied on these names consistently.

4.3.1. AAA names

These rules relate to the processing of AAA names by SAML entities using profiles making use of this binding.

- Identity Providers SHOULD apply policy based on the Relying Party’s identity associated with the RADIUS Access-Request.

- Relying Parties SHOULD apply policy based on the NAI realm associated with the RADIUS Access-Accept.

4.3.2. SAML names

These rules relate to the processing of SAML names by SAML entities using profiles making use of this binding.

Identity Providers MAY apply policy based on the Relying Party’s SAML entityId. In such cases, at least one of the following methods is required in order to establish a relation between the SAML name and the AAA name of the Relying Party:

- RADIUS client identity in trusted SAML metadata (as described in section Section 4.1.3).

- RADIUS client identity in trusted digitally signed SAML request.

A digitally signed SAML request without the RADIUS client identity is not sufficient, since a malicious RADIUS entity can observe a SAML message and include it in a different RADIUS message without the consent of the issuer of that SAML message. If an Identity Provider were to process the SAML message without confirming that it applied to the RADIUS message, inappropriate policy would be used.

Relying Parties MAY apply policy based on the SAML issuer’s <entityId>. In such cases, at least one of the following methods is
required in order to establish a relationship between the SAML name and the AAA name of the Identity Provider:

- RADIUS realm in trusted SAML metadata (as described in section Section 4.3.3).
- RADIUS realm in trusted digitally signed SAML response or assertion.

A digitally signed SAML response alone is not sufficient for the same reasons described above for SAML requests.

4.3.3. Mapping of AAA names in SAML metadata

This section defines extensions to the SAML metadata schema [OASIS.saml-metadata-2.0-os] that are required in order to represent AAA names associated with a particular <EntityDescriptor> element.

In SAML metadata, a single entity may act in many different roles in the support of multiple profiles. This document defines two new roles: RADIUS IDP and RADIUS RP, requiring the declaration of two new subtypes of RoleDescriptorType: RADIUSIDPDescriptorType and RADIUSRPDescriptorType. These subtypes contain the additional elements required to represent AAA names for IDP and RP entities respectively.

4.3.3.1. RADIUSIDPDescriptorType

The RADIUSIDPDescriptorType complex type extends RoleDescriptorType with elements common to IdPs that support RADIUS. It contains the following additional elements:

<RADIUSIDPService> [Zero or More] Zero or more elements of type EndpointType that describe RADIUS endpoints that are associated with the entity.

<RADIUSRealm> [Zero or More] Zero or more elements of type string that represent the acceptable values of the RADIUS realm associated with the entity, obtained from the realm part of RADIUS User-Name attribute.

The following schema fragment defines the RADIUSIDPDescriptorType complex type:
4.3.3.2. RADIUSRPDescriptorType

The RADIUSRPDescriptorType complex type extends RoleDescriptorType with elements common to RPs that support RADIUS. It contains the following additional elements:

<RADIUSRPService> [Zero or More] Zero or more elements of type EndpointType that describe RADIUS endpoints that are associated with the entity.

<RADIUSNasIpAddress> [Zero or More] Zero or more elements of type string that represent the acceptable values of the RADIUS NAS-IP-Address or NAS-IPv6-Address attributes associated with the entity.

<RADIUSNasIdentifier> [Zero or More] Zero or more elements of type string that represent the acceptable values of the RADIUS NAS-Identifier attribute associated with the entity.

<RADIUSGssEapName> [Zero or More] Zero or more elements of type string that represent the acceptable values of the GSS-EAP acceptor name associated with the entity. The format for this name is described in section 3.1 of [RFC7055], while section 3.4 describes how that name is decomposed and transported using RADIUS attributes.

The following schema fragment defines the RADIUSRPDescriptorType complex type:

```
<complexType name="RADIUSRPDescriptorType">
  <complexContent>
    <extension base="md:RoleDescriptorType">
      <sequence>
        <element ref="abfab:RADIUSRPService" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        <element ref="abfab:RADIUSNasIpAddress" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        <element ref="abfab:RADIUSNasIdentifier" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        <element ref="abfab:RADIUSGssEapName" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </sequence>
    </extension>
  </complexContent>
</complexType>
```
<complexType name="RADIUSRPDescriptorType">
    <complexContent>
        <extension base="md:RoleDescriptorType">
            <sequence>
                <element ref="md:RADIUSRPService" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
                <element ref="md:RADIUSNasIpAddress" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
                <element ref="md:RADIUSNasIdentifier" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
                <element ref="md:RADIUSGssEapName" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
            </sequence>
        </extension>
    </complexContent>
</complexType>

<element name="RADIUSRPService" type="md:EndpointType"/>
<element name="RADIUSNasIpAddress" type="string"/>
<element name="RADIUSNasIdentifier" type="string"/>
<element name="RADIUSGssEapName" type="string"/>

Figure 4: RADIUSRPDescriptorType schema

4.3.4. Example of SAML metadata including AAA names

The following figures illustrate an example of metadata including AAA names for an IDP and an RP respectively. The IDP’s SAML name is "https://IdentityProvider.com/", whereas its RADIUS realm is "idp.com". The RP’s SAML name is "https://RelyingParty.com/SAML", being its GSS-EAP acceptor name "nfs/fileserver.rp.com@RP.COM".

<EntityDescriptor xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata"
    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
    xmlns:abfab="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:abfab"
    entityID="https://IdentityProvider.com/SAML">
    <RoleDescriptor xsi:type="abfab:RADIUSIDPDescriptorType"
        protocolSupportEnumeration="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
        <RADIUSRealm>idp.com</RADIUSRealm>
    </RoleDescriptor>
</EntityDescriptor>

Figure 5: Metadata for the IDP
<EntityDescriptor xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata"
    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
    xmlns:abfab="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:abfab"
    entityID="https://RelyingParty.com/SAML">
    <RoleDescriptor xsi:type="abfab:RADIUSRPDescriptorType"
        protocolSupportEnumeration="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
        <RADIUSGssEapName>nfs/fileserver.rp.com@RP.COM</RADIUSGssEapName>
    </RoleDescriptor>
</EntityDescriptor>

Figure 6: Metadata for the RP

4.4. Use of XML Signatures

This binding calls for the use of SAML elements that support XML signatures. To promote interoperability, implementations of this binding MUST support a default configuration that does not require the use of XML signatures. Implementations MAY choose to use XML signatures.

4.5. Metadata Considerations

These binding and profiles are mostly intended to be used without metadata. In this usage, RADIUS infrastructure is used to provide integrity and naming of the SAML messages and assertions. RADIUS configuration is used to provide policy, including which attributes are accepted from a Relying Party and which attributes are sent by an Identity Provider.

Nevertheless, if metadata is used, the roles describe in section Section 4.3.3 MUST be present.

5. Network Access Identifier Name Identifier Format

URI: urn:ietf:params:abfab:nameid-format:nai

Indicates that the content of the element is in the form of a Network Access Identifier (NAI) using the syntax described by [RFC7542].

6. RADIUS State Confirmation Method Identifiers

URI: urn:ietf:params:abfab:cm:user
URI: urn:ietf:params:abfab:cm:machine

Indicates that the Subject is the system entity (either the user or machine) authenticated by a previously transmitted RADIUS Access-
Accept message, as identified by the value of that RADIUS message’s State attribute.

7. ABFAB Authentication Profile

In the scenario supported by the ABFAB Authentication Profile, a Client controlling a User Agent requests access to a Relying Party. The Relying Party uses RADIUS to authenticate the Client. In particular, the Relying Party, acting as a RADIUS client, attempts to validate the Client’s credentials against a RADIUS server acting as the Client’s Identity Provider. If the Identity Provider successfully authenticates the Client, it produces an authentication assertion which is consumed by the Relying Party. This assertion MAY include a name identifier that can be used between the Relying Party and the Identity Provider to refer to the Client.

7.1. Required Information

Identification: urn:ietf:params:abfab:profiles:authentication

Contact information: iesg@ietf.org

SAML Confirmation Method Identifiers: The SAML V2.0 "RADIUS State" confirmation method identifiers, either urn:ietf:params:abfab:cm:user or urn:ietf:params:abfab:cm:machine, are used by this profile.

Updates: None.

7.2. Profile Overview

To implement this scenario, this profile of the SAML Authentication Request protocol MUST be used in conjunction with the SAML RADIUS binding defined in Section 4.

This profile is based on the SAML V2.0 Web Browser Single Sign-On Profile [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os]. There are some important differences, specifically:

Authentication: This profile does not require the use of any particular authentication method. The ABFAB architecture does require the use of EAP [RFC3579], but this specification may be used in other non-ABFAB scenarios.

Bindings: This profile does not use HTTP-based bindings. Instead all SAML protocol messages are transported using the SAML RADIUS binding defined in Section 4. This is intended to reduce the number of bindings that implementations must support to be interoperable.
Requests: The profile does not permit the Relying Party to name the `<saml:Subject>` of the `<samlp:AuthnRequest>`. This is intended to simplify implementation and interoperability.

Responses: The profile only permits the Identity Provider to return a single SAML message or assertion that MUST contain exactly one authentication statement. Other statements may be included within this assertion at the discretion of the Identity Provider. This is intended to simplify implementation and interoperability.

Figure 7 below illustrates the flow of messages within this profile.

```
Client            Relying Party             Identity Provider
                  |                     |                           |
                  |         (1)         |                           |
                  | - - - - - - - - - > |
                  |                     |                           |
                  |   (2)              |                           |
                  |                     | - - - - - - - - - - - > |
                  |                     |                           |
                  |              (3)    |                           |
                  |                     | - - - - - - - - - - - - > |
                  |                     |   (4)              |
                  |                     | < - - - - - - - - - - - |
                  |                     |                           |
                  |         (5)         |                           |
                  | < - - - - - - - - - |
                  | V                     V                           V

The following steps are described by the profile. Within an individual step, there may be one or more actual message exchanges.

Figure 7

1. Client request to Relying Party (Section 7.3.1): In step 1, the Client, via a User Agent, makes a request for a secured resource at the Relying Party. The Relying Party determines that no security context for the Client exists and initiates the authentication process.

2. Relying Party issues `<samlp:AuthnRequest>` to Identity Provider (Section 7.3.2). In step 2, the Relying Party may optionally issue a `<samlp:AuthnRequest>` message to be delivered to the Identity Provider using the SAML-Protocol RADIUS attribute.
3. Identity Provider identifies Client (Section 7.3.3). In step 3, the Client is authenticated and identified by the Identity Provider, while honoring any requirements imposed by the Relying Party in the <samlp:AuthnRequest> message if provided.

4. Identity Provider issues <samlp:Response> to Relying Party (Section 7.3.4). In step 4, the Identity Provider issues a <samlp:Response> message to the Relying Party using the SAML RADIUS binding. The response either indicates an error or includes a SAML Authentication Statement in exactly one SAML Assertion. If the RP did not send an <samlp:AuthnRequest>, the IdP issues an unsolicited <samlp:Assertion>, as described in Section 7.4.4.

5. Relying Party grants or denies access to Client (Section 7.3.5). In step 5, having received the response from the Identity Provider, the Relying Party can respond to the Client with its own error, or can establish its own security context for the Client and return the requested resource.

7.3. Profile Description

The ABFAB Authentication Profile is a profile of the SAML V2.0 Authentication Request Protocol [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]. Where both specifications conflict, the ABFAB Authentication Profile takes precedence.

7.3.1. Client Request to Relying Party

The profile is initiated by an arbitrary Client request to the Relying Party. There are no restrictions on the form of the request. The Relying Party is free to use any means it wishes to associate the subsequent interactions with the original request. The Relying Party, acting as a RADIUS client, attempts to authenticate the Client.

7.3.2. Relying Party Issues <samlp:AuthnRequest> to Identity Provider

The Relying Party uses RADIUS to communicate with the Client’s Identity Provider. The Relying Party MAY include a <samlp:AuthnRequest> within this RADIUS Access-Request message using the SAML-Protocol RADIUS attribute. The next hop destination MAY be the Identity Provider or alternatively an intermediate RADIUS proxy. Profile-specific rules for the contents of the <samlp:AuthnRequest> element are given in Section 7.4.1.
7.3.3. Identity Provider Identifies Client

The Identity Provider MUST establish the identity of the Client using a RADIUS authentication method, or else it will return an error. If the ForceAuthn attribute on the <samlp:AuthnRequest> element (if sent by the Relying Party) is present and true, the Identity Provider MUST freshly establish this identity rather than relying on any existing session state it may have with the Client (for example, TLS state that may be used for session resumption). Otherwise, and in all other respects, the Identity Provider may use any method to authenticate the Client, subject to the constraints called out in the <samlp:AuthnRequest> message.

7.3.4. Identity Provider Issues <samlp:Response> to Relying Party

The Identity Provider MUST conclude the authentication in a manner consistent with the RADIUS authentication result. The IdP MAY issue a <samlp:Response> message to the Relying Party that is consistent with the authentication result, as described in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]. This SAML response is delivered to the Relying Party using the SAML RADIUS binding described in Section 4.

Profile-specific rules regarding the contents of the <samlp:Response> element are given in Section 7.4.2.

7.3.5. Relying Party Grants or Denies Access to Client

If a <samlp:Response> message is issued by the Identity Provider, the Relying Party MUST process that message and any enclosed assertion elements as described in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]. Any subsequent use of the assertion elements is at the discretion of the Relying Party, subject to any restrictions contained within the assertions themselves or from any previously established out-of-band policy that governs the interaction between the Identity Provider and the Relying Party.

7.4. Use of Authentication Request Protocol

This profile is based on the Authentication Request Protocol defined in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]. In the nomenclature of actors enumerated in section 3.4 of that document, the Relying Party is the requester, the User Agent is the attesting entity and the Client is the Requested Subject.
7.4.1.  <samlp:AuthnRequest> Usage

The Relying Party MUST NOT include a <saml:Subject> element in the request. The authenticated RADIUS identity identifies the Client to the Identity Provider.

A Relying Party MAY include any message content described in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os], section 3.4.1. All processing rules are as defined in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os].

If the Relying Party wishes to permit the Identity Provider to establish a new identifier for the Client if none exists, it MUST include a <saml:NameIDPolicy> element with the AllowCreate attribute set to "true". Otherwise, only a Client for whom the Identity Provider has previously established an identifier usable by the Relying Party can be authenticated successfully.

The <samlp:AuthnRequest> message MAY be signed. Authentication and integrity are also provided by the SAML RADIUS binding.

7.4.2.  <samlp:Response> Message Usage

If the Identity Provider cannot or will not satisfy the request, it MUST either respond with a <samlp:Response> message containing an appropriate error status code or codes and/or respond with a RADIUS Access-Reject message.

If the Identity Provider wishes to return an error, it MUST NOT include any assertions in the <samlp:Response> message. Otherwise, if the request is successful (or if the response is not associated with a request), the <samlp:Response> element is subject to the following constraints:

- It MAY be signed.
- It MUST contain exactly one assertion. The <saml:Subject> element of this assertion MUST refer to the authenticated RADIUS user.
- The assertion MUST contain a <saml:AuthnStatement>. Besides, the assertion MUST contain a <saml:Subject> element with at least one <saml:SubjectConfirmation> element containing a Method of urn:ietf:params:abfab:cm:user or urn:ietf:params:abfab:cm:machine that reflects the authentication of the Client to the Identity Provider. Since the containing message is in response to an <samlp:AuthnRequest>, the InResponseTo attribute (both in the <saml:SubjectConfirmationData> and in the <saml:Response> elements) MUST match the request’s ID. The <saml:Subject> element
MAY use the NAI Name Identifier Format described in Section 5 to establish an identifier between the Relying Party and the IdP.

- Other conditions MAY be included as requested by the Relying Party or at the discretion of the Identity Provider. The Identity Provider is NOT obligated to honor the requested set of conditions in the `<samlp:AuthnRequest>`, if any.

7.4.3. `<samlp:Response>` Message Processing Rules

The Relying Party MUST do the following:

- Assume that the Client’s identifier implied by a SAML `<Subject>` element, if present, takes precedence over an identifier implied by the RADIUS User-Name attribute.

- Verify that the InResponseTo attribute in the "RADIUS State" `<saml:SubjectConfirmationData>` equals the ID of its original `<samlp:AuthnRequest>` message, unless the response is unsolicited, in which case the attribute MUST NOT be present.

- If a `<saml:AuthnStatement>` used to establish a security context for the Client contains a `SessionNotOnOrAfter` attribute, the security context SHOULD be discarded once this time is reached, unless the Relying Party reestablishes the Client’s identity by repeating the use of this profile.

- Verify that any assertions relied upon are valid according to processing rules in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os].

- Any assertion which is not valid, or whose subject confirmation requirements cannot be met MUST be discarded and MUST NOT be used to establish a security context for the Client.

7.4.4. Unsolicited Responses

An Identity Provider MAY initiate this profile by delivering an unsolicited assertion to a Relying Party. This MUST NOT contain any `<saml:SubjectConfirmationData>` elements containing an `InResponseTo` attribute.

7.4.5. Use of the SAML RADIUS Binding

It is RECOMMENDED that the RADIUS exchange is protected using TLS encryption for RADIUS [RFC6614] to provide confidentiality and integrity protection.
7.4.6. Use of XML Signatures

This profile calls for the use of SAML elements that support XML signatures. To promote interoperability implementations of this profile MUST NOT require the use of XML signatures. Implementations MAY choose to use XML signatures.

7.4.7. Metadata Considerations

There are no metadata considerations particular to this profile, aside from those applying to the use of the RADIUS binding.

8. ABFAB Assertion Query/Request Profile

This profile builds on the SAML V2.0 Assertion Query/Request Profile defined by [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os]. That profile describes the use of the Assertion Query and Request Protocol defined by section 3.3 of [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] with synchronous bindings, such as the SOAP binding defined in [OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os].

While the SAML V2.0 Assertion Query/Request Profile is independent of the underlying binding, it is nonetheless useful to describe the use of the SAML RADIUS binding defined in Section 4 of this document, in the interests of promoting interoperable implementations, particularly as the SAML V2.0 Assertion Query/Request Profile is most frequently discussed and implemented in the context of the SOAP binding.

8.1. Required Information

Identification: urn:ietf:params:abfab:profiles:query

Contact information: iesg@ietf.org

Description: Given below.

Updates: None.

8.2. Profile Overview

As with the SAML V2.0 Assertion Query/Request Profile defined by [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os] the message exchange and basic processing rules that govern this profile are largely defined by Section 3.3 of [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] that defines the messages to be exchanged, in combination with the binding used to exchange the messages. The SAML RADIUS binding described in this document defines the binding of the message exchange to RADIUS. Unless specifically noted here, all requirements defined in those specifications apply.
Figure 8 below illustrates the basic template for the query/request profile.

