Abstract

This memo deprecates IPv6 fragmentation and the IPv6 fragment header. It provides reasons for deprecation and updates RFC 2460.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

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1. Introduction

Each link on the Internet is characterized by a Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU). A link’s MTU represents the maximum packet size that can be conveyed over the link, without fragmentation. IPv6 [RFC2460] requires that every link in the Internet have an MTU of 1280 octets or greater. On any link that cannot convey a 1280-octet packet in one piece, link-specific fragmentation and reassembly must be provided at a layer below IPv6.

For any given source node, the path to a particular destination is characterized by a path MTU (PMTU). At a given source, the PMTU associated with a destination is equal to the minimum MTU of all of the links in the path between the source and the destination. Because every IPv6-enabled link must support an MTU or 1280 bytes or
greater, the PMTU between any two IPv6 nodes is also 1280 bytes or greater.

[RFC2460] strongly recommends that IPv6 nodes implement Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD) [RFC1981], in order to discover and take advantage of PMTU values greater than 1280 octets. However, a minimal IPv6 implementation (e.g., in a boot ROM) may simply restrict itself to sending packets no larger than 1280 octets, and omit implementation of PMTUD.

In order to send a packet larger than a path’s MTU, a node may use the IPv6 Fragment header to fragment the packet at the source and have it reassembled at the destination(s). However, the use of such fragmentation is discouraged in any application that is able to adjust its packets to fit the measured path MTU (i.e., down to 1280 octets).

In IPv6, a packet can be fragmented only by the host that originates it. This constitutes a departure from the IPv4 [RFC0791] fragmentation strategy, in which a packet can be fragmented by its originator or by any router that it traverses en route to its destination.

This memo deprecates IPv6 fragmentation and the IPv6 fragment header. It provides reasons for deprecation and updates [RFC2460].

2. Case For Deprecation

This section presents a case for deprecating the IPv6 Fragment Header.

2.1. Resource Conservation

Packets that are fragmented at their source need to be reassembled at their destination. [Kent87] points out that the reassembly process is resource intensive. It consumes significant compute and memory resources. While the cited reference refers to IPv4 fragmentation and reassembly, many of its criticisms are equally applicable to IPv6.

By comparison, if a source node were to execute PMTUD procedures, and if applications were to avoid sending datagrams that would result in IP packets that exceed the PMTU, the task of reassembly could be avoided, altogether.

2.2. Application Reliance on IPv6 Fragmentation

Today, a limited number of applications rely upon IPv6 fragmentation.
Most popular TCP implementations include PMTUD or an extension thereof, called Packetization Layer MTU Discovery (PMTUD) [RFC4821]. Therefore, in the nominal case, applications obtaining transport services from these TCP implementations never cause IPv6 fragments to be sent. However, some TCP implementations that include PMTUD do emit segments long enough to cause IPv6 fragmentation. This happens in the following circumstance:

- The TCP implementation establishes two (or more) sessions to the same destination.
- Because the TCP implementation has not yet emitted any long segments, the underlying IPv6 implementation estimates the PMTU for destination to be equal to the MTU of the first link in the path to the destination. This estimate is incorrect, and will be revised, below.
- The first TCP session submits a long segment to the underlying IPv6 implementation.
- The underlying IPv6 implementation determines that if it were to encapsulate this segment in an IPv6 header, the resulting packet would not exceed its current estimate of the PMTU for the destination. So, the underlying IPv6 implementation emits a non-fragmented IPv6 packet. This packet exceeds the actual PMTU for the destination.
- A downstream router discards the long packet and returns an ICMPv6 Packet Too Big (PTB) message.
- The first TCP session reduces its Maximum Segment Size (MSS) to an appropriate value.
- The underlying IPv6 implementation reduces its estimate of the PMTU for the destination to an appropriate value.
- The second TCP session submits a long segment to the underlying IPv6 implementation. It does so without first querying the underlying IPv6 implementation to learn its estimate of the PMTU for the destination.
- The underlying IPv6 implementation determines that if it were to encapsulate this segment in an IPv6 header, the resulting packet would exceed its current estimate of the PMTU for the destination. So, the underlying IPv6 implementation emits multiple IPv6 fragments.
The authors suggest that the behavior described above may be sub-optimal, and that TCP implementations should leverage PMTU information that the underlying IPv6 implementation could provide.

Many UDP-based [RFC0768] applications follow the recommendations of [RFC5405]. According to [RFC5405], "an application SHOULD NOT send UDP datagrams that result in IP packets that exceed the MTU of the path to the destination. Consequently, an application SHOULD either use the path MTU information provided by the IP layer or implement path MTU discovery itself to determine whether the path to a destination will support its desired message size without fragmentation. Applications that do not follow this recommendation to do PMTU discovery SHOULD still avoid sending UDP datagrams that would result in IP packets that exceed the path MTU. Because the actual path MTU is unknown, such applications SHOULD fall back to sending messages that are shorter than the default effective MTU for sending." The effective MTU for IPv6 is 1280 bytes.

However, several applications are known to rely on IPv6 fragmentation. Some of these are mentioned in Section 3.

2.3. Attack Vectors

Security researchers have found and continue to find attack vectors that rely on IP fragmentation. For example, [I-D.ietf-6man-oversized-header-chain] and [I-D.ietf-6man-nd-extension-headers] describe variants of the tiny fragment attack [RFC1858]. In this attack, a packet is crafted so that it can evade stateless firewall filters. The stateless firewall filter matches on fields drawn from the IPv6 header and an upper layer header. However, the packet is fragmented so that the upper layer header, or a significant part of that header, does not appear in the first fragment. Because a stateless firewall cannot parse payload beyond the first fragment, the packet evades detection by the firewall.

Security researchers have also studied reassembly algorithms on popular computing platforms, with the following goals:

o to discover fragility in seldom exercised parts of the IP stack

o to engineer flows that maximize resources consumed by the reassembly process

The Dawn and Rose Attacks [Hollis] are the products of such research.

All of the attack vectors mentioned above can be mitigated with firewalls and increasingly sophisticated reassembly algorithms.
However, the continued investment required to mitigate newly discovered vulnerabilities detracts from the cost effectiveness of IPv6 as a networking solution.

2.4. Operator Behavior

For reasons described above, and also articulated in [I-D.taylor-v6ops-fragdrop], many network operators filter all IPv6 fragments. Also, the default behavior of many currently deployed firewalls is to discard IPv6 fragments.

In one recent study [DeBoer], two researchers utilized a measurement network to measure fragment filtering. They sent packets, fragmented to the minimum MTU of 1280, to 502 IPv6 enabled and reachable probes. They found that during any given trial period, ten percent of the probes did not receive fragmented packets.

