Security Requirements in the Software Defined Networking Model  
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Abstract

Software defined/driven networks provide new dimensions of flexibility in network design. This document analyzes security requirements as we design protocols to support multiple network applications on an SDN in an open manner.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 3
2. Moving Beyond a Single Application ........................... 3
   2.1. Class 1: Network Sensitive Applications ................ 3
   2.2. Class 2: Services for the Network ....................... 4
   2.3. Class 3: Packaged Network Services ..................... 5
3. Authentication, Authorization and Multiple Organizations ...... 6
4. Security Requirements ........................................... 8
   4.1. Nested Application Security ............................. 9
5. Security Considerations .......................................... 9
6. IANA Considerations ............................................ 10
7. Informative References ......................................... 10
Authors’ Addresses ............................................... 10
1. Introduction

This document analyzes the security of SDN architectures as we work to build SDN frameworks supporting multiple applications at the same time. The assumption of this protocol is that protocols like Openflow will be used between a SDN controller and switches. However this document assumes that there will be additional protocols between controllers and between controllers and applications. That is the focus for the current analysis.

2. Moving Beyond a Single Application

Openflow defines a protocol between a physical switch and a controller. Several factors motivate a layer between the controller and applications. For example [I-D.nadeau-sdn-problem-statement] discusses a model where managed service providers (MSPs) provide networking services to applications. This model involves the following attributes that significantly impact SDN security analysis:

- An application in one organization may use an MSP in another
- MSPs may be nested; one MSP may use the services of another
- Privacy concerns may limit what information should be exposed
- Applications require significant authorization and policy

The remainder of this section examines a few classes of applications in order to identify characteristics of SDN use cases that affect security.

2.1. Class 1: Network Sensitive Applications

Some applications require particular characteristics from the network. For example an application might need access to ports in a particular isolation domain/vlan. An application might require a path with particular characteristics. An application might require that traffic stay within a certain jurisdiction, travel only over certain equipment, or similar constraints. An application might want to monitor the cost of certain traffic or flows. And application might require that flows be discarded to mitigate a DOS attack or accepted in order to run a service.

Applications in this class will typically wish to provision aspects of the network using some API. They may wish to collect information from the network for monitoring, auditing or accounting.
Applications may not be aware of each others’ requests. the SDN controller needs to make sure that one application does not negatively interact with another. Isolation of applications may be a security requirement. In this case the controller needs to make sure that even a malicious application cannot interact badly with another.

In most cases authorization will be important. The network may have resources that are not appropriate for one application or another and may wish to enforce authorization between them.

Multiple organizations may be involved within providing network services to such an application. For example, an application may request a network connection within a particular isolation domain. However that isolation domain may include resources within an enterprise, a cloud provider and a transit network between the enterprise and cloud provider. Authorization and authentication are likely to be handled by proxies in at least the simpler cases. For example, an application in the enterprise network requests access to the application domain from some controller in the enterprise. That controller has necessary credentials to request access from the transit network and cloud provider. Authentication and authorization may be more complex when an application in the cloud environment requests access to the isolation domain. Does it contact the enterprise controller or does it contact a resource in the cloud that has sufficient privilege to grant access to the enterprise aspect of the isolation domain. Debugging of multi-organization environments is facilitated by exposing information about all the environments. For example it is likely that for monitoring and debugging purposes enterprise applications would want visibility into the cloud environment and the parts of the transit network that the enterprise is allowed to see. Obviously the transit network and cloud provider would want to limit visibility into their internal structure but would want to make available information about resources controlled by that customer. For example the cloud provider would typically allow customers to see their own instances and virtual networks. Going through a proxy to authenticate requests for debugging and monitoring may not be ideal; it may be desirable for the application to collect debugging and monitoring information directly from the transit network and cloud provider. If so, the authentication and authorization needs to be flexible enough to permit this.

