Abstract

This document presents an initial framework and discussion of the problem of transferring middlebox (for example, firewall or NAT) flow-coupled state from one middlebox to another while the flow is still active. This has most recently come up in the context of virtual machine (VM) migration between hypervisors, but it is a problem that has appeared in other situations, as well. We present some of the parameters of the problem, define some language for discussing the problem, and begin to identify a path forward for addressing it.

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1. Introduction

An end-to-end network flow typically traverses one or more
"middlebox," which may retain state about the flow. These include,
for example, firewalls, NATs, traffic optimizers, and similar. The
flow-associated state is usually instantiated through a combination
of traffic inspection and broad policies, but may also be created by
the use of an explicit request or signaling mechanism.

When an endpoint changes its point of attachment to a network, it
retains its IP address, and the standard 5-tuple used to describe a
flow (source and destination addresses, source and destination ports,
protocol) stay the same. Because of this it is possible to move
existing middlebox state containing these elements.

The problem of how to handle transferring flow-associated middlebox
state when one flow endpoint moves is not a new one, but with some
exceptions it remains largely unaddressed. For example, situations
in which one endpoint or another "move" (we define what it means to
move an endpoint in more detail in Section 5) include mobile IP
[RFC5944], failover in a high-availability deployment, and VM
(virtual machine) migration. Related problems include multihomed
endpoints in SCTP and load balancing.

In this document we establish terminology (Section 2), describe the
problem, and lay out the components of the problem that would need to
be addressed in a solution.
2. Terminology

flow: "Traffic flow" is defined in [RFC2722] as an artificial logical equivalent of a call or connection. It is delimited by a start and a stop time.

middlebox: A middlebox was defined in [RFC3234] as "any intermediary device performing functions other than the normal, standard functions of an IP router on the datagram path between a source host and a destination host." RFC 3234 provides an older but excellent and still-relevant taxonomy of middlebox types.

move: When we talk about an endpoint "moving" what we are describing is the endpoint changing its point of attachment to the network. For the purpose of this discussion we assume that it retains the same IP address after the move that it had before the move.

policy: See Section 4.2
3. Goals

The problem we are interested in solving is the question of how to keep longer-lived network flows "alive" when an endpoint's point of attachment to a network changes. The particular piece of this we intend to address is how to move the middlebox (in this case, firewall or NAT) state associated with a network flow to new middleboxes.
4. Middlebox state

4.1. What state is associated with a flow on a middlebox?

To date, we haven’t been able to find a normative definition of the term ‘state’ in IETF documents. More generally it tends to be considered to be a set of observable properties associated with an object. This is (largely) distinct from automata theory, in which "state" refers to the condition of an object (or automaton). The observable things which might be associated by a middlebox with a network flow are described below.

Transport-layer middleboxes which keep flow-associated state through the duration of the flow typically keep, at a minimum, the standard IP 5-tuple:

\{s_addr, d_addr, s_port, d_port, protocol\}

where

s_addr is the source address

d_addr is the destination address

s_port is the source port

d_port is the destination port

protocol is the IP protocol (TCP, UDP, SCTP, RSVP, etc.)

Other data elements often associated with a network flow include timers.

Over the lifetime of a flow, it is not expected that elements of the standard 5-tuple will change, but there may be other pieces of state, such as timers, or data extracted from stateful inspection, which may be expected to change before a flow terminates.

As mentioned above, when an endpoint "moves" it retains its IP address(es) and the sockaddr information associated with a flow on an endpoint does not change.

Middlebox state is almost always associated with a specific interface (rather than the interface being an attribute of the flow). Some "stateful inspection" firewalls may keep state from higher layers in the networking stack: everything from TCP sequence numbers to entire SIP dialogues.
Note that the state associated with a flow may be left up when the flow is torn down in some implementations, such as those NATs that put the state on an activity-based timer as an efficiency mechanism, to avoid reinstantiating state should a new flow be created which shares the attributes of the flow which just ended. This is often the case with HTTP, for example.

It should also be noted that it is possible that a given bidirectional network flow (say, TCP) may have each flow (to and from its peer) follow different routes, commonly referred to as "asymmetric routing." When an endpoint moves, it is possible that

- both flows traverse the same middlebox before the move and after the move,
- both flows traverse the same middlebox before the move and different middleboxes after the move,
- both flows traverse different middleboxes before the move but the same middlebox after the move, or
- both flows traverse different middleboxes before the move and different middleboxes after the move.

