Abstract

This document registers Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) authentication schemes which have been defined in standards-track RFCs before the IANA HTTP Authentication Scheme Registry was established.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTPBIS working group mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at <http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/>.

The current issues list is at <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/query?component=authscheme-registrations> and related documents (including fancy diffs) can be found at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/>.

The changes in this draft are summarized in Appendix B.5.

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1. Introduction

This document registers Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) authentication schemes which have been defined in standards-track RFCs before the IANA HTTP Authentication Scheme Registry was established.

2. Security Considerations

There are no security considerations related to the registration itself.

3. IANA Considerations

Appendix A provides initial registrations of HTTP authentication schemes for the IANA HTTP Authentication Scheme registry at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-authschemes> (see Section 2.3 of [draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth]).

4. Normative References


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<th>Reference</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>[RFC2617], Section 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bearer</td>
<td>[RFC6750]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digest</td>
<td>[RFC2617], Section 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiate</td>
<td>[RFC4559], Section 3</td>
<td>This authentication scheme violates both HTTP semantics (being connection-oriented) and syntax (use of syntax incompatible with the WWW-Authenticate and Authorization header field syntax).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAuth</td>
<td>[RFC5849], Section 3.5.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)

B.1. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations-00

Update draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth reference.

B.2. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations-01

Update draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth reference.

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/308>: "need to reserve 'negotiate' as auth scheme name"

B.3. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations-02

Update draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth reference.

B.4. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations-03

Update draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth reference.
B.5. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations-04

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/382>: "add OAuth auth scheme to initial registry contents"


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Muenster, NW 48155
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Abstract

This document registers those Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) methods which have been defined in standards-track RFCs before the IANA HTTP Method Registry was established.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTPBIS working group mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at <http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/>.

The current issues list is at <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/query?component=method-registrations> and related documents (including fancy diffs) can be found at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/>.

The changes in this draft are summarized in Appendix B.10.

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1. Introduction

This document registers those Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) methods which have been defined in standards-track RFCs other than [draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics] before the IANA HTTP Method Registry was established.

2. Security Considerations

There are no security considerations related to the registration itself.

3. IANA Considerations

Appendix A provides initial registrations of HTTP method names for the IANA HTTP Method registry at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-methods> (see Section 9.1 of [draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics]).

4. Normative References


### Appendix A. Initial Registry Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method Name</th>
<th>Safe</th>
<th>Idempotent</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACL</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC3744], Section 8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASELINE-CONTROL</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC3253], Section 12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIND</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC5842], Section 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHECKIN</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC3253], Section 4.4 and [RFC3253], Section 9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHECKOUT</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC3253], Section 4.3 and [RFC3253], Section 8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPY</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC4918], Section 9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABEL</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC3253], Section 8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>LINK</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC2068], Section 19.6.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCK</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>[RFC4918], Section 9.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERGE</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC3253], Section 11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKACTIVITY</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC3253], Section 13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKCALENDAR</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC4791], Section 5.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKCOL</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC4918], Section 9.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>MKREDIRECTREF</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC4437], Section 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKWORKSPACE</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC3253], Section 6.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOVE</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC4918], Section 9.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORDERPATCH</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC3648], Section 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>PATCH</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>[RFC5789], Section 2</td>
</tr>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC4918], Section 9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROPPATCH</td>
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<td>[RFC4918], Section 9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REBIND</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC5842], Section 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEARCH</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC5323], Section 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNBIND</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC5842], Section 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCHECKOUT</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC3253], Section 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNLINK</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC2068], Section 19.6.1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNLOCK</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC4918], Section 9.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPDATE</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC3253], Section 7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDATEREDIRECTREF</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC4437], Section 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERSION-CONTROL</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[RFC3253], Section 3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B.1. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-method-registrations-00

Added SEARCH method (RFC 5323).

B.2. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-method-registrations-01

Update draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics reference.

B.3. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-method-registrations-02

Update draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics reference. PATCH is now defined in draft-dusseault-http-patch. BIND, UNBIND and REBIND are defined in draft-ietf-webdav-bind. Drop the "updates draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics" clause.

B.4. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-method-registrations-03

draft-dusseault-http-patch was published as RFC 5789.

B.5. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-method-registrations-04

Update draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics reference.

B.6. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-method-registrations-05

Update draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics reference.

B.7. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-method-registrations-06

Update draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics reference.

B.8. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-method-registrations-07

Update draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics reference.

B.9. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-method-registrations-08


B.10. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-method-registrations-09

Closed issues:
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/377>: "what is the idempotency of LINK and UNLINK?"

Update draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics reference.

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Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing
draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-21

Abstract

The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. HTTP has been in use by the World Wide Web global information initiative since 1990. This document provides an overview of HTTP architecture and its associated terminology, defines the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes, defines the HTTP/1.1 message syntax and parsing requirements, and describes general security concerns for implementations.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTPBIS working group mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at <http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/>.

The current issues list is at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/report/3> and related documents (including fancy diffs) can be found at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/>.

The changes in this draft are summarized in Appendix D.22.

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1. Introduction

The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-level request/response protocol that uses extensible semantics and MIME-like message payloads for flexible interaction with network-based hypertext information systems. This document is the first in a series of documents that collectively form the HTTP/1.1 specification:

- RFC xxx1: Message Syntax and Routing
- RFC xxx2: Semantics and Content
- RFC xxx3: Conditional Requests
- RFC xxx4: Range Requests
- RFC xxx5: Caching
- RFC xxx6: Authentication

This HTTP/1.1 specification obsoletes and moves to historic status RFC 2616, its predecessor RFC 2068, RFC 2145 (on HTTP versioning), and RFC 2817 (on using CONNECT for TLS upgrades).

HTTP is a generic interface protocol for information systems. It is designed to hide the details of how a service is implemented by presenting a uniform interface to clients that is independent of the types of resources provided. Likewise, servers do not need to be aware of each client’s purpose: an HTTP request can be considered in isolation rather than being associated with a specific type of client or a predetermined sequence of application steps. The result is a protocol that can be used effectively in many different contexts and for which implementations can evolve independently over time.

HTTP is also designed for use as an intermediation protocol for translating communication to and from non-HTTP information systems. HTTP proxies and gateways can provide access to alternative information services by translating their diverse protocols into a hypertext format that can be viewed and manipulated by clients in the same way as HTTP services.

One consequence of HTTP flexibility is that the protocol cannot be defined in terms of what occurs behind the interface. Instead, we are limited to defining the syntax of communication, the intent of received communication, and the expected behavior of recipients. If the communication is considered in isolation, then successful actions ought to be reflected in corresponding changes to the observable...
interface provided by servers. However, since multiple clients might act in parallel and perhaps at cross-purposes, we cannot require that such changes be observable beyond the scope of a single response.

This document describes the architectural elements that are used or referred to in HTTP, defines the "http" and "https" URI schemes, describes overall network operation and connection management, and defines HTTP message framing and forwarding requirements. Our goal is to define all of the mechanisms necessary for HTTP message handling that are independent of message semantics, thereby defining the complete set of requirements for message parsers and message-forwarding intermediaries.

1.1. Requirement Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are defined in Section 2.5.

1.2. Syntax Notation

This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of [RFC5234] with the list rule extension defined in Appendix B. Appendix C shows the collected ABNF with the list rule expanded.

The following core rules are included by reference, as defined in [RFC5234], Appendix B.1: ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return), CRLF (CR LF), CTL (controls), DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double quote), HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), HTAB (horizontal tab), LF (line feed), OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), and VCHAR (any visible [USASCII] character).

As a convention, ABNF rule names prefixed with "obs-" denote "obsolete" grammar rules that appear for historical reasons.

2. Architecture

HTTP was created for the World Wide Web architecture and has evolved over time to support the scalability needs of a worldwide hypertext system. Much of that architecture is reflected in the terminology and syntax productions used to define HTTP.
2.1. Client/Server Messaging

HTTP is a stateless request/response protocol that operates by exchanging messages (Section 3) across a reliable transport or session-layer "connection" (Section 6). An HTTP "client" is a program that establishes a connection to a server for the purpose of sending one or more HTTP requests. An HTTP "server" is a program that accepts connections in order to service HTTP requests by sending HTTP responses.

The terms client and server refer only to the roles that these programs perform for a particular connection. The same program might act as a client on some connections and a server on others. We use the term "user agent" to refer to the program that initiates a request, such as a WWW browser, editor, or spider (web-traversing robot), and the term "origin server" to refer to the program that can originate authoritative responses to a request. For general requirements, we use the term "sender" to refer to whichever component sent a given message and the term "recipient" to refer to any component that receives the message.

HTTP relies upon the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) standard [RFC3986] to indicate the target resource (Section 5.1) and relationships between resources. Messages are passed in a format similar to that used by Internet mail [RFC5322] and the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) [RFC2045] (see Appendix A of [Part2] for the differences between HTTP and MIME messages).

Most HTTP communication consists of a retrieval request (GET) for a representation of some resource identified by a URI. In the simplest case, this might be accomplished via a single bidirectional connection (===) between the user agent (UA) and the origin server (O).

```
request   >
UA ================ 0
<   response
```

A client sends an HTTP request to a server in the form of a request message, beginning with a request-line that includes a method, URI, and protocol version (Section 3.1.1), followed by header fields containing request modifiers, client information, and representation metadata (Section 3.2), an empty line to indicate the end of the header section, and finally a message body containing the payload body (if any, Section 3.3).

A server responds to a client’s request by sending one or more HTTP response messages, each beginning with a status line that includes
the protocol version, a success or error code, and textual reason
phrase (Section 3.1.2), possibly followed by header fields containing
server information, resource metadata, and representation metadata
(Section 3.2), an empty line to indicate the end of the header
section, and finally a message body containing the payload body (if
any, Section 3.3).

A connection might be used for multiple request/response exchanges,
as defined in Section 6.2.

The following example illustrates a typical message exchange for a
GET request on the URI "http://www.example.com/hello.txt":

client request:

GET /hello.txt HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: curl/7.16.3 libcurl/7.16.3 OpenSSL/0.9.71 zlib/1.2.3
Host: www.example.com
Accept-Language: en, mi

server response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2009 12:28:53 GMT
Server: Apache
ETag: "34aa387-d-1568eb00"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 14
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/plain

Hello World!

2.2. Implementation Diversity

When considering the design of HTTP, it is easy to fall into a trap
of thinking that all user agents are general-purpose browsers and all
origin servers are large public websites. That is not the case in
practice. Common HTTP user agents include household appliances,
stereos, scales, firmware update scripts, command-line programs,
mobile apps, and communication devices in a multitude of shapes and
sizes. Likewise, common HTTP origin servers include home automation
units, configurable networking components, office machines,
autonomous robots, news feeds, traffic cameras, ad selectors, and
video delivery platforms.
The term "user agent" does not imply that there is a human user directly interacting with the software agent at the time of a request. In many cases, a user agent is installed or configured to run in the background and save its results for later inspection (or save only a subset of those results that might be interesting or erroneous). Spiders, for example, are typically given a start URI and configured to follow certain behavior while crawling the Web as a hypertext graph.

The implementation diversity of HTTP means that we cannot assume the user agent can make interactive suggestions to a user or provide adequate warning for security or privacy options. In the few cases where this specification requires reporting of errors to the user, it is acceptable for such reporting to only be observable in an error console or log file. Likewise, requirements that an automated action be confirmed by the user before proceeding can be met via advance configuration choices, run-time options, or simply not proceeding with the unsafe action.

2.3. Intermediaries

HTTP enables the use of intermediaries to satisfy requests through a chain of connections. There are three common forms of HTTP intermediary: proxy, gateway, and tunnel. In some cases, a single intermediary might act as an origin server, proxy, gateway, or tunnel, switching behavior based on the nature of each request.

```
>             >             >             >
UA =========== A =========== B =========== C =========== O
<             <             <             <
```

The figure above shows three intermediaries (A, B, and C) between the user agent and origin server. A request or response message that travels the whole chain will pass through four separate connections. Some HTTP communication options might apply only to the connection with the nearest, non-tunnel neighbor, only to the end-points of the chain, or to all connections along the chain. Although the diagram is linear, each participant might be engaged in multiple, simultaneous communications. For example, B might be receiving requests from many clients other than A, and/or forwarding requests to servers other than C, at the same time that it is handling A’s request.

We use the terms "upstream" and "downstream" to describe various requirements in relation to the directional flow of a message: all messages flow from upstream to downstream. Likewise, we use the terms inbound and outbound to refer to directions in relation to the request path: "inbound" means toward the origin server and "outbound"
means toward the user agent.

A "proxy" is a message forwarding agent that is selected by the client, usually via local configuration rules, to receive requests for some type(s) of absolute URI and attempt to satisfy those requests via translation through the HTTP interface. Some translations are minimal, such as for proxy requests for "http" URIs, whereas other requests might require translation to and from entirely different application-level protocols. Proxies are often used to group an organization’s HTTP requests through a common intermediary for the sake of security, annotation services, or shared caching.

An HTTP-to-HTTP proxy is called a "transforming proxy" if it is designed or configured to modify request or response messages in a semantically meaningful way (i.e., modifications, beyond those required by normal HTTP processing, that change the message in a way that would be significant to the original sender or potentially significant to downstream recipients). For example, a transforming proxy might be acting as a shared annotation server (modifying responses to include references to a local annotation database), a malware filter, a format transcoder, or an intranet-to-Internet privacy filter. Such transformations are presumed to be desired by the client (or client organization) that selected the proxy and are beyond the scope of this specification. However, when a proxy is not intended to transform a given message, we use the term "non-transforming proxy" to target requirements that preserve HTTP message semantics. See Section 7.3.4 of [Part2] and Section 7.5 of [Part6] for status and warning codes related to transformations.

A "gateway" (a.k.a., "reverse proxy") is a receiving agent that acts as a layer above some other server(s) and translates the received requests to the underlying server’s protocol. Gateways are often used to encapsulate legacy or untrusted information services, to improve server performance through "accelerator" caching, and to enable partitioning or load-balancing of HTTP services across multiple machines.

A gateway behaves as an origin server on its outbound connection and as a user agent on its inbound connection. All HTTP requirements applicable to an origin server also apply to the outbound communication of a gateway. A gateway communicates with inbound servers using any protocol that it desires, including private extensions to HTTP that are outside the scope of this specification. However, an HTTP-to-HTTP gateway that wishes to interoperate with third-party HTTP servers MUST conform to HTTP user agent requirements on the gateway’s inbound connection and MUST implement the Connection (Section 6.1) and Via (Section 5.7) header fields for both connections.
A "tunnel" acts as a blind relay between two connections without changing the messages. Once active, a tunnel is not considered a party to the HTTP communication, though the tunnel might have been initiated by an HTTP request. A tunnel ceases to exist when both ends of the relayed connection are closed. Tunnels are used to extend a virtual connection through an intermediary, such as when Transport Layer Security (TLS, [RFC5246]) is used to establish confidential communication through a shared firewall proxy.

The above categories for intermediary only consider those acting as participants in the HTTP communication. There are also intermediaries that can act on lower layers of the network protocol stack, filtering or redirecting HTTP traffic without the knowledge or permission of message senders. Network intermediaries often introduce security flaws or interoperability problems by violating HTTP semantics. For example, an "interception proxy" [RFC3040] (also commonly known as a "transparent proxy" [RFC1919] or "captive portal") differs from an HTTP proxy because it is not selected by the client. Instead, an interception proxy filters or redirects outgoing TCP port 80 packets (and occasionally other common port traffic). Interception proxies are commonly found on public network access points, as a means of enforcing account subscription prior to allowing use of non-local Internet services, and within corporate firewalls to enforce network usage policies. They are indistinguishable from a man-in-the-middle attack.

HTTP is defined as a stateless protocol, meaning that each request message can be understood in isolation. Many implementations depend on HTTP's stateless design in order to reuse proxied connections or dynamically load balance requests across multiple servers. Hence, servers MUST NOT assume that two requests on the same connection are from the same user agent unless the connection is secured and specific to that agent. Some non-standard HTTP extensions (e.g., [RFC4559]) have been known to violate this requirement, resulting in security and interoperability problems.

2.4. Caches

A "cache" is a local store of previous response messages and the subsystem that controls its message storage, retrieval, and deletion. A cache stores cacheable responses in order to reduce the response time and network bandwidth consumption on future, equivalent requests. Any client or server MAY employ a cache, though a cache cannot be used by a server while it is acting as a tunnel.

The effect of a cache is that the request/response chain is shortened if one of the participants along the chain has a cached response applicable to that request. The following illustrates the resulting
A response is "cacheable" if a cache is allowed to store a copy of the response message for use in answering subsequent requests. Even when a response is cacheable, there might be additional constraints placed by the client or by the origin server on when that cached response can be used for a particular request. HTTP requirements for cache behavior and cacheable responses are defined in Section 2 of [Part6].

There are a wide variety of architectures and configurations of caches and proxies deployed across the World Wide Web and inside large organizations. These systems include national hierarchies of proxy caches to save transoceanic bandwidth, systems that broadcast or multicast cache entries, organizations that distribute subsets of cached data via optical media, and so on.

2.5. Conformance and Error Handling

This specification targets conformance criteria according to the role of a participant in HTTP communication. Hence, HTTP requirements are placed on senders, recipients, clients, servers, user agents, intermediaries, origin servers, proxies, gateways, or caches, depending on what behavior is being constrained by the requirement. Additional (social) requirements are placed on implementations, resource owners, and protocol element registrations when they apply beyond the scope of a single communication.

The verb "generate" is used instead of "send" where a requirement differentiates between creating a protocol element and merely forwarding a received element downstream.

An implementation is considered conformant if it complies with all of the requirements associated with the roles it partakes in HTTP. Note that SHOULD-level requirements are relevant here, unless one of the documented exceptions is applicable.

Conformance applies to both the syntax and semantics of HTTP protocol elements. A sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements that convey a meaning that is known by that sender to be false. A sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements that do not match the grammar defined by the ABNF rules for those protocol elements that are applicable to the sender’s role. If a received protocol element is processed, the
recipient MUST be able to parse any value that would match the ABNF rules for that protocol element, excluding only those rules not applicable to the recipient's role.

Unless noted otherwise, a recipient MAY attempt to recover a usable protocol element from an invalid construct. HTTP does not define specific error handling mechanisms except when they have a direct impact on security, since different applications of the protocol require different error handling strategies. For example, a Web browser might wish to transparently recover from a response where the Location header field doesn't parse according to the ABNF, whereas a systems control client might consider any form of error recovery to be dangerous.

2.6. Protocol Versioning

HTTP uses a "<major>.<minor>" numbering scheme to indicate versions of the protocol. This specification defines version "1.1". The protocol version as a whole indicates the sender’s conformance with the set of requirements laid out in that version’s corresponding specification of HTTP.

The version of an HTTP message is indicated by an HTTP-version field in the first line of the message. HTTP-version is case-sensitive.

HTTP-version = HTTP-name "/" DIGIT "." DIGIT
HTTP-name = %x48.54.54.50 ; "HTTP", case-sensitive

The HTTP version number consists of two decimal digits separated by a "." (period or decimal point). The first digit ("major version") indicates the HTTP messaging syntax, whereas the second digit ("minor version") indicates the highest minor version to which the sender is conformant and able to understand for future communication. The minor version advertises the sender’s communication capabilities even when the sender is only using a backwards-compatible subset of the protocol, thereby letting the recipient know that more advanced features can be used in response (by servers) or in future requests (by clients).

When an HTTP/1.1 message is sent to an HTTP/1.0 recipient [RFC1945] or a recipient whose version is unknown, the HTTP/1.1 message is constructed such that it can be interpreted as a valid HTTP/1.0 message if all of the newer features are ignored. This specification places recipient-version requirements on some new features so that a conformant sender will only use compatible features until it has determined, through configuration or the receipt of a message, that the recipient supports HTTP/1.1.
The interpretation of a header field does not change between minor versions of the same major HTTP version, though the default behavior of a recipient in the absence of such a field can change. Unless specified otherwise, header fields defined in HTTP/1.1 are defined for all versions of HTTP/1.x. In particular, the Host and Connection header fields ought to be implemented by all HTTP/1.x implementations whether or not they advertise conformance with HTTP/1.1.

New header fields can be defined such that, when they are understood by a recipient, they might override or enhance the interpretation of previously defined header fields. When an implementation receives an unrecognized header field, the recipient MUST ignore that header field for local processing regardless of the message’s HTTP version. An unrecognized header field received by a proxy MUST be forwarded downstream unless the header field’s field-name is listed in the message’s Connection header field (see Section 6.1). These requirements allow HTTP’s functionality to be enhanced without requiring prior update of deployed intermediaries.

Intermediaries that process HTTP messages (i.e., all intermediaries other than those acting as tunnels) MUST send their own HTTP-version in forwarded messages. In other words, they MUST NOT blindly forward the first line of an HTTP message without ensuring that the protocol version in that message matches a version to which that intermediary is conformant for both the receiving and sending of messages. Forwarding an HTTP message without rewriting the HTTP-version might result in communication errors when downstream recipients use the message sender’s version to determine what features are safe to use for later communication with that sender.

An HTTP client SHOULD send a request version equal to the highest version to which the client is conformant and whose major version is no higher than the highest version supported by the server, if this is known. An HTTP client MUST NOT send a version to which it is not conformant.

An HTTP client MAY send a lower request version if it is known that the server incorrectly implements the HTTP specification, but only after the client has attempted at least one normal request and determined from the response status or header fields (e.g., Server) that the server improperly handles higher request versions.

An HTTP server SHOULD send a response version equal to the highest version to which the server is conformant and whose major version is less than or equal to the one received in the request. An HTTP server MUST NOT send a version to which it is not conformant. A server MAY send a 505 (HTTP Version Not Supported) response if it cannot send a response using the major version used in the client’s
request.

An HTTP server MAY send an HTTP/1.0 response to an HTTP/1.0 request if it is known or suspected that the client incorrectly implements the HTTP specification and is incapable of correctly processing later version responses, such as when a client fails to parse the version number correctly or when an intermediary is known to blindly forward the HTTP-version even when it doesn’t conform to the given minor version of the protocol. Such protocol downgrades SHOULD NOT be performed unless triggered by specific client attributes, such as when one or more of the request header fields (e.g., User-Agent) uniquely match the values sent by a client known to be in error.

The intention of HTTP’s versioning design is that the major number will only be incremented if an incompatible message syntax is introduced, and that the minor number will only be incremented when changes made to the protocol have the effect of adding to the message semantics or implying additional capabilities of the sender. However, the minor version was not incremented for the changes introduced between [RFC2068] and [RFC2616], and this revision is specifically avoiding any such changes to the protocol.

2.7. Uniform Resource Identifiers

Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) [RFC3986] are used throughout HTTP as the means for identifying resources (Section 2 of [Part2]). URI references are used to target requests, indicate redirects, and define relationships.

This specification adopts the definitions of "URI-reference", "absolute-URI", "relative-part", "port", "host", "path-abempty", "path-absolute", "query", and "authority" from the URI generic syntax. In addition, we define a partial-URI rule for protocol elements that allow a relative URI but not a fragment.

```
URI-reference = <URI-reference, defined in [RFC3986], Section 4.1>
absolute-URI = <absolute-URI, defined in [RFC3986], Section 4.3>
relative-part = <relative-part, defined in [RFC3986], Section 4.2>
authority = <authority, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2>
path-abempty = <path-abempty, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.3>
path-absolute = <path-absolute, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.3>
port = <port, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2.3>
query = <query, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.4>
uri-host = <host, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2.2>

partial-URI = relative-part [ "?" query ]
```

Each protocol element in HTTP that allows a URI reference will
indicate in its ABNF production whether the element allows any form of reference (URI-reference), only a URI in absolute form (absolute-URI), only the path and optional query components, or some combination of the above. Unless otherwise indicated, URI references are parsed relative to the effective request URI (Section 5.5).

2.7.1. http URI scheme

The "http" URI scheme is hereby defined for the purpose of minting identifiers according to their association with the hierarchical namespace governed by a potential HTTP origin server listening for TCP connections on a given port.

http-URI = "http: "//" authority path-abempty ["?" query ]

The HTTP origin server is identified by the generic syntax's authority component, which includes a host identifier and optional TCP port ([RFC3986], Section 3.2.2). The remainder of the URI, consisting of both the hierarchical path component and optional query component, serves as an identifier for a potential resource within that origin server's name space.

If the host identifier is provided as an IP literal or IPv4 address, then the origin server is any listener on the indicated TCP port at that IP address. If host is a registered name, then that name is considered an indirect identifier and the recipient might use a name resolution service, such as DNS, to find the address of a listener for that host. The host MUST NOT be empty; if an "http" URI is received with an empty host, then it MUST be rejected as invalid. If the port subcomponent is empty or not given, then TCP port 80 is assumed (the default reserved port for WWW services).

Regardless of the form of host identifier, access to that host is not implied by the mere presence of its name or address. The host might or might not exist and, even when it does exist, might or might not be running an HTTP server or listening to the indicated port. The "http" URI scheme makes use of the delegated nature of Internet names and addresses to establish a naming authority (whatever entity has the ability to place an HTTP server at that Internet name or address) and allows that authority to determine which names are valid and how they might be used.

When an "http" URI is used within a context that calls for access to the indicated resource, a client MAY attempt access by resolving the host to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to that address on the indicated port, and sending an HTTP request message (Section 3) containing the URI's identifying data (Section 5) to the server. If the server responds to that request with a non-interim
HTTP response message, as described in Section 7 of [Part2], then that response is considered an authoritative answer to the client’s request.

Although HTTP is independent of the transport protocol, the "http" scheme is specific to TCP-based services because the name delegation process depends on TCP for establishing authority. An HTTP service based on some other underlying connection protocol would presumably be identified using a different URI scheme, just as the "https" scheme (below) is used for resources that require an end-to-end secured connection. Other protocols might also be used to provide access to "http" identified resources -- it is only the authoritative interface used for mapping the namespace that is specific to TCP.

The URI generic syntax for authority also includes a deprecated userinfo subcomponent ([RFC3986], Section 3.2.1) for including user authentication information in the URI. Some implementations make use of the userinfo component for internal configuration of authentication information, such as within command invocation options, configuration files, or bookmark lists, even though such usage might expose a user identifier or password. Senders MUST NOT include a userinfo subcomponent (and its "@" delimiter) when transmitting an "http" URI in a message. Recipients of HTTP messages that contain a URI reference SHOULD parse for the existence of userinfo and treat its presence as an error, likely indicating that the deprecated subcomponent is being used to obscure the authority for the sake of phishing attacks.

2.7.2. https URI scheme

The "https" URI scheme is hereby defined for the purpose of minting identifiers according to their association with the hierarchical namespace governed by a potential HTTP origin server listening to a given TCP port for TLS-secured connections [RFC5246].

All of the requirements listed above for the "http" scheme are also requirements for the "https" scheme, except that a default TCP port of 443 is assumed if the port subcomponent is empty or not given, and the TCP connection MUST be secured, end-to-end, through the use of strong encryption prior to sending the first HTTP request.

https-URI = "https: " //" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ]

Unlike the "http" scheme, responses to "https" identified requests are never "public" and thus MUST NOT be reused for shared caching. They can, however, be reused in a private cache if the message is cacheable by default in HTTP or specifically indicated as such by the Cache-Control header field (Section 7.2 of [Part6]).
Resources made available via the "https" scheme have no shared identity with the "http" scheme even if their resource identifiers indicate the same authority (the same host listening to the same TCP port). They are distinct name spaces and are considered to be distinct origin servers. However, an extension to HTTP that is defined to apply to entire host domains, such as the Cookie protocol [RFC6265], can allow information set by one service to impact communication with other services within a matching group of host domains.

The process for authoritative access to an "https" identified resource is defined in [RFC2818].

2.7.3. http and https URI Normalization and Comparison

Since the "http" and "https" schemes conform to the URI generic syntax, such URIs are normalized and compared according to the algorithm defined in [RFC3986], Section 6, using the defaults described above for each scheme.

If the port is equal to the default port for a scheme, the normal form is to elide the port subcomponent. Likewise, an empty path component is equivalent to an absolute path of "/", so the normal form is to provide a path of "/" instead. The scheme and host are case-insensitive and normally provided in lowercase; all other components are compared in a case-sensitive manner. Characters other than those in the "reserved" set are equivalent to their percent-encoded octets (see [RFC3986], Section 2.1): the normal form is to not encode them.

For example, the following three URIs are equivalent:

http://example.com:80/~smith/home.html
http://EXAMPLE.com/%7Esmith/home.html
http://EXAMPLE.com/%7esmith/home.html

3. Message Format

All HTTP/1.1 messages consist of a start-line followed by a sequence of octets in a format similar to the Internet Message Format [RFC5322]: zero or more header fields (collectively referred to as the "headers" or the "header section"), an empty line indicating the end of the header section, and an optional message body.

\[
\text{HTTP-message} = \text{start-line} \\
\quad \times ( \text{header-field} \ \text{CRLF} ) \\
\quad \text{CRLF} \\
\quad [ \text{message-body} ]
\]
The normal procedure for parsing an HTTP message is to read the start-line into a structure, read each header field into a hash table by field name until the empty line, and then use the parsed data to determine if a message body is expected. If a message body has been indicated, then it is read as a stream until an amount of octets equal to the message body length is read or the connection is closed.

Recipients MUST parse an HTTP message as a sequence of octets in an encoding that is a superset of US-ASCII [USASCII]. Parsing an HTTP message as a stream of Unicode characters, without regard for the specific encoding, creates security vulnerabilities due to the varying ways that string processing libraries handle invalid multibyte character sequences that contain the octet LF (\%x0A). String-based parsers can only be safely used within protocol elements after the element has been extracted from the message, such as within a header field-value after message parsing has delineated the individual fields.

An HTTP message can be parsed as a stream for incremental processing or forwarding downstream. However, recipients cannot rely on incremental delivery of partial messages, since some implementations will buffer or delay message forwarding for the sake of network efficiency, security checks, or payload transformations.

3.1. Start Line

An HTTP message can either be a request from client to server or a response from server to client. Syntactically, the two types of message differ only in the start-line, which is either a request-line (for requests) or a status-line (for responses), and in the algorithm for determining the length of the message body (Section 3.3). In theory, a client could receive requests and a server could receive responses, distinguishing them by their different start-line formats, but in practice servers are implemented to only expect a request (a response is interpreted as an unknown or invalid request method) and clients are implemented to only expect a response.

\[ \text{start-line} \quad = \quad \text{request-line} / \text{status-line} \]

A sender MUST NOT send whitespace between the start-line and the first header field. The presence of such whitespace in a request might be an attempt to trick a server into ignoring that field or processing the line after it as a new request, either of which might result in a security vulnerability if other implementations within the request chain interpret the same message differently. Likewise, the presence of such whitespace in a response might be ignored by some clients or cause others to cease parsing.
3.1.1. Request Line

A request-line begins with a method token, followed by a single space (SP), the request-target, another single space (SP), the protocol version, and ending with CRLF.

    request-line   = method SP request-target SP HTTP-version CRLF

A server MUST be able to parse any received message that begins with a request-line and matches the ABNF rule for HTTP-message.

The method token indicates the request method to be performed on the target resource. The request method is case-sensitive.

    method         = token

The methods defined by this specification can be found in Section 5 of [Part2], along with information regarding the HTTP method registry and considerations for defining new methods.

The request-target identifies the target resource upon which to apply the request, as defined in Section 5.3.

No whitespace is allowed inside the method, request-target, and protocol version. Hence, recipients typically parse the request-line into its component parts by splitting on the SP characters.

Unfortunately, some user agents fail to properly encode hypertext references that have embedded whitespace, sending the characters directly instead of properly percent-encoding the disallowed characters. Recipients of an invalid request-line SHOULD respond with either a 400 (Bad Request) error or a 301 (Moved Permanently) redirect with the request-target properly encoded. Recipients SHOULD NOT attempt to autocorrect and then process the request without a redirect, since the invalid request-line might be deliberately crafted to bypass security filters along the request chain.

HTTP does not place a pre-defined limit on the length of a request-line. A server that receives a method longer than any that it implements SHOULD respond with either a 405 (Method Not Allowed), if it is an origin server, or a 501 (Not Implemented) status code. A server MUST be prepared to receive URIs of unbounded length and respond with the 414 (URI Too Long) status code if the received request-target would be longer than the server wishes to handle (see Section 7.5.12 of [Part2]).

Various ad-hoc limitations on request-line length are found in practice. It is RECOMMENDED that all HTTP senders and recipients
support, at a minimum, request-line lengths of up to 8000 octets.

3.1.2. Status Line

The first line of a response message is the status-line, consisting of the protocol version, a space (SP), the status code, another space, a possibly-empty textual phrase describing the status code, and ending with CRLF.

status-line = HTTP-version SP status-code SP reason-phrase CRLF

A client MUST be able to parse any received message that begins with a status-line and matches the ABNF rule for HTTP-message.

The status-code element is a 3-digit integer code describing the result of the server’s attempt to understand and satisfy the client’s corresponding request. The rest of the response message is to be interpreted in light of the semantics defined for that status code. See Section 7 of [Part2] for information about the semantics of status codes, including the classes of status code (indicated by the first digit), the status codes defined by this specification, considerations for the definition of new status codes, and the IANA registry.

status-code    = 3DIGIT

The reason-phrase element exists for the sole purpose of providing a textual description associated with the numeric status code, mostly out of deference to earlier Internet application protocols that were more frequently used with interactive text clients. A client SHOULD ignore the reason-phrase content.

reason-phrase  = *( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )

3.2. Header Fields

Each HTTP header field consists of a case-insensitive field name followed by a colon (":"), optional whitespace, and the field value.

header-field   = field-name ":" OWS field-value BWS
field-name     = token
field-value    = *( field-content / obs-fold )
field-content  = *( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
obs-fold       = CRLF ( SP / HTAB )
                ; obsolete line folding
                ; see Section 3.2.2

The field-name token labels the corresponding field-value as having
the semantics defined by that header field. For example, the Date header field is defined in Section 8.1.1.2 of [Part2] as containing the origination timestamp for the message in which it appears.

HTTP header fields are fully extensible: there is no limit on the introduction of new field names, each presumably defining new semantics, or on the number of header fields used in a given message. Existing fields are defined in each part of this specification and in many other specifications outside the standards process. New header fields can be introduced without changing the protocol version if their defined semantics allow them to be safely ignored by recipients that do not recognize them.

New HTTP header fields SHOULD be registered with IANA in the Message Header Field Registry, as described in Section 9.3 of [Part2]. Unrecognized header fields MUST be forwarded by a proxy unless the field-name is listed in the Connection header field (Section 6.1) or the proxy is specifically configured to block or otherwise transform such fields. Unrecognized header fields SHOULD be ignored by other recipients.

The order in which header fields with differing field names are received is not significant. However, it is "good practice" to send header fields that contain control data first, such as Host on requests and Date on responses, so that implementations can decide when not to handle a message as early as possible. A server MUST wait until the entire header section is received before interpreting a request message, since later header fields might include conditionals, authentication credentials, or deliberately misleading duplicate header fields that would impact request processing.

Multiple header fields with the same field name MUST NOT be sent in a message unless the entire field value for that header field is defined as a comma-separated list [i.e., #(values)]. Multiple header fields with the same field name can be combined into one "field-name: field-value" pair, without changing the semantics of the message, by appending each subsequent field value to the combined field value in order, separated by a comma. The order in which header fields with the same field name are received is therefore significant to the interpretation of the combined field value; a proxy MUST NOT change the order of these field values when forwarding a message.

Note: The "Set-Cookie" header field as implemented in practice can occur multiple times, but does not use the list syntax, and thus cannot be combined into a single line ([RFC6265]). (See Appendix A.2.3 of [Kri2001] for details.) Also note that the Set-Cookie2 header field specified in [RFC2965] does not share this problem.
3.2.1. Whitespace

This specification uses three rules to denote the use of linear whitespace: OWS (optional whitespace), RWS (required whitespace), and BWS ("bad" whitespace).

The OWS rule is used where zero or more linear whitespace octets might appear. OWS SHOULD either not be produced or be produced as a single SP. Multiple OWS octets that occur within field-content SHOULD either be replaced with a single SP or transformed to all SP octets (each octet other than SP replaced with SP) before interpreting the field value or forwarding the message downstream.

RWS is used when at least one linear whitespace octet is required to separate field tokens. RWS SHOULD be produced as a single SP. Multiple RWS octets that occur within field-content SHOULD either be replaced with a single SP or transformed to all SP octets before interpreting the field value or forwarding the message downstream.

BWS is used where the grammar allows optional whitespace, for historical reasons, but senders SHOULD NOT produce it in messages; recipients MUST accept such bad optional whitespace and remove it before interpreting the field value or forwarding the message downstream.

OWS            = *( SP / HTAB )
                  ; "optional" whitespace
RWS            = 1*( SP / HTAB )
                  ; "required" whitespace
BWS            = OWS
                  ; "bad" whitespace

3.2.2. Field Parsing

No whitespace is allowed between the header field-name and colon. In the past, differences in the handling of such whitespace have led to security vulnerabilities in request routing and response handling. Any received request message that contains whitespace between a header field-name and colon MUST be rejected with a response code of 400 (Bad Request). A proxy MUST remove any such whitespace from a response message before forwarding the message downstream.

A field value MAY be preceded by optional whitespace (OWS); a single SP is preferred. The field value does not include any leading or trailing white space: OWS occurring before the first non-whitespace octet of the field value or after the last non-whitespace octet of the field value is ignored and SHOULD be removed before further
Historically, HTTP header field values could be extended over multiple lines by preceding each extra line with at least one space or horizontal tab (obs-fold). This specification deprecates such line folding except within the message/http media type (Section 7.3.1). HTTP senders MUST NOT produce messages that include line folding (i.e., that contain any field-value that matches the obs-fold rule) unless the message is intended for packaging within the message/http media type. HTTP recipients SHOULD accept line folding and replace any embedded obs-fold whitespace with either a single SP or a matching number of SP octets (to avoid buffer copying) prior to interpreting the field value or forwarding the message downstream.

Historically, HTTP has allowed field content with text in the ISO-8859-1 [ISO-8859-1] character encoding and supported other character sets only through use of [RFC2047] encoding. In practice, most HTTP header field values use only a subset of the US-ASCII character encoding [USASCII]. Newly defined header fields SHOULD limit their field values to US-ASCII octets. Recipients SHOULD treat other (obs-text) octets in field content as opaque data.

3.2.3. Field Length

HTTP does not place a pre-defined limit on the length of header fields, either in isolation or as a set. A server MUST be prepared to receive request header fields of unbounded length and respond with a 4xx (Client Error) status code if the received header field(s) would be longer than the server wishes to handle.

A client that receives response header fields that are longer than it wishes to handle can only treat it as a server error.

Various ad-hoc limitations on header field length are found in practice. It is RECOMMENDED that all HTTP senders and recipients support messages whose combined header fields have 4000 or more octets.

3.2.4. Field value components

Many HTTP header field values consist of words (token or quoted-string) separated by whitespace or special characters. These special characters MUST be in a quoted string to be used within a parameter value (as defined in Section 4).
word            = token / quoted-string

token          = 1*tchar

tchar          = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / ";" / ";" / ";" / ";" / ";" / ";" / ";" / ";" / DIGIT / ALPHA
                   ; any VCHAR, except special

special        = "(" / ")" / ";" / ";" / ";" / DQUOTE / ";" / ";"
                   / ";" / ";" / ";" / obs-text

A string of text is parsed as a single word if it is quoted using double-quote marks.

quoted-string  = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE
qdtext         = OWS / %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text
obs-text       = %x80-FF

The backslash octet ("\") can be used as a single-octet quoting mechanism within quoted-string constructs:

quoted-pair    = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )

Recipients that process the value of the quoted-string MUST handle a quoted-pair as if it were replaced by the octet following the backslash.

Senders SHOULD NOT escape octets in quoted-strings that do not require escaping (i.e., other than DQUOTE and the backslash octet).

Comments can be included in some HTTP header fields by surrounding the comment text with parentheses. Comments are only allowed in fields containing "comment" as part of their field value definition.

comment        = "(" *( ctext / quoted-cpair / comment ) ")"
ctext          = OWS / %x21-27 / %x2A-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text

The backslash octet ("\") can be used as a single-octet quoting mechanism within comment constructs:

quoted-cpair   = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )

Senders SHOULD NOT escape octets in comments that do not require escaping (i.e., other than the backslash octet "\" and the parentheses "(" and ")").
3.3. Message Body

The message body (if any) of an HTTP message is used to carry the payload body of that request or response. The message body is identical to the payload body unless a transfer coding has been applied, as described in Section 3.3.1.

   message-body = *OCTET

The rules for when a message body is allowed in a message differ for requests and responses.

The presence of a message body in a request is signaled by a Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding header field. Request message framing is independent of method semantics, even if the method does not define any use for a message body.

The presence of a message body in a response depends on both the request method to which it is responding and the response status code (Section 3.1.2). Responses to the HEAD request method never include a message body because the associated response header fields (e.g., Transfer-Encoding, Content-Length, etc.), if present, indicate only what their values would have been if the request method had been GET (Section 5.2 of [Part2]). 2xx (Successful) responses to CONNECT switch to tunnel mode instead of having a message body (Section 5.3.6 of [Part2]). All 1xx (Informational), 204 (No Content), and 304 (Not Modified) responses MUST NOT include a message body. All other responses do include a message body, although the body MAY be of zero length.

3.3.1. Transfer-Encoding

When one or more transfer codings are applied to a payload body in order to form the message body, a Transfer-Encoding header field MUST be sent in the message and MUST contain the list of corresponding transfer-coding names in the same order that they were applied. Transfer codings are defined in Section 4.

   Transfer-Encoding = 1#transfer-coding

Transfer-Encoding is analogous to the Content-Transfer-Encoding field of MIME, which was designed to enable safe transport of binary data over a 7-bit transport service ([RFC2045], Section 6). However, safe transport has a different focus for an 8bit-clean transfer protocol. In HTTP’s case, Transfer-Encoding is primarily intended to accurately delimit a dynamically generated payload and to distinguish payload encodings that are only applied for transport efficiency or security from those that are characteristics of the target resource.
The "chunked" transfer-coding (Section 4.1) MUST be implemented by all HTTP/1.1 recipients because it plays a crucial role in delimiting messages when the payload body size is not known in advance. When the "chunked" transfer-coding is used, it MUST be the last transfer-coding applied to form the message body and MUST NOT be applied more than once in a message body. If any transfer-coding is applied to a request payload body, the final transfer-coding applied MUST be "chunked". If any transfer-coding is applied to a response payload body, then either the final transfer-coding applied MUST be "chunked" or the message MUST be terminated by closing the connection.

For example,

    Transfer-Encoding: gzip, chunked

indicates that the payload body has been compressed using the gzip coding and then chunked using the chunked coding while forming the message body.

If more than one Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a message, the multiple field-values MUST be combined into one field-value, according to the algorithm defined in Section 3.2, before determining the message body length.

Unlike Content-Encoding (Section 3.1.2.1 of [Part2]), Transfer-Encoding is a property of the message, not of the payload, and thus MAY be added or removed by any implementation along the request/response chain. Additional information about the encoding parameters MAY be provided by other header fields not defined by this specification.

Transfer-Encoding MAY be sent in a response to a HEAD request or in a 304 (Not Modified) response (Section 4.1 of [Part4]) to a GET request, neither of which includes a message body, to indicate that the origin server would have applied a transfer coding to the message body if the request had been an unconditional GET. This indication is not required, however, because any recipient on the response chain (including the origin server) can remove transfer codings when they are not needed.

Transfer-Encoding was added in HTTP/1.1. It is generally assumed that implementations advertising only HTTP/1.0 support will not understand how to process a transfer-encoded payload. A client MUST NOT send a request containing Transfer-Encoding unless it knows the server will handle HTTP/1.1 (or later) requests; such knowledge might be in the form of specific user configuration or by remembering the version of a prior received response. A server MUST NOT send a response containing Transfer-Encoding unless the corresponding
request indicates HTTP/1.1 (or later).

A server that receives a request message with a transfer-coding it does not understand SHOULD respond with 501 (Not Implemented) and then close the connection.

3.3.2. Content-Length

When a message is allowed to contain a message body, does not have a Transfer-Encoding header field, and has a payload body length that is known to the sender before the message header section has been sent, the sender SHOULD send a Content-Length header field to indicate the length of the payload body as a decimal number of octets.

Content-Length = 1*DIGIT

An example is

Content-Length: 3495

A sender MUST NOT send a Content-Length header field in any message that contains a Transfer-Encoding header field.

A server MAY send a Content-Length header field in a response to a HEAD request (Section 5.3.2 of [Part2]); a server MUST NOT send Content-Length in such a response unless its field-value equals the decimal number of octets that would have been sent in the payload body of a response if the same request had used the GET method.

A server MAY send a Content-Length header field in a 304 (Not Modified) response to a conditional GET request (Section 4.1 of [Part4]); a server MUST NOT send Content-Length in such a response unless its field-value equals the decimal number of octets that would have been sent in the payload body of a 200 (OK) response to the same request.

A server MUST NOT send a Content-Length header field in any response with a status code of 1xx (Informational) or 204 (No Content). A server SHOULD not send a Content-Length header field in any 2xx (Successful) response to a CONNECT request (Section 5.3.6 of [Part2]).

Any Content-Length field value greater than or equal to zero is valid. Since there is no predefined limit to the length of an HTTP payload, recipients SHOULD anticipate potentially large decimal numerals and prevent parsing errors due to integer conversion overflows (Section 8.6).
If a message is received that has multiple Content-Length header fields with field-values consisting of the same decimal value, or a single Content-Length header field with a field value containing a list of identical decimal values (e.g., "Content-Length: 42, 42"), indicating that duplicate Content-Length header fields have been generated or combined by an upstream message processor, then the recipient MUST either reject the message as invalid or replace the duplicated field-values with a single valid Content-Length field containing that decimal value prior to determining the message body length.

Note: HTTP’s use of Content-Length for message framing differs significantly from the same field’s use in MIME, where it is an optional field used only within the "message/external-body" media-type.

3.3.3. Message Body Length

The length of a message body is determined by one of the following (in order of precedence):

1. Any response to a HEAD request and any response with a 1xx (Informational), 204 (No Content), or 304 (Not Modified) status code is always terminated by the first empty line after the header fields, regardless of the header fields present in the message, and thus cannot contain a message body.

2. Any 2xx (Successful) response to a CONNECT request implies that the connection will become a tunnel immediately after the empty line that concludes the header fields. A client MUST ignore any Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding header fields received in such a message.

3. If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present and the "chunked" transfer-coding (Section 4.1) is the final encoding, the message body length is determined by reading and decoding the chunked data until the transfer-coding indicates the data is complete.

If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a response and the "chunked" transfer-coding is not the final encoding, the message body length is determined by reading the connection until it is closed by the server. If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a request and the "chunked" transfer-coding is not the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request) status code and then close the connection.

If a message is received with both a Transfer-Encoding and a
Content-Length header field, the Transfer-Encoding overrides the Content-Length. Such a message might indicate an attempt to perform request or response smuggling (bypass of security-related checks on message routing or content) and thus ought to be handled as an error. The provided Content-Length MUST be removed, prior to forwarding the message downstream, or replaced with the real message body length after the transfer-coding is decoded.

4. If a message is received without Transfer-Encoding and with either multiple Content-Length header fields having differing field-values or a single Content-Length header field having an invalid value, then the message framing is invalid and MUST be treated as an error to prevent request or response smuggling. If this is a request message, the server MUST respond with a 400 (Bad Request) status code and then close the connection. If this is a response message received by a proxy, the proxy MUST discard the received response, send a 502 (Bad Gateway) status code as its downstream response, and then close the connection. If this is a response message received by a user-agent, it MUST be treated as an error by discarding the message and closing the connection.

5. If a valid Content-Length header field is present without Transfer-Encoding, its decimal value defines the message body length in octets. If the actual number of octets sent in the message is less than the indicated Content-Length, the recipient MUST consider the message to be incomplete and treat the connection as no longer usable. If the actual number of octets sent in the message is more than the indicated Content-Length, the recipient MUST only process the message body up to the field value’s number of octets; the remainder of the message MUST either be discarded or treated as the next message in a pipeline. For the sake of robustness, a user-agent MAY attempt to detect and correct such an error in message framing if it is parsing the response to the last request on a connection and the connection has been closed by the server.

6. If this is a request message and none of the above are true, then the message body length is zero (no message body is present).

7. Otherwise, this is a response message without a declared message body length, so the message body length is determined by the number of octets received prior to the server closing the connection.

Since there is no way to distinguish a successfully completed, close-delimited message from a partially-received message interrupted by
network failure, a server SHOULD use encoding or length-delimited messages whenever possible. The close-delimiting feature exists primarily for backwards compatibility with HTTP/1.0.

A server MAY reject a request that contains a message body but not a Content-Length by responding with 411 (Length Required).

Unless a transfer-coding other than "chunked" has been applied, a client that sends a request containing a message body SHOULD use a valid Content-Length header field if the message body length is known in advance, rather than the "chunked" encoding, since some existing services respond to "chunked" with a 411 (Length Required) status code even though they understand the chunked encoding. This is typically because such services are implemented via a gateway that requires a content-length in advance of being called and the server is unable or unwilling to buffer the entire request before processing.

A client that sends a request containing a message body MUST include a valid Content-Length header field if it does not know the server will handle HTTP/1.1 (or later) requests; such knowledge can be in the form of specific user configuration or by remembering the version of a prior received response.

3.4. Handling Incomplete Messages

Request messages that are prematurely terminated, possibly due to a canceled connection or a server-imposed time-out exception, MUST result in closure of the connection; sending an error response prior to closing the connection is OPTIONAL.

Response messages that are prematurely terminated, usually by closure of the connection prior to receiving the expected number of octets or by failure to decode a transfer-encoded message body, MUST be recorded as incomplete. A response that terminates in the middle of the header block (before the empty line is received) cannot be assumed to convey the full semantics of the response and MUST be treated as an error.

A message body that uses the chunked transfer encoding is incomplete if the zero-sized chunk that terminates the encoding has not been received. A message that uses a valid Content-Length is incomplete if the size of the message body received (in octets) is less than the value given by Content-Length. A response that has neither chunked transfer encoding nor Content-Length is terminated by closure of the connection, and thus is considered complete regardless of the number of message body octets received, provided that the header block was received intact.
A user agent MUST NOT render an incomplete response message body as if it were complete (i.e., some indication needs to be given to the user that an error occurred). Cache requirements for incomplete responses are defined in Section 3 of [Part6].

A server MUST read the entire request message body or close the connection after sending its response, since otherwise the remaining data on a persistent connection would be misinterpreted as the next request. Likewise, a client MUST read the entire response message body if it intends to reuse the same connection for a subsequent request. Pipelining multiple requests on a connection is described in Section 6.2.2.1.

3.5. Message Parsing Robustness

Older HTTP/1.0 client implementations might send an extra CRLF after a POST request as a lame workaround for some early server applications that failed to read message body content that was not terminated by a line-ending. An HTTP/1.1 client MUST NOT preface or follow a request with an extra CRLF. If terminating the request message body with a line-ending is desired, then the client MUST include the terminating CRLF octets as part of the message body length.

In the interest of robustness, servers SHOULD ignore at least one empty line received where a request-line is expected. In other words, if the server is reading the protocol stream at the beginning of a message and receives a CRLF first, it SHOULD ignore the CRLF. Likewise, although the line terminator for the start-line and header fields is the sequence CRLF, we recommend that recipients recognize a single LF as a line terminator and ignore any CR.

When a server listening only for HTTP request messages, or processing what appears from the start-line to be an HTTP request message, receives a sequence of octets that does not match the HTTP-message grammar aside from the robustness exceptions listed above, the server MUST respond with an HTTP/1.1 400 (Bad Request) response.

4. Transfer Codings

Transfer-coding values are used to indicate an encoding transformation that has been, can be, or might need to be applied to a payload body in order to ensure "safe transport" through the network. This differs from a content coding in that the transfer-coding is a property of the message rather than a property of the representation that is being transferred.
transfer-coding = "chunked" ; Section 4.1
/ "compress" ; Section 4.2.1
/ "deflate" ; Section 4.2.2
/ "gzip" ; Section 4.2.3
/ transfer-extension

transfer-extension = token *( OWS ;" ; OWS transfer-parameter )

Parameters are in the form of attribute/value pairs.

transfer-parameter = attribute BWS "=" BWS value
attribute = token
value = word

All transfer-coding values are case-insensitive and SHOULD be registered within the HTTP Transfer Coding registry, as defined in Section 7.4. They are used in the TE (Section 4.3) and Transfer-Encoding (Section 3.3.1) header fields.

4.1. Chunked Transfer Coding

The chunked encoding modifies the body of a message in order to transfer it as a series of chunks, each with its own size indicator, followed by an OPTIONAL trailer containing header fields. This allows dynamically produced content to be transferred along with the information necessary for the recipient to verify that it has received the full message.

chunked-body = *chunk
last-chunk
trailer-part
CRLF

chunk = chunk-size [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
chunk-data CRLF

chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG
last-chunk = 1*"0" [ chunk-ext ] CRLF

chunk-ext = *( ";" chunk-ext-name [ "=" chunk-ext-val ] )
chunk-ext-name = token
chunk-ext-val = token / quoted-str-nf
chunk-data = 1*OCTET ; a sequence of chunk-size octets
trailer-part = *( header-field CRLF )

quoted-str-nf = DQUOTE *( qdtext-nf / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE
qdtext-nf = HTAB / SP / %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text

Chunk extensions within the chunked encoding are deprecated. Senders
SHOULD NOT send chunk-ext. Definition of new chunk extensions is discouraged.

The chunk-size field is a string of hex digits indicating the size of the chunk-data in octets. The chunked encoding is ended by any chunk whose size is zero, followed by the trailer, which is terminated by an empty line.

4.1.1. Trailer

A trailer allows the sender to include additional fields at the end of a chunked message in order to supply metadata that might be dynamically generated while the message body is sent, such as a message integrity check, digital signature, or post-processing status. The trailer MUST NOT contain fields that need to be known before a recipient processes the body, such as Transfer-Encoding, Content-Length, and Trailer.

When a message includes a message body encoded with the chunked transfer-coding and the sender desires to send metadata in the form of trailer fields at the end of the message, the sender SHOULD send a Trailer header field before the message body to indicate which fields will be present in the trailers. This allows the recipient to prepare for receipt of that metadata before it starts processing the body, which is useful if the message is being streamed and the recipient wishes to confirm an integrity check on the fly.

Trailer = 1#field-name

If no Trailer header field is present, the sender of a chunked message body SHOULD send an empty trailer.

A server MUST send an empty trailer with the chunked transfer-coding unless at least one of the following is true:

1. the request included a TE header field that indicates "trailers" is acceptable in the transfer-coding of the response, as described in Section 4.3; or,

2. the trailer fields consist entirely of optional metadata and the recipient could use the message (in a manner acceptable to the server where the field originated) without receiving that metadata. In other words, the server that generated the header field is willing to accept the possibility that the trailer fields might be silently discarded along the path to the client.

The above requirement prevents the need for an infinite buffer when a message is being received by an HTTP/1.1 (or later) proxy and
4.1.2. Decoding chunked

A process for decoding the "chunked" transfer-coding can be represented in pseudo-code as:

```
length := 0
read chunk-size, chunk-ext (if any) and CRLF
while (chunk-size > 0) {
    read chunk-data and CRLF
    append chunk-data to decoded-body
    length := length + chunk-size
    read chunk-size and CRLF
}
read header-field
while (header-field not empty) {
    append header-field to existing header fields
    read header-field
}
Content-Length := length
Remove "chunked" from Transfer-Encoding
Remove Trailer from existing header fields
```

All recipients MUST be able to receive and decode the "chunked" transfer-coding and MUST ignore chunk-ext extensions they do not understand.

4.2. Compression Codings

The codings defined below can be used to compress the payload of a message.

4.2.1. Compress Coding

The "compress" format is produced by the common UNIX file compression program "compress". This format is an adaptive Lempel-Ziv-Welch coding (LZW). Recipients SHOULD consider "x-compress" to be equivalent to "compress".

4.2.2. Deflate Coding

The "deflate" format is defined as the "deflate" compression mechanism (described in [RFC1951]) used inside the "zlib" data format ([RFC1950]).
Note: Some incorrect implementations send the "deflate" compressed data without the zlib wrapper.

4.2.3. Gzip Coding

The "gzip" format is produced by the file compression program "gzip" (GNU zip), as described in [RFC1952]. This format is a Lempel–Ziv coding (LZ77) with a 32 bit CRC. Recipients SHOULD consider "x-gzip" to be equivalent to "gzip".

4.3. TE

The "TE" header field in a request indicates what transfer-codings, besides "chunked", the client is willing to accept in response, and whether or not the client is willing to accept trailer fields in a chunked transfer-coding.

The TE field-value consists of a comma-separated list of transfer-coding names, each allowing for optional parameters (as described in Section 4), and/or the keyword "trailers". Clients MUST NOT send the chunked transfer-coding name in TE; chunked is always acceptable for HTTP/1.1 recipients.

```
TE        = #t-codings
  t-codings = "trailers" / ( transfer-coding [ t-ranking ] )
  t-ranking = OWS " ; " OWS " q = " rank
    rank     = ( "0" [ . 0*3DIGIT ] )
             / ( "1" [ ." 0*3("0") ] )
```

Three examples of TE use are below.

```
TE: deflate
TE:
TE: trailers, deflate;q=0.5
```

The presence of the keyword "trailers" indicates that the client is willing to accept trailer fields in a chunked transfer-coding, as defined in Section 4.1, on behalf of itself and any downstream clients. For chained requests, this implies that either: (a) all downstream clients are willing to accept trailer fields in the forwarded response; or, (b) the client will attempt to buffer the response on behalf of downstream recipients. Note that HTTP/1.1 does not define any means to limit the size of a chunked response such that a client can be assured of buffering the entire response.

When multiple transfer-codings are acceptable, the client MAY rank the codings by preference using a case-insensitive "q" parameter (similar to the qvalues used in content negotiation fields, Section
6.3.1 of [Part2]). The rank value is a real number in the range 0 through 1, where 0.001 is the least preferred and 1 is the most preferred; a value of 0 means "not acceptable".

If the TE field-value is empty or if no TE field is present, the only acceptable transfer-coding is "chunked". A message with no transfer-coding is always acceptable.

Since the TE header field only applies to the immediate connection, a sender of TE MUST also send a "TE" connection option within the Connection header field (Section 6.1) in order to prevent the TE field from being forwarded by intermediaries that do not support its semantics.

5. Message Routing

HTTP request message routing is determined by each client based on the target resource, the client’s proxy configuration, and establishment or reuse of an inbound connection. The corresponding response routing follows the same connection chain back to the client.

5.1. Identifying a Target Resource

HTTP is used in a wide variety of applications, ranging from general-purpose computers to home appliances. In some cases, communication options are hard-coded in a client’s configuration. However, most HTTP clients rely on the same resource identification mechanism and configuration techniques as general-purpose Web browsers.

HTTP communication is initiated by a user agent for some purpose. The purpose is a combination of request semantics, which are defined in [Part2], and a target resource upon which to apply those semantics. A URI reference (Section 2.7) is typically used as an identifier for the "target resource", which a user agent would resolve to its absolute form in order to obtain the "target URI". The target URI excludes the reference’s fragment identifier component, if any, since fragment identifiers are reserved for client-side processing ([RFC3986], Section 3.5).

5.2. Connecting Inbound

Once the target URI is determined, a client needs to decide whether a network request is necessary to accomplish the desired semantics and, if so, where that request is to be directed.

If the client has a response cache and the request semantics can be satisfied by a cache ([Part6]), then the request is usually directed
to the cache first.

If the request is not satisfied by a cache, then a typical client will check its configuration to determine whether a proxy is to be used to satisfy the request. Proxy configuration is implementation-dependent, but is often based on URI prefix matching, selective authority matching, or both, and the proxy itself is usually identified by an "http" or "https" URI. If a proxy is applicable, the client connects inbound by establishing (or reusing) a connection to that proxy.

If no proxy is applicable, a typical client will invoke a handler routine, usually specific to the target URI’s scheme, to connect directly to an authority for the target resource. How that is accomplished is dependent on the target URI scheme and defined by its associated specification, similar to how this specification defines origin server access for resolution of the "http" (Section 2.7.1) and "https" (Section 2.7.2) schemes.

HTTP requirements regarding connection management are defined in Section 6.

5.3. Request Target

Once an inbound connection is obtained, the client sends an HTTP request message (Section 3) with a request-target derived from the target URI. There are four distinct formats for the request-target, depending on both the method being requested and whether the request is to a proxy.

request-target = origin-form
                 / absolute-form
                 / authority-form
                 / asterisk-form

origin-form    = path-absolute [ "?" query ]
absolute-form  = absolute-URI
authority-form = authority
asterisk-form  = "*"

The most common form of request-target is the origin-form. When making a request directly to an origin server, other than a CONNECT or server-wide OPTIONS request (as detailed below), a client MUST send only the absolute path and query components of the target URI as the request-target. If the target URI’s path component is empty, then the client MUST send "/" as the path within the origin-form of request-target. A Host header field is also sent, as defined in Section 5.4, containing the target URI’s authority component.
(excluding any userinfo).