2.2. Class 2: Services for the Network

An application may provide a service such as a firewall, content inspection or intrusion detection to the entire network. In this case, the security model is similar to the security model between the SDN controller and switch; there is one key exception that will be discussed shortly. The primary role of the separation between the
SDN controller and application for this class of applications is to permit multiple applications to co-exist. So, isolation of resources is still important.

The security model for this class of application is similar to one of the common models for routing protocols and network management. Strong defense against outside attacks is required. It would be a significant attack if an attacker could impersonate an authorized application and gain the ability to reconfigure or monitor the network. However, inside attacks are not generally considered in scope for the threat analysis.

One key consideration with this type of security model is protecting the boundary between inside and outside and supporting multiple zones of trust. As an example, a border firewall application does not need the ability to reconfigure the interior of the network or to examine traffic inside interior isolation domains not destined for the border of the network. So, even in this model authorizing what resources an application is permitted to see and manipulate is important. This contrasts somewhat with the security model between the controller and switch, where the controller is permitted to manipulate all OpenFlow resources on the switch.

2.3. Class 3: Packaged Network Services

This class combines the previous two classes. Consider an application of class 1 that wishes for all traffic leaving a certain isolation domain to pass through a particular border firewall service. In effect an application is requesting an instantiation of another application be created as a virtual element in the network. This class of application permits abstraction and re-use of network applications. There is obvious value in the cloud space. However even within an organization, configuration re-use may have significant value.

To discuss the security we will say that an outer application nests a nested application within the network. The nested application may involve network resources (virtual or real) as well as compute and other resources.

This class involves classic security concerns such as authentication and authorization. What applications is the outer application permitted to nest? How is auditing and accounting handled? The IETF SDN architecture needs to permit these questions to be answered in a secure manner.

There may be multiple instances of a nested application, nested into either the same or different outer applications. There are
significant issues related to the sharing of information between instances of a nested application. For example, it is quite common for e-mail filtering services to collect information from multiple customers in order to better detect unwanted e-mail. However leaking proprietary information from one customer to another would be undesirable. To a large extent appropriate information sharing is a matter for application design and is out of scope for the SDN architecture. However the SDN architecture needs to support tracking of instance-specific information as well as global information and needs to facilitate design of applications that supports isolation of instances. This parallels virtual computing architectures, where the decision about how to split a problem is application specific, but the virtualization platform provides facilities to share information in a controlled manner and to manage large numbers of instances of applications.

Authentication may be more complex in the nested application situation. The permissions that a nested application has will depend on which outer application it is working on-behalf of; the authentication approach will need to account for this.

Multiple organizations may be involved with this class of application. As an example, the nested application may be provided by an MSP. Also, the nested application may use an MSP in providing the application.

Balancing which resources are visible to the outer application will be tricky. As with class 1 applications, debugging argues for visibility where possible. however, resources may be shared between instances of a nested application. Also, visibility into the nested application might provide proprietary information or provide an attacker with potential advantages. For example, understanding what flow filters were in place on a firewall application might expose information that would be valuable in getting around the firewall.

There’s a similar concern with the nested application’s visibility into the outer application. That visibility can be valuable for optimization and debugging. However, it may provide proprietary information or otherwise compromise the privacy goals of the outer application.

3.  Authentication, Authorization and Multiple Organizations

In looking at needs of the various classes of applications, support for applications and network resources spanning multiple organizations appeared as a requirement multiple times. This requirement is interesting from a security standpoint. This section
explores how authentication and authorization can be handled between organizations.

One approach is for an organization to proxy connections to other organizations. The controller in one organization has credentials on behalf of the organization that it uses with other organizations. The local application talks to the local controller. When the controller realizes that it needs resources from another organization it talks to that organization’s controller. This approach has been used fairly effectively in SIP [RFC3261] and other protocols with trusted intermediates. A significant advantage of this approach is that it permits the organization to enforce organization-level policy. It also permits the organization to hide information. For example, consider the class 1 example where the enterprise’s isolation domain is split between a cloud, transit network and domain inside the enterprise. That split might be unimportant to the application; the organization’s controller might try and present a unified network to applications. In such a case a proxy approach can work well.