3. Applications That Rely on Fragmentation

The following is a list of applications that are currently known to rely on IPv6 fragmentation:

- DNSSEC [RFC4035]
- SIIT [RFC6145]
- OSPFv3 [RFC5340]
- NFSv4 [RFC3530]
- DCCP [RFC4340]

Some tunneling configurations also rely upon IPv6 fragmentation. See Section 3.5 for details.

Each of these applications relies on fragmentation to a varying degree. In some cases, that reliance is essential, and cannot be broken without fundamentally changing the protocol. In other cases, that reliance is incidental, and most protocol implementations already take appropriate steps to avoid fragmentation.

Each of these applications will continue to emit IPv6 fragments, even after the IPv6 fragmentation header is deprecated. In order to achieve backwards compatibility, new IPv6 implementations will continue to support reassembly of incoming fragments. See for Section 4 details.
3.1. DNSSEC

DNSSEC can obtain transport services from either UDP or TCP. Superior performance and scaling characteristics are observed when DNSSEC runs over UDP.

When running over UDP, DNSSEC is likely to cause the generation of IPv6 fragments. By comparison, when running over TCP, DNSSEC is much less likely to cause the generation of IPv6 fragments.

When running over UDP, DNSSEC’s reliance upon IPv6 fragmentation is fundamental. That reliance cannot be broken without changing the DNSSEC specification.

DNSSEC is an essential part of the Internet architecture. Therefore, this issue is for further study and must be resolved before IPv6 fragmentation can be deprecated.

3.2. SIIT

[RFC6145] requires the following:

o "When the IPv4 sender does not set the DF bit, the translator SHOULD always include an IPv6 Fragment Header to indicate that the sender allows fragmentation. The translator MAY provide a configuration function that allows the translator not to include the Fragment Header for the non-fragmented IPv6 packets".

o "If the DF flag is not set and the IPv4 packet will result in an IPv6 packet larger than 1280 bytes, the packet SHOULD be fragmented so the resulting IPv6 packet (with Fragment Header added to each fragment) will be less than or equal to 1280 bytes."

These behaviors cannot be changed, and for these reasons, SIIT devices will continue to emit IPv6 fragments, even after IPv6 fragmentation has been deprecated.

SIIT also emits ICMPv6 PTB messages with MTU less than 1280. In that case, the originating IPv6 node is not required to reduce the size of subsequent packets to less than 1280, but must include a Fragment header in those packets so that SIIT can obtain a suitable Identification value to use in resulting IPv4 fragments. Note that this means the payload may have to be reduced to 1232 octets (1280 minus 40 for the IPv6 header and 8 for the Fragment header), and smaller still if additional extension headers are used.

This problem could be avoided if SIIT executed an alternative procedure. For example, rather than discarding the packet and
sending an ICMPv6 PTB message with MTU less than 1280, SIIT could generate a random number for use as the Identification value and forward the packet. This issue clearly requires further study.

3.3. OSPFv3

OSPFv3 implementations may emit messages large enough to cause IPv6 fragmentation. However, in keeping with the recommendations of [RFC2460], and in order to optimize performance, most OSPFv3 implementation refrain from doing so. Many implementations simply restrict their maximum message size to some value that is safely below 1280.

3.4. DCCP and NFS

Details TBD

3.5. Tunneling

TBD

4. Recommendation

This memo deprecates IPv6 fragmentation and the IPv6 fragment header. Application and transport layer protocols SHOULD support effective PLMTUD [RFC4821], since ICMP-based PMTUD [RFC1981] is unreliable. Any application or transport layer protocol that cannot support effective PMTUD MUST NOT in any circumstances send IPv6 packets that exceed the IPv6 minimum MTU of 1280 bytes.

IPv6 stacks and forwarding nodes MUST continue to support inbound fragmented IPv6 packets as specified in [RFC2460]. However, this requirement exceeds the capability of some types of forwarding nodes such as firewalls and load balancers. Therefore implementers and operators need to be aware that on many paths through the Internet, IPv6 fragmentation will fail. Legacy applications and transport layer protocols that do not conform to the previous paragraph can expect connectivity failures as a result.

5. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to mark the Fragment Header for IPv6 (44) as deprecated in the Protocol Numbers registry.

6. Security Considerations

Deprecation of the IPv6 Fragment Header will improve network security by eliminating attacks that rely on fragmentation.
7. Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge Tore Anderson, Mark Andrews, Brian Carpenter, Havard Eidnes, Bob Hinden, Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, Simon Perreault, Arturo Servin, Mark Smith, Fred Templin, Willem Toorop, Glen Turner and Ole Troan for their review and constructive comments.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


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Guidelines for Adding Congestion Notification to Protocols that Encapsulate IP
draft-briscoe-tsvwg-ecn-encap-guidelines-02

Abstract

The purpose of this document is to guide the design of congestion notification in any lower layer or tunnelling protocol that encapsulates IP. The aim is for explicit congestion signals to propagate consistently from lower layer protocols into IP. Then the IP internetwork layer can act as a portability layer to carry congestion notification from non-IP-aware congested nodes up to the transport layer (L4). Following these guidelines should assure interworking between new lower layer congestion notification mechanisms, whether specified by the IETF or other standards bodies.

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1. Introduction

Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN [RFC3168]) is defined in the IP header (v4 & v6) to allow a resource to notify the onset of queue build-up without having to drop packets, by explicitly marking a proportion of packets with the congestion experienced (CE) codepoint.

ECN removes nearly all congestion loss and it cuts delays for two main reasons: i) it avoids the delay when recovering from congestion losses, which particularly benefits small flows, making their completion time predictably short [RFC2884]; and ii) as ECN is used more widely by end-systems, it will gradually remove the need to configure a degree of delay into buffers before they start to notify congestion (the cause of bufferbloat). The latter delay is because drop involves a trade-off between sending a timely signal and trying to avoid impairment, whereas ECN is solely a signal not an impairment, so there is no harm triggering it earlier.

Some lower layer technologies (e.g. MPLS, Ethernet) are used to form large subnetworks with IP-aware nodes only at the edges. These networks are often designed so that it is rare for interior queues to overflow. However, this has often only been possible because the original design of TCP did not scale, and fixes (e.g. [RFC1323]) proved hard to deploy. Now that modern operating systems are finally capable of saturating interior links, even the buffers of well-provisioned interior switches will need to signal episodes of queuing. However, the above benefits of ECN can only be fully realised if support for ECN is added to the relevant subnetwork technology, as well as IP. When a lower layer queue drops a packet it does not just drop at that layer; the packet disappears from all layers. In contrast, when a lower layer marks a packet with ECN, the marking needs to be explicitly propagated up the layers.

Propagation of ECN is defined for MPLS [RFC5129], and is being defined for TRILL [trill-rbridge-options], but it remains to be defined for a number of other subnetwork technologies.