For example, a client wishing to retrieve a representation of the resource identified as

http://www.example.org/where?q=now

directly from the origin server would open (or reuse) a TCP connection to port 80 of the host "www.example.org" and send the lines:

GET /where?q=now HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org

followed by the remainder of the request message.

When making a request to a proxy, other than a CONNECT or server-wide OPTIONS request (as detailed below), a client MUST send the target URI in absolute-form as the request-target. The proxy is requested to either service that request from a valid cache, if possible, or make the same request on the client’s behalf to either the next inbound proxy server or directly to the origin server indicated by the request-target. Requirements on such "forwarding" of messages are defined in Section 5.6.

An example absolute-form of request-line would be:

GET http://www.example.org/pub/WWW/TheProject.html HTTP/1.1

To allow for transition to the absolute-form for all requests in some future version of HTTP, HTTP/1.1 servers MUST accept the absolute-form in requests, even though HTTP/1.1 clients will only send them in requests to proxies.

The authority-form of request-target is only used for CONNECT requests (Section 5.3.6 of [Part2]). When making a CONNECT request to establish a tunnel through one or more proxies, a client MUST send only the target URI’s authority component (excluding any userinfo) as the request-target. For example,

CONNECT www.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1

The asterisk-form of request-target is only used for a server-wide OPTIONS request (Section 5.3.7 of [Part2]). When a client wishes to request OPTIONS for the server as a whole, as opposed to a specific named resource of that server, the client MUST send only "*" (%x2A) as the request-target. For example,
OPTIONS * HTTP/1.1

If a proxy receives an OPTIONS request with an absolute-form of request-target in which the URI has an empty path and no query component, then the last proxy on the request chain MUST send a request-target of "*" when it forwards the request to the indicated origin server.

For example, the request

OPTIONS http://www.example.org:8001 HTTP/1.1

would be forwarded by the final proxy as

OPTIONS * HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org:8001

after connecting to port 8001 of host "www.example.org".

5.4. Host

The "Host" header field in a request provides the host and port information from the target URI, enabling the origin server to distinguish among resources while servicing requests for multiple host names on a single IP address. Since the Host field-value is critical information for handling a request, it SHOULD be sent as the first header field following the request-line.

Host = uri-host [ "": port ] ; Section 2.7.1

A client MUST send a Host header field in all HTTP/1.1 request messages. If the target URI includes an authority component, then the Host field-value MUST be identical to that authority component after excluding any userinfo (Section 2.7.1). If the authority component is missing or undefined for the target URI, then the Host header field MUST be sent with an empty field-value.

For example, a GET request to the origin server for

<http://www.example.org/pub/WWW/> would begin with:

GET /pub/WWW/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org

The Host header field MUST be sent in an HTTP/1.1 request even if the request-target is in the absolute-form, since this allows the Host information to be forwarded through ancient HTTP/1.0 proxies that might not have implemented Host.
When a proxy receives a request with an absolute-form of request-target, the proxy MUST ignore the received Host header field (if any) and instead replace it with the host information of the request-target. If the proxy forwards the request, it MUST generate a new Host field-value based on the received request-target rather than forward the received Host field-value.

Since the Host header field acts as an application-level routing mechanism, it is a frequent target for malware seeking to poison a shared cache or redirect a request to an unintended server. An interception proxy is particularly vulnerable if it relies on the Host field-value for redirecting requests to internal servers, or for use as a cache key in a shared cache, without first verifying that the intercepted connection is targeting a valid IP address for that host.

A server MUST respond with a 400 (Bad Request) status code to any HTTP/1.1 request message that lacks a Host header field and to any request message that contains more than one Host header field or a Host header field with an invalid field-value.

5.5. Effective Request URI

A server that receives an HTTP request message MUST reconstruct the user agent’s original target URI, based on the pieces of information learned from the request-target, Host header field, and connection context, in order to identify the intended target resource and properly service the request. The URI derived from this reconstruction process is referred to as the "effective request URI".

For a user agent, the effective request URI is the target URI.

If the request-target is in absolute-form, then the effective request URI is the same as the request-target. Otherwise, the effective request URI is constructed as follows.

If the request is received over a TLS-secured TCP connection, then the effective request URI’s scheme is "https"; otherwise, the scheme is "http".

If the request-target is in authority-form, then the effective request URI’s authority component is the same as the request-target. Otherwise, if a Host header field is supplied with a non-empty field-value, then the authority component is the same as the Host field-value. Otherwise, the authority component is the concatenation of the default host name configured for the server, a colon (":") , and the connection’s incoming TCP port number in decimal form.
If the request-target is in authority-form or asterisk-form, then the effective request URI's combined path and query component is empty. Otherwise, the combined path and query component is the same as the request-target.

The components of the effective request URI, once determined as above, can be combined into absolute-URI form by concatenating the scheme, ":/", authority, and combined path and query component.

Example 1: the following message received over an insecure TCP connection

```
GET /pub/WWW/TheProject.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org:8080
```

has an effective request URI of

```
http://www.example.org:8080/pub/WWW/TheProject.html
```

Example 2: the following message received over a TLS-secured TCP connection

```
OPTIONS * HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org
```

has an effective request URI of

```
https://www.example.org
```

An origin server that does not allow resources to differ by requested host MAY ignore the Host field-value and instead replace it with a configured server name when constructing the effective request URI.

Recipients of an HTTP/1.0 request that lacks a Host header field MAY attempt to use heuristics (e.g., examination of the URI path for something unique to a particular host) in order to guess the effective request URI's authority component.

5.6. Message Forwarding

As described in Section 2.3, intermediaries can serve a variety of roles in the processing of HTTP requests and responses. Some intermediaries are used to improve performance or availability. Others are used for access control or to filter content. Since an HTTP stream has characteristics similar to a pipe-and-filter architecture, there are no inherent limits to the extent an intermediary can enhance (or interfere) with either direction of the stream.
Intermediaries that forward a message MUST implement the Connection header field, as specified in Section 6.1, to exclude fields that are only intended for the incoming connection.

In order to avoid request loops, a proxy that forwards requests to other proxies MUST be able to recognize and exclude all of its own server names, including any aliases, local variations, or literal IP addresses.

5.7. Via

The "Via" header field MUST be sent by a proxy or gateway in forwarded messages to indicate the intermediate protocols and recipients between the user agent and the server on requests, and between the origin server and the client on responses. It is analogous to the "Received" field used by email systems (Section 3.6.7 of [RFC5322]). Via is used in HTTP for tracking message forwards, avoiding request loops, and identifying the protocol capabilities of all senders along the request/response chain.

\[
\text{Via} = 1\#( \text{received-protocol} \text{RWS} \text{received-by} \\
[ \text{RWS comment} ] ) \\
\text{received-protocol} = [ \text{protocol-name} "/" ] \text{protocol-version} \\
\text{received-by} = ( \text{uri-host} [ ":\text{port} ] ) / \text{pseudonym} \\
\text{pseudonym} = \text{token}
\]

The received-protocol indicates the protocol version of the message received by the server or client along each segment of the request/response chain. The received-protocol version is appended to the Via field value when the message is forwarded so that information about the protocol capabilities of upstream applications remains visible to all recipients.

The protocol-name is excluded if and only if it would be "HTTP". The received-by field is normally the host and optional port number of a recipient server or client that subsequently forwarded the message. However, if the real host is considered to be sensitive information, it MAY be replaced by a pseudonym. If the port is not given, it MAY be assumed to be the default port of the received-protocol.

Multiple Via field values represent each proxy or gateway that has forwarded the message. Each recipient MUST append its information such that the end result is ordered according to the sequence of forwarding applications.

Comments MAY be used in the Via header field to identify the software of each recipient, analogous to the User-Agent and Server header fields. However, all comments in the Via field are optional and MAY
be removed by any recipient prior to forwarding the message.

For example, a request message could be sent from an HTTP/1.0 user agent to an internal proxy code-named "fred", which uses HTTP/1.1 to forward the request to a public proxy at p.example.net, which completes the request by forwarding it to the origin server at www.example.com. The request received by www.example.com would then have the following Via header field:

   Via: 1.0 fred, 1.1 p.example.net (Apache/1.1)

A proxy or gateway used as a portal through a network firewall SHOULD NOT forward the names and ports of hosts within the firewall region unless it is explicitly enabled to do so. If not enabled, the received-by host of any host behind the firewall SHOULD be replaced by an appropriate pseudonym for that host.

A proxy or gateway MAY combine an ordered subsequence of Via header field entries into a single such entry if the entries have identical received-protocol values. For example,

   Via: 1.0 ricky, 1.1 ethel, 1.1 fred, 1.0 lucy

could be collapsed to

   Via: 1.0 ricky, 1.1 mertz, 1.0 lucy

Senders SHOULD NOT combine multiple entries unless they are all under the same organizational control and the hosts have already been replaced by pseudonyms. Senders MUST NOT combine entries which have different received-protocol values.

5.8. Message Transforming

If a proxy receives a request-target with a host name that is not a fully qualified domain name, it MAY add its own domain to the host name it received when forwarding the request. A proxy MUST NOT change the host name if it is a fully qualified domain name.

A non-transforming proxy MUST NOT modify the "path-absolute" and "query" parts of the received request-target when forwarding it to the next inbound server, except as noted above to replace an empty path with "/" or "*".

A non-transforming proxy MUST preserve the message payload (Section 3.3 of [Part2]), though it MAY change the message body through application or removal of a transfer-coding (Section 4).
A non-transforming proxy SHOULD NOT modify header fields that provide information about the end points of the communication chain, the resource state, or the selected representation.

A non-transforming proxy MUST NOT modify any of the following fields in a request or response, and it MUST NOT add any of these fields if not already present:

- Allow (Section 8.4.1 of [Part2])
- Content-Location (Section 3.1.4.2 of [Part2])
- Content-MD5 (Section 14.15 of [RFC2616])
- ETag (Section 2.3 of [Part4])
- Last-Modified (Section 2.2 of [Part4])
- Server (Section 8.4.2 of [Part2])

A non-transforming proxy MUST NOT modify an Expires header field (Section 7.3 of [Part6]) if already present in a response, but it MAY add an Expires header field with a field-value identical to that of the Date header field.

A proxy MUST NOT modify or add any of the following fields in a message that contains the no-transform cache-control directive:

- Content-Encoding (Section 3.1.2.2 of [Part2])
- Content-Range (Section 5.2 of [Part5])
- Content-Type (Section 3.1.1.5 of [Part2])

A transforming proxy MAY modify or add these fields to a message that does not include no-transform, but if it does so, it MUST add a Warning 214 (Transformation applied) if one does not already appear in the message (see Section 7.5 of [Part6]).

Warning: Unnecessary modification of header fields might cause authentication failures if stronger authentication mechanisms are introduced in later versions of HTTP. Such authentication mechanisms MAY rely on the values of header fields not listed here.
5.9. Associating a Response to a Request

HTTP does not include a request identifier for associating a given request message with its corresponding one or more response messages. Hence, it relies on the order of response arrival to correspond exactly to the order in which requests are made on the same connection. More than one response message per request only occurs when one or more informational responses (1xx, see Section 7.2 of [Part2]) precede a final response to the same request.

A client that uses persistent connections and sends more than one request per connection MUST maintain a list of outstanding requests in the order sent on that connection and MUST associate each received response message to the highest ordered request that has not yet received a final (non-1xx) response.

6. Connection Management

HTTP messaging is independent of the underlying transport or session-layer connection protocol(s). HTTP only presumes a reliable transport with in-order delivery of requests and the corresponding in-order delivery of responses. The mapping of HTTP request and response structures onto the data units of an underlying transport protocol is outside the scope of this specification.

As described in Section 5.2, the specific connection protocols to be used for an HTTP interaction are determined by client configuration and the target URI. For example, the "http" URI scheme (Section 2.7.1) indicates a default connection of TCP over IP, with a default TCP port of 80, but the client might be configured to use a proxy via some other connection, port, or protocol.

HTTP implementations are expected to engage in connection management, which includes maintaining the state of current connections, establishing a new connection or reusing an existing connection, processing messages received on a connection, detecting connection failures, and closing each connection. Most clients maintain multiple connections in parallel, including more than one connection per server endpoint. Most servers are designed to maintain thousands of concurrent connections, while controlling request queues to enable fair use and detect denial of service attacks.

6.1. Connection

The "Connection" header field allows the sender to indicate desired control options for the current connection. In order to avoid confusing downstream recipients, a proxy or gateway MUST remove or replace any received connection options before forwarding the
message.

When a header field is used to supply control information for or about the current connection, the sender SHOULD list the corresponding field-name within the "Connection" header field. A proxy or gateway MUST parse a received Connection header field before a message is forwarded and, for each connection-option in this field, remove any header field(s) from the message with the same name as the connection-option, and then remove the Connection header field itself (or replace it with the intermediary’s own connection options for the forwarded message).

Hence, the Connection header field provides a declarative way of distinguishing header fields that are only intended for the immediate recipient ("hop-by-hop") from those fields that are intended for all recipients on the chain ("end-to-end"), enabling the message to be self-descriptive and allowing future connection-specific extensions to be deployed without fear that they will be blindly forwarded by older intermediaries.

The Connection header field’s value has the following grammar:

\[
\text{Connection} \quad = \quad 1\#\text{connection-option} \\
\text{connection-option} \quad = \quad \text{token}
\]

Connection options are case-insensitive.

A sender MUST NOT include field-names in the Connection header field-value for fields that are defined as expressing constraints for all recipients in the request or response chain, such as the Cache-Control header field (Section 7.2 of [Part6]).

The connection options do not have to correspond to a header field present in the message, since a connection-specific header field might not be needed if there are no parameters associated with that connection option. Recipients that trigger certain connection behavior based on the presence of connection options MUST do so based on the presence of the connection-option rather than only the presence of the optional header field. In other words, if the connection option is received as a header field but not indicated within the Connection field-value, then the recipient MUST ignore the connection-specific header field because it has likely been forwarded by an intermediary that is only partially conformant.

When defining new connection options, specifications ought to carefully consider existing deployed header fields and ensure that the new connection option does not share the same name as an unrelated header field that might already be deployed. Defining a
new connection option essentially reserves that potential field-name for carrying additional information related to the connection option, since it would be unwise for senders to use that field-name for anything else.

The "close" connection option is defined for a sender to signal that this connection will be closed after completion of the response. For example,

Connection: close

in either the request or the response header fields indicates that the connection SHOULD be closed after the current request/response is complete (Section 6.2.5).

A client that does not support persistent connections MUST send the "close" connection option in every request message.

A server that does not support persistent connections MUST send the "close" connection option in every response message that does not have a 1xx (Informational) status code.

6.2. Persistent Connections

HTTP was originally designed to use a separate connection for each request/response pair. As the Web evolved and embedded requests became common for inline images, the connection establishment overhead was a significant drain on performance and a concern for Internet congestion. Message framing (via Content-Length) and optional long-lived connections (via Keep-Alive) were added to HTTP/1.0 in order to improve performance for some requests. However, these extensions were insufficient for dynamically generated responses and difficult to use with intermediaries.

HTTP/1.1 defaults to the use of "persistent connections", which allow multiple requests and responses to be carried over a single connection. The "close" connection-option is used to signal that a connection will close after the current request/response. Persistent connections have a number of advantages:

- By opening and closing fewer connections, CPU time is saved in routers and hosts (clients, servers, proxies, gateways, tunnels, or caches), and memory used for protocol control blocks can be saved in hosts.

- Most requests and responses can be pipelined on a connection. Pipelining allows a client to make multiple requests without waiting for each response, allowing a single connection to be used
much more efficiently and with less overall latency.

- For TCP connections, network congestion is reduced by eliminating the packets associated with the three way handshake and graceful close procedures, and by allowing sufficient time to determine the congestion state of the network.
- Latency on subsequent requests is reduced since there is no time spent in the connection opening handshake.
- HTTP can evolve more gracefully, since most errors can be reported without the penalty of closing the connection. Clients using future versions of HTTP might optimistically try a new feature, but if communicating with an older server, retry with old semantics after an error is reported.

HTTP implementations SHOULD implement persistent connections.

6.2.1. Establishment

It is beyond the scope of this specification to describe how connections are established via various transport or session-layer protocols. Each connection applies to only one transport link.

A recipient determines whether a connection is persistent or not based on the most recently received message’s protocol version and Connection header field (if any):

- If the close connection option is present, the connection will not persist after the current response; else,
- If the received protocol is HTTP/1.1 (or later), the connection will persist after the current response; else,
- If the received protocol is HTTP/1.0, the "keep-alive" connection option is present, the recipient is not a proxy, and the recipient wishes to honor the HTTP/1.0 "keep-alive" mechanism, the connection will persist after the current response; otherwise,
- The connection will close after the current response.

A proxy server MUST NOT maintain a persistent connection with an HTTP/1.0 client (see Section 19.7.1 of [RFC2068] for information and discussion of the problems with the Keep-Alive header field implemented by many HTTP/1.0 clients).
6.2.2. Reuse

In order to remain persistent, all messages on a connection MUST have a self-defined message length (i.e., one not defined by closure of the connection), as described in Section 3.3.

A server MAY assume that an HTTP/1.1 client intends to maintain a persistent connection until a close connection option is received in a request.

A client MAY reuse a persistent connection until it sends or receives a close connection option or receives an HTTP/1.0 response without a "keep-alive" connection option.

Clients and servers SHOULD NOT assume that a persistent connection is maintained for HTTP versions less than 1.1 unless it is explicitly signaled. See Appendix A.1.2 for more information on backward compatibility with HTTP/1.0 clients.

6.2.2.1. Pipelining

A client that supports persistent connections MAY "pipeline" its requests (i.e., send multiple requests without waiting for each response). A server MUST send its responses to those requests in the same order that the requests were received.

Clients which assume persistent connections and pipeline immediately after connection establishment SHOULD be prepared to retry their connection if the first pipelined attempt fails. If a client does such a retry, it MUST NOT pipeline before it knows the connection is persistent. Clients MUST also be prepared to resend their requests if the server closes the connection before sending all of the corresponding responses.

Clients SHOULD NOT pipeline requests using non-idempotent request methods or non-idempotent sequences of request methods (see Section 5.2.2 of [Part2]). Otherwise, a premature termination of the transport connection could lead to indeterminate results. A client wishing to send a non-idempotent request SHOULD wait to send that request until it has received the response status line for the previous request.

6.2.2.2. Retrying Requests

Senders can close the transport connection at any time. Therefore, clients, servers, and proxies MUST be able to recover from asynchronous close events. Client software MAY reopen the transport connection and retransmit the aborted sequence of requests without
user interaction so long as the request sequence is idempotent (see Section 5.2.2 of [Part2]). Non-idempotent request methods or sequences MUST NOT be automatically retried, although user agents MAY offer a human operator the choice of retrying the request(s). Confirmation by user-agent software with semantic understanding of the application MAY substitute for user confirmation. The automatic retry SHOULD NOT be repeated if the second sequence of requests fails.

6.2.3. Concurrency

Clients SHOULD limit the number of simultaneous connections that they maintain to a given server.

Previous revisions of HTTP gave a specific number of connections as a ceiling, but this was found to be impractical for many applications. As a result, this specification does not mandate a particular maximum number of connections, but instead encourages clients to be conservative when opening multiple connections.

Multiple connections are typically used to avoid the "head-of-line blocking" problem, wherein a request that takes significant server-side processing and/or has a large payload blocks subsequent requests on the same connection. However, each connection consumes server resources. Furthermore, using multiple connections can cause undesirable side effects in congested networks.

Note that servers might reject traffic that they deem abusive, including an excessive number of connections from a client.

6.2.4. Failures and Time-outs

Servers will usually have some time-out value beyond which they will no longer maintain an inactive connection. Proxy servers might make this a higher value since it is likely that the client will be making more connections through the same server. The use of persistent connections places no requirements on the length (or existence) of this time-out for either the client or the server.

When a client or server wishes to time-out it SHOULD issue a graceful close on the transport connection. Clients and servers SHOULD both constantly watch for the other side of the transport close, and respond to it as appropriate. If a client or server does not detect the other side’s close promptly it could cause unnecessary resource drain on the network.

A client, server, or proxy MAY close the transport connection at any time. For example, a client might have started to send a new request
at the same time that the server has decided to close the "idle"
connection. From the server’s point of view, the connection is being
closed while it was idle, but from the client’s point of view, a
request is in progress.

Servers SHOULD maintain persistent connections and allow the
underlying transport’s flow control mechanisms to resolve temporary
overloads, rather than terminate connections with the expectation
that clients will retry. The latter technique can exacerbate network
congestion.

A client sending a message body SHOULD monitor the network connection
for an error status code while it is transmitting the request. If
the client sees an error status code, it SHOULD immediately cease
transmitting the body and close the connection.

6.2.5. Tear-down

The Connection header field (Section 6.1) provides a "close"
connection option that a sender SHOULD send when it wishes to close
the connection after the current request/response pair.

A client that sends a close connection option MUST NOT send further
requests on that connection (after the one containing close) and MUST
close the connection after reading the final response message
corresponding to this request.

A server that receives a close connection option MUST initiate a
lingering close of the connection after it sends the final response
to the request that contained close. The server SHOULD include a
close connection option in its final response on that connection.
The server MUST NOT process any further requests received on that
connection.

A server that sends a close connection option MUST initiate a
lingering close of the connection after it sends the response
containing close. The server MUST NOT process any further requests
received on that connection.

A client that receives a close connection option MUST cease sending
requests on that connection and close the connection after reading
the response message containing the close; if additional pipelined
requests had been sent on the connection, the client SHOULD assume
that they will not be processed by the server.

If a server performs an immediate close of a TCP connection, there is
a significant risk that the client will not be able to read the last
HTTP response. If the server receives additional data from the
client on a fully-closed connection, such as another request that was sent by the client before receiving the server’s response, the server’s TCP stack will send a reset packet to the client; unfortunately, the reset packet might erase the client’s unacknowledged input buffers before they can be read and interpreted by the client’s HTTP parser.

To avoid the TCP reset problem, a server can perform a lingering close on a connection by closing only the write side of the read/write connection (a half-close) and continuing to read from the connection until the connection is closed by the client or the server is reasonably certain that its own TCP stack has received the client’s acknowledgement of the packet(s) containing the server’s last response. It is then safe for the server to fully close the connection.

It is unknown whether the reset problem is exclusive to TCP or might also be found in other transport connection protocols.

6.3. Upgrade

The "Upgrade" header field is intended to provide a simple mechanism for transitioning from HTTP/1.1 to some other protocol on the same connection. A client MAY send a list of protocols in the Upgrade header field of a request to invite the server to switch to one or more of those protocols before sending the final response. A server MUST send an Upgrade header field in 101 (Switching Protocols) responses to indicate which protocol(s) are being switched to, and MUST send it in 426 (Upgrade Required) responses to indicate acceptable protocols. A server MAY send an Upgrade header field in any other response to indicate that they might be willing to upgrade to one of the specified protocols for a future request.

Upgrade  = 1#protocol
protocol  = protocol-name ["/"] protocol-version
protocol-name = token
protocol-version = token

For example,

Upgrade: HTTP/2.0, SHTTP/1.3, IRC/6.9, RTA/x11

Upgrade eases the difficult transition between incompatible protocols by allowing the client to initiate a request in the more commonly supported protocol while indicating to the server that it would like to use a "better" protocol if available (where "better" is determined by the server, possibly according to the nature of the request method
Upgrade cannot be used to insist on a protocol change; its acceptance and use by the server is optional. The capabilities and nature of the application-level communication after the protocol change is entirely dependent upon the new protocol chosen, although the first action after changing the protocol MUST be a response to the initial HTTP request that contained the Upgrade header field.

For example, if the Upgrade header field is received in a GET request and the server decides to switch protocols, then it MUST first respond with a 101 (Switching Protocols) message in HTTP/1.1 and then immediately follow that with the new protocol’s equivalent of a response to a GET on the target resource. This allows a connection to be upgraded to protocols with the same semantics as HTTP without the latency cost of an additional round-trip. A server MUST NOT switch protocols unless the received message semantics can be honored by the new protocol; an OPTIONS request can be honored by any protocol.

When Upgrade is sent, a sender MUST also send a Connection header field (Section 6.1) that contains the "upgrade" connection option, in order to prevent Upgrade from being accidentally forwarded by intermediaries that might not implement the listed protocols. A server MUST ignore an Upgrade header field that is received in an HTTP/1.0 request.

The Upgrade header field only applies to switching application-level protocols on the existing connection; it cannot be used to switch to a protocol on a different connection. For that purpose, it is more appropriate to use a 3xx (Redirection) response (Section 7.4 of [Part2]).

This specification only defines the protocol name "HTTP" for use by the family of Hypertext Transfer Protocols, as defined by the HTTP version rules of Section 2.6 and future updates to this specification. Additional tokens can be registered with IANA using the registration procedure defined in Section 7.6.

7. IANA Considerations

7.1. Header Field Registration

HTTP header fields are registered within the Message Header Field Registry [RFC3864] maintained by IANA at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/message-headers/message-header-index.html>.

This document defines the following HTTP header fields, so their
associated registry entries shall be updated according to the permanent registrations below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connection</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content-Length</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 3.3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TE</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 4.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer-Encoding</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 3.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrade</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, the header field-name "Close" shall be registered as "reserved", since using that name as an HTTP header field might conflict with the "close" connection option of the "Connection" header field (Section 6.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>reserved</td>
<td>Section 7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The change controller is: "IETF (iesg@ietf.org) - Internet Engineering Task Force".

7.2. URI Scheme Registration


This document defines the following URI schemes, so their associated registry entries shall be updated according to the permanent registrations below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URI Scheme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>http</td>
<td>Hypertext Transfer Protocol</td>
<td>Section 2.7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>https</td>
<td>Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure</td>
<td>Section 2.7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.3. Internet Media Type Registrations

This document serves as the specification for the Internet media types "message/http" and "application/http". The following is to be registered with IANA (see [RFC4288]).

7.3.1. Internet Media Type message/http

The message/http type can be used to enclose a single HTTP request or response message, provided that it obeys the MIME restrictions for all "message" types regarding line length and encodings.

Type name: message
Subtype name: http
Required parameters: none
Optional parameters: version, msgtype

    version: The HTTP-version number of the enclosed message (e.g., "1.1"). If not present, the version can be determined from the first line of the body.

    msgtype: The message type -- "request" or "response". If not present, the type can be determined from the first line of the body.

Encoding considerations: only "7bit", "8bit", or "binary" are permitted
Security considerations: none
Interoperability considerations: none
Published specification: This specification (see Section 7.3.1).
Applications that use this media type:
Additional information:

    Magic number(s): none
    File extension(s): none
7.3.2. Internet Media Type application/http

The application/http type can be used to enclose a pipeline of one or more HTTP request or response messages (not intermixed).

Type name: application
Subtype name: http
Required parameters: none
Optional parameters: version, msgtype

version: The HTTP-version number of the enclosed messages (e.g., "1.1"). If not present, the version can be determined from the first line of the body.

msgtype: The message type -- "request" or "response". If not present, the type can be determined from the first line of the body.

Encoding considerations: HTTP messages enclosed by this type are in "binary" format; use of an appropriate Content-Transfer-Encoding is required when transmitted via E-mail.

Security considerations: none
Interoperability considerations: none
Published specification: This specification (see Section 7.3.2).
Applications that use this media type:
Additional information:
7.4. Transfer Coding Registry

The HTTP Transfer Coding Registry defines the name space for transfer coding names.

Registrations MUST include the following fields:

- Name
- Description
- Pointer to specification text

Names of transfer codings MUST NOT overlap with names of content codings (Section 3.1.2.1 of [Part2]) unless the encoding transformation is identical, as is the case for the compression codings defined in Section 4.2.

Values to be added to this name space require IETF Review (see Section 4.1 of [RFC5226]), and MUST conform to the purpose of transfer coding defined in this section. Use of program names for the identification of encoding formats is not desirable and is discouraged for future encodings.

The registry itself is maintained at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters>.

7.5. Transfer Coding Registrations

The HTTP Transfer Coding Registry shall be updated with the registrations below:
7.6. Upgrade Token Registry

The HTTP Upgrade Token Registry defines the name space for protocol-name tokens used to identify protocols in the Upgrade header field. Each registered protocol name is associated with contact information and an optional set of specifications that details how the connection will be processed after it has been upgraded.

Registrations happen on a "First Come First Served" basis (see Section 4.1 of [RFC5226]) and are subject to the following rules:

1. A protocol-name token, once registered, stays registered forever.
2. The registration MUST name a responsible party for the registration.
3. The registration MUST name a point of contact.
4. The registration MAY name a set of specifications associated with that token. Such specifications need not be publicly available.
5. The registration SHOULD name a set of expected "protocol-version" tokens associated with that token at the time of registration.
6. The responsible party MAY change the registration at any time. The IANA will keep a record of all such changes, and make them available upon request.
7. The IESG MAY reassign responsibility for a protocol token. This will normally only be used in the case when a responsible party cannot be contacted.

This registration procedure for HTTP Upgrade Tokens replaces that previously defined in Section 7.2 of [RFC2817].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>chunked</td>
<td>Transfer in a series of chunks</td>
<td>Section 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compress</td>
<td>UNIX &quot;compress&quot; program method</td>
<td>Section 4.2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deflate</td>
<td>&quot;deflate&quot; compression mechanism ([RFC1951]) used inside the &quot;zlib&quot; data format ([RFC1950])</td>
<td>Section 4.2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gzip</td>
<td>Same as GNU zip ([RFC1952])</td>
<td>Section 4.2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.7. Upgrade Token Registration

The HTTP Upgrade Token Registry shall be updated with the registration below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Expected Version Tokens</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HTTP</td>
<td>Hypertext Transfer Protocol</td>
<td>any DIGIT.DIGIT (e.g., &quot;2.0&quot;)</td>
<td>Section 2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responsible party is: "IETF (iesg@ietf.org) - Internet Engineering Task Force".

8. Security Considerations

This section is meant to inform application developers, information providers, and users of the security limitations in HTTP/1.1 as described by this document. The discussion does not include definitive solutions to the problems revealed, though it does make some suggestions for reducing security risks.

8.1. Personal Information

HTTP clients are often privy to large amounts of personal information, including both information provided by the user to interact with resources (e.g., the user’s name, location, mail address, passwords, encryption keys, etc.) and information about the user’s browsing activity over time (e.g., history, bookmarks, etc.). HTTP implementations need to prevent unintentional leakage of this information.

8.2. Abuse of Server Log Information

A server is in the position to save personal data about a user’s requests which might identify their reading patterns or subjects of interest. In particular, log information gathered at an intermediary often contains a history of user agent interaction, across a multitude of sites, that can be traced to individual users.

HTTP log information is confidential in nature; its handling is often constrained by laws and regulations. Log information needs to be securely stored and appropriate guidelines followed for its analysis. Anonymization of personal information within individual entries helps, but is generally not sufficient to prevent real log traces from being re-identified based on correlation with other access...
characteristics. As such, access traces that are keyed to a specific client should not be published even if the key is pseudonymous.

To minimize the risk of theft or accidental publication, log information should be purged of personally identifiable information, including user identifiers, IP addresses, and user-provided query parameters, as soon as that information is no longer necessary to support operational needs for security, auditing, or fraud control.

8.3. Attacks Based On File and Path Names

Origin servers SHOULD be careful to restrict the documents returned by HTTP requests to be only those that were intended by the server administrators. If an HTTP server translates HTTP URIs directly into file system calls, the server MUST take special care not to serve files that were not intended to be delivered to HTTP clients. For example, UNIX, Microsoft Windows, and other operating systems use ".." as a path component to indicate a directory level above the current one. On such a system, an HTTP server MUST disallow any such construct in the request-target if it would otherwise allow access to a resource outside those intended to be accessible via the HTTP server. Similarly, files intended for reference only internally to the server (such as access control files, configuration files, and script code) MUST be protected from inappropriate retrieval, since they might contain sensitive information.

8.4. DNS-related Attacks

HTTP clients rely heavily on the Domain Name Service (DNS), and are thus generally prone to security attacks based on the deliberate misassociation of IP addresses and DNS names not protected by DNSSec. Clients need to be cautious in assuming the validity of an IP number/DNS name association unless the response is protected by DNSSec ([RFC4033]).

8.5. Intermediaries and Caching

By their very nature, HTTP intermediaries are men-in-the-middle, and represent an opportunity for man-in-the-middle attacks. Compromise of the systems on which the intermediaries run can result in serious security and privacy problems. Intermediaries have access to security-related information, personal information about individual users and organizations, and proprietary information belonging to users and content providers. A compromised intermediary, or an intermediary implemented or configured without regard to security and privacy considerations, might be used in the commission of a wide range of potential attacks.
Intermediaries that contain a shared cache are especially vulnerable to cache poisoning attacks.

Implementers need to consider the privacy and security implications of their design and coding decisions, and of the configuration options they provide to operators (especially the default configuration).

Users need to be aware that intermediaries are no more trustworthy than the people who run them; HTTP itself cannot solve this problem.

8.6. Protocol Element Size Overflows

Because HTTP uses mostly textual, character-delimited fields, attackers can overflow buffers in implementations, and/or perform a Denial of Service against implementations that accept fields with unlimited lengths.

To promote interoperability, this specification makes specific recommendations for minimum size limits on request-line (Section 3.1.1) and blocks of header fields (Section 3.2). These are minimum recommendations, chosen to be supportable even by implementations with limited resources; it is expected that most implementations will choose substantially higher limits.

This specification also provides a way for servers to reject messages that have request-targets that are too long (Section 7.5.12 of [Part2]) or request entities that are too large (Section 7.5 of [Part2]).

Recipients SHOULD carefully limit the extent to which they read other fields, including (but not limited to) request methods, response status phrases, header field-names, and body chunks, so as to avoid denial of service attacks without impeding interoperability.

9. Acknowledgments

This edition of HTTP builds on the many contributions that went into RFC 1945, RFC 2068, RFC 2145, and RFC 2616, including substantial contributions made by the previous authors, editors, and working group chairs: Tim Berners-Lee, Ari Luotonen, Roy T. Fielding, Henrik Frystyk Nielsen, Jim Gettys, Jeffrey C. Mogul, Larry Masinter, Paul J. Leach, and Mark Nottingham. See Section 16 of [RFC2616] for additional acknowledgements from prior revisions.

Since 1999, the following contributors have helped improve the HTTP specification by reporting bugs, asking smart questions, drafting or reviewing text, and evaluating open issues:

10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


Appendix A.  HTTP Version History

HTTP has been in use by the World-Wide Web global information initiative since 1990.  The first version of HTTP, later referred to as HTTP/0.9, was a simple protocol for hypertext data transfer across the Internet with only a single request method (GET) and no metadata.  HTTP/1.0, as defined by [RFC1945], added a range of request methods and MIME-like messaging that could include metadata about the data transferred and modifiers on the request/response semantics.  However, HTTP/1.0 did not sufficiently take into consideration the effects of hierarchical proxies, caching, the need for persistent connections, or name-based virtual hosts.  The proliferation of incompletely-implemented applications calling themselves "HTTP/1.0" further necessitated a protocol version change in order for two communicating applications to determine each other’s true capabilities.

HTTP/1.1 remains compatible with HTTP/1.0 by including more stringent requirements that enable reliable implementations, adding only those new features that will either be safely ignored by an HTTP/1.0 recipient or only sent when communicating with a party advertising conformance with HTTP/1.1.

It is beyond the scope of a protocol specification to mandate conformance with previous versions.  HTTP/1.1 was deliberately designed, however, to make supporting previous versions easy.  We would expect a general-purpose HTTP/1.1 server to understand any valid request in the format of HTTP/1.0 and respond appropriately with an HTTP/1.1 message that only uses features understood (or safely ignored) by HTTP/1.0 clients.  Likewise, we would expect an HTTP/1.1 client to understand any valid HTTP/1.0 response.

Since HTTP/0.9 did not support header fields in a request, there is no mechanism for it to support name-based virtual hosts (selection of resource by inspection of the Host header field).  Any server that implements name-based virtual hosts ought to disable support for HTTP/0.9.  Most requests that appear to be HTTP/0.9 are, in fact, badly constructed HTTP/1.x requests wherein a buggy client failed to properly encode linear whitespace found in a URI reference and placed in the request-target.

A.1.  Changes from HTTP/1.0

This section summarizes major differences between versions HTTP/1.0 and HTTP/1.1.
A.1.1. Multi-homed Web Servers

The requirements that clients and servers support the Host header field (Section 5.4), report an error if it is missing from an HTTP/1.1 request, and accept absolute URIs (Section 5.3) are among the most important changes defined by HTTP/1.1.

Older HTTP/1.0 clients assumed a one-to-one relationship of IP addresses and servers; there was no other established mechanism for distinguishing the intended server of a request than the IP address to which that request was directed. The Host header field was introduced during the development of HTTP/1.1 and, though it was quickly implemented by most HTTP/1.0 browsers, additional requirements were placed on all HTTP/1.1 requests in order to ensure complete adoption. At the time of this writing, most HTTP-based services are dependent upon the Host header field for targeting requests.

A.1.2. Keep-Alive Connections

In HTTP/1.0, each connection is established by the client prior to the request and closed by the server after sending the response. However, some implementations implement the explicitly negotiated ("Keep-Alive") version of persistent connections described in Section 19.7.1 of [RFC2068].

Some clients and servers might wish to be compatible with these previous approaches to persistent connections, by explicitly negotiating for them with a "Connection: keep-alive" request header field. However, some experimental implementations of HTTP/1.0 persistent connections are faulty; for example, if a HTTP/1.0 proxy server doesn't understand Connection, it will erroneously forward that header field to the next inbound server, which would result in a hung connection.

One attempted solution was the introduction of a Proxy-Connection header field, targeted specifically at proxies. In practice, this was also unworkable, because proxies are often deployed in multiple layers, bringing about the same problem discussed above.

As a result, clients are encouraged not to send the Proxy-Connection header field in any requests.

Clients are also encouraged to consider the use of Connection: keep-alive in requests carefully; while they can enable persistent connections with HTTP/1.0 servers, clients using them need will need to monitor the connection for "hung" requests (which indicate that the client ought stop sending the header field), and this mechanism
ought not be used by clients at all when a proxy is being used.

A.1.3. Introduction of Transfer-Encoding

HTTP/1.1 introduces the Transfer-Encoding header field (Section 3.3.1). Proxies/gateways MUST remove any transfer-coding prior to forwarding a message via a MIME-compliant protocol.

A.2. Changes from RFC 2616

Clarify that the string "HTTP" in the HTTP-version ABNF production is case sensitive. Restrict the version numbers to be single digits due to the fact that implementations are known to handle multi-digit version numbers incorrectly. (Section 2.6)

Require that invalid whitespace around field-names be rejected. Change ABNF productions for header fields to only define the field value. (Section 3.2)

Rules about implicit linear whitespace between certain grammar productions have been removed; now whitespace is only allowed where specifically defined in the ABNF. (Section 3.2.1)

The NUL octet is no longer allowed in comment and quoted-string text. The quoted-pair rule no longer allows escaping control characters other than HTAB. Non-ASCII content in header fields and reason phrase has been obsoleted and made opaque (the TEXT rule was removed). (Section 3.2.4)

Require recipients to handle bogus "Content-Length" header fields as errors. (Section 3.3)

Remove reference to non-existent identity transfer-coding value tokens. (Sections 3.3 and 4)

Clarification that the chunk length does not include the count of the octets in the chunk header and trailer. Furthermore disallowed line folding in chunk extensions, and deprecate their use. (Section 4.1)

Update use of abs_path production from RFC 1808 to the path-absolute + query components of RFC 3986. State that the asterisk form is allowed for the OPTIONS request method only. (Section 5.3)

Clarify exactly when "close" connection options have to be sent; drop notion of header fields being "hop-by-hop" without being listed in the Connection header field. (Section 6.1)

Remove hard limit of two connections per server. Remove requirement
to retry a sequence of requests as long it was idempotent. Remove requirements about when servers are allowed to close connections prematurely. (Section 6.2)

Remove requirement to retry requests under certain circumstances when the server prematurely closes the connection. (Section 6.2.2)

Define the semantics of the Upgrade header field in responses other than 101 (this was incorporated from [RFC2817]). (Section 6.3)

Registration of Transfer Codings now requires IETF Review (Section 7.4)

Take over the Upgrade Token Registry, previously defined in Section 7.2 of [RFC2817]. (Section 7.6)

Empty list elements in list productions have been deprecated. (Appendix B)

Appendix B. ABNF list extension: #rule

A #rule extension to the ABNF rules of [RFC5234] is used to improve readability in the definitions of some header field values.

A construct "#" is defined, similar to "*", for defining comma-delimited lists of elements. The full form is "<n><m>element" indicating at least <n> and at most <m> elements, each separated by a single comma (","), and optional whitespace (OWS).

Thus,

1#element => element *( OWS ""," OWS element )

and:

#element => [ 1#element ]

and for n >= 1 and m > 1:

<n><m>element => element <n-1><m-1>( OWS "," OWS element )

For compatibility with legacy list rules, recipients SHOULD accept empty list elements. In other words, consumers would follow the list productions:

#element => [ ( "," / element ) *( OWS "," [ OWS element ] ) ]

1#element => *( "," OWS ) element *( OWS "," [ OWS element ] )
Note that empty elements do not contribute to the count of elements present, though.

For example, given these ABNF productions:

```
example-list   = 1#example-list-elmt
example-list-elmt = token ; see Section 3.2.4
```

Then these are valid values for example-list (not including the double quotes, which are present for delimitation only):

```
"foo,bar"
"foo ,bar,"
"foo , ,bar, charlie"
```

But these values would be invalid, as at least one non-empty element is required:

```
""
" ,"
","
```

Appendix C shows the collected ABNF, with the list rules expanded as explained above.

Appendix C. Collected ABNF

```
BWS = OWS

Connection = *( " ," OWS ) connection-option *( OWS "," [ OWS
  connection-option ] )
Content-Length = 1*DIGIT

HTTP-message = start-line *( header-field CRLF ) CRLF [ message-body ]
HTTP-name = %x48.54.54.50 ; HTTP
HTTP-version = HTTP-name "/" DIGIT "." DIGIT
Host = uri-host [ ":" port ]

OWS = *( SP / HTAB )

RWS = 1*( SP / HTAB )

TE = [ ( ," / t-codings ) *( OWS "," [ OWS t-codings ] ) ]
Trailer = *( "," OWS ) field-name *( OWS "," [ OWS field-name ] )
Transfer-Encoding = *( "," OWS ) transfer-coding *( OWS "," [ OWS
  transfer-coding ] )
```

URI-reference = <URI-reference, defined in [RFC3986], Section 4.1>
Upgrade = *( "," OWS ) protocol *( OWS "," [ OWS protocol ] )
Via = *( "," OWS ) ( received-protocol RWS received-by [ RWS comment ] ) *( OWS "," [ OWS ( received-protocol RWS received-by [ RWS comment ] ) ] )

absolute-URI = <absolute-URI, defined in [RFC3986], Section 4.3>
absolute-form = absolute-URI
asterisk-form = "*"
attribute = token
authority = <authority, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2>
authority-form = authority

chunk = chunk-size [ chunk-ext ] CRLF chunk-data CRLF
chunk-data = 1*OCTET
chunk-ext = *( ";" chunk-ext-name [ "=" chunk-ext-val ] )
chunk-ext-name = token
chunk-ext-val = token / quoted-str-nf
chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG
chunked-body = *chunk last-chunk trailer-part CRLF
chunked-body = *chunk last-chunk trailer-part CRLF
comment = "(" *( ctext / quoted-cpair / comment ) ")"
connection-option = token
ctext = OWS / %x21-27 ; '!'-''
/ %x2A-5B ; '*'-'
/ %x5D-7E ; ']'-'~'
/ obs-text
field-content = *( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
field-name = token
field-value = *( field-content / obs-fold )

header-field = field-name ":" OWS field-value BWS
http-URI = "http:" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ]
https-URI = "https:" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ]

last-chunk = 1"0" [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
message-body = *OCTET
method = token

obs-fold = CRLF ( SP / HTAB )
obs-text = %x80-FF
origin-form = path-absolute [ "?" query ]
partial-URI = relative-part [ "?" query ]
path-abempty = <path-abempty, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.3>
path-absolute = <path-absolute, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.3>
port = <port, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2.3>
protocol = protocol-name [ "/" protocol-version ]
protocol-name = token
protocol-version = token
pseudonym = token

gdtext = OWS / "!" / %x23-5B ; '#'-['}
/ %x5D-7E ; '}''-'
/ obs-text
gdtext-nf = HTAB / SP / "!" / %x23-5B ; '#'-['}
/ %x5D-7E ; '}''-'
/ obs-text
query = <query, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.4>
quoted-cpair = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
quoted-pair = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
quoted-str-nf = DQUOTE *( gdtext-nf / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE
quoted-string = DQUOTE *( gdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE

rank = ( "0" [ ":" *3DIGIT ] ) / ( "1" [ ":" *3"0" ] )
reason-phrase = *( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
received-by = ( uri-host [ ":" port ] ) / pseudonym
received-protocol = [ protocol-name "/" ] protocol-version
relative-part = <relative-part, defined in [RFC3986], Section 4.2>
request-line = method SP request-target SP HTTP-version CRLF
request-target = origin-form / absolute-form / authority-form / asterisk-form

special = "(" / ")" / "<" / ">" / ";" / ":" / ":" / \" / DQUOTE / ":/" / "^[" / "?" / ":" / "{" / ":/"
start-line = request-line / status-line
status-code = 3DIGIT
status-line = HTTP-version SP status-code SP reason-phrase CRLF

t-codings = "trailers" / ( transfer-coding [ t-ranking ] )
t-ranking = OWS "q=" rank

tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / ":" / ":" / "$" / ":" / ":" / ":" / ":" / ":" / DIGIT / ALPHA
token = 1*tchar
trailer-part = *( header-field CRLF )
transfer-coding = "chunked" / "compress" / "deflate" / "gzip" / 
transfer-extension
transfer-extension = token *( OWS ";" OWS transfer-parameter )
transfer-parameter = attribute BWS ";=" BWS value

uri-host = <host, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2.2>

value = word
word = token / quoted-string

Appendix D. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)

D.1. Since RFC 2616

Extracted relevant partitions from [RFC2616].

D.2. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-00

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/1>: "HTTP Version should be case sensitive" (<http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#verscase>)
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/26>: "Import query BNF"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/31>: "qdtext BNF"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/35>: "Normative and Informative references"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/46>: "RFC1700 references"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/47>: "inconsistency in date format explanation"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/48>: "Date reference typo"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/65>: "Informative references"


o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/86>: "Normative up-to-date references"

Other changes:

o  Update media type registrations to use RFC4288 template.

o  Use names of RFC4234 core rules DQUOTE and HTAB, fix broken ABNF for chunk-data (work in progress on <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36>)

D.3. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-01

Closed issues:

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/19>: "Bodies on GET (and other) requests"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/55>: "Updating to RFC4288"


o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/82>: "rel_path not used"

Ongoing work on ABNF conversion (<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36>):
- Get rid of duplicate BNF rule names ("host" -> "uri-host", "trailer" -> "trailer-part").

- Avoid underscore character in rule names ("http_URL" -> "http-URL", "abs_path" -> "path-absolute").

- Add rules for terms imported from URI spec ("absoluteURI", "authority", "path-absolute", "port", "query", "relativeURI", "host") -- these will have to be updated when switching over to RFC3986.

- Synchronize core rules with RFC5234.

- Get rid of prose rules that span multiple lines.

- Get rid of unused rules LOALPHA and UPALPHA.

- Move "Product Tokens" section (back) into Part 1, as "token" is used in the definition of the Upgrade header field.

- Add explicit references to BNF syntax and rules imported from other parts of the specification.

- Rewrite prose rule "token" in terms of "tchar", rewrite prose rule "TEXT".

D.4. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-02

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/51>: "HTTP-date vs. rfc1123-date"


Ongoing work on IANA Message Header Field Registration (<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/40>):

- Reference RFC 3984, and update header field registrations for header fields defined in this document.

Ongoing work on ABNF conversion (<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36>):

- Replace string literals when the string really is case-sensitive (HTTP-version).
D.5. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-03

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/97>: "Move registrations and registry information to IANA Considerations"

Ongoing work on ABNF conversion (<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36>):

- Replace string literals when the string really is case-sensitive (HTTP-Date).
- Replace HEX by HEXDIG for future consistence with RFC 5234’s core rules.


Closed issues:


Ongoing work on ABNF conversion (<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36>):

- Use "/" instead of "|" for alternatives.
- Get rid of RFC822 dependency; use RFC5234 plus extensions instead.
o Only reference RFC 5234’s core rules.

o Introduce new ABNF rules for "bad" whitespace ("BWS"), optional whitespace ("OWS") and required whitespace ("RWS").

o Rewrite ABNFs to spell out whitespace rules, factor out header field value format definitions.

D.7. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-05

Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/30>: "Header LWS"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/52>: "Sort 1.3 Terminology"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/63>: "RFC2047 encoded words"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/74>: "Character Encodings in TEXT"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/77>: "Line Folding"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/83>: "OPTIONS * and proxies"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/94>: "reason-phrase BNF"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/111>: "Use of TEXT"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/118>: "Join "Differences Between HTTP Entities and RFC 2045 Entities"?"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/134>: "RFC822 reference left in discussion of date formats"

Final work on ABNF conversion
( <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36> ):

o Rewrite definition of list rules, deprecate empty list elements.

o Add appendix containing collected and expanded ABNF.

Other changes:
D.8. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-06

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/162>: "comment ABNF"

Partly resolved issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/88>: "205 Bodies" (took out language that implied that there might be methods for which a payload body MUST NOT be included)
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/163>: "editorial improvements around HTTP-date"

D.9. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-07

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/131>: "increase connection limit"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/172>: "take over HTTP Upgrade Token Registry"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/184>: "HTTP/0.9 support"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/188>: "pick IANA policy (RFC5226) for Transfer Coding / Content Coding"
o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/189>: "move definitions of gzip/deflate/compress to part 1"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/194>: "disallow control characters in quoted-pair"

Partly resolved issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/148>: "update IANA requirements wrt Transfer-Coding values" (add the IANA Considerations subsection)

D.10. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-pl-messaging-08

Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/201>: "header parsing, treatment of leading and trailing OWS"

Partly resolved issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/60>: "Placement of 13.5.1 and 13.5.2"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/200>: "use of term "word" when talking about header field structure"

D.11. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-pl-messaging-09

Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/73>: "Clarification of the term 'deflate'"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/83>: "OPTIONS * and proxies"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/122>: "MIME-Version not listed in P1, general header fields"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/143>: "IANA registry for content/transfer encodings"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/165>: "Case-sensitivity of HTTP-date"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/200>: "use of term "word" when talking about header field structure"
Partly resolved issues:


D.12. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-pl-messaging-10

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/220>: "consider removing the ‘changes from 2068’ sections"

Partly resolved issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/159>: "HTTP(s) URI scheme definitions"

D.13. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-pl-messaging-11

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/204>: "Text about clock requirement for caches belongs in p6"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/221>: "effective request URI: handling of missing host in HTTP/1.0"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/248>: "confusing Date requirements for clients"

Partly resolved issues:
D.14. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-12

Closed issues:

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/75]: "RFC2145 Normative"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/159]: "HTTP(s) URI scheme definitions" (tune the requirements on userinfo)
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/210]: "define 'transparent' proxy"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/224]: "Header Field Classification"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/233]: "Is * usable as a request-uri for new methods?"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/240]: "Migrate Upgrade details from RFC2817"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/276]: "untangle ABNFs for header fields"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/279]: "update RFC 2109 reference"

D.15. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-13

Closed issues:

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/53]: "Allow is not in 13.5.2"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/95]: "Handling multiple Content-Length header fields"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/276]: "untangle ABNFs for header fields"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/286]: "Content-Length ABNF broken"
D.16. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-14

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/273>: "HTTP-version should be redefined as fixed length pair of DIGIT. DIGIT"

D.17. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-15

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/100>: "DNS Spoofing / DNS Binding advice"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/254>: "move RFCs 2145, 2616, 2817 to Historic status"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/305>: "'Close' should be reserved in the HTTP header field registry"

D.18. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-16

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/219>: "Revise Acknowledgements Sections"
o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/318>: "Closing the connection on server error"

D.19. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-pl-messaging-17

Closed issues:


o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/166>: "Clarify 'User Agent'"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/300>: "Define non-final responses"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/323>: "intended maturity level vs normative references"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/324>: "Intermediary rewriting of queries"

D.20. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-pl-messaging-18

Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/250>: "message-body in CONNECT response"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/302>: "Misplaced text on connection handling in p2"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/335>: "wording of line folding rule"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/343>: "chunk-extensions"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/346>: "make IANA policy definitions consistent"


Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/346>: "make IANA policy definitions consistent"
o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/359>: "clarify connection header field values are case-insensitive"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/361>: "ABNF requirements for recipients"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/368>: "note introduction of new IANA registries as normative changes"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/374>: "Reference to ISO-8859-1 is informative"

D.22. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-pl-messaging-20

Closed issues:

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/378>: "is 'q=' case-sensitive?"


Other changes:

o  Drop notion of header fields being "hop-by-hop" without being listed in the Connection header field.

o  Section about connection management rewritten; dropping some historic information.

o  Move description of "100-continue" into Part 2.

o  Rewrite the persistent connection and Upgrade requirements to be actionable by role and consistent with the rest of HTTP.

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Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content
draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-21

Abstract

The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document defines the semantics of HTTP/1.1 messages, as expressed by request methods, request header fields, response status codes, and response header fields, along with the payload of messages (metadata and body content) and mechanisms for content negotiation.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTPBIS working group mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at <http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/>.

The current issues list is at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/report/3> and related documents (including fancy diffs) can be found at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/>.

The changes in this draft are summarized in Appendix F.41.

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1. Introduction

Each Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) message is either a request or a response. A server listens on a connection for a request, parses each message received, interprets the message semantics in relation to the identified request target, and responds to that request with one or more response messages. A client constructs request messages to communicate specific intentions, and examines received responses to see if the intentions were carried out and determine how to interpret the results. This document defines HTTP/1.1 request and response semantics in terms of the architecture defined in [Part1].

HTTP provides a uniform interface for interacting with a resource (Section 2), regardless of its type, nature, or implementation, and for transferring content in message payloads in the form of a representation (Section 3).

HTTP semantics include the intentions defined by each request method (Section 5), extensions to those semantics that might be described in request header fields (Section 6), the meaning of status codes to indicate a machine-readable response (Section 7), and the meaning of other control data and resource metadata that might be given in response header fields (Section 8).

This document also defines representation metadata that describe how a payload is intended to be interpreted by a recipient, the request header fields that might influence content selection, and the various selection algorithms that are collectively referred to as "content negotiation" (Section 3.4).

1.1. Conformance and Error Handling

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are defined in Section 2.5 of [Part1].

1.2. Syntax Notation

This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of [RFC5234] with the list rule extension defined in Section 1.2 of [Part1]. Appendix D describes rules imported from other documents. Appendix E shows the collected ABNF with the list rule expanded.
2. Resource

The target of each HTTP request is called a resource. HTTP does not limit the nature of a resource; it merely defines an interface that might be used to interact with resources. Each resource is identified by a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI), as described in Section 2.7 of [Part1].

When a client constructs an HTTP/1.1 request message, it sends the "target URI" in one of various forms, as defined in (Section 5.3 of [Part1]). When a request is received, the server reconstructs an "effective request URI" for the target resource (Section 5.5 of [Part1]).

One design goal of HTTP is to separate resource identification from request semantics, which is made possible by vesting the request semantics in the request method (Section 5) and a few request-modifying header fields (Section 6). Resource owners SHOULD NOT include request semantics within a URI, such as by specifying an action to invoke within the path or query components of the effective request URI, unless those semantics are disabled when they are inconsistent with the request method.

3. Representation

If we consider that a resource could be anything, and that the uniform interface provided by HTTP is similar to a window through which one can observe and act upon such a thing only through the communication of messages to some independent actor on the other side, then we need an abstraction to represent ("take the place of") the current or desired state of that thing in our communications. We call that abstraction a "representation" [REST].

For the purposes of HTTP, a representation is information that reflects the current or desired state of a given resource, in a format that can be readily communicated via the protocol, consisting of a set of representation metadata and a potentially unbounded stream of representation data.

3.1. Representation Metadata

Representation header fields provide metadata about the representation. When a message includes a payload body, the representation header fields describe how to interpret the representation data enclosed in the payload body. In a response to a HEAD request, the representation header fields describe the representation data that would have been enclosed in the payload body if the same request had been a GET.
The following header fields are defined to convey representation metadata:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Defined in...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content-Type</td>
<td>Section 3.1.1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content-Encoding</td>
<td>Section 3.1.2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content-Language</td>
<td>Section 3.1.3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content-Location</td>
<td>Section 3.1.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expires</td>
<td>Section 7.3 of [Part6]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.1.1. Data Type

3.1.1.1. Media Types

HTTP uses Internet Media Types [RFC2046] in the Content-Type (Section 3.1.1.5) and Accept (Section 6.3.2) header fields in order to provide open and extensible data typing and type negotiation.

```
media-type = type "/" subtype *( OWS ';' OWS parameter )
type       = token
subtype    = token
```

The type/subtype MAY be followed by parameters in the form of attribute/value pairs.

```
parameter    = attribute "=" value
attribute    = token
value        = word
```

The type, subtype, and parameter attribute names are case-insensitive. Parameter values might or might not be case-sensitive, depending on the semantics of the parameter name. The presence or absence of a parameter might be significant to the processing of a media-type, depending on its definition within the media type registry.

A parameter value that matches the token production can be transmitted as either a token or within a quoted-string. The quoted and unquoted values are equivalent.

Media-type values are registered with the Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA). The media type registration process is outlined in [RFC4288]. Use of non-registered media types is discouraged.
3.1.1.2. Character Encodings (charset)

HTTP uses charset names to indicate the character encoding of a textual representation.

A character encoding is identified by a case-insensitive token. The complete set of tokens is defined by the IANA Character Set registry (<http://www.iana.org/assignments/character-sets>).

```plaintext
charset = token
```

Although HTTP allows an arbitrary token to be used as a charset value, any token that has a predefined value within the IANA Character Set registry MUST represent the character encoding defined by that registry. Applications SHOULD limit their use of character encodings to those defined within the IANA registry.

HTTP uses charset in two contexts: within an Accept-Charset request header field (in which the charset value is an unquoted token) and as the value of a parameter in a Content-Type header field (within a request or response), in which case the parameter value of the charset parameter can be quoted.

Implementers need to be aware of IETF character set requirements [RFC3629] [RFC2277].

3.1.1.3. Canonicalization and Text Defaults

Internet media types are registered with a canonical form. A representation transferred via HTTP messages MUST be in the appropriate canonical form prior to its transmission except for "text" types, as defined in the next paragraph.

When in canonical form, media subtypes of the "text" type use CRLF as the text line break. HTTP relaxes this requirement and allows the transport of text media with plain CR or LF alone representing a line break when it is done consistently for an entire representation. HTTP applications MUST accept CRLF, bare CR, and bare LF as indicating a line break in text media received via HTTP. In addition, if the text is in a character encoding that does not use octets 13 and 10 for CR and LF respectively, as is the case for some multi-byte character encodings, HTTP allows the use of whatever octet sequences are defined by that character encoding to represent the equivalent of CR and LF for line breaks. This flexibility regarding line breaks applies only to text media in the payload body; a bare CR or LF MUST NOT be substituted for CRLF within any of the HTTP control structures (such as header fields and multipart boundaries).
If a representation is encoded with a content-coding, the underlying data MUST be in a form defined above prior to being encoded.

3.1.1.4. Multipart Types

MIME provides for a number of "multipart" types -- encapsulations of one or more representations within a single message body. All multipart types share a common syntax, as defined in Section 5.1.1 of [RFC2046], and include a boundary parameter as part of the media type value. The message body is itself a protocol element; a sender MUST generate only CRLF to represent line breaks between body-parts.

In general, HTTP treats a multipart message body no differently than any other media type: strictly as payload. HTTP does not use the multipart boundary as an indicator of message body length. In all other respects, an HTTP user agent SHOULD follow the same or similar behavior as a MIME user agent would upon receipt of a multipart type. The MIME header fields within each body-part of a multipart message body do not have any significance to HTTP beyond that defined by their MIME semantics.

A recipient MUST treat an unrecognized multipart subtype as being equivalent to "multipart/mixed".

Note: The "multipart/form-data" type has been specifically defined for carrying form data suitable for processing via the POST request method, as described in [RFC2388].

3.1.1.5. Content-Type

The "Content-Type" header field indicates the media type of the representation, which defines both the data format and how that data SHOULD be processed by the recipient (within the scope of the request method semantics) after any Content-Encoding is decoded. For responses to the HEAD method, the media type is that which would have been sent had the request been a GET.