4.2. State vs policy

We would like to draw a clear distinction between state and policy. 'Policy' is a set of statements that define how traffic (in this case) is to be treated by the middlebox. In some sense policy is a description of what state should be applied to a network flow; that is to say, state includes the instantiation of policy. When a flow first arrives at a middlebox, it consults its policy to determine what state (if any) is to be created and then associated with that flow.

As a general rule of thumb, policy is provisioned while state represents run-time responses to environmental conditions (in this case, network flows). Because policy is provisioned and because we assume that the middleboxes between which state would be migrated are under the administrative control of the same organization, we will make another assumption that there is consistent policy configured across middleboxes. We are aware that this is not always a correct assumption.

Note that implicit in this description is the notion of policy definition having an administrative scope. That is to say, there is an assumption that state must only be migrated between middleboxes in the same administrative policy domain. There are several risks.
associated with migrating state between middleboxes in different administrative domains, prominent among which is the possibility of installing local state on the "new" middlebox which violates its policy. We feel that migrating state between middleboxes in different administrative policy domains should be considered out of scope for the time being.

4.3. Mechanisms for instantiating middlebox state

State is created on middleboxes using a small number of mechanisms, sometimes in combination.

The most common means by which middlebox state is created is that the middlebox examines traffic and compares it against its own policies, which have typically been configured or provisioned by a systems or network administrator but in very simple cases can come preprovisioned, for example on commodity consumer equipment. It then creates middlebox state, in the form of a firewall pinhole, a NAT table mapping, QoS table entry, etc.

Another means is through explicit request. An endpoint or its proxy sends a request for resources (again, firewall pinhole, NAT table mapping, and so on) to the middlebox using some sort of "signaling" protocol to request the resource. The middlebox compares the request to its policy and grants or denies the request based on that policy. Examples of explicit request include RSVP [RFC2205], midcom [RFC3303], TURN [RFC5766], and the work being done by the IETF pcp [1] working group.

It is worth mention that there are mechanisms that are essentially hybrids of the previous two approaches, using expected effects of sending traffic across a middlebox to trigger hoped-for state instantiation. STUN [RFC5389] is probably the best-known example of this.
5. "Moving" endpoints

Moving an endpoint, in the context of this internet draft, refers to changing its point of attachment to a network. Doing so may cause traffic to cross different middleboxes from the ones the traffic traversed when the middlebox state was created.

5.1. A few words about addresses

One question that comes up from time to time in discussions of VM migration is whether or not the IP address will change as a result of the migration. We believe that this is out of scope for the time being, not the least because host operating system support is potentially difficult. If our goal is to keep a given network flow up and alive during a migration, not only would the endpoint operating system need to be aware that its address has changed, it would also need to be able to signal the other end of the flow, which would have to respond by modifying open sockets’ sockaddrs, etc. There are also some obvious security problems that would need to be addressed.

5.2. Scenarios

In this section we introduce a few scenarios. We believe the problem characteristics are fundamentally the same in these scenarios and that what we’re describing is a general problem.

5.2.1. Virtual machine migration

The live migration (i.e. the VM appears to remain "up" and available during the migration - that is to say, TCP or other connection-oriented flows are not dropped) of virtual machines between hypervisors in the same data center has been established practice for several years now, but there’s been a move towards live migration of VMs between geographically disparate data centers (see, for example this collaboration [2] between Cisco and VMWare). This provides the ability to perform data center maintenance without downtime, data center migration or consolidation, data center expansion, and workload balancing. There is a compelling use case for VM migration.

5.2.2. SCTP NAT

The SCTP [RFC4960] protocol supports multihomed endpoints. Any NAT that is port-aware (and these days it is nearly all of them) will need to have SCTP support in order to be able to handle extracting the port numbers even for flows that are single-homed on each end. This provides a mechanism for transparent failover when one path taken by the network flow fails (see section 6.4 in [RFC4960])
The upshot of this is that if a NAT is maintaining state related to a flow on the primary path and the primary path fails, that state may need to be transferred to the NAT being traversed by the secondary path.

This problem is being addressed in the IETF behave [3] working group.

5.2.3. High availability, and failover

"High-availability" commonly suggests failover as a mechanism to guarantee uninterrupted (or minimally interrupted) services. When a failure is detected services are shifted onto a secondary server. Note that this shift can be implemented through VM migration, as well as having the services brought up on a new system image.

Because outages are sometimes caused by site failures, failover can take place across geographically disparate sites. This introduces the likelihood of the flow now traversing a very different network path and a new set of middleboxes.
6. "Directionality"

One of the questions that comes up when considering an overall architecture to solve this set of problems is who initiates the state migration and how the data "flow" from place to place.