Similarly, ECN propagation is yet to be defined for many tunnelling protocols. [RFC6040] defines how ECN should be propagated for IP-in-IP [RFC2003] and IPsec [RFC4301] tunnels. However, as Section 9.3 of RFC3168 pointed out, ECN support will need to be defined for other tunnelling protocols, e.g. L2TP [RFC2661], GRE [RFC1701, RFC2784], PPTP [RFC2637] and GTP [GTPv1, GTPv1-U, GTPv2-C].

The purpose of this document is to guide the addition of congestion notification to any subnet technology or tunnelling protocol, so that lower layer equipment can signal congestion explicitly and it will propagate consistently into encapsulated (higher layer) headers,
otherwise the signals will not reach their ultimate destination.

Incremental deployment is the most tricky aspect when adding support for ECN. The original ECN protocol in IP [RFC3168] was carefully designed so that a congested buffer would not mark a packet (rather than drop it) unless both source and destination hosts were ECN-capable. Otherwise its congestion markings would never be detected and congestion would just deteriorate further. However, to support congestion marking below the IP layer, it is not sufficient to only check that the two end-points support ECN; correct operation also depends on the decapsulator at each subnet egress faithfully propagating congestion notifications to the higher layer. Otherwise, a legacy decapsulator might silently fail to propagate any ECN signals from the outer to the forwarded header. Then the lost signals would never be detected and again congestion would deteriorate further. The guidelines given later require protocol designers to carefully consider incremental deployment, and suggest various safe approaches for different circumstances.

Of course, the IETF does not have standards authority over every link layer protocol. So this document gives guidelines for designing propagation of congestion notification across the interface between IP and protocols that may encapsulate IP (i.e. that can be layered beneath IP). Each lower layer technology will exhibit different issues and compromises, so the IETF or the relevant standards body must be free to define the specifics of each lower layer congestion notification scheme. Nonetheless, if the guidelines are followed, congestion notification should interwork between different technologies, using IP in its role as a ‘portability layer’.

Therefore, the capitalised term ‘SHOULD’ or ‘SHOULD NOT’ are often used in preference to ‘MUST’ or ‘MUST NOT’, because it is difficult to know the compromises that will be necessary in each protocol design. If a particular protocol design chooses to contradict a ‘SHOULD (NOT)’ given in the advice below, it MUST include a sound justification.

It has not been possible to give common guidelines for all lower layer technologies, because they do not all fit a common pattern. Instead they have been divided into a few distinct modes of operation: feed-forward-and-upward; feed-upward-and-forward; feed-backward; and null mode. These modes are described in Section 3, then in the following sections separate guidelines are given for each mode.

This document updates the advice to subnetwork designers about ECN in Section 13 of [RFC3819].
1.1. Scope

This document only concerns wire protocol processing of explicit notification of congestion and makes no changes or recommendations concerning algorithms for congestion marking or congestion response (algorithm issues should be independent of the layer the algorithm operates in).

The question of congestion notification signals with different semantics to those of ECN in IP is touched on in a couple of specific cases (e.g. QCN [IEEE802.1Qau]) and with schemes with multiple severity levels such as PCN [RFC6660]). However, no attempt is made to give guidelines about schemes with different semantics that are yet to be invented.

Note that these guidelines do not require the subnet wire protocol to be changed to accommodate congestion notification. Another way to add congestion notification without consuming header space in the subnet protocol might be to use a parallel control plane protocol.

This document focuses on the congestion notification interface between IP and lower layer protocols that can encapsulate IP, where the term ‘IP’ includes v4 or v6, unicast, multicast or anycast. However, it is likely that the guidelines will also be useful when a lower layer protocol or tunnel encapsulates itself (e.g. Ethernet MAC in MAC [IEEE802.1Qah]) or when it encapsulates other protocols.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Further terminology used within this document:

Protocol data unit (PDU): Information that is delivered as a unit among peer entities of a layered network consisting of protocol control information (typically a header) and possibly user data (payload) of that layer. The scope of this document includes layer 2 and layer 3 networks, where the PDU is respectively termed a frame or a packet (or a cell in ATM). PDU is a general term for any of these. This definition also includes a payload with a shim header lying somewhere between layer 2 & 3.

Transport: The end-to-end transmission control function, conventionally considered at layer-4 in the OSI reference model. Given the audience for this document will often use the word transport to mean low level bit carriage, whenever the term is
used it will be qualified, e.g. ‘L4 transport’.

Encapsulator:  The link or tunnel endpoint function that adds an outer header to a PDU (also termed the 'link ingress', the 'subnet ingress', the 'ingress tunnel endpoint' or just the 'ingress' where the context is clear).

Decapsulator:  The link or tunnel endpoint function that removes an outer header from a PDU (also termed the 'link egress', the 'subnet egress', the 'egress tunnel endpoint' or just the 'egress' where the context is clear).

Incoming header:  The header of an arriving PDU before encapsulation.

Outer header:  The header added to encapsulate a PDU.

Inner header:  The header encapsulated by the outer header.

Outgoing header:  The header forwarded by the decapsulator.

CE:  Congestion Experienced [RFC3168]

ECT:  ECN-Capable Transport [RFC3168]

Not-ECT:  Not ECN-Capable Transport [RFC3168]

ECN-PDU:  A PDU that is part of a feedback loop within which all the nodes that need to propagate explicit congestion notifications back to the Load Regulator are ECN-capable. An IP packet with a non-zero ECN field implies that the endpoints are ECN-capable, so this would be an ECN-PDU. However, ECN-PDU is intended to be a general term for a PDU at any layer, not just IP.

Not-ECN-PDU:  A PDU that is part of a feedback-loop within which some nodes necessary to propagate explicit congestion notifications back to the load regulator are not ECN-capable.

Load Regulator:  For each flow of PDUs, the transport function that is capable of controlling the data rate. Typically located at the data source, but in-path nodes can regulate load in some congestion control arrangements (e.g. admission control or policing nodes). Note the term "a function capable of controlling the load" deliberately includes a transport that doesn’t actually control the load but ideally it ought to (e.g. a sending application without congestion control that uses UDP).
3. Modes of Operation

This section sets down the different modes by which congestion information is passed between the lower layer and the higher one. It acts as a reference framework for the following sections, which give normative guidelines for designers of explicit congestion notification protocols, taking each mode in turn:

Feed-Forward-and-Up: Nodes feed forward congestion notification towards the egress within the lower layer then up and along the layers towards the end-to-end destination at the transport layer. The following local optimisation is possible:

Feed-Up-and-Forward: A lower layer switch feeds-up congestion notification directly into the ECN field in the higher layer (e.g. IP) header, irrespective of whether the node is at the egress of a subnet.

Feed-Backward: Nodes feed back congestion signals towards the ingress of the lower layer and (optionally) attempt to control congestion within their own layer.