```
Relying Party                               Identity Provider
(SAML requester)                             (SAML responder)

(1)                                           (2)
<---------------------------------------------->
V                                               V
```

The following steps are described by the profile.

**Figure 8**

1. Query/Request issued by Relying Party: In step 1, a Relying Party initiates the profile by sending an `<AssertionIDRequest>`, `<SubjectQuery>`, `<AuthnQuery>`, `<AttributeQuery>`, or `<AuthzDecisionQuery>` message to a SAML authority.

2. `<Response>` issued by SAML Authority: In step 2, the responding SAML authority (after processing the query or request) issues a `<Response>` message to the Relying Party.

**8.3. Profile Description**

**8.3.1. Differences from the SAML V2.0 Assertion Query/Request Profile**

This profile is identical to the SAML V2.0 Assertion Query/Request Profile, with the following exceptions:

- When processing the SAML request, the IdP MUST give precedence to the Client’s identifier implied by RADIUS State attribute, if present, over the identifier implied by the SAML request’s `<Subject>`, if any.

- In respect to sections 6.3.1 and 6.5 of [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os], this profile does not consider the use of metadata (as in [OASIS.saml-metadata-2.0-os]). See Section 8.3.4.

- In respect to sections 6.3.2, 6.4.1, and 6.4.2 of [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os], this profile additionally stipulates that implementations of this profile MUST NOT require the use of XML signatures. See Section 8.3.3.
8.3.2. Use of the SAML RADIUS Binding

The RADIUS Access-Request sent by the Relying Party:

- MUST include an instance of the RADIUS Service-Type attribute, having a value of Authorize-Only.
- SHOULD include the RADIUS State attribute, where this Query/Request pertains to previously authenticated Client.

When processing the SAML request, the IdP MUST give precedence to the Client’s identifier implied by RADIUS State attribute over the identifier implied by the SAML request’s <Subject>, if any.

It is RECOMMENDED that the RADIUS exchange is protected using TLS encryption for RADIUS [RFC6614] to provide confidentiality and integrity protection.

8.3.3. Use of XML Signatures

This profile calls for the use of SAML elements that support XML signatures. To promote interoperability implementations of this profile MUST NOT require the use of XML signatures. Implementations MAY choose to use XML signatures.

8.3.4. Metadata Considerations

There are no metadata considerations particular to this profile, aside from those applying to the use of the RADIUS binding.

9. Privacy considerations

The profiles defined in this document allow a Relying Party to request specific information about the Client, and allow an IdP to disclose information about that Client. In this sense, Identity Providers MUST apply policy to decide what information is released to a particular Relying Party. Moreover, the identity of the Client is typically hidden from the Relying Party unless informed by the Identity Provider. Conversely, the Relying Party does typically know the realm of the IdP, as it is required to route the RADIUS packets to the right destination.

The kind of information that is released by the IdP can include generic attributes such as affiliation shared by many Clients. But even these generic attributes can help to identify a specific Client. Other kinds of attributes may also provide a Relying Party with the ability to link the same Client between different sessions. Finally, other kind of attributes might provide a group of Relying Parties
with the ability to link the Client between them or with personally identifiable information about the Client.

These profiles do not directly provide a Client with a mechanism to express preferences about what information is released. That information can be expressed out-of-band, for example as part of the enrollment process.

The Relying Party may disclose privacy-sensitive information about itself as part of the request, although this is unlikely in typical deployments.

If RADIUS proxies are used and encryption is not used, the attributes disclosed by the IdP are visible to the proxies. This is a significant privacy exposure in some deployments. Ongoing work is exploring mechanisms for creating TLS connections directly between the RADIUS client and the RADIUS server to reduce this exposure. If proxies are used, the impact of exposing SAML assertions to the proxies needs to be carefully considered.

The use of TLS to provide confidentiality for the RADIUS exchange is strongly encouraged. Without this, passive eavesdroppers can observe the assertions.

10. Security Considerations

In this specification, the Relying Party MUST trust any statement in the SAML messages from the IdP in the same way that it trusts information contained in RADIUS attributes. These entities MUST trust the RADIUS infrastructure to provide integrity of the SAML messages.

Furthermore, the Relying Party MUST apply policy and filter the information based on what information the IdP is permitted to assert and on what trust is reasonable to place in proxies between them.

XML signatures and encryption are provided as an OPTIONAL mechanism for end-to-end security. These mechanism can protect SAML messages from being modified by proxies in the RADIUS infrastructure. These mechanisms are not mandatory-to-implement. It is believed that ongoing work to provide direct TLS connections between a RADIUS client and RADIUS server will provide similar assurances but better deployability. XML security is appropriate for deployments where end-to-end security is required but proxies cannot be removed or where SAML messages need to be verified at a later time or by parties not involved in the authentication exchange.
11. IANA Considerations

11.1. RADIUS Attributes

The authors request that Attribute Types and Attribute Values defined in this document be registered by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) from the RADIUS namespaces as described in the "IANA Considerations" section of [RFC3575], in accordance with BCP 26 [RFC5226]. For RADIUS packets, attributes and registries created by this document IANA is requested to place them at http://www.iana.org/assignments/radius-types.

In particular, this document defines two new RADIUS attributes, entitled "SAML-Assertion" and "SAML-Protocol" (see Section 3), with assigned values of 245.TBD1 and 245.TBD2 from the Long Extended Space of [RFC6929]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ext. Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>TBD1</td>
<td>SAML-Assertion</td>
<td>&gt;=5</td>
<td>Encodes a SAML assertion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>TBD2</td>
<td>SAML-Protocol</td>
<td>&gt;=5</td>
<td>Encodes a SAML protocol message</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.2. ABFAB Parameters

A new top-level registry is created titled "ABFAB Parameters".

In this top-level registry, a sub-registry titled "ABFAB URN Parameters" is created. Registration in this registry is by the IETF review or expert review procedures [RFC5226].

This paragraph gives guidance to designated experts. Registrations in this registry are generally only expected as part of protocols published as RFCs on the IETF stream; other URIs are expected to be better choices for non-IETF work. Expert review is permitted mainly to allow early registration related to specifications under development when the community believes they have reached sufficient maturity. The expert SHOULD evaluate the maturity and stability of such an IETF-stream specification. Experts SHOULD review anything not from the IETF stream for consistency and consensus with current practice. Today such requests would not typically be approved.

If a parameter named "paramname" is to be registered in this registry, then its URN will be "urn:ietf:params:abfab:paramname".

The initial registrations are as follows:
ABFAB Parameters

11.3. Registration of the ABFAB URN Namespace

IANA is requested to register the "abfab" URN sub-namespace in the IETF URN sub-namespace for protocol parameters defined in [RFC3553].

Registry Name: abfab

Specification: draft-ietf-abfab-aaa-saml

Repository: ABFAB URN Parameters (Section Section 11.2)

Index Value: Sub-parameters MUST be specified in UTF-8 using standard URI encoding where necessary.

12. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the OASIS Security Services (SAML) Technical Committee, and Scott Cantor in particular, for their help with the SAML-related material.

The authors would also like to acknowledge the collaboration of Jim Schaad, Leif Johansson, Klaas Wierenga, Stephen Farrell, Gabriel Lopez, and Rafael Marin, who have provided valuable comments on this document.

13. References

13.1. Normative References


13.2. Informative References


Appendix A.  XML Schema

The following schema formally defines the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:abfab" namespace used in this document, in
conformance with [W3C.REC-xmlschema-1] While XML validation is
optional, the schema that follows is the normative definition of the
constructs it defines. Where the schema differs from any prose in
this specification, the schema takes precedence.
<schema
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:abfab"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:md="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata"
xmlns:abfab="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:abfab"
elementFormDefault="unqualified"
attributeFormDefault="unqualified"
blockDefault="substitution"
version="1.0">
  <import namespace="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata"/>
  <complexType name="RADIUSIDPDescriptorType">
    <complexContent>
      <extension base="md:RoleDescriptorType">
        <sequence>
          <element ref="abfab:RADIUSIDPService" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
          <element ref="abfab:RADIUSRealm" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        </sequence>
      </extension>
    </complexContent>
  </complexType>
  <element name="RADIUSIDPService" type="md:EndpointType"/>
  <element name="RADIUSRealm" type="string"/>

  <complexType name="RADIUSRPDescriptorType">
    <complexContent>
      <extension base="md:RoleDescriptorType">
        <sequence>
          <element ref="md:RADIUSRPService" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
          <element ref="md:RADIUSNasIpAddress" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
          <element ref="md:RADIUSNasIdentifier" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
          <element ref="md:RADIUSGssEapName" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        </sequence>
      </extension>
    </complexContent>
  </complexType>
  <element name="RADIUSRPService" type="md:EndpointType"/>
  <element name="RADIUSNasIpAddress" type="string"/>
  <element name="RADIUSNasIdentifier" type="string"/>
  <element name="RADIUSGssEapName" type="string"/>
</schema>
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A GSS-API Mechanism for the Extensible Authentication Protocol
draft-ietf-abfab-gss-eap-09.txt

Abstract

This document defines protocols, procedures, and conventions to be employed by peers implementing the Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) when using the Extensible Authentication Protocol mechanism. Through the GS2 family of mechanisms defined in RFC 5801, these protocols also define how Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL, RFC 4422) applications use the Extensible Authentication Protocol.

Status of this Memo

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 4
   1.1. Discovery ............................................... 5
   1.2. Authentication ........................................ 5
   1.3. Secure Association Protocol ........................... 6
2. Requirements notation ........................................ 8
3. EAP Channel Binding and Naming ................................ 9
   3.1. Mechanism Name Format ................................ 9
   3.2. Internationalization of Names ......................... 12
   3.3. Exported Mechanism Names ............................. 12
   3.4. Acceptor Name RADIUS AVP ............................. 13
   3.5. Proxy Verification of Acceptor Name .................. 13
4. Selection of EAP Method ...................................... 15
5. Context Tokens ................................................ 16
   5.1. Mechanisms and Encryption Types ..................... 17
   5.2. Processing received tokens ............................. 17
   5.3. Error Subtokens ....................................... 18
   5.4. Initial State ........................................... 18
   5.4.1. Vendor Subtoken ................................... 19
   5.4.2. Acceptor Name Request ............................. 19
   5.4.3. Acceptor Name Response ............................. 19
   5.5. Authenticate State ..................................... 20
   5.5.1. EAP Request Subtoken ............................... 21
   5.5.2. EAP Response Subtoken ............................... 21
   5.6. Extension State ........................................ 21
   5.6.1. Flags Subtoken ..................................... 22
   5.6.2. GSS Channel Bindings Subtoken ..................... 22
   5.6.3. MIC Subtoken ....................................... 23
   5.7. Example Token .......................................... 24
   5.8. Context Options ....................................... 24
6. Acceptor Services ............................................. 26
   6.1. GSS-API Channel Binding ............................... 26
   6.2. Per-message security .................................. 27
   6.3. Pseudo Random Function ............................... 27
7. Iana Considerations ........................................... 28
   7.1. OID Registry .......................................... 28
   7.2. RFC 4121 Token Identifiers ........................... 29
   7.3. GSS EAP Subtoken Types ............................... 29
   7.4. RADIUS Attribute Assignments ........................ 30
   7.5. Registration of the EAP-AES128 SASL Mechanisms ...... 31
   7.6. GSS EAP Errors ........................................ 31
   7.7. GSS EAP Context Flags ................................. 32
1. Introduction

ABFAB [I-D.ietf-abfab-arch] describes an architecture for providing federated access management to applications using the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface (GSS-API) [RFC2743] and Simple Authentication and Security Layers (SASL) [RFC4422]. This specification provides the core mechanism for bringing federated authentication to these applications.

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] defines a framework for authenticating a network access client and server in order to gain access to a network. A variety of different EAP methods are in wide use; one of EAP’s strengths is that for most types of credentials in common use, there is an EAP method that permits the credential to be used.

EAP is often used in conjunction with a backend Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) server via RADIUS [RFC3579] or Diameter [RFC4072]. In this mode, the Network Access Server (NAS) simply tunnels EAP packets over the backend authentication protocol to a home EAP/AAA server for the client. After EAP succeeds, the backend authentication protocol is used to communicate key material to the NAS. In this mode, the NAS need not be aware of or have any specific support for the EAP method used between the client and the home EAP server. The client and EAP server share a credential that depends on the EAP method; the NAS and AAA server share a credential based on the backend authentication protocol in use. The backend authentication server acts as a trusted third party enabling network access even though the client and NAS may not actually share any common authentication methods. As described in the architecture document, using AAA proxies, this mode can be extended beyond one organization to provide federated authentication for network access.

The GSS-API provides a generic framework for applications to use security services including authentication and per-message data security. Between protocols that support GSS-API directly or protocols that support SASL [RFC4422], many application protocols can use GSS-API for security services. However, with the exception of Kerberos [RFC4121], few GSS-API mechanisms are in wide use on the Internet. While GSS-API permits an application to be written independent of the specific GSS-API mechanism in use, there is no facility to separate the server from the implementation of the mechanism as there is with EAP and backend authentication servers.

The goal of this specification is to combine GSS-API’s support for application protocols with EAP/AAA’s support for common credential types and for authenticating to a server without requiring that server to specifically support the authentication method in use. In
addition, this specification supports the architectural goal of
transporting attributes about subjects to relying parties. Together
this combination will provide federated authentication and
authorization for GSS-API applications. This specification meets the
applicability requirements for EAP to application authentication
[I-D.ietf-abfab-eapapplicability].

This mechanism is a GSS-API mechanism that encapsulates an EAP
coloration. From the perspective of RFC 3748, this specification
defines a new lower-layer protocol for EAP. From the perspective of
the application, this specification defines a new GSS-API mechanism.

Section 1.3 of [RFC5247] outlines the typical conversation between
EAP peers where an EAP key is derived:

- Phase 0: Discovery
- Phase 1: Authentication
  - 1a: EAP authentication
  - 1b: AAA Key Transport (optional)
- Phase 2: Secure Association Protocol
  - 2a: Unicast Secure Association
  - 2b: Multicast Secure Association (optional)

1.1. Discovery

GSS-API peers discover each other and discover support for GSS-API in
an application-dependent mechanism. SASL [RFC4422] describes how
discovery of a particular SASL mechanism such as a GSS-API mechanism
is conducted. The Simple and Protected Negotiation mechanism
(SPNEGO) [RFC4178] provides another approach for discovering what
GSS-API mechanisms are available. The specific approach used for
discovery is out of scope for this mechanism.

1.2. Authentication

GSS-API authenticates a party called the GSS-API initiator to the
GSS-API acceptor, optionally providing authentication of the acceptor
to the initiator. Authentication starts with a mechanism-specific
message called a context token sent from the initiator to the
acceptor. The acceptor responds, followed by the initiator, and so
on until authentication succeeds or fails. GSS-API context tokens
are reliably delivered by the application using GSS-API. The
application is responsible for in-order delivery and retransmission.

EAP authenticates a party called a peer to a party called the EAP server. A third party called an EAP passthrough authenticator may decapsulate EAP messages from a lower layer and reencapsulate them into an AAA protocol. The term EAP authenticator refers to whichever of the passthrough authenticator or EAP server receives the lower-layer EAP packets. The first EAP message travels from the authenticator to the peer; a GSS-API message is sent from the initiator to acceptor to prompt the authenticator to send the first EAP message. The EAP peer maps onto the GSS-API initiator. The role of the GSS-API acceptor is split between the EAP authenticator and the EAP server. When these two entities are combined, the division resembles GSS-API acceptors in other mechanisms. When a more typical deployment is used and there is a passthrough authenticator, most context establishment takes place on the EAP server and per-message operations take place on the authenticator. EAP messages from the peer to the authenticator are called responses; messages from the authenticator to the peer are called requests.

Because GSS-API applications provide guaranteed delivery of context tokens, the EAP retransmission timeout MUST be infinite and the EAP layer MUST NOT retransmit a message.

This specification permits a GSS-API acceptor to hand-off the processing of the EAP packets to a remote EAP server by using AAA protocols such as RADIUS, RadSec or Diameter. In this case, the GSS-API acceptor acts as an EAP pass-through authenticator. The pass-through authenticator is responsible for retransmitting AAA messages if a response is not received from the AAA server. If a response cannot be received, then the authenticator generates an error at the GSS-API level. If EAP authentication is successful, and where the chosen EAP method supports key derivation, EAP keying material may also be derived. If an AAA protocol is used, this can also be used to replicate the EAP Key from the EAP server to the EAP authenticator.

See Section 5 for details of the authentication exchange.

1.3. Secure Association Protocol

After authentication succeeds, GSS-API provides a number of per-message security services that can be used:

GSS_Wrap() provides integrity and optional confidentiality for a message.
GSS_GetMIC() provides integrity protection for data sent independently of the GSS-API.

GSS_Pseudo_random [RFC4401] provides key derivation functionality.

These services perform a function similar to secure association protocols in network access. Like secure association protocols, these services need to be performed near the authenticator/acceptor even when a AAA protocol is used to separate the authenticator from the EAP server. The key used for these per-message services is derived from the EAP key; the EAP peer and authenticator derive this key as a result of a successful EAP authentication. In the case that the EAP authenticator is acting as a pass-through it obtains it via the AAA protocol. See Section 6 for details.
2. Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. EAP Channel Binding and Naming

EAP authenticates a user to a realm. The peer knows that it has exchanged authentication with an EAP server in a given realm. Today, the peer does not typically know which NAS it is talking to securely. That is often fine for network access. However privileges to delegate to a chat server seem very different than privileges for a file server or trading site. Also, an EAP peer knows the identity of the home realm, but perhaps not even the visited realm.

In contrast, GSS-API takes a name for both the initiator and acceptor as inputs to the authentication process. When mutual authentication is used, both parties are authenticated. The granularity of these names is somewhat mechanism dependent. In the case of the Kerberos mechanism, the acceptor name typically identifies both the protocol in use (such as IMAP) and the specific instance of the service being connected to. The acceptor name almost always identifies the administrative domain providing service.

An EAP GSS-API mechanism needs to provide GSS-API naming semantics in order to work with existing GSS-API applications. EAP channel binding [I-D.ietf-emu-chbind] is used to provide GSS-API naming semantics. Channel binding sends a set of attributes from the peer to the EAP server either as part of the EAP conversation or as part of a secure association protocol. In addition, attributes are sent in the backend authentication protocol from the authenticator to the EAP server. The EAP server confirms the consistency of these attributes. Confirming attribute consistency also involves checking consistency against a local policy database as discussed in Section 3.5. In particular, the peer sends the name of the acceptor it is authenticating to as part of channel binding. The acceptor sends its full name as part of the backend authentication protocol. The EAP server confirms consistency of the names.

EAP channel binding is easily confused with a facility in GSS-API also called channel binding. GSS-API channel binding provides protection against man-in-the-middle attacks when GSS-API is used as authentication inside some tunnel; it is similar to a facility called cryptographic binding in EAP. See [RFC5056] for a discussion of the differences between these two facilities and Section 6.1 for how GSS-API channel binding is handled in this mechanism.

3.1. Mechanism Name Format

Before discussing how the initiator and acceptor names are validated in the AAA infrastructure, it is necessary to discuss what composes a name for an EAP GSS-API mechanism. GSS-API permits several types of generic names to be imported using GSS_Import_name(). Once a
mechanism is chosen, these names are converted into a mechanism-specific name called a "Mechanism Name". Note that a Mechanism Name is the name of an initiator or acceptor, not of a GSS-API mechanism. This section first discusses the mechanism name form and then discusses what name forms are supported.

The string representation of the GSS-EAP mechanism name has the following ABNF [RFC5234] representation:

char-normal = %x00-2E/%x30-3F/%x41-5B/%x5D-FF
char-escaped = "\" %x2F / "\" %x40 / "\" %x5C
name-char = char-normal / char-escaped
name-string = 1*name-char
user-or-service = name-string
host = [name-string]
realm = name-string
service-specific = name-string
service-specifics = service-specific 0*("/") service-specifics)
name = user-or-service ["/"] host ["/"] service-specifics]] ["@" realm]

Special characters appearing in a name can be backslash escaped to avoid their special meanings. For example "\" represents a literal backslash. This escaping mechanism is a property of the string representation; if the components of a name are transported in some mechanism that will keep them separate without backslash escaping, then backslash SHOULD have no special meaning.

The user-or-service component is similar to the portion of a network access identifier (NAI) before the '@' symbol for initiator names and the service name from the registry of GSS-API host-based services in the case of acceptor names [GSS-IANA]. The NAI specification provides rules for encoding and string preparation in order to support internationalization of NAIs; implementations of this mechanism MUST NOT prepare the user-or-service according to these rules; see Section 3.2 for internationalization of this mechanism. The host portion is empty for initiators and typically contains the domain name of the system on which an acceptor service is running. Some services MAY require additional parameters to distinguish the entity being authenticated against. Such parameters are encoded in the service-specifics portion of the name. The EAP server MUST reject authentication of any acceptor name that has a non-empty service-specifics component unless the EAP server understands the service-specifics and authenticates them. The interpretation of the service-specifics is scoped by the user-or-service portion. The realm is similar to the the realm portion of a NAI for initiator names; again the NAI specification's internationalization rules MUST NOT be applied to the realm. The realm is the administrative realm...
of a service for an acceptor name.

The string representation of this name form is designed to be
generally compatible with the string representation of Kerberos names
declared in [RFC1964].

The GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME form represents the name of an individual
user. From the standpoint of this mechanism it may take the form
either of an undecorated user name or a name semantically similar to
a network access identifier (NAI) [RFC4282]. The name is split at
the first at-sign ('@') into the part preceding the realm which is
the user-or-service portion of the mechanism name and the realm
portion which is the realm portion of the mechanism name.

The GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE name form represents a service running
on a host; it is textually represented as "service@host". This name
form is required by most SASL profiles and is used by many existing
applications that use the Kerberos GSS-API mechanism. While support
for this name form is critical, it presents an interesting challenge
in terms of EAP channel binding. Consider a case where the server
communicates with a "server proxy," or a AAA server near the server.
That server proxy communicates with the EAP server. The EAP server
and server proxy are in different administrative realms. The server
proxy is in a position to verify that the request comes from the
indicated host. However the EAP server cannot make this
determination directly. So, the EAP server needs to determine
whether to trust the server proxy to verify the host portion of the
acceptor name. This trust decision depends both on the host name and
the realm of the server proxy. In effect, the EAP server decides
whether to trust that the realm of the server proxy is the right
realm for the given hostname and then makes a trust decision about
the server proxy itself. The same problem appears in Kerberos:
there, clients decide what Kerberos realm to trust for a given
hostname. The service portion of this name is imported into the
user-or-service portion of the mechanism name; the host portion is
imported into the host portion of the mechanism name. The realm
portion is empty. However, authentication will typically fail unless
some AAA component indicates the realm to the EAP server. If the
application server knows its realm, then it should be indicated in
the outgoing AAA request. Otherwise, a proxy SHOULD add the realm.
An alternate form of this name type MAY be used on acceptors; in this
case the name form is "service" with no host component. This is
imported with the service as user-or-service and an empty host and
realm portion. This form is useful when a service is unsure which
name an initiator knows it by.

If the null name type or the GSS_EAP_NT_EAP_NAME (OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.15.2.1) (see Section 7.1 ) is imported, then the string
representation above should be directly imported. Mechanisms MAY support the GSS_KRB5_NT_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_NAME name form with the OID (iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) krb5(2) krb5_name(1)). In many circumstances, Kerberos GSS-API mechanism names will behave as expected when used with the GSS-API EAP mechanism, but there are some differences that may cause some confusion. If an implementation does support importing Kerberos names it SHOULD fail the import if the Kerberos name is not syntactically a valid GSS-API EAP mechanism name as defined in this section.

3.2. Internationalization of Names

For the most part, GSS-EAP names are transported in other protocols; those protocols define the internationalization semantics. For example, if an AAA server wishes to communicate the user-or-service portion of the initiator name to an acceptor, it does so using existing mechanisms in the AAA protocol. Existing internationalization rules are applied. Similarly, within an application, existing specifications such as [RFC5178] define the encoding of names that are imported and displayed with the GSS-API.

This mechanism does introduce a few cases where name components are sent. In these cases the encoding of the string is UTF-8. Senders SHOULD NOT normalize or map strings before sending. These strings include RADIUS attributes introduced in Section 3.4.

When comparing the host portion of a GSS-EAP acceptor name supplied in EAP channel binding by a peer to that supplied by an acceptor, EAP servers SHOULD prepare the host portion according to [RFC5891] prior to comparison. Applications MAY prepare domain names prior to importing them into this mechanism.

3.3. Exported Mechanism Names

GSS-API provides the GSS_Export_name call. This call can be used to export the binary representation of a name. This name form can be stored on access control lists for binary comparison.

The exported name token MUST use the format described in section 3.2 of RFC 2743. The mechanism specific portion of this name token is the string format of the mechanism name described in Section 3.1.

RFC 2744 [RFC2744] places the requirement that the result of importing a name, canonicalizing it to a Mechanism Name and then exporting it needs to be the same as importing that name, obtaining credentials for that principal, initiating a context with those credentials and exporting the name on the acceptor. In practice, GSS
mechanisms often, but not always meet this requirement. For names expected to be used as initiator names, this requirement is met. However, permitting empty host and realm components when importing hostbased services may make it possible for an imported name to differ from the exported name actually used. Other mechanisms such as Kerberos have similar situations where imported and exported names may differ.

3.4. Acceptor Name RADIUS AVP

See Section 7.4 for registrations of RADIUS attribute types to carry the acceptor service name. All the attribute types registered in that section are strings. See Section 3.1 for details of the values in a name.

If RADIUS is used as an AAA transport, the acceptor MUST send the acceptor name in these attribute types. That is, the acceptor decomposes its name and sends any non-empty portion as a RADIUS attribute. With the exception of the service-specifics portion of the name, the backslash escaping mechanism is not used in RADIUS attributes; backslash has no special meaning. In the service-specifics portion, a literal "/" separates components. In this one attribute, "/" indicates a slash character that does not separate components and "\" indicates a literal backslash character.

The initiator MUST require that the EAP method in use support channel binding and MUST send the acceptor name as part of the channel binding data. The client MUST NOT indicate mutual authentication in the result of GSS_Init_Sec_Context unless all name elements that the client supplied are in a successful channel binding response. For example, if the client supplied a hostname in channel binding data, the hostname MUST be in a successful channel binding response.

If an empty target name is supplied to GSS_Init_Sec_Context, the initiator MUST fail context establishment unless the acceptor supplies the acceptor name response (Section 5.4.3). If a null target name is supplied, the initiator MUST use this response to populate EAP channel bindings.

3.5. Proxy Verification of Acceptor Name

Proxies may play a role in verification of the acceptor identity. For example, an AAA proxy near the acceptor may be in a position to verify the acceptor hostname, while the EAP server is likely to be too distant to reliably verify this on its own.

The EAP server or some proxy trusted by the EAP server is likely to be in a position to verify the acceptor realm. In effect, this proxy
is confirming that the right AAA credential is used for the claimed realm and thus that the acceptor is in the organization it claims to be part of. This proxy is also typically trusted by the EAP server to make sure that the hostname claimed by the acceptor is a reasonable hostname for the realm of the acceptor.

A proxy close to the EAP server is unlikely to be in a position to confirm that the acceptor is claiming the correct hostname. Instead this is typically delegated to a proxy near the acceptor. That proxy is typically expected to verify the acceptor hostname and to verify the appropriate AAA credential for that host is used. Such a proxy may insert the acceptor realm if it is absent, permitting realm configuration to be at the proxy boundary rather than on acceptors.

Ultimately specific proxy behavior is a matter for deployment. The EAP server MUST assure that the appropriate validation has been done before including acceptor name attributes in a successful channel binding response. If the acceptor service is included the EAP server asserts that the service is plausible for the acceptor. If the acceptor hostname is included the EAP server asserts that the acceptor hostname is verified. If the realm is included the EAP server asserts that the realm has been verified, and if the hostname was also included, that the realm and hostname are consistent. Part of this verification MAY be delegated to proxies, but the EAP server configuration MUST guarantee that the combination of proxies meets these requirements. Typically such delegation will involve business or operational measures such as cross-organizational agreements as well as technical measures.

It is likely that future technical work will be needed to communicate what verification has been done by proxies along the path. Such technical measures will not release the EAP server from its responsibility to decide whether proxies on the path should be trusted to perform checks delegated to them. However technical measures could prevent misconfigurations and help to support diverse environments.
4. Selection of EAP Method

EAP does not provide a facility for an EAP server to advertise what methods are available to a peer. Instead, a server starts with its preferred method selection. If the peer does not accept that method, the peer sends a NAK response containing the list of methods supported by the client.

Providing multiple facilities to negotiate which security mechanism to use is undesirable. Section 7.3 of [RFC4462] describes the problem referencing the SSH key exchange negotiation and the SPNEGO GSS-API mechanism. If a client preferred an EAP method A, a non-EAP authentication mechanism B, and then an EAP method C, then the client would have to commit to using EAP before learning whether A is actually supported. Such a client might end up using C when B is available.

The standard solution to this problem is to perform all the negotiation at one layer. In this case, rather than defining a single GSS-API mechanism, a family of mechanisms should be defined. Each mechanism corresponds to an EAP method. The EAP method type should be part of the GSS-API OID. Then, a GSS-API rather than EAP facility can be used for negotiation.

Unfortunately, using a family of mechanisms has a number of problems. First, GSS-API assumes that both the initiator and acceptor know the entire set of mechanisms that are available. Some negotiation mechanisms are driven by the client; others are driven by the server. With EAP GSS-API, the acceptor does not know what methods the EAP server implements. The EAP server that is used depends on the identity of the client. The best solution so far is to accept the disadvantages of multi-layer negotiation and commit to using EAP GSS-API before a specific EAP method. This has two main disadvantages. First, authentication may fail when other methods might allow authentication to succeed. Second, a non-optimal security mechanism may be chosen.
5. Context Tokens

All context establishment tokens emitted by the EAP mechanism SHALL have the framing described in section 3.1 of [RFC2743], as illustrated by the following pseudo-ASN.1 structures:

```asn1
GSS-API DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN

MechType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- representing EAP mechanism
GSSAPI-Token ::=  
-- option indication (delegation, etc.) indicated within
-- mechanism-specific token
[APPLICATION 0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE {
  thisMech MechType,
  innerToken ANY DEFINED BY thisMech 
  -- contents mechanism-specific 
  -- ASN.1 structure not required
}

END
```

The innerToken field starts with a 16-bit network byte order token type identifier. The remainder of the innerToken field is a set of type-length-value subtokens. The following figure describes the structure of the inner token:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Octet Position</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0..1</td>
<td>token ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2..5</td>
<td>first subtoken type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6..9</td>
<td>length of first subtoken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10..10+n-1</td>
<td>first subtoken body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10+n..10+n+3</td>
<td>second subtoken type</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The inner token continues with length, second subtoken body, and so forth. If a subtoken type is present, its length and body MUST be present.

Structure of Inner Token

The length is a four-octet length of the subtoken body in network
byte order. The length does not include the length of the type field or the length field; the length only covers the body.

Tokens from the initiator to acceptor use an inner token type with ID 06 01; tokens from acceptor to initiator use an inner token type with ID 06 02. These token types are registered in the registry of RFC 4121 token types; see Section 7.2.

See Section 5.7 for the encoding of a complete token. The following sections discuss how mechanism OIDs are chosen and the state machine that defines what subtokens are permitted at each point in the context establishment process.

5.1. Mechanisms and Encryption Types

This mechanism family uses the security services of the Kerberos cryptographic framework [RFC3961]. The root of the OID ARC for mechanisms described in this document is 1.3.6.1.5.5.15.1.1; a Kerberos encryption type number [RFC3961] is appended to that root OID to form a mechanism OID. As such, a particular encryption type needs to be chosen. By convention, there is a single object identifier arc for the EAP family of GSS-API mechanisms. A specific mechanism is chosen by adding the numeric Kerberos encryption type number to the root of this arc. However, in order to register the SASL name, the specific usage with a given encryption type needs to be registered. This document defines the EAP-AES128 GSS-API mechanism.

5.2. Processing received tokens

Whenever a context token is received, the receiver performs the following checks. First the receiver confirms the object identifier is that of the mechanism being used. The receiver confirms that the token type corresponds to the role of the peer: acceptors will only process initiator tokens and initiators will only process acceptor tokens.

Implementations of this mechanism maintain a state machine for the context establishment process. Both the initiator and acceptor start out in the initial state; see Section 5.4 for a description of this state. Associated with each state are a set of subtoken types that are processed in that state and rules for processing these subtoken types. The reciever examines the subtokens in order, processing any that are appropriate for the current state. Unknown subtokens or subtokens that are not expected in the current state are ignored if their critical bit (see below) is clear.

A state may have a set of required subtoken types. If a subtoken
type is required by the current state but no subtoken of that type is
present, then the context establishment MUST fail.

The most-significant bit (0x80000000) in a subtoken type is the
critical bit. If a subtoken with this bit set in the type is
received, the receiver MUST fail context establishment unless the
subtoken is understood and processed for the current state.

The subtoken type MUST be unique within a given token.

5.3. Error Subtokens

The acceptor may always end the exchange by generating an error
subtoken. The error subtoken has the following format:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pos</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0..3</td>
<td>0x80 00 00 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4..7</td>
<td>length of error token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8..11</td>
<td>major status from RFC 2744 as 32-bit network byte order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12..15</td>
<td>GSS EAP error code as 32-bit network byte order; see Section 7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initiators MUST ignore octets beyond the GSS EAP error code for future extensibility. As indicated, the error token is always marked critical.

5.4. Initial State

Both the acceptor and initiator start the context establishment process in the initial state.

The initiator sends a token to the acceptor. It MAY be empty; no subtokens are required in this state. Alternatively the initiator MAY include a vendor ID subtoken or an acceptor name request subtoken.

The acceptor responds to this message. It MAY include an acceptor name response subtoken. It MUST include a first eap request; this is an EAP request/identity message (see Section 5.5.1 for the format of this subtoken).

The initiator and acceptor then transition to authenticate state.
5.4.1. Vendor Subtoken

The vendor ID token has type 0x0000000B and the following structure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pos</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0..3</td>
<td>0x0000000B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4..7</td>
<td>length of vendor token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8..8+length</td>
<td>Vendor ID string</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The vendor ID string is an UTF-8 string describing the vendor of this implementation. This string is unstructured and for debugging purposes only.

5.4.2. Acceptor Name Request

The acceptor name request token is sent from the initiator to the acceptor indicating that the initiator wishes a particular acceptor name. This is similar to TLS Server Name Indication [RFC6066] which permits a client to indicate which one of a number of virtual services to contact. The structure is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pos</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0..3</td>
<td>0x00000002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4..7</td>
<td>Length of subtoken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8..n</td>
<td>string form of acceptor name</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is likely that channel binding and thus authentication will fail if the acceptor does not choose a name that is a superset of this name. That is, if a hostname is sent, the acceptor needs to be willing to accept this hostname.

5.4.3. Acceptor Name Response

The acceptor name response subtoken indicates what acceptor name is used. This is useful for example if the initiator supplied no target name to context initialization. This allows the initiator to learn the acceptor name. EAP channel bindings will provide confirmation that the acceptor is accurately naming itself.
this token is sent from the acceptor to initiator. In the Initial state, this token would typically be sent if the acceptor name request is absent, because if the initiator already sent an acceptor name then the initiator knows what acceptor it wishes to contact. This subtoken is also sent in extensions state Section 5.6 so the initiator can protect against a man-in-the-middle modifying the acceptor name request subtoken.

+-----+---------------------------------+
| Pos | Description                     |
|-----|---------------------------------+
| 0..3| 0x00000003                      |
| 4..7| Length of subtoken              |
| 8..n| string form of acceptor name    |

5.5. Authenticate State

In this state, the acceptor sends EAP requests to the initiator and the initiator generates EAP responses. The goal of the state is to perform a successful EAP authentication. Since the acceptor sends an identity request at the end of the initial state, the first half-round-trip in this state is a response to that request from the initiator.

The EAP conversation can end in a number of ways:

- If the EAP state machine generates an EAP success message, then the EAP authenticator believes the authentication is successful. The Acceptor MUST confirm that a key has been derived (Section 7.10 of [RFC3748]). The acceptor MUST confirm that this success indication is consistent with any protected result indication for combined authenticators and with AAA indication of success for pass-through authenticators. If any of these checks fail, the acceptor MUST send an error subtoken and fail the context establishment. If these checks succeed the acceptor sends the success message using the EAP Request subtoken type and transitions to Extensions state. If the initiator receives an EAP Success message, it confirms that a key has been derived and that the EAP success is consistent with any protected result indication. If so, it transitions to Extensions state. Otherwise, it returns an error to the caller of GSS_Init_Sec_context without producing an output token.

- If the acceptor receives an EAP failure, then the acceptor sends this in the Eap Request subtoken type. If the initiator receives
an EAP Failure, it returns GSS failure.

- If there is some other error, the acceptor MAY return an error subtoken.

### 5.5.1. EAP Request Subtoken

The EAP Request subtoken is sent from the acceptor to the initiator. This subtoken is always critical and is REQUIRED in the authentication state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pos</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0..3</td>
<td>0x80000005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4..7</td>
<td>Length of EAP message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8..8+length</td>
<td>EAP message</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.5.2. EAP Response Subtoken

This subtoken is REQUIRED in authentication state messages from the initiator to the acceptor. It is always critical.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pos</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0..3</td>
<td>0x80000004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4..7</td>
<td>Length of EAP message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8..8+length</td>
<td>EAP message</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.6. Extension State

After EAP success, the initiator sends a token to the acceptor including additional subtokens that negotiate optional features or provide GSS-API channel binding (see Section 6.1). The acceptor then responds with a token to the initiator. When the acceptor produces its final token it returns GSS_S_COMPLETE; when the initiator consumes this token it returns GSS_S_COMPLETE if no errors are detected.

The acceptor SHOULD send an acceptor name response (Section 5.4.3) so that the initiator can get a copy of the acceptor name protected by
the MIC subtoken.

Both the initiator and acceptor MUST include and verify a MIC subtoken to protect the extensions exchange.

5.6.1. Flags Subtoken

This token is sent to convey initiator flags to the acceptor. The flags are sent as a 32-bit integer in network byte order. The only flag defined so far is GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG, indicating that the initiator successfully performed mutual authentication of the acceptor. This flag is communicated to the acceptor because some protocols [RFC4462] require the acceptor to know whether the initiator has confirmed its identity. This flag has the value 0x2 to be consistent with RFC 2744.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pos</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0..3</td>
<td>0x0000000C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4..7</td>
<td>length of flags token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8..11</td>
<td>flags</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initiators MUST send 4 octets of flags. Acceptors MUST ignore flag octets beyond the first 4 and MUST ignore flag bits other than GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG. Initiators MUST send undefined flag bits as zero.

5.6.2. GSS Channel Bindings Subtoken

This token is always critical when sent. It is sent from the initiator to the acceptor. The contents of this token are an RFC 3961 get_mic token of the application data from the GSS channel bindings structure passed into the context establishment call.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pos</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0..3</td>
<td>0x80000006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4..7</td>
<td>length of token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8..8+length</td>
<td>get_mic of channel binding application data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, only the application data is sent in the channel binding. Any
initiator and acceptor addresses passed by an application into
case establishment calls are ignored and not sent over the wire.
The checksum type of the get_mic token SHOULD be the mandatory to
implement checksum type of the Context Root Key (CRK.) The key to
use is the CRK and the key usage is 60 (KEY_USAGE_GSSEAP_CHBIND_MIC).
An acceptor MAY accept any MIC in the channel bindings subtoken if
the channel bindings input to GSS_Accept_Sec_context is not provided.
If the channel binding input to GSS_Accept_Sec_context is provided,
the acceptor MUST return failure if the channel binding MIC in a
received channel binding subtoken fails to verify.

The initiator MUST send this token if channel bindings including
application data are passed into GSS_Init_Sec_context and MUST NOT
send this token otherwise.

5.6.3. MIC Subtoken

This token MUST be the last subtoken in the tokens sent in Extensions
state. This token is sent both by the initiator and acceptor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pos</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0..3</td>
<td>0x8000000D for initiator 0x8000000E for acceptor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4..7</td>
<td>Length of RFC 3961 MIC token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8..8+length</td>
<td>RFC 3961 result of get_mic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with any call to get_mic, a token is produced as described in RFC
3961 using the CRK Section 6 as the key and the mandatory checksum
type for the encryption type of the CRK as the checksum type. The
key usage is 61 (KEY_USAGE_GSSEAP_ACCTOKEN_MIC) for the subtoken from
the acceptor to the initiator and 62 (KEY_USAGE_GSSEAP_INITTOKEN_MIC)
for the subtoken from the initiator to the acceptor. The input is as
follows:

1. The DER-encoded object identifier of the mechanism in use; this
   value starts with 0x06 (the tag for object identifier). When
   encoded in an RFC 2743 context token, the object identifier is
   preceeded by the tag and length for [Application 0] SEQUENCE.
   This tag and the length of the overall token is not included;
   only the tag, length and value of the object identifier itself.

2. A 16-bit token type in network byte order of the RFC 4121 token
   identifier (0x0601 for initiator, 0x0602 for acceptor).
3. For each subtoken other than the MIC subtoken itself in the order the subtokens appear in the token:

1. A four octet subtoken type in network byte order
2. A four byte length in network byte order
3. Length octets of value from that subtoken

5.7. Example Token

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>60</th>
<th>23</th>
<th>06</th>
<th>09</th>
<th>2b</th>
<th>06 01 05 05 0f 01 01 11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>App0</td>
<td>Token</td>
<td>OID</td>
<td>OID</td>
<td>1 3</td>
<td>6 1 5 15 1 1 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tag</td>
<td>length</td>
<td>Tag</td>
<td>length</td>
<td>Mechanism object id</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+----------+-------------+-------------+
| 06 01    | 00 00 00 02 | 00 00 00 0e |
| Initiator | Acceptor    | Length      |
| context   | name        | (14 octets) |

+----------+-------------+-------------+
| 68 6f 73 74 2f 6c 6f 63 61 6c 68 6f 73 74 |
| String form of acceptor name |
| "host/localhost" |

5.8. Context Options

GSS-API provides a number of optional per-context services requested by flags on the call to GSS_Init_sec_context and indicated as outputs from both GSS_Init_sec_context and GSS_Accept_sec_context. This section describes how these services are handled. Which services the client selects in the call to GSS_Init_sec_context controls what EAP methods MAY be used by the client. Section 7.2 of RFC 3748 describes a set of security claims for EAP. As described below, the selected GSS options place requirements on security claims that MUST be met.
This GSS mechanism MUST only be used with EAP methods that provide dictionary attack resistance. Typically dictionary attack resistance is obtained by using an EAP tunnel method to tunnel an inner method in TLS.

The EAP method MUST support key derivation. Integrity, confidentiality, sequencing and replay detection MUST be indicated in the output of GSS_Init_Sec_Context and GSS_Accept_Sec_context regardless of which services are requested.

The PROT_READY service defined in Section 1.2.7 of [RFC2743] is never available with this mechanism. Implementations MUST NOT offer this flag or permit per-message security services to be used before context establishment.

The EAP method MUST support mutual authentication and channel binding. See Section 3.4 for details on what is required for successful mutual authentication. Regardless of whether mutual authentication is requested, the implementation MUST include channel bindings in the EAP authentication. If mutual authentication is requested and successful mutual authentication takes place as defined in Section 3.4, the initiator MUST send a flags subtoken Section 5.6.1 in Extensions state.
6. Acceptor Services

The context establishment process may be passed through to a EAP server via a backend authentication protocol. However after the EAP authentication succeeds, security services are provided directly by the acceptor.

This mechanism uses an RFC 3961 cryptographic key called the context root key (CRK). The CRK is derived from the GMSK (GSS-API MSK). The GMSK is the result of the random-to-key [RFC3961] operation of the encryption type of this mechanism consuming the appropriate number of bits from the EAP master session key. For example for aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96, the random-to-key operation consumes 16 octets of key material; thus the first 16 bytes of the master session key are input to random-to-key to form the GMSK. If the MSK is too short, authentication MUST fail.

In the following, pseudo-random is the RFC 3961 pseudo-random operation for the encryption type of the GMSK and random-to-key is the RFC 3961 random-to-key operation for the enctype of the mechanism. The truncate function takes the initial l bits of its input. The goal in constructing a CRK is to call the pseudo-random function enough times to produce the right number of bits of output and discard any excess bits of output.

The CRK is derived from the GMSK using the following procedure

\begin{align*}
T_n &= \text{pseudo-random}(\text{GMSK}, n \mid "rfc4121-gss-eap") \\
\text{CRK} &= \text{random-to-key}(\text{truncate}(L, T_0 \mid T_1 \mid .. \mid T_n)) \\
L &= \text{random-to-key input size}
\end{align*}

Where n is a 32-bit integer in network byte order starting at 0 and incremented to each call to the pseudo_random operation.

6.1. GSS-API Channel Binding

GSS-API channel binding [RFC5554] is a protected facility for exchanging a cryptographic name for an enclosing channel between the initiator and acceptor. The initiator sends channel binding data and the acceptor confirms that channel binding data has been checked.

The acceptor SHOULD accept any channel binding provided by the initiator if null channel bindings are passed into gss_accept_sec_context. Protocols such as HTTP Negotiate [RFC4559] depend on this behavior of some Kerberos implementations.

As discussed, the GSS channel bindings subtoken is sent in the extensions state.
6.2. Per-message security

The per-message tokens of section 4 of RFC 4121 are used. The CRK SHALL be treated as the initiator sub-session key, the acceptor sub-session key and the ticket session key.

6.3. Pseudo Random Function

The pseudo random function defined in [RFC4402] is used to provide GSS_Pseudo_Random functionality to applications.
7.  Iana Considerations

This specification creates a number of IANA registries.

7.1.  OID Registry

IANA is requested to create a registry of ABFAB object identifiers titled "Object Identifiers for Application Bridging for federated Access". The initial contents of the registry are specified below. The registration policy is IETF review or IESG approval. Early allocation is permitted. IANA is requested to update the reference for the root of this OID delegation to point to the newly created registry.

Prefix: iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms.abfab (1.3.6.1.5.5.15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decimal</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>mechanisms</td>
<td>A sub-arc containing ABFAB mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>nametypes</td>
<td>A sub-arc containing ABFAB GSS-API Name Types</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: the following mechanisms registry are the root of the OID for the mechanism in question. As discussed in Section 5.1 [draft-ietf-abbfab-gss-eap], a Kerberos encryption type number [RFC3961] is appended to the mechanism version OID below to form the OID of a specific mechanism.

Prefix: iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms.abfab.mechanisms (1.3.6.1.5.5.15.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decimal</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>gss-eap-v1</td>
<td>The GSS-EAP mechanism</td>
<td>[this spec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prefix: iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms.abfab.nametypes (1.3.6.1.5.5.15.2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decimal</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>GSS_EAP_NT_EAP_NAME</td>
<td>sect 3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.2. RFC 4121 Token Identifiers

In the top level registry titled "Kerberos V GSS-API Mechanism Parameters," a sub-registry called "Kerberos GSS-API Token Type Identifiers" is created; the overall reference for this subregistry is section 4.1 of RFC 4121. The allocation procedure is expert review [RFC5226]. The expert’s primary job is to make sure that token type identifiers are requested by an appropriate requester for the RFC 4121 mechanism in which they will be used and that multiple values are not allocated for the same purpose. For RFC 4121 and this mechanism, the expert is currently expected to make allocations for token identifiers from documents in the IETF stream; effectively for these mechanisms the expert currently confirms the allocation meets the requirements of the IETF review process.

The ID field is a hexadecimal token identifier specified in network byte order.

The initial registrations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 00</td>
<td>KRB_AP_REQ</td>
<td>RFC 4121 sect 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 00</td>
<td>KRB_AP_REP</td>
<td>RFC 4121 sect 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 00</td>
<td>KRB_ERROR</td>
<td>RFC 4121 sect 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 04</td>
<td>MIC tokens</td>
<td>RFC 4121 sect 4.2.6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 04</td>
<td>wrap tokens</td>
<td>RFC 4121 sect 4.2.6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 01</td>
<td>GSS-EAP initiator context token</td>
<td>Section 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 02</td>
<td>GSS-EAP acceptor context token</td>
<td>Section 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.3. GSS EAP Subtoken Types

This document creates a top level registry called "The Extensible Authentication Protocol Mechanism for the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface (GSS-EAP) Parameters". In any short form of that name, including any URI for this registry, it is important that the string GSS come before the string EAP; this will help to distinguish registries if EAP methods for performing GSS-API authentication are ever defined.
In this registry is a subregistry of subtoken types; identifiers are 32-bit integers; the upper bit (0x80000000) is reserved as a critical flag and should not be indicated in the registration. Assignments of GSS EAP subtoken types are made by expert review. The expert is expected to require a public specification of the subtoken similar in detail to registrations given in this document. The security of GSS-EAP depends on making sure that subtoken information has adequate protection and that the overall mechanism continues to be secure. Examining the security and architectural consistency of the proposed registration is the primary responsibility of the expert.

+------------+--------------------------+---------------+
| Type       | Description              | Reference     |
+------------+--------------------------+---------------+
| 0x00000001 | Error                    | Section 5.3   |
| 0x0000000B | Vendor                   | Section 5.4.1 |
| 0x00000002 | Acceptor name request    | Section 5.4.2 |
| 0x00000003 | Acceptor name response   | Section 5.4.3 |
| 0x00000005 | EAP request              | Section 5.5.1 |
| 0x00000004 | EAP response             | Section 5.5.2 |
| 0x0000000C | Flags                    | Section 5.6.1 |
| 0x00000006 | GSS-API channel bindings | Section 5.6.2 |
| 0x0000000D | Initiator MIC            | Section 5.6.3 |
| 0x0000000E | Acceptor MIC             | Section 5.6.3 |
+------------+--------------------------+---------------+

7.4. RADIUS Attribute Assignments

The following RADIUS attribute type values [RFC3575] are assigned. The assignment rules in section 10.3 of [I-D.ietf-radext-radius-extensions] may be used if that specification is approved when IANA actions for this specification are processed.