One approach is to have the middleboxes communicate directly with each other. In this case having all middleboxes poll all other middleboxes for copies of their state seems wasteful and inefficient, suggesting that communication between middleboxes would need a specific trigger. The "old" middlebox could send its state to the "new" middlebox or the new middlebox could send a request to the old middlebox for a copy of its state. In either case one middlebox would need to know the location of the other and be able to communicate with it (both parties would need to authenticate to each other). Note that if a catastrophic network event caused the old middlebox to become unreachable, it would be impossible to successfully query it for its state. [Note that this approach was considered for SCTP NAT traversal and discarded as impossible, since there was no way for one NAT to know about other NATs.]

Another approach is to have some controlling entity involved, either mediating communication between middleboxes or directing communication between middleboxes. In a VM migration scenario, a VM manager, or a network manager communicating with a VM manager, is an obvious candidate. As described in Section 4.2, the migration must stay within an administrative policy boundary, which may eliminate the need for multiple mediators.

The orthogonal question to whether or not there’s a mediating entity is who initiates the communication – does the old middlebox respond to a catastrophic event by dumping state before shutting down (not always possible, obviously) or is it polled by a mediating device or a new middlebox? Another possibility is to periodically transfer incremental information so that a non-recoverable error can save most of the flows, if not all.
7. Problems

The problems that must be solved in order to move middlebox state along with a moving endpoint include:

- Recognizing when an endpoint has moved
- Locating middleboxes along the original path
- Locating middleboxes along the new path
- Getting a copy of state from middleboxes along the old path
- Installing that state in middleboxes along the new path

7.1. Recognizing when an endpoint has moved

As touched upon in Section 5.2, there are various circumstances that could cause an endpoint to change its point of attachment to a network. They fall into two broad categories: planned and unplanned.

In the planned case, some entity knows that an endpoint is about to move and the move can happen in a controlled fashion. There may be time to send network queries, learn topology, and gather state.

The unplanned case is typically a response to the failure of some element in the network. A monitoring heartbeat is missed, a connection times out, or some other indication of catastrophic failure is received by an endpoint or by a monitoring service. Not only does this interfere with the notion of an organized transfer from one path to the new one, it also means that there may be cases where the old middlebox is not reachable and it’s not possible to query its state.

7.2. Topology discovery

Somehow or other the state migration mechanism needs to be able to locate and communicate with both the middleboxes on the old path and the middleboxes on the new path. This is not a trivial problem; IP was designed to have the network itself be largely opaque to endpoints, and very often systems and network administrators prefer not to expose network topology, feeling that it would introduce security threats.

There are several options, including configuration, discovery, and notification. In configuration, someone with knowledge of the network topology would be able to construct a table describing middleboxes associated with certain routes. In discovery, a network
mechanism would be used to query for the middleboxes along a path, similar to traceroute or to a PATH message in RSVP [RFC2205].

A configuration mechanism would have the disadvantage of being not particularly responsive to changes in the network, as well as being somewhat error-prone. However, it would not involve inventing a new network mechanism or requiring changes on every participating middlebox (although the state migration mechanism itself would nearly certainly require changes).

[Note that an architecture that had the middlebox copying its own state out to some third party would almost certainly have to be configuration-base.]

A discovery-based approach would require putting new software on every middlebox, an approach that is intuitively unappealing and that has been repeatedly shown to inhibit adoption of newer technologies. There is no such thing as incremental deployment using this approach. It also introduces security problems, since without the appropriate protections it would allow attackers to probe and discover not just network topology but specifically the location of security devices/middleboxes in a given network. On the other hand it’s robust against configuration errors and highly responsive to changes in the underlying network.

A third option, notification, relies on a middlebox announcing its presence to the network, typically using anycast or broadcast. This also requires changes to both the middlebox and a controlling entity, and a an announcement/notification protocol. It has the advantage of being responsive to new middleboxes coming up in the network, although a mechanism (such as a heartbeat) would be needed to detect outages and drops.

The primary security consideration in a notification scenario is that the network must be tightly controlled to prevent announcements from being eavesdropped upon by adversaries.

7.3. Copying state from a middlebox

Another problem to be solved is the one of copying state from a middlebox, encoding it, and transferring it over the network.