Null: Nodes cannot experience congestion at the lower layer except at ingress nodes (which are IP-aware or equivalently higher-layer-aware).

3.1. Feed-Forward-and-Up Mode

Like IP and MPLS, many subnet technologies are based on self-contained protocol data units (PDUs) or frames sent unreliably. They provide no feedback channel at the subnetwork layer, instead relying on higher layers (e.g. TCP) to feed back loss signals.

In these cases, ECN may best be supported by standardising explicit notification of congestion into the lower layer protocol that carries the data forwards. It will then also be necessary to define how the egress of the lower layer subnet propagates this explicit signal into the forwarded upper layer (IP) header. It can then continue forwards until it finally reaches the destination transport (at L4). Then typically the destination will feed this congestion notification back to the source transport using an end-to-end protocol (e.g. TCP). This is the arrangement that has already been used to add ECN to IP-
in-IP tunnels [RFC6040], IP-in-MPLS and MPLS-in-MPLS [RFC5129].

This mode is illustrated in Figure 1. Along the middle of the figure, layers 2, 3 & 4 of the protocol stack are shown, and one packet is shown along the bottom as it progresses across the network from source to destination, crossing two subnets connected by a router, and crossing two switches on the path across each subnet. Congestion at the output of the first switch (shown as *) leads to a congestion marking in the L2 header (shown as C in the illustration of the packet). The chevrons show the progress of the resulting congestion indication. It is propagated from link to link across the subnet in the L2 header, then when the router removes the marked L2 header, it propagates the marking up into the L3 (IP) header. The router forwards the marked L3 header into subnet 2, and when it adds a new L2 header it copies the L3 marking into the L2 header as well, as shown by the ‘C’ s in both layers (assuming the technology of subnet 2 also supports explicit congestion marking).

Note that there is no implication that each ‘C’ marking is encoded the same; a different encoding might be used for the ‘C’ marking in each protocol.

Finally, for completeness, we show the L3 marking arriving at the destination, where the host transport protocol (e.g. TCP) feeds it back to the source in the L4 acknowledgement (the ‘C’ at L4 in the packet at the top of the diagram).

Figure 1: Feed-Forward-and-Up Mode

Of course, modern networks are rarely as simple as this text-book example, often involving multiple nested layers. For example, a 3GPP mobile network may have two IP-in-IP (GTP) tunnels in series and an
MPLS backhaul between the base station and the first router. Nonetheless, the example illustrates the general idea of feeding congestion notification forward then upward whenever a header is removed at the egress of a subnet.

Note that the FECN (forward ECN) bit in Frame Relay and the explicit forward congestion indication (EFCI [ITU-T.I.371]) bit in ATM user data cells follow a feed-forward pattern. However, in ATM, this is only as part of a feed-forward-and-backward pattern at the lower layer, not feed-forward-and-up out of the lower layer—the intention was never to interface to IP ECN at the subnet egress. To our knowledge, Frame Relay FECN is solely used to detect where more capacity should be provisioned [Buck00].

3.2. Feed-Up-and-Forward Mode

Ethernet is particularly difficult to extend incrementally to support explicit congestion notification. One way to support ECN in such cases has been to use so called ‘layer-3 switches’. These are Ethernet switches that bury into the Ethernet payload to find an IP header and manipulate or act on certain IP fields (specifically DiffServ & ECN). For instance, in Data Center TCP [DCTCP], layer-3 switches are configured to mark the ECN field of the IP header within the Ethernet payload when their output buffer becomes congested. With respect to switching, a layer-3 switch acts solely on the addresses in the Ethernet header; it doesn’t use IP addresses, and it doesn’t decrement the TTL field in the IP header.

![Figure 2: Feed-Up-and-Forward Mode](image-url)

By comparing Figure 2 with Figure 1, it can be seen that subnet E (perhaps a subnet of layer-3 Ethernet switches) works in feed-up-and-
forward mode by notifying congestion directly into L3 at the point of congestion, even though the congested switch does not otherwise act at L3. In this example, the technology in subnet F (e.g. MPLS) does support ECN natively, so when the router adds the layer-2 header it copies the ECN marking from L3 to L2 as well.

3.3. Feed-Backward Mode

In some layer 2 technologies, explicit congestion notification has been defined for use internally within the subnet with its own feedback and load regulation, but typically the interface with IP for ECN has not been defined.

For instance, for the available bit-rate (ABR) service in ATM, the relative rate mechanism was one of the more popular mechanisms for managing traffic, tending to supersede earlier designs. In this approach ATM switches send special resource management (RM) cells in both the forward and backward directions to control the ingress rate of user data into a virtual circuit. If a switch buffer is approaching congestion or congested it sends an RM cell back towards the ingress with respectively the No Increase (NI) or Congestion Indication (CI) bit set in its message type field [ATM-TM-ABR]. The ingress then holds or decreases its sending bit-rate accordingly.
ATM’s feed-backward approach doesn’t fit well when layered beneath IP’s feed-forward approach—unless the initial data source is the same node as the ATM ingress. Figure 3 shows the feed-backward approach being used in subnet H. If the final switch on the path is congested (*), it doesn’t feed-forward any congestion indications on packet (U). Instead it sends a control cell (V) back to the router at the ATM ingress.

However, the backward feedback doesn’t reach the original data source directly because IP doesn’t support backward feedback (and subnet G is independent of subnet H). Instead, the router in the middle throttles down its sending rate but the original data sources don’t reduce their rates. The resulting rate mismatch causes the middle router’s buffer at layer 3 to back up until it becomes congested, which it signals forwards on later data packets at layer 3 (e.g. packet W). Note that the forward signal from the middle router is not triggered directly by the backward signal. Rather, it is triggered by congestion resulting from the middle router’s mismatched rate response to the backward signal.

Figure 3: Feed-Backward Mode
In response to this later forward signalling, end-to-end feedback at layer-4 finally completes the tortuous path of congestion indications back to the origin data source, as before.

3.4. Null Mode

Often link and physical layer resources are ‘non-blocking’ by design. In these cases congestion notification may be implemented but it does not need to be deployed at the lower layer; ECN in IP would be sufficient.

A degenerate example is a point-to-point Ethernet link. Excess loading of the link merely causes the queue from the higher layer to back up, while the lower layer remains immune to congestion. Even a whole meshed subnetwork can be made immune to interior congestion by limiting ingress capacity and careful sizing of links, particularly if multi-path routing is used to ensure even worst-case patterns of load cannot congest any link.

4. Feed-Forward-and-Up Mode: Guidelines for Adding Congestion Notification

Feed-forward-and-up is the mode already used for signalling ECN up the layers through MPLS into IP [RFC5129] and through IP-in-IP tunnels [RFC6040]. These RFCs take a consistent approach and the following guidelines are designed to ensure this consistency continues as ECN support is added to other protocols that encapsulate IP. The guidelines are also designed to ensure compliance with the more general best current practice for the design of alternate ECN schemes given in [RFC4774].