7.5. Registration of the EAP-AES128 SASL Mechanisms

Subject: Registration of SASL mechanisms
EAP-AES128 and EAP-AES128-PLUS

SASL mechanism names: EAP-AES128 and EAP-AES128-PLUS

Security considerations: See RFC 5801 and draft-ietf-abfab-gss-eap

Published specification (recommended): draft-ietf-abfab-gss-eap

Person & email address to contact for further information:
Abfab Working Group abfab@ietf.org

Intended usage: common

Owner/Change controller: iesg@ietf.org

Note: This mechanism describes the GSS-EAP mechanism used with
the aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 enctype. The GSS-API OID for this
mechanism is 1.3.6.1.5.5.15.1.1.17
As described in RFC 5801 a PLUS varient of this mechanism is
also required.

7.6. GSS EAP Errors

A new subregistry is created in the GSS EAP parameters registry
titled "Error Codes". The error codes in this registry are unsigned
32-bit numbers. Values less than or equal to 127 are assigned by
standards action. Values 128 through 255 are assigned with the
specification required assignment policy. Values greater than 255
are reserved; updates to registration policy may make these values
available for assignment and implementations MUST be prepared to

Hartman & Howlett Expires February 14, 2013 [Page 31]
receive them.

This table provides the initial contents of the registry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Buffer is incorrect size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Incorrect mechanism OID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Token is corrupted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Token is truncated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Packet received by direction that sent it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Incorrect token type identifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Unhandled critical subtoken received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Missing required subtoken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Duplicate subtoken type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Received unexpected subtoken for current state xxx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>EAP did not produce a key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>EAP key too short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Authentication rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>AAA returned an unexpected message type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>AAA response did not include EAP request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Generic AAA failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.7.  GSS EAP Context Flags

A new sub-registry is created in the GSS EAP parameters registry. This registry holds registrations of flag bits sent in the flags subtoken Section 5.6.1. There are 32 flag bits available for registration represented as hexadecimal numbers from the most-
significant bit 0x80000000 to the least significant bit 0x1. The registration policy for this registry is IETF review or in exceptional cases IESG approval. The following table indicates initial registrations; all other values are available for assignment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x2</td>
<td>GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG</td>
<td>Section 5.6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Security Considerations

RFC 3748 discusses security issues surrounding EAP. RFC 5247 discusses the security and requirements surrounding key management that leverages the AAA infrastructure. These documents are critical to the security analysis of this mechanism.

RFC 2743 discusses generic security considerations for the GSS-API. RFC 4121 discusses security issues surrounding the specific per-message services used in this mechanism.

As discussed in Section 4, this mechanism may introduce multiple layers of security negotiation into application protocols. Multiple layer negotiations are vulnerable to a bid-down attack when a mechanism negotiated at the outer layer is preferred to some but not all mechanisms negotiated at the inner layer; see section 7.3 of [RFC4462] for an example. One possible approach to mitigate this attack is to construct security policy such that the preference for all mechanisms negotiated in the inner layer falls between preferences for two outer layer mechanisms or falls at one end of the overall ranked preferences including both the inner and outer layer. Another approach is to only use this mechanism when it has specifically been selected for a given service. The second approach is likely to be common in practice because one common deployment will involve an EAP supplicant interacting with a user to select a given identity. Only when an identity is successfully chosen by the user will this mechanism be attempted.

EAP channel binding is used to give the GSS-API initiator confidence in the identity of the GSS-API acceptor. Thus, the security of this mechanism depends on the use and verification of EAP channel binding. Today EAP channel binding is in very limited deployment. If EAP channel binding is not used, then the system may be vulnerable to phishing attacks where a user is diverted from one service to another. If the EAP method in question supports mutual authentication then users can only be diverted between servers that are part of the same AAA infrastructure. For deployments where membership in the AAA infrastructure is limited, this may serve as a significant limitation on the value of phishing as an attack. For other deployments, use of EAP channel binding is critical to avoid phishing. These attacks are possible with EAP today although not typically with common GSS-API mechanisms. For this reason, implementations are required to implement and use EAP channel binding; see Section 3 for details.

The security considerations of EAP channel binding [I-D.ietf-emu-chbind] describe the security properties of channel binding. Two attacks are worth calling out here. First, when a
tunneled EAP method is used, it is critical that the channel binding be performed with an EAP server trusted by the peer. With existing EAP methods this typically requires validating the certificate of the server tunnel endpoint back to a trust anchor and confirming the name of the entity who is a subject of that certificate. EAP methods may suffer from bid-down attacks where an attacker can cause a peer to think that a particular EAP server does not support channel binding. This does not directly cause a problem because mutual authentication is only offered at the GSS-API level when channel binding to the server’s identity is successful. However when an EAP method is not vulnerable to these bid-down attacks, additional protection is available. This mechanism will benefit significantly from new strong EAP methods such as [I-D.ietf-emu-eap-tunnel-method].

Every proxy in the AAA chain from the authenticator to the EAP server needs to be trusted to help verify channel bindings and to protect the integrity of key material. GSS-API applications may be built to assume a trust model where the acceptor is directly responsible for authentication. However, GSS-API is definitely used with trusted-third-party mechanisms such as Kerberos.

RADIUS does provide a weak form of hop-by-hop confidentiality of key material based on using MD5 as a stream cipher. Diameter can use TLS or IPsec but has no mandatory-to-implement confidentiality mechanism. Operationally, protecting key material as it is transported between the IDP and RP is critical to per-message security and verification of GSS-API channel binding [RFC5056]. Mechanisms such as RADIUS over TLS [I-D.ietf-radext-radsec] provide significantly better protection of key material than the base RADIUS specification.
9. Acknowledgements

Luke Howard, Jim Schaad, Alejandro Perez Mendez, Alexey Melnikov and Sujing Zhou provided valuable reviews of this document.

Rhys Smith provided the text for the OID registry section. Sam Hartman’s work on this draft has been funded by JANET.
10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


[I-D.ietf-radext-radsec]


Appendix A. Pre-Publication RADIUS VSA

As described in Section 3.4, RADIUS attributes are used to carry the acceptor name when this family of mechanisms is used with RADIUS. Prior to publication of this specification, a vendor-specific RADIUS attribute was used. This non-normative appendix documents that attribute as it may be seen from older implementations.

Prior to IANA assignment, GSS-EAP used a RADIUS vendor-specific attribute for carrying the acceptor name. The VSA with enterprise ID 25622 is formatted as a VSA according to the recommendation in the RADIUS specification. The following sub-attributes are defined:

+--------------------------------+-----------+----------------------+
| Name                           | Attribute | Description          |
+--------------------------------+-----------+----------------------+
| GSS-Acceptor-Service-Name      | 128       | user-or-service      |
|                                |           | portion of name      |
|                                |           |                      |
| GSS-Acceptor-Host-Name         | 129       | host portion of name |
|                                |           |                      |
| GSS-Acceptor-Service-specifics | 130       | service-specifics    |
|                                |           | portion of name      |
|                                |           |                      |
| GSS-Acceptor-Realm-Name        | 131       | Realm portion of name|
+--------------------------------+-----------+----------------------+
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Name Attributes for the GSS-API EAP mechanism
draft-ietf-abfab-gss-eap-naming-07

Abstract

The naming extensions to the Generic Security Services Application Programming interface provide a mechanism for applications to discover authorization and personalization information associated with GSS-API names. The Extensible Authentication Protocol GSS-API mechanism allows an Authentication/Authorization/Accounting peer to provide authorization attributes along side an authentication response. It also provides mechanisms to process Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) messages provided in the AAA response. This document describes the necessary information to use the naming extensions API to access that information.

Status of this Memo

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ................................................. 3
2. Requirements notation ....................................... 4
3. Naming Extensions and SAML ................................... 5
4. Federated Context ............................................. 6
5. Name Attributes for GSS-EAP ................................. 8
6. Names of SAML Attributes in the Federated Context ........ 9
   6.1. Assertions ............................................. 9
   6.2. SAML Attributes ....................................... 9
   6.3. SAML Name Identifiers ................................. 10
7. Security Considerations ...................................... 11
8. IANA Considerations .......................................... 12
   8.1. Registration of the GSS URN Namespace ................ 12
9. Acknowledgements ............................................ 14
10. References .................................................. 15
   10.1. Normative References ................................. 15
   10.2. Informative References ............................... 16
Authors’ Addresses .............................................. 17
1. Introduction

The naming extensions [I-D.ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts] to the Generic Security Services Application Programming interface (GSS-API) [RFC2743] provide a mechanism for applications to discover authorization and personalization information associated with GSS-API names. The Extensible Authentication Protocol GSS-API mechanism [I-D.ietf-abfab-gss-eap] allows an Authentication/Authorization/Accounting (AAA) peer to provide authorization attributes along side an authentication response. It also provides mechanisms to process Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) messages provided in the AAA response. Other mechanisms such as SAML EC [I-D.ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-ec] also support SAML assertions and attributes carried in the GSS-API. This document describes the necessary information to use the naming extensions API to access SAML assertions in the federated context and AAA attributes.

The semantics of setting attributes defined in this specification are undefined and left to future work.
2. Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Naming Extensions and SAML

SAML assertions can carry attributes describing properties of the subject of the assertion. For example, an assertion might carry an attribute describing the organizational affiliation or e-mail address of a subject. According to Section 8.2 and 2.7.3.1 of [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os], the name of an attribute has two parts. The first is a Universal Resource Identifier (URI) describing the format of the name. The second part, whose form depends on the format URI, is the actual name. GSS-API name attributes may take a form starting with a URI describing the form of the name; the rest of the name is specified by that URI.

SAML attributes carried in GSS-API names are named with three parts. The first is a Universal Resource Name (URN) indicating that the name is a SAML attribute and describing the context (Section 4). This URN is followed by a space, the URI indicating the format of the SAML name, a space and the SAML attribute name. The URI indicating the format of the SAML attribute name is not optional and MUST be present.

SAML attribute names may not be globally unique. Many names that are named by URNs or URIs are likely to have semantics independent of the issuer. However other name formats, including unspecified name formats, make it easy for two issuers to choose the same name for attributes with different semantics. Attributes using the federated context Section 4 are issued by the same party performing the authentication. So, based on who is the subject of the name, the semantics of the attribute can be determined.
4. Federated Context

GSS-API naming extensions have the concept of an authenticated name attribute. The mechanism guarantees that the contents of an authenticated name attribute are an authenticated statement from the trusted source of the peer credential. The fact that an attribute is authenticated does not imply that the trusted source of the peer credential is authorized to assert the attribute.

In the federated context, the trusted source of the peer credential is typically some identity provider. In the GSS EAP mechanism, information is combined from AAA and SAML sources. The SAML IDP and home AAA server are assumed to be in the same trust domain. However, this trust domain is not typically the same as the trust domain of the service. With other SAML mechanisms using this specification, the SAML assertion also comes from the party performing authentication. Typically, the IDP is run by another organization in the same federation. The IDP is trusted to make some statements, particularly related to the context of a federation. For example, an academic federation’s participants would typically trust an IDP’s assertions about whether someone was a student or a professor. However that same IDP would not typically be trusted to make assertions about local entitlements such as group membership. Thus, a service MUST make a policy decision about whether the IDP is permitted to assert a particular attribute and about whether the asserted value is acceptable. This policy can be implemented as local configuration on the service, as rules in AAA proxies, or through other deployment-specific mechanisms.

In contrast, attributes in an enterprise context are often verified by a central authentication infrastructure that is trusted to assert most or all attributes. For example, in a Kerberos infrastructure, the KDC typically indicates group membership information for clients to a server using KDC-authenticated authorization data.

The context of an attribute is an important property of that attribute; trust context is an important part of this overall context. In order for applications to distinguish the context of attributes, attributes with different context need different names. This specification defines attribute names for SAML and AAA attributes in the federated context.

These names MUST NOT be used for attributes issued by a party other than one closely associated with the source of credentials unless the source of credentials is re-asserting the attributes. For example, a source of credentials can consult whatever sources of attributes it chooses, but acceptors can assume attributes in the federated context are from the source of credentials. This requirement is typically
enforced in mechanism specifications. For example [I-D.ietf-abfab-aaa-saml] provides enough information that we know the attributes it carries today are in the federated context. Similarly, we know that the requirements of this paragraph are met by SAML mechanisms where the assertion is the means of authentication.
5. Name Attributes for GSS-EAP

This section describes how RADIUS attributes received in an access-accept message by the GSS-EAP [I-D.ietf-abfab-gss-eap] mechanism are named. The use of attributes defined in this section for other RADIUS messages or prior to the access-accept message is undefined at this time. Future specifications can explore these areas giving adequate weight to backward compatibility. In particular, this specification defines the meaning of these attributes for the src_name output of GSS_Accept_sec_context after that function returns GSS_S_COMPLETE. Attributes MAY be absent or values MAY change in other circumstances; future specifications MAY define this behavior.

The first portion of the name is urn:ietf:params:gss:radius-attribute (a URN indicating that this is a GSS-EAP RADIUS AVP). This is followed by a space and a numeric RADIUS name as described by section 2.6 of [I-D.ietf-radext-radius-extensions]. For example the name of the User-Name attribute is "urn:ietf:params:gss:radius-attribute 1". The name of extended type 1 within type 241 would be "urn:ietf:params:gss:radius-attribute 241.1".

Consider a case where the RADIUS access-accept response includes the RADIUS username attribute. An application wishing to retrieve the value of this attribute would first wait until GSS_Accept_sec_Context returned GSS_S_COMPLETE. Then the application would take the src_name output from GSS_Accept_sec_context and call GSS_Get_name_attribute passing this name and an attribute of "urn:ietf:params:gss:radius-attribute 1" as inputs. After confirming that the authenticated boolean output is true, the application can find the username in the values output.

The value of RADIUS attributes is the raw octets of the packet. Integers are in network byte order. The display value SHOULD be a human readable string; an implementation can only produce this string if it knows the type of a given RADIUS attribute. If multiple attributes are present with a given name in the RADIUS message, then a multi-valued GSS-API attribute SHOULD be returned. As an exception, implementations SHOULD concatenate RADIUS attributes such as EAP-Message or large attributes defined in [I-D.ietf-radext-radius-extensions] that use multiple attributes to carry more than 253 octets of information.
6. Names of SAML Attributes in the Federated Context

6.1. Assertions

An assertion generated by the credential source is named by "urn:ietf:params:gss:federated-saml-assertion". The value of this attribute is the assertion carried in the AAA protocol or used for authentication in a SAML mechanism. This attribute is absent from a given acceptor name if no such assertion is present or if the assertion fails local policy checks.

When GSS_Get_name_attribute is called, This attribute will be returned with the authenticated output set to true only if the mechanism can successfully authenticate the SAML statement. For the GSS-EAP mechanism this is true if the AAA exchange has successfully authenticated. However, uses of the GSS-API MUST confirm that the attribute is marked authenticated as other mechanisms MAY permit an initiator to provide an unauthenticated SAML statement.

Mechanisms MAY perform additional local policy checks and MAY remove the attribute corresponding to assertions that fail these checks.

6.2. SAML Attributes

Each attribute carried in the assertion SHOULD also be a GSS name attribute. The name of this attribute has three parts, all separated by an ASCII space character. The first part is urn:ietf:params:gss:federated-saml-attribute. The second part is the URI for the <saml:Attribute> element’s NameFormat XML attribute. The final part is the <saml:Attribute> element’s Name XML attribute. The SAML attribute name may itself contain spaces. As required by the URI specification, spaces within a URI are encoded as "%20". Spaces within a URI, including either the first or second part of the name, encoded as "%20" do not separate parts of the GSS-API attribute name; they are simply part of the URI.

As an example, if the eduPersonEntitlement attribute is present in an assertion, then an attribute with the name "urn:ietf:params:gss:federated-saml-attribute
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri
urn:oid:1.3.6.1.4.1.5923.1.1.1.7" could be returned from GSS_Inquire_Name. If an application calls GSS_Get_name_attribute with this attribute in the attr parameter then the values output would include one or more URIs of entitlements that were associated with the authenticated user.

If the content of each <saml:AttributeValue> element is a simple text node (or nodes), then the raw and "display" values of the GSS name
attribute MUST be the text content of the element(s). The raw value
MUST be encoded as UTF-8.

If the value is not simple or is empty, then the raw value(s) of the
GSS name attribute MUST be a namespace well-formed serialization
/XMLNS/of the <saml:AttributeValue> element(s) encoded as UTF-8. The
"display" values are implementation-defined.

These attributes SHOULD be marked authenticated if they are contained
in SAML assertions that have been successfully validated back to the
trusted source of the peer credential. In the GSS-EAP mechanism, a
SAML assertion carried in an integrity-protected and authenticated
AAA protocol SHALL be successfully validated; attributes from that
assertion SHALL be returned from GSS_Get_name_attribute with the
authenticated output set to true. An implementation MAY apply local
policy checks to each attribute in this assertion and discard the
attribute if it is unacceptable according to these checks.

6.3. SAML Name Identifiers

The <saml:NameID> carried in the subject of the assertion SHOULD also
be a GSS name attribute. The name of this attribute has two parts,
separated by an ASCII space character. The first part is
urn:ietf:params:gss:federated-saml-nameid. The second part is the
URI for the <saml:NameID> element’s Format XML attribute.

The raw value of the GSS name attribute MUST be the well-formed
serialization of the <saml:NameID> element encoded as UTF-8. The
"display" value is implementation-defined. For formats defined by
section 8.3 of [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os], missing values of the
NameQualifier or SPNameQualifier XML attributes MUST be populated in
accordance with the definition of the format prior to serialization.
In other words, the defaulting rules specified for the "persistent"
and "transient" formats MUST be applied prior to serialization.

This attribute SHOULD be marked authenticated if the name identifier
is contained in a SAML assertion that has been successfully validated
back to the trusted source of the peer credential. In the GSS-EAP
mechanism, a SAML assertion carried in an integrity-protected and
authenticated AAA protocol SHALL be sufficiently validated. An
implementation MAY apply local policy checks to this assertion and
discard it if it is unacceptable according to these checks.
7. Security Considerations

This document describes how to access RADIUS attributes, SAML attributes and SAML assertions from some GSS-API mechanisms. These attributes are typically used for one of two purposes. The least sensitive is personalization: a central service MAY provide information about an authenticated user so they need not enter it with each acceptor they access. A more sensitive use is authorization.

The mechanism is responsible for authentication and integrity protection of the attributes. However, the acceptor application is responsible for making a decision about whether the credential source is trusted to assert the attribute and validating the asserted value.

Mechanisms are permitted to perform local policy checks on SAML assertions, attributes and name identifiers exposed through name attributes defined in this document. If there is another way to get access to the SAML assertion, for example the mechanism described in [I-D.ietf-abfab-aaa-saml], then an application MAY get different results depending on how the SAML is accessed. This is intended behavior; applications who choose to bypass local policy checks SHOULD perform their own evaluation before relying on information.
8. IANA Considerations

A new top-level registry is created titled "Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Parameters".

In this top-level registry, a sub-registry titled "GSS-API URN Parameters" is created. Registration in this registry is by the IETF review or expert review procedures [RFC5226].

This paragraph gives guidance to designated experts. Registrations in this registry are generally only expected as part of protocols published as RFCs on the IETF stream; other URIs are expected to be better choices for non-IETF work. Expert review is permitted mainly to permit early registration related to specifications under development when the community believes they have reach sufficient maturity. The expert SHOULD evaluate the maturity and stability of such an IETF-stream specification. Experts SHOULD review anything not from the IETF stream for consistency and consensus with current practice. Today such requests would not typically be approved.

If the "paramname" parameter is registered in this registry then its URN will be "urn:ietf:params:gss:paramname". The initial registrations are as follows:

```
+--------------------------+-------------+
| Parameter                | Reference   |
+--------------------------+-------------+
| radius-attribute         | Section 5   |
| federated-saml-assertion | Section 6.1 |
| federated-saml-attribute | Section 6.2 |
| federated-saml-nameid    | Section 6.3 |
```

8.1. Registration of the GSS URN Namespace

IANA is requested to register the "gss" URN sub-namespace in the IETF URN sub-namespace for protocol parameters defined in [RFC3553].

Registry Name: gss

Specification: draft-ietf-abfab-gss-eap-naming

Repository: GSS-API URN Parameters (Section 8)

Index Value: Sub-parameters MUST be specified in UTF-8 using standard
URI encoding where necessary.
9. Acknowledgements

Scott Cantor contributed significant text and multiple reviews of this document.

The authors would like to thank Stephen Farrell, Luke Howard, and Jim Schaad.

Sam hartman’s work on this specification has been funded by Janet.
10. References

10.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-abfab-gss-eap]
draft-ietf-abfab-gss-eap-09 (work in progress), August 2012.

[I-D.ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts]

[I-D.ietf-radext-radius-extensions]
draft-ietf-radext-radius-extensions-06 (work in progress), June 2012.

[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]


10.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-abfab-aaa-saml]

[I-D.ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-ec]
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This Internet-Draft, draft-jones-diameter-abfab-00.txt, has expired, and has been deleted from the Internet-Drafts directory. An Internet-Draft expires 185 days from the date that it is posted unless it is replaced by an updated version, or the Secretariat has been notified that the document is under official review by the IESG or has been passed to the RFC Editor for review and/or publication as an RFC. This Internet-Draft was not published as an RFC.

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Abstract

This document describes a mechanism for establishing trust across a multihop federation within the Application Bridging for Federation Beyond the Web (ABFAB) framework.

This document introduces a new entity, the Trust Router. Trust Routers exchange information about the availability of Trust Paths across a multihop federation. They can be queried by a Relying Party to obtain the best Trust Path to reach an Identity Provider. They also provide temporary identities that can be used by a Relying Party to traverse a Trust Path.
Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 3
2. Terminology ................................................... 4
3. Motivation ..................................................... 5
4. Multihop Federation Example ................................. 7
5. Trust Router Protocol ........................................... 9
6. Trust Path Query ................................................ 10
7. Temporary Identity Request .................................... 10
8. Security Considerations ......................................... 11
9. IANA Considerations ............................................. 12
10. Acknowledgements ............................................... 12
11. Change Log ..................................................... 12
   11.1. Changes from -01 to -02 ................................. 12
   11.2. Changes from -00 to -01 ................................. 12
12. References ....................................................... 12
   12.1. Normative References ................................... 12
   12.2. Informative References .................................. 13
Authors’ Addresses ................................................. 13
1. Introduction

This document describes a mechanism for establishing trust across a multihop federation within the Application Bridging for Federation Beyond the Web (ABFAB) framework [I-D.lear-abfab-arch].

This document introduces a new ABFAB entity, the Trust Router. Trust Routers exchange information about the availability of Trust Paths across a multihop federation. ABFAB entity, the Trust Router. These paths are used by RPs to construct transitive trust chains across a federation to a AAA Server (a RADIUS, RadSec or Diameter Server) within a target IdP.

A Trust Path consists of one or more Trust Links. A Trust Link is an assertion that a specific Trust Router is capable of providing temporary identities that can be used to access another entity in the ABFAB system. At this point, we anticipate that there will be two types of Trust Links in ABFAB: a Trust Link that indicates that one Trust Router can be used to reach another Trust Router, and a Trust Link that indicates that a Trust Router can be used to reach a AAA Server. The first type (Trust Router Links) are shown as A->B(T), which indicates that the Trust Router in realm A can create identities to reach the trust router in Realm B. The second type (AAA Links) are shown as A->B(R), to indicate that a trust router in Realm A can be used to reach a AAA Server in Realm B.

Trust Routers exchange information about available Trust Links within a federation, and each Trust Router maintains a tree of available paths to reach all of the IdPs within the federation that can be reached from the local realm of the Trust Router.

When an RP receives a request from a party within a realm that not known directly to the RP, the RP will query its local Trust Router to obtain the best Trust Path to reach that IdP. Note that we use the term ‘best’ here to highlight that there may well be multiple paths to reach an IdP from a given RP, and the selection of the ‘best’ path may involve several factors in addition to the length of the path, such as security and privacy practices, or monetary costs.

The RP will traverse the Trust Path obtained from it’s local Trust Router. At each step, the RP will request a temporary identity to access the next step in the Trust Path, constructing a transitive chain of trust to a AAA Server within the target IdP.

To summarize, the Trust Router performs three functions:

- Trust Routers peer with other Trust Routers to exchange information about available Trust Links, and Trust Paths. This
information is exchanged between Trust Routers using the Trust Router Protocol. The Trust Router Protocol is described in more detail in [I-D.mrw-abfab-trust-router].

- Trust Routers respond to queries from Relying Parties to make information about Trust Paths available. This exchange is referred to as a Trust Path Query Protocol, which is described in Section 6.

- To follow the Trust Path across a federation, the RP will use KNP to ask each Trust Router along the path to provision a temporary identity that can be used to gain access to the next step in the path. This mechanism is called a Temporary Identity Request, which is described in [I-D.howlett-radsec-knp].

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

This document introduces the following terms:

Trust Router:

This is a logical ABFAB entity that exchanges information about Trust Paths that Relying Parties can use to create transitive chains of trust across multihop ABFAB federations.

Trust Link:

A Trust Link is an assertion that a given Trust Router is capable of providing a temporary identity to communicate with another ABFAB entity (either another Trust Router, or a AAA Server within an IdP).

Trust Path:

A Trust Path is a concatenation of Trust Links that can be used by an RP to construct a transitive trust chain across a federation to a target IdP.

Trust Router Protocol:

The Trust Router Protocol is the mechanism used by two Trust Routers to exchange information about Trust Links and Trust Paths.
Community of Interest:

A Community of Interest defines a group of Services and IdPs that have agreed to cooperate to provide access to a specific set of services only to those users within a particular community. Communities of Interest can be layered on top of the base Trust Router infrastructure to allow selected access to IdPs that have joined a specific group, or agreed to a set of community-specific policies.

The terms Identity Provider (IdP), Relying Party (RP), Subject, and Federation are used as defined in [I-D.lear-abfab-arch].

3. Motivation

Figure 1 shows an example federation where the Relying Party Foo, has established relationships with various Identity Providers.