The proxy approach has some disadvantages. There is no end-to-end security including integrity or data-origin authentication. The proxy becomes a very sensitive target. Because of the lack of end-to-end integrity, if the proxy is compromised, then the attacker can impersonate other network resources from the view of elements behind the proxy. The proxy may make deploying new features more difficult. To the extent that the proxy needs to understand a new feature before it is used, the proxy makes it more expensive to deploy the feature.

Another approach is for applications to directly have credentials in another organization. For example, this might work if an application wishes to use a particular external MSP. The advantage of this approach is that it provides flexibility to the application. The disadvantage is that it leaves open the question of how the two organizations’ resources are glued together to form a consistent network. In some cases the application could manage this. In other cases, for example where changes are required in flow tables based on dynamic responses from the other organization, this may not be practical. Other disadvantages include increased complexity and difficulty in enforcing organization-level policy.

A third approach is to use some sort of federated/delegated authentication approach such as oauth [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] or ABFAB [I-D.ietf-abfab-arch] to permit applications to obtain credentials that can be used in other organizations. This sort of delegation and federation could facilitate the following use cases:
o Permit applications to obtain credentials for debugging and monitoring while attaching constraints to those credentials limiting resources the application can see

o Preset credentials so applications can talk to foreign controllers; for example the cloud application talking to the enterprise controller to gain access to the enterprise isolation domain

o Permit nested applications to be delegated access to some outer application resources

o Grant outer applications access to nested application resources for debugging, monitoring or application-specific reasons

Another concern when multiple organizations are involved is auditing and accountability. Digital signatures and other mechanisms can be used to provide end-to-end accountability. However, this needs to be balanced against the need to hide information. It seems like the SDN use case may be one where end-to-end accountability is rarely an option.

4. Security Requirements

This section captures a variety of security requirements for layers on top of SDN controllers. These requirements are based on the discussion of potential applications as well as multi-organization considerations.

REQ1: Authentication is REQUIRED to the controller. Authentication SHOULD support existing credentials that are likely to be used in the datacenter.

REQ2: The interface to the SDN controller MUST support authorizing specific network resources to applications and manipulating the authorizations of applications.

REQ3: The SDN controller MUST provide facilities to isolate one application from another. XXX more discussion of this

REQ 4: The SDN controller interface MUST support a controller acting as a proxy on behalf of applications.

REQ 4a: The SDN interface SHOULd support a way of associating an audit ID or other tracking ID so that requests can be correlated with an original application when a proxy acts on behalf of an application.
REQ 5: The SDN controller interface MUST provide mechanisms for operators and applications to enforce privacy.

REQ 6: The SDN controller interface MUST support delegating access to a subset of resources; as part of delegation new authorization and privacy constraints MAY be supplied. This supports the security needs of the debugging use case, aspects of the nested application use case, and facilitates other inter-organization uses.

4.1. Nested Application Security

This section captures requirements for nested application support.

REQ N1: The SDN controller interface MUST support controlling authorization for what nested applications an outer application can nest.

REQ N2: The controller MUST separate authorizations held by one instance of a nested application from authorizations held by other instances of the same nested application. This is more about defense from bugs and operational mistakes than maintaining isolation of authorizations even if the nested application tries to circumvent the authorizations. However, it should be possible to write a nested application that maintains isolation sufficiently that compromise of one instance of the application will not lead to compromise of other instances. Obviously doing so places constraints on what resources need to be duplicated between instances of an application.

REQ N3: The SDN controller interface SHOULD provide outer applications a way to learn a nested application’s policy for sharing information between instances.

REQ N4: Nested applications MUST be able to authenticate on behalf of a specific outer application. This facilitates authorization, accounting and auditing.

REQ N5: Nested applications MUST be able to specify privacy policy for what resources are visible to the outer application.