The rest of this section is structured as follows:

- Section 4.1 addresses the most straightforward cases, where [RFC6040] can be applied directly to add ECN to tunnels that are effectively the same as IP-in-IP tunnels.

- The subsequent sections give guidelines for adding ECN to a subnet technology that uses feed-forward-and-up mode like IP, but it is not so similar to IP that [RFC6040] rules can be applied directly. Specifically:
  - Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 respectively address how to add ECN support to the wire protocol and to the encapsulators and decapsulators at the ingress and egress of the subnet.
  - Section 4.5 deals with the special, but common, case of sequences of tunnels or subnets that all use the same
technology

* Section 4.6 deals with the question of reframing when IP packets do not map 1:1 into lower layer frames.

4.1. IP-in-IP Tunnels with Tightly Coupled Shim Headers

A common pattern for many tunnelling protocols is to encapsulate an inner IP header with shim header(s) then an outer IP header. In many cases the shim header(s) always have to be tightly coupled to the outer IP header because they are not sufficient as outer headers in their own right. In such cases the shim header(s) and the outer IP header are always added (or removed) in the same operation. Therefore, in all such tightly coupled IP-in-IP tunnelling protocols, the rules in [RFC6040] for propagating the ECN field between the two IP headers SHOULD be applied directly.

Examples of tightly coupled IP-in-IP tunnelling protocols where [RFC6040] can be applied directly are:

- L2TP [RFC2661]
- GRE [RFC1701, RFC2784]
- PPTP [RFC2637]
- GTP [GTPv1, GTPv1-U, GTPv2-C]
- VXLAN [vxlan].

4.2. Wire Protocol Design: Indication of ECN Support

A lower layer (or subnet) congestion notification system:

1. SHOULD NOT apply explicit congestion notifications to PDUs that are destined for legacy layer-4 transport implementations that will not understand ECN, and

2. SHOULD NOT apply explicit congestion notifications to PDUs if the egress of the subnet might not propagate congestion notifications onward into the higher layer.

We use the term ECN-PDUs for a PDU on a feedback loop that will propagate congestion notification properly because it meets both the above criteria. And a Not-ECN-PDU is a PDU on a feedback loop that does not meet both criteria, and will therefore not propagate congestion notification properly. A corollary of the above is that a lower layer congestion notification protocol:
3. SHOULD be able to distinguish ECN-PDUs from Not-ECN-PDUs.

Note that there is no need for all interior nodes within a subnet to be able to mark congestion explicitly. A mix of ECN and drop signals from different nodes is fine. However, if _any_ interior nodes might generate ECN markings, guideline 2 above says that all relevant egress node(s) SHOULD be able to propagate those markings up to the higher layer.

In IP, if the ECN field in each PDU is cleared to the Not-ECT (not ECN-capable transport) codepoint, it indicates that the L4 transport will not understand congestion markings. A congested buffer must not mark these Not-ECT PDUs, and therefore drops them instead.

The mechanism a lower layer uses to distinguish the ECN-capability of PDUs need not mimic that of IP. All the above guidelines say is that the lower layer system, as a whole, should achieve the same outcome. For instance, ECN-capable feedback loops might use PDUs that are identified by a particular set of labels or tags. Alternatively, logical link protocols that use flow state might determine whether a PDU can be congestion marked by checking for ECN-support in the flow state. Other protocols might depend on out-of-band control signals.

The per-domain checking of ECN support in MPLS [RFC5129] is a good example of a way to avoid sending congestion markings to transports that will not understand them, without using any header space in the subnet protocol.

In MPLS, header space is extremely limited, therefore RFC5129 does not provide a field in the MPLS header to indicate whether the PDU is an ECN-PDU or a Not-ECN-PDU. Instead, interior nodes in a domain are allowed to set explicit congestion indications without checking whether the PDU is destined for a transport that will understand them. Nonetheless, this is made safe by requiring that the network operator upgrades all decapsulating edges of a whole domain at once, as soon as even one switch within the domain is configured to mark rather than drop during congestion. Therefore, any edge node that might decapsulate a packet will be capable of checking whether the higher layer transport is ECN-capable. When decapsulating a CE-marked packet, if the decapsulator discovers that the higher layer (inner header) indicates the transport is not ECN-capable, it drops the packet—effectively on behalf of the earlier congested node (see Decapsulation Guideline 1 in Section 4.4).

It was only appropriate to define such an incremental deployment strategy because MPLS is targeted solely at professional operators, who can be expected to ensure that a whole subnetwork is consistently configured. This strategy might not be appropriate for other link
technologies targeted at zero-configuration deployment or deployment by the general public (e.g., Ethernet). For such 'plug-and-play' environments it will be necessary to invent a failsafe approach that ensures congestion markings will never fall into black holes, no matter how inconsistently a system is put together. Alternatively, congestion notification relying on correct system configuration could be confined to flavours of Ethernet intended only for professional network operators, such as IEEE 802.1ah Provider Backbone Bridges (PBB).

QCN [IEEE802.1Qau] provides another example of how to indicate to lower layer devices that the end-points will not understand ECN. An operator can define certain 802.1p classes of service to indicate non-QCN frames and an ingress bridge is required to map arriving not-QCN-capable IP packets to one of these non-QCN 802.1p classes.

4.3. Encapsulation Guidelines

1. Egress Capability Check: A subnet ingress needs to be sure that the corresponding egress of a subnet will propagate any congestion notification added to the outer header across the subnet. This is necessary in addition to checking that an incoming PDU indicates an ECN-capable (L4) transport. Examples of how this guarantee might be provided include:

   * by configuration (e.g. if any label switches in a domain support ECN marking, [RFC5129] requires all egress nodes to have been configured to propagate ECN)

   * by the ingress explicitly checking that the egress propagates ECN (e.g. TRILL uses IS-IS to check path capabilities before using critical options [trill-rbridge-options])

   * by inherent design of the protocol (e.g. by encoding ECN marking on the outer header in such a way that a legacy egress that does not understand ECN will consider the PDU corrupt and discard it, thus at least propagating a form of congestion signal).

2. Egress Fails Capability Check: If the ingress cannot guarantee that the egress will propagate congestion notification, the ingress SHOULD disable ECN when it forwards the PDU at the lower layer. An example of how the ingress might disable ECN at the lower layer would be by setting the outer header of the PDU to identify it as a Not-ECN-PDU, assuming the subnet technology supports such a concept.
3. Standard Congestion Monitoring Baseline: Once the ingress to a subnet has established that the egress will correctly propagate ECN, on encapsulation it SHOULD encode the same level of congestion in outer headers as is arriving in incoming headers. For example it might copy any incoming congestion notification into the outer header of the lower layer protocol.