It may be the case that the middleboxes are from different manufacturers/vendors, and so the problem of representing the state we wish to transfer includes the question of presenting it in a vendor-neutral format, including both state semantics and state syntax.
A somewhat more challenging aspect of this problem is how to transport the encoded state. For one thing, it may be that the event that triggered the endpoint migration has also rendered the middlebox in question unreachable. For another, what sort of load this imposes on the middlebox depends, among other things, on the "directionality" of the state migration. It may be that an external device, such as a session controller, a hypervisor, or another middlebox queries the old middlebox for a copy of its state. In high-availability scenarios the middlebox may end up "pushing" copies of its state out to some controlling or intermediate entity, such as a hypervisor.

Among the transport characteristics that need to be considered is reliability, and being able to recognize when a copy of the source middlebox state has not been transferred correctly, whether it’s because it’s incomplete, damaged, or inauthentic.

7.4. Installing state on the new middlebox

The problem of installing state on the new middlebox is closely related to the one of copying state from the old middlebox. In both cases we’re facing the problems of representation and encoding, a transport protocol to/from the middlebox, and questions about reachability.

Reliability is a question here, as well, with the additional concern, beyond what is described in the previous section, of whether or not the state is installed correctly on the new middlebox. Issues that could interfere with installation include resource limitations, and authority/authorization.
8. Security Considerations

Any time we introduce new mechanisms to query and manipulate middleboxes, we also introduce potentially very serious security exposures.

In this case, because we’re planning on discovering the location of middleboxes, querying the middleboxes for their state, and installing state on middleboxes, we face a very broad range indeed of potential threats.

Network and systems administrators typically want to conceal network topology from outsiders, and it may be necessary to use authenticated discovery (packet filtering may be adequate for some deployments but not all). This introduces problems around credentials management and keying for participants, and may suggest that we would want to minimize the number of network elements talking with one another.

Clearly the ability to copy data from a middlebox introduces the ability to discover yet more network topology, and in particular to identify specific firewall pinholes and NAT table mappings, and their associated state.

Similarly, the ability to install state on a middlebox can introduce both Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerabilities but also the ability of an attacker to penetrate a middlebox, or to disable it completely.

In all cases, protections must be designed with sensitivity to performance, since middleboxes often are processing very heavy traffic loads. This means keeping an eye on cryptographic processing demands, key and other credentials management, etc.
9. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.
10. Acknowledgments

Many thanks to David Black for his careful review and suggestions for improvements.
11. Informative References


Appendix A. On the applicability of the Context Transfer Protocol

In this section we examine the applicability of the Context Transfer Protocol [RFC4067] to the state migration problem, given the problems outlined in Section 7. In Section 7, we identify the following components of the overall state migration problem:

- Recognizing when an endpoint has moved
- Locating middleboxes along the original path
- Locating middleboxes along the new path
- Getting a copy of state from middleboxes along the old path
- Installing that state in middleboxes along the new path

A.1. Topology awareness

The Context Transfer Protocol was designed to support node mobility -- to minimize disruptions when a mobile node attaches to a new access router. In a typical scenario, when a mobile node moves from one access router to another, CXTP provides a means to move associated state (or context) to the new access router to which the node becomes attached.

In the CXTP scenario, the mobile node "knows" that the access router is there and has direct communication with it, by virtue of the underlying network mobility mechanisms. A context transfer may be initiated by the mobile node when it "knows" that it will be attaching to a new access router, or it may be initiated by the existing access router when it receives a link-layer trigger. Alternatively, a context transfer may be initiated by the new access router when it receives a link-layer trigger. In short, the context transfer request is generated by a first party in the network, either the mobile node itself or one of its access routers.

This contrasts rather starkly with the usual middlebox scenario, where the middlebox is typically invisible to the endpoint (the mobile node analogue). A mobile node has an explicit relationship with an access router; a network endpoint has no such relationship with a firewall or NAT, except in those cases in which the firewall or NAT is doing double-duty as a proxy.

Topology awareness has been one of the most persistent and difficult problems associated with middlebox communication issues. In the CXTP case topology awareness is pre-existing in the network and the relationship between the mobile node and the access router.
A.2. Triggers

The question of the triggers initiating a context transfer or state migration is very closely tied to the question of topology awareness, since in the CXTP case the mobile node "knows" the access router is there and has an explicit relationship with it, while in the state migration case the middlebox is opaque to the endpoint.

The mechanisms underlying a mobile node attach/detach differ significantly from those underlying, say, a virtual machine migration. At the most basic level, a mobile node knows that it is moving between access routers. A virtual machine typically does not know that it's being moved - the VM migration is triggered by a third party and is opaque to the VM itself, since its own state is maintained intact across the migration. A network access device may detect a change, but it will not have knowledge of the other (previous) middlebox nor will it be able to request that information from the migrated VM, since the VM itself will not know whether or not there were middleboxes present, or where they were, as described in the previous section.