```
+---------------+  | Identity      |
    | Provider     |  `..-._      |
      | Example-A.org|    `-._    |
    +---------------+        `._

+---------------+  | Identity      |
    | Provider     |  `-._      |
      | Example-B.org|    `-._    |
    +---------------+        `-._

+---------------+  | Identity      |
    | Provider     |  `-._      |
      | Example-C.org|    `-._    |
    +---------------+        `-._

Figure 1: One-to-many Federation Example
```

When an RP receives a request to access a protected resource (or requires authentication and authorization for other purposes) the request includes a realm name that indicates the IdP the Subject has selected for this exchange. Offering the Subject the ability to choose among many different IdPs is necessary because a Subject may have, and want to maintain, uncorrelated identities in several
different realms within a single federation (i.e. work, school, social networking, etc.). However, this also places a burden on the RPs to establish and maintain business agreements and exchange security credentials with a potentially large number of Identity Providers.

In order for a single-hop federation to function, each IdP needs to maintain business agreements and exchange credentials with every RP that its Subjects are authorized to access. Figure 2, shows the likely outcome, which is that a single-hop federation will come to resemble a dense mesh topology.

![Mesh Federation Example](image)

**Figure 2: Mesh Federation Example**

As discussed in section 2.1.1 of [I-D.lear-abfab-arch], as the number of organizations involved in a ABFAB federation increase, static configuration may not scale sufficiently. Also, using a Trust Broker to establish keys between entities near the RP and entities near the IDP with improve the security and privacy of an ABFAB federation. Figure 3 shows the structure of a federation where each IdP and RP has a single connection to the Trust Router infrastructure.
To improve the operational scalability and security of large ABFAB federations, this document proposes a Trust Broker solution consisting of a set of Trust Routers, as described in this document, and the Key Negotiation Protocol (KNP), as described in [I-D.howlett-radsec-knp].

4. Multihop Federation Example

The diagram below shows an example of a successful exchange in a multihop federation using the Trust Router Protocol and KNP:
A multihop federation exchange matching the above diagram can be summarized as follows:

1. We start with a single federation including four realms, each containing a single Trust Router. The Trust Routers are peered, such that their interconnections form a multihop federation.

2. A Subject (with an identity in Realm D) attempts to access a service provided by a Relying Party in Realm A.

3. The Relying Party does not have direct access to a AAA Server in Realm D that it can use to authenticate the Subject, so it asks its local Trust Router for a Trust Path to reach Realm D. The Trust Router in Realm A returns the path A->B(T)->C(T)->D(T)->D(R), which indicates that the Relying Party should use the Trust Routers in Realms B, C and D to reach a AAA Server in Realm D, which could then be used to authenticate the
Subject.

4. The Relying Party contacts a Trust Router in Realm B (using its permanent identity in Realm A), and requests the creation of a temporary identity that can be used to communicate with the Trust Router in Realm C.

5. The Relying Party then contacts the Trust Router in Realm C (using the temporary identity returned in the previous step), and asks for a temporary identity that can be used to communicate with the Trust Router in Realm D.

6. The Relying Party then contacts the Trust Router in Realm D (using the temporary identity returned in the previous step), and asks the Trust Router to provision an identity that it can use to speak to the AAA Server in Realm D (which is part of Realm D’s Identity Provider).

7. At this point, the Relying Party can reach the Subject’s Identity provider, and the rest of the ABFAB exchange can continue, as described in [I-D.lear-abfab-arch].

5. Trust Router Protocol

Trust Routers use the Trust Router Protocol to exchange information about available Trust Links, and Trust Paths across a federation.

The Trust Router Protocol differs from an Internet Routing Protocol in a couple of important ways:

- Trust Links are unidirectional. It can not be assumed that the fact that a Trust Router in Realm A is authorized to create temporary identities to access a Trust Router in Realm B, that the opposite is also true (A -> B(T) does not imply B->A(T)).

- Realm names are not necessarily hierarchical. Although aggregation might be possible as a later optimization, the ability to aggregate realm names based on shared roots is not currently assumed.

In addition to the existence of the links themselves, Trust Links have a set of associated attributes that can be used for filtering and tree computation, including:

- The cost of the link.
o Any security and privacy characteristics associated with the link.

o Information indicating how/if the link should be propagated across the federation.

Current thinking is that we will use a BGP-based algorithm for computation of the local tree at each Trust Router, and that we will communicate a similar set of information between Trust Routers as would be communicated between Internet Routers running BGP.

6. Trust Path Query

A Trust Path Query is generated by a RP to request a Trust Path to reach a specific realm within a given Community of Interest. If possible, the Trust Router will reply with a Trust Path that consists of zero or more Trust Router steps and ends with a AAA Server (or a path of multiple AAA Servers) within the IdP for the indicated realm.

The Trust Path Query is initiated by the RP, and the initial query message will contain the destination realm and Community of Interest.

When a Trust Path Query is received by a Trust Router, the router will first authenticate the RP, and check local policy information to determine whether or not to reply.

Assuming that the RP is successfully authenticated and the request passes local policy checks, the Trust Router will search its tree of Trust Path information to determine whether a Trust Path exists that will reach the destination Realm within the indicated Community of Interest. If so, the shortest/best Trust Path will be returned to the Relying Party.

A Trust Path will consist of a list of steps, each of which will contain: The type of the step (Trust Router or AAA Server), the Community of Interest associated with each step, information needed to reach the indicated Trust Router or server (domain name or IP address), and any special attributes associated with that step.

7. Temporary Identity Request

A Temporary Identity Request is issued by a Relying Party in order to obtain an identity that can be used to traverse each step in the Trust Path. When a Temporary Identity is requested, a Trust Router will provision a new identity in its local AAA infrastructure that can be used by the Relying Party to communicate with the Trust Router or AAA Server that represents the next step in the Trust Path.
Current thinking is that KNP will be used as the protocol mechanism for these requests.

These Temporary Identities will have a finite lifetime and, when authenticated, will include a Radius Attribute/Diameter AVP indicating that they were generated based on a Temporary Identity Request. This attribute will include the chain of identities that preceded the current identity in the traversal of the Trust Path.

The details of how these messages will be encoded has not yet been determined. However, it is expected that, for each Trust Router step in the Trust Path, the following actions will take place:

1. The Relying Party will send a Temporary Identity Request message to the Trust Router, containing the identity of the next step in the Trust Path, the destination realm that it is trying to reach, and the Community of Interest in use. This request will be sent using the identity that the Trust Router obtained from the previous step in the Trust Path (or the Trust Router’s permanent identity in its home realm, if this is the first step).

2. The Trust Router will authenticate the Relying Party.

3. If the authentication is successful, the Trust Router will check local policy to determine whether it should provision an identity for the Relying Party for the indicated purpose (details of this check may be implementation dependent).

4. If the request passes any policy requirements, the Trust Router will provision a temporary identity for the Relying Party within the Trust Router’s local realm that can be used to access the next-hop Trust Router or AAA Server in the Trust Path.

8. Security Considerations

This document describes an architecture for the establishment of transitive trust across an ABFAB federation. It describes, at a high level, the entities and protocols that will be used to establish transitive trust, but it does not describe the actual protocols that will be used in detail. Those details, and the detailed Security Considerations associated with them are described in separate documents.

It is important to note that the trust established using a transitive trust mechanism described in this document will only be as good as the weakest link in the transitive trust chain. To service the needs of a highly sensitive Community of Interest, stringent criteria must
be applied to join the Community, sites must be monitored to ensure that they are adhering to the Community’s standards, and local policy may be required to ensure that the chain of trust does not traverse any untrusted, or insufficiently trusted, realms.

9. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA actions required for this document.

10. Acknowledgements

This document was written using the xml2rfc tool described in RFC 2629 [RFC2629].

11. Change Log

11.1. Changes from -01 to -02

  o Changed the term "Policy Regime" to "Community of Interest" throughout the document.

  o Replaced explicit references to RADIUS and Diameter servers with more generic references to AAA Servers.

  o Minor editorial changes.

11.2. Changes from -00 to -01

  o Editorial changes, and additional text throughout document.

12. References

12.1. Normative References

[I-D.howlett-radsec-knp]

[I-D.lear-abfab-arch]
12.2. Informative References


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Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond web (ABFAB) OID Registry
draft-smith-abfab-oidregistry-01

Abstract

The IETF ABFAB working group has been assigned an OID arc by IANA. The goal of this document is to catalogue usage within the arc and the procedures for IANA to use to control the arc after the ABFAB working group has handed the arc over.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

IANA has assigned the IETF ABFAB working group an OID arc of 1.3.6.1.5.5.15 (iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms.abfab). The goal of this document is to catalogue usage within the arc and the procedures for IANA to use to control the arc after the ABFAB working group has handed the arc over.

2. OID Registry

OIDs in usage under this arc are to be passed to IANA when the ABFAB working group deems the arc sufficiently mature. This list is intended to be exhaustive.

Prefix: iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms.abfab (1.3.6.1.5.5.15)

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3. OID registration process

4. Acknowledgements

TODO

5. Security Considerations

TODO
6. IANA Considerations

TODO.

All applications for assigned numbers under the ABFAB OID arc should be reviewed. TODO - Review process? TODO - Mailing list? Guidance to IANA if not review process?

See [RFC2434]

Appendix A. Other Related Arcs - REMOVE BEFORE FINAL VERSION

There are also OIDs in usage under other private arcs. These are not intended to be passed to IANA, but are temporarily recorded here, purely for completeness. This section is intended to be removed for the final version of this I-D. Note that this list may not be exhaustive. TODO - remove this section before final draft.

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7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2.  Informative References

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Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond web (ABFAB) Usability and User Interface Considerations
draft-smith-abfab-usability-ui-considerations-04

Abstract

The use of ABFAB-based technologies requires that each user’s device is configured with the user’s identities that they wish to use in ABFAB transactions. This will require something on that device, either built into the operating system or a standalone utility, that will manage the user’s identities and identity to service mappings. Anyone designing that "something" will face the same set of challenges. This document aims to document these challenges with the aim of producing well-thought out UIs with some degree of consistency.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

The use of ABFAB-based technologies requires that a user’s device is configured with their identities that they wish to use in ABFAB transactions. Achieving this will require something on that device, either built into the operating system or a standalone utility, that will manage the user’s identities and identity to service mappings. Anyone designing that “something” will face the same set of challenges. This document aims to document these challenges with the aim of producing well-thought out UIs with some degree of consistency.

2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Terminology

Various items of terminology used in the document are heavily overloaded and thus could mean a variety of different things to different people. In an attempt to minimise this problem, this section gives a brief description of the main items of terminology used in order to aid with a consistent understanding of this document.

- **NAI**: Network Access Identifier – a standard way of identifying a user. See [RFC4282].
- **Identity**: In this context, an identity is a credential given to a user by a particular organisation with which they have an association. A user MAY have multiple identities. The identity will consist of an NAI, alongside other information that supports authentication.
- **Service**: The thing that the user is attempting to authenticate to via ABFAB technology. See [TODO: Link to ABFAB-Use-Cases] for example use cases of what these services could be.
- **Identity Selector**: The mechanism by which the GSS-API acquires the identity to use with a particular service. An Identity Selector typically would allow the user to configure a set of identities along with service to identity mappings.
- **Trust anchor**: An authoritative source of verification of a particular service, used to allow authentication of a server using X.509 [TODO: link]. Typically a commercial CA to allow
4. Context

When using the ABFAB architecture to perform federated authentication to some service, when a user attempts to authenticate to an ABFAB secured application they will need to provide identity information that they wish to authenticate to that particular service with. This will happen through a process of the application calling the GSS-API, which will in turn gather the users credentials through whatever mechanism it has been configured to do so. We will call this mechanism the "identity selector" in this document, though note that this is not a recommendation on terminology for the mechanism!

The simplest way to achieve the desired effect would be a mechanism that simply takes the credentials from the currently logged in user (e.g. the Windows Domain Credentials) and uses those for all services that request authenticate through ABFAB. This approach gives ultimate simplicity in terms of UI - i.e. it wouldn’t have one - but the least flexibility. If there is ever to be a requirement for a user to use a different set of credentials for a service, then something more complex will be needed.

Where there is a requirement for multiple credentials to be supported, there are of course two methods that could be employed to configure identities and associated information:

- They could be configured manually by a user in a configuration file that could be edited by hand or some such simple mechanism, and read by the GSS-API mechanism. While this could work very well functionally, in practice only a small subset of users would be happy with - and able to - configure their identities in such a manner.

- They could be configured through some interactive mechanism. For ease of use this should have a simple UI, although a headless mode may need to be supported for those not using a GUI.

When designing an identity selector with a UI (or indeed, with a headless mode), any implementer will share a common set of usability considerations inherent to the context. This document aims to explore these considerations, and provide advice and guidance on addressing them where possible.
5. Considerations around Terminology

Anyone designing an identity selector will have to grapple with choosing terminology that the average user has some chance of understanding. This terminology can split into a few main functional areas, as discussed next.

5.1. Identity

The first area where terminology is needed is around the identity/identities of the user. Users are typically used to seeing a variety of terms for aspects of their identity in the federated sense, and an even larger variety in the wider internet sense. For example, in the federated sense some of these terms include "username", "login", "network account", "institutional account", "home organisation account", "credentials", and a myriad of other such terms. However, NAI - the technically correct name for their identity in an ABFAB sense - is highly unlikely to be one of these terms that users are used to seeing.

Implementers of an identity selector will need to carefully consider their intended audience for both their level of technical capability and the existing terminology that they may have been exposed to.

Beyond terminology, careful thought needs to be given to the paradigm to use when presenting identity to users, as identities and services are abstract concepts that some users may not find is easily understandable. Implementers may wish to keep such abstract concepts, or may wish to examine attempts to map to real world paradigms, e.g. the idea of using "Identity Cards" that are held in the user’s "Wallet", as used by Microsoft Cardspace.

5.2. Services

Terminology around services is likely to be less of a problem than identity, but it will actually depend on what the service is. For example, each service could be simply described as "server", "system", etc. But for simplicity just the word "service" will probably suffice.

5.3. Identity to Service Mapping

Depending on your perspective either each identity may be mapped to multiple services, or each service has multiple identities mapped to it. Thus any UI could present either perspective, or both.
6. Considerations around Management of Identities

One of the core features of an identity selector is the management of a user’s identities. This section first looks at what information associated with an identity will need to be managed, and then looks in detail at various usability considerations of this area.

6.1. Information associated with each Identity

There is firstly a minimal set of information that MUST be stored about each identity to allow ABFAB authentication to take place:

- NAI: The user’s Network Access Identifier (see [RFC4282]) for this particular credentials. For example, "joe@example.com".
- Password: The password associated with this particular NAI.
- Trust anchor: For the identity selector to be able to verify that the server it is going to talk to and attempt to authenticate against is the server that it is expecting, and that it is not being spoofed in some way. This is likely to be an X.509 certificate [TODO X509 ref], or a tuple of (trusted root certificate, servername in Subject or subjectAltName).

Next up is a small set of information that SHOULD be stored about each identity to allow the user to effectively select a particular identity:

- Friendly name for identity: To allow the user to differentiate between the set of identities represented in the Identity Selector. This should be editable by the user. The only restriction on this name is that it MUST be unique within that particular user’s set of identities. For example: "My University", "Google Account", "Work Login", etc.
- Friendly icon for identity: To allow the user to differentiate between the set of identities they have they should be able to set an icon for that particular identity.

Finally, there is a set of optional information that MAY be stored about each identity that represent useful information for the user to have. Note that this list is not intended to be exhaustive; any implementer is free to add any more items to their identity selector that make sense in their implementation.

- Password changing URL: The URL the user should visit should they need to change their password for this particular identity. For example, "http://www.example.com/passwordreset".
6.2. Adding/Association of an Identity

Users will have one or more identities given to them by organisations that they have a relationship with. One of the core tasks of an identity selector will be to learn about these identities in order to use them when it comes to authenticating to services on behalf of the user. Adding these identities could be done in one of three ways: manual addition, automated addition that is manually triggered, or automated addition that is automatically triggered. Each of these are discussed in more detail next.

Note that the term "association" or "addition" of an identity is used rather than "provisioning" of an identity, because while we actually are provisioning identities into the UI, provisioning is an overloaded term in the identity and access management space and could easily be confused with identity provisioning in the sense of the creation of the identity by the home organisation's identity management procedures.