REQ N6: Outer applications MUST be able to specify privacy policy and authorizations with regard to what outer resources the nested application can interact with.

5. Security Considerations

This document provides discussion of the security implications of SDN architectures supporting multiple applications.
6. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to make the internet secure. Note to someone: reword this section before IANA reviews it.

7. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-abfab-arch]

[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]

[I-D.nadeau-sdn-problem-statement]


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Security Analysis of the Open Networking Foundation (ONF) OpenFlow Switch Specification
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Abstract

This document discusses the security properties of the OpenFlow Switch Specification version 1.3.0 (OpenFlow), a Software-Defined Network (SDN) solution produced by the Open Networking Foundation (ONF). It analyzes the suitability of OpenFlow for use in "the cloud" or on the open Internet. It also makes some suggestions about how OpenFlow could be made more secure for use in those environments.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 3
2. OpenFlow Security Features ................................. 3
   3.1. Optional Security, Failure Path Unspecified .......... 4
   3.2. No Certificate Details ................................. 4
   3.3. Importance of Checking Certificates on Both Sides .... 4
   3.4. TLS 1.0 Vulnerabilities ............................... 4
   4.1. One Controller per Switch Scenario ................... 5
   4.2. Security in Other Scenarios .......................... 5
      4.2.1. Multiple Controllers per Switch .................. 5
      4.2.2. Multiple Apps Talking to a Central Controller ... 5
5. Suggestions for Future Work ................................. 6
6. Security Considerations ...................................... 6
7. Acknowledgements ............................................ 6
8. Informative References ....................................... 6
Authors’ Addresses .............................................. 7
1. Introduction

This document discusses the security properties of the OpenFlow Switch Specification (OpenFlow) version 1.3.0 [ref], a Software-Defined Network (SDN) solution produced by the Open Networking Foundation (ONF). It analyzes the suitability of OpenFlow for use in "the cloud" or on the open Internet. It also makes some suggestions about how OpenFlow could be made more secure for use in those environments.

TBD: Add a short overview of OpenFlow.

2. OpenFlow Security Features

To quote the OpenFlow specification, "The switch and controller may communicate through a TLS connection. The TLS connection is initiated by the switch on startup to the controller, which is located by default on TCP port 6633. The switch and controller mutually authenticate by exchanging certificates signed by a site-specific private key. Each switch must be user-configurable with one certificate for authenticating the controller (controller certificate) and the other for authenticating to the controller (switch certificate)."

In other words, OpenFlow includes an optional security feature that allows the use of TLS on an OpenFlow control channel. This mechanism provides for authentication of the switch and the controller (if certificates are properly checked in both directions) to prevent attackers from impersonating a switch or a controller. It also allows for encryption of the control channel to prevent eavesdropping.

The OpenFlow specification mentions that auxiliary connections can use UDP with DTLS, but there is no further discussion of how DTLS will be used. Presumably it would use the same certificate-based authentication as is described for connections using TCP and TLS.


OpenFlow security is minimally specified, to the point where the differences between multiple OpenFlow implementations could cause operational complexity, interoperability issues or unexpected security vulnerabilities. This section outlines some of the issues in the OpenFlow specification that it might be useful to address in a later version of the specification.
3.1. Optional Security, Failure Path Unspecified

OpenFlow security is optional, requiring that implementations include support for non-secure control connections to ensure interoperability. Furthermore, there is no indication about whether implementations should fall back to insecure operation if authentication fails, or whether the connection should be closed after an authentication failure.

Also, as the OpenFlow specification states, "when using plain TCP, it is recommended to use alternative security measures to prevent eavesdropping, controller impersonation or other attacks on the OpenFlow channel." However, the specification gives no indication of what sort of alternative security measures are needed to prevent those attacks.

3.2. No Certificate Details

The OpenFlow document does not specify what certificate format will be used for the certificates that are exchanged between the switch and the controller, nor does it indicate what field(s) in the certificate will be used for naming. This could lead to operational complexity (if different names need to be used in different implementations to indicate the same device), or to a lack of interoperability.