This ensures that all outer headers reflect congestion accumulated along the whole upstream path since the Load Regulator, not just since the ingress of the subnet. A node that is not the Load Regulator SHOULD NOT re-initialise the level of CE markings in the outer to zero.

This guideline is intended to ensure that any bulk congestion monitoring of outer headers (e.g. by a network management node monitoring ECN in passing frames) is most meaningful. For instance, if an operator measures CE in 0.4% of passing outer headers, this information is only useful if the operator knows where the proportion of CE markings was last initialised to 0% (the Congestion Baseline). Such monitoring information will not be useful if some subnet ingress nodes reset all outer CE markings while others copy incoming CE markings into the outer.

Most information can be extracted if the Congestion Baseline is standardised at the node that is regulating the load (the Load Regulator--typically the data source). Then the operator can measure both congestion since the Load Regulator, and congestion since the subnet ingress. The latter might be measurable by subtracting the level of CE markings on inner headers from that on outer headers (see Appendix C of [RFC6040]).

4.4. Decapsulation Guidelines

A subnet egress SHOULD NOT simply copy congestion notification from outer headers to the forwarded header. It SHOULD calculate the outgoing congestion notification field from the inner and outer headers using the following guidelines. If there is any conflict, rules earlier in the list take precedence over rules later in the list:

1. If the arriving inner header is a Not-ECN-PDU it implies the L4 transport will not understand explicit congestion markings. Then:

   * If the outer header carries an explicit congestion marking, the packet SHOULD be dropped--the only indication of congestion that the L4 transport will understand.
2. If the outer header does not support explicit congestion notification (a Not-ECN-PDU), but the inner header does (an ECN-PDU), the inner header SHOULD be forwarded unchanged.

3. In some lower layer protocols congestion may be signalled as a numerical level, such as in the control frames of quantised congestion notification [IEEE802.1Qau]. If such a multi-bit encoding encapsulates an ECN-capable IP data packet, a function will be needed to convert the quantised congestion level into the frequency of congestion markings in outgoing IP packets.

4. Congestion indications may be encoded by a severity level. For instance increasing levels of congestion might be encoded by numerically increasing indications, e.g. pre-congestion notification (PCN) can be encoded in each PDU at three severity levels in IP or MPLS [RFC6660].

If the arriving inner header is an ECN-PDU, where the inner and outer headers carry indications of congestion of different severity, the more severe indication SHOULD be forwarded in preference to the less severe.

5. The inner and outer headers might carry a combination of congestion notification fields that should not be possible given any currently used protocol transitions. For instance, if Encapsulation Guideline 3 in Section 4.3 had been followed, it should not be possible to have a less severe indication of congestion in the outer than in the inner. It MAY be appropriate to log unexpected combinations of headers and possibly raise an alarm.

If a safe outgoing codepoint can be defined for such a PDU, the PDU SHOULD be forwarded rather than dropped. Some implementers discard PDUs with currently unused combinations of headers just in case they represent an attack. However, an approach using alarms and policy-mediated drop is preferable to hard-coded drop, so that operators can keep track of possible attacks but currently unused combinations are not precluded from future use through new standards actions.
4.5. Sequences of Similar Tunnels or Subnets

In some deployments, particularly in 3GPP networks, an IP packet may traverse two or more IP-in-IP tunnels in sequence that all use identical technology (e.g. GTP).

In such cases, it would be sufficient for every encapsulation and decapsulation in the chain to comply with RFC6040. Alternatively, as an optimisation, a node that decapsulates a packet and immediately re-encapsulates it for the next tunnel MAY copy the incoming outer ECN field directly to the outgoing outer and the incoming inner ECN field directly to the outgoing inner. Then the overall behavior across the sequence of tunnel segments would still be consistent with RFC 6040.

Appendix C of RFC6040 describes how a tunnel egress can monitor how much congestion has been introduced within a tunnel. A network operator might want to monitor how much congestion had been introduced within a whole sequence of tunnels. Using the technique in Appendix C of RFC6040 at the final egress, the operator could monitor the whole sequence of tunnels, but only if the above optimisation were used consistently along the sequence of tunnels, in order to make it appear as a single tunnel. Therefore, tunnel endpoint implementations SHOULD allow the operator to configure whether this optimisation is enabled.

When ECN support is added to a subnet technology, consideration SHOULD be given to a similar optimisation between subnets in sequence if they all use the same technology.

4.6. Reframing and Congestion Markings

Where framing boundaries are different between two layers, congestion indications SHOULD be propagated on the basis that a congestion indication on a PDU applies to all the octets in the PDU. On average, an encapsulator or decapsulator SHOULD approximately preserve the number of marked octets arriving and leaving (counting the size of inner headers, but not added encapsulating headers).

The next departing frame SHOULD be immediately marked even if only enough incoming marked octets have arrived for part of the departing frame. This ensures that any outstanding congestion marked octets are propagated immediately, rather than held back waiting for a frame no bigger than the outstanding marked octets—which might involve a long wait.

For instance, an algorithm for marking departing frames could maintain a counter representing the balance of arriving marked octets
minus departing marked octets. It adds the size of every marked frame that arrives and if the counter is positive it marks the next frame to depart and subtracts its size from the counter. This will often leave a negative remainder in the counter, which is deliberate.

5. Feed-Up-and-Forward Mode: Guidelines for Adding Congestion Notification

Marking the IP header while switching at layer-2 (by using a layer-3 switch) seems to represent a layering violation. However, it can be considered as a benign optimisation if the guidelines below are followed. Feed-up-and-forward is certainly not a general alternative to implementing feed-forward congestion notification in the lower layer, because:

- IPv4 and IPv6 are not the only layer-3 protocols that might be encapsulated by lower layer protocols
- Link-layer encryption might be in use, making the layer-2 payload inaccessible
- Many Ethernet switches do not have 'layer-3 switch' capabilities so they cannot read or modify an IP payload
- It might be costly to find an IP header (v4 or v6) when it may be encapsulated by more than one Ethernet header (e.g. MAC in MAC [IEEE802.1Qah]).

Nonetheless, configuring a layer-3 switch to look for an ECN field in an encapsulated IP header is a useful optimisation. If the implementation follows the guidelines below, this optimisation does not have to be confined to a controlled environment such as within a data centre; it could usefully be applied on any network—even if the operator is not sure whether the above issues will never apply:

1. If a native lower-layer congestion notification mechanism exists for a subnet technology, it is safe to mix feed-up-and-forward with feed-forward-and-up on other switches in the same subnet. However, it will generally be more efficient to use the native mechanism.

