

Update on LISP Threats Analysis

~~draft-saucez-lisp-security-01.txt~~
~~draft-saucez-lisp-security-02.txt~~
~~draft-saucez-lisp-security-03.txt~~
~~draft-ietf-lisp-threats-00.txt~~
draft-ietf-lisp-threats-01.txt

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Data-plane based attacks

Spoofing

```
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
/ |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|                Total Length                |
/ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| |                Identification                |Flags|      Fragment Offset      |
| +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
OH |  Time to Live | Protocol = 17 |                Header Checksum                |
| +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| |                Source Routing Locator                |
\ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
\ |                Destination Routing Locator                |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
/ |                Source Port = xxxx                |                Dest Port = 4341                |
UDP +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
\ |                UDP Length                |                UDP Checksum                |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
L |N|L|E|V|I|flags|                Nonce/Map-Version                |
I \ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
S / |                Instance ID/Locator Status Bits                |
P +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
/ |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|                Total Length                |
/ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| |                Identification                |Flags|      Fragment Offset      |
| +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
IH |  Time to Live | Protocol                |                Header Checksum                |
| +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| |                Source EID                |
\ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
\ |                Destination EID                |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
```

RLOC Spoofing

EID Spoofing

LISP header crafting

(potentially combined with spoofing)

```

+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length          |
/ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |          Identification          |Flags|          Fragment Offset  |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
OH |  Time to Live | Protocol = 17 |          Header Checksum      |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |          Source Routing Locator          |
\ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ |          Destination Routing Locator          |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ |          Source Port = xxxx          |          Dest Port = 4341          |
UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ |          UDP Length          |          UDP Checksum          |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
L |N|L|E|V|I|flags|          Nonce/Map-Version          |
I \ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
S / |          Instance ID/Locator Status Bits          |
P +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length          |
/ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |          Identification          |Flags|          Fragment Offset  |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
IH |  Time to Live |          Protocol          |          Header Checksum      |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |          Source EID          |
\ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ |          Destination EID          |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

```

LISP header crafting (potentially combined with spoofing)

```
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
/ |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|                Total Length                |
/ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| |                Identification                |Flags|      Fragment Offset      |
| +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
OH |  Time to Live | Protocol = 17 |                Header Checksum                |
| +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| |                Source Routing Locator                |
\ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
\ |                Destination Routing Locator                |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
/ |                Source Port = xxxx                |      Dest Port = 4341                |
UDP +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
\ |                UDP Length                |      UDP Checksum                |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
L |N| |E| |I| flags|                Nonce/Map-Version                |
I \ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
S / |                Instance ID/Locator Status Bits                |
P +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
/ |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|                Total Length                |
/ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| |                Identification                |Flags|      Fragment Offset      |
| +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
IH |  Time to Live |      Protocol      |                Header Checksum                |
| +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| |                Source EID                |
\ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
\ |                Destination EID                |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
4
```

Nonce present
and/or force echo-
noncing

Control-plane based attacks

Forge the mappings

```
+> +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     Record TTL                                     |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
R | Locator Count | EID mask-len | ACT | A | Reserved |
e | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
c | Rsvd | Map-Version Number | EID-AFI |
o | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
r |                                     EID-prefix                                     |
d | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| | Priority | Weight | M Priority | M Weight |
L | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
o | Unused Flags | L | p | R | Loc-AFI |
c | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| \ |                                     Locator                                     |
+> +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
```

But control-plane is more than Map-Reply

- Amplification (send a Map-Request with a spoofed RLOC)
- SMR bit
- P bit
- Mappings piggybacking

Main changes

- Editorial polishing
 - typos
 - rephrasing
- Added new threat
 - Cache overflow with de-aggregation
- Added LISP-DDT
 - in conjunction with LISP+ALT
- References update

New threat

- Cache overflow with de-aggregation (remember jeff's mails)
 - an ETR attacker can force an ITR to send a Map-Request for her legitimate EIDs
 - the ETR returns either positive or negative Map-Reply
 - the reply is massively de-aggregated into a lot of artificially small EID prefixes
- Example
 - *planete-xtr* sends one ping6 packet to an EID behind *damien-xtr* with source EID `12610:D0:212D::DEAD`
 - *damien-xtr* sends Map-Request for `12610:D0:212D::DEAD`
 - as `12610:D0:212D::/48` belongs to *planete-xtr*, if *planete-xtr* is malicious, she can return up to 2^{80} de-aggregated prefixes upon *damien-xtr* request...

LISP-DDT

- LISP Delegated Database Tree (LISP-DDT) is a DNS like mapping system... wait Vina and Darrel presentations!
- MR iteratively sends DDT Map-Requests to DDT nodes in DDT hierarchy
- DDT nodes reply with Map-Referrals that give pointers to her children
- DDT MSes forward Map-Requests to registered ETRs
- The iterative behavior of the MR in LISP-DDT implies state at the MR
 - a malicious ITR can cause MR's memory to be overloaded by Map-Requests for a large amount of different EIDs
 - compromised LISP-DDT can provide fake referrals to control mapping delivery
- Need some minor revisions to fit draft-fuller-lisp-ddt-01.txt

Next Steps...

- We tried to document all the categories of attack against LISP, any other?
- Integrate further comments (if any)
- Is the document ready for last-call?