Content-Type = media-type

Media types are defined in Section 3.1.1.1. An example of the field is

Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1

A sender SHOULD include a Content-Type header field in a message containing a payload body, defining the media type of the enclosed representation, unless the intended media type is unknown to the sender. If a Content-Type header field is not present, recipients...
MAY either assume a media type of "application/octet-stream" ([RFC2046], Section 4.5.1) or examine the representation data to determine its type.

In practice, resource owners do not always properly configure their origin server to provide the correct Content-Type for a given representation, with the result that some clients will examine a payload’s content and override the specified type. Clients that do so risk drawing incorrect conclusions, which might expose additional security risks (e.g., "privilege escalation"). Furthermore, it is impossible to determine the sender’s intent by examining the data format: many data formats match multiple media types that differ only in processing semantics. Implementers are encouraged to provide a means of disabling such "content sniffing" when it is used.

3.1.2. Data Encoding

3.1.2.1. Content Codings

Content coding values indicate an encoding transformation that has been or can be applied to a representation. Content codings are primarily used to allow a representation to be compressed or otherwise usefully transformed without losing the identity of its underlying media type and without loss of information. Frequently, the representation is stored in coded form, transmitted directly, and only decoded by the recipient.

```
content-coding = token
```

All content-coding values are case-insensitive and SHOULD be registered within the HTTP Content Coding registry, as defined in Section 9.4. They are used in the Accept-Encoding (Section 6.3.4) and Content-Encoding (Section 3.1.2.2) header fields.

The following content-coding values are defined by this specification:

- compress (and x-compress): See Section 4.2.1 of [Part1].
- deflate: See Section 4.2.2 of [Part1].
- gzip (and x-gzip): See Section 4.2.3 of [Part1].

3.1.2.2. Content-Encoding

The "Content-Encoding" header field indicates what content codings have been applied to the representation, beyond those inherent in the media type, and thus what decoding mechanisms have to be applied in
order to obtain data in the media type referenced by the Content-Type header field. Content-Encoding is primarily used to allow a representation’s data to be compressed without losing the identity of its underlying media type.

Content-Encoding = 1#content-coding

An example of its use is

Content-Encoding: gzip

If multiple encodings have been applied to a representation, the content codings MUST be listed in the order in which they were applied. Additional information about the encoding parameters MAY be provided by other header fields not defined by this specification.

Unlike Transfer-Encoding (Section 3.3.1 of [Part1]), the codings listed in Content-Encoding are a characteristic of the representation; the representation is defined in terms of the coded form, and all other metadata about the representation is about the coded form unless otherwise noted in the metadata definition. Typically, the representation is only decoded just prior to rendering or analogous usage.

A transforming proxy MAY modify the content coding if the new coding is known to be acceptable to the recipient, unless the "no-transform" cache-control directive is present in the message.

If the media type includes an inherent encoding, such as a data format that is always compressed, then that encoding would not be restated as a Content-Encoding even if it happens to be the same algorithm as one of the content codings. Such a content coding would only be listed if, for some bizarre reason, it is applied a second time to form the representation. Likewise, an origin server might choose to publish the same payload data as multiple representations that differ only in whether the coding is defined as part of Content-Type or Content-Encoding, since some user agents will behave differently in their handling of each response (e.g., open a "Save as ..." dialog instead of automatic decompression and rendering of content).

If the content-coding of a representation in a request message is not acceptable to the origin server, the server SHOULD respond with a status code of 415 (Unsupported Media Type).
3.1.3. Audience Language

3.1.3.1. Language Tags

A language tag, as defined in [RFC5646], identifies a natural language spoken, written, or otherwise conveyed by human beings for communication of information to other human beings. Computer languages are explicitly excluded. HTTP uses language tags within the Accept-Language and Content-Language fields.

In summary, a language tag is composed of one or more parts: A primary language subtag followed by a possibly empty series of subtags:

   language-tag = <Language-Tag, defined in [RFC5646], Section 2.1>

White space is not allowed within the tag and all tags are case-insensitive. The name space of language subtags is administered by the IANA (see <http://www.iana.org/assignments/language-subtag-registry>).

Example tags include:

   en, en-US, es-419, az-Arab, x-pig-latin, man-Nkoo-GN

See [RFC5646] for further information.

3.1.3.2. Content-Language

The "Content-Language" header field describes the natural language(s) of the intended audience for the representation. Note that this might not be equivalent to all the languages used within the representation.

   Content-Language = 1#language-tag

Language tags are defined in Section 3.1.3.1. The primary purpose of Content-Language is to allow a user to identify and differentiate representations according to the user’s own preferred language. Thus, if the content is intended only for a Danish-literate audience, the appropriate field is

   Content-Language: da

If no Content-Language is specified, the default is that the content is intended for all language audiences. This might mean that the sender does not consider it to be specific to any natural language, or that the sender does not know for which language it is intended.
Multiple languages MAY be listed for content that is intended for multiple audiences. For example, a rendition of the "Treaty of Waitangi", presented simultaneously in the original Maori and English versions, would call for

   Content-Language: mi, en

However, just because multiple languages are present within a representation does not mean that it is intended for multiple linguistic audiences. An example would be a beginner’s language primer, such as "A First Lesson in Latin", which is clearly intended to be used by an English-literate audience. In this case, the Content-Language would properly only include "en".

Content-Language MAY be applied to any media type -- it is not limited to textual documents.

3.1.4. Identification

3.1.4.1. Identifying a Representation

When a complete or partial representation is transferred in a message payload, it is often desirable for the sender to supply, or the recipient to determine, an identifier for a resource corresponding to that representation.

The following rules are used to determine such a URI for the payload of a request message:

- If the request has a Content-Location header field, then the sender asserts that the payload is a representation of the resource identified by the Content-Location field-value. However, such an assertion cannot be trusted unless it can be verified by other means (not defined by HTTP). The information might still be useful for revision history links.

- Otherwise, the payload is unidentified.

The following rules, to be applied in order until a match is found, are used to determine such a URI for the payload of a response message:

1. If the request is GET or HEAD and the response status code is 200 (OK), 204 (No Content), 206 (Partial Content), or 304 (Not Modified), the payload’s identifier is the effective request URI (Section 5.5 of [Part1]).
2. If the request is GET or HEAD and the response status code is 203 (Non-Authoritative Information), the payload is a potentially modified representation of the target resource; as such, the effective request URI might only act as an identifier for the payload’s representation when a request is made via the same chain of intermediaries.

3. If the response has a Content-Location header field and its field-value is a reference to the same URI as the effective request URI, the payload’s identifier is the effective request URI.

4. If the response has a Content-Location header field and its field-value is a reference to a URI different from the effective request URI, then the sender asserts that the payload is a representation of the resource identified by the Content-Location field-value. However, such an assertion cannot be trusted unless it can be verified by other means (not defined by HTTP).

5. Otherwise, the payload is unidentified.

3.1.4.2. Content-Location

The "Content-Location" header field references a URI that can be used as a specific identifier for the representation in this message payload. In other words, if one were to perform a GET on this URI at the time of this message’s generation, then a 200 (OK) response would contain the same representation that is enclosed as payload in this message.

Content-Location = absolute-URI / partial-URI

The Content-Location value is not a replacement for the effective Request URI (Section 5.5 of [Part1]). It is representation metadata. It has the same syntax and semantics as the header field of the same name defined for MIME body parts in Section 4 of [RFC2557]. However, its appearance in an HTTP message has some special implications for HTTP recipients.

If Content-Location is included in a 2xx (Successful) response message and its value refers (after conversion to absolute form) to a URI that is the same as the effective request URI, then the response payload SHOULD be considered a current representation of that resource. For a GET or HEAD request, this is the same as the default semantics when no Content-Location is provided by the server. For a state-changing request like PUT or POST, it implies that the server’s response contains the new representation of that resource, thereby distinguishing it from representations that might only report about
the action (e.g., "It worked!"). This allows authoring applications to update their local copies without the need for a subsequent GET request.

If Content-Location is included in a 2xx (Successful) response message and its field-value refers to a URI that differs from the effective request URI, then the origin server claims that the field-value is an identifier for the payload’s representation. Such a claim can only be trusted if both identifiers share the same resource owner, which cannot be programmatically determined via HTTP.

- For a response to a GET or HEAD request, this is an indication that the effective request URI identifies a resource that is subject to content negotiation and the Content-Location field-value is a more specific identifier for the selected representation.

- For a 201 (Created) response to a state-changing method, a Content-Location field-value that is identical to the Location field-value indicates that this payload is a current representation of the newly created resource.

- Otherwise, such a Content-Location indicates that this payload is a representation reporting on the requested action’s status and that the same report is available (for future access with GET) at the given URI. For example, a purchase transaction made via a POST request might include a receipt document as the payload of the 200 (OK) response; the Content-Location field-value provides an identifier for retrieving a copy of that same receipt in the future.

If Content-Location is included in a request message, then it MAY be interpreted by the origin server as an indication of where the user agent originally obtained the content of the enclosed representation (prior to any subsequent modification of the content by that user agent). In other words, the user agent is providing the same representation metadata that it received with the original representation. However, such interpretation MUST NOT be used to alter the semantics of the method requested by the client. For example, if a client makes a PUT request on a negotiated resource and the origin server accepts that PUT (without redirection), then the new set of values for that resource is expected to be consistent with the one representation supplied in that PUT; the Content-Location cannot be used as a form of reverse content selection that identifies only one of the negotiated representations to be updated. If the user agent had wanted the latter semantics, it would have applied the PUT directly to the Content-Location URI.
A Content-Location field received in a request message is transitory information that SHOULD NOT be saved with other representation metadata for use in later responses. The Content-Location’s value might be saved for use in other contexts, such as within source links or other metadata.

A cache cannot assume that a representation with a Content-Location different from the URI used to retrieve it can be used to respond to later requests on that Content-Location URI.

3.2. Representation Data

The representation data associated with an HTTP message is either provided as the payload body of the message or referred to by the message semantics and the effective request URI. The representation data is in a format and encoding defined by the representation metadata header fields.

The data type of the representation data is determined via the header fields Content-Type and Content-Encoding. These define a two-layer, ordered encoding model:

representation-data := Content-Encoding( Content-Type( bits ) )

3.3. Payload Semantics

Some HTTP messages transfer a complete or partial representation as the message "payload". In some cases, a payload might only contain the associated representation’s header fields (e.g., responses to HEAD) or only some part(s) of the representation data (e.g., the 206 (Partial Content) status code).

The purpose of a payload in a request is defined by the method semantics. In a response, the payload’s purpose is defined by both the request method and the response status code.

For example, a representation in the payload of a PUT request (Section 5.3.4) represents the desired state of the target resource if the request is successfully applied, whereas a representation in the payload of a POST request (Section 5.3.3) represents an anonymous resource for providing data to be processed, such as the information that a user entered within an HTML form.

Likewise, the payload of a 200 (OK) response to GET (Section 5.3.1) contains a representation of the target resource, as observed at the time of the message origination date (Section 8.1.1.2), whereas the same status code in a response to POST might contain either a representation of the processing result or a current representation
of the target resource after applying the processing. Response messages with an error status code usually contain a representation that describes the error and what next steps are suggested for resolving it.

Header fields that specifically describe the payload, rather than the associated representation, are referred to as "payload header fields". Payload header fields are defined in other parts of this specification, due to their impact on message parsing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Defined in...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content-Length</td>
<td>Section 3.3.2 of [Part1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content-Range</td>
<td>Section 5.2 of [Part5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer-Encoding</td>
<td>Section 3.3.1 of [Part1]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4. Content Negotiation

HTTP responses include a representation which contains information for interpretation, whether by a human user or for further processing. Often, the server has different ways of representing the same information; for example, in different formats, languages, or using different character encodings.

HTTP clients and their users might have different or variable capabilities, characteristics or preferences which would influence which representation, among those available from the server, would be best for the server to deliver. For this reason, HTTP provides mechanisms for "content negotiation" -- a process of allowing selection of a representation of a given resource, when more than one is available.

This specification defines two patterns of content negotiation; "proactive", where the server selects the representation based upon the client’s stated preferences, and "reactive" negotiation, where the server provides a list of representations for the client to choose from, based upon their metadata. In addition, there are other patterns: some applications use an "active content" pattern, where the server returns active content which runs on the client and, based on client available parameters, selects additional resources to invoke. "Transparent Content Negotiation" ([RFC2295]) has also been proposed.

These patterns are all widely used, and have trade-offs in applicability and practicality. In particular, when the number of preferences or capabilities to be expressed by a client are large
(such as when many different formats are supported by a user-agent), proactive negotiation becomes unwieldy, and might not be appropriate. Conversely, when the number of representations to choose from is very large, reactive negotiation might not be appropriate.

Note that, in all cases, the supplier of representations has the responsibility for determining which representations might be considered to be the "same information".

3.4.1. Proactive Negotiation

If the selection of the best representation for a response is made by an algorithm located at the server, it is called proactive negotiation. Selection is based on the available representations of the response (the dimensions over which it can vary; e.g., language, content-coding, etc.) and the contents of particular header fields in the request message or on other information pertaining to the request (such as the network address of the client).

Proactive negotiation is advantageous when the algorithm for selecting from among the available representations is difficult to describe to the user agent, or when the server desires to send its "best guess" to the client along with the first response (hoping to avoid the round-trip delay of a subsequent request if the "best guess" is good enough for the user). In order to improve the server's guess, the user agent MAY include request header fields (Accept, Accept-Language, Accept-Encoding, etc.) which describe its preferences for such a response.

Proactive negotiation has disadvantages:

1. It is impossible for the server to accurately determine what might be "best" for any given user, since that would require complete knowledge of both the capabilities of the user agent and the intended use for the response (e.g., does the user want to view it on screen or print it on paper?).

2. Having the user agent describe its capabilities in every request can be both very inefficient (given that only a small percentage of responses have multiple representations) and a potential violation of the user's privacy.

3. It complicates the implementation of an origin server and the algorithms for generating responses to a request.

4. It might limit a public cache's ability to use the same response for multiple user's requests.
Proactive negotiation allows the user agent to specify its preferences, but it cannot expect responses to always honor them. For example, the origin server might not implement proactive negotiation, or it might decide that sending a response that doesn’t conform to them is better than sending a 406 (Not Acceptable) response.

HTTP/1.1 includes the following header fields for enabling proactive negotiation through description of user agent capabilities and user preferences: Accept (Section 6.3.2), Accept-Charset (Section 6.3.3), Accept-Encoding (Section 6.3.4), Accept-Language (Section 6.3.5), and User-Agent (Section 6.5.3). However, an origin server is not limited to these dimensions and MAY vary the response based on any aspect of the request, including aspects of the connection (e.g., IP address) or information within extension header fields not defined by this specification.

Note: In practice, User-Agent based negotiation is fragile, because new clients might not be recognized.

The Vary header field (Section 8.2.1) can be used to express the parameters the server uses to select a representation that is subject to proactive negotiation.

3.4.2. Reactive Negotiation

With reactive negotiation, selection of the best representation for a response is performed by the user agent after receiving an initial response from the origin server. Selection is based on a list of the available representations of the response included within the header fields or body of the initial response, with each representation identified by its own URI. Selection from among the representations can be performed automatically (if the user agent is capable of doing so) or manually by the user selecting from a generated (possibly hypertext) menu.

Reactive negotiation is advantageous when the response would vary over commonly-used dimensions (such as type, language, or encoding), when the origin server is unable to determine a user agent’s capabilities from examining the request, and generally when public caches are used to distribute server load and reduce network usage.

Reactive negotiation suffers from the disadvantage of needing a second request to obtain the best alternate representation. This second request is only efficient when caching is used. In addition, this specification does not define any mechanism for supporting automatic selection, though it also does not prevent any such mechanism from being developed as an extension and used within
HTTP/1.1

This specification defines the 300 (Multiple Choices) and 406 (Not Acceptable) status codes for enabling reactive negotiation when the server is unwilling or unable to provide a varying response using proactive negotiation.

4. Product Tokens

Product tokens are used to allow communicating applications to identify themselves by software name and version. Most fields using product tokens also allow sub-products which form a significant part of the application to be listed, separated by whitespace. By convention, the products are listed in order of their significance for identifying the application.

```plaintext
product = token ["/"] product-version
product-version = token
```

Examples:

```
User-Agent: CERN-LineMode/2.15 libwww/2.17b3
Server: Apache/0.8.4
```

Product tokens SHOULD be short and to the point. They MUST NOT be used for advertising or other non-essential information. Although any token octet MAY appear in a product-version, this token SHOULD only be used for a version identifier (i.e., successive versions of the same product SHOULD only differ in the product-version portion of the product value).

5. Request Methods

5.1. Overview

The request method token is the primary source of request semantics; it indicates the purpose for which the client has made this request and what is expected by the client as a successful result. The request semantics MAY be further specialized by the semantics of some header fields when present in a request (Section 6) if those additional semantics do not conflict with the method.

```plaintext
method = token
```

HTTP was originally designed to be usable as an interface to distributed object systems. The request method was envisioned as applying semantics to a target resource in much the same way as invoking a defined method on an identified object would apply.
semantics. The method token is case-sensitive because it might be used as a gateway to object-based systems with case-sensitive method names.

Unlike distributed objects, the standardized request methods in HTTP are not resource-specific, since uniform interfaces provide for better visibility and reuse in network-based systems [REST]. Once defined, a standardized method MUST have the same semantics when applied to any resource, though each resource determines for itself whether those semantics are implemented or allowed.

This specification defines a number of standardized methods that are commonly used in HTTP, as outlined by the following table. By convention, standardized methods are defined in all-uppercase ASCII letters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sec.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GET</td>
<td>Transfer a current representation of the target resource.</td>
<td>5.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAD</td>
<td>Same as GET, but do not include a message body in the response.</td>
<td>5.3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>Perform resource-specific processing on the request payload.</td>
<td>5.3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUT</td>
<td>Replace all current representations of the target resource with the request payload.</td>
<td>5.3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELETE</td>
<td>Remove all current representations of the target resource.</td>
<td>5.3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONNECT</td>
<td>Establish a tunnel to the server identified by the target resource.</td>
<td>5.3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTIONS</td>
<td>Describe the communication options for the target resource.</td>
<td>5.3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRACE</td>
<td>Perform a message loop-back test along the path to the target resource.</td>
<td>5.3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The methods GET and HEAD MUST be supported by all general-purpose servers. All other methods are OPTIONAL. When implemented, a server MUST implement the above methods according to the semantics defined for them in Section 5.3.

Additional methods MAY be used in HTTP; many have already been standardized outside the scope of this specification and registered within the HTTP Method Registry maintained by IANA, as defined in Section 9.1.

The set of methods allowed by a target resource can be listed in an
Allow header field (Section 8.4.1). However, the set of allowed methods can change dynamically. When a request message is received that is unrecognized or not implemented by an origin server, the origin server SHOULD respond with the 501 (Not Implemented) status code. When a request message is received that is known by an origin server but not allowed for the target resource, the origin server SHOULD respond with the 405 (Method Not Allowed) status code.

5.2. Common Method Properties

5.2.1. Safe Methods

Request methods are considered "safe" if their defined semantics are essentially read-only; i.e., the client does not request, and does not expect, any state change on the origin server as a result of applying a safe method to a target resource. Likewise, reasonable use of a safe method is not expected to cause any harm, loss of property, or unusual burden on the origin server.

This definition of safe methods does not prevent an implementation from including behavior that is potentially harmful, not entirely read-only, or which causes side-effects while invoking a safe method. What is important, however, is that the client did not request that additional behavior and cannot be held accountable for it. For example, most servers append request information to access log files at the completion of every response, regardless of the method, and that is considered safe even though the log storage might become full and crash the server. Likewise, a safe request initiated by selecting an advertisement on the Web will often have the side-effect of charging an advertising account.

The GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, and TRACE request methods are defined to be safe.

The purpose of distinguishing between safe and unsafe methods is to allow automated retrieval processes (spiders) and cache performance optimization (pre-fetching) to work without fear of causing harm. In addition, it allows a user agent to apply appropriate constraints on the automated use of unsafe methods when processing potentially untrusted content.

A user agent SHOULD distinguish between safe and unsafe methods when presenting potential actions to a user, such that the user can be made aware of an unsafe action before it is requested.

When a resource is constructed such that parameters within the effective request URI have the effect of selecting an action, it is the resource owner’s responsibility to ensure that the action is
consistent with the request method semantics. For example, it is common for Web-based content editing software to use actions within query parameters, such as "page?do=delete". If the purpose of such a resource is to perform an unsafe action, then the resource MUST disable or disallow that action when it is accessed using a safe request method. Failure to do so will result in unfortunate side-effects when automated processes perform a GET on every URI reference for the sake of link maintenance, pre-fetching, building a search index, etc.

5.2.2. Idempotent Methods

Request methods are considered "idempotent" if the intended effect of multiple identical requests is the same as for a single request. PUT, DELETE, and all safe request methods are idempotent.

Like the definition of safe, the idempotent property only applies to what has been requested by the user; a server is free to log each request separately, retain a revision control history, or implement other non-idempotent side-effects for each idempotent request.

Idempotent methods are distinguished because the request can be repeated automatically if a communication failure occurs before the client is able to read the server’s response. For example, if a client sends a PUT request and the underlying connection is closed before any response is received, then it can establish a new connection and retry the idempotent request because it knows that repeating the request will have the same effect even if the original request succeeded. Note, however, that repeated failures would indicate a problem within the server.

5.2.3. Cacheable Methods

Request methods are considered "cacheable" if it is possible and useful to answer a current client request with a stored response from a prior request. GET and HEAD are defined to be cacheable. In general, safe methods that do not depend on a current or authoritative response are cacheable, though the overwhelming majority of caches only support GET and HEAD. HTTP requirements for cache behavior and cacheable responses are defined in [Part6].

5.3. Method Definitions

5.3.1. GET

The GET method requests transfer of a current representation of the target resource.
If the target resource is a data-producing process, it is the produced data which shall be returned as the representation in the response and not the source text of the process, unless that text happens to be the output of the process.

The semantics of the GET method change to a "conditional GET" if the request message includes an If-Modified-Since, If-Unmodified-Since, If-Match, If-None-Match, or If-Range header field ([Part4]). A conditional GET requests that the representation be transferred only under the circumstances described by the conditional header field(s). The conditional GET request is intended to reduce unnecessary network usage by allowing cached representations to be refreshed without requiring multiple requests or transferring data already held by the client.

The semantics of the GET method change to a "partial GET" if the request message includes a Range header field ([Part5]). A partial GET requests that only part of the representation be transferred, as described in Section 5.4 of [Part5]. The partial GET request is intended to reduce unnecessary network usage by allowing partially-retrieved representations to be completed without transferring data already held by the client.

A payload within a GET request message has no defined semantics; sending a payload body on a GET request might cause some existing implementations to reject the request.

The response to a GET request is cacheable and MAY be used to satisfy subsequent GET and HEAD requests (see [Part6]).

See Section 10.2 for security considerations when used for forms.

5.3.2. HEAD

The HEAD method is identical to GET except that the server MUST NOT return a message body in the response. The metadata contained in the HTTP header fields in response to a HEAD request SHOULD be identical to the information sent in response to a GET request. This method can be used for obtaining metadata about the representation implied by the request without transferring the representation data. This method is often used for testing hypertext links for validity, accessibility, and recent modification.

The response to a HEAD request is cacheable and MAY be used to satisfy a subsequent HEAD request. It also has potential side effects on previously stored responses to GET; see Section 5 of [Part6].
A payload within a HEAD request message has no defined semantics; sending a payload body on a HEAD request might cause some existing implementations to reject the request.

5.3.3. POST

The POST method requests that the origin server accept the representation enclosed in the request as data to be processed by the target resource. POST is designed to allow a uniform method to cover the following functions:

- Annotation of existing resources;
- Posting a message to a bulletin board, newsgroup, mailing list, or similar group of articles;
- Providing a block of data, such as the result of submitting a form, to a data-handling process;
- Extending a database through an append operation.

The actual function performed by the POST method is determined by the server and is usually dependent on the effective request URI.

The action performed by the POST method might not result in a resource that can be identified by a URI. In this case, either 200 (OK) or 204 (No Content) is the appropriate response status code, depending on whether or not the response includes a representation that describes the result.

If a resource has been created on the origin server, the response SHOULD be 201 (Created) and contain a representation which describes the status of the request and refers to the new resource, and a Location header field (see Section 8.1.2).

Responses to POST requests are only cacheable when they include explicit freshness information (see Section 4.1.1 of [Part6]). A cached POST response with a Content-Location header field (see Section 3.1.4.2) whose value is the effective Request URI MAY be used to satisfy subsequent GET and HEAD (not POST) requests.

Note that POST caching is not widely implemented. However, the 303 (See Other) response can be used to direct the user agent to retrieve a cacheable representation of the resource.
5.3.4. PUT

The PUT method requests that the state of the target resource be created or replaced with the state defined by the representation enclosed in the request message payload. A successful PUT of a given representation would suggest that a subsequent GET on that same target resource will result in an equivalent representation being returned in a 200 (OK) response. However, there is no guarantee that such a state change will be observable, since the target resource might be acted upon by other user agents in parallel, or might be subject to dynamic processing by the origin server, before any subsequent GET is received. A successful response only implies that the user agent’s intent was achieved at the time of its processing by the origin server.

If the target resource does not have a current representation and the PUT successfully creates one, then the origin server MUST inform the user agent by sending a 201 (Created) response. If the target resource does have a current representation and that representation is successfully modified in accordance with the state of the enclosed representation, then either a 200 (OK) or 204 (No Content) response SHOULD be sent to indicate successful completion of the request.

Unrecognized header fields SHOULD be ignored (i.e., not saved as part of the resource state).

An origin server SHOULD verify that the PUT representation is consistent with any constraints which the server has for the target resource that cannot or will not be changed by the PUT. This is particularly important when the origin server uses internal configuration information related to the URI in order to set the values for representation metadata on GET responses. When a PUT representation is inconsistent with the target resource, the origin server SHOULD either make them consistent, by transforming the representation or changing the resource configuration, or respond with an appropriate error message containing sufficient information to explain why the representation is unsuitable. The 409 (Conflict) or 415 (Unsupported Media Type) status codes are suggested, with the latter being specific to constraints on Content-Type values.

For example, if the target resource is configured to always have a Content-Type of "text/html" and the representation being PUT has a Content-Type of "image/jpeg", then the origin server SHOULD do one of:

a. reconfigure the target resource to reflect the new media type;
b. transform the PUT representation to a format consistent with that of the resource before saving it as the new resource state; or,

c. reject the request with a 415 (Unsupported Media Type) response indicating that the target resource is limited to "text/html", perhaps including a link to a different resource that would be a suitable target for the new representation.

HTTP does not define exactly how a PUT method affects the state of an origin server beyond what can be expressed by the intent of the user agent request and the semantics of the origin server response. It does not define what a resource might be, in any sense of that word, beyond the interface provided via HTTP. It does not define how resource state is "stored", nor how such storage might change as a result of a change in resource state, nor how the origin server translates resource state into representations. Generally speaking, all implementation details behind the resource interface are intentionally hidden by the server.

The fundamental difference between the POST and PUT methods is highlighted by the different intent for the target resource. The target resource in a POST request is intended to handle the enclosed representation as a data-accepting process, such as for a gateway to some other protocol or a document that accepts annotations. In contrast, the target resource in a PUT request is intended to take the enclosed representation as a new or replacement value. Hence, the intent of PUT is idempotent and visible to intermediaries, even though the exact effect is only known by the origin server.

Proper interpretation of a PUT request presumes that the user agent knows what target resource is desired. A service that is intended to select a proper URI on behalf of the client, after receiving a state-changing request, SHOULD be implemented using the POST method rather than PUT. If the origin server will not make the requested PUT state change to the target resource and instead wishes to have it applied to a different resource, such as when the resource has been moved to a different URI, then the origin server MUST send a 301 (Moved Permanently) response; the user agent MAY then make its own decision regarding whether or not to redirect the request.

A PUT request applied to the target resource MAY have side-effects on other resources. For example, an article might have a URI for identifying "the current version" (a resource) which is separate from the URIs identifying each particular version (different resources that at one point shared the same state as the current version resource). A successful PUT request on "the current version" URI might therefore create a new version resource in addition to changing the state of the target resource, and might also cause links to be
added between the related resources.

An origin server SHOULD reject any PUT request that contains a Content-Range header field (Section 5.2 of [Part5]), since it might be misinterpreted as partial content (or might be partial content that is being mistakenly PUT as a full representation). Partial content updates are possible by targeting a separately identified resource with state that overlaps a portion of the larger resource, or by using a different method that has been specifically defined for partial updates (for example, the PATCH method defined in [RFC5789]).

Responses to the PUT method are not cacheable. If a PUT request passes through a cache that has one or more stored responses for the effective request URI, those stored responses will be invalidated (see Section 6 of [Part6]).

5.3.5. DELETE

The DELETE method requests that the origin server delete the target resource. This method MAY be overridden by human intervention (or other means) on the origin server. The client cannot be guaranteed that the operation has been carried out, even if the status code returned from the origin server indicates that the action has been completed successfully. However, the server SHOULD NOT indicate success unless, at the time the response is given, it intends to delete the resource or move it to an inaccessible location.

A successful response SHOULD be 200 (OK) if the response includes a representation describing the status, 202 (Accepted) if the action has not yet been enacted, or 204 (No Content) if the action has been enacted but the response does not include a representation.

A payload within a DELETE request message has no defined semantics; sending a payload body on a DELETE request might cause some existing implementations to reject the request.

Responses to the DELETE method are not cacheable. If a DELETE request passes through a cache that has one or more stored responses for the effective request URI, those stored responses will be invalidated (see Section 6 of [Part6]).

5.3.6. CONNECT

The CONNECT method requests that the proxy establish a tunnel to the request-target and, if successful, thereafter restrict its behavior to blind forwarding of packets until the connection is closed.

When using CONNECT, the request-target MUST use the authority form
(Section 5.3 of [Part1]); i.e., the request-target consists of only 
the host name and port number of the tunnel destination, separated by 
a colon. For example,

CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com:80

Any 2xx (Successful) response to a CONNECT request indicates that the 
proxy has established a connection to the requested host and port, 
and has switched to tunneling the current connection to that server 
connection. The tunneled data from the server begins immediately 
after the blank line that concludes the successful response’s header 
block.

A server SHOULD NOT send any Transfer-Encoding or Content-Length 
header fields in a successful response. A client MUST ignore any 
Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding header fields received in a 
successful response.

Any response other than a successful response indicates that the 
tunnel has not yet been formed and that the connection remains 
governed by HTTP.

Proxy authentication might be used to establish the authority to 
create a tunnel:

CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com:80
Proxy-Authorization: basic aGVsbG86d29ybGQ=

A payload within a CONNECT request message has no defined semantics; 
sending a payload body on a CONNECT request might cause some existing 
implementations to reject the request.

Similar to a pipelined HTTP/1.1 request, data to be tunneled from 
client to server MAY be sent immediately after the request (before a 
response is received). The usual caveats also apply: data can be 
discarded if the eventual response is negative, and the connection 
can be reset with no response if more than one TCP segment is 
outstanding.

It might be the case that the proxy itself can only reach the 
requested origin server through another proxy. In this case, the 
first proxy SHOULD make a CONNECT request of that next proxy, 
requesting a tunnel to the authority. A proxy MUST NOT respond with 
any 2xx status code unless it has either a direct or tunnel
connection established to the authority.

If at any point either one of the peers gets disconnected, any outstanding data that came from that peer will be passed to the other one, and after that also the other connection will be terminated by the proxy. If there is outstanding data to that peer undelivered, that data will be discarded.

An origin server which receives a CONNECT request for itself MAY respond with a 2xx status code to indicate that a connection is established. However, most origin servers do not implement CONNECT.

5.3.7. OPTIONS

The OPTIONS method requests information about the communication options available on the request/response chain identified by the effective request URI. This method allows a client to determine the options and/or requirements associated with a resource, or the capabilities of a server, without implying a resource action or initiating a resource retrieval.

Responses to the OPTIONS method are not cacheable.

If the OPTIONS request includes a payload, then the media type MUST be indicated by a Content-Type field. Although this specification does not define any use for such a body, future extensions to HTTP might use the OPTIONS body to make more detailed queries on the server.

If the request-target (Section 5.3 of [Part1]) is an asterisk ("**"), the OPTIONS request is intended to apply to the server in general rather than to a specific resource. Since a server’s communication options typically depend on the resource, the "**" request is only useful as a "ping" or "no-op" type of method; it does nothing beyond allowing the client to test the capabilities of the server. For example, this can be used to test a proxy for HTTP/1.1 conformance (or lack thereof).

If the request-target is not an asterisk, the OPTIONS request applies only to the options that are available when communicating with that resource.

A 200 (OK) response SHOULD include any header fields that indicate optional features implemented by the server and applicable to that resource (e.g., Allow), possibly including extensions not defined by this specification. The response payload, if any, SHOULD also include information about the communication options. The format for such a payload is not defined by this specification, but might be
defined by future extensions to HTTP. Content negotiation MAY be used to select the appropriate representation. If no payload body is included, the response MUST include a Content-Length field with a field-value of "0".

The Max-Forwards header field MAY be used to target a specific proxy in the request chain (see Section 6.1.1). If no Max-Forwards field is present in the request, then the forwarded request MUST NOT include a Max-Forwards field.

5.3.8. TRACE

The TRACE method requests a remote, application-level loop-back of the request message. The final recipient of the request SHOULD reflect the message received back to the client as the message body of a 200 (OK) response. The final recipient is either the origin server or the first proxy to receive a Max-Forwards value of zero (0) in the request (see Section 6.1.1). A TRACE request MUST NOT include a message body.

TRACE allows the client to see what is being received at the other end of the request chain and use that data for testing or diagnostic information. The value of the Via header field (Section 5.7 of [Part1]) is of particular interest, since it acts as a trace of the request chain. Use of the Max-Forwards header field allows the client to limit the length of the request chain, which is useful for testing a chain of proxies forwarding messages in an infinite loop.

If the request is valid, the response SHOULD have a Content-Type of "message/http" (see Section 7.3.1 of [Part1]) and contain a message body that encloses a copy of the entire request message. Responses to the TRACE method are not cacheable.

6. Request Header Fields

A client sends request header fields to provide more information about the request context, make the request conditional based on the target resource state, suggest preferred formats for the response, supply authentication credentials, or modify the expected request processing. These fields act as request modifiers, similar to the parameters on a programming language method invocation.

6.1. Controls

Controls are request header fields that direct specific handling of the request.
6.1.1. Max-Forwards

The "Max-Forwards" header field provides a mechanism with the TRACE (Section 5.3.8) and OPTIONS (Section 5.3.7) methods to limit the number of times that the request is forwarded by proxies. This can be useful when the client is attempting to trace a request which appears to be failing or looping mid-chain.

Max-Forwards = 1*DIGIT

The Max-Forwards value is a decimal integer indicating the remaining number of times this request message can be forwarded.

Each recipient of a TRACE or OPTIONS request containing a Max-Forwards header field MUST check and update its value prior to forwarding the request. If the received value is zero (0), the recipient MUST NOT forward the request; instead, it MUST respond as the final recipient. If the received Max-Forwards value is greater than zero, then the forwarded message MUST contain an updated Max-Forwards field with a value decremented by one (1).

The Max-Forwards header field MAY be ignored for all other request methods.

6.1.2. Expect

The "Expect" header field is used to indicate that particular server behaviors are required by the client.

Expect = 1#expectation

expectation = expect-name [ BWS "=" BWS expect-value ] *( OWS ";" [ OWS expect-param ] )

expect-param = expect-name [ BWS "=" BWS expect-value ]

expect-name = token

expect-value = token / quoted-string

If all received Expect header field(s) are syntactically valid but
contain an expectation that the recipient does not understand or cannot comply with, the recipient MUST respond with a 417 (Expectation Failed) status code. A recipient of a syntactically invalid Expectation header field MUST respond with a 4xx status code other than 417.

The only expectation defined by this specification is:

100-continue

The "100-continue" expectation is defined below. It does not support any expect-params.

Comparison is case-insensitive for names (expect-name), and case-sensitive for values (expect-value).

The Expect mechanism is hop-by-hop: the above requirements apply to any server, including proxies. However, the Expect header field itself is end-to-end; it MUST be forwarded if the request is forwarded.

Many older HTTP/1.0 and HTTP/1.1 applications do not understand the Expect header field.

6.1.2.1. Use of the 100 (Continue) Status

The purpose of the 100 (Continue) status code (Section 7.2.1) is to allow a client that is sending a request message with a payload to determine if the origin server is willing to accept the request (based on the request header fields) before the client sends the payload body. In some cases, it might either be inappropriate or highly inefficient for the client to send the payload body if the server will reject the message without looking at the body.

Requirements for HTTP/1.1 clients:

- If a client will wait for a 100 (Continue) response before sending the payload body, it MUST send an Expect header field with the "100-continue" expectation.

- A client MUST NOT send an Expect header field with the "100-continue" expectation if it does not intend to send a payload body.

Because of the presence of older implementations, the protocol allows ambiguous situations in which a client might send "Expect: 100-continue" without receiving either a 417 (Expectation Failed) or a 100 (Continue) status code. Therefore, when a client sends this
header field to an origin server (possibly via a proxy) from which it has never seen a 100 (Continue) status code, the client SHOULD NOT wait for an indefinite period before sending the payload body.

Requirements for HTTP/1.1 origin servers:

- Upon receiving a request which includes an Expect header field with the "100-continue" expectation, an origin server MUST either respond with 100 (Continue) status code and continue to read from the input stream, or respond with a final status code. The origin server MUST NOT wait for the payload body before sending the 100 (Continue) response. If it responds with a final status code, it MAY close the transport connection or it MAY continue to read and discard the rest of the request. It MUST NOT perform the request method if it returns a final status code.

- An origin server SHOULD NOT send a 100 (Continue) response if the request message does not include an Expect header field with the "100-continue" expectation, and MUST NOT send a 100 (Continue) response if such a request comes from an HTTP/1.0 (or earlier) client. There is an exception to this rule: for compatibility with [RFC2068], a server MAY send a 100 (Continue) status code in response to an HTTP/1.1 PUT or POST request that does not include an Expect header field with the "100-continue" expectation. This exception, the purpose of which is to minimize any client processing delays associated with an undeclared wait for 100 (Continue) status code, applies only to HTTP/1.1 requests, and not to requests with any other HTTP-version value.

- An origin server MAY omit a 100 (Continue) response if it has already received some or all of the payload body for the corresponding request.

- An origin server that sends a 100 (Continue) response MUST ultimately send a final status code, once the payload body is received and processed, unless it terminates the transport connection prematurely.

- If an origin server receives a request that does not include an Expect header field with the "100-continue" expectation, the request includes a payload body, and the server responds with a final status code before reading the entire payload body from the transport connection, then the server SHOULD NOT close the transport connection until it has read the entire request, or until the client closes the connection. Otherwise, the client might not reliably receive the response message. However, this requirement ought not be construed as preventing a server from defending itself against denial-of-service attacks, or from badly
broken client implementations.

Requirements for HTTP/1.1 proxies:

- If a proxy receives a request that includes an Expect header field with the "100-continue" expectation, and the proxy either knows that the next-hop server complies with HTTP/1.1 or higher, or does not know the HTTP version of the next-hop server, it MUST forward the request, including the Expect header field.

- If the proxy knows that the version of the next-hop server is HTTP/1.0 or lower, it MUST NOT forward the request, and it MUST respond with a 417 (Expectation Failed) status code.

- Proxies SHOULD maintain a record of the HTTP version numbers received from recently-referenced next-hop servers.

- A proxy MUST NOT forward a 100 (Continue) response if the request message was received from an HTTP/1.0 (or earlier) client and did not include an Expect header field with the "100-continue" expectation. This requirement overrides the general rule for forwarding of 1xx responses (see Section 7.2.1).

6.2. Conditionals

Conditionals are request header fields that indicate a precondition to be tested before applying the method semantics to the target resource. Each precondition is based on metadata that is expected to change if the selected representation of the target resource is changed. The HTTP/1.1 conditional request mechanisms are defined in [Part4].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Defined in...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If-Match</td>
<td>Section 3.1 of [Part4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If-None-Match</td>
<td>Section 3.2 of [Part4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If-Modified-Since</td>
<td>Section 3.3 of [Part4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If-Unmodified-Since</td>
<td>Section 3.4 of [Part4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If-Range</td>
<td>Section 5.3 of [Part5]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3. Content Negotiation

+-------------------+---------------+
| Header Field Name | Defined in... |
+-------------------+---------------+
| Accept            | Section 6.3.2 |
| Accept-Charset    | Section 6.3.3 |
| Accept-Encoding   | Section 6.3.4 |
| Accept-Language   | Section 6.3.5 |
+-------------------+---------------+

6.3.1. Quality Values

Many of the request header fields for proactive content negotiation use a common parameter, named "q" (case-insensitive), to assign a relative "weight" to the preference for that associated kind of content. This weight is referred to as a "quality value" (or "qvalue") because the same parameter name is often used within server configurations to assign a weight to the relative quality of the various representations that can be selected for a resource.

The weight is normalized to a real number in the range 0 through 1, where 0.001 is the least preferred and 1 is the most preferred; a value of 0 means "not acceptable". If no "q" parameter is present, the default weight is 1.

weight = OWS ";" OWS "q=" qvalue
qvalue = ( "0" [ "." 0*3DIGIT ] )
        / ( "1" [ "." 0*3("0") ] )

A sender of qvalue MUST NOT generate more than three digits after the decimal point. User configuration of these values ought to be limited in the same fashion.

6.3.2. Accept

The "Accept" header field can be used by user agents to specify response media types that are acceptable. Accept header fields can be used to indicate that the request is specifically limited to a small set of desired types, as in the case of a request for an in-line image.
Accept = #( media-range [ accept-params ] )

media-range = ( "*/*")
/ ( type "/" "*" )
/ ( type "/" subtype )
) *( OWS ";" OWS parameter )
accept-params = weight *( accept-ext )
accept-ext = OWS ";" OWS token [ "=" word ]

The asterisk "*" character is used to group media types into ranges, with "*/*" indicating all media types and "type/*" indicating all subtypes of that type. The media-range MAY include media type parameters that are applicable to that range.

Each media-range MAY be followed by one or more accept-params, beginning with the "q" parameter for indicating a relative weight, as defined in Section 6.3.1. The first "q" parameter (if any) separates the media-range parameter(s) from the accept-params.

Note: Use of the "q" parameter name to separate media type parameters from Accept extension parameters is due to historical practice. Although this prevents any media type parameter named "q" from being used with a media range, such an event is believed to be unlikely given the lack of any "q" parameters in the IANA media type registry and the rare usage of any media type parameters in Accept. Future media types are discouraged from registering any parameter named "q".

The example

Accept: audio/*; q=0.2, audio/basic

SHOULD be interpreted as "I prefer audio/basic, but send me any audio type if it is the best available after an 80% mark-down in quality".

A request without any Accept header field implies that the user agent will accept any media type in response. If an Accept header field is present in a request and none of the available representations for the response have a media type that is listed as acceptable, the origin server MAY either honor the Accept header field by sending a 406 (Not Acceptable) response or disregard the Accept header field by treating the response as if it is not subject to content negotiation.

A more elaborate example is

Accept: text/plain; q=0.5, text/html,
   text/x-dvi; q=0.8, text/x-c
Verbally, this would be interpreted as "text/html and text/x-c are the preferred media types, but if they do not exist, then send the text/x-dvi representation, and if that does not exist, send the text/plain representation".

Media ranges can be overridden by more specific media ranges or specific media types. If more than one media range applies to a given type, the most specific reference has precedence. For example,

Accept: text/*, text/plain, text/plain;format=flowed, */*

have the following precedence:

1. text/plain;format=flowed
2. text/plain
3. text/*
4. */*

The media type quality factor associated with a given type is determined by finding the media range with the highest precedence which matches that type. For example,

Accept: text/*;q=0.3, text/html;q=0.7, text/html;level=1, text/html;level=2;q=0.4, */*;q=0.5

would cause the following values to be associated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Type</th>
<th>Quality Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>text/html;level=1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>text/html</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>text/plain</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>image/jpeg</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>text/html;level=2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>text/html;level=3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A user agent might be provided with a default set of quality values for certain media ranges. However, unless the user agent is a closed system which cannot interact with other rendering agents, this default set ought to be configurable by the user.
6.3.3. Accept-Charset

The "Accept-Charset" header field can be used by user agents to indicate what character encodings are acceptable in a response payload. This field allows clients capable of understanding more comprehensive or special-purpose character encodings to signal that capability to a server which is capable of representing documents in those character encodings.

\[
\text{Accept-Charset} = 1#( \text{ charset / "*" } )[ \text{ weight } ]
\]

Character encoding values (a.k.a., charsets) are described in Section 3.1.1.2. Each charset MAY be given an associated quality value which represents the user’s preference for that charset, as defined in Section 6.3.1. An example is

Accept-Charset: iso-8859-5, unicode-1-1;q=0.8

The special value "*", if present in the Accept-Charset field, matches every character encoding which is not mentioned elsewhere in the Accept-Charset field. If no "*" is present in an Accept-Charset field, then any character encodings not explicitly mentioned in the field are considered "not acceptable" to the client.

A request without any Accept-Charset header field implies that the user agent will accept any character encoding in response.

If an Accept-Charset header field is present in a request and none of the available representations for the response have a character encoding that is listed as acceptable, the origin server MAY either honor the Accept-Charset header field by sending a 406 (Not Acceptable) response or disregard the Accept-Charset header field by treating the response as if it is not subject to content negotiation.

6.3.4. Accept-Encoding

The "Accept-Encoding" header field can be used by user agents to indicate what response content-codings (Section 3.1.2.1) are acceptable in the response. An "identity" token is used as a synonym for "no encoding" in order to communicate when no encoding is preferred.

\[
\text{Accept-Encoding} = #( \text{ codings [ weight ] })
\]

\[
\text{codings} = \text{ content-coding / "identity" / "*"}
\]

Each codings value MAY be given an associated quality value which represents the preference for that encoding, as defined in Section 6.3.1.
For example,

    Accept-Encoding: compress, gzip
    Accept-Encoding:
    Accept-Encoding: *
    Accept-Encoding: compress;q=0.5, gzip;q=1.0
    Accept-Encoding: gzip;q=1.0, identity; q=0.5, *;q=0

A server tests whether a content-coding for a given representation is acceptable, according to an Accept-Encoding field, using these rules:

1. The special "*" symbol in an Accept-Encoding field matches any available content-coding not explicitly listed in the header field.

2. If the representation has no content-coding, then it is acceptable by default unless specifically excluded by the Accept-Encoding field stating either "identity;q=0" or "*;q=0" without a more specific entry for "identity".

3. If the representation’s content-coding is one of the content-codings listed in the Accept-Encoding field, then it is acceptable unless it is accompanied by a qvalue of 0. (As defined in Section 6.3.1, a qvalue of 0 means "not acceptable").

4. If multiple content-codings are acceptable, then the acceptable content-coding with the highest non-zero qvalue is preferred.

An Accept-Encoding header field with a combined field-value that is empty implies that the user agent does not want any content-coding in response. If an Accept-Encoding header field is present in a request and none of the available representations for the response have a content-coding that is listed as acceptable, the origin server SHOULD send a response without any content-coding.

A request without an Accept-Encoding header field implies that the user agent will accept any content-coding in response.

Note: Most HTTP/1.0 applications do not recognize or obey qvalues associated with content-codings. This means that qvalues will not work and are not permitted with x-gzip or x-compress.

6.3.5. Accept-Language

The "Accept-Language" header field can be used by user agents to indicate the set of natural languages that are preferred in the response. Language tags are defined in Section 3.1.3.1.
Accept-Language = 1#( language-range [ weight ] )
language-range =
                   <language-range, defined in [RFC4647], Section 2.1>

Each language-range can be given an associated quality value which
represents an estimate of the user’s preference for the languages
specified by that range, as defined in Section 6.3.1. For example,

   Accept-Language: da, en-gb;q=0.8, en;q=0.7

would mean: "I prefer Danish, but will accept British English and
other types of English". (see also Section 2.3 of [RFC4647])

For matching, Section 3 of [RFC4647] defines several matching
schemes. Implementations can offer the most appropriate matching
scheme for their requirements.

   Note: The "Basic Filtering" scheme ([RFC4647], Section 3.3.1) is
   identical to the matching scheme that was previously defined in
   Section 14.4 of [RFC2616].

It might be contrary to the privacy expectations of the user to send
an Accept-Language header field with the complete linguistic
preferences of the user in every request. For a discussion of this
issue, see Section 10.5.

As intelligibility is highly dependent on the individual user, it is
recommended that client applications make the choice of linguistic
preference available to the user. If the choice is not made
available, then the Accept-Language header field MUST NOT be given in
the request.

   Note: When making the choice of linguistic preference available to
   the user, we remind implementers of the fact that users are not
   familiar with the details of language matching as described above,
   and ought to be provided appropriate guidance. As an example,
   users might assume that on selecting "en-gb", they will be served
   any kind of English document if British English is not available.
   A user agent might suggest in such a case to add "en" to get the
   best matching behavior.
6.4. Authentication Credentials

+---------------------+------------------------+
| Header Field Name   | Defined in...          |
+---------------------+------------------------+
| Authorization       | Section 4.1 of [Part7] |
| Proxy-Authorization | Section 4.3 of [Part7] |
+---------------------+------------------------+

6.5. Context

+-------------------+------------------------+
| Header Field Name | Defined in...          |
+-------------------+------------------------+
| From              | Section 6.5.1          |
| Referer           | Section 6.5.2          |
| TE                | Section 4.3 of [Part1] |
| User-Agent        | Section 6.5.3          |
+-------------------+------------------------+

6.5.1. From

The "From" header field, if given, SHOULD contain an Internet e-mail address for the human user who controls the requesting user agent. The address SHOULD be machine-usable, as defined by "mailbox" in Section 3.4 of [RFC5322]:

From = mailbox

mailbox = <mailbox, defined in [RFC5322], Section 3.4>

An example is:

From: webmaster@example.org

This header field MAY be used for logging purposes and as a means for identifying the source of invalid or unwanted requests. It SHOULD NOT be used as an insecure form of access protection. The interpretation of this field is that the request is being performed on behalf of the person given, who accepts responsibility for the method performed. In particular, robot agents SHOULD include this header field so that the person responsible for running the robot can be contacted if problems occur on the receiving end.

The Internet e-mail address in this field MAY be separate from the Internet host which issued the request. For example, when a request is passed through a proxy the original issuer’s address SHOULD be used.
The client SHOULD NOT send the From header field without the user’s approval, as it might conflict with the user’s privacy interests or their site’s security policy. It is strongly recommended that the user be able to disable, enable, and modify the value of this field at any time prior to a request.

6.5.2. Referer

The "Referer" [sic] header field allows the client to specify the URI of the resource from which the target URI was obtained (the "referrer", although the header field is misspelled.).

The Referer header field allows servers to generate lists of back-links to resources for interest, logging, optimized caching, etc. It also allows obsolete or mistyped links to be traced for maintenance. Some servers use Referer as a means of controlling where they allow links from (so-called "deep linking"), but legitimate requests do not always contain a Referer header field.

If the target URI was obtained from a source that does not have its own URI (e.g., input from the user keyboard), the Referer field MUST either be sent with the value "about:blank", or not be sent at all. Note that this requirement does not apply to sources with non-HTTP URIs (e.g., FTP).

Referer = absolute-URI / partial-URI

Example:

Referer: http://www.example.org/hypertext/Overview.html

If the field value is a relative URI, it SHOULD be interpreted relative to the effective request URI. The URI MUST NOT include a fragment. See Section 10.2 for security considerations.

6.5.3. User-Agent

The "User-Agent" header field contains information about the user agent originating the request. User agents SHOULD include this field with requests.

Typically, it is used for statistical purposes, the tracing of protocol violations, and tailoring responses to avoid particular user agent limitations.

The field can contain multiple product tokens (Section 4) and comments (Section 3.2 of [Part1]) identifying the agent and its significant subproducts. By convention, the product tokens are
listed in order of their significance for identifying the application.

Because this field is usually sent on every request a user agent makes, implementations are encouraged not to include needlessly fine-grained detail, and to limit (or even prohibit) the addition of subproducts by third parties. Overly long and detailed User-Agent field values make requests larger and can also be used to identify ("fingerprint") the user against their wishes.

Likewise, implementations are encouraged not to use the product tokens of other implementations in order to declare compatibility with them, as this circumvents the purpose of the field. Finally, they are encouraged not to use comments to identify products; doing so makes the field value more difficult to parse.

User-Agent = product *( RWS ( product / comment ) )

Example:

User-Agent: CERN-LineMode/2.15 libwww/2.17b3

7. Response Status Codes

The status-code element is a 3-digit integer result code of the attempt to understand and satisfy the request.

HTTP status codes are extensible. HTTP applications are not required to understand the meaning of all registered status codes, though such understanding is obviously desirable. However, applications MUST understand the class of any status code, as indicated by the first digit, and treat any unrecognized response as being equivalent to the x00 status code of that class, with the exception that an unrecognized response MUST NOT be cached. For example, if an unrecognized status code of 431 is received by the client, it can safely assume that there was something wrong with its request and treat the response as if it had received a 400 status code. In such cases, user agents SHOULD present to the user the representation enclosed with the response, since that representation is likely to include human-readable information which will explain the unusual status.

The first digit of the status-code defines the class of response. The last two digits do not have any categorization role. There are 5 values for the first digit:

- 1xx (Informational): Request received, continuing process
o 2xx (Successful): The action was successfully received, understood, and accepted

o 3xx (Redirection): Further action needs to be taken in order to complete the request

o 4xx (Client Error): The request contains bad syntax or cannot be fulfilled

o 5xx (Server Error): The server failed to fulfill an apparently valid request

For most status codes the response can carry a payload, in which case a Content-Type header field indicates the payload’s media type (Section 3.1.1.5).

7.1. Overview of Status Codes

The status codes listed below are defined in this specification, Section 4 of [Part4], Section 3 of [Part5], and Section 3 of [Part7]. The reason phrases listed here are only recommendations -- they can be replaced by local equivalents without affecting the protocol.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>status-code</th>
<th>reason-phrase</th>
<th>Defined in...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Continue</td>
<td>Section 7.2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>Switching Protocols</td>
<td>Section 7.2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>Section 7.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>Created</td>
<td>Section 7.3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
<td>Section 7.3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Non-Authoritative Information</td>
<td>Section 7.3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>No Content</td>
<td>Section 7.3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>Reset Content</td>
<td>Section 7.3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>Partial Content</td>
<td>Section 3.1 of [Part5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>Multiple Choices</td>
<td>Section 7.4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301</td>
<td>Moved Permanently</td>
<td>Section 7.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>302</td>
<td>Found</td>
<td>Section 7.4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303</td>
<td>See Other</td>
<td>Section 7.4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>304</td>
<td>Not Modified</td>
<td>Section 4.1 of [Part4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>305</td>
<td>Use Proxy</td>
<td>Section 7.4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307</td>
<td>Temporary Redirect</td>
<td>Section 7.4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>Bad Request</td>
<td>Section 7.5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401</td>
<td>Unauthorized</td>
<td>Section 3.1 of [Part7]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>402</td>
<td>Payment Required</td>
<td>Section 7.5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>403</td>
<td>Forbidden</td>
<td>Section 7.5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>404</td>
<td>Not Found</td>
<td>Section 7.5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td>Method Not Allowed</td>
<td>Section 7.5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>406</td>
<td>Not Acceptable</td>
<td>Section 7.5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407</td>
<td>Proxy Authentication Required</td>
<td>Section 3.2 of [Part7]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>408</td>
<td>Request Time-out</td>
<td>Section 7.5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Section 7.5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410</td>
<td>Gone</td>
<td>Section 7.5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411</td>
<td>Length Required</td>
<td>Section 7.5.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412</td>
<td>Precondition Failed</td>
<td>Section 4.2 of [Part4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>413</td>
<td>Request Representation Too Large</td>
<td>Section 7.5.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>414</td>
<td>URI Too Long</td>
<td>Section 7.5.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>415</td>
<td>Unsupported Media Type</td>
<td>Section 7.5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>416</td>
<td>Requested range not satisfiable</td>
<td>Section 3.2 of [Part5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>417</td>
<td>Expectation Failed</td>
<td>Section 7.5.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>426</td>
<td>Upgrade Required</td>
<td>Section 7.5.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>Internal Server Error</td>
<td>Section 7.6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501</td>
<td>Not Implemented</td>
<td>Section 7.6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Status Code</td>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>502</td>
<td>Bad Gateway</td>
<td>7.6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>503</td>
<td>Service Unavailable</td>
<td>7.6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504</td>
<td>Gateway Time-out</td>
<td>7.6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>505</td>
<td>HTTP Version not supported</td>
<td>7.6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that this list is not exhaustive -- it does not include extension status codes defined in other specifications.

### 7.2. Informational 1xx

This class of status code indicates a provisional response, consisting only of the status-line and optional header fields, and is terminated by an empty line. There are no required header fields for this class of status code. Since HTTP/1.0 did not define any 1xx status codes, servers MUST NOT send a 1xx response to an HTTP/1.0 client except under experimental conditions.

A client MUST be prepared to accept one or more 1xx status responses prior to a regular response, even if the client does not expect a 100 (Continue) status message. Unexpected 1xx status responses MAY be ignored by a user agent.

Proxies MUST forward 1xx responses, unless the connection between the proxy and its client has been closed, or unless the proxy itself requested the generation of the 1xx response. (For example, if a proxy adds an "Expect: 100-continue" field when it forwards a request, then it need not forward the corresponding 100 (Continue) response(s).)

#### 7.2.1. 100 Continue

The client SHOULD continue with its request. This interim response is used to inform the client that the initial part of the request has been received and has not yet been rejected by the server. The client SHOULD continue by sending the remainder of the request or, if the request has already been completed, ignore this response. The server MUST send a final response after the request has been completed. See Section 6.1.2.1 for detailed discussion of the use and handling of this status code.

#### 7.2.2. 101 Switching Protocols

The server understands and is willing to comply with the client’s request, via the Upgrade message header field (Section 6.3 of [Part1]), for a change in the application protocol being used on this connection. The server will switch protocols to those defined by the response’s Upgrade header field immediately after the empty line.
which terminates the 101 response.

The protocol SHOULD be switched only when it is advantageous to do so. For example, switching to a newer version of HTTP is advantageous over older versions, and switching to a real-time, synchronous protocol might be advantageous when delivering resources that use such features.

7.3. Successful 2xx

This class of status code indicates that the client’s request was successfully received, understood, and accepted.

7.3.1. 200 OK

The request has succeeded. The payload returned with the response is dependent on the method used in the request, for example:

GET a representation of the target resource is sent in the response;
HEAD the same representation as GET, except without the message body;
POST a representation describing or containing the result of the action;
TRACE a representation containing the request message as received by the end server.

Caches MAY use a heuristic (see Section 4.1.2 of [Part6]) to determine freshness for 200 responses.

7.3.2. 201 Created

The request has been fulfilled and has resulted in one or more new resources being created.

Newly created resources are typically linked to from the response payload, with the most relevant URI also being carried in the Location header field. If the newly created resource’s URI is the same as the Effective Request URI, this information can be omitted (e.g., in the case of a response to a PUT request).

The origin server MUST create the resource(s) before returning the 201 status code. If the action cannot be carried out immediately, the server SHOULD respond with 202 (Accepted) response instead.

A 201 response MAY contain an ETag response header field indicating
the current value of the entity-tag for the representation of the resource identified by the Location header field or, in case the Location header field was omitted, by the Effective Request URI (see Section 2.3 of [Part4]).

7.3.3. 202 Accepted

The request has been accepted for processing, but the processing has not been completed. The request might or might not eventually be acted upon, as it might be disallowed when processing actually takes place. There is no facility for re-sending a status code from an asynchronous operation such as this.

The 202 response is intentionally non-committal. Its purpose is to allow a server to accept a request for some other process (perhaps a batch-oriented process that is only run once per day) without requiring that the user agent’s connection to the server persist until the process is completed. The representation returned with this response SHOULD include an indication of the request’s current status and either a pointer to a status monitor or some estimate of when the user can expect the request to be fulfilled.

7.3.4. 203 Non-Authoritative Information

The representation in the response has been transformed or otherwise modified by a transforming proxy (Section 2.3 of [Part1]). Note that the behavior of transforming intermediaries is controlled by the no-transform Cache-Control directive (Section 7.2 of [Part6]).

This status code is only appropriate when the response status code would have been 200 (OK) otherwise. When the status code before transformation would have been different, the 214 Transformation Applied warn-code (Section 7.5 of [Part6]) is appropriate.

Caches MAY use a heuristic (see Section 4.1.2 of [Part6]) to determine freshness for 203 responses.

7.3.5. 204 No Content

The 204 (No Content) status code indicates that the server has successfully fulfilled the request and that there is no additional content to return in the response payload body. Metadata in the response header fields refer to the target resource and its current representation after the requested action.