2. The depth of the search for an IP header SHOULD be limited. If an IP header is not found soon enough, or an unrecognised or unreadable header is encountered, the switch SHOULD resort to an alternative means of signalling congestion (e.g. drop, or the native lower layer mechanism if available).
3. It is sufficient to use the first IP header found in the stack; the egress of the relevant tunnel can propagate congestion notification upwards to any more deeply encapsulated IP headers later.

6. Feed-Backward Mode: Guidelines for Adding Congestion Notification

It can be seen from Section 3.3 that congestion notification in a subnet using feed-backward mode has generally not been designed to be directly coupled with IP layer congestion notification. The subnet attempts to minimise congestion internally, and if the incoming load at the ingress exceeds the capacity somewhere through the subnet, the layer 3 buffer into the ingress backs up. Thus, a feed-backward mode subnet is in some sense similar to a null mode subnet, in that there is no need for any direct interaction between the subnet and higher layer congestion notification. Therefore no detailed protocol design guidelines are appropriate. Nonetheless, a more general guideline is appropriate:

1. A subnetwork technology intended to eventually interface to IP SHOULD NOT be designed using only the feed-backward mode, which is certainly best for a stand-alone subnet, but would need to be modified to work efficiently as part of the wider Internet, because IP uses feed-forward-and-up mode.

The feed-backward approach does at least work beneath IP, but it can result in very inefficient and sluggish congestion control—except if it is confined to the subnet directly connected to the original data source, when it is faster than feed-forward. It would be valid to design a protocol that could work in feed-backward mode for paths that only cross one subnet, and in feed-forward-and-up mode for paths that cross subnets.

In the early days of TCP/IP, a similar feed-backward approach was tried for explicit congestion signalling, using source-quench (SQ) ICMP control packets. However, SQ fell out of favour and is now formally deprecated [RFC6633]. The main problem was that it is hard for a data source to tell the difference between a spoofed SQ message and a quench request from a genuine buffer on the path. It is also hard for a lower layer buffer to address an SQ message to the original source port number, which may be buried within many layers of headers, and possibly encrypted.

Quantised congestion notification (QCN—also known as backward congestion notification or BCN) [IEEE802.1Qau] uses a feed-backward mode structurally similar to ATM’s relative rate mechanism. However, QCN confines its applicability to scenarios such as some data centres where all endpoints are directly attached by the same Ethernet.
technology. If a QCN subnet were later connected into a wider IP-based internetwork (e.g. when attempting to interconnect multiple data centres) it would suffer the inefficiency shown Figure 3.

7. IANA Considerations (to be removed by RFC Editor)

This memo includes no request to IANA.

8. Security Considerations

(ToDo)'

9. Conclusions

Following the guidance in the document enables ECN support to be extended to numerous protocols that encapsulate IP (v4 & v6) in a consistent way, so that IP continues to fulfil its role as an end-to-end interoperability layer. This includes:

- A wide range of tunnelling protocols with various forms of shim header between two IP headers;

- A wide range of subnet technologies, particularly those that work in the same ‘feed-forward-and-up’ mode that is used to support ECN in IP and MPLS.

Guidelines have been defined for supporting propagation of ECN between Ethernet and IP on so-called Layer-3 Ethernet switches, using a ‘feed-up-an-forward’ mode. This approach could enable other subnet technologies to pass ECN signals into the IP layer, even if they do not support ECN natively.

Finally, attempting to add ECN to a subnet technology in feed-backward mode is deprecated except in special cases, due to its likely sluggish response to congestion.

10. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Gorry Fairhurst for extensive initial reviews. Michael Welzl pointed out that lower layer congestion notification signals may have different semantics to those in IP.

Bob Briscoe was part-funded by the European Community under its Seventh Framework Programme through the Trilogy project (ICT-216372) for initial drafts and through the Reducing Internet Transport Latency (RITE) project (ICT-317700) subsequently. The views expressed here are solely those of the author.
11. Comments Solicited

Comments and questions are encouraged and very welcome. They can be addressed to the IETF Transport Area working group mailing list <tsvwg@ietf.org>, and/or to the authors.

12. References

12.1. Normative References


12.2. Informative References


[GTPv1] 3GPP, "GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) across..."


(Access Controlled link within page)


(Access Controlled link within page)


[RFC2637] Hamzeh, K., Pall, G., Verthein, W., Taarud, J., Little, W., and G. Zorn, "Point-to-Point


Appendix A. Outstanding Document Issues

1. [GF] Concern that certain guidelines warrant a MUST (NOT) rather than a SHOULD (NOT). Given the guidelines say that if any SHOULD (NOT)s are not followed, a strong justification will be needed, they have been left as SHOULD (NOT) pending further list discussion. In particular:

   * If inner is a Not-ECN-PDU and Outer is CE (or highest severity congestion level), MUST (not SHOULD) drop?

2. [GF] Impact of Diffserv on alternate marking schemes (referring to RFC3168, RFC4774 & RFC2983)

3. Consider whether an IETF Standard Track doc will be needed to Update the IP-in-IP protocols listed in Section 4.1--at least those that the IETF controls--and which Area it should sit under.

4. Guidelines referring to subnet technologies should also refer to tunnels and vice versa.

5. Check that guidelines allow for multicast as well as unicast.

6. Security Considerations

Appendix B. Changes in This Version (to be removed by RFC Editor)

From briscoe-01 to 02:

* Added authors: JK & PT

* Added

  + Section 4.1 "IP-in-IP Tunnels with Tightly Coupled Shim Headers"

  + Section 4.5 "Sequences of Similar Tunnels or Subnets"

  + roadmap at the start of Section 4, given the subsections have become quite fragmented.

  + Section 9 "Conclusions"
* Clarified why transports are starting to be able to saturate interior links

* Under Section 1.1, addressed the question of alternative signal semantics and included multicast & anycast.

* Under Section 3.1, included a 3GPP example.

* Section 4.2. "Wire Protocol Design":

  + Altered guideline 2. to make it clear that it only applies to the immediate subnet egress, not later ones

  + Added a reminder that it is only necessary to check that ECN propagates at the egress, not whether interior nodes mark ECN

  + Added example of how QCN uses 802.1p to indicate support for QCN.

* Added references to Appendix C of RFC6040, about monitoring the amount of congestion signals introduced within a tunnel

* Appendix A: Added more issues to be addressed, including plan to produce a standards track update to IP-in-IP tunnel protocols.

* Updated acks and references

From briscoe-00 to 01:

* Intended status: BCP (was Informational) & updates 3819 added.

* Briefer Introduction: Introductory para justifying benefits of ECN. Moved all but a brief enumeration of modes of operation to their own new section (from both Intro & Scope). Introduced incr. deployment as most tricky part.

* Tightened & added to terminology section

* Structured with Modes of Operation, then Guidelines section for each mode.

