### **IETF 83 DHC WG Meeting**

### Security option extensions for DHCPv4 draft-bi-dhc-sec-option-01

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### Motivation

 To propose a new DHCP option, providing network configuration parameter for security

#### • Why DHCP?

- configuration information is expected to be initialized at the early stage when it is connected to the network
- DHCP is essential for users who want to connect to IP networks before they can communicate with other hosts

# Background

### DHCP options:

 configuration parameters and control information can be carried in DHCP options, such as defined in [RFC2132], [RFC3046], [RFC4030], etc.

#### Security related parameters, not included


- hard to guarantee the validity of information provided, even authentication [RFC3118] is deployed
- DHCP solely is quite hard to provide security
- how to guarantee the validity of DHCP option is out of scope

## DHCP option

- However, DHCP has the capability to help set up security mechanism, at the very beginning a client connects to IP network, if
  - the security does not depend on configuration information provisioned by DHCP option, for example, not contain any sensitive information to SA
  - 2. attackers do not benefit from manipulating DHCP option

# A typical use case - self booting in 3GPP network

- I. client connects to DHCP server to get IP address and network configuration, including IP addresses of SeGW (and PKI server, etc.) by a new DHCP option, automatically
- 2. client (with pre-installed vendor's certificate) connects to SeGW for mutual authentication and security mechanism setting up
- 3. client can connect to operator's core network by IPsec tunnel or TLS.




# Analysis

- Client is pre-installed with vendor's certificates to have cross-certification with operator's network
- Security consideration
  - since DHCP server is not in administrative area, DHCP option could be manipulated.
  - but, a fake DHCP option cannot hurt the security between client and SeGW, because they have mutual authentication
  - attackers do not benefit, because security does not depend on DHCP option

# Problem of previous solution

- Vendor-specific (option 43) does not give the dynamic capability to DHCP clients, because
  - bad interoperability
  - manual setting is necessary
  - fail the booting-up, since IP address of the SeGW (and PKI server) is a MUST for client



## Proposal

- DHCP security configuration option, possibly includes the following minimum set for security
  - client IP address
  - SeGW IP address
  - PKI IP address
  - etc.

### Data format

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
option-code   option-len   C-IP Address   data-len1
Client IP address Data
Se-GW ID   data-len2   Security-GW ID Data
Security-GW ID Data
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ACL Policy Data
PKI IP Add   data-len4   PKI IP Address Data
PKI IP Address Data
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# Finally...

- A new DHCP option itself does not guarantee the security, but provides a quick and dynamic way to allocate the security configuration parameter
- A standardized DHCP option could be a huge benefit to interoperability, instead of vendor-specific (option 43) solution
- To get further reviews and comments

### Questions?