6.2.1. Manual Addition

Allowing users to manually add an identity is technically the easiest method to get this information, but it is a method that has the greatest usability drawbacks. Most of the information required is relatively technical and finding some way of explaining what each field is to an non-technical audience is challenging (to say the least). This especially is the case for trust anchor information. Thus this method should be considered as a power-user option only, or as a fall-back should the other methods not be applicable.

When this method is used, careful consideration should be given to the UI presented to the user. The UI will have to ask for all of the information detailed in Section 6.1.

There are two points at which a user could manually add an identity:

- Asynchronously: the user could be allowed to, at any time, trigger a workflow of manually adding an identity. This represents the most flexible way of adding an identity since a user can perform this at any time. It does, however, have inherent issues when it comes to verifying the newly added identity — see Section 6.4.
o Just In Time: when connecting to a service which has no mapping to an existing identity, the user could be given an option to add a new one, as well as associating with an existing one. This presents a better user experience when it comes to verifying the newly added identity (see Section 6.4), however, represents a less direct method of adding an identity. Users who have not yet added the appropriate identity to their identity selector may find it difficult to understand that they must try to access a particular service in order to add an identity.

Of course, implementers could support both styles of identity addition to gain the benefits of both and give flexibility to the user.

One item worthy of discussion here is the area of verification of trust anchors. An Identity Selector SHOULD try to ensure that manual addition of an identity and checking of the relevant trust anchors is done as securely as possible, whereby users have to enter and confirm all trust anchor information, or be required to explicitly agree to an insecure configuration if this is not done properly.

6.2.2. Manually Triggered Automated Addition

One way to bypass the need for manual addition of a user’s identity – and all of the usability issues inherent with that approach – is to provide some sort of manually triggered, but automated, provisioning process.

One approach to accomplishing this, for example, could be for an organisation to have a section on their website where their users could visit, enter the user part of their NAI, and be given piece of provisioning data that contains much or all of the relevant identity information for importing into the identity selector.

It is reasonable to assume that any such provisioning service is likely to be organisation specific, so that the Issuing Organisation and realm part of the NAI will be constant, as would be the trust anchor information. The user part of their NAI will have been input on the web service. The password could be provided as a part of the provisioning file or the identity selector could prompt the user to enter it.

Additionally, the user SHOULD be given the opportunity to:

o Supply or change the default friendly name for that identity – to allow the user to customise the identifier they use for that identity;
o Indicate whether or not the identity selector should always ask before using services with this identity - to customise the way in which the identity selector interacts with the user with this particular identity;

o Reject the addition of the identity completely - to allow the user to back out of the association process in an intuitive way.

In this case, trust anchors could be directly provided through the provisioning mechanism to help establish the trust relationship in a secure manner.

6.2.3. Fully Automated Addition

Many organisations manage the machines of their users using enterprise management tools. Such organisations may wish to be able to automatically add a particular user’s identity to the identity selector on their machine/network account so that the user has to do nothing.

This represents the best usability for the user - who wouldn’t actually have to do anything. However, it can only work on machines centrally managed by the organisation.

Additionally, having an identity automatically provided, including its password, does have some particular usability issues. Users are used to having to provide their username and password to access services. When attempting to access services, authenticating to them completely transparently to the user could represent a source of confusion. User training within an organisation to explain that automated provisioning of their identity has been enabled is the only way to counter this.

6.3. Modifying Identity Information

This process is conceptually fairly similar to adding an identity, and thus shares many of the usability issues with that process. Some particular things are discussed here.

6.3.1. Manual Modification

An identity selector may allow a user to manually modify some or all of the information associated with each identity. The obvious item that MUST be allowed to be changed by the user is the password associated with the identity.
6.3.2. Automated Modification

To ease usability, organisations may wish to automatically provide updates to identity information. For example, if the user’s password changes, it could automatically update the password for the identity in the user’s identity selector.

6.4. Verifying an identity

An inherent by-product of the ABFAB architecture is that an identity cannot be verified during the addition process; it can only be verified while it is in use with a real service. This represents a definite usability issue no matter which method of identity addition is used (see Section 6.2):

- If the user has manually added the identity (see Section 6.2) they may have gone through the whole manual process with no errors and so believe the identity has been set up correctly. However, when they attempt to access a service, they may be given an error message, thus causing some amount of confusion.

- If the user has had the identity provisioned into their identity selector, then there is a much greater chance of the identity information being correct. However, if any of the information is not correct, then there is the potential for confusion as the user did not add the information in the first place.

Also, if the identity information is incorrect the user may not know where the error lies, and the error messages provided by the mechanism may not be helpful enough to indicate the error and how to fix it (see Section 8).

6.5. Removing an Identity

This is fairly similar to adding or modifying an identity, and thus shares many of the usability issues with those processes. Some particular things are discussed here.

6.5.1. Manual Removal

Allowing the user to manually delete an identity is probably the best way to achieve the goal. Any UI should allow for this option.

6.5.2. Automated Removal

While automated removal of an identity is a way of achieving the goal without having to interact with the user, the consequence is that things may disappear from the user’s identity selector without them
realising.

7. Considerations around Management of Service to Identity Mappings

A service to identity mapping tell the identity selector which identity should be used for a particular service. There is potentially a many-to-many association between identities and services since a user may wish to use one of their identities for many services, or more than one identity for a single service (e.g. if they have multiple roles on that service).

This potentially complex many-to-many association between is not easily comprehended by the user, and allowing the user to both manipulate it and control can be challenging. These obstacles are especially common when errors occur after an association has been made. In this scenario it is important that an identity can be disassociated with a service.

7.1. Listing Services and Identities

A service listing should be considered in the identity selector which is both searchable and editable by the user.

7.2. Showing the Identity currently in use

It would be beneficial if, when using a service, the identity currently in use could be made visible to the user while he/she is using a specific service. This allows the user to identify which the identity is used with a particular service at a particular time (the user may have more than one identity that they could use with a particular service) - so that they can then disassociate the pairing.

7.3. Associating a Service with an Identity

There needs to be a way for the user to create the service to identity association. It is advisable that this link be made only after the identity in question has authenticated with the service without any error.

There are a few ways this association could happen.

7.3.1. User-driven Manual Association

There are two ways in which manual association of an identity to a service could happen:

1. The user could manually associate a particular service with a particular identity using the identity selector before they first
attempt to use the service. In order to do so, however, the user would need to know all the required technical details of that service beforehand, such as its GSS Acceptor Name.

2. On encountering a service new to the identity selector, the identity selector could pop up a dialogue box to the user asking if they would like to use an existing identity for this service (and might also allow them to create a new identity and use that).

7.3.2. Automated Rules-based Association

It would be beneficial from a usability perspective to minimise - or avoid entirely - situations where the user has to pick an identity for a particular service. This could be accomplished by having rules to describe services and their mapping to identities. Such a rule could match, for example, a particular identity for all IMAP servers, or a particular identity for all services in a given service realm. These rules could be configured as a part of the automated identity addition process described in Section 6.2.2 or Section 6.2.3.

7.4. Disassociating a Service with an Identity

A user MUST be able to disassociate an identity with a service - that is, to be able to remove the mapping without having to remove the identity.

There should also be provision for the automated disassociation of an identity with a service for appropriate types of authentication failures.

8. Handling of Errors

All GSS-API calls need to be instantiated from the application. For this reason when an error occurs the user needs to be sent back to the application to re-initiate the GSS-API call. This can get tedious and cause the user to opt out of what they are trying to accomplish. In addition to this the error messages themselves may not be useful enough for the user to decipher what has gone wrong.

It is important to try and avoid error cases all together while using GSS-API as error messages and error handling can really effect usability. Another solution would be to alter the application to handle the errors as it is instantiating the GSS-API communication.

TODO: Lots more to discuss here...
8.1.  Identity Association/Verification Errors

TODO: e.g. wrong password, bad trust anchors, etc.  TODO.

8.2.  Service Errors

TODO: e.g. identity is correct but no authorisation.  TODO.

8.3.  Other Errors.

TODO: e.g. network errors.  TODO.

9.  Handling of Successes

It is of course hoped that the identity selector will have to occasionally handle successes as well as errors.  This section has some brief discussion about some areas you might want to think about.

9.1.  Reporting Authentication Success on First Use of Identity

The first time an identity is used with a service, it would be good practice to visually indicate in some way that the process has been successful, in order that the user understands what is happening and is then prepared for future authentication attempts.

9.2.  Reporting Authentication Success

On an on-going basis you may or may not wish to indicate visually to the user a successful authentication to a service.  This relates to Section 7.2.

10.  Other Considerations

This section briefly discusses other considerations that you might want to think about that don’t fit in any of the other categories.

10.1.  Import/Export of Credentials

For various reasons, an identity selector implementation might want to include functionality that allows for the export/import of identities and service to identity mappings.  This could be for backup purposes, to allow a degree of mobility between identity selector instances, etc.

If providing this functionality, it would be advisable that the credential store that is the result of the export should be secure - encrypted and password protected - given the nature of the information.
11. Contributors

The following individuals made important contributions to the text of this document: Sam Hartman (Painless Security LLC), and Maria Turk (Codethink Ltd).

12. Acknowledgements

Jim, Stefan.

13. Security Considerations

TODO

14. IANA Considerations

This document does not require actions by IANA.

15. Normative References


Appendix A. Change Log

Note to RFC Editor: if this document does not obsolete an existing RFC, please remove this appendix before publication as an RFC.

Draft -03 to draft -04

1. Addressing various comments from Jim and Stefan.

Draft -02 to draft -03

1. Bumping version to keep it alive.

Draft -01 to draft -02

1. Completed the major consideration sections, lots of rewording throughout.

Draft -00 to draft -01

1. None, republishing to refresh the document. Other than adding this comment...
Appendix B. Open Issues

Note to RFC Editor: please remove this appendix before publication as an RFC.

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Abstract

Network stratum and application stratum form a federation to facilitate user’s access. Network operator acts as Identity Provider (IdP), and application reuses underlying network’s security capabilities to simplify application’s access. This document is to introduce such federated cross-layer access use case and message flows.

Status of this Memo

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 3
2. Related Work ................................................... 3
3. Use Case ......................................................... 4
4. Message Flow ................................................... 5
   4.1. Fast Re-authentication ....................................... 5
   4.2. Secure Data Sharing .......................................... 7
5. Acknowledgements ................................................ 10
6. IANA Considerations ............................................ 10
7. Security Considerations ......................................... 10
8. References ....................................................... 10
   8.1. Normative References ........................................ 10
   8.2. Informative References ....................................... 10
Author’s Address ................................................. 12
1. Introduction

Currently it is agreed that digital identity is a crucial element in a service environment. Typically telecom operators provide access customers with identity which is associated with some form of trusted element on the network (e.g. SIM/UICC). Meanwhile the identity required by Web or non-Web services for users on is usually associated with username.

Ordinarly telecom operators have tens of millions of users and can provide trusted identity and higher security. However the categories of service provided by telecom operators are relatively few. On the contrary most service providers on the Internet have limited amount of users and can not assure the security of user identity, but they can provide abundant kinds of service. Furthermore, user is reluctant to register too many accounts because it is inconvenient to remember dozens of passwords. These facts creates some driving forces that telecom is interworking with Internet. The stakeholders can benefit from these combination. For telecom operators, they can provide identity service, trusted security service, mobile payment service and sharing some user profiles according user’s preferences. Telecom operators is not just providing pipeine for communication, but also become a part of service value chain. For service providers, they can focus on core business and reuse capabilities provided by telecom operators without worring about sources of users. For end users, they can enjoy seamless service experiences and improve security and privacy.

This document considers a use case which telecom operator acts as Identity provider (IdP) and federates with non-Web applications, e.g. Email, Messaging. This use case combines network stratum access and application stratum access, which is named as federated cross-layer access. The detailed message flows for this use case are given.

2. Related Work

GSMA Association IDM project address operators’ requirements for emerging mobile application (such as, Single Sign-on, mobile payments and other UICC enabled applications). Several use cases are also identified[GSMA_IDM]. Liberty Alliance Telecommunications SIG investigates digital identity grown in both telecom and Internet, develops several use cases and proposes corresponding solutions for interworking these two different domains [TelecoSiG].

GBA (Generic Bootstrapping Authentication) mechanism for bootstrapping authentication and key agreement for application is defined in [TS33.220]. The interworking between GBA and Identity Federation
Framework (ID-FE) is documented in [TR33.980]. Another interworking case between GBA and OpenID is specified in [TR33.924].

Currently some use cases [I-D.ietf-abfab-usecases], architecture [I-D.ietf-abfab-arch] and mechanisms are developed in IETF abfab working group.

3. Use Case

Editor’s Note: The section is for readable and completeness for this memo. The formal use case is referred to [I-D.ietf-abfab-usecases].

Telecom operators have a communication network infrastructures to provider users with a wealthy of access methods. Telecom operators have a huge number of registered users, and they can provide trusted identity and higher security. Therefore they have a natural advantage to act as an Identity Provider (IdP) to serve for service providers. On the contrary most service providers on the Internet have limited amount of users and can not assure the security of user identity, but they can provide abundant kinds of service. Furthermore, user is reluctant to register too many accounts because it is inconvenient to remember dozens of passwords.

Telecom network supports Web or non-Web application. In some cases user prefers to choose non-Web application, e.g. Messaging service, VoIP, EMail service, etc. Based on the result of network stratum authentication and authorization, User equipment (UE) can access applications without doing another authentication and authorization procedure. In this way, the system can implement federated cross-layer access. Firstly mutual authentication is performed between UE and Network, secondly UE accesses Application based on the result of network stratum’s authentication. In this case, a federation is formed between Network and Application.

For federated cross-layer access, Network can assure the Application of the authenticity of user’s identity, share some of use profile with Application. These can bring some benifits to stakeholders:

- For telecom operators, it becomes part of the business value chain as an Identity Provider.
- For service provider, it can focus on core competitive services without worrying about the number of registered users by reusing underlying security mechanisms during network stratum access.
- For end users, seamless service is provided, security and privacy are improved.
4. Message Flow

Take mobile network for example, UE has pre-shared key (PSK) with HSS. UE is mutually authenticated with network during attach procedure. After authentication, a master session key (MSK) is created on both UE and AAA. EAP [RFC3748] can enable the above procedure.

Figure 1: Federated Cross-Layer Access

Figure 1 shows the relation among UE, network and application. Firstly mutual authentication is performed between UE and Network, secondly UE accesses Application using Single Sign-ON (SSO) based on network stratum’s authentication. In this case, a federation is formed between Network and Application. The brief steps are as follows:

1. When UE attach the Network, mutual authentication is performed master session key is created between them.
2. UE visits non-Web Application, e.g. Messaging service, VoIP service, or Email service.
3. Application has no information about the UE. The Application contacts Network to validate the authentication result in the network stratum. Application can find Network according the configuration or dynamical discovery protocol.
4. Network responds to Application with authentication result.
5. UE is authorized to access the Application.

4.1. Fast Re-authentication

The message flows below make use of the security capabilities provided by network and some building blocks, such as GSS-EAP [I-D.ietf-abfab-gss-eap], AAA-SAML etc.
As described in the specification of GSS-EAP[I-D.ietf-abfab-gss-eap], UE maps onto GSS-API initiator, RP acts as GSS-API acceptor or EAP path-through authenticator, IdP maps onto EAP server. For the EAP is widely been used, this memo assumes the network access authentication is based on EAP. When UE visits application, it will improve the efficiency of authentication if the previous authentication result is reused. This procedure is called fast re-authentication, which is similar to the definition in EAP-AKA[RFC4187].