A.3. Copying state

CXTP has been designed to transfer state between a source access router and a destination access router -- that is to say, they must know about each other, know that a given mobile node is associated with the other access router, and have a network path between the two access routers.

That is not the case when migrating virtual machines. The network element which triggers a VM migration does not necessarily have network topology awareness and does not have sufficient information to be able to request a migration of associated state.

That said, CXTP looks highly suitable for actually transferring the middlebox state, once the topology/middlebox discovery problems are solved. Security issues would need an extra level of scrutiny, not only because, as described in [RFC4067], the threats in a handover were not well understood at the time the document was published, but also because the network elements involved are different and the relationships among those network elements are different. Having a third party (the element requesting the VM migration) request a migration of network middlebox state requires different security properties from having a network element (a mobile node or its access routers) request a context transfer on its own behalf.
A.4. Conclusion

Based on the previous discussion we believe that CXTP may be directly useful for the actual transfer of middlebox state but that it does not address some core problems which would need to be solved in order to successfully migrate that state. These problems are topology discovery (i.e. locating the correct middleboxes), and generating triggers.
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Large-Scale Measurement of Broadband Performance: Use Cases, Architecture and Protocol Requirements
draft-schulzrinne-lmap-requirements-00

Abstract

Measuring broadband performance on a large scale is important for network diagnostics by providers and users, as well as for public policy. To conduct such measurements, user networks gather data, either on their own initiative or instructed by a measurement controller, and then upload the measurement results to a designated measurement server. This document describes a logical architecture and summarizes key requirements for protocols to connect the components. The system is designed to support residential and small-enterprise networks, using either wired or wireless networks. The architecture supports an extensible set of active and passive measurements, but the details of the metrics themselves are beyond the scope of this document.

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1. Introduction

Measuring actual network performance is crucial to managing consumer and enterprise networks, but, when performed at scale, it also allows third parties to gain insight into the actual performance of such networks, facilitating consumer choice and allowing to evaluate the state of broadband performance in a country, among other public policy goals. A number of network performance metrics have been defined, such as [2], but there is no overall architecture and set of protocols that facilitates gathering such measurements in a coordinated way, at scales drawing on thousands or millions of nodes.

Large-scale measurement efforts (e.g., [3]) use proprietary, custom-designed mechanisms to coordinate the measurement clients. They require that the organization running the measurements deploy thousands of dedicated hardware components or rely on end-system software modules that are subject to exogeneous factors, such as home networks, that may distort the results. Thus, this document proposes an overall architecture, with emphasis on the functional and security requirements for the protocols connecting the elements of the architecture, that will make it possible to build measurement capabilities into home and enterprise edge routers, personal computers, mobile devices and other edge devices.

Any usage and implementation will likely impose a number of additional operational requirements and a statistical sampling methodology. For example, the Measurement Broadband America project [3] within the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has established specific operational guidelines on data validity and commits to specific requirements for open access to measurement data, software tools and documentation of measurement methodology and statistical approaches. While crucial for deployment, these are beyond the scope of this protocol requirements document. Also, as is customary for IETF-managed protocols, this document does not mandate a specific hardware or operating system platform for implementation.

We suggest that the IETF IP Performance Metrics (IPPM) working group take on defining any additional performance metrics as needed. Such an effort should be undertaken as a collaborative effort with the Broadband Forum (BBF) [4]; other SDOs may also take on aspects of this problem area.

In some applications, such as data gathering by local regulatory entities, extensive logging at various levels, from packet arrival times to events, will be used to assure all parties of the validity of the data gathered. However, logging is beyond the scope of this document.
Both active and passive measurement techniques have been widely accepted in practice. In active measurements, the end systems emit traffic and observes a performance metric, or has another end point do so. Examples of active measurements include round-trip delay [2], one-way delay [5] and throughput [6] metrics, service availability, as well as a range of measurements that try to emulate application behavior, such as VoIP, HTTP retrievals or media streaming. Passive measurements observe existing user traffic flows. We note that there is some overlap between NetFlow [7] measurements and passive measurements described here. The delineation between the two and possible re-use of functionality are left to further discussion.

For both active and passive measurements, a measurement client sends or observes traffic, respectively. For active measurements, the measurement client may need a measurement server as serve as recipient of the measurement traffic. (In some cases, such as measurements modeling user access to network services, such as web page retrieval performance, the measurement traffic is exchanged with a production server, such as a web server, but this requires careful design to avoid overloading that server with measurement traffic.) Since we are interested in large-scale measurements, we assume that a measurement controller provides the measurement client with information on what to measure and when to perform the measurements. Finally, in some cases, a measurement data collector gathers data, typically samples rather than aggregate data, collected by the measurement clients for later analysis. The data models and file formats for supporting the exchange of the test parameters as well as test results require standardization.