For example, if a 204 status code is received in response to a PUT request and the response contains an ETag header field, then the PUT was successful and the ETag field-value contains the entity-tag for
the new representation of that target resource.

The 204 response allows a server to indicate that the action has been successfully applied to the target resource while implying that the user agent SHOULD NOT traverse away from its current "document view" (if any). The server assumes that the user agent will provide some indication of the success to its user, in accord with its own interface, and apply any new or updated metadata in the response to the active representation.

For example, a 204 status code is commonly used with document editing interfaces corresponding to a "save" action, such that the document being saved remains available to the user for editing. It is also frequently used with interfaces that expect automated data transfers to be prevalent, such as within distributed version control systems.

The 204 response MUST NOT include a message body, and thus is always terminated by the first empty line after the header fields.

7.3.6. 205 Reset Content

The server has fulfilled the request and the user agent SHOULD reset the document view which caused the request to be sent. This response is primarily intended to allow input for actions to take place via user input, followed by a clearing of the form in which the input is given so that the user can easily initiate another input action.

The message body included with the response MUST be empty. Note that receivers still need to parse the response according to the algorithm defined in Section 3.3 of [Part1].

7.4. Redirection 3xx

This class of status code indicates that further action needs to be taken by the user agent in order to fulfill the request. If the required action involves a subsequent HTTP request, it MAY be carried out by the user agent without interaction with the user if and only if the method used in the second request is known to be "safe", as defined in Section 5.2.1.

There are several types of redirects:

1. Redirects of the request to another URI, either temporarily or permanently. The new URI is specified in the Location header field. In this specification, the status codes 301 (Moved Permanently), 302 (Found), and 307 (Temporary Redirect) fall under this category.
2. Redirection to a new location that represents an indirect response to the request, such as the result of a POST operation to be retrieved with a subsequent GET request. This is status code 303 (See Other).

3. Redirection offering a choice of matching resources for use by reactive content negotiation (Section 3.4.2). This is status code 300 (Multiple Choices).

4. Other kinds of redirection, such as to a cached result (status code 304 (Not Modified), see Section 4.1 of [Part4]).

Note: In HTTP/1.0, only the status codes 301 (Moved Permanently) and 302 (Found) were defined for the first type of redirect, and the second type did not exist at all ([RFC1945], Section 9.3). However it turned out that web forms using POST expected redirects to change the operation for the subsequent request to retrieval (GET). To address this use case, HTTP/1.1 introduced the second type of redirect with the status code 303 (See Other) ([RFC2068], Section 10.3.4). As user agents did not change their behavior to maintain backwards compatibility, the first revision of HTTP/1.1 added yet another status code, 307 (Temporary Redirect), for which the backwards compatibility problems did not apply ([RFC2616], Section 10.3.8). Over 10 years later, most user agents still do method rewriting for status codes 301 and 302, therefore this specification makes that behavior conformant in case the original request was POST.

A Location header field on a 3xx response indicates that a client MAY automatically redirect to the URI provided; see Section 8.1.2.

Note that for methods not known to be "safe", as defined in Section 5.2.1, automatic redirection needs to be done with care, since the redirect might change the conditions under which the request was issued.

Clients SHOULD detect and intervene in cyclical redirections (i.e., "infinite" redirection loops).

Note: An earlier version of this specification recommended a maximum of five redirections ([RFC2068], Section 10.3). Content developers need to be aware that some clients might implement such a fixed limitation.
7.4.1. 300 Multiple Choices

The target resource has more than one representation, each with its own specific location, and reactive negotiation information (Section 3.4) is being provided so that the user (or user agent) can select a preferred representation by redirecting its request to that location.

Unless it was a HEAD request, the response SHOULD include a representation containing a list of representation metadata and location(s) from which the user or user agent can choose the one most appropriate. Depending upon the format and the capabilities of the user agent, selection of the most appropriate choice MAY be performed automatically. However, this specification does not define any standard for such automatic selection.

If the server has a preferred choice of representation, it SHOULD include the specific URI for that representation in the Location field; user agents MAY use the Location field value for automatic redirection.

Caches MAY use a heuristic (see Section 4.1.2 of [Part6]) to determine freshness for 300 responses.

7.4.2. 301 Moved Permanently

The target resource has been assigned a new permanent URI and any future references to this resource SHOULD use one of the returned URIs. Clients with link editing capabilities ought to automatically re-link references to the effective request URI to one or more of the new references returned by the server, where possible.

Caches MAY use a heuristic (see Section 4.1.2 of [Part6]) to determine freshness for 301 responses.

The new permanent URI SHOULD be given by the Location field in the response. A response payload can contain a short hypertext note with a hyperlink to the new URI(s).

Note: For historic reasons, user agents MAY change the request method from POST to GET for the subsequent request. If this behavior is undesired, status code 307 (Temporary Redirect) can be used instead.
7.4.3.  302 Found

The target resource resides temporarily under a different URI. Since the redirection might be altered on occasion, the client SHOULD continue to use the effective request URI for future requests.

The temporary URI SHOULD be given by the Location field in the response. A response payload can contain a short hypertext note with a hyperlink to the new URI(s).

Note: For historic reasons, user agents MAY change the request method from POST to GET for the subsequent request. If this behavior is undesired, status code 307 (Temporary Redirect) can be used instead.

7.4.4.  303 See Other

The 303 status code indicates that the server is redirecting the user agent to a different resource, as indicated by a URI in the Location header field, that is intended to provide an indirect response to the original request. In order to satisfy the original request, a user agent SHOULD perform a retrieval request using the Location URI (a GET or HEAD request if using HTTP), which can itself be redirected further, and present the eventual result as an answer to the original request. Note that the new URI in the Location header field is not considered equivalent to the effective request URI.

This status code is generally applicable to any HTTP method. It is primarily used to allow the output of a POST action to redirect the user agent to a selected resource, since doing so provides the information corresponding to the POST response in a form that can be separately identified, bookmarked, and cached independent of the original request.

A 303 response to a GET request indicates that the requested resource does not have a representation of its own that can be transferred by the server over HTTP. The Location URI indicates a resource that is descriptive of the target resource, such that the follow-on representation might be useful to recipients without implying that it adequately represents the target resource. Note that answers to the questions of what can be represented, what representations are adequate, and what might be a useful description are outside the scope of HTTP and thus entirely determined by the URI owner(s).

Except for responses to a HEAD request, the representation of a 303 response SHOULD contain a short hypertext note with a hyperlink to the Location URI.
7.4.5. 305 Use Proxy

The 305 status code was defined in a previous version of this specification (see Appendix C), and is now deprecated.

7.4.6. 306 (Unused)

The 306 status code was used in a previous version of the specification, is no longer used, and the code is reserved.

7.4.7. 307 Temporary Redirect

The target resource resides temporarily under a different URI. Since the redirection can change over time, the client SHOULD continue to use the effective request URI for future requests.

The temporary URI SHOULD be given by the Location field in the response. A response payload can contain a short hypertext note with a hyperlink to the new URI(s).

Note: This status code is similar to 302 (Found), except that it does not allow rewriting the request method from POST to GET. This specification defines no equivalent counterpart for 301 (Moved Permanently) ([status-308], however, defines the status code 308 (Permanent Redirect) for this purpose).

7.5. Client Error 4xx

The 4xx class of status code is intended for cases in which the client seems to have erred. Except when responding to a HEAD request, the server SHOULD include a representation containing an explanation of the error situation, and whether it is a temporary or permanent condition. These status codes are applicable to any request method. User agents SHOULD display any included representation to the user.

7.5.1. 400 Bad Request

The server cannot or will not process the request, due to a client error (e.g., malformed syntax).

7.5.2. 402 Payment Required

This code is reserved for future use.
7.5.3.  403 Forbidden

The server understood the request, but refuses to authorize it. Providing different user authentication credentials might be successful, but any credentials that were provided in the request are insufficient. The request SHOULD NOT be repeated with the same credentials.

If the request method was not HEAD and the server wishes to make public why the request has not been fulfilled, it SHOULD describe the reason for the refusal in the representation. If the server does not wish to make this information available to the client, the status code 404 (Not Found) MAY be used instead.

7.5.4.  404 Not Found

The server has not found anything matching the effective request URI. No indication is given of whether the condition is temporary or permanent. The 410 (Gone) status code SHOULD be used if the server knows, through some internally configurable mechanism, that an old resource is permanently unavailable and has no forwarding address. This status code is commonly used when the server does not wish to reveal exactly why the request has been refused, or when no other response is applicable.

7.5.5.  405 Method Not Allowed

The method specified in the request-line is not allowed for the target resource. The response MUST include an Allow header field containing a list of valid methods for the requested resource.

7.5.6.  406 Not Acceptable

The resource identified by the request is only capable of generating response representations which have content characteristics not acceptable according to the Accept and Accept-* header fields sent in the request.

Unless it was a HEAD request, the response SHOULD include a representation containing a list of available representation characteristics and location(s) from which the user or user agent can choose the one most appropriate. Depending upon the format and the capabilities of the user agent, selection of the most appropriate choice MAY be performed automatically. However, this specification does not define any standard for such automatic selection.
Note: HTTP/1.1 servers are allowed to return responses which are not acceptable according to the accept header fields sent in the request. In some cases, this might even be preferable to sending a 406 response. User agents are encouraged to inspect the header fields of an incoming response to determine if it is acceptable.

If the response could be unacceptable, a user agent SHOULD temporarily stop receipt of more data and query the user for a decision on further actions.

7.5.7. 408 Request Timeout

The client did not produce a request within the time that the server was prepared to wait. The client MAY repeat the request without modifications at any later time.

7.5.8. 409 Conflict

The request could not be completed due to a conflict with the current state of the resource. This code is only allowed in situations where it is expected that the user might be able to resolve the conflict and resubmit the request. The payload SHOULD include enough information for the user to recognize the source of the conflict. Ideally, the response representation would include enough information for the user or user agent to fix the problem; however, that might not be possible and is not required.

Conflicts are most likely to occur in response to a PUT request. For example, if versioning were being used and the representation being PUT included changes to a resource which conflict with those made by an earlier (third-party) request, the server might use the 409 response to indicate that it can’t complete the request. In this case, the response representation would likely contain a list of the differences between the two versions.

7.5.9. 410 Gone

The target resource is no longer available at the server and no forwarding address is known. This condition is expected to be considered permanent. Clients with link editing capabilities SHOULD delete references to the effective request URI after user approval. If the server does not know, or has no facility to determine, whether or not the condition is permanent, the status code 404 (Not Found) SHOULD be used instead.

The 410 response is primarily intended to assist the task of web maintenance by notifying the recipient that the resource is intentionally unavailable and that the server owners desire that
remote links to that resource be removed. Such an event is common for limited-time, promotional services and for resources belonging to individuals no longer working at the server’s site. It is not necessary to mark all permanently unavailable resources as "gone" or to keep the mark for any length of time -- that is left to the discretion of the server owner.

Caches MAY use a heuristic (see Section 4.1.2 of [Part6]) to determine freshness for 410 responses.

7.5.10. 411 Length Required

The server refuses to accept the request without a defined Content-Length. The client MAY repeat the request if it adds a valid Content-Length header field containing the length of the message body in the request message.

7.5.11. 413 Request Representation Too Large

The server is refusing to process a request because the request representation is larger than the server is willing or able to process. The server MAY close the connection to prevent the client from continuing the request.

If the condition is temporary, the server SHOULD include a Retry-After header field to indicate that it is temporary and after what time the client MAY try again.

7.5.12. 414 URI Too Long

The server is refusing to service the request because the effective request URI is longer than the server is willing to interpret. This rare condition is only likely to occur when a client has improperly converted a POST request to a GET request with long query information, when the client has descended into a URI "black hole" of redirection (e.g., a redirected URI prefix that points to a suffix of itself), or when the server is under attack by a client attempting to exploit security holes present in some servers using fixed-length buffers for reading or manipulating the request-target.

7.5.13. 415 Unsupported Media Type

The server is refusing to service the request because the request payload is in a format not supported by this request method on the target resource.
7.5.14. 417 Expectation Failed

The expectation given in an Expect header field (see Section 6.1.2) could not be met by this server, or, if the server is a proxy, the server has unambiguous evidence that the request could not be met by the next-hop server.

7.5.15. 426 Upgrade Required

The request can not be completed without a prior protocol upgrade. This response MUST include an Upgrade header field (Section 6.3 of [Part1]) specifying the required protocols.

Example:

HTTP/1.1 426 Upgrade Required
Upgrade: HTTP/3.0
Connection: Upgrade
Content-Length: 53
Content-Type: text/plain

This service requires use of the HTTP/3.0 protocol.

The server SHOULD include a message body in the 426 response which indicates in human readable form the reason for the error and describes any alternative courses which might be available to the user.

7.6. Server Error 5xx

Response status codes beginning with the digit "5" indicate cases in which the server is aware that it has erred or is incapable of performing the request. Except when responding to a HEAD request, the server SHOULD include a representation containing an explanation of the error situation, and whether it is a temporary or permanent condition. User agents SHOULD display any included representation to the user. These response codes are applicable to any request method.

7.6.1. 500 Internal Server Error

The server encountered an unexpected condition which prevented it from fulfilling the request.

7.6.2. 501 Not Implemented

The server does not support the functionality required to fulfill the request. This is the appropriate response when the server does not recognize the request method and is not capable of supporting it for
any resource.

7.6.3.  502 Bad Gateway

The server, while acting as a gateway or proxy, received an invalid response from the upstream server it accessed in attempting to fulfill the request.

7.6.4.  503 Service Unavailable

The server is currently unable to handle the request due to a temporary overloading or maintenance of the server.

The implication is that this is a temporary condition which will be alleviated after some delay. If known, the length of the delay MAY be indicated in a Retry-After header field (Section 8.1.3). If no Retry-After is given, the client SHOULD handle the response as it would for a 500 (Internal Server Error) response.

Note: The existence of the 503 status code does not imply that a server has to use it when becoming overloaded. Some servers might wish to simply refuse the connection.

7.6.5.  504 Gateway Timeout

The server, while acting as a gateway or proxy, did not receive a timely response from the upstream server specified by the URI (e.g., HTTP, FTP, LDAP) or some other auxiliary server (e.g., DNS) it needed to access in attempting to complete the request.

Note to implementers: some deployed proxies are known to return 400 (Bad Request) or 500 (Internal Server Error) when DNS lookups time out.

7.6.6.  505 HTTP Version Not Supported

The server does not support, or refuses to support, the protocol version that was used in the request message. The server is indicating that it is unable or unwilling to complete the request using the same major version as the client, as described in Section 2.6 of [Part1], other than with this error message. The response SHOULD contain a representation describing why that version is not supported and what other protocols are supported by that server.

8.  Response Header Fields

The response header fields allow the server to pass additional information about the response which cannot be placed in the status-
line. These header fields give information about the server and about further access to the target resource (Section 5.5 of [Part1]).

8.1. Control Data

Response header fields can supply control data that supplements the status code or instructs the client where to go next.

+-------------------+------------------------+
| Header Field Name | Defined in...          |
| Age               | Section 7.1 of [Part6] |
| Date              | Section 8.1.1.2        |
| Location          | Section 8.1.2          |
| Retry-After       | Section 8.1.3          |
+-------------------+------------------------+

8.1.1. Origination Date

8.1.1.1. Date/Time Formats

HTTP applications have historically allowed three different formats for date/time stamps. However, the preferred format is a fixed-length subset of that defined by [RFC1123]:

Sun, 06 Nov 1994 08:49:37 GMT ; RFC 1123

The other formats are described here only for compatibility with obsolete implementations.

Sunday, 06-Nov-94 08:49:37 GMT ; obsolete RFC 850 format
Sun Nov 6 08:49:37 1994 ; ANSI C’s asctime() format

HTTP/1.1 clients and servers that parse a date value MUST accept all three formats (for compatibility with HTTP/1.0), though they MUST only generate the RFC 1123 format for representing HTTP-date values in header fields.

All HTTP date/time stamps MUST be represented in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), without exception. For the purposes of HTTP, GMT is exactly equal to UTC (Coordinated Universal Time). This is indicated in the first two formats by the inclusion of "GMT" as the three-letter abbreviation for time zone, and MUST be assumed when reading the asctime format. HTTP-date is case sensitive and MUST NOT include additional whitespace beyond that specifically included as SP in the grammar.

HTTP-date = rfc1123-date / obs-date
Preferred format:

```
rfc1123-date = day-name "", SP date1 SP time-of-day SP GMT
 ; fixed length subset of the format defined in
 ; Section 5.2.14 of [RFC1123]

day-name     = %x4D.6F.6E ; "Mon", case-sensitive
 / %x54.75.65 ; "Tue", case-sensitive
 / %x57.65.64 ; "Wed", case-sensitive
 / %x54.68.75 ; "Thu", case-sensitive
 / %x46.72.69 ; "Fri", case-sensitive
 / %x53.61.74 ; "Sat", case-sensitive
 / %x53.75.6E ; "Sun", case-sensitive

date1        = day SP month SP year
 ; e.g., 02 Jun 1982

day          = 2DIGIT
month        = %x4A.61.6E ; "Jan", case-sensitive
 / %x46.65.62 ; "Feb", case-sensitive
 / %x4D.61.72 ; "Mar", case-sensitive
 / %x41.70.72 ; "Apr", case-sensitive
 / %x4D.61.79 ; "May", case-sensitive
 / %x4A.75.6E ; "Jun", case-sensitive
 / %x4A.75.6C ; "Jul", case-sensitive
 / %x41.75.67 ; "Aug", case-sensitive
 / %x53.65.70 ; "Sep", case-sensitive
 / %x4F.63.74 ; "Oct", case-sensitive
 / %x4E.6F.76 ; "Nov", case-sensitive
 / %x44.65.63 ; "Dec", case-sensitive

year         = 4DIGIT

GMT   = %x47.4D.54 ; "GMT", case-sensitive

time-of-day  = hour ":" minute ":" second
 ; 00:00:00 - 23:59:59

hour         = 2DIGIT
minute       = 2DIGIT
second       = 2DIGIT
```

The semantics of day-name, day, month, year, and time-of-day are the same as those defined for the RFC 5322 constructs with the corresponding name ([RFC5322], Section 3.3).

Obsolete formats:

```
obs-date     = rfc850-date / asctime-date
```

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8.1.1.2. Date

The "Date" header field represents the date and time at which the message was originated, having the same semantics as the Origination Date Field (orig-date) defined in Section 3.6.1 of [RFC5322]. The field value is an HTTP-date, as defined in Section 8.1.1.1; it MUST be sent in rfc1123-date format.

\[
\text{Date} = \text{HTTP-date}
\]

An example is

\[
\text{Date: Tue, 15 Nov 1994 08:12:31 GMT}
\]

Origin servers MUST include a Date header field in all responses, except in these cases:

1. If the response status code is 100 (Continue) or 101 (Switching Protocols), the response MAY include a Date header field, at the server’s option.
2. If the response status code conveys a server error, e.g., 500 (Internal Server Error) or 503 (Service Unavailable), and it is inconvenient or impossible to generate a valid Date.

3. If the server does not have a clock that can provide a reasonable approximation of the current time, its responses MUST NOT include a Date header field.

A received message that does not have a Date header field MUST be assigned one by the recipient if the message will be cached by that recipient.

Clients can use the Date header field as well; in order to keep request messages small, they are advised not to include it when it doesn’t convey any useful information (as is usually the case for requests that do not contain a payload).

The HTTP-date sent in a Date header field SHOULD NOT represent a date and time subsequent to the generation of the message. It SHOULD represent the best available approximation of the date and time of message generation, unless the implementation has no means of generating a reasonably accurate date and time. In theory, the date ought to represent the moment just before the payload is generated. In practice, the date can be generated at any time during the message origination without affecting its semantic value.

8.1.2. Location

The "Location" header field MAY be sent in responses to refer to a specific resource in accordance with the semantics of the status code.

```
Location = URI-reference
```

For 201 (Created) responses, the Location is the URI of the new resource which was created by the request. For 3xx (Redirection) responses, the location SHOULD indicate the server’s preferred URI for automatic redirection to the resource.

The field value consists of a single URI-reference. When it has the form of a relative reference ([RFC3986], Section 4.2), the final value is computed by resolving it against the effective request URI ([RFC3986], Section 5). If the original URI, as navigated to by the user agent, did contain a fragment identifier, and the final value does not, then the original URI’s fragment identifier is added to the final value.
For example, the original URI "http://www.example.org/˜tim", combined with a field value given as:

   Location: /pub/WWW/People.html#tim

would result in a final value of "http://www.example.org/pub/WWW/People.html#tim"

An original URI "http://www.example.org/index.html#larry", combined with a field value given as:

   Location: http://www.example.net/index.html

would result in a final value of "http://www.example.net/index.html#larry", preserving the original fragment identifier.

Note: Some recipients attempt to recover from Location fields that are not valid URI references. This specification does not mandate or define such processing, but does allow it.

There are circumstances in which a fragment identifier in a Location URI would not be appropriate. For instance, when it appears in a 201 (Created) response, where the Location header field specifies the URI for the entire created resource.

   Note: The Content-Location header field (Section 3.1.4.2) differs from Location in that the Content-Location identifies the most specific resource corresponding to the enclosed representation. It is therefore possible for a response to contain header fields for both Location and Content-Location.

8.1.3. Retry-After

The header "Retry-After" field can be used with a 503 (Service Unavailable) response to indicate how long the service is expected to be unavailable to the requesting client. This field MAY also be used with any 3xx (Redirection) response to indicate the minimum time the user-agent is asked to wait before issuing the redirected request.

The value of this field can be either an HTTP-date or an integer number of seconds (in decimal) after the time of the response.

   Retry-After = HTTP-date / delta-seconds

Time spans are non-negative decimal integers, representing time in seconds.
Two examples of its use are

```text
Retry-After: 120
```

In the latter example, the delay is 2 minutes.

8.2. Selected Representation Header Fields

We use the term "selected representation" to refer to the current representation of a target resource that would have been selected in a successful response if the same request had used the method GET and excluded any conditional request header fields.

Additional header fields define metadata about the selected representation, which might differ from the representation included in the message for responses to some state-changing methods. The following header fields are defined as selected representation metadata:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Defined in...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ETag</td>
<td>Section 2.3 of [Part4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last-Modified</td>
<td>Section 2.2 of [Part4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vary</td>
<td>Section 8.2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.2.1. Vary

The "Vary" header field conveys the set of header fields that were used to select the representation.

Caches use this information as part of determining whether a stored response can be used to satisfy a given request (Section 4.3 of [Part6]).

In uncacheable or stale responses, the Vary field value advises the user agent about the criteria that were used to select the representation.

```text
Vary = "*" / 1#field-name
```

The set of header fields named by the Vary field value is known as the selecting header fields.
A server SHOULD include a Vary header field with any cacheable response that is subject to proactive negotiation. Doing so allows a cache to properly interpret future requests on that resource and informs the user agent about the presence of negotiation on that resource. A server MAY include a Vary header field with a non-cacheable response that is subject to proactive negotiation, since this might provide the user agent with useful information about the dimensions over which the response varies at the time of the response.

A Vary field value of "*" signals that unspecified parameters not limited to the header fields (e.g., the network address of the client), play a role in the selection of the response representation; therefore, a cache cannot determine whether this response is appropriate. A proxy MUST NOT generate the "*" value.

The field-names given are not limited to the set of standard header fields defined by this specification. Field names are case-insensitive.

8.3. Authentication Challenges

Authentication challenges indicate what mechanisms are available for the client to provide authentication credentials in future requests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Defined in...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WWW-Authenticate</td>
<td>Section 4.4 of [Part7]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proxy-Authenticate</td>
<td>Section 4.2 of [Part7]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.4. Informative

The remaining response header fields provide more information about the target resource for potential use in later requests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Defined in...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accept-Ranges</td>
<td>Section 5.1 of [Part5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow</td>
<td>Section 8.4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Server</td>
<td>Section 8.4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.4.1. Allow

The "Allow" header field lists the set of methods advertised as supported by the target resource. The purpose of this field is strictly to inform the recipient of valid request methods associated with the resource.

Allow = #method

Example of use:

Allow: GET, HEAD, PUT

The actual set of allowed methods is defined by the origin server at the time of each request.

A proxy MUST NOT modify the Allow header field -- it does not need to understand all the methods specified in order to handle them according to the generic message handling rules.

8.4.2. Server

The "Server" header field contains information about the software used by the origin server to handle the request.

The field can contain multiple product tokens (Section 4) and comments (Section 3.2 of [Part1]) identifying the server and any significant subproducts. The product tokens are listed in order of their significance for identifying the application.

Server = product *( RWS ( product / comment ) )

Example:

Server: CERN/3.0 libwww/2.17

If the response is being forwarded through a proxy, the proxy application MUST NOT modify the Server header field. Instead, it MUST include a Via field (as described in Section 5.7 of [Part1]).

Note: Revealing the specific software version of the server might allow the server machine to become more vulnerable to attacks against software that is known to contain security holes. Server implementers are encouraged to make this field a configurable option.
9. IANA Considerations

9.1. Method Registry

The HTTP Method Registry defines the name space for the request method token (Section 5). The method registry is maintained at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-methods>.

9.1.1. Procedure

HTTP method registrations MUST include the following fields:

- Method Name (see Section 5)
- Safe ("yes" or "no", see Section 5.2.1)
- Idempotent ("yes" or "no", see Section 5.2.2)
- Pointer to specification text

Values to be added to this name space require IETF Review (see [RFC5226], Section 4.1).

9.1.2. Considerations for New Methods

Standardized methods are generic; that is, they are potentially applicable to any resource, not just one particular media type, kind of resource, or application. As such, it is preferred that new methods be registered in a document that isn’t specific to a single application or data format, since orthogonal technologies deserve orthogonal specification.

Since message parsing (Section 3.3 of [Part1]) needs to be independent of method semantics (aside from responses to HEAD), definitions of new methods cannot change the parsing algorithm or prohibit the presence of a message body on either the request or the response message. Definitions of new methods can specify that only a zero-length message body is allowed by requiring a Content-Length header field with a value of "0".

New method definitions need to indicate whether they are safe (Section 5.2.1), idempotent (Section 5.2.2), cacheable (Section 5.2.3), and what semantics are to be associated with the payload body if any is present in the request. If a method is cacheable, the method definition ought to describe how, and under what conditions, a cache can store a response and use it to satisfy a subsequent request.
9.1.3. Registrations

The HTTP Method Registry shall be populated with the registrations below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Safe</th>
<th>Idempotent</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONNECT</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Section 5.3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELETE</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Section 5.3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GET</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Section 5.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAD</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Section 5.3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTIONS</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Section 5.3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Section 5.3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUT</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Section 5.3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRACE</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Section 5.3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.2. Status Code Registry

The HTTP Status Code Registry defines the name space for the response status-code token (Section 7). The status code registry is maintained at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-status-codes>.

This section replaces the registration procedure for HTTP Status Codes previously defined in Section 7.1 of [RFC2817].

9.2.1. Procedure

Values to be added to the HTTP status code name space require IETF Review (see [RFC5226], Section 4.1).

9.2.2. Considerations for New Status Codes

When it is necessary to express semantics for a response that are not defined by current status codes, a new status code can be registered. HTTP status codes are generic; they are potentially applicable to any resource, not just one particular media type, "type" of resource, or application. As such, it is preferred that new status codes be registered in a document that isn’t specific to a single application.

New status codes are required to fall under one of the categories defined in Section 7. To allow existing parsers to properly handle them, new status codes cannot disallow a payload, although they can mandate a zero-length payload body.

A definition for a new status code ought to explain the request conditions that produce a response containing that status code (e.g.,
combinations of request header fields and/or method(s)) along with any dependencies on response header fields (e.g., what fields are required and what fields can modify the semantics). A response that can transfer a payload ought to specify expected cache behavior (e.g., cacheability and freshness criteria, as described in [Part6]) and whether the payload has any implied association with an identified resource (Section 3.1.4.1).

9.2.3. Registrations

The HTTP Status Code Registry shall be updated with the registrations below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Continue</td>
<td>Section 7.2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>Switching Protocols</td>
<td>Section 7.2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>Section 7.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>Created</td>
<td>Section 7.3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
<td>Section 7.3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Non-Authoritative Information</td>
<td>Section 7.3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>No Content</td>
<td>Section 7.3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>Reset Content</td>
<td>Section 7.3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>Multiple Choices</td>
<td>Section 7.4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301</td>
<td>Moved Permanently</td>
<td>Section 7.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>302</td>
<td>Found</td>
<td>Section 7.4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303</td>
<td>See Other</td>
<td>Section 7.4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>305</td>
<td>Use Proxy</td>
<td>Section 7.4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>306</td>
<td>(Unused)</td>
<td>Section 7.4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307</td>
<td>Temporary Redirect</td>
<td>Section 7.4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>Bad Request</td>
<td>Section 7.5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401</td>
<td>Payment Required</td>
<td>Section 7.5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>402</td>
<td>No Content</td>
<td>Section 7.5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>403</td>
<td>Forbidden</td>
<td>Section 7.5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>404</td>
<td>Not Found</td>
<td>Section 7.5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td>Method Not Allowed</td>
<td>Section 7.5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>406</td>
<td>Not Acceptable</td>
<td>Section 7.5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Section 7.5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410</td>
<td>Gone</td>
<td>Section 7.5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411</td>
<td>Length Required</td>
<td>Section 7.5.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412</td>
<td>Request Representation Too Large</td>
<td>Section 7.5.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>414</td>
<td>URI Too Long</td>
<td>Section 7.5.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>415</td>
<td>Unsupported Media Type</td>
<td>Section 7.5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>417</td>
<td>Expectation Failed</td>
<td>Section 7.5.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>426</td>
<td>Upgrade Required</td>
<td>Section 7.5.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>Internal Server Error</td>
<td>Section 7.6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501</td>
<td>Not Implemented</td>
<td>Section 7.6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>502</td>
<td>Bad Gateway</td>
<td>Section 7.6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>503</td>
<td>Service Unavailable</td>
<td>Section 7.6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504</td>
<td>Gateway Timeout</td>
<td>Section 7.6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>505</td>
<td>HTTP Version Not Supported</td>
<td>Section 7.6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.3. Header Field Registry

HTTP header fields are registered within the Message Header Field Registry located at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/message-header-field-index.html>, as defined by [RFC3864].
9.3.1. Considerations for New Header Fields

Header fields are key:value pairs that can be used to communicate data about the message, its payload, the target resource, or the connection (i.e., control data). See Section 3.2 of [Part1] for a general definition of header field syntax in HTTP messages.

The requirements for header field names are defined in Section 4.1 of [RFC3864]. Authors of specifications defining new fields are advised to keep the name as short as practical, and not to prefix them with "X-" if they are to be registered (either immediately or in the future).

New header field values typically have their syntax defined using ABNF ([RFC5234]), using the extension defined in Appendix B of [Part1] as necessary, and are usually constrained to the range of ASCII characters. Header fields needing a greater range of characters can use an encoding such as the one defined in [RFC5987].

Because commas (",")) are used as a generic delimiter between field-values, they need to be treated with care if they are allowed in the field-value’s payload. Typically, components that might contain a comma are protected with double-quotes using the quoted-string ABNF production (Section 3.2.4 of [Part1]).

For example, a textual date and a URI (either of which might contain a comma) could be safely carried in field-values like these:

Example-URI-Field: "http://example.com/a.html,foo",
                   "http://without-a-comma.example.com/
Example-Date-Field: "Sat, 04 May 1996", "Wed, 14 Sep 2005"

Note that double-quote delimiters almost always are used with the quoted-string production; using a different syntax inside double-quotes will likely cause unnecessary confusion.

Many header fields use a format including (case-insensitively) named parameters (for instance, Content-Type, defined in Section 3.1.1.5). Allowing both unquoted (token) and quoted (quoted-string) syntax for the parameter value enables recipients to use existing parser components. When allowing both forms, the meaning of a parameter value ought to be independent of the syntax used for it (for an example, see the notes on parameter handling for media types in Section 3.1.1.1).

Authors of specifications defining new header fields are advised to consider documenting:
o Whether the field is a single value, or whether it can be a list (delimited by commas; see Section 3.2 of [Part1]).

If it does not use the list syntax, document how to treat messages where the header field occurs multiple times (a sensible default would be to ignore the header field, but this might not always be the right choice).

Note that intermediaries and software libraries might combine multiple header field instances into a single one, despite the header field not allowing this. A robust format enables recipients to discover these situations (good example: "Content-Type", as the comma can only appear inside quoted strings; bad example: "Location", as a comma can occur inside a URI).

o Under what conditions the header field can be used; e.g., only in responses or requests, in all messages, only on responses to a particular request method.

o Whether it is appropriate to list the field-name in the Connection header field (i.e., if the header field is to be hop-by-hop, see Section 6.1 of [Part1]).

o Under what conditions intermediaries are allowed to modify the header field’s value, insert or delete it.

o How the header field might interact with caching (see [Part6]).

o Whether the header field is useful or allowable in trailers (see Section 4.1 of [Part1]).

o Whether the header field ought to be preserved across redirects.

9.3.2. Registrations

The Message Header Field Registry shall be updated with the following permanent registrations:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accept</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 6.3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept-Charset</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 6.3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept-Encoding</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 6.3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept-Language</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 6.3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 8.4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content-Encoding</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 3.1.2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content-Language</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 3.1.3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content-Location</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 3.1.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content-Type</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 3.1.1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 8.1.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expect</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 6.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 6.5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 8.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIME-Version</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Appendix A.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max-Forwards</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 6.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referer</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 6.5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retry-After</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 8.1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Server</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 8.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User-Agent</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 6.5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vary</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 8.2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The change controller for the above registrations is: "IETF (iesg@ietf.org) - Internet Engineering Task Force".

9.4. Content Coding Registry

The HTTP Content Coding Registry defines the name space for content coding names (Section 4.2 of [Part1]). The content coding registry is maintained at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters>.

9.4.1. Procedure

Content Coding registrations MUST include the following fields:

- Name
- Description
- Pointer to specification text

Names of content codings MUST NOT overlap with names of transfer codings (Section 4 of [Part1]), unless the encoding transformation is identical (as is the case for the compression codings defined in Section 4.2 of [Part1]).
Values to be added to this name space require IETF Review (see Section 4.1 of [RFC5226]), and MUST conform to the purpose of content coding defined in this section.

9.4.2. Registrations

The HTTP Content Codings Registry shall be updated with the registrations below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>compress</td>
<td>UNIX &quot;compress&quot; program method</td>
<td>Section 4.2.1 of [Part1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deflate</td>
<td>&quot;deflate&quot; compression mechanism ([RFC1951]) used inside the &quot;zlib&quot; data format ([RFC1950])</td>
<td>Section 4.2.2 of [Part1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gzip</td>
<td>Same as GNU zip [RFC1952]</td>
<td>Section 4.2.3 of [Part1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identity</td>
<td>reserved (synonym for &quot;no encoding&quot; in Accept-Encoding header field)</td>
<td>Section 6.3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Security Considerations

This section is meant to inform application developers, information providers, and users of the security limitations in HTTP/1.1 as described by this document. The discussion does not include definitive solutions to the problems revealed, though it does make some suggestions for reducing security risks.

10.1. Transfer of Sensitive Information

Like any generic data transfer protocol, HTTP cannot regulate the content of the data that is transferred, nor is there any a priori method of determining the sensitivity of any particular piece of information within the context of any given request. Therefore, applications SHOULD supply as much control over this information as possible to the provider of that information. Four header fields are worth special mention in this context: Server, Via, Referer and From.

Revealing the specific software version of the server might allow the server machine to become more vulnerable to attacks against software that is known to contain security holes. Implementers SHOULD make the Server header field a configurable option.

Proxies which serve as a portal through a network firewall SHOULD take special precautions regarding the transfer of header information.
that identifies the hosts behind the firewall. In particular, they SHOULD remove, or replace with sanitized versions, any Via fields generated behind the firewall.

The Referer header field allows reading patterns to be studied and reverse links drawn. Although it can be very useful, its power can be abused if user details are not separated from the information contained in the Referer. Even when the personal information has been removed, the Referer header field might indicate a private document’s URI whose publication would be inappropriate.

The information sent in the From field might conflict with the user’s privacy interests or their site’s security policy, and hence it SHOULD NOT be transmitted without the user being able to disable, enable, and modify the contents of the field. The user MUST be able to set the contents of this field within a user preference or application defaults configuration.

We suggest, though do not require, that a convenient toggle interface be provided for the user to enable or disable the sending of From and Referer information.

The User-Agent (Section 6.5.3) or Server (Section 8.4.2) header fields can sometimes be used to determine that a specific client or server has a particular security hole which might be exploited. Unfortunately, this same information is often used for other valuable purposes for which HTTP currently has no better mechanism.

Furthermore, the User-Agent header field might contain enough entropy to be used, possibly in conjunction with other material, to uniquely identify the user.

Some request methods, like TRACE (Section 5.3.8), expose information that was sent in request header fields within the body of their response. Clients SHOULD be careful with sensitive information, like Cookies, Authorization credentials, and other header fields that might be used to collect data from the client.

10.2. Encoding Sensitive Information in URIs

Because the source of a link might be private information or might reveal an otherwise private information source, it is strongly recommended that the user be able to select whether or not the Referer field is sent. For example, a browser client could have a toggle switch for browsing openly/anonymously, which would respectively enable/disable the sending of Referer and From information.
Clients SHOULD NOT include a Referer header field in a (non-secure) HTTP request if the referring page was transferred with a secure protocol.

Authors of services SHOULD NOT use GET-based forms for the submission of sensitive data because that data will be placed in the request-target. Many existing servers, proxies, and user agents log or display the request-target in places where it might be visible to third parties. Such services can use POST-based form submission instead.

10.3. Location Header Fields: Spoofing and Information Leakage

If a single server supports multiple organizations that do not trust one another, then it MUST check the values of Location and Content-Location header fields in responses that are generated under control of said organizations to make sure that they do not attempt to invalidate resources over which they have no authority.

Furthermore, appending the fragment identifier from one URI to another one obtained from a Location header field might leak confidential information to the target server -- although the fragment identifier is not transmitted in the final request, it might be visible to the user agent through other means, such as scripting.

10.4. Security Considerations for CONNECT

Since tunneled data is opaque to the proxy, there are additional risks to tunneling to other well-known or reserved ports. A HTTP client CONNECTing to port 25 could relay spam via SMTP, for example. As such, proxies SHOULD restrict CONNECT access to a small number of known ports.

10.5. Privacy Issues Connected to Accept Header Fields

Accept header fields can reveal information about the user to all servers which are accessed. The Accept-Language header field in particular can reveal information the user would consider to be of a private nature, because the understanding of particular languages is often strongly correlated to the membership of a particular ethnic group. User agents which offer the option to configure the contents of an Accept-Language header field to be sent in every request are strongly encouraged to let the configuration process include a message which makes the user aware of the loss of privacy involved.

An approach that limits the loss of privacy would be for a user agent to omit the sending of Accept-Language header fields by default, and to ask the user whether or not to start sending Accept-Language
header fields to a server if it detects, by looking for any Vary header fields generated by the server, that such sending could improve the quality of service.

Elaborate user-customized accept header fields sent in every request, in particular if these include quality values, can be used by servers as relatively reliable and long-lived user identifiers. Such user identifiers would allow content providers to do click-trail tracking, and would allow collaborating content providers to match cross-server click-trails or form submissions of individual users. Note that for many users not behind a proxy, the network address of the host running the user agent will also serve as a long-lived user identifier. In environments where proxies are used to enhance privacy, user agents ought to be conservative in offering accept header field configuration options to end users. As an extreme privacy measure, proxies could filter the accept header fields in relayed requests. General purpose user agents which provide a high degree of header field configurability SHOULD warn users about the loss of privacy which can be involved.

11. Acknowledgments

See Section 9 of [Part1].

12. References

12.1. Normative References


12.2. Informative References


[RFC4288] Freed, N. and J. Klensin, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 4288,
Appendix A. Differences between HTTP and MIME

HTTP/1.1 uses many of the constructs defined for Internet Mail ([RFC5322]) and the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME [RFC2045]) to allow a message body to be transmitted in an open variety of representations and with extensible mechanisms. However, RFC 2045 discusses mail, and HTTP has a few features that are different from those described in MIME. These differences were carefully chosen to optimize performance over binary connections, to allow greater freedom in the use of new media types, to make date comparisons easier, and to acknowledge the practice of some early HTTP servers and clients.

This appendix describes specific areas where HTTP differs from MIME. Proxies and gateways to strict MIME environments SHOULD be aware of these differences and provide the appropriate conversions where necessary. Proxies and gateways from MIME environments to HTTP also need to be aware of the differences because some conversions might be required.
A.1. MIME-Version

HTTP is not a MIME-compliant protocol. However, HTTP/1.1 messages MAY include a single MIME-Version header field to indicate what version of the MIME protocol was used to construct the message. Use of the MIME-Version header field indicates that the message is in full conformance with the MIME protocol (as defined in [RFC2045]). Proxies/gateways are responsible for ensuring full conformance (where possible) when exporting HTTP messages to strict MIME environments.

    MIME-Version = 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT

MIME version "1.0" is the default for use in HTTP/1.1. However, HTTP/1.1 message parsing and semantics are defined by this document and not the MIME specification.

A.2. Conversion to Canonical Form

MIME requires that an Internet mail body-part be converted to canonical form prior to being transferred, as described in Section 4 of [RFC2049]. Section 3.1.1.3 of this document describes the forms allowed for subtypes of the "text" media type when transmitted over HTTP. [RFC2046] requires that content with a type of "text" represent line breaks as CRLF and forbids the use of CR or LF outside of line break sequences. HTTP allows CRLF, bare CR, and bare LF to indicate a line break within text content when a message is transmitted over HTTP.

Where it is possible, a proxy or gateway from HTTP to a strict MIME environment SHOULD translate all line breaks within the text media types described in Section 3.1.1.3 of this document to the RFC 2049 canonical form of CRLF. Note, however, that this might be complicated by the presence of a Content-Encoding and by the fact that HTTP allows the use of some character encodings which do not use octets 13 and 10 to represent CR and LF, respectively, as is the case for some multi-byte character encodings.

Conversion will break any cryptographic checksums applied to the original content unless the original content is already in canonical form. Therefore, the canonical form is recommended for any content that uses such checksums in HTTP.

A.3. Conversion of Date Formats

HTTP/1.1 uses a restricted set of date formats (Section 8.1.1.1) to simplify the process of date comparison. Proxies and gateways from other protocols SHOULD ensure that any Date header field present in a message conforms to one of the HTTP/1.1 formats and rewrite the date
if necessary.

A.4. Introduction of Content-Encoding

MIME does not include any concept equivalent to HTTP/1.1’s Content-Encoding header field. Since this acts as a modifier on the media type, proxies and gateways from HTTP to MIME-compliant protocols MUST either change the value of the Content-Type header field or decode the representation before forwarding the message. (Some experimental applications of Content-Type for Internet mail have used a media-type parameter of ";conversions=<content-coding>" to perform a function equivalent to Content-Encoding. However, this parameter is not part of the MIME standards).

A.5. No Content-Transfer-Encoding

HTTP does not use the Content-Transfer-Encoding field of MIME. Proxies and gateways from MIME-compliant protocols to HTTP MUST remove any Content-Transfer-Encoding prior to delivering the response message to an HTTP client.

Proxies and gateways from HTTP to MIME-compliant protocols are responsible for ensuring that the message is in the correct format and encoding for safe transport on that protocol, where "safe transport" is defined by the limitations of the protocol being used. Such a proxy or gateway SHOULD label the data with an appropriate Content-Transfer-Encoding if doing so will improve the likelihood of safe transport over the destination protocol.

A.6. MHTML and Line Length Limitations

HTTP implementations which share code with MHTML [RFC2557] implementations need to be aware of MIME line length limitations. Since HTTP does not have this limitation, HTTP does not fold long lines. MHTML messages being transported by HTTP follow all conventions of MHTML, including line length limitations and folding, canonicalization, etc., since HTTP transports all message-bodies as payload (see Section 3.1.1.4) and does not interpret the content or any MIME header lines that might be contained therein.

Appendix B. Additional Features

[RFC1945] and [RFC2068] document protocol elements used by some existing HTTP implementations, but not consistently and correctly across most HTTP/1.1 applications. Implementers are advised to be aware of these features, but cannot rely upon their presence in, or interoperability with, other HTTP/1.1 applications. Some of these describe proposed experimental features, and some describe features
that experimental deployment found lacking that are now addressed in
the base HTTP/1.1 specification.

A number of other header fields, such as Content-Disposition and
Title, from SMTP and MIME are also often implemented (see [RFC6266]
and [RFC2076]).

Appendix C. Changes from RFC 2616

Remove base URI setting semantics for "Content-Location" due to poor
implementation support, which was caused by too many broken servers
emitting bogus Content-Location header fields, and also the
potentially undesirable effect of potentially breaking relative links
in content-negotiated resources. (Section 3.1.4.2)

Clarify definition of POST. (Section 5.3.3)

Remove requirement to handle all Content-* header fields; ban use of
Content-Range with PUT. (Section 5.3.4)

Take over definition of CONNECT method from [RFC2817].
(Section 5.3.6)

Restrict "Max-Forwards" header field to OPTIONS and TRACE
(previously, extension methods could have used it as well).
(Section 6.1.1)

The ABNF for the "Expect" header field has been both fixed (allowing
parameters for value-less expectations as well) and simplified
(allowing trailing semicolons after "100-continue" when they were
invalid before). (Section 6.1.2)

Remove ISO-8859-1 special-casing in Accept-Charset. (Section 6.3.3)

Allow "Referer" field value of "about:blank" as alternative to not
specifying it. (Section 6.5.2)

Broadened the definition of 203 (Non-Authoritative Information) to
include cases of payload transformations as well. (Section 7.3.4)

Status codes 301, 302, and 307: removed the normative requirements on
both response payloads and user interaction. (Section 7.4)

Failed to consider that there are many other request methods that are
safe to automatically redirect, and further that the user agent is
able to make that determination based on the request method
semantics. Furthermore, allow user agents to rewrite the method from
POST to GET for status codes 301 and 302. (Sections 7.4.2, 7.4.3 and
7.4.7)

Deprecate 305 (Use Proxy) status code, because user agents did not implement it. It used to indicate that the target resource needs to be accessed through the proxy given by the Location field. The Location field gave the URI of the proxy. The recipient was expected to repeat this single request via the proxy. (Section 7.4.5)

Define status 426 (Upgrade Required) (this was incorporated from [RFC2817]). (Section 7.5.15)

Correct syntax of "Location" header field to allow URI references (including relative references and fragments), as referred symbol "absoluteURI" wasn’t what was expected, and add some clarifications as to when use of fragments would not be appropriate. (Section 8.1.2)

Reclassify "Allow" as response header field, removing the option to specify it in a PUT request. Relax the server requirement on the contents of the Allow header field and remove requirement on clients to always trust the header field value. (Section 8.4.1)

In the description of the "Server" header field, the "Via" field was described as a SHOULD. The requirement was and is stated correctly in the description of the Via header field in Section 5.7 of [Part1]. (Section 8.4.2)

Clarify contexts that charset is used in. (Section 3.1.1.2)

Remove the default character encoding of "ISO-8859-1" for text media types; the default now is whatever the media type definition says. (Section 3.1.1.3)

Registration of Content Codings now requires IETF Review (Section 9.4)

Remove definition of "Content-MD5 header" field because it was inconsistently implemented with respect to partial responses, and also because of known deficiencies in the hash algorithm itself (see [RFC6151] for details).

Introduce Method Registry. (Section 9.1)

Take over the Status Code Registry, previously defined in Section 7.1 of [RFC2817]. (Section 9.2)

Remove reference to non-existant identity transfer-coding value tokens. (Appendix A.5)
Remove discussion of Content-Disposition header field, it is now defined by [RFC6266]. (Appendix B)

Appendix D. Imported ABNF

The following core rules are included by reference, as defined in Appendix B.1 of [RFC5234]: ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return), CRLF (CR LF), CTL (controls), DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double quote), HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), HTAB (horizontal tab), LF (line feed), OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), and VCHAR (any visible US-ASCII character).

The rules below are defined in [Part1]:

BWS = <BWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1>
OWS = <OWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1>
RWS = <RWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1>
URI-reference = <URI-reference, defined in [Part1], Section 2.7>
absolute-URI = <absolute-URI, defined in [Part1], Section 2.7>
comment = <comment, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>
field-name = <field-name, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2>
partial-URI = <partial-URI, defined in [Part1], Section 2.7>
quoted-string = <quoted-string, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>
token = <token, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>
word = <word, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>

Appendix E. Collected ABNF

Accept = [ ( ",", / ( media-range [ accept-params ] ) ) *( OWS ",", [ OWS ( media-range [ accept-params ] ) ] ) ]
Accept-Charset = *( ",", OWS ) ( ( charset / "*" ) [ weight ] ) *( OWS ",", [ OWS ( charset / "*" ) [ weight ] ] )
Accept-Encoding = [ ( ",", / ( codings [ weight ] ) ) *( OWS ",", [ OWS ( codings [ weight ] ) ] ) ]
Allow = [ ( ",", / method ) *( OWS ",", [ OWS method ] ) ]

BWS = <BWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1>

Content-Encoding = *( ",", OWS ) content-coding *( OWS ",", [ OWS content-coding ] )
Content-Language = *( ",", OWS ) language-tag *( OWS ",", [ OWS language-tag ] )
Content-Location = absolute-URI / partial-URI
Content-Type = media-type

Date = HTTP-date
Expect = *( "," OWS ) expectation *( OWS "," [ OWS expectation ] )

From = mailbox

GMT = %x47.4D.54 ; GMT

HTTP-date = rfc1123-date / obs-date

Location = URI-reference

MIME-Version = 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT

Max-Forwards = 1*DIGIT

OWS = <OWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1>

RWS = <RWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1>

Referer = absolute-URI / partial-URI

Retry-After = HTTP-date / delta-seconds

Server = product *( RWS ( product / comment ) )

URI-reference = <URI-reference, defined in [Part1], Section 2.7>

User-Agent = product *( RWS ( product / comment ) )

Vary = "*" / ( *( "," OWS ) field-name *( OWS "," [ OWS field-name ] ) )

absolute-URI = <absolute-URI, defined in [Part1], Section 2.7>

accept-ext = OWS ";" OWS token [ ";" word ]

accept-params = weight *accept-ext

asctime-date = day-name SP date3 SP time-of-day SP year

attribute = token

charset = token

codings = content-coding / "identity" / "*"

comment = <comment, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>

content-coding = token

date1 = day SP month SP year

date2 = day "-" month "-" 2DIGIT

date3 = month SP ( 2DIGIT / ( SP DIGIT ) )

day = 2DIGIT
day-name = %x4D.6F.6E ; Mon
/ %x54.75.65 ; Tue
/ %x57.65.64 ; Wed
/ %x54.68.75 ; Thu
/ %x46.72.69 ; Fri
/ %x53.61.74 ; Sat
/ %x53.75.6E ; Sun
day-name-l = %x4D.6F.6E.64.61.79 ; Monday
/ %x54.75.65.73.64.61.79 ; Tuesday
/ %x57.65.66.6E.65.73.64.61.79 ; Wednesday
/ %x54.68.75.72.73.64.61.79 ; Thursday
/ %x46.72.69.64.61.79 ; Friday
/ %x53.61.74.75.72.64.61.79 ; Saturday
/ %x53.75.6E.64.61.79 ; Sunday
delta-seconds = 1*DIGIT

expect-name = token
expect-param = expect-name [ BWS "=" BWS expect-value ]
expect-value = token / quoted-string
expectation = expect-name [ BWS "=" BWS expect-value ] *( OWS ";" [ OWS expect-param ] )

field-name = <comment, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2>

hour = 2DIGIT

language-range = <language-range, defined in [RFC4647], Section 2.1>
language-tag = <Language-Tag, defined in [RFC5646], Section 2.1>

mailbox = <mailbox, defined in [RFC5322], Section 3.4>
media-range = ( "/*" / ( type "/" subtype ) ) *( OWS ";" OWS parameter )
media-type = type "/" subtype *( OWS "," OWS parameter )
method = token
minute = 2DIGIT
month = %x4A.61.6E ; Jan
/ %x46.65.62 ; Feb
/ %x4D.61.72 ; Mar
/ %x41.70.72 ; Apr
/ %x4D.61.79 ; May
/ %x4A.75.6E ; Jun
/ %x4A.75.6C ; Jul
/ %x41.75.67 ; Aug
/ %x53.65.70 ; Sep
/ %x4F.63.74 ; Oct
/ %x4E.6F.76 ; Nov
/ %x44.65.63 ; Dec
obs-date = rfc850-date / asctime-date

parameter = attribute "=" value

partial-URI = <partial-URI, defined in [Part1], Section 2.7>

product = token [ "/" product-version ]

product-version = token

quoted-string = <quoted-string, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>

qvalue = ( "0" [ "." *3DIGIT ] ) / ( "1" [ "." *3"0" ] )

rfc1123-date = day-name "," SP date1 SP time-of-day SP GMT

rfc850-date = day-name-l "," SP date2 SP time-of-day SP GMT

second = 2DIGIT

subtype = token

time-of-day = hour ":" minute ":" second

token = <token, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>

type = token

value = word

weight = OWS ";" OWS "q=" qvalue

word = <word, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>

year = 4DIGIT

Appendix F. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)

F.1. Since RFC 2616

Extracted relevant partitions from [RFC2616].

F.2. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-00

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/5>: "Via is a MUST" (<http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#via-must>)


o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/17>: "Revise
description of the POST method"
    (<http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#post>)

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/35>: "Normative and
Informative references"

Compliance"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/65>: "Informative
references"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/84>: "Redundant
cross-references"

Other changes:

o  Move definitions of 304 and 412 condition codes to [Part4]

F.3. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-00

Closed issues:

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/8>: "Media Type
Registrations" (<http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#media-reg>)

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/14>: "Clarification
regarding quoting of charset values"
    (<http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#charactersets>)

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/16>: "Remove
'identity' token references"
    (<http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#identity>)

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/25>: "Accept-
Encoding BNF"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/35>: "Normative and
Informative references"

references"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/55>: "Updating to
RFC4288"
o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/65>: "Informative references"


o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/68>: "Encoding References Normative"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/86>: "Normative up-to-date references"

F.4. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-01

Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/21>: "PUT side effects"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/91>: "Duplicate Host header requirements"

Ongoing work on ABNF conversion (<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36>):

o Move "Product Tokens" section (back) into Part 1, as "token" is used in the definition of the Upgrade header field.

o Add explicit references to BNF syntax and rules imported from other parts of the specification.

o Copy definition of delta-seconds from Part6 instead of referencing it.

F.5. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-01

Ongoing work on ABNF conversion (<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36>):

o Add explicit references to BNF syntax and rules imported from other parts of the specification.

F.6. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-02

Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/24>: "Requiring Allow in 405 responses"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/61>: "Redirection vs. Location"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/70>: "Cacheability of 303 response"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/76>: "305 Use Proxy"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/105>: "Classification for Allow header field"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/112>: "PUT - 'store under' vs 'store at'"

Ongoing work on IANA Message Header Field Registration (<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/40>):

o Reference RFC 3984, and update header field registrations for header fields defined in this document.

Ongoing work on ABNF conversion (<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36>):

o Replace string literals when the string really is case-sensitive (method).

F.7. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-02

Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/67>: "QuotingCharsets"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/105>: "Classification for Allow header field"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/115>: "missing default for qvalue in description of Accept-Encoding"

Ongoing work on IANA Message Header Field Registration (<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/40>):

o Reference RFC 3984, and update header field registrations for header fields defined in this document.
F.8. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-03

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/119>: "Description of CONNECT should refer to RFC2817"

Ongoing work on Method Registry (<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/72>):

- Added initial proposal for registration process, plus initial content (non-HTTP/1.1 methods to be added by a separate specification).

F.9. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-03

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/121>: "RFC 1806 has been replaced by RFC2183"

Other changes:


F.10. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-04

Closed issues:

Ongoing work on ABNF conversion
(<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36>):

- Use "/" instead of "|" for alternatives.
- Introduce new ABNF rules for "bad" whitespace ("BWS"), optional whitespace ("OWS") and required whitespace ("RWS").
- Rewrite ABNFs to spell out whitespace rules, factor out header field value format definitions.

F.11. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-04

Closed issues:


Ongoing work on ABNF conversion
(<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36>):

- Use "/" instead of "|" for alternatives.
- Introduce new ABNF rules for "bad" whitespace ("BWS"), optional whitespace ("OWS") and required whitespace ("RWS").
- Rewrite ABNFs to spell out whitespace rules, factor out header field value format definitions.

F.12. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-05

Closed issues:


Final work on ABNF conversion
(<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36>):

- Add appendix containing collected and expanded ABNF, reorganize ABNF introduction.

F.13. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-05

Closed issues:

"Differences Between HTTP Entities and RFC 2045 Entities"?"
Final work on ABNF conversion
(<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36>):

- Add appendix containing collected and expanded ABNF, reorganize ABNF introduction.

Other changes:
- Move definition of quality values into Part 1.

F.14. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-06

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/144>: "Clarify when Referer is sent"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/164>: "status codes vs methods"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/170>: "Do not require "updates" relation for specs that register status codes or method names"

F.15. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-06

Closed issues:


F.16. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-07

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/33>: "TRACE security considerations"
Partly resolved issues:

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/171]: "Are OPTIONS and TRACE safe?"

F.17. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-07

Closed issues:

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/13]: "Updated reference for language tags"

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/110]: "Clarify rules for determining what entities a response carries"

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/154]: "Content-Location base-setting problems"

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/155]: "Content Sniffing"

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/188]: "pick IANA policy (RFC5226) for Transfer Coding / Content Coding"

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/189]: "move definitions of gzip/deflate/compress to part 1"

Partly resolved issues:

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/148]: "update IANA requirements wrt Transfer-Coding values" (add the IANA Considerations subsection)

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/149]: "update IANA requirements wrt Content-Coding values" (add the IANA Considerations subsection)
F.18. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-08

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/10>: "Safe Methods vs Redirection" (we missed the introduction to the 3xx status codes when fixing this previously)

F.19. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-08

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/81>: "Content Negotiation for media types"

F.20. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-09

Closed issues:


Partly resolved issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/185>: "Location header field payload handling"

F.21. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-09

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/122>: "MIME-Version not listed in P1, general header fields"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/143>: "IANA registry for content/transfer encodings"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/200>: "use of term "word" when talking about header field structure"
Partly resolved issues:

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/196]: "Term for the requested resource’s URI"

F.22. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-10

Closed issues:

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/69]: "Clarify 'Requested Variant’"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/109]: "Clarify entity / representation / variant terminology"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/139]: "Methods and Caching"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/190]: "OPTIONS vs Max-Forwards"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/199]: "Status codes and caching"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/220]: "consider removing the 'changes from 2068' sections"

F.23. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-10

Closed issues:

- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/69]: "Clarify 'Requested Variant’"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/80]: "Content-Location isn’t special"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/90]: "Delimiting messages with multipart/byteranges"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/109]: "Clarify entity / representation / variant terminology"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/136]: "confusing req. language for Content-Location"
- [http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/167]: "Content-Location on 304 responses"
o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/183>: "'requested resource' in content-encoding definition"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/220>: "consider removing the 'changes from 2068' sections"

Partly resolved issues:

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/178>: "Content-MD5 and partial responses"


Closed issues:

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/229>: "Considerations for new status codes"


o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/232>: "User-Agent guidelines" (relating to the 'User-Agent' header field)

F.25. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-11

Closed issues:

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/123>: "Factor out Content-Disposition"

F.26. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-12

Closed issues:

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/43>: "Fragment combination / precedence during redirects" (added warning about having a fragid on the redirect might cause inconvenience in some cases)

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/79>: "Content-* vs. PUT"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/88>: "205 Bodies"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/102>: "Understanding Content-* on non-PUT requests"
Internet-Draft       HTTP/1.1 Semantics and Content         October 2012

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/103>: "Content-*"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/104>: "Header field
type defaulting"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/112>: "PUT - 'store
under' vs 'store at'"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/137>: "duplicate
ABNF for reason-phrase"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/180>: "Note special
status of Content-* prefix in header field registration
procedures"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/203>: "Max-Forwards
vs extension methods"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/213>: "What is the
value space of HTTP status codes?" (actually fixed in
draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-11)

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/224>: "Header Field
Classification"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/225>: "PUT side
effect: invalidation or just stale?"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/226>: "proxies not
supporting certain methods"

CONNECT from RFC2817 to p2"

Upgrade details from RFC2817"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/267>: "clarify PUT
semantics’"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/275>: "duplicate
ABNF for ‘Method’"

o  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/276>: "untangle
ABNFs for header fields"
F.27. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-12

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/224>: "Header Field Classification"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/276>: "untangle ABNFs for header fields"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/277>: "potentially misleading MAY in media-type def"

F.28. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-13

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/276>: "untangle ABNFs for header fields"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/251>: "message body in CONNECT request"

F.29. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-13

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/20>: "Default charsets for text media types"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/276>: "untangle ABNFs for header fields"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/281>: "confusing undefined parameter in media range example"

F.30. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-14

Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/296>: "Clarify 203 Non-Authoritative Information"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/298>: "update default reason phrase for 413"

F.31. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-14

None.

