Operations Model for Router Keying

draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-03

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Update Discussion Related with Key Table (1)

• [I-D.housley-saag-crypto-key-table]->[I-D.ietf-karp-crypto-key-table]
• Remove the discussion about the limitations introduced by the key IDs in key table.
• Change the name of section 3.3 from “Protocol Limitations from the Key Table” to “Interactions with Automated Key Management”
Update Discussion Related with Key Table (2)

• Each routing protocol is responsible for defining the form of the Peer specification used by that protocol.

• Thus each routing protocol needs to define the scope of keys.
  – For group keying, the Peer specification names the group.
  – A protocol could define a Peer specification indicating the key had a link scope and also a Peer specification for scoping a key to a specific area.
  – For link-scoped keys it is generally best to define a single Peer specification indicating the key has a link scope and to use interface restrictions to restrict the key to the appropriate link.
Add Discussion about Notification Mechanism

• Notifications will play a critical role in avoiding security faults. Implementations SHOULD use appropriate mechanisms to notify operators.

• Notifications can include messages to consoles, logged events, SNMP traps, or notifications within a routing protocol. One strategy is to have increasing escalations of notifications.
END