As noted above, it appears likely that metrics will evolve and new ones will be added over time. Components of the platform may be designed and operated by different, independent entities, or, at minimum, data gathered by the platform may be used by different parties for different purposes. For example, a regulator or ISP might contract with third parties to manage various components of a measurement effort, and all data communications must securely support the delegation and authentication of rights and responsibilities to perform any operational parameter supported by the measurement architecture. Thus, it will be important to agree to on a set of metrics and associated metric-specific protocol parameters. For example, the TCP throughput metric defined in [6] depends on the TCP congestion avoidance algorithm. Each measurement run generates one or more data samples, e.g., a set of throughput values. The controller needs to convey those parameters to the measurement client and the data collector needs to be able to determine unambiguously which parameters were used for a specific set of data samples.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "MAY", "MAY NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MUST BE", "SHALL BE".
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [1]. Although RFC
2119 was written with protocols in mind, the key words are used in
this document to indicate the strength of a requirement.
2. Use Cases

Large-scale, automated measurements are helpful in a number of use cases. We illustrate the scope with three examples:

Provider network measurements: Internet service providers have an interest in knowing how well their networks are performing, as viewed from their customers’ perspective. Such performance information allows them to identify bottlenecks and observe the impact of changes in user behavior, e.g., the emergence of new network applications or time-of-day patterns. Here, the provider is not interested in the performance of an individual edge network or device, but rather wants to get a statistically-valid sample of performance across their network. Service providers may be interested in both the end device performance, i.e., the performance as seen by edge devices in home and enterprise networks, as well as the edge performance, i.e., as seen by the network device directly attached to their network, such as a cable modem, DSL modem or enterprise edge router. To reduce the network load, providers are unlikely to gather measurements from all clients all the time, but rather sample randomly across both time and their user population. The measurement controller directs the measurement client what measurements are to be performed, what measurement servers to use, when to measure and at which data collector it should deposit the measurement data.

User network diagnostics: End users may want to determine whether their network is performing according to the specifications (e.g., service level agreements) offered by the Internet service provider, or they may want to diagnose whether components of their network path are impaired. End users may perform measurements on their own, using the measurement infrastructure they provide or infrastructure offered by a third party, or they may work directly with their network or application provider to diagnose a specific performance problem. Depending on the circumstances, measurements may occur at specific pre-defined intervals, or may be triggered manually. A system administrator may perform such measurements on behalf of the user.

Multi-provider network measurements: As an extension of the first use case, multiple network providers and third parties, such as a regulatory body, may collaborate to gather network performance data on a one-time or recurring basis, using a subset of customers of the service providers. The form of collaboration is beyond the scope of this paper, however it should be understood that a data collection platform must serve multiple stakeholder interests.

In the description above, the network provider can either be a
commercial or not-for-profit entity distinct from the network edge users, or it can be the information technology department in a local area network. Particularly for the user diagnostics use case, it may be helpful for the measurement client to obtain parameters of their connectivity, such as the nominal uplink and downlink speed. In other cases, only the entity performing the data analysis may need to know the nominal performance parameters.
3. Architecture Overview

We define a measurement platform to consist of one or more measurement clients, measurement controllers and data collection servers. Based on the use cases above, we summarize their functions below.

3.1. Measurement client

The measurement client is the reference point for measurements. For active measurements, it sends measurement traffic to the measurement server or other network elements. For passive measurements, it observes network performance metrics. Client measurement functionality must be implementable in a variety of user contexts and provide for communications within different network segments, such as the access link between a broadband subscriber's modem and an ISP network, as well as consumer electronic device communicating to measurement server features in a wireless LAN device.

3.2. Measurement server

The measurement server is only needed for active measurements that require two network nodes. The measurement server typically operates as a traffic source or sink. To allow scaling, different clients within a measurement platform may use different measurement servers. Clients may also select, for example, the closest measurement server if the influence of wide-area connectivity on measurement results is to be minimized.

3.3. Measurement controller

The measurement controller provides the measurement client with instructions on when and how to conduct what measurements, i.e., the measurement schedule. For example, it might instruct the client to conduct a particular kind of throughput measurement every ten minutes, and to deposit the throughput samples into a particular data collector. Measurement controllers may be capable of accepting inputs from other controllers, scaling up the scope of the measurement system. As one example, an ISP operating a testing platform for its own network may accept test requests from an external controller as part of a nationwide testing program that it is participating in.