F.32. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-15

Closed issues:


o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/303>: "400 response isn’t generic"

F.33. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-15

Closed issues:


F.34. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-16

Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/160>: "Redirects and non-GET methods"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/186>: "Document HTTP’s error-handling philosophy"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/231>: "Considerations for new header fields"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/310>: "clarify 303 redirect on HEAD"

F.35. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-16

Closed issues:
F.36. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-17

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/185>: "Location header field payload handling"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/255>: "Clarify status code for rate limiting" (change backed out because a new status code is being defined for this purpose)
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/312>: "should there be a permanent variant of 307"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/325>: "When are Location’s semantics triggered?"

F.37. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-17

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/323>: "intended maturity level vs normative references"

F.38. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-18

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/238>: "Requirements for user intervention during redirects"
o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/302>: "Misplaced text on connection handling in p2"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/331>: "clarify that 201 doesn’t require Location header fields"


o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/333>: "example for 426 response should have a payload"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/336>: "drop indirection entries for status codes"

F.39. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-18

Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/330>: "is ETag a representation header field?"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/338>: "Content-Location doesn’t constrain the cardinality of representations"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/346>: "make IANA policy definitions consistent"


Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/312>: "should there be a permanent variant of 307"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/347>: "clarify that 201 can imply *multiple* resources were created"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/351>: "merge P2 and p3"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/361>: "ABNF requirements for recipients"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/364>: "Capturing more information in the method registry"
o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/368>: "note introduction of new IANA registries as normative changes"

F.41. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-20

Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/378>: "is ’q=’ case-sensitive?"

Other changes:

o Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are now defined in Part 1.

o Properly explain what HTTP semantics are and why. Rewrite introductory description of methods. Rewrite definition of "safe" to be more operable and weaken the original same-origin restrictions to be more consistent with modern UAs. Rewrite definition of "idempotent", add definition of "cacheable".

o Conneg terminology change: "server-driven" => "proactive" (UA sends Accept* fields), "agent-driven" => "reactive" (UA waits for 300/Alternatives)

o Move description of "100-continue" from Part 1 over here.

o Move definition of "Vary" header field from Part 6 over here.

o Rewrite definition of "representation".

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Abstract

The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document defines HTTP/1.1 conditional requests, including metadata header fields for indicating state changes, request header fields for making preconditions on such state, and rules for constructing the responses to a conditional request when one or more preconditions evaluate to false.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTPBIS working group mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at <http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/>.

The current issues list is at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/report/3> and related documents (including fancy diffs) can be found at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/>.

The changes in this draft are summarized in Appendix D.2.

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than English.
1. Introduction

Conditional requests are HTTP requests [Part2] that include one or more header fields indicating a precondition to be tested before applying the method semantics to the target resource. Each precondition is based on metadata that is expected to change if the selected representation of the target resource is changed. This document defines the HTTP/1.1 conditional request mechanisms in terms of the architecture, syntax notation, and conformance criteria defined in [Part1].

Conditional GET requests are the most efficient mechanism for HTTP cache updates [Part6]. Conditionals can also be applied to state-changing methods, such as PUT and DELETE, to prevent the "lost update" problem: one client accidentally overwriting the work of another client that has been acting in parallel.

Conditional request preconditions are based on the state of the target resource as a whole (its current value set) or the state as observed in a previously obtained representation (one value in that set). A resource might have multiple current representations, each with its own observable state. The conditional request mechanisms assume that the mapping of requests to corresponding representations will be consistent over time if the server intends to take advantage of conditionals. Regardless, if the mapping is inconsistent and the server is unable to select the appropriate representation, then no harm will result when the precondition evaluates to false.

We use the term "selected representation" to refer to the current representation of the target resource that would have been selected in a successful response if the same request had used the method GET and had excluded all of the conditional request header fields. The conditional request preconditions are evaluated by comparing the values provided in the request header fields to the current metadata for the selected representation.

1.1. Conformance and Error Handling

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are defined in Section 2.5 of [Part1].
1.2. Syntax Notation

This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of [RFC5234] with the list rule extension defined in Section 1.2 of [Part1]. Appendix B describes rules imported from other documents. Appendix C shows the collected ABNF with the list rule expanded.

2. Validators

This specification defines two forms of metadata that are commonly used to observe resource state and test for preconditions: modification dates (Section 2.2) and opaque entity tags (Section 2.3). Additional metadata that reflects resource state has been defined by various extensions of HTTP, such as WebDAV [RFC4918], that are beyond the scope of this specification. A resource metadata value is referred to as a "validator" when it is used within a precondition.

2.1. Weak versus Strong

Validators come in two flavors: strong or weak. Weak validators are easy to generate but are far less useful for comparisons. Strong validators are ideal for comparisons but can be very difficult (and occasionally impossible) to generate efficiently. Rather than impose that all forms of resource adhere to the same strength of validator, HTTP exposes the type of validator in use and imposes restrictions on when weak validators can be used as preconditions.

A "strong validator" is a representation metadata value that MUST be changed to a new, previously unused or guaranteed unique, value whenever a change occurs to the representation data such that a change would be observable in the payload body of a 200 (OK) response to GET.

A strong validator MAY be changed for other reasons, such as when a semantically significant part of the representation metadata is changed (e.g., Content-Type), but it is in the best interests of the origin server to only change the value when it is necessary to invalidate the stored responses held by remote caches and authoring tools. A strong validator MUST be unique across all representations of a given resource, such that no two representations of that resource share the same validator unless their payload body would be identical.

Cache entries might persist for arbitrarily long periods, regardless of expiration times. Thus, a cache might attempt to validate an entry using a validator that it obtained in the distant past. A
strong validator MUST be unique across all versions of all
representations associated with a particular resource over time.
However, there is no implication of uniqueness across representations
of different resources (i.e., the same strong validator might be in
use for representations of multiple resources at the same time and
does not imply that those representations are equivalent).

There are a variety of strong validators used in practice. The best
are based on strict revision control, wherein each change to a
representation always results in a unique node name and revision
identifier being assigned before the representation is made
accessible to GET. A collision-resistant hash function applied to
the representation data is also sufficient if the data is available
prior to the response header fields being sent and the digest does
not need to be recalculated every time a validation request is
received. However, if a resource has distinct representations that
differ only in their metadata, such as might occur with content
negotiation over media types that happen to share the same data
format, then the origin server SHOULD incorporate additional
information in the validator to distinguish those representations and
avoid confusing cache behavior.

In contrast, a "weak validator" is a representation metadata value
that might not be changed for every change to the representation
data. This weakness might be due to limitations in how the value is
calculated, such as clock resolution or an inability to ensure
uniqueness for all possible representations of the resource, or due
to a desire by the resource owner to group representations by some
self-determined set of equivalency rather than unique sequences of
data. An origin server SHOULD change a weak entity-tag whenever it
considers prior representations to be unacceptable as a substitute
for the current representation. In other words, a weak entity-tag
ought to change whenever the origin server wants caches to invalidate
old responses.

For example, the representation of a weather report that changes in
content every second, based on dynamic measurements, might be grouped
into sets of equivalent representations (from the origin server’s
perspective) with the same weak validator in order to allow cached
representations to be valid for a reasonable period of time (perhaps
adjusted dynamically based on server load or weather quality).
Likewise, a representation’s modification time, if defined with only
one-second resolution, might be a weak validator if it is possible
for the representation to be modified twice during a single second
and retrieved between those modifications.

A "use" of a validator occurs when either a client generates a
request and includes the validator in a precondition or when a server
compares two validators. Weak validators are only usable in contexts that do not depend on exact equality of a representation's payload body. Strong validators are usable and preferred for all conditional requests, including cache validation, partial content ranges, and "lost update" avoidance.

2.2. Last-Modified

The "Last-Modified" header field indicates the date and time at which the origin server believes the selected representation was last modified.

Last-Modified = HTTP-date

An example of its use is

Last-Modified: Tue, 15 Nov 1994 12:45:26 GMT

2.2.1. Generation

Origin servers SHOULD send Last-Modified for any selected representation for which a last modification date can be reasonably and consistently determined, since its use in conditional requests and evaluating cache freshness ([Part6]) results in a substantial reduction of HTTP traffic on the Internet and can be a significant factor in improving service scalability and reliability.

A representation is typically the sum of many parts behind the resource interface. The last-modified time would usually be the most recent time that any of those parts were changed. How that value is determined for any given resource is an implementation detail beyond the scope of this specification. What matters to HTTP is how recipients of the Last-Modified header field can use its value to make conditional requests and test the validity of locally cached responses.

An origin server SHOULD obtain the Last-Modified value of the representation as close as possible to the time that it generates the Date field value for its response. This allows a recipient to make an accurate assessment of the representation's modification time, especially if the representation changes near the time that the response is generated.

An origin server with a clock MUST NOT send a Last-Modified date that is later than the server's time of message origination (Date). If the last modification time is derived from implementation-specific metadata that evaluates to some time in the future, according to the origin server's clock, then the origin server MUST replace that value
with the message origination date. This prevents a future modification date from having an adverse impact on cache validation.

An origin server without a clock MUST NOT assign Last-Modified values to a response unless these values were associated with the resource by some other system or user with a reliable clock.

2.2.2. Comparison

A Last-Modified time, when used as a validator in a request, is implicitly weak unless it is possible to deduce that it is strong, using the following rules:

- The validator is being compared by an origin server to the actual current validator for the representation and,

- That origin server reliably knows that the associated representation did not change twice during the second covered by the presented validator.

or

- The validator is about to be used by a client in an If-Modified-Since, If-Unmodified-Since header field, because the client has a cache entry, or If-Range for the associated representation, and

- That cache entry includes a Date value, which gives the time when the origin server sent the original response, and

- The presented Last-Modified time is at least 60 seconds before the Date value.

or

- The validator is being compared by an intermediate cache to the validator stored in its cache entry for the representation, and

- That cache entry includes a Date value, which gives the time when the origin server sent the original response, and

- The presented Last-Modified time is at least 60 seconds before the Date value.

This method relies on the fact that if two different responses were sent by the origin server during the same second, but both had the same Last-Modified time, then at least one of those responses would have a Date value equal to its Last-Modified time. The arbitrary 60-second limit guards against the possibility that the Date and Last-
Modified values are generated from different clocks, or at somewhat different times during the preparation of the response. An implementation MAY use a value larger than 60 seconds, if it is believed that 60 seconds is too short.

2.3. ETag

The "ETag" header field provides the current entity-tag for the selected representation. An entity-tag is an opaque validator for differentiating between multiple representations of the same resource, regardless of whether those multiple representations are due to resource state changes over time, content negotiation resulting in multiple representations being valid at the same time, or both. An entity-tag consists of an opaque quoted string, possibly prefixed by a weakness indicator.

```
ETag = entity-tag
entity-tag = [ weak ] opaque-tag
  weak = %x57.2F ; "W/", case-sensitive
opaque-tag = DQUOTE *etagc DQUOTE
  etagc = %x21 / %x23-7E / obs-text
    ; VCHAR except double quotes, plus obs-text
```

Note: Previously, opaque-tag was defined to be a quoted-string ([RFC2616], Section 3.11), thus some recipients might perform backslash unescaping. Servers therefore ought to avoid backslash characters in entity tags.

An entity-tag can be more reliable for validation than a modification date in situations where it is inconvenient to store modification dates, where the one-second resolution of HTTP date values is not sufficient, or where modification dates are not consistently maintained.

Examples:

```
ETag: "xyzzy"
ETag: W/"xyzzy"
ETag: ""
```

An entity-tag can be either a weak or strong validator, with strong being the default. If an origin server provides an entity-tag for a representation and the generation of that entity-tag does not satisfy the requirements for a strong validator (Section 2.1), then that entity-tag MUST be marked as weak by prefixing its opaque value with "W/" (case-sensitive).
2.3.1. Generation

The principle behind entity-tags is that only the service author knows the implementation of a resource well enough to select the most accurate and efficient validation mechanism for that resource, and that any such mechanism can be mapped to a simple sequence of octets for easy comparison. Since the value is opaque, there is no need for the client to be aware of how each entity-tag is constructed.

For example, a resource that has implementation-specific versioning applied to all changes might use an internal revision number, perhaps combined with a variance identifier for content negotiation, to accurately differentiate between representations. Other implementations might use a collision-resistant hash of representation content, a combination of various filesystem attributes, or a modification timestamp that has sub-second resolution.

Origin servers SHOULD send ETag for any selected representation for which detection of changes can be reasonably and consistently determined, since the entity-tag's use in conditional requests and evaluating cache freshness ([Part6]) can result in a substantial reduction of HTTP network traffic and can be a significant factor in improving service scalability and reliability.

2.3.2. Comparison

There are two entity-tag comparison functions, depending on whether the comparison context allows the use of weak validators or not:

- The strong comparison function: in order to be considered equal, both opaque-tags MUST be identical character-by-character, and both MUST NOT be weak.

- The weak comparison function: in order to be considered equal, both opaque-tags MUST be identical character-by-character, but either or both of them MAY be tagged as "weak" without affecting the result.

The example below shows the results for a set of entity-tag pairs, and both the weak and strong comparison function results:
2.3.3. Example: Entity-tags varying on Content-Negotiated Resources

Consider a resource that is subject to content negotiation (Section 3.4 of [Part2]), and where the representations returned upon a GET request vary based on the Accept-Encoding request header field (Section 6.3.4 of [Part2]):

>> Request:

GET /index HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Accept-Encoding: gzip

In this case, the response might or might not use the gzip content coding. If it does not, the response might look like:

>> Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2010 00:05:00 GMT
ETag: "123-a"
Content-Length: 70
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/plain

Hello World!
Hello World!
Hello World!
Hello World!
Hello World!

An alternative representation that does use gzip content coding would be:
Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2010 00:05:00 GMT
ETag: "123-b"
Content-Length: 43
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Encoding: gzip

...binary data...

Note: Content codings are a property of the representation, so therefore an entity-tag of an encoded representation has to be distinct from an unencoded representation to prevent conflicts during cache updates and range requests. In contrast, transfer codings (Section 4 of [Part1]) apply only during message transfer and do not require distinct entity-tags.

2.4. Rules for When to Use Entity-tags and Last-Modified Dates

We adopt a set of rules and recommendations for origin servers, clients, and caches regarding when various validator types ought to be used, and for what purposes.

HTTP/1.1 origin servers:

- SHOULD send an entity-tag validator unless it is not feasible to generate one.
- MAY send a weak entity-tag instead of a strong entity-tag, if performance considerations support the use of weak entity-tags, or if it is unfeasible to send a strong entity-tag.
- SHOULD send a Last-Modified value if it is feasible to send one.

In other words, the preferred behavior for an HTTP/1.1 origin server is to send both a strong entity-tag and a Last-Modified value.

HTTP/1.1 clients:

- MUST use that entity-tag in any cache-conditional request (using If-Match or If-None-Match) if an entity-tag has been provided by the origin server.
- SHOULD use the Last-Modified value in non-subrange cache-conditional requests (using If-Modified-Since) if only a Last-Modified value has been provided by the origin server.
o MAY use the Last-Modified value in subrange cache-conditional requests (using If-Unmodified-Since) if only a Last-Modified value has been provided by an HTTP/1.0 origin server. The user agent SHOULD provide a way to disable this, in case of difficulty.

o SHOULD use both validators in cache-conditional requests if both an entity-tag and a Last-Modified value have been provided by the origin server. This allows both HTTP/1.0 and HTTP/1.1 caches to respond appropriately.

An HTTP/1.1 origin server, upon receiving a conditional request that includes both a Last-Modified date (e.g., in an If-Modified-Since or If-Unmodified-Since header field) and one or more entity-tags (e.g., in an If-Match, If-None-Match, or If-Range header field) as cache validators, MUST NOT return a response status code of 304 (Not Modified) unless doing so is consistent with all of the conditional header fields in the request.

An HTTP/1.1 caching proxy, upon receiving a conditional request that includes both a Last-Modified date and one or more entity-tags as cache validators, MUST NOT return a locally cached response to the client unless that cached response is consistent with all of the conditional header fields in the request.

Note: The general principle behind these rules is that HTTP/1.1 servers and clients ought to transmit as much non-redundant information as is available in their responses and requests. HTTP/1.1 systems receiving this information will make the most conservative assumptions about the validators they receive.

HTTP/1.0 clients and caches might ignore entity-tags. Generally, last-modified values received or used by these systems will support transparent and efficient caching, and so HTTP/1.1 origin servers still ought to provide Last-Modified values.

3. Precondition Header Fields

This section defines the syntax and semantics of HTTP/1.1 header fields for applying preconditions on requests. Section 5 defines the order of evaluation when more than one precondition is present in a request.

3.1. If-Match

The "If-Match" header field can be used to make a request method conditional on the current existence or value of an entity-tag for one or more representations of the target resource.
If-Match is generally useful for resource update requests, such as
PUT requests, as a means for protecting against accidental overwrites
when multiple clients are acting in parallel on the same resource
(i.e., the "lost update" problem). An If-Match field-value of "*"
places the precondition on the existence of any current
representation for the target resource.

If-Match = "*" / 1#entity-tag

The If-Match condition is met if and only if any of the entity-tags
listed in the If-Match field value match the entity-tag of the
selected representation for the target resource (as per
Section 2.3.2), or if "*" is given and any current representation
exists for the target resource.

If the condition is met, the server MAY perform the request method as
if the If-Match header field was not present.

Origin servers MUST NOT perform the requested method if the condition
is not met; instead they MUST respond with the 412 (Precondition
Failed) status code.

Proxy servers using a cached response as the selected representation
MUST NOT perform the requested method if the condition is not met;
instead, they MUST forward the request towards the origin server.

If the request would, without the If-Match header field, result in
anything other than a 2xx (Successful) or 412 (Precondition Failed)
status code, then the If-Match header field MUST be ignored.

Examples:

  If-Match: "xyzzy"
  If-Match: "xyzzy", "r2d2xxxx", "c3piozzzz"
  If-Match: *

3.2. If-None-Match

The "If-None-Match" header field can be used to make a request method
conditional on not matching any of the current entity-tag values for
representations of the target resource.

If-None-Match is primarily used in conditional GET requests to enable
efficient updates of cached information with a minimum amount of
transaction overhead. A client that has one or more representations
previously obtained from the target resource can send If-None-Match
with a list of the associated entity-tags in the hope of receiving a
304 (Not Modified) response if at least one of those representations
matches the selected representation.

If-None-Match can also be used with a value of "*" to prevent an unsafe request method (e.g., PUT) from inadvertently modifying an existing representation of the target resource when the client believes that the resource does not have a current representation. This is a variation on the "lost update" problem that might arise if more than one client attempts to create an initial representation for the target resource.

If-None-Match = "*" / 1#entity-tag

The If-None-Match condition is met if and only if none of the entity-tags listed in the If-None-Match field value match the entity-tag of the selected representation for the target resource (as per Section 2.3.2), or if "*" is given and no current representation exists for that resource.

If the condition is not met, the server MUST NOT perform the requested method. Instead, if the request method was GET or HEAD, the server SHOULD respond with a 304 (Not Modified) status code, including the cache-related header fields (particularly ETag) of the selected representation that has a matching entity-tag. For all other request methods, the server MUST respond with a 412 (Precondition Failed) status code.

If the condition is met, the server MAY perform the requested method as if the If-None-Match header field did not exist, but MUST also ignore any If-Modified-Since header field(s) in the request. That is, if no entity-tags match, then the server MUST NOT return a 304 (Not Modified) response.

If the request would, without the If-None-Match header field, result in anything other than a 2xx (Successful) or 304 (Not Modified) status code, then the If-None-Match header field MUST be ignored. (See Section 2.4 for a discussion of server behavior when both If-Modified-Since and If-None-Match appear in the same request.)

Examples:

If-None-Match: "xyzzy"
If-None-Match: W/"xyzzy"
If-None-Match: "xyzzy", "r2d2xxxx", "c3piozzzz"
If-None-Match: W/"xyzzy", W/"r2d2xxxx", W/"c3piozzzz"
If-None-Match: *
3.3. If-Modified-Since

The "If-Modified-Since" header field can be used with GET or HEAD to make the method conditional by modification date: if the selected representation has not been modified since the time specified in this field, then do not perform the request method; instead, respond as detailed below.

If-Modified-Since = HTTP-date

An example of the field is:


A GET method with an If-Modified-Since header field and no Range header field requests that the selected representation be transferred only if it has been modified since the date given by the If-Modified-Since header field. The algorithm for determining this includes the following cases:

1. If the request would normally result in anything other than a 200 (OK) status code, or if the passed If-Modified-Since date is invalid, the response is exactly the same as for a normal GET. A date which is later than the server’s current time is invalid.

2. If the selected representation has been modified since the If-Modified-Since date, the response is exactly the same as for a normal GET.

3. If the selected representation has not been modified since a valid If-Modified-Since date, the server SHOULD return a 304 (Not Modified) response.

The purpose of this feature is to allow efficient updates of cached information with a minimum amount of transaction overhead.

Note: The Range header field modifies the meaning of If-Modified-Since; see Section 5.4 of [Part5] for full details.

Note: If-Modified-Since times are interpreted by the server, whose clock might not be synchronized with the client.

Note: When handling an If-Modified-Since header field, some servers will use an exact date comparison function, rather than a less-than function, for deciding whether to send a 304 (Not Modified) response. To get best results when sending an If-Modified-Since header field for cache validation, clients are advised to use the exact date string received in a previous Last-
Modified header field whenever possible.

Note: If a client uses an arbitrary date in the If-Modified-Since header field instead of a date taken from the Last-Modified header field for the same request, the client needs to be aware that this date is interpreted in the server’s understanding of time. Unsynchronized clocks and rounding problems, due to the different encodings of time between the client and server, are concerns. This includes the possibility of race conditions if the document has changed between the time it was first requested and the If-Modified-Since date of a subsequent request, and the possibility of clock-skew-related problems if the If-Modified-Since date is derived from the client’s clock without correction to the server’s clock. Corrections for different time bases between client and server are at best approximate due to network latency.

3.4. If-Unmodified-Since

The "If-Unmodified-Since" header field can be used to make a request method conditional by modification date: if the selected representation has been modified since the time specified in this field, then the server MUST NOT perform the requested operation and MUST instead respond with the 412 (Precondition Failed) status code. If the selected representation has not been modified since the time specified in this field, the server SHOULD perform the request method as if the If-Unmodified-Since header field were not present.

If-Unmodified-Since = HTTP-date

An example of the field is:


If a request normally (i.e., in absence of the If-Unmodified-Since header field) would result in anything other than a 2xx (Successful) or 412 (Precondition Failed) status code, the If-Unmodified-Since header field SHOULD be ignored.

If the specified date is invalid, the header field MUST be ignored.

3.5. If-Range

The "If-Range" header field provides a special conditional request mechanism that is similar to If-Match and If-Unmodified-Since but specific to HTTP range requests. If-Range is defined in Section 5.3 of [Part5].
4. Status Code Definitions

4.1. 304 Not Modified

The 304 status code indicates that a conditional GET request has been received and would have resulted in a 200 (OK) response if it were not for the fact that the condition has evaluated to false. In other words, there is no need for the server to transfer a representation of the target resource because the client’s request indicates that it already has a valid representation, as indicated by the 304 response header fields, and is therefore redirecting the client to make use of that stored representation as if it were the payload of a 200 response. The 304 response MUST NOT contain a message-body, and thus is always terminated by the first empty line after the header fields.

A 304 response MUST include a Date header field (Section 8.1.1.2 of [Part2]) unless the origin server does not have a clock that can provide a reasonable approximation of the current time. If a 200 (OK) response to the same request would have included any of the header fields Cache-Control, Content-Location, ETag, Expires, or Vary, then those same header fields MUST be sent in a 304 response.

Since the goal of a 304 response is to minimize information transfer when the recipient already has one or more cached representations, the response SHOULD NOT include representation metadata other than the above listed fields unless said metadata exists for the purpose of guiding cache updates (e.g., future HTTP extensions).

If the recipient of a 304 response does not have a cached representation corresponding to the entity-tag indicated by the 304 response, then the recipient MUST NOT use the 304 to update its own cache. If this conditional request originated with an outbound client, such as a user agent with its own cache sending a conditional GET to a shared proxy, then the 304 response MAY be forwarded to that client. Otherwise, the recipient MUST disregard the 304 response and repeat the request without any preconditions.

If a cache uses a received 304 response to update a cache entry, the cache MUST update the entry to reflect any new field values given in the response.

4.2. 412 Precondition Failed

The 412 status code indicates that one or more preconditions given in the request header fields evaluated to false when tested on the server. This response code allows the client to place preconditions on the current resource state (its current representations and metadata) and thus prevent the request method from being applied if
the target resource is in an unexpected state.

5. Precedence

When more than one conditional request header field is present in a request, the order in which the fields are evaluated becomes important. In practice, the fields defined in this document are consistently implemented in a single, logical order, due to the fact that entity tags are presumed to be more accurate than date validators. For example, the only reason to send both If-Modified-Since and If-None-Match in the same GET request is to support intermediary caches that might not have implemented If-None-Match, so it makes sense to ignore the If-Modified-Since when entity tags are understood and available for the selected representation.

The general rule of conditional precedence is that exact match conditions are evaluated before cache-validating conditions and, within that order, last-modified conditions are only evaluated if the corresponding entity tag condition is not present (or not applicable because the selected representation does not have an entity tag).

Specifically, the fields defined by this specification are evaluated as follows:

1. When If-Match is present, evaluate it:
   * if true, continue to step 3
   * if false, respond 412 (Precondition Failed)

2. When If-Match is not present and If-Unmodified-Since is present, evaluate it:
   * if true, continue to step 3
   * if false, respond 412 (Precondition Failed)

3. When the method is GET and both Range and If-Range are present, evaluate it:
   * if the validator matches, respond 206 (Partial Content)
   * if the validator does not match, respond 200 (OK)

4. When If-None-Match is present, evaluate it:
   * if true, all conditions are met
* if false for GET/HEAD, respond 304 (Not Modified)

* if false for other methods, respond 412 (Precondition Failed)

5. When the method is GET or HEAD, If-None-Match is not present, and If-Modified-Since is present, evaluate it:

* if true, all conditions are met

* if false, respond 304 (Not Modified)

Any extension to HTTP/1.1 that defines additional conditional request header fields ought to define its own expectations regarding the order for evaluating such fields in relation to those defined in this document and other conditionals that might be found in practice.

6. IANA Considerations

6.1. Status Code Registration

The HTTP Status Code Registry located at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-status-codes> shall be updated with the registrations below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>304</td>
<td>Not Modified</td>
<td>Section 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412</td>
<td>Precondition Failed</td>
<td>Section 4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2. Header Field Registration

The Message Header Field Registry located at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/message-headers/message-header-index.html> shall be updated with the permanent registrations below (see [RFC3864]):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ETag</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If-Match</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If-Modified-Since</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If-None-Match</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If-Unmodified-Since</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last-Modified</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Security Considerations

No additional security considerations have been identified beyond those applicable to HTTP in general [Part1].

The validators defined by this specification are not intended to ensure the validity of a representation, guard against malicious changes, or detect man-in-the-middle attacks. At best, they enable more efficient cache updates and optimistic concurrent writes when all participants are behaving nicely. At worst, the conditions will fail and the client will receive a response that is no more harmful than an HTTP exchange without conditional requests.

8. Acknowledgments

See Section 9 of [Part1].

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Changes from RFC 2616

Allow weak entity-tags in all requests except range requests (Sections 2.1 and 3.2).

Change "ETag" header field ABNF not to use quoted-string, thus avoiding escaping issues. (Section 2.3)

Appendix B. Imported ABNF

The following core rules are included by reference, as defined in Appendix B.1 of [RFC5234]: ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return), CRLF (CR LF), CTL (controls), DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double quote), HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), LF (line feed), OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), and VCHAR (any visible US-ASCII character).

The rules below are defined in [Part1]:

    OWS = <OWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1>
    obs-text = <obs-text, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>

The rules below are defined in other parts:

    HTTP-date = <HTTP-date, defined in [Part2], Section 8.1.1.1>
Appendix C. Collected ABNF

ETag = entity-tag

HTTP-date = <HTTP-date, defined in [Part2], Section 8.1.1.1>

If-Match = "*" / ( *( "," OWS ) entity-tag *( OWS "," [ OWS entity-tag ] ) )
If-Modified-Since = HTTP-date
If-None-Match = "*" / ( *( "," OWS ) entity-tag *( OWS "," [ OWS entity-tag ] ) )
If-Unmodified-Since = HTTP-date

Last-Modified = HTTP-date

OWS = <OWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1>

entity-tag = [ weak ] opaque-tag
etagc = "!" / %x23-7E ; '#'-'˜'
    / obs-text
obs-text = <obs-text, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>
opaque-tag = DQUOTE *etagc DQUOTE

weak = %x57.2F ; W/

Appendix D. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)

Changes up to the first Working Group Last Call draft are summarized in <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-p4-conditional-19#appendix-C>.

D.1. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p4-conditional-19

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/345>: "Required headers on 304 and 206"
o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/361>: "ABNF requirements for recipients"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/363>: "Rare cases"


o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/371>: "If-Modified-Since lacks definition for method != GET"

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/372>: "refactor conditional header field descriptions"

D.2. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p4-conditional-20

o Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are now defined in Part 1.

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Abstract

The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document defines range requests and the rules for constructing and combining responses to those requests.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTPBIS working group mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at <http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/>.

The current issues list is at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/report/3> and related documents (including fancy diffs) can be found at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/>.

The changes in this draft are summarized in Appendix E.2.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on April 7, 2013.
1. Introduction

HTTP clients often encounter interrupted data transfers as a result of canceled requests or dropped connections. When a client has stored a partial representation, it is desirable to request the remainder of that representation in a subsequent request rather than transfer the entire representation. There are also a number of Web applications that benefit from being able to request only a subset of a larger representation, such as a single page of a very large document or only part of an image to be rendered by a device with limited local storage.

This document defines HTTP/1.1 range requests, partial responses, and the multipart/byteranges media type. The protocol for range requests is an OPTIONAL feature of HTTP, designed so resources or recipients that do not implement this feature can respond as if it is a normal GET request without impacting interoperability. Partial responses are indicated by a distinct status code to not be mistaken for full responses by intermediate caches that might not implement the feature.

Although the HTTP range request mechanism is designed to allow for extensible range types, this specification only defines requests for byte ranges.

1.1. Conformance and Error Handling

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are defined in Section 2.5 of [Part1].

1.2. Syntax Notation

This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of [RFC5234] with the list rule extension defined in Section 1.2 of [Part1]. Appendix C describes rules imported from other documents. Appendix D shows the collected ABNF with the list rule expanded.

2. Range Units

HTTP/1.1 allows a client to request that only part (a range) of the representation be included within the response. HTTP/1.1 uses range units in the Range (Section 5.4) and Content-Range (Section 5.2) header fields. A representation can be broken down into subranges
HTTP/1.1 has been designed to allow implementations of applications that do not depend on knowledge of ranges. The only range unit defined by HTTP/1.1 is "bytes". Additional specifiers can be defined as described in Section 2.1.

If a range unit is not understood in a request, a server MUST ignore the whole Range header field (Section 5.4). If a range unit is not understood in a response, an intermediary SHOULD pass the response to the client; a client MUST fail.

2.1. Range Specifier Registry

The HTTP Range Specifier Registry defines the name space for the range specifier names.

Registrations MUST include the following fields:

- Name
- Description
- Pointer to specification text

Values to be added to this name space require IETF Review (see [RFC5226], Section 4.1).

The registry itself is maintained at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-range-specifiers>.

3. Status Code Definitions

3.1. 206 Partial Content

The server has fulfilled the partial GET request for the resource. The request MUST have included a Range header field (Section 5.4) indicating the desired range, and MAY have included an If-Range header field (Section 5.3) to make the request conditional.

The response MUST include the following header fields:

- Either a Content-Range header field (Section 5.2) indicating the range included with this response, or a multipart/byteranges...
Content-Type including Content-Range fields for each part. If a
Content-Length header field is present in the response, its value
MUST match the actual number of octets transmitted in the message
body.

- Date

- Cache-Control, ETag, Expires, Content-Location and/or Vary, if the
  header field would have been sent in a 200 (OK) response to the
  same request

If a 206 is sent in response to a request with an If-Range header
field, it SHOULD NOT include other representation header fields.
Otherwise, the response MUST include all of the representation header
fields that would have been returned with a 200 (OK) response to the
same request.

Caches MAY use a heuristic (see Section 4.1.2 of [Part6]) to
determine freshness for 206 responses.

3.2. 416 Requested Range Not Satisfiable

A server SHOULD return a response with this status code if a request
included a Range header field (Section 5.4), and none of the ranges-
specifier values in this field overlap the current extent of the
selected resource, and the request did not include an If-Range header
field (Section 5.3). (For byte-ranges, this means that the first-
byte-pos of all of the byte-range-spec values were greater than the
current length of the selected resource.)

When this status code is returned for a byte-range request, the
response SHOULD include a Content-Range header field specifying the
current length of the representation (see Section 5.2). This
response MUST NOT use the multipart/byteranges content-type. For
example,

HTTP/1.1 416 Requested Range Not Satisfiable
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2012 15:41:54 GMT
Content-Range: bytes */47022
Content-Type: image/gif

Note: Clients cannot depend on servers to send a 416 (Requested
Range Not Satisfiable) response instead of a 200 (OK) response for
an unsatisfiable Range header field, since not all servers
implement this header field.
4. Responses to a Range Request

4.1. Response to a Single and Multiple Ranges Request

When an HTTP message includes the content of a single range (for example, a response to a request for a single range, or to a request for a set of ranges that overlap without any holes), this content is transmitted with a Content-Range header field, and a Content-Length header field showing the number of bytes actually transferred. For example,

    HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content
    Date: Wed, 15 Nov 1995 06:25:24 GMT
    Last-Modified: Wed, 15 Nov 1995 04:58:08 GMT
    Content-Range: bytes 21010-47021/47022
    Content-Length: 26012
    Content-Type: image/gif

When an HTTP message includes the content of multiple ranges (for example, a response to a request for multiple non-overlapping ranges), these are transmitted as a multipart message. The multipart media type used for this purpose is "multipart/byteranges" as defined in Appendix A.

A server MAY combine requested ranges when those ranges are overlapping (see Section 7.1).

A response to a request for a single range MUST NOT be sent using the multipart/byteranges media type. A response to a request for multiple ranges, whose result is a single range, MAY be sent as a multipart/byteranges media type with one part. A client that cannot decode a multipart/byteranges message MUST NOT ask for multiple ranges in a single request.

When a client asks for multiple ranges in one request, the server SHOULD return them in the order that they appeared in the request.

4.2. Combining Ranges

A response might transfer only a subrange of a representation if the connection closed prematurely or if the request used one or more Range specifications. After several such transfers, a client might have received several ranges of the same representation. These ranges can only be safely combined if they all have in common the same strong validator, where "strong validator" is defined to be either an entity-tag that is not marked as weak (Section 2.3 of [Part4]) or, if no entity-tag is provided, a Last-Modified value that is strong in the sense defined by Section 2.2.2 of [Part4].
When a client receives an incomplete 200 (OK) or 206 (Partial Content) response and already has one or more stored responses for the same method and effective request URI, all of the stored responses with the same strong validator MAY be combined with the partial content in this new response. If none of the stored responses contain the same strong validator, then this new response corresponds to a new representation and MUST NOT be combined with the existing stored responses.

If the new response is an incomplete 200 (OK) response, then the header fields of that new response are used for any combined response and replace those of the matching stored responses.

If the new response is a 206 (Partial Content) response and at least one of the matching stored responses is a 200 (OK), then the combined response header fields consist of the most recent 200 response’s header fields. If all of the matching stored responses are 206 responses, then the stored response with the most header fields is used as the source of header fields for the combined response, except that the client MUST use other header fields provided in the new response, aside from Content-Range, to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response.

The combined response message body consists of the union of partial content ranges in the new response and each of the selected responses. If the union consists of the entire range of the representation, then the combined response MUST be recorded as a complete 200 (OK) response with a Content-Length header field that reflects the complete length. Otherwise, the combined response(s) MUST include a Content-Range header field describing the included range(s) and be recorded as incomplete. If the union consists of a discontinuous range of the representation, then the client MAY store it as either a multipart range response or as multiple 206 responses with one continuous range each.

5. Header Field Definitions

This section defines the syntax and semantics of HTTP/1.1 header fields related to range requests and partial responses.

5.1. Accept-Ranges

The "Accept-Ranges" header field allows a resource to indicate its acceptance of range requests.

\[ \text{Accept-Ranges} = \text{acceptable-ranges} \]
\[ \text{acceptable-ranges} = 1#\text{range-unit} / \text{"none"} \]
Origin servers that accept byte-range requests MAY send

   Accept-Ranges: bytes

but are not required to do so. Clients MAY generate range requests
without having received this header field for the resource involved. Range units are defined in Section 2.

Servers that do not accept any kind of range request for a resource
MAY send

   Accept-Ranges: none

to advise the client not to attempt a range request.

5.2. Content-Range

The "Content-Range" header field is sent with a partial
representation to specify where in the full representation the
payload body is intended to be applied.

Range units are defined in Section 2.

    Content-Range   = byte-content-range-spec
                    / other-content-range-spec

    byte-content-range-spec = bytes-unit SP
                             byte-range-resp-spec "/
                             ( instance-length / "*" )

    byte-range-resp-spec   = (first-byte-pos "-" last-byte-pos)
                            / "*"

    instance-length      = 1*DIGIT

    other-content-range-spec = other-range-unit SP
                              other-range-resp-spec

    other-range-resp-spec   = *CHAR

The header field SHOULD indicate the total length of the full
representation, unless this length is unknown or difficult to
determine. The asterisk "*" character means that the instance-length
is unknown at the time when the response was generated.

Unlike byte-ranges-specifier values (see Section 5.4.1), a byte-
range-resp-spec MUST only specify one range, and MUST contain
absolute byte positions for both the first and last byte of the
range.
A byte-content-range-spec with a byte-range-resp-spec whose last-byte-pos value is less than its first-byte-pos value, or whose instance-length value is less than or equal to its last-byte-pos value, is invalid. The recipient of an invalid byte-content-range-spec MUST ignore it and any content transferred along with it.

In the case of a byte range request: A server sending a response with status code 416 (Requested Range Not Satisfiable) SHOULD include a Content-Range field with a byte-range-resp-spec of "*". The instance-length specifies the current length of the selected resource. A response with status code 206 (Partial Content) MUST NOT include a Content-Range field with a byte-range-resp-spec of ".*".

The "Content-Range" header field has no meaning for status codes that do not explicitly describe its semantic. Currently, only status codes 206 (Partial Content) and 416 (Requested Range Not Satisfiable) describe the meaning of this header field.

Examples of byte-content-range-spec values, assuming that the representation contains a total of 1234 bytes:

- The first 500 bytes:
  bytes 0-499/1234
- The second 500 bytes:
  bytes 500-999/1234
- All except for the first 500 bytes:
  bytes 500-1233/1234
- The last 500 bytes:
  bytes 734-1233/1234

If the server ignores a byte-range-spec (for example if it is syntactically invalid, or if it might be seen as a denial-of-service attack), the server SHOULD treat the request as if the invalid Range header field did not exist. (Normally, this means return a 200 (OK) response containing the full representation).

5.3. If-Range

If a client has a partial copy of a representation and wishes to have an up-to-date copy of the entire representation, it could use the Range header field with a conditional GET (using either or both of
If-Unmodified-Since and If-Match.) However, if the condition fails because the representation has been modified, the client would then have to make a second request to obtain the entire current representation.

The "If-Range" header field allows a client to "short-circuit" the second request. Informally, its meaning is "if the representation is unchanged, send me the part(s) that I am missing; otherwise, send me the entire new representation".

\[
\text{If-Range} = \text{entity-tag} / \text{HTTP-date}
\]

Clients MUST NOT use an entity-tag marked as weak in an If-Range field value and MUST NOT use a Last-Modified date in an If-Range field value unless it has no entity-tag for the representation and the Last-Modified date it does have for the representation is strong in the sense defined by Section 2.2.2 of [Part4].

A server that evaluates a conditional range request that is applicable to one of its representations MUST evaluate the condition as false if the entity-tag used as a validator is marked as weak or, when an HTTP-date is used as the validator, if the date value is not strong in the sense defined by Section 2.2.2 of [Part4]. (A server can distinguish between a valid HTTP-date and any form of entity-tag by examining the first two characters.)

The If-Range header field SHOULD only be sent by clients together with a Range header field. The If-Range header field MUST be ignored if it is received in a request that does not include a Range header field. The If-Range header field MUST be ignored by a server that does not support the sub-range operation.

If the validator given in the If-Range header field matches the current validator for the selected representation of the target resource, then the server SHOULD send the specified sub-range of the representation using a 206 (Partial Content) response. If the validator does not match, then the server SHOULD send the entire representation using a 200 (OK) response.

5.4. Range

5.4.1. Byte Ranges

Since all HTTP representations are transferred as sequences of bytes, the concept of a byte range is meaningful for any HTTP representation. (However, not all clients and servers need to support byte-range operations.)
Byte range specifications in HTTP apply to the sequence of bytes in the representation data (not necessarily the same as the message body).

A byte range operation MAY specify a single range of bytes, or a set of ranges within a single representation.

```
byte-ranges-specifier = bytes-unit "=" byte-range-set
byte-range-set = 1#( byte-range-spec / suffix-byte-range-spec )
byte-range-spec = first-byte-pos "-" [ last-byte-pos ]
first-byte-pos = 1*DIGIT
last-byte-pos = 1*DIGIT

suffix-byte-range-spec = "-" suffix-length
suffix-length = 1*DIGIT
```

The first-byte-pos value in a byte-range-spec gives the byte-offset of the first byte in a range. The last-byte-pos value gives the byte-offset of the last byte in the range; that is, the byte positions specified are inclusive. Byte offsets start at zero.

If the last-byte-pos value is present, it MUST be greater than or equal to the first-byte-pos in that byte-range-spec, or the byte-range-spec is syntactically invalid. The recipient of a byte-range-set that includes one or more syntactically invalid byte-range-spec values MUST ignore the header field that includes that byte-range-set.

If the last-byte-pos value is absent, or if the value is greater than or equal to the current length of the representation data, last-byte-pos is taken to be equal to one less than the current length of the representation in bytes.

By its choice of last-byte-pos, a client can limit the number of bytes retrieved without knowing the size of the representation.

```
suffix-byte-range-spec = "-" suffix-length
suffix-length = 1*DIGIT
```

A suffix-byte-range-spec is used to specify the suffix of the representation data, of a length given by the suffix-length value. (That is, this form specifies the last N bytes of a representation.) If the representation is shorter than the specified suffix-length, the entire representation is used.

If a syntactically valid byte-range-set includes at least one byte-range-spec whose first-byte-pos is less than the current length of the representation, or at least one suffix-byte-range-spec with a non-zero suffix-length, then the byte-range-set is satisfiable. Otherwise, the byte-range-set is unsatisfiable. If the byte-range-set is unsatisfiable, the server SHOULD return a response with a 416
(Requested Range Not Satisfiable) status code. Otherwise, the server SHOULD return a response with a 206 (Partial Content) status code containing the satisfiable ranges of the representation.

In the byte range syntax, first-byte-pos, last-byte-pos, and suffix-length are expressed as decimal number of octets. Since there is no predefined limit to the length of an HTTP payload, recipients SHOULD anticipate potentially large decimal numerals and prevent parsing errors due to integer conversion overflows.

Examples of byte-ranges-specifier values (assuming a representation of length 10000):

- The first 500 bytes (byte offsets 0-499, inclusive):
  \[\text{bytes}=0-499\]

- The second 500 bytes (byte offsets 500-999, inclusive):
  \[\text{bytes}=500-999\]

- The final 500 bytes (byte offsets 9500-9999, inclusive):
  \[\text{bytes}=-500\]

  Or:
  \[\text{bytes}=9500-\]

- The first and last bytes only (bytes 0 and 9999):
  \[\text{bytes}=0-0,-1\]

- Several legal but not canonical specifications of the second 500 bytes (byte offsets 500-999, inclusive):
  \[\text{bytes}=500-600,601-999\]
  \[\text{bytes}=500-700,601-999\]

5.4.2. Range Retrieval Requests

The "Range" header field defines the GET method (conditional or not) to request one or more sub-ranges of the response representation data, instead of the entire representation data.

\[\text{Range} = \text{byte-ranges-specifier} / \text{other-ranges-specifier}
\text{other-ranges-specifier} = \text{other-range-unit} \"=\" \text{other-range-set}
\text{other-range-set} = 1\text{*CHAR}\]
A server MAY ignore the Range header field. However, origin servers and intermediate caches ought to support byte ranges when possible, since Range supports efficient recovery from partially failed transfers, and supports efficient partial retrieval of large representations.

If the server supports the Range header field and the specified range or ranges are appropriate for the representation:

- The presence of a Range header field in an unconditional GET modifies what is returned if the GET is otherwise successful. In other words, the response carries a status code of 206 (Partial Content) instead of 200 (OK).

- The presence of a Range header field in a conditional GET (a request using one or both of If-Modified-Since and If-None-Match, or one or both of If-Unmodified-Since and If-Match) modifies what is returned if the GET is otherwise successful and the condition is true. It does not affect the 304 (Not Modified) response returned if the conditional is false.

In some cases, it might be more appropriate to use the If-Range header field (see Section 5.3) in addition to the Range header field.

If a proxy that supports ranges receives a Range request, forwards the request to an inbound server, and receives an entire representation in reply, it MAY only return the requested range to its client.

6. IANA Considerations

6.1. Status Code Registration

The HTTP Status Code Registry located at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-status-codes> shall be updated with the registrations below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>Partial Content</td>
<td>Section 3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>416</td>
<td>Requested Range Not Satisfiable</td>
<td>Section 3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2. Header Field Registration

The Message Header Field Registry located at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/message-headers/message-header-index.html> shall be updated with the permanent registrations below (see RFC3864):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accept-Ranges</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content-Range</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If-Range</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The change controller is: "IETF (iesg@ietf.org) - Internet Engineering Task Force".

6.3. Range Specifier Registration

The registration procedure for HTTP Range Specifiers is defined by Section 2.1 of this document.

The HTTP Range Specifier Registry shall be created at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-range-specifiers> and be populated with the registrations below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range Specifier Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bytes</td>
<td>a range of octets</td>
<td>Section 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>reserved as keyword, indicating no ranges are supported</td>
<td>Section 5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The change controller is: "IETF (iesg@ietf.org) - Internet Engineering Task Force".

7. Security Considerations

This section is meant to inform application developers, information providers, and users of the security limitations in HTTP/1.1 as described by this document. The discussion does not include definitive solutions to the problems revealed, though it does make some suggestions for reducing security risks.
7.1. Overlapping Ranges

Range requests containing overlapping ranges can lead to the situation where a server is sending far more data than the size of the complete resource representation.

8. Acknowledgments

See Section 9 of [Part1].

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References

Appendix A. Internet Media Type multipart/byteranges

When an HTTP 206 (Partial Content) response message includes the content of multiple ranges (a response to a request for multiple non-overlapping ranges), these are transmitted as a multipart message body ([RFC2046], Section 5.1). The media type for this purpose is called "multipart/byteranges". The following is to be registered with IANA [RFC4288].

The multipart/byteranges media type includes one or more parts, each with its own Content-Type and Content-Range fields. The required boundary parameter specifies the boundary string used to separate each body-part.

Type name: multipart

Subtype name: byteranges

Required parameters: boundary

Optional parameters: none

Encoding considerations: only "7bit", "8bit", or "binary" are permitted

Security considerations: none

Interoperability considerations: none

Published specification: This specification (see Appendix A).

Applications that use this media type: HTTP components supporting multiple ranges in a single request.
Additional information:

Magic number(s):  none
File extension(s):  none
Macintosh file type code(s):  none

Person and email address to contact for further information: See Authors Section.

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: none

Author/Change controller: IESG

Note: Despite the name "multipart/byteranges" is not limited to the byte ranges only.

For example:

HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content
Date: Wed, 15 Nov 1995 06:25:24 GMT
Last-Modified: Wed, 15 Nov 1995 04:58:08 GMT
Content-type: multipart/byteranges; boundary=THIS_STRING_SEPARATES

--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
Content-type: application/pdf
Content-range: bytes 500-999/8000

...the first range...
--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
Content-type: application/pdf
Content-range: bytes 7000-7999/8000

...the second range
--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES--
Another example, using the "exampleunit" range unit:

HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 1995 06:25:24 GMT
Last-Modified: Tue, 14 July 04:58:08 GMT
Content-type: multipart/byteranges; boundary=THIS_STRING_SEPARATES

--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
Content-type: video/example
Content-range: exampleunit 1.2-4.3/25

...the first range...
--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
Content-type: video/example
Content-range: exampleunit 11.2-14.3/25

...the second range
--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES--

Notes:

1. Additional CRLFs MAY precede the first boundary string in the body.

2. Although [RFC2046] permits the boundary string to be quoted, some existing implementations handle a quoted boundary string incorrectly.

3. A number of clients and servers were coded to an early draft of the byteranges specification to use a media type of multipart/x-byteranges, which is almost, but not quite compatible with the version documented in HTTP/1.1.

Appendix B. Changes from RFC 2616

Introduce Range Specifier Registry. (Section 2.1)

Clarify that it is not ok to use a weak validator in a 206 response. (Section 3.1)

Clarify that multipart/byteranges can consist of a single part. (Appendix A)

Appendix C. Imported ABNF

The following core rules are included by reference, as defined in Appendix B.1 of [RFC5234]: ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return), CRLF (CR LF), CTL (controls), DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double quote), QUOT (quotation marks), WS (whitespace).
quote), HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), LF (line feed), OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), and VCHAR (any visible US-ASCII character).

Note that all rules derived from token are to be compared case-insensitively, like range-unit and acceptable-ranges.

The rules below are defined in [Part1]:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{OWS} & = \langle \text{OWS}, \text{defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1} \rangle \\
\text{token} & = \langle \text{token}, \text{defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4} \rangle
\end{align*}
\]

The rules below are defined in other parts:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{HTTP-date} & = \langle \text{HTTP-date}, \text{defined in [Part2], Section 8.1.1.1} \rangle \\
\text{entity-tag} & = \langle \text{entity-tag}, \text{defined in [Part4], Section 2.3} \rangle
\end{align*}
\]
Appendix D. Collected ABNF

Accept-Ranges = acceptable-ranges

Content-Range = byte-content-range-spec / other-content-range-spec

HTTP-date = <HTTP-date, defined in [Part2], Section 8.1.1.1>

If-Range = entity-tag / HTTP-date

OWS = <OWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1>

Range = byte-ranges-specifier / other-ranges-specifier

acceptable-ranges = ( *( ""," OWS ) range-unit *( OWS "," [ OWS range-unit ] ) ) / "none"

byte-content-range-spec = bytes-unit SP byte-range-resp-spec "/" ( instance-length / "*" )
byte-range-resp-spec = ( first-byte-pos "-" last-byte-pos ) / "*"
byte-range-set = *( ""," OWS ) ( byte-range-spec / suffix-byte-range-spec ) *( OWS "," [ OWS ( byte-range-spec / suffix-byte-range-spec ) ] )
byte-range-spec = first-byte-pos "-" [ last-byte-pos ]
byte-ranges-specifier = bytes-unit "=" byte-range-set
bytes-unit = "bytes"

entity-tag = <entity-tag, defined in [Part4], Section 2.3>

first-byte-pos = 1*DIGIT

instance-length = 1*DIGIT

last-byte-pos = 1*DIGIT

other-content-range-spec = other-range-unit SP other-range-resp-spec
other-range-resp-spec = *CHAR
other-range-set = 1*CHAR
other-range-unit = token
other-ranges-specifier = other-range-unit "+" other-range-set
range-unit = bytes-unit / other-range-unit

suffix-byte-range-spec = "-" suffix-length
suffix-length = 1*DIGIT

token = <token, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>
Appendix E. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)

Changes up to the first Working Group Last Call draft are summarized in <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-p5-range-19#appendix-D>.

E.1. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p5-range-19

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/367>: "reserve ‘none’ as byte range unit"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/368>: "note introduction of new IANA registries as normative changes"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/369>: "range units vs leading zeroes vs size"

E.2. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p5-range-20

- Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are now defined in Part 1.

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Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching
draft-ietf-httpbis-p6-cache-21

Abstract

The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document defines requirements on HTTP caches and the associated header fields that control cache behavior or indicate cacheable response messages.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTPBIS working group mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at <http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/>.

The current issues list is at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/report/3> and related documents (including fancy diffs) can be found at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/>.

The changes in this draft are summarized in Appendix D.2.

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1. Introduction

HTTP is typically used for distributed information systems, where performance can be improved by the use of response caches. This document defines aspects of HTTP/1.1 related to caching and reusing response messages.

1.1. Purpose

An HTTP cache is a local store of response messages and the subsystem that controls its message storage, retrieval, and deletion. A cache stores cacheable responses in order to reduce the response time and network bandwidth consumption on future, equivalent requests. Any client or server MAY employ a cache, though a cache cannot be used by a server that is acting as a tunnel.

The goal of caching in HTTP/1.1 is to significantly improve performance by reusing a prior response message to satisfy a current request. A stored response is considered "fresh", as defined in Section 4.1, if the response can be reused without "validation" (checking with the origin server to see if the cached response remains valid for this request). A fresh cache response can therefore reduce both latency and network transfers each time it is reused. When a cached response is not fresh, it might still be reusable if it can be freshened by validation (Section 4.2) or if the origin is unavailable.

1.2. Terminology

This specification uses a number of terms to refer to the roles played by participants in, and objects of, HTTP caching.

**cache**

A conformant implementation of a HTTP cache. Note that this implies an HTTP/1.1 cache; this specification does not define conformance for HTTP/1.0 caches.

**shared cache**

A cache that stores responses to be reused by more than one user; usually (but not always) deployed as part of an intermediary.

**private cache**

A cache that is dedicated to a single user.
cacheable

A response is cacheable if a cache is allowed to store a copy of
the response message for use in answering subsequent requests.
Even when a response is cacheable, there might be additional
constraints on whether a cache can use the stored copy to satisfy
a particular request.

explicit expiration time

The time at which the origin server intends that a representation
no longer be returned by a cache without further validation.

heuristic expiration time

An expiration time assigned by a cache when no explicit expiration
time is available.

age

The age of a response is the time since it was sent by, or
successfully validated with, the origin server.

first-hand

A response is first-hand if the freshness model is not in use;
i.e., its age is 0.

freshness lifetime

The length of time between the generation of a response and its
expiration time.

fresh

A response is fresh if its age has not yet exceeded its freshness
lifetime.

stale

A response is stale if its age has passed its freshness lifetime
(either explicit or heuristic).

validator

A protocol element (e.g., an entity-tag or a Last-Modified time)
that is used to find out whether a stored response is an
equivalent copy of a representation.  See Section 2.1 of [Part4].
strong validator

A validator that is defined by the origin server such that its current value will change if the representation data changes; i.e., an entity-tag that is not marked as weak (Section 2.3 of [Part4]) or, if no entity-tag is provided, a Last-Modified value that is strong in the sense defined by Section 2.2.2 of [Part4].

1.3. Conformance and Error Handling

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are defined in Section 2.5 of [Part1].

1.4. Syntax Notation

This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of [RFC5234] with the list rule extension defined in Section 1.2 of [Part1]. Appendix B describes rules imported from other documents. Appendix C shows the collected ABNF with the list rule expanded.

1.4.1. Delta Seconds

The delta-seconds rule specifies a non-negative integer, representing time in seconds.

\[
\text{delta-seconds} = \text{1*DIGIT}
\]

If an implementation receives a delta-seconds value larger than the largest positive integer it can represent, or if any of its subsequent calculations overflows, it MUST consider the value to be 2147483648 (2^31). Recipients parsing a delta-seconds value MUST use an arithmetic type of at least 31 bits of range, and senders MUST NOT send delta-seconds with a value greater than 2147483648.

2. Overview of Cache Operation

Proper cache operation preserves the semantics of HTTP transfers ([Part2]) while eliminating the transfer of information already held in the cache. Although caching is an entirely OPTIONAL feature of HTTP, we assume that reusing the cached response is desirable and that such reuse is the default behavior when no requirement or locally-desired configuration prevents it. Therefore, HTTP cache requirements are focused on preventing a cache from either storing a
non-reusable response or reusing a stored response inappropriately.

Each cache entry consists of a cache key and one or more HTTP responses corresponding to prior requests that used the same key. The most common form of cache entry is a successful result of a retrieval request: i.e., a 200 (OK) response containing a representation of the resource identified by the request target. However, it is also possible to cache negative results (e.g., 404 (Not Found), incomplete results (e.g., 206 (Partial Content)), and responses to methods other than GET if the method’s definition allows such caching and defines something suitable for use as a cache key.

The default cache key consists of the request method and target URI. However, since HTTP caches in common use today are typically limited to caching responses to GET, many implementations simply decline other methods and use only the URI as the key.

If a request target is subject to content negotiation, its cache entry might consist of multiple stored responses, each differentiated by a secondary key for the values of the original request’s selecting header fields (Section 4.3).

3. Storing Responses in Caches

A cache MUST NOT store a response to any request, unless:

- The request method is understood by the cache and defined as being cacheable, and

- the response status code is understood by the cache, and

- the "no-store" cache directive (see Section 7.2) does not appear in request or response header fields, and

- the "private" cache response directive (see Section 7.2.2.2) does not appear in the response, if the cache is shared, and

- the Authorization header field (see Section 4.1 of [Part7]) does not appear in the request, if the cache is shared, unless the response explicitly allows it (see Section 3.2), and

- the response either:

  * contains an Expires header field (see Section 7.3), or

  * contains a max-age response cache directive (see Section 7.2.2.7), or
contains a s-maxage response cache directive and the cache is shared, or
* contains a Cache Control Extension (see Section 7.2.3) that allows it to be cached, or
* has a status code that can be served with heuristic freshness (see Section 4.1.2).

Note that any of the requirements listed above can be overridden by a cache-control extension; see Section 7.2.3.

In this context, a cache has "understood" a request method or a response status code if it recognizes it and implements any cache-specific behavior.

Note that, in normal operation, many caches will not store a response that has neither a cache validator nor an explicit expiration time, as such responses are not usually useful to store. However, caches are not prohibited from storing such responses.

3.1. Storing Incomplete Responses

A response message is considered complete when all of the octets indicated by the message framing ([Part1]) are received prior to the connection being closed. If the request is GET, the response status is 200 (OK), and the entire response header block has been received, a cache MAY store an incomplete response message body if the cache entry is recorded as incomplete. Likewise, a 206 (Partial Content) response MAY be stored as if it were an incomplete 200 (OK) cache entry. However, a cache MUST NOT store incomplete or partial content responses if it does not support the Range and Content-Range header fields or if it does not understand the range units used in those fields.

A cache MAY complete a stored incomplete response by making a subsequent range request ([Part5]) and combining the successful response with the stored entry, as defined in Section 4.4. A cache MUST NOT use an incomplete response to answer requests unless the response has been made complete or the request is partial and specifies a range that is wholly within the incomplete response. A cache MUST NOT send a partial response to a client without explicitly marking it as such using the 206 (Partial Content) status code.

3.2. Storing Responses to Authenticated Requests

A shared cache MUST NOT use a cached response to a request with an Authorization header field (Section 4.1 of [Part7]) to satisfy any
subsequent request unless a cache directive that allows such responses to be stored is present in the response.

In this specification, the following Cache-Control response directives (Section 7.2.2) have such an effect: must-revalidate, public, s-maxage.

Note that cached responses that contain the "must-revalidate" and/or "s-maxage" response directives are not allowed to be served stale (Section 4.1.4) by shared caches. In particular, a response with either "max-age=0, must-revalidate" or "s-maxage=0" cannot be used to satisfy a subsequent request without revalidating it on the origin server.

4. Constructing Responses from Caches

For a presented request, a cache MUST NOT return a stored response, unless:

- The presented effective request URI (Section 5.5 of [Part1]) and that of the stored response match, and
- the request method associated with the stored response allows it to be used for the presented request, and
- selecting header fields nominated by the stored response (if any) match those presented (see Section 4.3), and
- the presented request does not contain the no-cache pragma (Section 7.4), nor the no-cache cache directive (Section 7.2.1), unless the stored response is successfully validated (Section 4.2), and
- the stored response does not contain the no-cache cache directive (Section 7.2.2.3), unless it is successfully validated (Section 4.2), and
- the stored response is either:
  * fresh (see Section 4.1), or
  * allowed to be served stale (see Section 4.1.4), or
  * successfully validated (see Section 4.2).