3.3. Importance of Checking Certificates on Both Sides

Although the OpenFlow specification indicates that certificates will be exchanged in both directions, it does not explicitly state that the certificates must be checked on both ends of the connection. There are many TLS implementations that do not currently check client certificates, and if a similar approach was used in OpenFlow, it could result in vulnerability to man-in-the-middle attacks.

3.4. TLS 1.0 Vulnerabilities

The security text in the OpenFlow specification refers to "TLS", without any reference or version number. The failure to specify a TLS version number could result in non-interoperable implementations if some OpenFlow implementations include TLS 1.0 and others include TLS 1.1. Also, there are security vulnerabilities in TLS 1.0 that have been fixed in TLS 1.1. So, OpenFlow implementations that use TLS 1.0 may be subject to man-in-the-middle attacks, as well as other attacks against TLS 1.0. It would be advisable to mandate the use of TLS 1.1.

4.1. One Controller per Switch Scenario

The OpenFlow specification was originally written with the idea that there would be one controller (or a small set of tightly-coordinated controllers in a redundant deployment) controlling a set of switches. The OpenFlow specification correctly identifies two of the primary security threats in this scenario as eavesdropping and controller impersonation. The security mechanisms described in the OpenFlow specification are well-suited to protect against those threats. With some clarifications (as described above), the same mechanisms could be effective against man-in-the-middle attacks, which are also a significant concern in this scenario.

4.2. Security in Other Scenarios

Recent SDN discussions have raised the idea that multiple, non-tightly-coordinated processes might want to control the switching behavior of a network. There are two high-level scenarios under discussion to accomplish this goal, one where multiple controllers are used to control the same set of switches, and another where the needs of multiple control processes are mediated by a centralized controller that controls a set of switches. This section explores the applicability of the security mechanisms in the OpenFlow protocol, as currently specified, to those scenarios.

4.2.1. Multiple Controllers per Switch

In this scenario, multiple control processes talk directly to a single switch. OpenFlow security is poorly-suited to use in this scenario for two reasons: lack of support for authorization, and a lack of granular access/control.

OpenFlow authentication is, essentially, a binary process. An authenticated controller has access to view or change the full configuration of the switch. It also has access to all of the traffic flowing through the switch. This is not desirable in a case where multiple control processes are being used to control different portions of the network traffic.

4.2.2. Multiple Apps Talking to a Central Controller

This scenario effectively combines the two scenarios described above.

At the top-level, multiple control processes are talking to a single centralized controller, each communicating its own needs. This is akin to the "Multiple Controllers per Switch" scenario described in
the previous section. OpenFlow, as currently specified, is not well-suited for use at this level, due to its lack of support for authorization and fine-grained access control.

At the lower-level, a single, centralized controller is used to control a group of switches. Ignoring the specification issues raised earlier in this document, the security mechanisms defined in the OpenFlow specification are well-suited for communication between the centralized controller and the switches in this scenario.

5. Suggestions for Future Work

We would recommend that the IETF publish a document advising the ONF about the current weaknesses in the OpenFlow security specification. The document should also make specific suggestions for updates to the OpenFlow specification that would address those weaknesses. This document should focus on clarifications needed to ensure interoperability, as well as changes needed to eliminate vulnerabilities. The ONF could then decide when or if to include the suggested changes in the OpenFlow specification.

We would also recommend that the IETF publish a document outlining the security requirements for a protocol to run between applications and an SDN controller, or between multiple SDN controllers and a set of switches. This document would be useful for operators who are deciding what protocols to use for their SDN deployments, or for protocol designers (in the IETF, in the ONF or elsewhere) to use as the basis for designing security mechanisms for protocols intended for that purpose.

6. Security Considerations

TBD

7. Acknowledgements

This document was written using the xml2rfc tool described in RFC 2629 [RFC2629].

8. Informative References

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