```
+------+         +--------+        +------+         +------+
|  UE  |         |   ASN  |        |  IdP |         |  RP  |
+---+--+         +----+---+        +---+--+         +---+--+

1. Network Access Authentication

2. Access Application

3. GSS/EAP Req/Identity

4. GSS/EAP Res/Fast Re-auth Identity

5. AAA/EAP Msg

6. AAA/EAP Msg

7. GSS/EAP Req/Fast Re-auth

8. Auth Msg & Derive Key

9. GSS/EAP Res/Fast Re-auth

10. AAA/SAML Req

11. Auth & Deriv
    Key & Con SAML

12. AAA/SAML Res

13. Validate the SAML Assertion

14. Establish Secure Channel
```
Figure 2: Fast Re-authentication

1. When UE access network, UE is performed mutual authentication with network. EAP can be utilized to facilitate the authentication procedure. EAP-Identity and EAP-Method will be exchanged between UE and network element. After successful authentication, an shared MSK is generated and stored in UE and IdP respectively, which can be used to authenticate other applications and then establish secure channels. The network access authentication and key agreement is used as underlying security mechanism for GSS-API. The required credential for application is retrieved using gss_acquire_cred().

2. UE accesses Relying Party (RP). UE is identified by NAI [RFC4282]. GSS-API [RFC4121] is acted as underlying transport mechanisms.

3. RP responds with EAP Request/Identity message, which is contained in GSS-API token as a subtoken.

4. UE sends EAP Response/Identity message in GSS-API token, which may include fast re-authentication identity.

5. When RP receives the request from UE, RP transfers the EAP message to IdP in AAA message. IdP checks the EAP message and agrees on fast re-authentication with UE.

6. IdP sends EAP-Request/Re-authentication to RP via AAA message.

7. RP strips off the AAA header and transfers the EAP message to UE via GSS-API token.

8. UE verifies the EAP message, thus authenticate the IdP using the credential retrieve from underlying security mechanisms. UE derives session key from previous credential, which will provide per-message protection, e.g. integrity protection, encryption.

9. UE sends EAP-Response/Fast Re-authentication message to RP using GSS-API token.

10. RP transfers the EAP message to IdP using AAA message with a SAML Request (samlp:AuthenRequest) [I-D.ietf-abfab-aaa-saml]
     [I-D.jones-diameter-abfab].

11. When the fast re-authentication is successful, IdP derives the same session key and constructs a SAML response (samlp:AuthenResponse).

12. IdP sends the SAML response message to RP via AAA message.

13. RP validates the assertion in the SAML message. RP grants or denies access to the UE.

14. RP establishes secure channel with UE by means of GSS-EAP, thus the security services are also provided for message between UE and RP using gss_get_mic() and gss_get_warp().

4.2. Secure Data Sharing

After successful authentication, in order to provide effective services to customers, RP may need to retrieve some information from
operator’s network, which stores some useful information (user profile, contact list, and other resources etc.).

The following figure illustrate an architecture of secure data sharing in federated cross layer access. Network layer includes ASN, IdP and RS, which provides RP in application layer with secure services such as authentication and data sharing.

![Figure 3: Architecture of Secure Data Sharing](image)

- **UE** - User Equipment, it is identified by NAI and preconfigured with security credential.
- **ASN** - Access Serving Node, it is located at the border of network. It provides network access and authentication service to UE.
- **IdP** - Identity Provider, it is responsible for management of user identity. It provides authentication service to UE or RP. It is also to retrieve user information from RS and to provide them to RP in the condition of user’s permission.
- **RS** - Resource Server, it stores user personal information, such as name, telephone, hobby, contact list, etc.
- **RP** - Relying Party, it provides user with such services as message service, VoIP, EMail service, etc.

The following figure depicts the procedure for secure data sharing. UE and IdP are mutually authenticated. RP reuses the authentication result in network access. RP may securely acquire user shared data with the authorization of the user.
1. UE performs federated cross layer access with IdP and RP, as shown in Figure 2.
2. When RP needs to acquire user’s information for some services, RP sends user information request to IdP.
3. IdP verifies the request and sends user information request to RS.
4. RS validates the request and sends user information response to IdP according to the user’s preferences.
5. IdP sends user information authorization request to UE.
6. UE chooses the preferred data to be shared and sends the user information authorization response to IdP.
7. IdP sends the authorized user information to SP.
8. After user data is successfully shared, RP sends a notification to UE.

editor’s note: The detailed security mechanisms and technical details will be considered in next time.
5. Acknowledgements

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6. IANA Considerations

TODO

7. Security Considerations

TODO

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Update to the EAP Applicability Statement for ABFAB
draft-winter-abfab-eapapplicability-02

Abstract

This document updates the EAP applicability statement from RFC3748 to reflect recent usage of the EAP protocol in application oriented use cases proposed in ABFAB

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ............................................. 3
1.1. Requirements Language ................................. 3
2. Uses of EAP for Application-Layer Access .................. 3
3. Revised EAP applicability statement ....................... 4
4. Security Considerations .................................. 5
5. IANA Considerations ...................................... 5
6. Acknowledgements ......................................... 5
7. References ................................................ 5
   7.1. Normative References ................................. 5
   7.2. Informational References ............................ 5
1. Introduction

The EAP applicability statement in [RFC3748] defines the scope of the Extensible Authentication Protocol to be "for use in network access authentication, where IP layer connectivity may not be available.", and states that "Use of EAP for other purposes, such as bulk data transport, is NOT RECOMMENDED.".

While some of the recommendation against usage of EAP for bulk data transport is still valid, some of the other provisions in the applicability statement have turned out to be too narrow. Section 2 describes the example where EAP is used to authenticate application layer access. Section 3 provides new text to update the paragraph 1.3. "Applicability" in [RFC3748].

1.1. Requirements Language

In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements of the specification. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. [RFC2119]

2. Uses of EAP for Application-Layer Access

Ongoing work in the IETF (abfab working group) specifies the use of EAP over GSSAPI for generic application layer access. In the past, using EAP in this context has met resistance due to the lack of channel bindings [I-D.ietf-emu-chbind]. Without channel bindings, a peer does not know what service will be provided by the authenticator. In most network access use cases all access servers that are served by a particular EAP server are providing the same or very similar types of service. The peer does not need to differentiate between different access network services supported by the same EAP server.

However as additional services use EAP for authentication, the distinction of which service is being contacted becomes more important. Consider an environment with multiple printers; if a peer printed a document in the wrong location then potentially sensitive information might be printing in a location where the user associated with the peer would be unable to retrieve it. It is also likely that services might have different security properties. For example, it might be more likely that a low-value service is compromised than some high value service. If the high-value service could be impersonated by a low-value service then the security of the overall system would be limited by the security of the lower value service.
This distinction is present in any environment where peers’ security depends on which service they reach. However it is particularly acute in a federated environment where multiple organizations are involved. It is very likely that these organizations will have different security policies and practices. It is very likely that the goals of these organizations will not entirely be aligned. In many situations one organization could gain value by being able to impersonate another. In this environment, authenticating the EAP server is insufficient: the peer must also validate that the contacted host is authorized to provide the requested service.

For these reasons, channel binding MUST be implemented by peers, EAP servers and AAA servers in environments where EAP authentication is used to access application layer services. In addition, channel binding MUST default to being required by peers for non-network authentication. If the EAP server is aware that authentication is for something other than a network service, it too MUST default to requiring channel binding. Operators need to carefully consider the security implications before relaxing these requirements. One potentially serious attack exists when channel binding is not required and EAP authentication is introduced into an existing non-network service. A device can be created that impersonates a Network Access Service to peers, but actually proxies the authentication to the service that newly accepts EAP authentications may decrease the security of this service even for users who previously used non-EAP means of authentication to the service.

It is important for the application layer to prove possession of the EAP MSK between the EAP Peer and EAP Authenticator. In addition, the application should define an channel binding attributes that are sufficient to validate that the application service is being correctly represented to the peer.

3. Revised EAP applicability statement

The following text is added to the EAP applicability statement in [RFC3748].

In cases where EAP is used for application authentication, support for EAP Channel Bindings is REQUIRED on the EAP Peer and EAP Server to validate that the host is authorized to provide the services requested. In addition, the application MUST define channel binding attributes that are sufficient to validate that the application service is being correctly represented to the peer. It is important for the protocol carrying EAP to prove possession of the EAP MSK between the EAP Peer and EAP Authenticator.
4. Security Considerations

In addition to the requirements discussed in the main sections of the document applications should take into account how server authentication is achieved. Some deployments may allow for weak server authentication that is then validated with an additional existing exchange that provides mutual authentication. In order to fully mitigate the risk of NAS impersonation when these mechanisms are used, it is RECOMMENDED that mutual channel bindings be used enforced to bind the authentications together as described in [I-D.hartman-emu-mutual-crypto-bind]

5. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

6. Acknowledgements

Large amounts of helpful text and insightful thoughts were contributed by Sam Hartman, Painless Security.

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