Note that any of the requirements listed above can be overridden by a cache-control extension; see Section 7.2.3.
When a stored response is used to satisfy a request without validation, a cache MUST include a single Age header field (Section 7.1) in the response with a value equal to the stored response's current_age; see Section 4.1.3.

A cache MUST write through requests with methods that are unsafe (Section 5.2.1 of [Part2]) to the origin server; i.e., a cache is not allowed to generate a reply to such a request before having forwarded the request and having received a corresponding response.

Also, note that unsafe requests might invalidate already stored responses; see Section 6.

When more than one suitable response is stored, a cache MUST use the most recent response (as determined by the Date header field). It can also forward a request with "Cache-Control: max-age=0" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" to disambiguate which response to use.

A cache that does not have a clock available MUST NOT use stored responses without revalidating them on every use. A cache, especially a shared cache, SHOULD use a mechanism, such as NTP [RFC1305], to synchronize its clock with a reliable external standard.

4.1. Freshness Model

When a response is "fresh" in the cache, it can be used to satisfy subsequent requests without contacting the origin server, thereby improving efficiency.

The primary mechanism for determining freshness is for an origin server to provide an explicit expiration time in the future, using either the Expires header field (Section 7.3) or the max-age response cache directive (Section 7.2.2.7). Generally, origin servers will assign future explicit expiration times to responses in the belief that the representation is not likely to change in a semantically significant way before the expiration time is reached.

If an origin server wishes to force a cache to validate every request, it can assign an explicit expiration time in the past to indicate that the response is already stale. Compliant caches will normally validate the cached response before reusing it for subsequent requests (see Section 4.1.4).

Since origin servers do not always provide explicit expiration times, a cache MAY assign a heuristic expiration time when an explicit time is not specified, employing algorithms that use other header field values (such as the Last-Modified time) to estimate a plausible
expiration time. This specification does not provide specific algorithms, but does impose worst-case constraints on their results.

The calculation to determine if a response is fresh is:

   response_is_fresh = (freshness_lifetime > current_age)

The freshness_lifetime is defined in Section 4.1.1; the current_age is defined in Section 4.1.3.

Additionally, clients can influence freshness calculation -- either constraining it relaxing it -- by using the max-age and min-fresh request cache directives. See Section 7.2.1 for details.

Note that freshness applies only to cache operation; it cannot be used to force a user agent to refresh its display or reload a resource. See Section 8 for an explanation of the difference between caches and history mechanisms.

4.1.1. Calculating Freshness Lifetime

A cache can calculate the freshness lifetime (denoted as freshness_lifetime) of a response by using the first match of:

- If the cache is shared and the s-maxage response cache directive (Section 7.2.2.8) is present, use its value, or
- If the max-age response cache directive (Section 7.2.2.7) is present, use its value, or
- If the Expires response header field (Section 7.3) is present, use its value minus the value of the Date response header field, or
- Otherwise, no explicit expiration time is present in the response. A heuristic freshness lifetime might be applicable; see Section 4.1.2.

Note that this calculation is not vulnerable to clock skew, since all of the information comes from the origin server.

When there is more than one value present for a given directive (e.g., two Expires header fields, multiple Cache-Control: max-age directives), it is considered invalid. Caches are encouraged to consider responses that have invalid freshness information to be stale.
4.1.2. Calculating Heuristic Freshness

If no explicit expiration time is present in a stored response that has a status code whose definition allows heuristic freshness to be used (including the following in Section 7 of [Part2]: 200 (OK), 203 (Non-Authoritative Information), 206 (Partial Content), 300 (Multiple Choices), 301 (Moved Permanently) and 410 (Gone)), a cache MAY calculate a heuristic expiration time. A cache MUST NOT use heuristics to determine freshness for responses with status codes that do not explicitly allow it.

When a heuristic is used to calculate freshness lifetime, a cache SHOULD attach a Warning header field with a 113 warn-code to the response if its current_age is more than 24 hours and such a warning is not already present.

Also, if the response has a Last-Modified header field (Section 2.2 of [Part4]), caches are encouraged to use a heuristic expiration value that is no more than some fraction of the interval since that time. A typical setting of this fraction might be 10%.

Note: Section 13.9 of [RFC2616] prohibited caches from calculating heuristic freshness for URIs with query components (i.e., those containing '?'). In practice, this has not been widely implemented. Therefore, servers are encouraged to send explicit directives (e.g., Cache-Control: no-cache) if they wish to preclude caching.

4.1.3. Calculating Age

HTTP/1.1 uses the Age header field to convey the estimated age of the response message when obtained from a cache. The Age field value is the cache’s estimate of the amount of time since the response was generated or validated by the origin server. In essence, the Age value is the sum of the time that the response has been resident in each of the caches along the path from the origin server, plus the amount of time it has been in transit along network paths.

The following data is used for the age calculation:

age_value

The term "age_value" denotes the value of the Age header field (Section 7.1), in a form appropriate for arithmetic operation; or 0, if not available.
HTTP/1.1 requires origin servers to send a Date header field, if possible, with every response, giving the time at which the response was generated. The term "date_value" denotes the value of the Date header field, in a form appropriate for arithmetic operations. See Section 8.1.1.2 of [Part2] for the definition of the Date header field, and for requirements regarding responses without it.

now

The term "now" means "the current value of the clock at the host performing the calculation". A cache SHOULD use NTP ([RFC1305]) or some similar protocol to synchronize its clocks to a globally accurate time standard.

request_time

The current value of the clock at the host at the time the request resulting in the stored response was made.

response_time

The current value of the clock at the host at the time the response was received.

A response’s age can be calculated in two entirely independent ways:

1. the "apparent_age": response_time minus date_value, if the local clock is reasonably well synchronized to the origin server’s clock. If the result is negative, the result is replaced by zero.

2. the "corrected_age_value", if all of the caches along the response path implement HTTP/1.1. A cache MUST interpret this value relative to the time the request was initiated, not the time that the response was received.

apparent_age = max(0, response_time - date_value);

response_delay = response_time - request_time;
corrected_age_value = age_value + response_delay;
These SHOULD be combined as

\[
\text{corrected
d\text{_initial\text{_age}} = \text{max(apparent\_age, corrected\_age\_value)};
\]

unless the cache is confident in the value of the Age header field (e.g., because there are no HTTP/1.0 hops in the Via header field), in which case the corrected_age_value MAY be used as the corrected_initial_age.

The current_age of a stored response can then be calculated by adding the amount of time (in seconds) since the stored response was last validated by the origin server to the corrected_initial_age.

\[
\text{resident\_time} = \text{now - response\_time};
\]

\[
\text{current\_age} = \text{corrected\_initial\_age} + \text{resident\_time};
\]

Additionally, to avoid common problems in date parsing:

- Recipients SHOULD assume that an RFC-850 date which appears to be more than 50 years in the future is in fact in the past (this helps solve the "year 2000" problem).
- Although all date formats are specified to be case-sensitive, recipients SHOULD match day, week and timezone names case-insensitively.
- An implementation MAY internally represent a parsed Expires date as earlier than the proper value, but MUST NOT internally represent a parsed Expires date as later than the proper value.
- Recipients MUST perform all expiration-related calculations in GMT. The local time zone MUST NOT influence the calculation or comparison of an age or expiration time.
- Caches SHOULD consider dates with time zones other than "GMT" invalid.

4.1.4. Serving Stale Responses

A "stale" response is one that either has explicit expiry information or is allowed to have heuristic expiry calculated, but is not fresh according to the calculations in Section 4.1.

A cache MUST NOT return a stale response if it is prohibited by an explicit in-protocol directive (e.g., by a "no-store" or "no-cache" cache directive, a "must-revalidate" cache-response-directive, or an applicable "s-maxage" or "proxy-revalidate" cache-response-directive; see Section 7.2.2).
A cache MUST NOT return stale responses unless it is disconnected (i.e., it cannot contact the origin server or otherwise find a forward path) or doing so is explicitly allowed (e.g., by the max-stale request directive; see Section 7.2.1).

A cache SHOULD append a Warning header field with the 110 warn-code (see Section 7.5) to stale responses. Likewise, a cache SHOULD add the 112 warn-code to stale responses if the cache is disconnected.

If a cache receives a first-hand response (either an entire response, or a 304 (Not Modified) response) that it would normally forward to the requesting client, and the received response is no longer fresh, the cache can forward it to the requesting client without adding a new Warning (but without removing any existing Warning header fields). A cache shouldn’t attempt to validate a response simply because that response became stale in transit.

4.2. Validation Model

When a cache has one or more stored responses for a requested URI, but cannot serve any of them (e.g., because they are not fresh, or one cannot be selected; see Section 4.3), it can use the conditional request mechanism [Part4] in the forwarded request to give the origin server an opportunity to both select a valid stored response to be used, and to update it. This process is known as "validating" or "revalidating" the stored response.

When sending such a conditional request, a cache adds an If-Modified-Since header field whose value is that of the Last-Modified header field from the selected (see Section 4.3) stored response, if available.

Additionally, a cache can add an If-None-Match header field whose value is that of the ETag header field(s) from all responses stored for the requested URI, if present. However, if any of the stored responses contains only partial content, the cache shouldn’t include its entity-tag in the If-None-Match header field unless the request is for a range that would be fully satisfied by that stored response.

Cache handling of a response to a conditional request is dependent upon its status code:

- A 304 (Not Modified) response status code indicates that the stored response can be updated and reused; see Section 4.2.1.

- A full response (i.e., one with a payload body) indicates that none of the stored responses nominated in the conditional request is suitable. Instead, the cache can use the full response to
satisfy the request and MAY replace the stored response(s).

- However, if a cache receives a 5xx (Server Error) response while attempting to validate a response, it can either forward this response to the requesting client, or act as if the server failed to respond. In the latter case, it can return a previously stored response (see Section 4.1.4).

### 4.2.1. Freshening Responses with 304 Not Modified

When a cache receives a 304 (Not Modified) response and already has one or more stored 200 (OK) responses for the same cache key, the cache needs to identify which of the stored responses are updated by this new response and then update the stored response(s) with the new information provided in the 304 response.

- If the new response contains a strong validator, then that strong validator identifies the selected representation. All of the stored responses with the same strong validator are selected. If none of the stored responses contain the same strong validator, then this new response corresponds to a new selected representation and MUST NOT update the existing stored responses.

- If the new response contains a weak validator and that validator corresponds to one of the cache’s stored responses, then the most recent of those matching stored responses is selected.

- If the new response does not include any form of validator, there is only one stored response, and that stored response also lacks a validator, then that stored response is selected.

If a stored response is selected for update, the cache MUST:

- delete any Warning header fields in the stored response with warn- code 1xx (see Section 7.5);
- retain any Warning header fields in the stored response with warn- code 2xx; and,
- use other header fields provided in the 304 (Not Modified) response to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response.

### 4.3. Using Negotiated Responses

When a cache receives a request that can be satisfied by a stored response that has a Vary header field (Section 8.2.1 of [Part2]), it MUST NOT use that response unless all of the selecting header fields
nominated by the Vary header field match in both the original request (i.e., that associated with the stored response), and the presented request.

The selecting header fields from two requests are defined to match if and only if those in the first request can be transformed to those in the second request by applying any of the following:

- adding or removing whitespace, where allowed in the header field’s syntax
- combining multiple header fields with the same field name (see Section 3.2 of [Part1])
- normalizing both header field values in a way that is known to have identical semantics, according to the header field’s specification (e.g., re-ordering field values when order is not significant; case-normalization, where values are defined to be case-insensitive)

If (after any normalization that might take place) a header field is absent from a request, it can only match another request if it is also absent there.

A Vary header field-value of "/*" always fails to match, and subsequent requests to that resource can only be properly interpreted by the origin server.

The stored response with matching selecting header fields is known as the selected response.

If multiple selected responses are available, the most recent response (as determined by the Date header field) is used; see Section 4.

If no selected response is available, the cache can forward the presented request to the origin server in a conditional request; see Section 4.2.

4.4. Combining Partial Content

A response might transfer only a partial representation if the connection closed prematurely or if the request used one or more Range specifiers ([Part5]). After several such transfers, a cache might have received several ranges of the same representation. A cache MAY combine these ranges into a single stored response, and reuse that response to satisfy later requests, if they all share the same strong validator and the cache complies with the client
requirements in Section 4.2 of [Part5].

When combining the new response with one or more stored responses, a cache MUST:

- delete any Warning header fields in the stored response with warn-code 1xx (see Section 7.5);
- retain any Warning header fields in the stored response with warn-code 2xx; and,
- use other header fields provided in the new response, aside from Content-Range, to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response.

5. Updating Caches with HEAD Responses

A response to the HEAD method is identical to what an equivalent request made with a GET would have been, except it lacks a body. This property of HEAD responses is used to both invalidate and update cached GET responses.

If one or more stored GET responses can be selected (as per Section 4.3) for a HEAD request, and the Content-Length, ETag or Last-Modified value of a HEAD response differs from that in a selected GET response, the cache MUST consider that selected response to be stale.

If the Content-Length, ETag and Last-Modified values of a HEAD response (when present) are the same as that in a selected GET response (as per Section 4.3), the cache SHOULD update the remaining header fields in the stored response using the following rules:

- delete any Warning header fields in the stored response with warn-code 1xx (see Section 7.5);
- retain any Warning header fields in the stored response with warn-code 2xx; and,
- use other header fields provided in the response to replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored response.

6. Request Methods that Invalidate

Because unsafe request methods (Section 5.2.1 of [Part2]) such as PUT, POST or DELETE have the potential for changing state on the origin server, intervening caches can use them to keep their contents
A cache MUST invalidate the effective Request URI (Section 5.5 of [Part1]) as well as the URI(s) in the Location and Content-Location response header fields (if present) when a non-error response to a request with an unsafe method is received.

However, a cache MUST NOT invalidate a URI from a Location or Content-Location response header field if the host part of that URI differs from the host part in the effective request URI (Section 5.5 of [Part1]). This helps prevent denial of service attacks.

A cache MUST invalidate the effective request URI (Section 5.5 of [Part1]) when it receives a non-error response to a request with a method whose safety is unknown.

Here, a "non-error response" is one with a 2xx (Successful) or 3xx (Redirection) status code. "Invalidate" means that the cache will either remove all stored responses related to the effective request URI, or will mark these as "invalid" and in need of a mandatory validation before they can be returned in response to a subsequent request.

Note that this does not guarantee that all appropriate responses are invalidated. For example, the request that caused the change at the origin server might not have gone through the cache where a response is stored.

7. Header Field Definitions

This section defines the syntax and semantics of HTTP/1.1 header fields related to caching.

7.1. Age

The "Age" header field conveys the sender’s estimate of the amount of time since the response was generated or successfully validated at the origin server. Age values are calculated as specified in Section 4.1.3.

\[
\text{Age} = \text{delta-seconds}
\]

Age field-values are non-negative integers, representing time in seconds (see Section 1.4.1).

The presence of an Age header field in a response implies that a response is not first-hand. However, the converse is not true, since HTTP/1.0 caches might not implement the Age header field.
7.2. Cache-Control

The "Cache-Control" header field is used to specify directives for caches along the request/response chain. Such cache directives are unidirectional in that the presence of a directive in a request does not imply that the same directive is to be given in the response.

A cache MUST obey the requirements of the Cache-Control directives defined in this section. See Section 7.2.3 for information about how Cache-Control directives defined elsewhere are handled.

Note: HTTP/1.0 caches might not implement Cache-Control and might only implement Pragma: no-cache (see Section 7.4).

A proxy, whether or not it implements a cache, MUST pass cache directives through in forwarded messages, regardless of their significance to that application, since the directives might be applicable to all recipients along the request/response chain. It is not possible to target a directive to a specific cache.

Cache directives are identified by a token, to be compared case-insensitively, and have an optional argument, that can use both token and quoted-string syntax. For the directives defined below that define arguments, recipients ought to accept both forms, even if one is documented to be preferred. For any directive not defined by this specification, recipients MUST accept both forms.

Cache-Control   = 1#cache-directive

  cache-directive = token [ "=" ( token / quoted-string ) ]

For the cache directives defined below, no argument is defined (nor allowed) otherwise stated otherwise.

7.2.1. Request Cache-Control Directives

7.2.1.1. no-cache

The "no-cache" request directive indicates that a cache MUST NOT use a stored response to satisfy the request without successful validation on the origin server.

7.2.1.2. no-store

The "no-store" request directive indicates that a cache MUST NOT store any part of either this request or any response to it. This directive applies to both private and shared caches. "MUST NOT store" in this context means that the cache MUST NOT intentionally
store the information in non-volatile storage, and MUST make a best-effort attempt to remove the information from volatile storage as promptly as possible after forwarding it.

This directive is NOT a reliable or sufficient mechanism for ensuring privacy. In particular, malicious or compromised caches might not recognize or obey this directive, and communications networks might be vulnerable to eavesdropping.

Note that if a request containing this directive is satisfied from a cache, the no-store request directive does not apply to the already stored response.

7.2.1.3. max-age

Argument syntax:

delta-seconds (see Section 1.4.1)

The "max-age" request directive indicates that the client is unwilling to accept a response whose age is greater than the specified number of seconds. Unless the max-stale request directive is also present, the client is not willing to accept a stale response.

Note: This directive uses the token form of the argument syntax; e.g., 'max-age=5', not 'max-age="5"'. Senders SHOULD NOT use the quoted-string form.

7.2.1.4. max-stale

Argument syntax:

delta-seconds (see Section 1.4.1)

The "max-stale" request directive indicates that the client is willing to accept a response that has exceeded its expiration time. If max-stale is assigned a value, then the client is willing to accept a response that has exceeded its expiration time by no more than the specified number of seconds. If no value is assigned to max-stale, then the client is willing to accept a stale response of any age.

Note: This directive uses the token form of the argument syntax; e.g., 'max-stale=10', not 'max-stale="10"'. Senders SHOULD NOT use the quoted-string form.
7.2.1.5. min-fresh

Argument syntax:

   delta-seconds (see Section 1.4.1)

The "min-fresh" request directive indicates that the client is willing to accept a response whose freshness lifetime is no less than its current age plus the specified time in seconds. That is, the client wants a response that will still be fresh for at least the specified number of seconds.

Note: This directive uses the token form of the argument syntax; e.g., 'min-fresh=20', not 'min-fresh="20"'. Senders SHOULD NOT use the quoted-string form.

7.2.1.6. no-transform

The "no-transform" request directive indicates that an intermediary (whether or not it implements a cache) MUST NOT change the Content-Encoding, Content-Range or Content-Type request header fields, nor the request representation.

7.2.1.7. only-if-cached

The "only-if-cached" request directive indicates that the client only wishes to obtain a stored response. If it receives this directive, a cache SHOULD either respond using a stored response that is consistent with the other constraints of the request, or respond with a 504 (Gateway Timeout) status code. If a group of caches is being operated as a unified system with good internal connectivity, a member cache MAY forward such a request within that group of caches.

7.2.2. Response Cache-Control Directives

7.2.2.1. public

The "public" response directive indicates that a response whose associated request contains an 'Authentication' header MAY be stored (see Section 3.2).

7.2.2.2. private

Argument syntax:

   #field-name

The "private" response directive indicates that the response message
is intended for a single user and MUST NOT be stored by a shared
cache. A private cache MAY store the response.

If the private response directive specifies one or more field-names,
this requirement is limited to the field-values associated with the
listed response header fields. That is, a shared cache MUST NOT
store the specified field-names(s), whereas it MAY store the
remainder of the response message.

The field-names given are not limited to the set of standard header
fields defined by this specification. Field names are case-
insensitive.

Note: This usage of the word "private" only controls where the
response can be stored; it cannot ensure the privacy of the message
content. Also, private response directives with field-names are
often handled by implementations as if an unqualified private
directive was received; i.e., the special handling for the qualified
form is not widely implemented.

Note: This directive uses the quoted-string form of the argument
syntax. Senders SHOULD NOT use the token form (even if quoting
appears not to be needed for single-entry lists).

7.2.2.3. no-cache

Argument syntax:

    #field-name

The "no-cache" response directive indicates that the response MUST
NOT be used to satisfy a subsequent request without successful
validation on the origin server. This allows an origin server to
prevent a cache from using it to satisfy a request without contacting
it, even by caches that have been configured to return stale
responses.

If the no-cache response directive specifies one or more field-names,
then a cache MAY use the response to satisfy a subsequent request,
subject to any other restrictions on caching. However, any header
fields in the response that have the field-name(s) listed MUST NOT be
sent in the response to a subsequent request without successful
revalidation with the origin server. This allows an origin server to
prevent the re-use of certain header fields in a response, while
still allowing caching of the rest of the response.

The field-names given are not limited to the set of standard header
fields defined by this specification. Field names are case-
Note: Many HTTP/1.0 caches will not recognize or obey this directive. Also, no-cache response directives with field-names are often handled by implementations as if an unqualified no-cache directive was received; i.e., the special handling for the qualified form is not widely implemented.

Note: This directive uses the quoted-string form of the argument syntax. Senders SHOULD NOT use the token form (even if quoting appears not to be needed for single-entry lists).

7.2.2.4. no-store

The "no-store" response directive indicates that a cache MUST NOT store any part of either the immediate request or response. This directive applies to both private and shared caches. "MUST NOT store" in this context means that the cache MUST NOT intentionally store the information in non-volatile storage, and MUST make a best-effort attempt to remove the information from volatile storage as promptly as possible after forwarding it.

This directive is NOT a reliable or sufficient mechanism for ensuring privacy. In particular, malicious or compromised caches might not recognize or obey this directive, and communications networks might be vulnerable to eavesdropping.

7.2.2.5. must-revalidate

The "must-revalidate" response directive indicates that once it has become stale, a cache MUST NOT use the response to satisfy subsequent requests without successful validation on the origin server.

The must-revalidate directive is necessary to support reliable operation for certain protocol features. In all circumstances a cache MUST obey the must-revalidate directive; in particular, if a cache cannot reach the origin server for any reason, it MUST generate a 504 (Gateway Timeout) response.

The must-revalidate directive ought to be used by servers if and only if failure to validate a request on the representation could result in incorrect operation, such as a silently unexecuted financial transaction.

7.2.2.6. proxy-revalidate

The "proxy-revalidate" response directive has the same meaning as the must-revalidate response directive, except that it does not apply to
private caches.

7.2.2.7. max-age

Argument syntax:

delta-seconds (see Section 1.4.1)

The "max-age" response directive indicates that the response is to be considered stale after its age is greater than the specified number of seconds.

Note: This directive uses the token form of the argument syntax; e.g., 'max-age=5', not 'max-age="5"'. Senders SHOULD NOT use the quoted-string form.

7.2.2.8. s-maxage

Argument syntax:

delta-seconds (see Section 1.4.1)

The "s-maxage" response directive indicates that, in shared caches, the maximum age specified by this directive overrides the maximum age specified by either the max-age directive or the Expires header field. The s-maxage directive also implies the semantics of the proxy-revalidate response directive.

Note: This directive uses the token form of the argument syntax; e.g., 's-maxage=10', not 's-maxage="10"'. Senders SHOULD NOT use the quoted-string form.

7.2.2.9. no-transform

The "no-transform" response directive indicates that an intermediary (regardless of whether it implements a cache) MUST NOT change the Content-Encoding, Content-Range or Content-Type response header fields, nor the response representation.

7.2.3. Cache Control Extensions

The Cache-Control header field can be extended through the use of one or more cache-extension tokens, each with an optional value. Informational extensions (those that do not require a change in cache behavior) can be added without changing the semantics of other directives. Behavioral extensions are designed to work by acting as modifiers to the existing base of cache directives. Both the new directive and the standard directive are supplied, such that
applications that do not understand the new directive will default to the behavior specified by the standard directive, and those that understand the new directive will recognize it as modifying the requirements associated with the standard directive. In this way, extensions to the cache-control directives can be made without requiring changes to the base protocol.

This extension mechanism depends on an HTTP cache obeying all of the cache-control directives defined for its native HTTP-version, obeying certain extensions, and ignoring all directives that it does not understand.

For example, consider a hypothetical new response directive called "community" that acts as a modifier to the private directive. We define this new directive to mean that, in addition to any private cache, any cache that is shared only by members of the community named within its value is allowed to cache the response. An origin server wishing to allow the UCI community to use an otherwise private response in their shared cache(s) could do so by including

```
Cache-Control: private, community="UCI"
```

A cache seeing this header field will act correctly even if the cache does not understand the community cache-extension, since it will also see and understand the private directive and thus default to the safe behavior.

A cache MUST ignore unrecognized cache directives; it is assumed that any cache directive likely to be unrecognized by an HTTP/1.1 cache will be combined with standard directives (or the response’s default cacheability) such that the cache behavior will remain minimally correct even if the cache does not understand the extension(s).

New extension directives ought to consider defining:

- What it means for a directive to be specified multiple times,
- When the directive does not take an argument, what it means when an argument is present,
- When the directive requires an argument, what it means when it is missing.

The HTTP Cache Directive Registry defines the name space for the cache directives.

A registration MUST include the following fields:
7.3. Expires

The "Expires" header field gives the date/time after which the response is considered stale. See Section 4.1 for further discussion of the freshness model.

The presence of an Expires field does not imply that the original resource will change or cease to exist at, before, or after that time.

The field-value is an absolute date and time as defined by HTTP-date in Section 8.1.1.1 of [Part2]; a sender MUST use the rfc1123-date format.

Expires = HTTP-date

For example

Expires: Thu, 01 Dec 1994 16:00:00 GMT

A cache MUST treat other invalid date formats, especially including the value "0", as in the past (i.e., "already expired").

Note: If a response includes a Cache-Control field with the max-age directive (see Section 7.2.2.7), that directive overrides the Expires field. Likewise, the s-maxage directive (Section 7.2.2.8) overrides the Expires header field in shared caches.

Historically, HTTP required the Expires field-value to be no more than a year in the future. While longer freshness lifetimes are no longer prohibited, extremely large values have been demonstrated to cause problems (e.g., clock overflows due to use of 32-bit integers for time values), and many caches will evict a response far sooner than that. Therefore, senders ought not produce them.

An origin server without a clock MUST NOT assign Expires values to a response unless these values were associated with the resource by a system or user with a reliable clock. It MAY assign an Expires value
that is known, at or before server configuration time, to be in the past (this allows "pre-expiration" of responses without storing separate Expires values for each resource).

7.4. Pragma

The "Pragma" header field allows backwards compatibility with HTTP/1.0 caches, so that clients can specify a "no-cache" request that they will understand (as Cache-Control was not defined until HTTP/1.1). When the Cache-Control header field is also present and understood in a request, Pragma is ignored.

In HTTP/1.0, Pragma was defined as an extensible field for implementation-specified directives for recipients. This specification deprecates such extensions to improve interoperability.

Pragma = 1#pragma-directive
pragma-directive = "no-cache" / extension-pragma
extension-pragma = token [ "=" ( token / quoted-string ) ]

When the Cache-Control header field is not present in a request, the no-cache request pragma-directive MUST have the same effect on caches as if "Cache-Control: no-cache" were present (see Section 7.2.1).

When sending a no-cache request, a client ought to include both the pragma and cache-control directives, unless Cache-Control: no-cache is purposefully omitted to target other Cache-Control response directives at HTTP/1.1 caches. For example:

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Cache-Control: max-age=30
Pragma: no-cache

will constrain HTTP/1.1 caches to serve a response no older than 30 seconds, while precluding implementations that do not understand Cache-Control from serving a cached response.

Note: Because the meaning of "Pragma: no-cache" in responses is not specified, it does not provide a reliable replacement for "Cache-Control: no-cache" in them.

7.5. Warning

The "Warning" header field is used to carry additional information about the status or transformation of a message that might not be reflected in the message. This information is typically used to warn
about possible incorrectness introduced by caching operations or
transformations applied to the payload of the message.

Warnings can be used for other purposes, both cache-related and
otherwise. The use of a warning, rather than an error status code,
distinguishes these responses from true failures.

Warning header fields can in general be applied to any message,
however some warn-codes are specific to caches and can only be
applied to response messages.

Warning       = 1#warning-value

warning-value = warn-code SP warn-agent SP warn-text
               [SP warn-date]

warn-code  = 3DIGIT
warn-agent = ( uri-host [ "":" port ] ) / pseudonym
          ; the name or pseudonym of the server adding
          ; the Warning header field, for use in debugging
warn-text  = quoted-string
warn-date  = DQUOTE HTTP-date DQUOTE

Multiple warnings can be attached to a response (either by the origin
server or by a cache), including multiple warnings with the same code
number, only differing in warn-text.

When this occurs, the user agent SHOULD inform the user of as many of
them as possible, in the order that they appear in the response.

Systems that generate multiple Warning header fields are encouraged
to order them with this user agent behavior in mind. New Warning
header fields are added after any existing Warning header fields.

Warnings are assigned three digit warn-codes. The first digit
indicates whether the Warning is required to be deleted from a stored
response after validation:

- 1xx Warnings describe the freshness or validation status of the
   response, and so MUST be deleted by a cache after validation.
   They can only be generated by a cache when validating a cached
   entry, and MUST NOT be generated in any other situation.

- 2xx Warnings describe some aspect of the representation that is
  not rectified by a validation (for example, a lossy compression of
  the representation) and MUST NOT be deleted by a cache after
  validation, unless a full response is returned, in which case they
  MUST be.
If an implementation sends a message with one or more Warning header fields to a receiver whose version is HTTP/1.0 or lower, then the sender MUST include in each warning-value a warn-date that matches the Date header field in the message.

If a system receives a message with a warning-value that includes a warn-date, and that warn-date is different from the Date value in the response, then that warning-value MUST be deleted from the message before storing, forwarding, or using it. (preventing the consequences of naive caching of Warning header fields.) If all of the warning-values are deleted for this reason, the Warning header field MUST be deleted as well.

The following warn-codes are defined by this specification, each with a recommended warn-text in English, and a description of its meaning.

7.5.1. 110 Response is Stale

A cache SHOULD include this whenever the returned response is stale.

7.5.2. 111 Revalidation Failed

A cache SHOULD include this when returning a stale response because an attempt to validate the response failed, due to an inability to reach the server.

7.5.3. 112 Disconnected Operation

A cache SHOULD include this if it is intentionally disconnected from the rest of the network for a period of time.

7.5.4. 113 Heuristic Expiration

A cache SHOULD include this if it heuristically chose a freshness lifetime greater than 24 hours and the response’s age is greater than 24 hours.

7.5.5. 199 Miscellaneous Warning

The warning text can include arbitrary information to be presented to a human user, or logged. A system receiving this warning MUST NOT take any automated action, besides presenting the warning to the user.

7.5.6. 214 Transformation Applied

MUST be added by a proxy if it applies any transformation to the representation, such as changing the content-coding, media-type, or
modifying the representation data, unless this Warning code already
appears in the response.

7.5.7.  299 Miscellaneous Persistent Warning

The warning text can include arbitrary information to be presented to
a human user, or logged. A system receiving this warning MUST NOT
take any automated action.

7.5.8.  Warn Code Extensions

The HTTP Warn Code Registry defines the name space for warn codes.
A registration MUST include the following fields:

- Warn Code (3 digits)
- Short Description
- Pointer to specification text

Values to be added to this name space require IETF Review (see
[RFC5226], Section 4.1).

The registry itself is maintained at

8.  History Lists

User agents often have history mechanisms, such as "Back" buttons and
history lists, that can be used to redisplay a representation
retrieved earlier in a session.

The freshness model (Section 4.1) does not necessarily apply to
history mechanisms. I.e., a history mechanism can display a previous
representation even if it has expired.

This does not prohibit the history mechanism from telling the user
that a view might be stale, or from honoring cache directives (e.g.,
Cache-Control: no-store).

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  Cache Directive Registry

The registration procedure for HTTP Cache Directives is defined by
Section 7.2.3 of this document.
The HTTP Cache Directive Registry shall be created at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-cache-directives> and be populated with the registrations below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cache Directive</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>max-age</td>
<td>Section 7.2.1.3, Section 7.2.2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max-stale</td>
<td>Section 7.2.1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min-fresh</td>
<td>Section 7.2.1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>must-revalidate</td>
<td>Section 7.2.2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no-cache</td>
<td>Section 7.2.1.1, Section 7.2.2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no-store</td>
<td>Section 7.2.1.2, Section 7.2.2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no-transform</td>
<td>Section 7.2.1.6, Section 7.2.2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>only-if-cached</td>
<td>Section 7.2.1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private</td>
<td>Section 7.2.2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proxy-revalidate</td>
<td>Section 7.2.2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public</td>
<td>Section 7.2.2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s-maxage</td>
<td>Section 7.2.2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stale-if-error</td>
<td>[RFC5861], Section 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stale-while-revalidate</td>
<td>[RFC5861], Section 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.2. Warn Code Registry

The registration procedure for HTTP Warn Codes is defined by Section 7.5.8 of this document.

The HTTP Warn Code Registry shall be created at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-cache-directives> and be populated with the registrations below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warn Code</th>
<th>Short Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>Response is Stale</td>
<td>Section 7.5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>Revalidation Failed</td>
<td>Section 7.5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Disconnected Operation</td>
<td>Section 7.5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>Heuristic Expiration</td>
<td>Section 7.5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199</td>
<td>Miscellaneous Warning</td>
<td>Section 7.5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214</td>
<td>Transformation Applied</td>
<td>Section 7.5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>299</td>
<td>Miscellaneous Persistent Warning</td>
<td>Section 7.5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Message Header Field Registry located at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/message-headers/message-header-index.html> shall be updated with the permanent registrations below (see [RFC3864]):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
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<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expires</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragma</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The change controller is: "IETF (iesg@ietf.org) - Internet Engineering Task Force".

10. Security Considerations

Caches expose additional potential vulnerabilities, since the contents of the cache represent an attractive target for malicious exploitation. Because cache contents persist after an HTTP request is complete, an attack on the cache can reveal information long after a user believes that the information has been removed from the network. Therefore, cache contents need to be protected as sensitive information.

Implementation flaws might allow attackers to insert content into a cache ("cache poisoning"), leading to compromise of clients that trust that content. Because of their nature, these attacks are difficult to mitigate.

Likewise, implementation flaws (as well as misunderstanding of cache operation) might lead to caching of sensitive information (e.g., authentication credentials) that is thought to be private, exposing it to unauthorised parties.

Note that the Set-Cookie response header [RFC6265] does not inhibit caching; a cacheable response with a Set-Cookie header can be (and often is) used to satisfy subsequent requests to caches. Servers who wish to control caching of these responses are encouraged to emit appropriate Cache-Control response headers.
11. Acknowledgments

See Section 9 of [Part1].

12. References

12.1. Normative References


12.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Changes from RFC 2616

Make the specified age calculation algorithm less conservative.  (Section 4.1.3)

Remove requirement to consider "Content-Location" in successful responses in order to determine the appropriate response to use.  (Section 4.2)

Clarify denial of service attack avoidance requirement.  (Section 6)

Do not mention RFC 2047 encoding and multiple languages in "Warning" header fields anymore, as these aspects never were implemented.  (Section 7.5)

Introduce Cache Directive and Warn Code Registries.  (Section 7.2.3 and Section 7.5.8)

Appendix B. Imported ABNF

The following core rules are included by reference, as defined in Appendix B.1 of [RFC5234]: ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return), CRLF (CR LF), CTL (controls), DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double quote), HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), LF (line feed), OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), and VCHAR (any visible US-ASCII character).

The rules below are defined in [Part1]:
OWS = <OWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1>
field-name = <field-name, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2>
quoted-string = <quoted-string, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>
token = <token, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>
port = <port, defined in [Part1], Section 2.7>
pseudonym = <pseudonym, defined in [Part1], Section 5.7>
uri-host = <uri-host, defined in [Part1], Section 2.7>
The rules below are defined in other parts:
HTTP-date = <HTTP-date, defined in [Part2], Section 8.1.1.1>
Appendix C. Collected ABNF

Age = delta-seconds

Cache-Control = *( ",” OWS ) cache-directive *( OWS ",” [ OWS cache-directive ] )

Expires = HTTP-date

HTTP-date = <HTTP-date, defined in [Part2], Section 8.1.1.1>

OWS = <OWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1>

Pragma = *( ",” OWS ) pragma-directive *( OWS ",” [ OWS pragma-directive ] )

Warning = *( ",” OWS ) warning-value *( OWS ",” [ OWS warning-value ] )

cache-directive = token [ "=” ( token / quoted-string ) ]

delta-seconds = 1*DIGIT

extension-pragam = token [ "=” ( token / quoted-string ) ]

field-name = <field-name, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2>

port = <port, defined in [Part1], Section 2.7>

pragma-directive = "no-cache" / extension-pragma

pseudonym = <pseudonym, defined in [Part1], Section 5.7>

quoted-string = <quoted-string, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>

token = <token, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>

uri-host = <uri-host, defined in [Part1], Section 2.7>

warn-agent = ( uri-host [ "::” port ] ) / pseudonym

warn-code = 3DIGIT

warn-date = DQUOTE HTTP-date DQUOTE

warn-text = quoted-string

warning-value = warn-code SP warn-agent SP warn-text [ SP warn-date ]
Appendix D. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)

Changes up to the first Working Group Last Call draft are summarized in <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-p6-cache-19#appendix-C>.

D.1. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p6-cache-19

Closed issues:

- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/360>: "enhance considerations for new cache control directives"
- <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/368>: "note introduction of new IANA registries as normative changes"

D.2. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p6-cache-20

Closed issues:


Other changes:

- Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are now defined in Part 1.
- Move definition of "Vary" header field into Part 2.
Add security considerations with respect to cache poisoning and the "Set-Cookie" header field.

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Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication
draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-21

Abstract

The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypermedia information systems. This document defines the HTTP Authentication framework.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTPBIS working group mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at <http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/>.

The current issues list is at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/report/3> and related documents (including fancy diffs) can be found at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/>.

The changes in this draft are summarized in Appendix D.2.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on April 7, 2013.

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1. Introduction

This document defines HTTP/1.1 access control and authentication. It includes the relevant parts of RFC 2616 with only minor changes ([RFC2616]), plus the general framework for HTTP authentication, as previously defined in "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication" ([RFC2617]).

HTTP provides several OPTIONAL challenge-response authentication mechanisms which can be used by a server to challenge a client request and by a client to provide authentication information. The "basic" and "digest" authentication schemes continue to be specified in RFC 2617.

1.1. Conformance and Error Handling

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are defined in Section 2.5 of [Part1].

1.2. Syntax Notation

This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of [RFC5234] with the list rule extension defined in Section 1.2 of [Part1]. Appendix B describes rules imported from other documents. Appendix C shows the collected ABNF with the list rule expanded.

2. Access Authentication Framework

2.1. Challenge and Response

HTTP provides a simple challenge-response authentication mechanism that can be used by a server to challenge a client request and by a client to provide authentication information. It uses an extensible, case-insensitive token to identify the authentication scheme, followed by additional information necessary for achieving authentication via that scheme. The latter can either be a comma-separated list of parameters or a single sequence of characters capable of holding base64-encoded information.

Parameters are name-value pairs where the name is matched case-insensitively, and each parameter name MUST only occur once per challenge.
auth-scheme    = token
auth-param     = token BWS "=" BWS ( token / quoted-string )
token68        = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT /
           "-" / "." / "_" / "˜" / "+" / "/" ) *"="

The "token68" syntax allows the 66 unreserved URI characters ([RFC3986]), plus a few others, so that it can hold a base64, base64url (URL and filename safe alphabet), base32, or base16 (hex) encoding, with or without padding, but excluding whitespace ([RFC4648]).

The 401 (Unauthorized) response message is used by an origin server to challenge the authorization of a user agent. This response MUST include a WWW-Authenticate header field containing at least one challenge applicable to the requested resource.

The 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response message is used by a proxy to challenge the authorization of a client and MUST include a Proxy-Authenticate header field containing at least one challenge applicable to the proxy for the requested resource.

challenge     = auth-scheme [ 1*SP ( token68 / #auth-param ) ]

Note: User agents will need to take special care in parsing the WWW-Authenticate and Proxy-Authenticate header field values because they can contain more than one challenge, or if more than one of each is provided, since the contents of a challenge can itself contain a comma-separated list of authentication parameters.

Note: Many clients fail to parse challenges containing unknown schemes. A workaround for this problem is to list well-supported schemes (such as "basic") first.

A user agent that wishes to authenticate itself with an origin server -- usually, but not necessarily, after receiving a 401 (Unauthorized) -- can do so by including an Authorization header field with the request.

A client that wishes to authenticate itself with a proxy -- usually, but not necessarily, after receiving a 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) -- can do so by including a Proxy-Authorization header field with the request.

Both the Authorization field value and the Proxy-Authorization field value contain the client’s credentials for the realm of the resource.
being requested, based upon a challenge received from the server (possibly at some point in the past). When creating their values, the user agent ought to do so by selecting the challenge with what it considers to be the most secure auth-scheme that it understands, obtaining credentials from the user as appropriate.

credentials = auth-scheme [ 1*SP ( token68 / #auth-param ) ]

Upon a request for a protected resource that omits credentials, contains invalid credentials (e.g., a bad password) or partial credentials (e.g., when the authentication scheme requires more than one round trip), an origin server SHOULD return a 401 (Unauthorized) response. Such responses MUST include a WWW-Authenticate header field containing at least one (possibly new) challenge applicable to the requested resource.

Likewise, upon a request that requires authentication by proxies that omit credentials or contain invalid or partial credentials, a proxy SHOULD return a 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response. Such responses MUST include a Proxy-Authenticate header field containing a (possibly new) challenge applicable to the proxy.

A server receiving credentials that are valid, but not adequate to gain access, ought to respond with the 403 (Forbidden) status code (Section 7.5.3 of [Part2]).

The HTTP protocol does not restrict applications to this simple challenge-response mechanism for access authentication. Additional mechanisms MAY be used, such as encryption at the transport level or via message encapsulation, and with additional header fields specifying authentication information. However, such additional mechanisms are not defined by this specification.

Proxies MUST forward the WWW-Authenticate and Authorization header fields unmodified and follow the rules found in Section 4.1.

2.2. Protection Space (Realm)

The authentication parameter realm is reserved for use by authentication schemes that wish to indicate the scope of protection.

A protection space is defined by the canonical root URI (the scheme and authority components of the effective request URI; see Section 5.5 of [Part1]) of the server being accessed, in combination with the realm value if present. These realms allow the protected resources on a server to be partitioned into a set of protection spaces, each with its own authentication scheme and/or authorization database. The realm value is a string, generally assigned by the origin server,
which can have additional semantics specific to the authentication scheme. Note that there can be multiple challenges with the same auth-scheme but different realms.

The protection space determines the domain over which credentials can be automatically applied. If a prior request has been authorized, the same credentials MAY be reused for all other requests within that protection space for a period of time determined by the authentication scheme, parameters, and/or user preference. Unless otherwise defined by the authentication scheme, a single protection space cannot extend outside the scope of its server.

For historical reasons, senders MUST only use the quoted-string syntax. Recipients might have to support both token and quoted-string syntax for maximum interoperability with existing clients that have been accepting both notations for a long time.

2.3. Authentication Scheme Registry

The HTTP Authentication Scheme Registry defines the name space for the authentication schemes in challenges and credentials.

Registrations MUST include the following fields:

- Authentication Scheme Name
- Pointer to specification text
- Notes (optional)

Values to be added to this name space require IETF Review (see [RFC5226], Section 4.1).

The registry itself is maintained at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-authschemes>.

2.3.1. Considerations for New Authentication Schemes

There are certain aspects of the HTTP Authentication Framework that put constraints on how new authentication schemes can work:

- HTTP authentication is presumed to be stateless: all of the information necessary to authenticate a request MUST be provided in the request, rather than be dependent on the server remembering prior requests. Authentication based on, or bound to, the underlying connection is outside the scope of this specification and inherently flawed unless steps are taken to ensure that the connection cannot be used by any party other than the
The authentication parameter "realm" is reserved for defining Protection Spaces as defined in Section 2.2. New schemes MUST NOT use it in a way incompatible with that definition.

The "token68" notation was introduced for compatibility with existing authentication schemes and can only be used once per challenge/credentials. New schemes thus ought to use the "auth-param" syntax instead, because otherwise future extensions will be impossible.

The parsing of challenges and credentials is defined by this specification, and cannot be modified by new authentication schemes. When the auth-param syntax is used, all parameters ought to support both token and quoted-string syntax, and syntactical constraints ought to be defined on the field value after parsing (i.e., quoted-string processing). This is necessary so that recipients can use a generic parser that applies to all authentication schemes.

Note: The fact that the value syntax for the "realm" parameter is restricted to quoted-string was a bad design choice not to be repeated for new parameters.

Definitions of new schemes ought to define the treatment of unknown extension parameters. In general, a "must-ignore" rule is preferable over "must-understand", because otherwise it will be hard to introduce new parameters in the presence of legacy recipients. Furthermore, it’s good to describe the policy for defining new parameters (such as "update the specification", or "use this registry").

Authentication schemes need to document whether they are usable in origin-server authentication (i.e., using WWW-Authenticate), and/or proxy authentication (i.e., using Proxy-Authenticate).

The credentials carried in an Authorization header field are specific to the User Agent, and therefore have the same effect on HTTP caches as the "private" Cache-Control response directive, within the scope of the request they appear in.

Therefore, new authentication schemes which choose not to carry credentials in the Authorization header field (e.g., using a newly defined header field) will need to explicitly disallow caching, by mandating the use of either Cache-Control request directives (e.g., "no-store") or response directives (e.g., "private").
3. Status Code Definitions

3.1. 401 Unauthorized

The request requires user authentication. The response MUST include a WWW-Authenticate header field (Section 4.4) containing a challenge applicable to the target resource. The client MAY repeat the request with a suitable Authorization header field (Section 4.1). If the request already included Authorization credentials, then the 401 response indicates that authorization has been refused for those credentials. If the 401 response contains the same challenge as the prior response, and the user agent has already attempted authentication at least once, then the user SHOULD be presented the representation that was given in the response, since that representation might include relevant diagnostic information.

3.2. 407 Proxy Authentication Required

This code is similar to 401 (Unauthorized), but indicates that the client ought to first authenticate itself with the proxy. The proxy MUST return a Proxy-Authenticate header field (Section 4.2) containing a challenge applicable to the proxy for the target resource. The client MAY repeat the request with a suitable Proxy-Authorization header field (Section 4.3).

4. Header Field Definitions

This section defines the syntax and semantics of HTTP/1.1 header fields related to authentication.

4.1. Authorization

The "Authorization" header field allows a user agent to authenticate itself with a server -- usually, but not necessarily, after receiving a 401 (Unauthorized) response. Its value consists of credentials containing information of the user agent for the realm of the resource being requested.

Authorization = credentials

If a request is authenticated and a realm specified, the same credentials SHOULD be valid for all other requests within this realm (assuming that the authentication scheme itself does not require otherwise, such as credentials that vary according to a challenge value or using synchronized clocks).

When a shared cache (see Section 1.2 of [Part6]) receives a request containing an Authorization field, it MUST NOT return the
corresponding response as a reply to any other request, unless one of
the following specific exceptions holds:

1. If the response includes the "s-maxage" cache-control directive, the
   cache MAY use that response in replying to a subsequent request. But (if the specified maximum age has passed) a proxy cache
   MUST first revalidate it with the origin server, using the header fields from the new request to allow the origin server to authenticate the new request. (This is the defined behavior for s-maxage.) If the response includes "s-maxage=0", the proxy MUST always revalidate it before re-using it.

2. If the response includes the "must-revalidate" cache-control directive, the cache MAY use that response in replying to a subsequent request. But if the response is stale, all caches MUST first revalidate it with the origin server, using the header fields from the new request to allow the origin server to authenticate the new request.

3. If the response includes the "public" cache-control directive, it MAY be returned in reply to any subsequent request.

4.2. Proxy-Authenticate

The "Proxy-Authenticate" header field consists of at least one challenge that indicates the authentication scheme(s) and parameters applicable to the proxy for this effective request URI (Section 5.5 of [Part1]). It MUST be included as part of a 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response.

Proxy-Authenticate = 1#challenge

Unlike WWW-Authenticate, the Proxy-Authenticate header field applies only to the current connection, and intermediaries SHOULD NOT forward it to downstream clients. However, an intermediate proxy might need to obtain its own credentials by requesting them from the downstream client, which in some circumstances will appear as if the proxy is forwarding the Proxy-Authenticate header field.

Note that the parsing considerations for WWW-Authenticate apply to this header field as well; see Section 4.4 for details.

4.3. Proxy-Authorization

The "Proxy-Authorization" header field allows the client to identify itself (or its user) to a proxy which requires authentication. Its value consists of credentials containing the authentication information of the user agent for the proxy and/or realm of the
resource being requested.

Proxy-Authorization = credentials

Unlike Authorization, the Proxy-Authorization header field applies only to the next outbound proxy that demanded authentication using the Proxy-Authenticate field. When multiple proxies are used in a chain, the Proxy-Authorization header field is consumed by the first outbound proxy that was expecting to receive credentials. A proxy MAY relay the credentials from the client request to the next proxy if that is the mechanism by which the proxies cooperatively authenticate a given request.

4.4. WWW-Authenticate

The "WWW-Authenticate" header field consists of at least one challenge that indicates the authentication scheme(s) and parameters applicable to the effective request URI (Section 5.5 of [Part1]).

It MUST be included in 401 (Unauthorized) response messages and MAY be included in other response messages to indicate that supplying credentials (or different credentials) might affect the response.

WWW-Authenticate = 1#challenge

User agents are advised to take special care in parsing the WWW-Authenticate field value as it might contain more than one challenge, or if more than one WWW-Authenticate header field is provided, the contents of a challenge itself can contain a comma-separated list of authentication parameters.

For instance:

WWW-Authenticate: Newauth realm="apps", type=1, title="Login to \"apps\"", Basic realm="simple"

This header field contains two challenges; one for the "Newauth" scheme with a realm value of "apps", and two additional parameters "type" and "title", and another one for the "Basic" scheme with a realm value of "simple".

Note: The challenge grammar production uses the list syntax as well. Therefore, a sequence of comma, whitespace, and comma can be considered both as applying to the preceding challenge, or to be an empty entry in the list of challenges. In practice, this ambiguity does not affect the semantics of the header field value and thus is harmless.
5. IANA Considerations

5.1. Authentication Scheme Registry

The registration procedure for HTTP Authentication Schemes is defined by Section 2.3 of this document.

The HTTP Method Authentication Scheme shall be created at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-authschemes>.

5.2. Status Code Registration

The HTTP Status Code Registry located at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-status-codes> shall be updated with the registrations below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>401</td>
<td>Unauthorized</td>
<td>Section 3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407</td>
<td>Proxy Authentication Required</td>
<td>Section 3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3. Header Field Registration

The Message Header Field Registry located at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/message-headers/message-header-index.html> shall be updated with the permanent registrations below (see [RFC3864]):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field Name</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorization</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proxy-Authenticate</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proxy-Authorization</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWW-Authenticate</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The change controller is: "IETF (iesg@ietf.org) - Internet Engineering Task Force".

6. Security Considerations

This section is meant to inform application developers, information providers, and users of the security limitations in HTTP/1.1 as described by this document. The discussion does not include definitive solutions to the problems revealed, though it does make some suggestions for reducing security risks.
6.1. Authentication Credentials and Idle Clients

Existing HTTP clients and user agents typically retain authentication information indefinitely. HTTP/1.1 does not provide a method for a server to direct clients to discard these cached credentials. This is a significant defect that requires further extensions to HTTP. Circumstances under which credential caching can interfere with the application's security model include but are not limited to:

- Clients which have been idle for an extended period following which the server might wish to cause the client to reprompt the user for credentials.

- Applications which include a session termination indication (such as a "logout" or "commit" button on a page) after which the server side of the application "knows" that there is no further reason for the client to retain the credentials.

This is currently under separate study. There are a number of workarounds to parts of this problem, and we encourage the use of password protection in screen savers, idle time-outs, and other methods which mitigate the security problems inherent in this problem. In particular, user agents which cache credentials are encouraged to provide a readily accessible mechanism for discarding cached credentials under user control.

6.2. Protection Spaces

Authentication schemes that solely rely on the "realm" mechanism for establishing a protection space will expose credentials to all resources on a server. Clients that have successfully made authenticated requests with a resource can use the same authentication credentials for other resources on the same server. This makes it possible for a different resource to harvest authentication credentials for other resources.

This is of particular concern when a server hosts resources for multiple parties under the same canonical root URI (Section 2.2). Possible mitigation strategies include restricting direct access to authentication credentials (i.e., not making the content of the Authorization request header field available), and separating protection spaces by using a different host name for each party.

7. Acknowledgments

This specification takes over the definition of the HTTP Authentication Framework, previously defined in RFC 2617. We thank John Franks, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker, Jeffery L. Hostetler, Scott D.
Lawrence, Paul J. Leach, Ari Luotonen, and Lawrence C. Stewart for their work on that specification. See Section 6 of [RFC2617] for further acknowledgements.

See Section 9 of [Part1] for the Acknowledgments related to this document revision.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Changes from RFCs 2616 and 2617

The "realm" parameter isn't required anymore in general; consequently, the ABNF allows challenges without any auth parameters. (Section 2)

The "token68" alternative to auth-param lists has been added for consistency with legacy authentication schemes such as "Basic". (Section 2)

Introduce Authentication Scheme Registry. (Section 2.3)

Appendix B. Imported ABNF

The following core rules are included by reference, as defined in Appendix B.1 of [RFC5234]: ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return), CRLF (CR LF), CTL (controls), DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double quote), HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), LF (line feed), OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), and VCHAR (any visible US-ASCII character).

The rules below are defined in [Part1]:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{BWS} & = \langle \text{BWS}, \text{defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1}\rangle \\
\text{OWS} & = \langle \text{OWS}, \text{defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1}\rangle \\
\text{quoted-string} & = \langle \text{quoted-string}, \text{defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4}\rangle \\
\text{token} & = \langle \text{token}, \text{defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4}\rangle
\end{align*}
\]
Appendix C. Collected ABNF

Authorization = credentials

BWS = <BWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1>

OWS = <OWS, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.1>

Proxy-Authenticate = * ( "", OWS ) challenge *( OWS "", [ OWS challenge ] )
Proxy-Authorization = credentials

WWW-Authenticate = *( "", OWS ) challenge *( OWS "", [ OWS challenge ] )

auth-param = token BWS "=" BWS ( token / quoted-string )
auth-scheme = token

challenge = auth-scheme [ 1*SP ( token68 / [ ( "", / auth-param ) *( OWS "", [ OWS auth-param ] ) ] ) ]
credentials = auth-scheme [ 1*SP ( token68 / [ ( "", / auth-param ) *( OWS "", [ OWS auth-param ] ) ] ) ]

quoted-string = <quoted-string, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>

token = <token, defined in [Part1], Section 3.2.4>
token68 = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "." / "~" / "+" / "/" )
*"="

Appendix D. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)

Changes up to the first Working Group Last Call draft are summarized in <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-19#appendix-C>.

D.1. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-19

Closed issues:

D.2. Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-20

Closed issues:

o <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/376>: "rename b64token for clarity"

Other changes:

o Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are now defined in Part 1.

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This document clarifies the semantics associated with the Content-Range HTTP header and associated Partial Content (206) response code.

It specifically allows a server to produce a Content-Range response whose range is a subrange of the corresponding range requested using a previous Range request. The HTTP protocol syntax is not modified. Instead, this document clarifies that a server responding to a client requesting a range (x-y) may respond with a range ((x+e)-(y-f)) for nonzero integers e,f such that (x+e) < (y-f). In addition, it clarifies the semantics of Request ranges which contain only a starting value.

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1. Introduction

The HTTP/1.1 specification [RFC2616] defines the concepts of range requests, partial GET requests, and partial range responses. The definitions of these and other related concepts have been updated in [IDrange].

As originally conceived, these concepts allow a client to selectively ask for, and receive, portions of an entity. Quoting from [RFC2616], the intention is to "reduce unnecessary network usage by allowing partially-retrieved entities to be completed without transferring data already held by the client."

We may consider this case to be "client-driven", in that the client is best positioned to know what it has received and what it still wishes to obtain. Client-driven range requests become possible when
a server indicates its support of range request processing using the Accept-Ranges header (Section 14.5 of [RFC2616]). This header is used to indicate the type of unit the server is willing to process. Although various units could potentially be used, the only one defined for use with HTTP/1.1 and in common use is bytes. Thus, we shall assume a range refers to a byte range, and the notation (a-b) indicates a range of bytes numbered a through b (inclusive). The first byte of an entity is byte number zero.

A client wishing to make a partial GET request (i.e., a range request) includes a Range header in its request (see Sections 9.3 and 14.35 of [RFC2616]).

This header may include one or more byte ranges. Although a byte range may be expressed as (a-b), the value of b (called the last-byte-pos) may be omitted in a byte range when it is not known by the client. In this case, or in a case where b is larger than or equal to the current length of the entity-body, the value of b is taken to be is equal to one less than the current length of the entity-body in bytes.

A server which supports the Range header and receives an appropriate and satisfiable range request for an entity responds with status code of 206 (Partial Content) to indicate success (instead of status code 206, which indicates OK). In addition, the response must include either a Content-Range header or a multipart/byteranges Content-Type including Content-Range fields for each part included in the response.

Multiple byte ranges will only be used if the corresponding request’s Range header included multiple ranges. The presence of multiple ranges in the request in effect indicates the client’s ability to process the multipart/byteranges Content-Type.

Figure 1 A simple network (A-B) is TCP/IP; (B=C) may not be.
2. Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be interpreted as carrying RFC-2119 significance.

3. Server-Oriented Ranges

When range requests and responses are used successfully, the server will typically respond to a byte range request with the contents of the entire byte range(s) included in the Range header.

However, this behavior is not explicitly required by [RFC2616]. Furthermore, there are interesting use cases where certain portions of an entity may not be available at a server at a particular point in time, but other portions of the same entity may be of immediate use to a requesting client. Support for this case may be termed "server-driven," as the knowledge of which ranges are available at which times are determined more by the server than the client.

Consider the simple network depicted in Figure 1. The path between A and B is a conventional TCP/IP network and the path between B and C may be some other type of network (e.g., a lossy one directional link from C to B).

Assume that a web proxy agent on B aggregates blocks of an entity together and provides the re-aggregated portions to A as soon as they become available.

For concreteness, imagine the data being transferred are samples of continuous media such as streaming audio or video. In this case it would be useful to allow A to obtain whatever continuous byte ranges are available on B in as timely a manner as possible.

Using the existing framework for range requests, A can issue a partial GET request for the range (0-), indicating a desire to obtain whatever is available from B.

B is able to respond with a byte range indicated using the Content-Range header in a Partial Content (status code 206) response. It may, but is not require to, respond with a range of bytes starting with byte number zero.
Continuing with the example, if A desires to obtain the missing parts of the entity it is interested in, it may issue multiple range requests of the form (a-b) and the server on B may respond with ranges corresponding ranges (x-y). It is explicitly not required that a=x or b=y. However, to be a legal byte range, a <= b and x <= y are both required.

4. Summary

This document specifies a normative behavior for range responses. When a partial GET request contains a range (x-y), a response utilizing the 206 response code MAY include a range other than (x-y). However, if the entire range is available it SHOULD respond with the requested range.

In addition, when a range request is of the form (x-), the server MAY respond with a range response including an initial byte number y > x. Finally, a response including multiple ranges is permitted so long as the corresponding range request included multiple ranges.

If the number of ranges available at the server are greater than or equal to the number of ranges present in the request, the server SHOULD respond with the number of ranges equal to the number of responses.

5. Security Considerations

This document does not introduce any security considerations beyond those present in [RFC2616].

6. IANA Considerations

No IANA action is required by this document.

7. Conclusions

The existing structure of HTTP range requests and partial responses can be used for delivering portions of a requested entity without syntactical modification to the HTTP protocol.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

8.2. Informative References


9. Acknowledgments

This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.
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SPDY Protocol
draft-mbelshe-httpbis-spdy-00

Abstract

This document describes SPDY, a protocol designed for low-latency transport of content over the World Wide Web. SPDY introduces two layers of protocol. The lower layer is a general purpose framing layer which can be used atop a reliable transport (likely TCP) for multiplexed, prioritized, and compressed data communication of many concurrent streams. The upper layer of the protocol provides HTTP-like RFC2616 [RFC2616] semantics for compatibility with existing HTTP application servers.

Status of this Memo

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1. Overview

One of the bottlenecks of HTTP implementations is that HTTP relies on multiple connections for concurrency. This causes several problems, including additional round trips for connection setup, slow-start delays, and connection rationing by the client, where it tries to avoid opening too many connections to any single server. HTTP pipelining helps some, but only achieves partial multiplexing. In addition, pipelining has proven non-deployable in existing browsers due to intermediary interference.

SPDY adds a framing layer for multiplexing multiple, concurrent streams across a single TCP connection (or any reliable transport stream). The framing layer is optimized for HTTP-like request-response streams, such that applications which run over HTTP today can work over SPDY with little or no change on behalf of the web application writer.

The SPDY session offers four improvements over HTTP:

- **Multiplexed requests:** There is no limit to the number of requests that can be issued concurrently over a single SPDY connection.

