TLS out-of-band public key validation
draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey-04

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Changes between draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey-02 / -03

- Clarification on requirements with (CoAP) [I-D.ietf-core-coap]
- Hash support moved to [I-D.ietf-tls-cached-info]
- Proposed a new Certificate Type
- Very limited client authentication support (by pubkey blob lookup only)
- Required cert_type registry of RFC 6091
- Which required uplifting of RFC 6091 to standards-track
- A bis draft of RFC 6091 only produced yawns
- ...

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Changes between draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey-03 / -04

- Instead of new Certificate Type, proposes a new TLS Extension containing the CertificateType
- Add a cert-send / cert-receive extension to exchange which certificate types are supported
- Require new IANA registry for CertificateType
- No dependency on RFC 6091
- Allow more elaborate client authentication (eg Hybrid X.509/Raw)
client_hello,
cert-receive=(RawPublicKey) ->
  <- server_hello,
cert-send=RawPublicKey,
certificate,
certificate_request,
cert-receive=(RawPublicKey, X.509)
server_key_exchange,
server_hello_done

cert-send=RawPublicKey,
certificate,
client_key_exchange,
change_cipher_spec,
finished ->

  <- change_cipher_spec,
  finished

Application Data <--------> Application Data
Open issues

- Example 2 (Fig. 3) conflicts with RFC 5246:
  - RFC 5246 states TLS extensions can only be included into the ClientHello or the ServerHello handshake message.
  - The draft states, that the client must send a 'cert-send' before its Certificate message, but after having received the server's 'cert-receive'.

- If introducing a new TLS extension, why not add a client id identifier? (i.e. key from dns like draft-dane-fanf-smtp or draft-hoffman-dane-smime)

- Clarification on wire format of SubjectPublicKeyInfo (ASN.1 variable-length vector, i.e., preceded by its length)