3.4. Data collector

The data collector collects time-stamped measurement samples from measurement clients. It generally makes these measurement samples available only to authorized users. The data collector may store...
measurement samples in a database or as files and may make them available via download or SQL query. Access control, internal data storage and access methods to data are beyond the scope of this document.

We logically separate the data collector from the measurement server for both functional and performance reasons. In general, data collected should not be transferred to the collector while a measurement is in progress. Also, a measurement client on a mobile host may decide to delay transferring measurement data until a low-cost or high-speed connection to the server becomes available.

3.5. Network parameter server

In some of the use cases, it is necessary for the analysis to compare the measured against the nominal network performance, or correlate measured parameters with the type and key parameters of the user's network connection. For example, for evaluating network delay measurements, it is helpful to know what kind of access technology (e.g., FTTP, DSL, cable, cellular data or satellite) and nominal speed the network connection offers.
4. Protocols

With the description of the elements above and the relationships between them, a set of protocols needs to be defined. The key functions of the protocols are described briefly below.

Measurement client to measurement server: Each metric will have its own set of measurement protocols, and these are beyond the scope of this document. For example, a VoIP metric may use a defined set of UDP packets to estimate performance.

Measurement client to measurement controller: The measurement client queries the measurement controller to obtain an updated measurement schedule. The measurement schedule returned by the controller indicates the type of measurements the measurement client should perform, the measurement servers and on what schedule to conduct the measurements. For example, it might indicate to run a VoIP emulation test every day for ten minutes to a specific server, spanning a one-week measurement campaign. The collector also indicates one or more addresses of data collectors to the client.

Measurement controller to measurement controller: A measurement controller can request that another controller undertake a specific testing program and could indicate specific tests, schedules and sample parameters appropriate to the intended objectives. Other data could include the identity and identity verification of the requester, a specific test identifier, e.g. Nationwide Test XX, and information necessary for the data collector so that data is accessible to authorized parties.

Measurement client to data collector: The measurement client will typically perform one or more measurements, and then, during the pause between measurements, transmit the collected samples to the data collector. The samples must be tagged with identifying information, such as when they were collected, edge device information (e.g., the mobile device or cable modem) and which measurement host was used. For mobile measurements, the sample data is likely to contain location data, possibly of reduced spatial resolution to protect user privacy.

Measurement client to network parameter server: The measurement client may query the network parameter server, typically located in the service providers network, for information about its nominal service parameters, based on its network address, link layer address, or hardware identifiers such as the IMEI for mobile nodes. The data returned may include information such as nominal uplink and downlink speeds, data quotas and physical and data link
layer technology. (Data quotas may be important for deciding which data-intensive measurements a client wishes to run.)

While basic network connection information is unlikely to change rapidly, it may change at unpredictable instants. For example, a network provider may upgrade the connection speed of subsets of their customers, customers may change their subscription or provider may adjust the monthly data transfer quota.

We assume that the measurement server, controller and data collector cooperate in configuring appropriate parameters. For example, the controller needs to be able to determine which measurement servers and data collectors are currently available and the client is authorized to use. Discovery of suitable data collectors is considered beyond the scope of this effort.
5. Initiation of Measurements

Either the client or the measurement controller could in principle initiate measurements. For periodic measurements or one-off user-triggered diagnostics, it is sufficient for the end system to contact the controller, e.g., periodically every week. Client-initiated measurements have a number of advantages. In particular, they make it less likely that measurement hosts can be abused to generate denial-of-service traffic. They also avoid problems allowing inbound requests through network address translators (NATs) and firewalls.

However, there may be cases where the network provider wishes to initiate a one-time measurement or change the measurement parameters before the client next contacts the controller. For such cases, a publish-subscribe mechanism may be considered, where the measurement client subscribes to measurement schedule updates with the measurement controller.
6. Requirements

We distinguish requirements for the different component by a prefix:
Requirements labeled A-* describe the overall platform architecture,
M-* indicate requirements primarily affecting the measurement client,
C-* those for the controller, D-* for the data collector and N-* for
the functions necessary to obtain network parameter. In many cases,
a single requirement governs more than one entity or protocol, so the
labeling should be considered rough.

A-1: The architecture MUST allow for one-time measurements initiated
by end users, sampled measurements initiated by network providers
and measurements by one or more third parties.

A-2: Measurement clients and servers MUST support an extensible set
of performance metrics.