- **Prioritized requests:** Clients can request certain resources to be delivered first. This avoids the problem of congesting the network channel with non-critical resources when a high-priority request is pending.

- **Compressed headers:** Clients today send a significant amount of redundant data in the form of HTTP headers. Because a single web page may require 50 or 100 subrequests, this data is significant.

- **Server pushed streams:** Server Push enables content to be pushed from servers to clients without a request.

SPDY attempts to preserve the existing semantics of HTTP. All features such as cookies, ETags, Vary headers, Content-Encoding negotiations, etc work as they do with HTTP; SPDY only replaces the way the data is written to the network.

1.1. Document Organization

The SPDY Specification is split into two parts: a framing layer (Section 2), which multiplexes a TCP connection into independent, length-prefixed frames, and an HTTP layer (Section 3), which specifies the mechanism for overlaying HTTP request/response pairs on top of the framing layer. While some of the framing layer concepts are isolated from the HTTP layer, building a generic framing layer...
has not been a goal. The framing layer is tailored to the needs of the HTTP protocol and server push.

1.2. Definitions

client: The endpoint initiating the SPDY session.

connection: A transport-level connection between two endpoints.

endpoint: Either the client or server of a connection.

frame: A header-prefixed sequence of bytes sent over a SPDY session.

server: The endpoint which did not initiate the SPDY session.

session: A synonym for a connection.

session error: An error on the SPDY session.

stream: A bi-directional flow of bytes across a virtual channel within a SPDY session.

stream error: An error on an individual SPDY stream.
2. SPDY Framing Layer

2.1. Session (Connections)

The SPDY framing layer (or "session") runs atop a reliable transport layer such as TCP [RFC0793]. The client is the TCP connection initiator. SPDY connections are persistent connections.

For best performance, it is expected that clients will not close open connections until the user navigates away from all web pages referencing a connection, or until the server closes the connection. Servers are encouraged to leave connections open for as long as possible, but can terminate idle connections if necessary. When either endpoint closes the transport-level connection, it MUST first send a GOAWAY (Section 2.6.6) frame so that the endpoints can reliably determine if requests finished before the close.

2.2. Framing

Once the connection is established, clients and servers exchange framed messages. There are two types of frames: control frames (Section 2.2.1) and data frames (Section 2.2.2). Frames always have a common header which is 8 bytes in length.

The first bit is a control bit indicating whether a frame is a control frame or data frame. Control frames carry a version number, a frame type, flags, and a length. Data frames contain the stream ID, flags, and the length for the payload carried after the common header. The simple header is designed to make reading and writing of frames easy.

All integer values, including length, version, and type, are in network byte order. SPDY does not enforce alignment of types in dynamically sized frames.

2.2.1. Control frames

```
+----------------------------------+
| C | Version(15bits) | Type(16bits) |
+----------------------------------+
| Flags (8) | Length (24 bits) |
+--------------------------+
| Data |
+--------------------------+
```

Control bit: The 'C' bit is a single bit indicating if this is a control message. For control frames this value is always 1.
Version: The version number of the SPDY protocol. This document describes SPDY version 3.

Type: The type of control frame. See Control Frames for the complete list of control frames.

Flags: Flags related to this frame. Flags for control frames and data frames are different.

Length: An unsigned 24-bit value representing the number of bytes after the length field.

Data: data associated with this control frame. The format and length of this data is controlled by the control frame type.

Control frame processing requirements:

Note that full length control frames (16MB) can be large for implementations running on resource-limited hardware. In such cases, implementations MAY limit the maximum length frame supported. However, all implementations MUST be able to receive control frames of at least 8192 octets in length.

2.2.2. Data frames

+------------------------+
| C | Stream-ID (31bits) |
+------------------------+
| Flags (8) | Length (24 bits) |
+------------------------+
| Data |
+------------------------+

Control bit: For data frames this value is always 0.

Stream-ID: A 31-bit value identifying the stream.

Flags: Flags related to this frame. Valid flags are:

0x01 = FLAG_FIN - signifies that this frame represents the last frame to be transmitted on this stream. See Stream Close (Section 2.3.7) below.

0x02 = FLAG_COMPRESS - indicates that the data in this frame has been compressed.

Length: An unsigned 24-bit value representing the number of bytes after the length field. The total size of a data frame is 8 bytes +
length. It is valid to have a zero-length data frame.

Data: The variable-length data payload; the length was defined in the
length field.

Data frame processing requirements:

If an endpoint receives a data frame for a stream-id which is not
open and the endpoint has not sent a GOAWAY (Section 2.6.6) frame, it
MUST send an issue a stream error (Section 2.4.2) with the error
code INVALID_STREAM for the stream-id.

If the endpoint which created the stream receives a data frame
before receiving a SYN_REPLY on that stream, it is a protocol
error, and the recipient MUST issue a stream error (Section 2.4.2)
with the status code PROTOCOL_ERROR for the stream-id.

Implementors note: If an endpoint receives multiple data frames
for invalid stream-ids, it MAY close the session.

All SPDY endpoints MUST accept compressed data frames.
Compression of data frames is always done using zlib compression.
Each stream initializes and uses its own compression context
dedicated to use within that stream. Endpoints are encouraged to
use application level compression rather than SPDY stream level
compression.

Each SPDY stream sending compressed frames creates its own zlib
context for that stream, and these compression contexts MUST be
distinct from the compression contexts used with SYN_STREAM/
SYN_REPLY/HEADER compression. (Thus, if both endpoints of a
stream are compressing data on the stream, there will be two zlib
contexts, one for sending and one for receiving).

2.3. Streams

Streams are independent sequences of bi-directional data divided into
frames with several properties:

Streams may be created by either the client or server.
Streams optionally carry a set of name/value header pairs.
Streams can concurrently send data interleaved with other streams.
Streams may be cancelled.
2.3.1. Stream frames

SPDY defines 3 control frames to manage the lifecycle of a stream:

- **SYN_STREAM** - Open a new stream
- **SYN_REPLY** - Remote acknowledgement of a new, open stream
- **RST_STREAM** - Close a stream

2.3.2. Stream creation

A stream is created by sending a control frame with the type set to **SYN_STREAM** (Section 2.6.1). If the server is initiating the stream, the Stream-ID must be even. If the client is initiating the stream, the Stream-ID must be odd. 0 is not a valid Stream-ID. Stream-IDs from each side of the connection must increase monotonically as new streams are created. E.g. Stream 2 may be created after stream 3, but stream 7 must not be created after stream 9. Stream IDs do not wrap: when a client or server cannot create a new stream id without exceeding a 31 bit value, it MUST NOT create a new stream.

The stream-id MUST increase with each new stream. If an endpoint receives a **SYN_STREAM** with a stream id which is less than any previously received **SYN_STREAM**, it MUST issue a session error (Section 2.4.1) with the status **PROTOCOL_ERROR**.

It is a protocol error to send two **SYN_STREAMs** with the same stream-id. If a recipient receives a second **SYN_STREAM** for the same stream, it MUST issue a stream error (Section 2.4.2) with the status code **PROTOCOL_ERROR**.

Upon receipt of a **SYN_STREAM**, the recipient can reject the stream by sending a stream error (Section 2.4.2) with the error code **REFUSED_STREAM**. Note, however, that the creating endpoint may have already sent additional frames for that stream which cannot be immediately stopped.

Once the stream is created, the creator may immediately send HEADERS or DATA frames for that stream, without needing to wait for the recipient to acknowledge.

2.3.2.1. Unidirectional streams

When an endpoint creates a stream with the **FLAG_UNIDIRECTIONAL** flag set, it creates a unidirectional stream which the creating endpoint can use to send frames, but the receiving endpoint cannot. The receiving endpoint is implicitly already in the half-closed
(Section 2.3.6) state.

2.3.2.2. Bidirectional streams

SYN_STREAM frames which do not use the FLAG_UNIDIRECTIONAL flag are bidirectional streams. Both endpoints can send data on a bi-directional stream.

2.3.3. Stream priority

The creator of a stream assigns a priority for that stream. Priority is represented as an integer from 0 to 7. 0 represents the highest priority and 7 represents the lowest priority.

The sender and recipient SHOULD use best-effort to process streams in the order of highest priority to lowest priority.

2.3.4. Stream headers

Streams carry optional sets of name/value pair headers which carry metadata about the stream. After the stream has been created, and as long as the sender is not closed (Section 2.3.7) or half-closed (Section 2.3.6), each side may send HEADERS frame(s) containing the header data. Header data can be sent in multiple HEADERS frames, and HEADERS frames may be interleaved with data frames.

2.3.5. Stream data exchange

Once a stream is created, it can be used to send arbitrary amounts of data. Generally this means that a series of data frames will be sent on the stream until a frame containing the FLAG_FIN flag is set. The FLAG_FIN can be set on a SYN_STREAM (Section 2.6.1), SYN_REPLY (Section 2.6.2), HEADERS (Section 2.6.7) or a DATA (Section 2.2.2) frame. Once the FLAG_FIN has been sent, the stream is considered to be half-closed.

2.3.6. Stream half-close

When one side of the stream sends a frame with the FLAG_FIN flag set, the stream is half-closed from that endpoint. The sender of the FLAG_FIN MUST NOT send further frames on that stream. When both sides have half-closed, the stream is closed.

If an endpoint receives a data frame after the stream is half-closed from the sender (e.g. the endpoint has already received a prior frame for the stream with the FIN flag set), it MUST send a RST_STREAM to the sender with the status STREAM_ALREADY_CLOSED.
2.3.7. Stream close

There are 3 ways that streams can be terminated:

Normal termination: Normal stream termination occurs when both sender and recipient have half-closed the stream by sending a FLAG_FIN.

Abrupt termination: Either the client or server can send a RST_STREAM control frame at any time. A RST_STREAM contains an error code to indicate the reason for failure. When a RST_STREAM is sent from the stream originator, it indicates a failure to complete the stream and that no further data will be sent on the stream. When a RST_STREAM is sent from the stream recipient, the sender, upon receipt, should stop sending any data on the stream. The stream recipient should be aware that there is a race between data already in transit from the sender and the time the RST_STREAM is received. See Stream Error Handling (Section 2.4.2)

TCP connection teardown: If the TCP connection is torn down while un-closed streams exist, then the endpoint must assume that the stream was abnormally interrupted and may be incomplete.

If an endpoint receives a data frame after the stream is closed, it must send a RST_STREAM to the sender with the status PROTOCOL_ERROR.

2.4. Error Handling

The SPDY framing layer has only two types of errors, and they are always handled consistently. Any reference in this specification to "issue a session error" refers to Section 2.4.1. Any reference to "issue a stream error" refers to Section 2.4.2.

2.4.1. Session Error Handling

A session error is any error which prevents further processing of the framing layer or which corrupts the session compression state. When a session error occurs, the endpoint encountering the error MUST first send a GOAWAY (Section 2.6.6) frame with the stream id of most recently received stream from the remote endpoint, and the error code for why the session is terminating. After sending the GOAWAY frame, the endpoint MUST close the TCP connection.

Note that the session compression state is dependent upon both endpoints always processing all compressed data. If an endpoint partially processes a frame containing compressed data without updating compression state properly, future control frames which use compression will be always be errored. Implementations SHOULD always
try to process compressed data so that errors which could be handled as stream errors do not become session errors.

Note that because this GOAWAY is sent during a session error case, it is possible that the GOAWAY will not be reliably received by the receiving endpoint. It is a best-effort attempt to communicate with the remote about why the session is going down.

2.4.2. Stream Error Handling

A stream error is an error related to a specific stream-id which does not affect processing of other streams at the framing layer. Upon a stream error, the endpoint MUST send a RST_STREAM (Section 2.6.3) frame which contains the stream id of the stream where the error occurred and the error status which caused the error. After sending the RST_STREAM, the stream is closed to the sending endpoint. After sending the RST_STREAM, if the sender receives any frames other than a RST_STREAM for that stream id, it will result in sending additional RST_STREAM frames. An endpoint MUST NOT send a RST_STREAM in response to an RST_STREAM, as doing so would lead to RST_STREAM loops. Sending a RST_STREAM does not cause the SPDY session to be closed.

If an endpoint has multiple RST_STREAM frames to send in succession for the same stream-id and the same error code, it MAY coalesce them into a single RST_STREAM frame. (This can happen if a stream is closed, but the remote sends multiple data frames. There is no reason to send a RST_STREAM for each frame in succession).

2.5. Data flow

Because TCP provides a single stream of data on which SPDY multiplexes multiple logical streams, clients and servers must intelligently interleave data messages for concurrent sessions.

2.6. Control frame types

2.6.1. SYN_STREAM

The SYN_STREAM control frame allows the sender to asynchronously create a stream between the endpoints. See Stream Creation (Section 2.3.2)
Flags: Flags related to this frame. Valid flags are:

0x01 = FLAG_FIN - marks this frame as the last frame to be transmitted on this stream and puts the sender in the half-closed (Section 2.3.6) state.

0x02 = FLAG_UNIDIRECTIONAL - a stream created with this flag puts the recipient in the half-closed (Section 2.3.6) state.

Length: The length is the number of bytes which follow the length field in the frame. For SYN_STREAM frames, this is 10 bytes plus the length of the compressed Name/Value block.

Stream-ID: The 31-bit identifier for this stream. This stream-id will be used in frames which are part of this stream.

Associated-To-Stream-ID: The 31-bit identifier for a stream which this stream is associated to. If this stream is independent of all other streams, it should be 0.

Priority: A 3-bit priority (Section 2.3.3) field.

Unused: 5 bits of unused space, reserved for future use.

Slot: An 8 bit unsigned integer specifying the index in the server’s
CREDENTIAL vector of the client certificate to be used for this request. see CREDENTIAL frame (Section 2.6.9). The value 0 means no client certificate should be associated with this stream.

Name/Value Header Block: A set of name/value pairs carried as part of the SYN_STREAM. see Name/Value Header Block (Section 2.6.10).

If an endpoint receives a SYN_STREAM which is larger than the implementation supports, it MAY send a RST_STREAM with error code FRAME_TOO_LARGE. All implementations MUST support the minimum size limits defined in the Control Frames section (Section 2.2.1).

2.6.2. SYN_REPLY

SYN_REPLY indicates the acceptance of a stream creation by the recipient of a SYN_STREAM frame.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>version</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flags (8)</td>
<td>Length (24 bits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Stream-ID (31bits)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Name/Value pairs (int32)</td>
<td>&lt;+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Length of name (int32)</td>
<td>This section is the &quot;Name/Value Header Block&quot;, and is compressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name (string)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Length of value (int32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value (string)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(repeats)</td>
<td>&lt;+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Flags: Flags related to this frame. Valid flags are:

0x01 = FLAG_FIN - marks this frame as the last frame to be transmitted on this stream and puts the sender in the half-closed (Section 2.3.6) state.

Length: The length is the number of bytes which follow the length field in the frame. For SYN_REPLY frames, this is 4 bytes plus the length of the compressed Name/Value block.

Stream-ID: The 31-bit identifier for this stream.
If an endpoint receives multiple SYN_REPLY frames for the same active stream ID, it MUST issue a stream error (Section 2.4.2) with the error code STREAM_IN_USE.

Name/Value Header Block: A set of name/value pairs carried as part of the SYN_STREAM. see Name/Value Header Block (Section 2.6.10).

If an endpoint receives a SYN_REPLY which is larger than the implementation supports, it MAY send a RST_STREAM with error code FRAME_TOO_LARGE. All implementations MUST support the minimum size limits defined in the Control Frames section (Section 2.2.1).

2.6.3. RST_STREAM

The RST_STREAM frame allows for abnormal termination of a stream. When sent by the creator of a stream, it indicates the creator wishes to cancel the stream. When sent by the recipient of a stream, it indicates an error or that the recipient did not want to accept the stream, so the stream should be closed.

+----------------------------------+
|1|   version    |         3       |
+----------------------------------+
| Flags (8)  |         8           |
+----------------------------------+
|X|          Stream-ID (31bits)    |
+----------------------------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Flags: Flags related to this frame. RST_STREAM does not define any flags. This value must be 0.

Length: An unsigned 24-bit value representing the number of bytes after the length field. For RST_STREAM control frames, this value is always 8.

Stream-ID: The 31-bit identifier for this stream.

Status code: (32 bits) An indicator for why the stream is being terminated. The following status codes are defined:

1 - PROTOCOL_ERROR. This is a generic error, and should only be used if a more specific error is not available.

2 - INVALID_STREAM. This is returned when a frame is received for a stream which is not active.
3 - REFUSED_STREAM. Indicates that the stream was refused before any processing has been done on the stream.

4 - UNSUPPORTED_VERSION. Indicates that the recipient of a stream does not support the SPDY version requested.

5 - CANCEL. Used by the creator of a stream to indicate that the stream is no longer needed.

6 - INTERNAL_ERROR. This is a generic error which can be used when the implementation has internally failed, not due to anything in the protocol.

7 - FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR. The endpoint detected that its peer violated the flow control protocol.

8 - STREAM_IN_USE. The endpoint received a SYN_REPLY for a stream already open.

9 - STREAM_ALREADY_CLOSED. The endpoint received a data or SYN_REPLY frame for a stream which is half closed.

10 - INVALID_CREDENTIALS. The server received a request for a resource whose origin does not have valid credentials in the client certificate vector.

11 - FRAME_TOO_LARGE. The endpoint received a frame which this implementation could not support. If FRAME_TOO_LARGE is sent for a SYN_STREAM, HEADERS, or SYN_REPLY frame without fully processing the compressed portion of those frames, then the compression state will be out-of-sync with the other endpoint. In this case, senders of FRAME_TOO_LARGE MUST close the session.

Note: 0 is not a valid status code for a RST_STREAM.

After receiving a RST_STREAM on a stream, the recipient must not send additional frames for that stream, and the stream moves into the closed state.

2.6.4. SETTINGS

A SETTINGS frame contains a set of id/value pairs for communicating configuration data about how the two endpoints may communicate. SETTINGS frames can be sent at any time by either endpoint, are optionally sent, and are fully asynchronous. When the server is the sender, the sender can request that configuration data be persisted by the client across SPDY sessions and returned to the server in future communications.
Persistence of SETTINGS ID/Value pairs is done on a per origin/IP pair (the "origin" is the set of scheme, host, and port from the URI. See [RFC6454]). That is, when a client connects to a server, and the server persists settings within the client, the client SHOULD return the persisted settings on future connections to the same origin AND IP address and TCP port. Clients MUST NOT request servers to use the persistence features of the SETTINGS frames, and servers MUST ignore persistence related flags sent by a client.

+----------------------------------+
| 1|   version    |         4       |
+----------------------------------+
| Flags (8)  |  Length (24 bits) |
+----------------------------------+
| Number of entries                  |
+----------------------------------+
| ID/Value Pairs                      |
| ...                                 |

Control bit: The control bit is always 1 for this message.

Version: The SPDY version number.

Type: The message type for a SETTINGS message is 4.

Flags: FLAG_SETTINGS_CLEAR_SETTINGS (0x1): When set, the client should clear any previously persisted SETTINGS ID/Value pairs. If this frame contains ID/Value pairs with the FLAG_SETTINGS_PERSIST_VALUE set, then the client will first clear its existing, persisted settings, and then persist the values with the flag set which are contained within this frame. Because persistence is only implemented on the client, this flag can only be used when the sender is the server.

Length: An unsigned 24-bit value representing the number of bytes after the length field. The total size of a SETTINGS frame is 8 bytes + length.

Number of entries: A 32-bit value representing the number of ID/value pairs in this message.

ID: A 32-bit ID number, comprised of 8 bits of flags and 24 bits of unique ID.

   ID.flags:

   FLAG_SETTINGS_PERSIST_VALUE (0x1): When set, the sender of this SETTINGS frame is requesting that the recipient persist the ID/
Value and return it in future SETTINGS frames sent from the sender to this recipient. Because persistence is only implemented on the client, this flag is only sent by the server.

FLAG_SETTINGS_PERSISTED (0x2): When set, the sender is notifying the recipient that this ID/Value pair was previously sent to the sender by the recipient with the FLAG_SETTINGS_PERSIST_VALUE, and the sender is returning it. Because persistence is only implemented on the client, this flag is only sent by the client.

Defined IDs:

1 - SETTINGS_UPLOAD_BANDWIDTH allows the sender to send its expected upload bandwidth on this channel. This number is an estimate. The value should be the integral number of kilobytes per second that the sender predicts as an expected maximum upload channel capacity.

2 - SETTINGS_DOWNLOAD_BANDWIDTH allows the sender to send its expected download bandwidth on this channel. This number is an estimate. The value should be the integral number of kilobytes per second that the sender predicts as an expected maximum download channel capacity.

3 - SETTINGS_ROUND_TRIP_TIME allows the sender to send its expected round-trip-time on this channel. The round trip time is defined as the minimum amount of time to send a control frame from this client to the remote and receive a response. The value is represented in milliseconds.

4 - SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS allows the sender to inform the remote endpoint the maximum number of concurrent streams which it will allow. By default there is no limit. For implementors it is recommended that this value be no smaller than 100.

5 - SETTINGS_CURRENT_CWND allows the sender to inform the remote endpoint of the current TCP CWND value.

6 - SETTINGS_DOWNLOAD_RETRANS_RATE allows the sender to inform the remote endpoint the retransmission rate (bytes retransmitted / total bytes transmitted).

7 - SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE allows the sender to inform the remote endpoint the initial window size (in bytes) for new streams.
8 - SETTINGS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VECTOR_SIZE allows the server to inform the client if the new size of the client certificate vector.

Value: A 32-bit value.

The message is intentionally extensible for future information which may improve client-server communications. The sender does not need to send every type of ID/value. It must only send those for which it has accurate values to convey. When multiple ID/value pairs are sent, they should be sent in order of lowest id to highest id. A single SETTINGS frame MUST not contain multiple values for the same ID. If the recipient of a SETTINGS frame discovers multiple values for the same ID, it MUST ignore all values except the first one.

A server may send multiple SETTINGS frames containing different ID/Value pairs. When the same ID/Value is sent twice, the most recent value overrides any previously sent values. If the server sends IDs 1, 2, and 3 with the FLAG_SETTINGS_PERSIST_VALUE in a first SETTINGS frame, and then sends IDs 4 and 5 with the FLAG_SETTINGS_PERSIST_VALUE, when the client returns the persisted state on its next SETTINGS frame, it SHOULD send all 5 settings (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in this example) to the server.

2.6.5. PING

The PING control frame is a mechanism for measuring a minimal round-trip time from the sender. It can be sent from the client or the server. Recipients of a PING frame should send an identical frame to the sender as soon as possible (if there is other pending data waiting to be sent, PING should take highest priority). Each ping sent by a sender should use a unique ID.

+----------------------------------+
| 1 | version    | 6       |
+----------------------------------+
| 0 (flags) | 4 (length) |
+----------------------------------+
| 32-bit ID |
+----------------------------------+

Control bit: The control bit is always 1 for this message.

Version: The SPDY version number.

Type: The message type for a PING message is 6.

Length: This frame is always 4 bytes long.
ID: A unique ID for this ping, represented as an unsigned 32 bit value. When the client initiates a ping, it must use an odd numbered ID. When the server initiates a ping, it must use an even numbered ping. Use of odd/even IDs is required in order to avoid accidental looping on PINGs (where each side initiates an identical PING at the same time).

Note: If a sender uses all possible PING ids (e.g. has sent all $2^{31}$ possible IDs), it can wrap and start re-using IDs.

If a server receives an even numbered PING which it did not initiate, it must ignore the PING. If a client receives an odd numbered PING which it did not initiate, it must ignore the PING.

2.6.6. GOAWAY

The GOAWAY control frame is a mechanism to tell the remote side of the connection to stop creating streams on this session. It can be sent from the client or the server. Once sent, the sender will not respond to any new SYN_STREAMs on this session. Recipients of a GOAWAY frame must not send additional streams on this session, although a new session can be established for new streams. The purpose of this message is to allow an endpoint to gracefully stop accepting new streams (perhaps for a reboot or maintenance), while still finishing processing of previously established streams.

There is an inherent race condition between an endpoint sending SYN_STREAMs and the remote sending a GOAWAY message. To deal with this case, the GOAWAY contains a last-stream-id indicating the stream-id of the last stream which was created on the sending endpoint in this session. If the receiver of the GOAWAY sent new SYN_STREAMs for sessions after this last-stream-id, they were not processed by the server and the receiver may treat the stream as though it had never been created at all (hence the receiver may want to re-create the stream later on a new session).

Endpoints should always send a GOAWAY message before closing a connection so that the remote can know whether a stream has been partially processed or not. (For example, if an HTTP client sends a POST at the same time that a server closes a connection, the client cannot know if the server started to process that POST request if the server does not send a GOAWAY frame to indicate where it stopped working).

After sending a GOAWAY message, the sender must ignore all SYN_STREAM frames for new streams.
Control bit: The control bit is always 1 for this message.

Version: The SPDY version number.

Type: The message type for a GOAWAY message is 7.

Length: This frame is always 8 bytes long.

Last-good-stream-Id: The last stream id which was replied to (with either a SYN_REPLY or RST_STREAM) by the sender of the GOAWAY message. If no streams were replied to, this value MUST be 0.

Status: The reason for closing the session.

  0 - OK. This is a normal session teardown.

  1 - PROTOCOL_ERROR. This is a generic error, and should only be used if a more specific error is not available.

  11 - INTERNAL_ERROR. This is a generic error which can be used when the implementation has internally failed, not due to anything in the protocol.

2.6.7. HEADERS

The HEADERS frame augments a stream with additional headers. It may be optionally sent on an existing stream at any time. Specific application of the headers in this frame is application-dependent. The name/value header block within this frame is compressed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flags (8)</th>
<th>Length (24 bits)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Stream-ID (31bits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Name/Value pairs (int32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Length of name (int32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name (string)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Length of value (int32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value (string)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(repeats)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Flags: Flags related to this frame. Valid flags are:

0x01 = FLAG_FIN - marks this frame as the last frame to be transmitted on this stream and puts the sender in the half-closed (Section 2.3.6) state.

Length: An unsigned 24 bit value representing the number of bytes after the length field. The minimum length of the length field is 4 (when the number of name value pairs is 0).

Stream-ID: The stream this HEADERS block is associated with.

Name/Value Header Block: A set of name/value pairs carried as part of the SYN_STREAM. see Name/Value Header Block (Section 2.6.10).

2.6.8. WINDOW_UPDATE

The WINDOW_UPDATE control frame is used to implement per stream flow control in SPDY. Flow control in SPDY is per hop, that is, only between the two endpoints of a SPDY connection. If there are one or more intermediaries between the client and the origin server, flow control signals are not explicitly forwarded by the intermediaries. (However, throttling of data transfer by any recipient may have the effect of indirectly propagating flow control information upstream back to the original sender.) Flow control only applies to the data portion of data frames. Recipients must buffer all control frames. If a recipient fails to buffer an entire control frame, it MUST issue a stream error (Section 2.4.2) with the status code FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR for the stream.
Flow control in SPDY is implemented by a data transfer window kept by
the sender of each stream. The data transfer window is a simple
uint32 that indicates how many bytes of data the sender can transmit.
After a stream is created, but before any data frames have been
transmitted, the sender begins with the initial window size. This
window size is a measure of the buffering capability of the
recipient. The sender must not send a data frame with data length
greater than the transfer window size. After sending each data
frame, the sender decrements its transfer window size by the amount
of data transmitted. When the window size becomes less than or equal
to 0, the sender must pause transmitting data frames. At the other
end of the stream, the recipient sends a WINDOW_UPDATE control back
to notify the sender that it has consumed some data and freed up
buffer space to receive more data.

+----------------------------------+
| 1|   version    |         9       |
+----------------------------------+
| 0 (flags) |     8 (length)       |
+----------------------------------+
|X|     Stream-ID (31-bits)        |
+----------------------------------+
|X|  Delta-Window-Size (31-bits)   |
+----------------------------------+

Control bit: The control bit is always 1 for this message.

Version: The SPDY version number.

Type: The message type for a WINDOW_UPDATE message is 9.

Length: The length field is always 8 for this frame (there are 8
bytes after the length field).

Stream-ID: The stream ID that this WINDOW_UPDATE control frame is
for.

Delta-Window-Size: The additional number of bytes that the sender can
transmit in addition to existing remaining window size. The legal
range for this field is 1 to 2^31 - 1 (0x7fffffff) bytes.

The window size as kept by the sender must never exceed 2^31
(although it can become negative in one special case). If a sender
receives a WINDOW_UPDATE that causes the its window size to exceed
this limit, it must send RST_STREAM with status code
FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR to terminate the stream.

When a SPDY connection is first established, the default initial
window size for all streams is 64KB. An endpoint can use the SETTINGS control frame to adjust the initial window size for the connection. That is, its peer can start out using the 64KB default initial window size when sending data frames before receiving the SETTINGS. Because SETTINGS is asynchronous, there may be a race condition if the recipient wants to decrease the initial window size, but its peer immediately sends 64KB on the creation of a new connection, before waiting for the SETTINGS to arrive. This is one case where the window size kept by the sender will become negative. Once the sender detects this condition, it must stop sending data frames and wait for the recipient to catch up. The recipient has two choices:

- immediately send RST_STREAM with FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR status code.
- allow the head of line blocking (as there is only one stream for the session and the amount of data in flight is bounded by the default initial window size), and send WINDOW_UPDATE as it consumes data.

In the case of option 2, both sides must compute the window size based on the initial window size in the SETTINGS. For example, if the recipient sets the initial window size to be 16KB, and the sender sends 64KB immediately on connection establishment, the sender will discover its window size is -48KB on receipt of the SETTINGS. As the recipient consumes the first 16KB, it must send a WINDOW_UPDATE of 16KB back to the sender. This interaction continues until the sender’s window size becomes positive again, and it can resume transmitting data frames.

After the recipient reads in a data frame with FLAG_FIN that marks the end of the data stream, it should not send WINDOW_UPDATE frames as it consumes the last data frame. A sender should ignore all the WINDOW_UPDATE frames associated with the stream after it send the last frame for the stream.

The data frames from the sender and the WINDOW_UPDATE frames from the recipient are completely asynchronous with respect to each other. This property allows a recipient to aggressively update the window size kept by the sender to prevent the stream from stalling.

2.6.9. CREDENTIAL

The CREDENTIAL control frame is used by the client to send additional client certificates to the server. A SPDY client may decide to send requests for resources from different origins on the same SPDY session if it decides that that server handles both origins. For example if the IP address associated with both hostnames matches and
the SSL server certificate presented in the initial handshake is valid for both hostnames. However, because the SSL connection can contain at most one client certificate, the client needs a mechanism to send additional client certificates to the server.

The server is required to maintain a vector of client certificates associated with a SPDY session. When the client needs to send a client certificate to the server, it will send a CREDENTIAL frame that specifies the index of the slot in which to store the certificate as well as proof that the client possesses the corresponding private key. The initial size of this vector must be 8. If the client provides a client certificate during the first TLS handshake, the contents of this certificate must be copied into the first slot (index 1) in the CREDENTIAL vector, though it may be overwritten by subsequent CREDENTIAL frames. The server must exclusively use the CREDNETIAL vector when evaluating the client certificates associated with an origin. The server may change the size of this vector by sending a SETTINGS frame with the setting SETTINGS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VECTOR_SIZE value specified. In the event that the new size is smaller than the current size, truncation occurs preserving lower-index slots as possible.

TLS renegotiation with client authentication is incompatible with SPDY given the multiplexed nature of SPDY. Specifically, imagine that the client has 2 requests outstanding to the server for two different pages (in different tabs). When the renegotiation + client certificate request comes in, the browser is unable to determine which resource triggered the client certificate request, in order to prompt the user accordingly.

```
+-----------------+                |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>flags (8)</th>
<th>Length (24 bits)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slot (16 bits)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof Length (32 bits)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof &lt;=+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|               Certificate Length (32 bits) | Repeated until end of frame
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Certificate &lt;=+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Slot: The index in the server’s client certificate vector where this certificate should be stored. If there is already a certificate
stored at this index, it will be overwritten. The index is one based, not zero based; zero is an invalid slot index.

Proof: Cryptographic proof that the client has possession of the private key associated with the certificate. The format is a TLS digitally-signed element (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-4.7). The signature algorithm must be the same as that used in the CertificateVerify message. However, since the MD5+SHA1 signature type used in TLS 1.0 connections can not be correctly encoded in a digitally-signed element, SHA1 must be used when MD5+SHA1 was used in the SSL connection. The signature is calculated over a 32 byte TLS extractor value (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5705) with a label of "EXPORTER SPDY certificate proof" using the empty string as context. For RSA certificates the signature would be a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature. For ECDSA, it would be an ECDSA-Sig-Value (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5480#appendix-A). For a 1024-bit RSA key, the CREDENTIAL message would be ~500 bytes.

Certificate: The certificate chain, starting with the leaf certificate. Each certificate must be encoded as a 32 bit length, followed by a DER encoded certificate. The certificate must be of the same type (RSA, ECDSA, etc) as the client certificate associated with the SSL connection.

If the server receives a request for a resource with unacceptable credential (either missing or invalid), it must reply with a RST_STREAM frame with the status code INVALID_CREDENTIALS. Upon receipt of a RST_STREAM frame with INVALID_CREDENTIALS, the client should initiate a new stream directly to the requested origin and resend the request. Note, SPDY does not allow the server to request different client authentication for different resources in the same origin.

If the server receives an invalid CREDENTIAL frame, it MUST respond with a GOAWAY frame and shutdown the session.

2.6.10. Name/Value Header Block

The Name/Value Header Block is found in the SYN_STREAM, SYN_REPLY and HEADERS control frames, and shares a common format:
Number of Name/Value pairs: The number of repeating name/value pairs following this field.

List of Name/Value pairs:

Length of Name: a 32-bit value containing the number of octets in the name field. Note that in practice, this length must not exceed $2^{24}$, as that is the maximum size of a SPDY frame.

Name: 0 or more octets, 8-bit sequences of data, excluding 0.

Length of Value: a 32-bit value containing the number of octets in the value field. Note that in practice, this length must not exceed $2^{24}$, as that is the maximum size of a SPDY frame.

Value: 0 or more octets, 8-bit sequences of data, excluding 0.

Each header name must have at least one value. Header names are encoded using the US-ASCII character set [ASCII] and must be all lower case. The length of each name must be greater than zero. A recipient of a zero-length name MUST issue a stream error (Section 2.4.2) with the status code PROTOCOL_ERROR for the stream-id.

Duplicate header names are not allowed. To send two identically named headers, send a header with two values, where the values are separated by a single NUL (0) byte. A header value can either be empty (e.g. the length is zero) or it can contain multiple, NUL-separated values, each with length greater than zero. The value never starts nor ends with a NUL character. Recipients of illegal value fields MUST issue a stream error (Section 2.4.2) with the status code PROTOCOL_ERROR for the stream-id.
2.6.10.1. Compression

The Name/Value Header Block is a section of the SYN_STREAM, SYN_REPLY, and HEADERS frames used to carry header meta-data. This block is always compressed using zlib compression. Within this specification, any reference to ‘zlib’ is referring to the ZLIB Compressed Data Format Specification Version 3.3 as part of RFC1950. [RFC1950]

For each HEADERS compression instance, the initial state is initialized using the following dictionary [UDELCOMPRESSION]:

```c
const unsigned char SPDY_dictionary_txt[] = {
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x74, 0x69, \ "o p t i
    0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x68, \ e a d
    0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, \ o s t
    0x77, 0x74, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x64, 0x65, \ u t
    0x6c, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, \ l e t e
    0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x63, 0x65, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, \ t r a c e
    0x74, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x63, \ t
    0x65, 0x74, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x64, 0x65, \ e a d
    0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, \ o s t
    0x74, 0x77, 0x74, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, \ u t
};
```

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The entire contents of the name/value header block is compressed using zlib. There is a single zlib stream for all name value pairs in one direction on a connection. SPDY uses a SYNC_FLUSH between each compressed frame.

Implementation notes: the compression engine can be tuned to favor speed or size. Optimizing for size increases memory use and CPU consumption. Because header blocks are generally small, implementors may want to reduce the window-size of the compression engine from the default 15bits (a 32KB window) to more like 11bits (a 2KB window). The exact setting is chosen by the compressor, the decompressor will work with any setting.
3.  HTTP Layering over SPDY

SPDY is intended to be as compatible as possible with current web-based applications. This means that, from the perspective of the server business logic or application API, the features of HTTP are unchanged. To achieve this, all of the application request and response header semantics are preserved, although the syntax of conveying those semantics has changed. Thus, the rules from the HTTP/1.1 specification in RFC2616 [RFC2616] apply with the changes in the sections below.

3.1.  Connection Management

Clients SHOULD NOT open more than one SPDY session to a given origin [RFC6454] concurrently.

Note that it is possible for one SPDY session to be finishing (e.g. a GOAWAY message has been sent, but not all streams have finished), while another SPDY session is starting.

3.1.1. Use of GOAWAY

SPDY provides a GOAWAY message which can be used when closing a connection from either the client or server. Without a server GOAWAY message, HTTP has a race condition where the client sends a request (a new SYN_STREAM) just as the server is closing the connection, and the client cannot know if the server received the stream or not. By using the last-stream-id in the GOAWAY, servers can indicate to the client if a request was processed or not.

Note that some servers will choose to send the GOAWAY and immediately terminate the connection without waiting for active streams to finish. The client will be able to determine this because SPDY streams are deterministically closed. This abrupt termination will force the client to heuristically decide whether to retry the pending requests. Clients always need to be capable of dealing with this case because they must deal with accidental connection termination cases, which are the same as the server never having sent a GOAWAY.

More sophisticated servers will use GOAWAY to implement a graceful teardown. They will send the GOAWAY and provide some time for the active streams to finish before terminating the connection.

If a SPDY client closes the connection, it should also send a GOAWAY message. This allows the server to know if any server-push streams were received by the client.

If the endpoint closing the connection has not received any
SYN_STREAMs from the remote, the GOAWAY will contain a last-stream-id of 0.

3.2. HTTP Request/Response

3.2.1. Request

The client initiates a request by sending a SYN_STREAM frame. For requests which do not contain a body, the SYN_STREAM frame MUST set the FLAG_FIN, indicating that the client intends to send no further data on this stream. For requests which do contain a body, the SYN_STREAM will not contain the FLAG_FIN, and the body will follow the SYN_STREAM in a series of DATA frames. The last DATA frame will set the FLAG_FIN to indicate the end of the body.

The SYN_STREAM Name/Value section will contain all of the HTTP headers which are associated with an HTTP request. The header block in SPDY is mostly unchanged from today’s HTTP header block, with the following differences:

The first line of the request is unfolded into name/value pairs like other HTTP headers and MUST be present:

" :method" - the HTTP method for this request (e.g. "GET", "POST", "HEAD", etc)

" :path" - the url-path for this url with "/" prefixed. (See RFC1738 [RFC1738]). For example, for "http://www.google.com/search?q=dogs" the path would be "/search?q=dogs".

" :version" - the HTTP version of this request (e.g. "HTTP/1.1")

In addition, the following two name/value pairs must also be present in every request:

" :host" - the hostport (See RFC1738 [RFC1738]) portion of the URL for this request (e.g. "www.google.com:1234"). This header is the same as the HTTP 'Host' header.

" :scheme" - the scheme portion of the URL for this request (e.g. "https")

Header names are all lowercase.

The Connection, Host, Keep-Alive, Proxy-Connection, and Transfer-Encoding headers are not valid and MUST not be sent.
User-agents MUST support gzip compression. Regardless of the Accept-Encoding sent by the user-agent, the server may always send content encoded with gzip or deflate encoding.

If a server receives a request where the sum of the data frame payload lengths does not equal the size of the Content-Length header, the server MUST return a 400 (Bad Request) error.

POST-specific changes:

Although POSTs are inherently chunked, POST requests SHOULD also be accompanied by a Content-Length header. There are two reasons for this: First, it assists with upload progress meters for an improved user experience. But second, we know from early versions of SPDY that failure to send a content length header is incompatible with many existing HTTP server implementations. Existing user-agents do not omit the Content-Length header, and server implementations have come to depend upon this.

The user-agent is free to prioritize requests as it sees fit. If the user-agent cannot make progress without receiving a resource, it should attempt to raise the priority of that resource. Resources such as images, SHOULD generally use the lowest priority.

If a client sends a SYN_STREAM without all of the method, host, path, scheme, and version headers, the server MUST reply with a HTTP 400 Bad Request reply.

3.2.2. Response

The server responds to a client request with a SYN_REPLY frame. Symmetric to the client’s upload stream, server will send data after the SYN_REPLY frame via a series of DATA frames, and the last data frame will contain the FLAG_FIN to indicate successful end-of-stream. If a response (like a 202 or 204 response) contains no body, the SYN_REPLY frame may contain the FLAG_FIN flag to indicate no further data will be sent on the stream.

The response status line is unfolded into name/value pairs like other HTTP headers and must be present:

- ":status" - The HTTP response status code (e.g. "200" or "200 OK")
- ":version" - The HTTP response version (e.g. "HTTP/1.1")
All header names must be lowercase.

The Connection, Keep-Alive, Proxy-Connection, and Transfer-Encoding headers are not valid and MUST not be sent.

Responses MAY be accompanied by a Content-Length header for advisory purposes. (e.g. for UI progress meters)

If a client receives a response where the sum of the data frame payload lengths does not equal the size of the Content-Length header, the client MUST ignore the content length header.

If a client receives a SYN_REPLY without a status or without a version header, the client must reply with a RST_STREAM frame indicating a PROTOCOL ERROR.

3.2.3. Authentication

When a client sends a request to an origin server that requires authentication, the server can reply with a "401 Unauthorized" response, and include a WWW-Authenticate challenge header that defines the authentication scheme to be used. The client then retries the request with an Authorization header appropriate to the specified authentication scheme.

There are four options for proxy authentication, Basic, Digest, NTLM and Negotiate (SPNEGO). The first two options were defined in RFC2617 [RFC2617], and are stateless. The second two options were developed by Microsoft and specified in RFC4559 [RFC4559], and are stateful; otherwise known as multi-round authentication, or connection authentication.

3.2.3.1. Stateless Authentication

Stateless Authentication over SPDY is identical to how it is performed over HTTP. If multiple SPDY streams are concurrently sent to a single server, each will authenticate independently, similar to how two HTTP connections would independently authenticate to a proxy server.

3.2.3.2. Stateful Authentication

Unfortunately, the stateful authentication mechanisms were implemented and defined in a such a way that directly violates RFC2617 - they do not include a "realm" as part of the request. This is problematic in SPDY because it makes it impossible for a client to disambiguate two concurrent server authentication challenges.
To deal with this case, SPDY servers using Stateful Authentication MUST implement one of two changes:

Servers can add a "realm=<desired realm>" header so that the two authentication requests can be disambiguated and run concurrently. Unfortunately, given how these mechanisms work, this is probably not practical.

Upon sending the first stateful challenge response, the server MUST buffer and defer all further frames which are not part of completing the challenge until the challenge has completed. Completing the authentication challenge may take multiple round trips. Once the client receives a "401 Authenticate" response for a stateful authentication type, it MUST stop sending new requests to the server until the authentication has completed by receiving a non-401 response on at least one stream.

3.3. Server Push Transactions

SPDY enables a server to send multiple replies to a client for a single request. The rationale for this feature is that sometimes a server knows that it will need to send multiple resources in response to a single request. Without server push features, the client must first download the primary resource, then discover the secondary resource(s), and request them. Pushing of resources avoids the round-trip delay, but also creates a potential race where a server can be pushing content which a user-agent is in the process of requesting. The following mechanics attempt to prevent the race condition while enabling the performance benefit.

Browsers receiving a pushed response MUST validate that the server is authorized to push the URL using the browser same-origin [RFC6454] policy. For example, a SPDY connection to www.foo.com is generally not permitted to push a response for www.evil.com.

If the browser accepts a pushed response (e.g. it does not send a RST_STREAM), the browser MUST attempt to cache the pushed response in same way that it would cache any other response. This means validating the response headers and inserting into the disk cache.

Because pushed responses have no request, they have no request headers associated with them. At the framing layer, SPDY pushed streams contain an "associated-stream-id" which indicates the requested stream for which the pushed stream is related. The pushed stream inherits all of the headers from the associated-stream-id with the exception of ":host", ":scheme", and ":path", which are provided as part of the pushed response stream headers. The browser MUST store these inherited and implied request headers with the cached
Implementation note: With server push, it is theoretically possible for servers to push unreasonable amounts of content or resources to the user-agent. Browsers MUST implement throttles to protect against unreasonable push attacks.

3.3.1. Server implementation

When the server intends to push a resource to the user-agent, it opens a new stream by sending a unidirectional SYN_STREAM. The SYN_STREAM MUST include an Associated-To-Stream-ID, and MUST set the FLAG_UNIDIRECTIONAL flag. The SYN_STREAM MUST include headers for "scheme", "host", "path", which represent the URL for the resource being pushed. Subsequent headers may follow in HEADERS frames. The purpose of the association is so that the user-agent can differentiate which request induced the pushed stream; without it, if the user-agent had two tabs open to the same page, each pushing unique content under a fixed URL, the user-agent would not be able to differentiate the requests.

The Associated-To-Stream-ID must be the ID of an existing, open stream. The reason for this restriction is to have a clear endpoint for pushed content. If the user-agent requested a resource on stream 11, the server replies on stream 11. It can push any number of additional streams to the client before sending a FLAG_FIN on stream 11. However, once the originating stream is closed no further push streams may be associated with it. The pushed streams do not need to be closed (FIN set) before the originating stream is closed, they only need to be created before the originating stream closes.

It is illegal for a server to push a resource with the Associated-To-Stream-ID of 0.

To minimize race conditions with the client, the SYN_STREAM for the pushed resources MUST be sent prior to sending any content which could allow the client to discover the pushed resource and request it.

The server MUST only push resources which would have been returned from a GET request.

Note: If the server does not have all of the Name/Value Response headers available at the time it issues the HEADERS frame for the pushed resource, it may later use an additional HEADERS frame to augment the name/value pairs to be associated with the pushed stream. The subsequent HEADERS frame(s) must not contain a header for ':host', ':scheme', or ':path' (e.g. the server can't change the
identity of the resource to be pushed). The HEADERS frame must not contain duplicate headers with a previously sent HEADERS frame. The server must send a HEADERS frame including the scheme/host/port headers before sending any data frames on the stream.

3.3.2. Client implementation

When fetching a resource the client has 3 possibilities:

- the resource is not being pushed
- the resource is being pushed, but the data has not yet arrived
- the resource is being pushed, and the data has started to arrive

When a SYN_STREAM and HEADERS frame which contains an Associated-To-Stream-ID is received, the client must not issue GET requests for the resource in the pushed stream, and instead wait for the pushed stream to arrive.

If a client receives a server push stream with stream-id 0, it MUST issue a session error (Section 2.4.1) with the status code PROTOCOL_ERROR.

When a client receives a SYN_STREAM from the server without a the ':host', ':scheme', and ':path' headers in the Name/Value section, it MUST reply with a RST_STREAM with error code HTTP_PROTOCOL_ERROR.

To cancel individual server push streams, the client can issue a stream error (Section 2.4.2) with error code CANCEL. Upon receipt, the server MUST stop sending on this stream immediately (this is an Abrupt termination).

To cancel all server push streams related to a request, the client may issue a stream error (Section 2.4.2) with error code CANCEL on the associated-stream-id. By cancelling that stream, the server MUST immediately stop sending frames for any streams with in-association-to for the original stream.

If the server sends a HEADER frame containing duplicate headers with a previous HEADERS frame for the same stream, the client must issue a stream error (Section 2.4.2) with error code PROTOCOL ERROR.

If the server sends a HEADERS frame after sending a data frame for the same stream, the client MAY ignore the HEADERS frame. Ignoring the HEADERS frame after a data frame prevents handling of HTTP’s trailing headers (http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec14.html#sec14.40).
4. Design Rationale and Notes

Authors’ notes: The notes in this section have no bearing on the SPDY protocol as specified within this document, and none of these notes should be considered authoritative about how the protocol works. However, these notes may prove useful in future debates about how to resolve protocol ambiguities or how to evolve the protocol going forward. They may be removed before the final draft.

4.1. Separation of Framing Layer and Application Layer

Readers may note that this specification sometimes blends the framing layer (Section 2) with requirements of a specific application - HTTP (Section 3). This is reflected in the request/response nature of the streams, the definition of the HEADERS and compression contexts which are very similar to HTTP, and other areas as well.

This blending is intentional - the primary goal of this protocol is to create a low-latency protocol for use with HTTP. Isolating the two layers is convenient for description of the protocol and how it relates to existing HTTP implementations. However, the ability to reuse the SPDY framing layer is a non goal.

4.2. Error handling - Framing Layer

Error handling at the SPDY layer splits errors into two groups: Those that affect an individual SPDY stream, and those that do not.

When an error is confined to a single stream, but general framing is in tact, SPDY attempts to use the RST_STREAM as a mechanism to invalidate the stream but move forward without aborting the connection altogether.

For errors occurring outside of a single stream context, SPDY assumes the entire session is hosed. In this case, the endpoint detecting the error should initiate a connection close.

4.3. One Connection Per Domain

SPDY attempts to use fewer connections than other protocols have traditionally used. The rationale for this behavior is because it is very difficult to provide a consistent level of service (e.g. TCP slow-start), prioritization, or optimal compression when the client is connecting to the server through multiple channels.

Through lab measurements, we have seen consistent latency benefits by using fewer connections from the client. The overall number of packets sent by SPDY can be as much as 40% less than HTTP. Handling
large numbers of concurrent connections on the server also does
become a scalability problem, and SPDY reduces this load.

The use of multiple connections is not without benefit, however.
Because SPDY multiplexes multiple, independent streams onto a single
stream, it creates a potential for head-of-line blocking problems at
the transport level. In tests so far, the negative effects of head-
of-line blocking (especially in the presence of packet loss) is
outweighed by the benefits of compression and prioritization.

4.4. Fixed vs Variable Length Fields

SPDY favors use of fixed length 32bit fields in cases where smaller,
variable length encodings could have been used. To some, this seems
like a tragic waste of bandwidth. SPDY choses the simple encoding
for speed and simplicity.

The goal of SPDY is to reduce latency on the network. The overhead
of SPDY frames is generally quite low. Each data frame is only an 8
byte overhead for a 1452 byte payload (~0.6%). At the time of this
writing, bandwidth is already plentiful, and there is a strong trend
indicating that bandwidth will continue to increase. With an average
worldwide bandwidth of 1Mbps, and assuming that a variable length
encoding could reduce the overhead by 50%, the latency saved by using
a variable length encoding would be less than 100 nanoseconds. More
interesting are the effects when the larger encodings force a packet
boundary, in which case a round-trip could be induced. However, by
addressing other aspects of SPDY and TCP interactions, we believe
this is completely mitigated.

4.5. Compression Context(s)

When isolating the compression contexts used for communicating with
multiple origins, we had a few choices to make. We could have
maintained a map (or list) of compression contexts usable for each
origin. The basic case is easy - each HEADERS frame would need to
identify the context to use for that frame. However, compression
contexts are not cheap, so the lifecycle of each context would need
to be bounded. For proxy servers, where we could churn through many
contexts, this would be a concern. We considered using a static set
of contexts, say 16 of them, which would bound the memory use. We
also considered dynamic contexts, which could be created on the fly,
and would need to be subsequently destroyed. All of these are
complicated, and ultimately we decided that such a mechanism creates
too many problems to solve.

Alternatively, we’ve chosen the simple approach, which is to simply
provide a flag for resetting the compression context. For the common
case (no proxy), this fine because most requests are to the same origin and we never need to reset the context. For cases where we are using two different origins over a single SPDY session, we simply reset the compression state between each transition.

4.6. Unidirectional streams

Many readers notice that unidirectional streams are both a bit confusing in concept and also somewhat redundant. If the recipient of a stream doesn’t wish to send data on a stream, it could simply send a SYN_REPLY with the FLAG_FIN bit set. The FLAG_UNIDIRECTIONAL is, therefore, not necessary.

It is true that we don’t need the UNIDIRECTIONAL markings. It is added because it avoids the recipient of pushed streams from needing to send a set of empty frames (e.g. the SYN_STREAM w/ FLAG_FIN) which otherwise serve no purpose.

4.7. Data Compression

Generic compression of data portion of the streams (as opposed to compression of the headers) without knowing the content of the stream is redundant. There is no value in compressing a stream which is already compressed. Because of this, SPDY does allow data compression to be optional. We included it because study of existing websites shows that many sites are not using compression as they should, and users suffer because of it. We wanted a mechanism where, at the SPDY layer, site administrators could simply force compression – it is better to compress twice than to not compress.

Overall, however, with this feature being optional and sometimes redundant, it is unclear if it is useful at all. We will likely remove it from the specification.

4.8. Server Push

A subtle but important point is that server push streams must be declared before the associated stream is closed. The reason for this is so that proxies have a lifetime for which they can discard information about previous streams. If a pushed stream could associate itself with an already-closed stream, then endpoints would not have a specific lifecycle for when they could disavow knowledge of the streams which went before.
5. Security Considerations

5.1. Use of Same-origin constraints

This specification uses the same-origin policy [RFC6454] in all cases where verification of content is required.

5.2. HTTP Headers and SPDY Headers

At the application level, HTTP uses name/value pairs in its headers. Because SPDY merges the existing HTTP headers with SPDY headers, there is a possibility that some HTTP applications already use a particular header name. To avoid any conflicts, all headers introduced for layering HTTP over SPDY are prefixed with ":". ":" is not a valid sequence in HTTP header naming, preventing any possible conflict.

5.3. Cross-Protocol Attacks

By utilizing TLS, we believe that SPDY introduces no new cross-protocol attacks. TLS encrypts the contents of all transmission (except the handshake itself), making it difficult for attackers to control the data which could be used in a cross-protocol attack.

5.4. Server Push Implicit Headers

Pushed resources do not have an associated request. In order for existing HTTP cache control validations (such as the Vary header) to work, however, all cached resources must have a set of request headers. For this reason, browsers MUST be careful to inherit request headers from the associated stream for the push. This includes the 'Cookie' header.
6. Privacy Considerations

6.1. Long Lived Connections

SPDY aims to keep connections open longer between clients and servers in order to reduce the latency when a user makes a request. The maintenance of these connections over time could be used to expose private information. For example, a user using a browser hours after the previous user stopped using that browser may be able to learn about what the previous user was doing. This is a problem with HTTP in its current form as well, however the short lived connections make it less of a risk.

6.2. SETTINGS frame

The SPDY SETTINGS frame allows servers to store out-of-band transmitted information about the communication between client and server on the client. Although this is intended only to be used to reduce latency, renegade servers could use it as a mechanism to store identifying information about the client in future requests.

Clients implementing privacy modes, such as Google Chrome’s "incognito mode", may wish to disable client-persisted SETTINGS storage.

Clients MUST clear persisted SETTINGS information when clearing the cookies.

TODO: Put range maximums on each type of setting to limit inappropriate uses.
7. Incompatibilities with SPDY draft #2

Here is a list of the major changes between this draft and draft #2.

- Addition of flow control
- Increased 16 bit length fields in SYN_STREAM and SYN_REPLY to 32 bits.
- Changed definition of compression for DATA frames
- Updated compression dictionary
- Fixed off-by-one on the compression dictionary for headers
- Increased priority field from 2bits to 3bits.
- Removed NOOP frame
- Split the request "url" into "scheme", "host", and "path"
- Added the requirement that POSTs contain content-length.
- Removed wasted 16bits of unused space from the end of the SYN_REPLY and HEADERS frames.
- Fixed bug: Priorities were described backward (0 was lowest instead of highest).
- Fixed bug: Name/Value header counts were duplicated in both the Name Value header block and also the containing frame.
8. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
9. Acknowledgements

Many individuals have contributed to the design and evolution of SPDY: Adam Langley, Wan-Teh Chang, Jim Morrison, Mark Nottingham, Alyssa Wilk, Costin Manolache, William Chan, Vitaliy Lvin, Joe Chan, Adam Barth, Ryan Hamilton, Gavin Peters, Kent Alstad, Kevin Lindsay, Paul Amer, Fan Yang, Jonathan Leighton
10. Normative References


Appendix A. Changes

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HTTP 2.0 Negotiation
draft-montenegro-httpbis-http2-negotiation-01

Abstract

This document describes an Upgrade-based protocol negotiation proposal for HTTP 2.0.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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1. Introduction

User agents interact with numerous servers from different domains using different versions of HTTP. In particular, the co-existence of HTTP/1.x and HTTP/2.x requires a protocol negotiation mechanism transparent to the user agents. This document specifies an Upgrade-based HTTP 2.0 connection negotiation.

HTTP/2.0 will have the capability (but not the requirement) to use the same ports as HTTP/1.X, typically, but not limited to, 80 (in the clear) and 443 (when over TLS/SSL). Of course, it is possible for a client to somehow acquire knowledge that a server implements HTTP/2.0 at a given port. In such a case, the client can immediately begin sending HTTP/2.0 binary frames to the server, and the server can immediately respond with the corresponding HTTP/2.0 frames. How that knowledge is acquired is not the subject of this note. It could be acquired by some out-of-band means such as using the DNS, or by some configuration prior to the HTTP/2.0 exchange. Or it could have been acquired earlier in-band in a previous exchange using, for example, the Upgrade-based mechanism specified in this document. It could have also been acquired at an earlier phase of this same exchange, for example, at a lower protocol layer that precedes the overall HTTP sequence, such as in the TLS handshake (if using TLS).

Nevertheless, there may be some situations, in which the client can only assume that a server speaks HTTP/1.X. In such cases, a connection upgrade mechanism to opportunistically attempt switching to HTTP/2.0 is essential. Otherwise, the exchange will remain at HTTP/1.X despite both client and server being willing to speak HTTP/2.0.

This document specifies such a connection upgrade for HTTP/2.0. This handshake does not incur any extra delay in obtaining a response in HTTP/2.0, as the protocol switch is immediate and effective within the first round trip. There is no delay either if there is no protocol switch, as the server is capable to respond via HTTP/1.1 also within the first initial round trip.

This handshake uses the Upgrade header defined in HTTP/1.1 [I-D.ietf-httpbis-pl-messaging]. This Upgrade header is also in wide use by the WebSocket protocol for similar purposes [RFC6455].

The goal of this document is to propose additional text to the HTTP/2.0 specification. The starting point for HTTP/2.0, the initial version of [I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2], has no language with respect to a connection upgrade procedure. Hence, the text below could be incorporated as a new section or sections within the HTTP/2.0 document.
2. Negotiation

If a client has no knowledge about a server’s support for HTTP/2.0, it starts with HTTP/1.1 and attempt an upgrade to HTTP/2.0 as follows:

GET /default.htm HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Connection: Upgrade
Upgrade: HTTP/2.0

If the server does not support the new protocol, it will simply respond to the client using HTTP/1.1:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-length: 243
Content-type: text/html
...

If the server switches to the new protocol, it will signal so via a 101 response. The server switches to HTTP/2.0 immediately after the empty line which terminates the 101 response

HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols
Connection: Upgrade
Upgrade: HTTP/2.0

[ HTTP/2.0 frame ]

In the above, the string "HTTP/2.0" represents the final version of the protocol defined in [I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2]. However, per guidance in that document, preliminary revisions of that document (either draft or experimental) are denoted by adding the corresponding version or revision number. For example, if the above handshake were negotiating the use of the 03 version of the draft (draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-03), then, instead of using "HTTP/2.0" above, the handshake would use "HTTP-03/2.0" instead.
3. Optimizing the Handshake

This handshake may be further optimized by the definition of HTTP headers of the form "HTTP2-header_name". These "HTTP2" headers would be meant to be interpreted exclusively by HTTP/2.0 servers and applied upon a successful Upgrade to further optimize or proactively configure the subsequent HTTP/2.0 exchanges. These headers would be ignored by HTTP/1.1 servers. The HTTP2 headers are for future revisions of this document.
4. Acknowledgements

This document incorporates material from
[I-D.tarreau-httpbis-network-friendly] and
[I-D.montenegro-httpbis-speed-mobility].

This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629].
5. Appendix

This Upgrade-based handshake may have issues with certain proxies and intermediaries, particularly those that are not aware of its use and don’t obey its semantics. Some heuristics that have been observed to help in this respect is to turn off caching by adding the following to the client request:

Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
6. References

6.1. Normative References


6.2. Informative References


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HTTP/2.0 Discussion: Compact Header Encoding
draft-nir-httpbis-che-01

Abstract

This document proposes an alternative encoding for HTTP headers. This encoding is considerably more compact than the uncompressed textual encoding in HTTP/1.1 and current HTTP/2.0 draft.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

HTTP/1.x and the current draft of HTTP/2.0 encode headers using text labels and text values. HTTP/2.0 attempts to make this more efficient by compressing the textual headers. This proposes a binary-only alternative.

1.1. Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. The Binary Encoding

The header block is formatted as follows:

```
+------------------------------------+-----------+
|1| version     |          8       |
+------------------------------------+
| Flags (8)  |   Length (24 bits)    |
+------------------------------------+
|X|          Stream-ID (31bits)      |
+------------------------------------+
|      Sequence of headers           |
+------------------------------------+
```

The sequence of headers is just a list of the headers in one of 5 formats:
- Flags - These are headers with no associated data. The only information they convey is by their mere presence.
- Short Type-Value - where the header is associated with a 16-bit value.
- Long Type-Value - where the header is associated with a 32-bit value.
- Type-Length-Value - where the length is specified in the header.

All formats include a 16-bit header identifier (see below), and those identifiers will be allocated through a new IANA registry (see Section 6). The header identifier specifies which format applies.
2.1. Flags

These headers are 16-bit numbers containing the header identifier.

+-----------------+
|header identifier|
+-----------------+

2.2. Short Type-Value

These headers have the 16-bit identifier, and also the 16-bit value.

+------------------------------------+
|header identifier|  Value           |
+------------------------------------+

2.3. Long Type-Value

These headers have the 16-bit identifier, and also a 32-bit value.

+------------------------------------+
|header identifier|    Value         |
+------------------------------------+

| Value (cont)     |
+-----------------+------------------+

2.4. Type-Length-Value

These headers have the 16-bit identifier, and also a 24-bit length field, and a value of variable length.

+------------------------------------+
|header identifier|    Length        |
+---------+-------+------------------+
| Length  | Value...                 |
+---------+--------------------------+

3. Header Encoding

The encoding of each header is specified in the specification that describes it. For convenience, this document describes some common encodings. Specification writers SHOULD use these formats whenever they are appropriate.

Unsigned integer numbers can be represented by either the short or long type-value, depending on their range. Cache ages measured in seconds, such as in HSTS should use the long type-value, whereas a
header specifying an age in days should probably use a short type-value. Either way, the encoding can be called "INT".

Headers that hold an enumeration (such as Method) SHOULD use a short type-value, and SHOULD reserve one value (0xffff) for custom values.

Time values should be encoded as strings using the RFC3339 format.

Strings such as names should use the TLV format, and SHOULD be encoded as UTF-8. String headers should be specified by their encoding, so "UTF8", or "ASCII".

For headers with multiple values, the general format is always TLV, and the specification should list their type as either of three things:

- Short values - a list of 16-bit values
- Short strings - a sequence of strings, each prefixed by a 1-octet length field.
- Long strings - a sequence of strings, each prefixed by 1 2-octet length field.

4. Custom Headers and Custom Enumerations

For each type of header, a range will be allocated for experimental and custom headers. To avoid collisions, we define here a special header to denote what kind of header this is. The header is has identifier 49160 (0xC008), so it is TLV-formatted, and its value is formatted as follows:

Custom header format

+------------------------------------+
|header identifier| Flags  | Name... |
|-----------------+--------+---------|
+-----------------+--------+---------|

For example, suppose draft-nir-httpbis-copyright-notice defines a header that contains a copyright notice for the content. I will use 65530 (0xFFF0). Note that the two headers don’t have to be consecutive. If the sender knows that the receiver recognizes this header with this identifier, the Custom header MAY be omitted.
Custom and Copyright Headers

For custom values in enumerations we define the Custom-Value header with identifier 49161 (0vC009), where the content is the string name of the custom value. This header MUST follow the enumeration header.

5. Default Headers

Many requests share a lot of their headers. For example, the Cookie, User-Agents, Host, Connection, and Accept* headers pretty much remain constant between consecutive requests.

To make the per-stream Headers block even smaller, we allow a default Headers block. This block is distinguished by having Stream-ID fixed to all zeros. Additionally a new flag is defined:

0x02 = FLAG_UPD - marks that this frame updates the default headers

Every subsequent request is deemed to include all the default headers, except where such headers are overridden by that request. The default headers are persistent for the connection.

A default HEADERS with the FLAG_UPD flag cleared replaces the default headers for this connection. A default HEADERS block with the FLAG_UPD set updates the default headers for this connection by replacing those that had already been set, and adding those that had not been set. This is useful for example, if a cookie had been set by the server. The only way to delete a header from the default headers is by replacement - a default HEADERS block with FLAG_UPD cleared.

6. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to set up a new registry of header identifiers. The value is 16-bit, and the range is partitioned as follows:
0-16383 - these values are allocated to flag headers, where the format is as in Section 2.1
16384-32767 - these values are allocated to short type-value headers, where the format is as in Section 2.2
32768-49151 - these values are allocated to long type-value headers, where the format is as in Section 2.3
49152-65535 - these values are allocated to type-length-value headers, where the format is as in Section 2.4

The ending quarter of each range shall be reserved for experimental and custom usage, and shall not be allocated by standards action. For example, the range 45056-49151 will be reserved for experimental and custom long type-value headers.

7. Security Considerations

There are no security considerations for this draft.

8. Changes from Previous Versions

First version

9. Normative References


Appendix A. Additional Examples

NOTE: Most of the below examples were shamelessly copied from draft-snell-httpbis-bohe-01.

Assuming the following (intentionally incomplete) header registrations:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HTTP Header</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Hex</th>
<th>Format</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Version</td>
<td>16384</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>Major.Minor in 16-bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>16385</td>
<td>4001</td>
<td>Enumeration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host</td>
<td>49152</td>
<td>c000</td>
<td>UTF8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Path (Request URI)</td>
<td>49153</td>
<td>c001</td>
<td>UTF8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>16386</td>
<td>4002</td>
<td>uint16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status-Text</td>
<td>49386</td>
<td>c0ea</td>
<td>UTF8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content-Length</td>
<td>32768</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>uint32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content-Type</td>
<td>49154</td>
<td>c002</td>
<td>ASCII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expect</td>
<td>16387</td>
<td>4003</td>
<td>uint16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last-Modified</td>
<td>49155</td>
<td>c003</td>
<td>RFC3339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETag</td>
<td>49156</td>
<td>c004</td>
<td>sequence of short strings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If-None-Match</td>
<td>49157</td>
<td>c005</td>
<td>sequence of short strings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow</td>
<td>49158</td>
<td>c006</td>
<td>sequence of uint16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do-Not-Track</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>003a</td>
<td>flag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And the following values representing known HTTP Methods:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GET</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUT</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELETE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATCH</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAD</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTIONS</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONNECT</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here is what the encoding looks like:

Version Header:

```
40 00 02 00 |@...|
```

Method Header (GET Request)

```
40 01 00 01 |@...|
```

Method Header (PATCH Request)

```
40 01 00 05 |@...|
```
Internet-Draft  compact-header  November 2012

Method Header (Custom "FOO" Method)

40 01 FF FF C0 09 00 03 46 4F 4F |@.......Foo|

Do Not Track

00 3A |.:|

Host Header:

C0 00 00 00 0F 77 77 77 2e 65 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 |.....www.example|
2e 6f 72 67 |.org|

HTTP Response Status ("200 OK") as two separate headers, one containing the status code, the other containing the status text:

40 02 00 C8 C0 EA 00 00 02 4F 4B |@........OK|

Content-Length Header (value encoded as uint32):

80 00 00 00 00 C8 |......|

Content-Type Header (although maybe it should become an enum):

C0 02 00 00 0A 69 6d 61 67 65 2f 6a 70 65 67 |.....image/jpeg|

Expect Header (Expect: 100):

40 03 00 64 |...d|

Last-Modified (Using RFC3339 Format):

C0 03 00 00 19 32 30 31 32 2d 30 38 2d 30 31 54 |.....2012-08-01T|
30 34 3a 32 33 3a 31 32 2e 31 32 33 34 5a |04:23:12.1234Z|

ETag (Strong Entity-Tag, String-format):

C0 04 00 00 06 05 61 62 63 64 65 |......abcde|

If-None-Match (Multiple values)

C0 05 00 00 0C 05 61 62 63 64 65 05 61 62 63 64 |......abcde.abcd|
66 |f|
Allow (GET, POST, FOO):

C0 06 00 00 06 00 01 00 02 FF FF C0 09 00 00 04 ................|
03 46 4f 4f | .FOO |

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Header Delta-Compression for HTTP/2.0
draft-rpeon-httpbis-header-compression-03

Abstract

This document describes a mechanism for compressing streams of groups of key-value pairs, often known as Headers in an HTTP session. See RFC 2616 [RFC2616] or successors for more information about headers.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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1. Overview

There have been several problems pointed out with the use of the gzip compressor in SPDY [SPDY]. The biggest of these problems is that it is possible for a smart attacker to inject content into the compressor, and then to test hypotheses about the prior contents of the compressor by examining the output size after each such content injection. The other issue is that gzip often consumes more CPU than many would like, especially in situations where one is doing forward or reverse proxying. The compressor proposed here intends to solve the first issue and significantly mitigate the second, while providing compression that is not too much worse than gzip.

2. How it works

The ‘delta’ compressor works by examining the difference between what it is told to compress and the state that it has stored about what it knows about the past. The previous state is encoded in two separate pieces: An LRU of key-value pairs which the compressor ‘saw’ in the past (including a static group of key-value pairs which every compressor is assumed to have seen), and a set of references into the LRU which is called a header-group, which the compressor uses to determine what has changed between the current input and the past input. It then encodes this difference by changing the header-group by adding references to stored key-values, and it removes references to key-values which should no longer be part of the output. If a key-value exists in the to-be-compressed data, but is not present in the LRU, then the LRU is modified by having new data added. When new data is added, a reference to that new data is added to the header-group. The mechanism of adding new data takes two forms: Adding an entire new key-value, or by referring to the key part of a stored key-value, and providing a new value. When the LRU has reached its size limit, the oldest elements are popped off the end, and, any reference to that element is removed. All keys are assumed to have been lowercased, and if not, will be.

3. Definitions

user-agent: The program or device which a human interacts with directly and which typically initiates the transport layer connection or session
client: Synonym for user-agent

server: The computer or device which typically accepts a connection, stores, and serves data

proxy: An entity acting as a server for the client, and a client for the server

header: A complete set of key-value pairs, either request-headers, or response-headers as defined in RFC2616 [RFC2616] section 5.3 or 6.2, respectively

4. Header pre-processing

4.1. Mapping the first-line

Before the data is input into the compressor (which works only on key-value pairs), the first line of the HTTP message must be made into key-value pairs.

Requests are mapped as follows:
"METHOD PATH VERSION" becomes:

```
[  
  (":method", "METHOD"),
  (":path", "PATH"),
  (":version", "VERSION")
]
```

Responses are mapped as follows:
"VERSION STATUS-CODE PHRASE" becomes:

```
[  
  (":version", "VERSION"),
  (":status", "STATUS-CODE"),
  (":status-text", "PHRASE")
]
```

4.2. Mapping HTTP key-values

The rest of the HTTP key-values are simply added to the key-values as mapped from the first-line, with the keys made to be all lowercase, and with cookies split into crumbs by breaking apart the cookie string on semicolons and treating each as if it were a separate header-line.

As an example, the following key-value pairs:
Host: www.foo.com
User-Agent: Browser/1.x (FooOS; Bar) baz
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Cookie: foo; bar; baz

become:

[  
  ("host", "www.foo.com")
  ("user-agent", "Browser/1.x (FooOS; Bar) baz"),
  ("accept-language", "en-US,en;q=0.5"),
  ("cookie", "foo"),
  ("cookie", "bar"),
  ("cookie", "baz")
]

5. Compressor and Decompressor State

The header delta de/compression scheme consists of a state machine which executes opcodes, emits output, and modifies internal, persistent, state. The de/compressor state consists of:

static_entries:
  a number of static (unchanging) entries consisting of key-value pairs. These are listed in appendix A.
  e.g. static_entries=[ ("key1", "val1"), ("key2", "val2"), ...]
  an lru-idx references into the static key-value pairs if the value of the lru-idx is < len(static-entries)
  static_entries[lru_idx]

lru:
  a queue of key-value pairs
  e.g. lru = deque([([RefCntString("key1"), "val1"), (RefCntstring("key2", "val2")), ...])
  an lru-idx references a value in the lru if the lru-idx is >= len(static_entries). The mapping of an lru-idx to a offset from the front of the LRU is as follows:

  if lru.first_idx > lru_idx:
      queue_idx = 2**16 - lru.first_idx + lru_idx - len(static_entries)
  else:
      queue_idx = lru_idx - lru.first_idx

The oldest elements of the LRU are popped before inserting a new value if either:
Adding a new entry would exceed the maximum allowable length

Adding a new entry would exceed the maximum allowable byte length

header_groups: (default-size: 1)(max: 255)
a map of group-id to set of lru-idx. An lru-idx is a reference into either the static key-value pairs or the lru’s key-value pairs. The maximum number of header-groups is limited by default to 1, unless a higher-level of the protocol changes this. The maximum number of header_groups is 255. It is not currently allowed to assert that there are ‘0’ allowed header groups.
e.g. header_groups = {0: set([1,4,6,15122]), 1: set([6,76,3],...)}

lru.first_idx:
an int indicating the lru-idx of the oldest element in the queue of key-value pairs

max_byte_size: (default: 4k) (max:2**32-1)
an int indicating the maximum allowable amount of storage used by the strings of the queue’s key-value pairs. Unless a higher-level of the protocol changes this, this is assumed to be 4k

max_lru_entries: (default: 1024) (max:2**16-1)
an int indicating the maximum allowable number of key-value pairs in the queue. Unless a higher-level of the protocol changes this, this is assumed to be 1024

lru.length:
an int indicating the total number of key-value pairs currently stored in the lru

lru.stored_byte_size:
an int indicating the total number of bytes of storage used by strings in the queue. Note that the bytes in a ref-counted string are counted only once, regardless of how many times that string is referenced.

6. Header Block Wire Format

The decompressor is fed a header-block which may span multiple HEADERS frames by the HTTP/2 framing layer, the format of which follows:
All ints are in network byte order.

```
header-block: group-id
    ( (ekvsto-opcode ekvsto-count ekvsto-field(ekvsto-count))*
    (eclone-opcode eclone-count eclone-field(eclone-count))*
    (etrang-opcode etrang-count etrang-field(etrang-count))*
    (strang-opcode etrang-count strang-field(etrang-count))*
    (etoggl-opcode etoggl-count etoggl-field(etoggl-count))*
    (stoggl-opcode etoggl-count stoggl-field(stoggl-count))*
    (clone-opcode clone-count clone-field(clone-count))*
    (kvsto-opcode kvsto-count kvsto-field(kvsto-count))*
    )

    ;

    group-id: UINT8;
    etoggl-count: UINT8;
    stoggl-count: UINT8;
    etrang-count: UINT8;
    strang-count: UINT8;
    eclone-count: UINT8;
    sclone-count: UINT8;
    ekvsto-count: UINT8;
    skvsto-count: UINT8;

    stoggl-field: lru-idx;
    etoggl-field: lru-idx;
    strang-field: lru-idx lru-idx;
    etrang-field: lru-idx lru-idx;
    eclone-field: lru-idx string;
    sclone-field: lru-idx string;
    ekvsto-field: string string;
    skvsto-field: string string;

    stoggl-opcode: UINT8(0x00);
    etoggl-opcode: UINT8(0x01);
    strang-opcode: UINT8(0x02);
    etrang-opcode: UINT8(0x03);
    skvsto-opcode: UINT8(0x04);
    ekvsto-opcode: UINT8(0x05);
    sclone-opcode: UINT8(0x06);
    eclone-opcode: UINT8(0x07);

    lru_idx: UINT16;

    string: (HUFFMAN-ENCODED-CHAR)* HUFFMAN-EOP
        padding-to-nearest-byte-boundary;
        padding-to-nearest-byte-boundary: 0(0-7);
```
7. String Encoding

Strings are huffman encoded [HUFF] using a canonical huffman coding [CANON]. In the future, the opcode byte will be permuted to allow alternate encodings, such as raw text, binary, or perhaps other options.

The huffman code is constructed by taking the frequency-tables in Appendix B, adding 1 to all entries, then generating a canonical huffman coding. If/while this results in a code with a max-length of greater than 32 bits, divide all frequencies by two, capping the minimum frequency at '1', and regenerate until the max code-length is 32 bits or less. The EOF symbol, when decoded, is represented as 256, which allows for any 8-bit value to be encoded and decoded.

8. Operations

For all operations below, the 's' prefix stands for 'State modifying', whereas the 'e' prefix stands for 'Ephemeral', and does not modify state.

The *kvsto family of opcodes encode a new key-value entirely by providing a new string for key and a new string for val.

The *clone family of opcodes encode a backreference to the key part of a pre-existing key-value from either the static-entries or the lru, and a new string value.

The *toggl family of opcodes encode a backreference to an entire key-value from either the static-entries, or the lru.

The *trang family of opcodes is the same as the toggle family, except that it encodes a range of indices instead of a single index

With four families of opcodes, and two variations (ephemeral vs state-changing) per family, we have eight valid opcodes:

skvsto: (Stateful Key-Value STOre)
        state-modifying kvsto. The new key and value are inserted into the headers and also inserted into the LRU.

ekvsto: (Ephemeral Key-Value STOre)
        ephemeral, non-state-modifying kvsto. The new key and value are inserted into the headers but the LRU is untouched.
sclone (Stateful key CLONE):
  state-modifying clone. The key part of the referenced key-
  value is paired with the new value and inserted into the
  headers and also inserted into the LRU

eclone (Ephemeral key CLONE):
  ephemeral, non-state-modifying clone. The key part of the
  referenced key-value is paired with the new value and inserted
  into the headers. No persistent state is modified.

stoggl (Stateful TOGGLE):
  state-modifying toggle. If the index exists in the current
  header group, it will be turned off, else it will be turned on.

etoggl (Ephemeral TOGGLE):
  ephemeral, non-state-modifying toggle. If the provided index
  does not exist in the current header group after all stoggles
  have modified it, then the key-value as referenced by the
  provided index will be present in the output, else, that index
  of the current header group will be temporarily suppressed and
  will not be included in the headers

strang (Stateful Toggle RANGE):
  encodes a range of stoggl

etrang (Ephemeral Toggle RANGE):
  encodes a range of etoggl

9. Decompressor algorithm

The pseudo-code below provides a definition of how the header-block
is executed by the decompressor.

    ParseAndExecuteHeaderBlock(header_block):
        store_later = deque()
        etoggles = set()
        stoggles = set()
        headers = dict()
        # the HTTP/2 framing layer determines when the header_block
        # has finished reading.
        group_id  = header_block.read_uint8()
        current_header_group = header_groups[group_id]

        while data in header_block:
            opcode = header_block.read_uint8()
            num_fields = header_block.read_uint8()
            if opcode == stoggl:
                #...
repeat num_fields times:
    lru_idx = header_block.read_uint16()
    stoggles = set_symmetric_difference(stoggles, [lru_idx])
elif opcode == etoggl:
    repeat num_fields times:
        lru_idx = header_block.read_uint16()
        etoggles = set_symmetric_difference(etoggles, [lru_idx])
elif opcode == strang:
    repeat num_fields times:
        lru_idx_first = header_block.read_uint16()
        lru_idx_last = header_block.read_uint16()
        for lru_idx in (lru_idx_first, lru_idx_last) inclusive:
            stoggles = set_symmetric_difference(stoggles, [lru_idx])
            stoggles.add(lru_idx)
elif opcode == etrang:
    repeat num_fields times:
        lru_idx_first = header_block.read_uint16()
        lru_idx_last = header_block.read_uint16()
        for lru_idx in (lru_idx_first, lru_idx_last) inclusive:
            etoggles = set_symmetric_difference(etoggles, [lru_idx])
elif opcode == sclone:
    repeat num_fields times:
        lru_idx = header_block.read_uint16()
        val = header_block.read_huffman_string()
        kv = lookup_idx_from_static_entries_or_lru(lru_idx)
        AddToCurrentHeaders(headers, kv.key, val)
        store_later.append(KV(kv.key, val))
elif opcode == eclone:
    repeat num_fields times:
        lru_idx = header_block.read_uint16()
        val = header_block.read_huffman_string()
        kv = lookup_idx_from_static_entries_or_lru(lru_idx)
        AddToCurrentHeaders(headers, kv.key, val)
elif opcode == skvsto:
    repeat num_fields times:
        key = header_block.read_huffman_string()
        val = header_block.read_huffman_string()
        AddToCurrentHeaders(headers, key, val)
        store_later.append(KV(key, val))
elif opcode == ekvsto:
    repeat num_fields times:
        key = header_block.read_huffman_string()
        val = header_block.read_huffman_string()
        AddToCurrentHeaders(headers, key, val)

# store the state changes to the header-group.
current_header_group = \n    set_symmetric_difference(current_header_group, stoggles)
kv_references = set_symmetric_difference(current_header_group, etoggles)

for lru_idx in sorted(kv_references):
    kv = lookup_idx_from_static_entries_or_lru(lru_idx)
    AddToCurrentHeaders(headers, kv.key, kv.val)

if 'cookie' in headers:
    headers['cookie'] = headers['cookie'].replace('\0', '; ')

older_headers = []
for lru_idx in sorted(current_header_group):
    # As a refinement, we probably want to change this in the future to something which sorts based on the order in which the elements were first mentioned, which can be done by a smart implementation without actually sorting.
    kv = lookup_idx_from_static_entries_or_lru(lru_idx)
    older_headers.append(kv)
store_later = older_headers + store_later

# make state changes to the LRU. Note that this may remove items from the header-group if elements that the header-group refers to are removed from the LRU
for kv in store_later:
    new_lru_idx = lru.store(kv.key, kv.val)

return headers

lru.clear():
    while length > 0:
        pop_oldest()

lru.store(key, val):
    reserve_size = val.size + key.size
    if max_lru_entries == 0 or max_byte_size < reserve_size:
        lru.clear()
        return -1
    while length + 1 >= max_lru_entries:
        pop_oldest()
    while true:
        reserve_size = val.size
        if key.refcnt == 1:
            reserve_size += key.size
        if stored_byte_size + reserve_size < max_byte_size:
            break
        pop_oldest()
push(KV(key, val))
new_lru_idx = lru.first + length
if new_lru_idx >= 2**16:
  new_lru_idx -= 2**16
new_lru_idx += static_entries.size:
return new_lru_idx

lru.pop_oldest():
  kv = queue.front()
  length -= 1
  if kv.key.refcnt == 1:
    stored_byte_size -= kv.key.size
    stored_byte_size -= kv.val.size
    for header_group in header_groups:
      if first_idx in header_group:
        header_group.remove(first_idx)
        first_idx = get_next_idx(first_idx)
    queue.pop_front()  
lru.push(kv):
  length += 1
  if kv.key.refcnt == 1:
    stored_byte_size += kv.key.size
    stored_byte_size += kv.val.size
  queue.push_back(kv)

lru.get_next_idx(idx):
  idx += 1
  if idx >= 2**16 - 1:
    return decompressor.static_entries.size
  return idx

lookup_idx_from_static_entries_or_lru(lru_idx):
  if lru_idx < static_entries.size:
    return static_entries[lru_idx]
  if lru.first_idx > lru_idx:
    queue_idx = 2**16 - lru.first_idx + lru_idx - static_entries.size
  else:
    queue_idx = lru_idx - lru.first_idx
  return lru.queue[queue_idx]

10. Compression

The compressor generates a sequence of instructions which the
decompressor executes. There are various ways by which the
compressor can determine how to construct these operations. Pseudo-
code follows showing one approach. group_id is defined by the sender,
but must always be less than the maximum allowed number. A
reasonable implementation might assign the same group_id to a set of
headers which are likely to be similar, for instance those which go
to the same hostname or the same hostname suffix.

# assumptions: headers is a dict(), where multiple key:values with
# the same key are encoded as key:value1\0value2\0value3...
# group_id is provided by some other implementation-dependent
# code

# This compressor does not use all of the opcodes and serves simply
# as an example of a workable, if suboptimal, implementation
MakeOperations(self, headers, group_id):
headers_set = set()
for (key, val) in headers:
    splittoken = '\0'
    if key == 'cookie':
        splittoken = ';'
    for partial_val in split(val, ';'):
        headers_set.add( (key, partial_val) )
    # Note that this discards duplicates.
    # If we decide we care about that generate an 'ekvsto' or
    # 'eclone' for that (duplicate) key-value here.

keep_set = set()
done_set = set()
for idx in header_groups[group_id]:
    kv = lookup_idx_from_static_entries_or_lru(idx)
    if kv in headers_set:
        # If the KV referenced by the idx in the header-group
        # is also in the to-be-compressed headers, then we
        # keep using that reference (don’t remove it from the
        # header-group)
        keep_set.add(idx)  # we want to keep this one
        headers_set.remove(kv)
    else:
        # If we’re not finding the KV referenced by the idx in
        # the header-group in the to-be-compressed-header, then
        # this idx needs to be removed from the header-group.
        done_set.add(idx)  # we’ll want to remove it

instructions = dict()
toggls = set()
clones = []
kvstos = []
erefs = []
for (key, val) in headers_set:
    # The following 'if' block is a demonstration of an
    # optimization-- since path and referer are rarely
    # backreferenced, and since they are often large and
    # they would, if included in the LRU, cause other entries
    # to be expired from the LRU, we ensure that these don't
    # get stored in the LRU by emitting an 'ephemeral' operation
    if key in [":path", "referer"]:
        instructions[’ekvsto’].append( (key, val) )
        continue
    # FindEntryIdx looks for a matching key-value in the LRU, and then
    # in the static-entries, recording the first matching key it finds
    # while searching for the whole match. If it does find a whole
    # match then v_idx will be valid. If it finds an entry with a key
    # which matches, then k_idx will be valid.
    (k_idx, v_idx) = FindEntryIdx(key, val)
    if both k_idx and v_idx are valid:
        # if we found a index for all of the kv, we’ll generate
        # a new toggle which backreferences that entire kv.
        toggls.add(v_idx)
    elif only k_idx is valid:
        # Otherwise, if we didn’t find all of the kv pre-existing,
        # but there was something that already had that key,
        # generate a clone, which backreferences the key and provides
        # a new value.
        instructions[’sclone’].append( (k_idx, val) )
    else:
        # Otherwise, we’ll need to store a new key and value, both.
        instructions[’skvstos’].append( (key, val) )

full_toggl_list = union(toggls, done_set)
# convert runs of toggls into transgs
(trangs, toggls) = ComputeTrangsFromRawToggles(full_toggl_list)
instructions[’stoggl’] = toggls
instructions[’strang’] = trangs

header_block = SerializeInstructions(instructions, group_id)
# Execute the instructions just like you would when decompressing.
# We’re throwing away the computed headers here, because all
# we care about is the side-effects to the header_groups and the
# lru from executing the generated instructions.
ParseAndExecuteHeaderBlock(header_block)
return header_block

SerializeInstructions(instructions, group_id):
outbuf.write_uint8(group_id)
for opcode in ['stoggl', 'etoggl',
    'strang', 'etrag',
    'ecloge', 'ekvsto',
    'sclone', 'skvsto']:
    if not opcode in instructions:
        continue
    ops_idx = 0
    ops_len = len(instructions[opcode])
    while ops_len > ops_idx:
        ops_to_go = ops_len - ops_idx
        outbuf.write_uint8(OpcodeToOpcodeVal(opcode))
        # a value of '0' in this field means '1'.
        # a value of '255' in this field means '256',
        # thus, subtract one from the actual value when
        # preparing to write to the wire.
        outbuf.write_uint8(min(256, ops_to_go) - 1)
        orig_idx = ops_idx
        for i in xrange(ops_to_go):
            if opcode in ['stoggl', 'etoggl']:
                outbuf.write_uint16(instructions[ops_idx])
            elif opcode in ['strang', 'etrag']:
                outbuf.write_uint16(instructions[ops_idx][0])
                outbuf.write_uint16(instructions[ops_idx][1])
            elif opcide in ['sclone', 'ecloge']:
                outbuf.write_uint16(instructions[ops_idx][0])
                outbuf.encode_and_write_string(instructions[ops_idx][1])
            elif opcode in ['skvsto', 'ekvsto']:
                outbuf.encode_and_write_string(instructions[ops_idx][0])
                outbuf.encode_and_write_string(instructions[ops_idx][1])
            ops_idx += 1
        return outbuf

If the resulting output buffer is larger than the maximum allowed
frame size, then the buffer shall be split into maximum-allowed-
payload-size or smaller sections, and sent in separate HEADERS
frames, with only the last indicating that the frame is finished by
asserting the FRAME_FINISHED flag.

11. Example

11.1. Background

Here is a simple example showing an input, the changing part of the
compressor state, and an ascii-ified version of what would be
serialized on the wire.
GET / HTTP/1.0
Host: www.foo.com
User-Agent: bar-ua baz stuff
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

The first stage of processing is to break the first line into key-value pairs. The first line becomes:

```
["method": "GET"],
"path": "/",
"version": "HTTP/1.0"
]
```

This gets integrated with the rest of the headers, becoming:

```
["method": "GET"],
"path": "/",
"version": "HTTP/1.0",
"host": "www.foo.com",
"user-agent": "bar-ua baz stuff",
"accept-language": "en-US,en;q=0.5"
]
```

The compressor now goes through each key-value, determining if it is already present in the header-group, in the LRU or static state, and determines what it needs to emit.

11.2. Example Serialization

This is sample output from a program which implements the compression specification above. It prints out the stream ID, then the group ID, then the instructions that the encoder created, then the serialized form of these instructions, followed last by the decompressed output.

```
* http2-demo: 2 req messages
# delta2 request 1 (of 2) for http2-demo

stream_id: 1234 group_id: 1
{'opcode': 'eclone', 'index': 0, 'val': '/http2_sample.html'}
{'opcode': 'stoggl', 'index': 1}
{'opcode': 'stoggl', 'index': 3}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 38, 'val': 'no-cache'}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 10, 'val': 'ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3'}
```
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 11, 'val': 'gzip, deflate, sdch'}

{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 9, 'val': 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8'}

{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 16, 'val': 'no-cache'}

{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 4, 'val': 'http2-demo'}

{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 12, 'val': 'en-US, en;q=0.8'}

{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 51, 'val': 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.31 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/26.0.1410.28 Safari/537.31'}

00 FE 08 01 80 00 04 D2 01 05 00 00 00 00 0C C8 9E
9B A2 AD 5F A0 9B 32 D7 49 00 00 01 00 01 00 03
04 07 00 26 6B A7 5A 97 98 C8 00 0A F6 FD 3E 33
F3 E7 4D 73 A8 F8 D8 B1 9F 9F A3 F5 69 CD 57 F1
FF 5E 8F D5 A7 35 12 00 0B CF B6 C7 FF 18 0E 3A
28 87 F8 8E 0B CE 44 00 09 21 F2 20 CC B5 D3 F8
53 DF A3 16 A2 63 9A 1E 59 96 BA 7F DF 9B 7F
0A 7B F4 62 D4 4C 73 43 CB 5D 3D 1F AB 4E 6A FF
8F FA 0F FA F4 7E AD 39 B9 C8 00 10 6B A7 5A 97
98 C8 00 04 CC 89 E9 9F 01 D5 D2 00 0C 16 CF F6
FA 7F 02 DF 47 EA D3 9B 9C 80 00 33 F7 BB F6 CD
34 50 52 63 FF B7 FC 7E 50 8F 47 FB 7B 98 DD BC
BF DB CB 9F 2B B9 71 FF 9F F6 EC 7B F4 1F C0 DF
FE 98 41 4D 15 1A 84 7F B7 FC 7E AF 67 D7 DF EE
FE 3F DB 46 78 0F FB 7A C5 7E 0F EE 9F F6 EE CE
0E D4 41 3C 8C 73 23 8A 0E 64 F3 FF 6F A2 B1 54
18 14 D1 51 A8 44 80

get /http2_sample.html HTTP/1.1
accept-language: en-US, en;q=0.8
accept-encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.31 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/26.0.1410.28 Safari/537.31
:scheme: http
accept-charset: ISO-8859-1, utf-8; q=0.7, *; q=0.3
pragma: no-cache
cache-control: no-cache
host: http2-demo

# delta2 request 2 (of 2) for http2-demo

stream_id: 1234 group_id: 1

{'opcode': 'eclone', 'index': 0, 'val': '/s/http2_fractal.jpg'}

{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 42, 'val': 'http://http2-demo/http2_sample.html'}

{'opcode': 'strang', 'index': 69, 'index_start': 67}

{'opcode': 'strang', 'index': 74, 'index_start': 71}
get /s/http2_fractal.jpg HTTP/1.1
accept-language: en-US,en;q=0.8
pragma: no-cache
accept: */*
user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.31 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/26.0.1410.28 Safari/537.31
:scheme: http
accept-charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
referer: http://http2-demo/http2_sample.html
cache-control: no-cache
host: http2-demo
accept-encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch

delta2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>size</th>
<th>time</th>
<th>ratio</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
<th>std</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>334</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* http2-demo: 2 res messages

stream_id: 1234 group_id: 1

{'opcode': 'stoggl', 'index': 6}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 16, 'val': 'public, max-age=3600000000'}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 27, 'val': 'Fri, 1 Jan 2100 12:00:00 GMT'}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 18, 'val': 'gzip'}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 13, 'val': 'bytes'}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 52, 'val': 'Accept-Encoding'}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 19, 'val': '797'}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 34, 'val': 'Thu, 08 Nov 2012 17:24:16 GMT'}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 24, 'val': 'Tue, 12 Mar 2013 23:12:44 GMT'}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 44, 'val': 'Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)'}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 23, 'val': 'text/html'}
* http2-demo1: 5 req messages

# delta2 request 1 (of 5) for http2-demo1

```plaintext
stream_id: 1234 group_id: 2
{ 'opcode': 'eclone', 'index': 0, 'val': '/s/0.png' }
{ 'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 81, 'val': 'http2-demo1' }
{ 'opcode': 'strang', 'index': 80, 'index_start': 75 }
{ 'opcode': 'strang', 'index': 85, 'index_start': 82 }
```

```
00 20 08 01 80 00 04 D2 02 05 00 00 00 08 CC | ............
F6 E5 20 04 00 00 51 CC 89 E9 9F 01 D5 C8 90 02 | . ...Q........
01 00 50 00 4B 00 55 00 52                      | ..P.K.U.R
```

```
##### decompressed ######
get /s/0.png HTTP/1.1
accept-language: en-US,en;q=0.8
accept: */*
user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.31 (KHTML, like Gecko ) Chrome/26.0.1410.28 Safari/537.31
:scheme: http
accept-charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
referer: http://http2-demo/http2_sample.html
pragma: no-cache
cache-control: no-cache
host: http2-demo1
accept-encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
```

# delta2 request 2 (of 5) for http2-demo1

```
stream_id: 1234 group_id: 2
{ 'opcode': 'eclone', 'index': 0, 'val': '/s/6.png' }
{ 'opcode': 'stoggl', 'index': 96 }
```

```
00 0E 08 01 80 00 04 D2 02 05 00 00 00 08 CC | ............#
FF 05 01 00 00 4B 00 55 00 52                      | ..P.K.U.R
```

##### decompressed ######
get /s/6.png HTTP/1.1
accept-language: en-US,en;q=0.8
accept: */*
user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.31 (KHTML, like Gecko ) Chrome/26.0.1410.28 Safari/537.31
:scheme: http
accept-charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
referer: http://http2-demo/http2_sample.html
pragma: no-cache

Peon                    Expires September 19, 2013        [Page 20]
cache-control: no-cache
host: http2-demo1
accept-encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch

# delta2 request 3 (of 5) for http2-demo1
stream_id: 1234 group_id: 2
{'opcode': 'eclone', 'index': 0, 'val': '/s/12.png'}

00 0B 08 01 80 00 04 D2 02 05 00 00 08 82 12
67 B7 29 00

get /s/12.png HTTP/1.1
accept-language: en-US, en; q=0.8
accept: */*
user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.31 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/26.0.1410.28 Safari/537.31
:scheme: http
accept-charset: ISO-8859-1, utf-8; q=0.7, *; q=0.3
referer: http://http2-demo/http2_sample.html
pragma: no-cache

# delta2 request 4 (of 5) for http2-demo1
stream_id: 1234 group_id: 2
{'opcode': 'eclone', 'index': 0, 'val': '/s/18.png'}

00 0B 08 01 80 00 04 D2 02 05 00 00 08 82 39
99 ED CA 40

get /s/18.png HTTP/1.1
accept-language: en-US, en; q=0.8
accept: */*
user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.31 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/26.0.1410.28 Safari/537.31
:scheme: http
accept-charset: ISO-8859-1, utf-8; q=0.7, *; q=0.3
referer: http://http2-demo/http2_sample.html
pragma: no-cache

accept-encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch

# delta2 request 5 (of 5) for http2-demol

stream_id: 1234 group_id: 2
{'opcode': 'eclone', 'index': 0, 'val': '/s/24.png'}

00 0B 08 01 80 00 04 D2 02 05 00 00 08 82 78 | ............x
99 ED CA 40 | ...

#### decompressed ####
get /s/24.png HTTP/1.1
accept-language: en-US,en;q=0.8
accept: */*
user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.31 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/26.0.1410.28 Safari/537.31
:scheme: http
accept-charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
referer: http://http2-demo/http2_sample.html
pragma: no-cache
cache-control: no-cache
host: http2-demol
accept-encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch

* http2-demol: 5 res messages

# delta2 response 1 (of 5) for http2-demol

stream_id: 1234 group_id: 2
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 82, 'val': 'image/png'}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 84, 'val': 'Sat, 23 Jun 2012 02:03:47 GMT'}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 83, 'val': '338'}
{'opcode': 'strang', 'index': 81, 'index_start': 76}

00 2C 08 01 80 00 04 D2 02 04 02 00 00 08 82 78 | .............R.7
C7 A3 0B B7 C8 00 54 D9 0C A6 03 40 76 E7 70 18 | ......T....@v.p.
91 80 9B 85 0E 4A C2 9A 9F 20 00 00 00 82 19 20 02 | ......J...SB.
00 00 01 00 4C | ..Q.L

#### decompressed ####
HTTP/1.1 200 ?
content-length: 338
accept-ranges: bytes
expires: Fri, 1 Jan 2100 12:00:00 GMT
delta2 response 2 (of 5) for http2-demo1
stream_id: 1234 group_id: 2
{'opcode': 'strang', 'index': 93, 'index_start': 91}

00 06 08 01 80 00 04 D2 02 02 00 00 5D 00 5B | ............

delta2 response 3 (of 5) for http2-demo1
stream_id: 1234 group_id: 2
{'opcode': 'stoggl', 'index': 93}
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 102, 'val': '358'}

00 0B 08 01 80 00 04 D2 02 02 00 00 5D 04 00 00 | ............]
66 42 99 20 | fB.

delta2 response 4 (of 5) for http2-demo1
stream_id: 1234 group_id: 2
{'opcode': 'stoggl', 'index': 93}

# delta2 response 4 (of 5) for http2-demo1

stream_id: 1234 group_id: 2
{'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 111, 'val': '397'}

```
00 07 08 01 80 00 04 D2 02 04 00 00 6F 43 57 20 | ............oCW
```

##### decompressed ######

HTTP/1.1 200 ?
content-length: 397
accept-ranges: bytes
expires: Fri, 1 Jan 2100 12:00:00 GMT
server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
last-modified: Sat, 23 Jun 2012 02:03:47 GMT
cache-control: public, max-age=3600000000
date: Tue, 12 Mar 2013 23:12:44 GMT
content-type: image/png

# delta2 response 5 (of 5) for http2-demo1

stream_id: 1234 group_id: 2
{'opcode': 'stoggl', 'index': 92}

```json
{
    'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 119, 'val': 'Sat, 23 Jun 2012 02:03:46 GMT'
}
{
    'opcode': 'sclone', 'index': 120, 'val': '345'
}
```

```
00 20 08 01 80 00 04 D2 02 00 00 00 5C 04 01 00 | ............\...
77 D9 0C A6 03 40 76 E7 70 18 91 80 9B 85 0E 4D | w....@v.p.......
01 4D 4F 90 00 78 42 55 20                      | .MO..xBU
```

##### decompressed ######

HTTP/1.1 200 ?
content-length: 345
accept-ranges: bytes
expires: Fri, 1 Jan 2100 12:00:00 GMT
server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
last-modified: Sat, 23 Jun 2012 02:03:46 GMT
cache-control: public, max-age=3600000000
date: Tue, 12 Mar 2013 23:12:44 GMT
content-type: image/png
12. Unfinished components

These are components that must be added in the future.

Encoding of raw or ascii bytes

Describing safe mechanisms for changing the allowable compressor state size downwards.

The frequency table used to generate the huffman encoding should be updated with a more comprehensive analysis of header-character frequency.

13. Security Considerations

The compressor algorithm described here is expected to be immune to the current attacks against encrypted stream-based compressors such as TLS+gzip, but more scrutiny is warranted. The reason that it is believed that the algorithm(s) expressed here is immune is that any backreference to a header key or value always requires a whole-text match, and thus any probe of the compression context confirms no hypothesis unless the attacker has guessed the entire plaintext key and value simultaneously.

14. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

15. Acknowledgements

16. Appendix A

Appendix A (static-entries):

# (key, val)
# Order does matter...
static_entries = [
    (':path', '/'),
    (':scheme', 'http'),
    (':scheme', 'https'),
    (':method', 'get'),
    (':host', '')]
17. Appendix B

Appendix B huffman code-table for requests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sym</th>
<th>as bits</th>
<th>len</th>
<th>as hex</th>
<th>len</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>11111111 11111111 11110111 100</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7ffffbc</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11110111 101</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7ffffbd</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11110111 110</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7ffffbe</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11110111 111</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7ffffbf</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11111000 000</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7ffffc0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11111000 001</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7ffffc1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11111000 010</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7ffffc2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11111000 011</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7ffffc3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>7ffffc4</td>
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</tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11111000 101</td>
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<td>7ffffc5</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
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<td>10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11111111 11111111 11111000 000</td>
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<td>7ffffc8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11111000 001</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7ffffc9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11111001 010</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7fffdca</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11111001 011</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7fffdcb</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11111001 100</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7fffdcc</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11111001 101</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7fffdcd</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
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<td>7fffdcf</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>7fffd0</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>7fffd1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11111111 11111111 11111010 010</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7fffd2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11111010 011</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7fffd3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>11111111 11111111 11111010 100</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7fffd4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
'y' (121) | 11110011 [8]  
'z' (122) | 11111101|1 [9]  
'{' (123) | 11111111 11111101 [17]  
'}' (124) | 11111111 1100 [12]  
'{' (125) | 11111111 11111110 0 [17]  
'}' (126) | 11111111 101 [12]  
  (127) | 11111111 11111111 11111011 101 [27]  
  (128) | 11111111 11111111 11111011 110 [27]  
  (129) | 11111111 11111111 11111011 111 [27]  
  (130) | 11111111 11111111 11111100 000 [27]  
  (131) | 11111111 11111111 11111100 001 [27]  
  (132) | 11111111 11111111 11111100 010 [27]  
  (133) | 11111111 11111111 11111100 011 [27]  
  (134) | 11111111 11111111 11111100 100 [27]  
  (135) | 11111111 11111111 11111100 101 [27]  
  (136) | 11111111 11111111 11111100 110 [27]  
  (137) | 11111111 11111111 11111100 111 [27]  
  (138) | 11111111 11111111 11111101 000 [27]  
  (139) | 11111111 11111111 11111101 001 [27]  
  (140) | 11111111 11111111 11111101 010 [27]  
  (141) | 11111111 11111111 11111101 011 [27]  
  (142) | 11111111 11111111 11111101 100 [27]  
  (143) | 11111111 11111111 11111101 101 [27]  
  (144) | 11111111 11111111 11111101 110 [27]  
  (145) | 11111111 11111111 11111101 111 [27]  
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  (147) | 11111111 11111111 11111110 001 [27]  
  (148) | 11111111 11111111 11111110 010 [27]  
  (149) | 11111111 11111111 11111110 011 [27]  
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  (151) | 11111111 11111111 11111110 101 [27]  
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  (157) | 11111111 11111111 11111111 011 [27]  
  (158) | 11111111 11111111 11111111 100 [27]  
  (159) | 11111111 11111111 11111111 101 [27]  
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  (161) | 11111111 11111111 11111111 111 [27]  
  (162) | 11111111 11111111 11100000 00 [26]  
  (163) | 11111111 11111111 11100000 01 [26]  
  (164) | 11111111 11111111 11100000 10 [26]  
  (165) | 11111111 11111111 11100000 11 [26]  
  (166) | 11111111 11111111 11100001 00 [26]  
  (167) | 11111111 11111111 11100001 01 [26]  
  (168) | 11111111 11111111 11100001 10 [26]  

Peon
Expires September 19, 2013
(217) 11111111 11111111 11011011 11 [26] 3ffffb7 [26]
(218) 11111111 11111111 11101110 00 [26] 3ffffb8 [26]
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(245) 11111111 11111111 11101000 11 [26] 3ffffd3 [26]
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(254) 11111111 11111111 11101110 00 [26] 3ffffdc [26]
(255) 11111111 11111111 11101110 01 [26] 3ffffdd [26]

18. Appendix C

Appendix C huffman code-table for responses

aligned
aligned

Peon           Expires September 19, 2013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSB</th>
<th>LSB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sym as bits</td>
<td>len as hex</td>
</tr>
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<td>3ffffbe [26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3ffffbf [26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) 11111111 11111111 11100000 00 [26]</td>
<td>3ffffc0 [26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) 11111111 11111111 11100000 01 [26]</td>
<td>3ffffc1 [26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) 11111111 11111111 11100000 10 [26]</td>
<td>3ffffc2 [26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) 11111111 11111111 11100000 11 [26]</td>
<td>3ffffc3 [26]</td>
</tr>
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<td>(6) 11111111 11111111 11100001 00 [26]</td>
<td>3ffffc4 [26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) 11111111 11111111 11100001 01 [26]</td>
<td>3ffffc5 [26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) 11111111 11111111 11100001 10 [26]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>3ffffc9 [26]</td>
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<td>(21) 11111111 11111111 11101001 11 [26]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(23) 11111111 11111111 11101011 01 [26]</td>
<td>3ffffd5 [26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(24) 11111111 11111111 11101011 10 [26]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(27) 11111111 11111111 11101011 10 [26]</td>
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</table>
19. Normative References


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Google, Inc

Email: fenix@google.com
HTTP/2.0 Discussion: Stored Header Encoding
draft-snell-httpbis-bohe-13

Abstract

This memo describes a proposed alternative optimized encoding for ordered sets of header field (name, value) pairs in HTTP/2 HEADERS and PUSH_Promise frames.

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1. Stored Header Encoding

The Stored Header Encoding is a proposed alternative "compressed header encoding" for HTTP/2.0 that offers reasonably good compression ratios, support for a range of compressor strategies, efficient value type codecs, constrained state requirements, routing-friendly header value ordering, and easier implementation relative to the current header compression proposal.

2. Model

A "header" is a (name,value) pair. The name is a sequence of lower-case ASCII characters. The value is either an HTTP 1.1 defined field-value (see [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging]), a sequence of UTF-8 encoded octets, an integer, a timestamp, or an opaque sequence of binary octets.

The compressor and decompressor each maintain a synchronized cache of up to 256 headers. Every header stored in the cache is referenced by an 8-bit identifier ranging from 0x00-FF (inclusive).

The cache is managed in a "least recently written" manner, that is, as the cache fills to capacity in both number of entries and maximum stored byte size, the least recently written items are cleared and their index positions can be reused.
The specific index position to which a header is assigned is determined by the encoder using any algorithm the encoder determines to be appropriate. If a specific index position already has an assigned header, the existing header is replaced.

The maximum total size of the cache can be limited by the decompressor using the SETTINGS_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE setting. Each stored header contributes a certain number of octets to the total accumulated size of the cache. If adding a new header to the cache will cause the total size to grow beyond the set limit, the least-recently written items are removed in the order written until enough space is available to add the new item. Clearing existing items does not change the index positions of the remaining items in the cache.

The SETTINGS_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE setting has an initial default value of 4096 bytes. The decompressor can establish a new maximum buffer size at any time, possibly causing header (name,value) pairs to be evicted from the cache if the newly established limit is less than the current total size.

The decompressor can disable use of the storage cache completely by setting the SETTINGS_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE setting to 0, forcing the cache to empty completely and making it impossible to add new headers.

The size of a header is calculated as: The number of octets required for the name plus the number of octets required for the value plus 32-octets to account for any internal storage overhead. The number of octets required for the value depends on the value type:

- String values are measured by the number of UTF-8 encoded octets required to represent the character sequence.
- Number and Date-Time values are measured by the number of unsigned variable length integer (uvarint) encoded octets required to represent the value using a 5-bit prefix.
- Legacy (HTTP/1.1) values are measured by the number of octets required to represent the value.
- Binary values are measured by the number of octets contained by the sequence.

3. Header Encoding and Decoding

The set of headers is encoded for transmission using the following process:
1. For each header, determine if the (name, value) pair already exists in the cache.
   * If an exact match is found in the cache, encode the indexed position of the header as an Indexed Reference and advance to the next header (name, value) pair.
   * Otherwise, move to step #2.

2. Determine if a header (name, value) pair with the same name already exists in the cache. If a matching name is found, make note of the indexed position of the matching name and continue to step #3.

3. Determine whether the new header (name, value) pair ought to be assigned to the cache.
   * If the header is not to be cached, encode the header as a Non-Indexed Literal Representation and continue to the next header (name, value) pair.
   * Otherwise, assign an index position for the header (name, value) pair and encode the header as an Indexed Literal Representation.

Following these steps, headers are serialized into one of four representation types, each represented by a two-bit prefix code. The types and their codes are:

- 10 - Indexed
- 00 - Non-Indexed Literal
- 01 - Indexed Literal

Headers can be encoded into groups of up to 64 instances. Each group is prefixed by a single octet. The two most significant bits of this prefix identify the representation type, the six remaining bits specify the number of instances, with 000000 indicating a single instance and 111111 indicating 64.

Decoding simply reverses the encoding steps:

1. First initialize an empty working set of headers.

2. Begin iterating through each representation group:
* If it is an Indexed group, iterate through each index included in the group, look up the corresponding (name,value) pair in the cache and add that to the working set. If no matching (name,value) is found, terminate and report an error.

* If it’s a Non-Indexed Literal group, iterate through each (name,value) pair included in the group and add that to the working set.

* If it’s an Indexed Literal group, iterate through each (name,value) pair, assign it to the specified position in the cache and add it to the working set.

3. Continue with each representation group until the full block has been decoded.

When a single header name is used multiple times with different values, the order in which those values are serialized and processed is significant. The working set created by the decoding process above MUST preserve the ordering of those values as received.

3.1. Literal (name,value) Representation

The structure of an encoded (name,value) pair consists of:

- A 3-bit value type identifier,
- The name, encoded either as a literal sequence of ASCII octets or as the cache index position of another existing header sharing the same name, and
- The encoded value.

The three most-significant bits of the first octet identify the value type.

This design allows for a maximum of 7 value types, five of which are defined by this specification. The two remaining types are reserved for future use. The currently defined value types are:

- UTF-8 (000)
- Integer (001)
- Timestamp (010)
- Legacy (100)
Opaque Binary (111)

Of the five types, the Legacy type is reserved for encoding header values conforming to the field-value construct defined by [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging], and is used specifically for backwards compatibility with header fields that have not yet been updated to use a more specific type value (see Appendix B).

If the name is encoded using an index reference to another existing (name,value) pair in the cache, the remaining five least significant bits of the first octet are set to zero and the next octet identifies the referenced cache index position. This octet MUST NOT reference a cache index position that is not currently assigned.

If the name is encoded as a sequence of ASCII octets, the number of octets required to represent the name is encoded as a unsigned variable length integer with a five-bit prefix, filling the 5-remaining least significant bits of the first octet, followed by the sequence of ASCII octets conforming to the following header-name construct:

Header name ABNF:

header-name = ["":"] 1*header-char

header-char = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*" / "+" / "," / ";" / "^" / "_" / "'" / "|" / "˜" / DIGIT / LOWERALPHA

LOWERALPHA = %x61-7A

The encoding of the value depends on the value type.

UTF-8:

First, the number of UTF-8 encoded bytes required to represent the value is encoded as an unsigned variable length integer with a 0-bit prefix, followed by the full sequence of UTF-8 octets.

Integer

Integer values ranging from 0 to 2^64-1 are encoded as unsigned variable length integers with a 0-bit prefix. Negative or fractional numbers cannot be represented.

Timestamp
Timestamps is represented as the number of milliseconds elapsed since the standard Epoch (1970-01-01T00:00:00 GMT), encoded as an unsigned variable length integer with a 0-bit prefix. Timestamps that predate the Epoch cannot be represented.

Legacy
First, the number of octets required to represent the value is encoded as an unsigned variable length integer with a 0-bit prefix, followed by the full sequence of octets.

Opaque
The number of octets in the sequence is encoded as an unsigned variable length integer with a 0-bit prefix, followed by the full sequence of octets.

3.1.1. Dealing with invalid name or value encodings

Implementations encountering invalid name or value encodings MUST signal an error and terminate processing of the header block. Examples of such errors include:

- Header names that include any octets not explicitly permitted by the above header-name ABNF construction;
- UTF-8 values that include a byte order mark, over-long or invalid octet sequences, or octets representing invalid Unicode codepoints;
- Integer or Date-Time values that encode numbers strictly larger than \(2^{64}-1\);

3.2. Indexed Representation

The serialization of an Indexed Representation consists of a single octet prefix followed by up to 64 single-octet cache index position references.

```
+--------+--------+     +---------+
|10xxxxxx| IDX[1]  | ... | IDX[64] |
+--------+---------     +---------+
```

For instance:

0x80 0x00
References item #0 from the cache.

0x81 0x00 0x01
References items #0 and #1 from the cache.

Indexed Representations do not cause the cache state to be modified in any way. If an Indexed References specifies an index position that has not yet been assigned or whose value has been cleared, decoding MUST terminate with an error.

3.3. Non-Indexed Literal Representation

The serialization of a group of Non-Indexed Literal representations consists of a single-octet prefix followed by up to 64 Literal (name,value) Representations.

\[ \begin{array}{c|c|c}
\mid 00xxxxxx \mid & (name,value)[1] & \ldots \mid (name,value)[64] \\
\hline
\end{array} \]

For instance:

0x00 0x01 0x61 0x01 0x62

Specifies a single header with name "a" and a UTF-8 value of "b" is to be handled as a Non-Indexed header (it is not added to the cache).

3.4. Indexed Literal Representation

The serialization of a group of Indexed Literal representations consists of a single-octet prefix followed by up to 64 (index position, Literal (name,value) representation) pairs.

\[ \begin{array}{c|c|c}
\mid 01xxxxxx \mid IDX[1] \mid (name,value)[1] & \ldots \mid IDX[64] \mid (name,value)[64] \\
\hline
\end{array} \]

For instance:

0x40 0x03 0x01 0x61 0x01 0x62

Specifies that a single header with name "a" and a UTF-8 String value of "b" is to be assigned to the cache at index position #3.

0x40 0x03 0x21 0x61 0x04

Specifies that a single header with name "a" and Integer value of 3 is to be assigned to the cache at index position #4.

4. Unsigned Variable Length Integer Syntax
Unsigned integers are encoded as defined in [I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-compression].

5. Security Considerations

TBD

6. References

6.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-compression]
Peon, R. and H. Ruellan, "HTTP/2.0 Header Compression",
draft-ietf-httpbis-header-compression-01 (work in progress), July 2013.


6.2. Informational References

[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging]


Appendix A. Initial Cache Entries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>:scheme</td>
<td>http</td>
<td>Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>:scheme</td>
<td>https</td>
<td>Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>:host</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>:path</td>
<td>/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>:method</td>
<td>GET</td>
<td>Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>accept</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>accept-charset</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>accept-encoding</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>accept-language</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>cookie</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>if-modified-since</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
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<td>user-agent</td>
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<td>proxy-connection</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>referer</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>accept-datetime</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>authorization</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>allow</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>cache-control</td>
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<td>connection</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>content-length</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>content-md5</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>content-type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>date</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>expect</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>from</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>if-match</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>if-none-match</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>if-range</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>if-unmodified-since</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>max-forwards</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>pragma</td>
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<td>proxy-authorization</td>
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<td>via</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>warning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>38</td>
<td>:status</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Integer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>cache-control</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>41</td>
<td>content-length</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>content-type</td>
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</tr>
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<td>date</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>etag</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>expires</td>
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<td>last-modified</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>server</td>
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<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>set-cookie</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>vary</td>
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<td>via</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>access-control-allow-origin</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>accept-ranges</td>
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<td>allow</td>
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<td>connection</td>
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<td>content-disposition</td>
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<td>content-encoding</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>content-language</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>content-location</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix B. Updated Standard Header Definitions

To properly deal with the backwards compatibility concerns for HTTP/1, there are several important rules for use of Typed Codecs in HTTP headers:

- All header fields MUST be explicitly defined to use the new header types. All existing HTTP/1 header fields will continue to be represented in conformance to the field-value construct defined by [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging] unless their specific definitions are updated. Such fields MUST specify the Legacy value type when serialized. The HTTP/2 specification would update the definitions of specific known header fields (e.g. content-length, date, if-modified-since, etc).

- For translation to HTTP/1.1, header fields that use the typed codecs will have specific normative transformations defined.
  - UTF-8 will be converted to ISO-8859-1 with extended characters pct-encoded
  - Numbers will be converted to their ASCII equivalent values.
  - Date Times will be converted to their HTTP-Date equivalent values.
  - Opaque fields will be Base64-encoded.
  - Legacy fields are passed through untranslated.
There will be no normative transformation from legacy values into the typed codecs. Implementations are free to apply transformation where they determine it to be appropriate, but it will be perfectly acceptable for an implementation to pass a text value through as a Legacy type even if it is known that a given header has a typed codec equivalent.

A Note of warning: Individual header fields MAY be defined such that they can be represented using multiple types. Numeric fields, for instance, can be represented using either the uvarint encoding or using the equivalent sequence of ASCII numbers. Implementers will need to be capable of supporting each of the possible variations. Designers of header field definitions need to be aware of the additional complexity and possible issues that allowing for such alternatives can introduce for implementers.

Based on an initial survey of header fields currently defined by the HTTPbis specification documents, the following header field definitions can be updated to make use of the new types:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>content-length</td>
<td>Numeric or Text</td>
<td>Can be represented as either an unsigned, variable-length integer or a sequence of ASCII numbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>date</td>
<td>Timestamp or Text</td>
<td>Can be represented as either a uvarint encoded timestamp or as text (HTTP-date).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max-forwards</td>
<td>Numeric or Text</td>
<td>Can be represented as either an unsigned, variable-length integer or a sequence of ASCII numbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retry-after</td>
<td>Timestamp, Numeric or Text</td>
<td>Can be represented as either a uvarint encoded timestamp, an unsigned, variable-length integer, or the text equivalents of either (HTTP-date or sequence of ASCII numbers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>if-modified-since</td>
<td>Timestamp or Text</td>
<td>Can be represented as either a uvarint encoded timestamp or as text (HTTP-date).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Header</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>if-unmodified-since</td>
<td>Timestamp or Text</td>
<td>Can be represented as either a uvarint encoded timestamp or as text (HTTP-date).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>last-modified</td>
<td>Timestamp or Text</td>
<td>Can be represented as either a uvarint encoded timestamp or as text (HTTP-date).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>Numeric or Text</td>
<td>Can be represented as either an unsigned, variable-length integer or a sequence of ASCII numbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expires</td>
<td>Timestamp or Text</td>
<td>Can be represented as either a uvarint encoded timestamp or as text (HTTP-date).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etag</td>
<td>Binary or Text</td>
<td>Can be represented as either an opaque sequence of binary octets or using the currently defined text format. When represented as binary octets, the Entity Tag MUST be considered to be a Strong Entity tag. Weak Entity Tags cannot be represented using the binary octet option.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix C. Example**

**C.1. First Header Set:**

The first header set to represent is the following:

```
:path: /my-example/index.html
user-agent: my-user-agent
x-my-header: first
```

The cache is prefilled as defined in Appendix A, however, none of the values represented in the initial set can be found in the cache. All headers, then, are encoding using the Indexed Literal Representation:

```
43 4a 00 03 16 2f 6d 79 2d 65
78 61 6d 70 6c 65 2f 69 6e 64
```
Three new entries are added to the cache:

| Index | Name        | Value                  |
|-------+-------------+------------------------|
| 74    | :path       | /my-example/index.html |
| 75    | user-agent  | my-user-agent          |
| 76    | x-my-header | first                  |

C.2. Second Header Set:

The second header set to represent is the following:

:path: /my-example/resources/script.js
user-agent: my-user-agent
x-my-header: second

Comparing this second header set to the first, we see that the :path and x-my-header headers have new values, while the user-agent value remains unchanged.

Items #74 and #76 added by the previous header set are replaced:

| Index | Name        | Value                           |
|-------+-------------+---------------------------------|
| 74    | :path       | /my-example/resources/script.js |
| 75    | user-agent  | my-user-agent                   |
| 76    | x-my-header | second                          |
C.3. Third Header Set:

Let’s suppose a third header set that is identical to the second is sent:

82 4b 4c 4d

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