A-3: Measurement clients, measurement servers and data collectors
MAY be operated by different administrative entities, including
entities other than the Internet service provider.

A-4: Measurement clients MUST be able perform both active and
passive measurements.

A-6: All entities MUST be able to authenticate the entities they
communicate with.

A-7: Each measurement sample MUST be unambiguously associated with
the measurement parameters, either by reference or by value.

A-8: To ensure availability and scaling, implementations MUST be
able to implement multiple measurement controllers, measurement
servers and data collectors with appropriate load balancing and
failover.

M-1: The architecture MUST allow a single measurement client to
participate in one or more independent measurement platforms.

M-2: A measurement client SHOULD be able to automatically switch
from a non-responsive to an alternate measurement server.

M-3: A measurement client MUST be able to register with the data
collection platform automatically, announcing its availability and
relevant system parameters. (For example, a cable or DSL modem
may indicate its make and model number.)
M-4: A measurement client MUST be able to declare what kind of measurements it can perform, e.g., by enumerating a set of measurement identifiers.

C-1: The measurement system MUST support measurements that are scheduled according to a pre-defined calendar.

C-2: The measurement controller MUST be able to specify the interval on how often it wishes to be contacted for updated measurement schedules.

C-3: A measurement client SHOULD be able to automatically discover controllers provided by their Internet service provider.

C-4: A measurement client MUST be able to authenticate and authorize the measurement controller.

C-5: The data exchange between the client and controller MUST allow for optional encryption and integrity protection.

D-1: The protocol messages for measurement samples MUST allow new measurement types and parameters.

D-2: It MUST be possible to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the measurement data exchanged between the measurement client and the data collector.

D-3: The data exchange protocol between measurement server and data collector SHOULD allow the definition of common data elements, e.g., for network addresses and timestamps.

D-4: The measurement client SHOULD be able to automatically fail over to alternate data collectors.

D-5: Clients MUST be able to either send data immediate or delay sending measurement data to the collector, e.g., to use a low-traffic period or a low-cost network.

D-6: Clients MUST be able to interleave data samples from different measurement metrics to the data collector.

D-7: The data collector SHOULD be able to ascertain whether the measurement client clock is at least approximately synchronized to its own.
D-8: The data exchange between measurement client and data collector MUST be subject to flow and congestion control.

D-9: The measurement client MUST be able to ascertain that it is initiating a session with the desired data collector rather than an impostor.

N-1: Measurement clients SHOULD be able to obtain nominal network service parameters in a machine-readable format, such as advertised speed and typical latency. (This may not be necessary in all measurement use cases.)

N-2: The set of network parameters MUST be extensible in a backward-compatible manner.

N-3: The measurement client SHOULD be able to determine the network parameter server without manual configuration.

N-4: The protocol between measurement client and network parameter server SHOULD support a variety of client identifiers, such as network addresses, link-layer addresses, AAA identifiers or hardware identifiers.

N-5: The data exchanged between the network parameter server and the measurement client SHOULD ensure its confidentiality and integrity.

N-6: The protocol SHOULD support suitable authentication functionality to restrict access to network parameters to authorized nodes. Authorized nodes may include third parties, such as data collectors.

N-7: The entity querying the network parameter server MUST be able to assure itself that it is communicating with an authentic server.

N-8: Clients of the network parameter server SHOULD be able to be automatically informed of changes in parameters.
7. Security Considerations

The large-scale measurement architecture has to prevent third parties' use of the measurement clients in bot-nets or for other nefarious or malicious purposes. A malicious third party could cause a measurement client to initiate probe traffic to victim hosts rather than measurement servers. We rely on user-initiated requests, secured with transport-layer security and server certificates, to ensure that only user-authorized entities issue control commands. Users may also authenticate themselves via local shared secrets. We note that there are similarities in approach with M2M data communications and we suggest that reference of ongoing work on the M2M signaling gateway framework or other models may be useful.

Measurements may also inadvertently expose information that the owner of the measurement client considers privacy-sensitive. Privacy considerations may differ depending on whether the measurement client, measurement server or data collector are operated by the same entity or not, and what trust relationships these entities have with each other. It must be possible to protect the confidentiality of the measurement data exchanged between the measurement client and the data collector. For mobile measurements, location information is likely to be crucial to interpreting measurement results. A measurement client may want to substitute rough location [8] to reduce the ability of a third party to track its movements and whereabouts.
8. IANA Considerations

This document does not request any IANA actions.
9. Acknowledgements

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DISCLAIMER: The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Communications Commission or the United States Government.
10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


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