* Tightened up guideline text to remove vagueness / passive voice / ambiguity and highlight main guidelines as numbered items.

* Added Outstanding Document Issues Appendix
* Updated references

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Abstract

Many networks, such as service provider and enterprise networks, can provide per packet treatments based on Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCP) on a per hop basis. This document provides the recommended DSCP values for browsers to use for various classes of traffic.

DSCP and other packet markings for RTCWeb QoS
draft-dhesikan-tsvwg-rtcweb-qos-00

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCP)[RFC2474] style packet marking can help provide QoS in some environments. There are many use cases where such marking does not help, but it seldom makes things worse if packets are marked appropriately. In other words, when attempting to avoid congestion by marking certain traffic flows, say all audio or all audio and video, marking too many audio and/or video flows for a given network’s capacity can prevent desirable results. Either too much other traffic will be starved, or there is not enough capacity for the preferentially marked packets (i.e., audio and/or video).

This draft proposes how a browser and other VoIP applications can mark packets. This draft does not contradict or redefine any advice from previous IETF RFCs but simply provides a simple set of recommendations for implementors based on the previous RFCs.

There are some environments where priority markings frequently help. These include:

1. If the congested link is the broadband uplink in a Cable or DSL scenario, often residential routers/NAT support preferential treatment based on DSCP.

2. If the congested link is a local WiFi network, marking may help.

3. In some cellular style deployments, markings may help in cases where the network does not remove them.

Traditionally DSCP values have been thought of as being site specific, with each site selecting its own code points for each QoS level. However in the RTCWeb use cases, the browsers need to set them to something when there is no site specific information. This document describes a reasonable default set of DSCP code point values drawn from existing RFCs and common usage. These code points are solely defaults. Future drafts may define mechanisms for site specific mappings to override the values provided in this draft.

This draft defines some inputs that the browser can look at to determine how to set the various packet markings and defines the a mapping from abstract QoS policies (media type, priority level) to
2. Relation to Other Standards

This specification does not change or override the advice in any other standards about setting packet markings. It simply provides a non-normative summary of them and provides the context of how they relate into the RTCWeb context. This document also specifies the requirements for the W3C WebRTC API to understand what it needs to control, and how the control splits between things the JavaScript application running in the browser can control and things the browser needs to control. In some cases, such as DSCP where the normative RFC leaves open multiple options to choose from, this clarifies which choice should be used in the RTCWeb context.

3. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

4. Inputs

The first input is the type of the media. The browser provides this input as it knows if the media is audio, video, or data. In this specification, both interactive and streaming media is included. They are treated in different categories as their QoS requirements are slightly different. The second input is the relative treatment of the stream within that session. Many applications have multiple video streams and often some are more important than others. JavaScript applications can tell the browser whether a particular media stream is high, medium, or low importance to the application.

5. DSCP Mappings

Below is a table of DSCP markings for each media type RTCWeb is interested in. These DSCPs for each media type listed are a reasonable default set of code point values taken from [RFC4594]. A web browser SHOULD use these values to mark the appropriate media packets. More information on EF can be found in [RFC3246]. More information on AF can be found in [RFC2597].
### Table 1

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<th>High (EF)</th>
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<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive Video</td>
<td>38 (AF43)</td>
<td>36 (AF42)</td>
<td>34 (AF41)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Interactive Video</td>
<td>26 (AF33)</td>
<td>28 (AF32)</td>
<td>30 (AF31)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Data</td>
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<td>0 (BE)</td>
<td>10 (AF11)</td>
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</table>

### Table 2

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<th>Medium</th>
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<tr>
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This corresponds to the mapping provided in TODO REF which are: QCI values (LTE)

### Table 3

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Non-BG</td>
<td>R 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9</td>
<td>Non-BG</td>
<td>R 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. WiFi Mapping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Type</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive Video</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Interactive Video</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

This corresponds to the mappings from TODO REF of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Traffic Type</th>
<th>Access Category (AC)</th>
<th>Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>BK Background</td>
<td>AC_BK</td>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>- (spare)</td>
<td>AC_BK</td>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>BE Best Effort</td>
<td>AC_BE</td>
<td>Best Effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EE Excellent Effort</td>
<td>AC_BE</td>
<td>Best Effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>CL Controlled Load</td>
<td>AC_VI</td>
<td>Video</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>VI Video</td>
<td>AC_VI</td>
<td>Video</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>VO Voice</td>
<td>AC_VO</td>
<td>Voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>NC Network Control</td>
<td>AC_VO</td>
<td>Voice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5

8. W3C API Implications

To work with this proposal, the W3C specification SHOULD provide a way to specify the importance of media and data streams.

The W3C API SHOULD also provide a way for the application to find out the source and destination IP and ports of any flow as well as the DSCP value or other markings in use for that flow. The JavaScript application can then communicate this to a web service that may install a particular policy for that flow.

The W3C API SHOULD NOT provide a way for the JavaScript to arbitrarily set the marking to any value of the JavaScript choosing as this reduces the security provided by the browser knowing the media type.
9. Security Considerations

TODO - discuss implications of what browser can set and what
JavaScript can set

10. IANA Considerations

This specification does not require any actions from IANA.

11. Downward References

This specification contains a downwards reference to [RFC4594]
however the parts of that RFC used by this specificaiton are
suffenteintly stable for this donward reference.

12. Acknowledgements

Cullen Jennings was one of the authors of this text in the original
individual submission but was unceremoniously kicked off by the
chairs when it became a WG version. Thanks for hints on code to do
this from Paolo Severini, Jim Hasselbrook, Joe Marcus, and Erik
Nordmark.

13. Document History

Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section.

This document was originally an individual submission in RTCWeb WG.
The RTCWeb working group selected it to be become a WG document.
Later the transport ADs requested that this be moved to the TSVWG WG
as that seemed to be a better match. This document is now being
submitted as individual submission to the TSVWG with the hope that WG
will select it as a WG draft and move it forward to an RFC.

14. Appendix: Code Hints

On windows setting the source interface works but BSD, OSX, Linux use
weak end-system model and will route out different interface if that
looks like a better route. (TODO - Can someone verify this with
specific versions?)

In windows you might be able to tell something about priority of an
interface for ICE purposes with WlanQueryInterface or GetIfTable.
The specific mechanisms required to set DSCP code points depend on the application platform.

In Windows, setting the DSCP is not easy. See Knowledge Base Article KB248611. TODO - add more information about what can be done for Windows.

For most Unix variants, the following program can set DSCP.

TODO - make this work in V6. For v6 have a look at IPv6_TCLASS or better the tclass part of sin6_flowid for IPv6.

TODO - Can someone test and report back results of program in iOS, Android, Linux, OSX, BSD.

Example test program:

```c
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#define MSG "Hello, World!"

int main(void) {
    int sock = -1;
    struct sockaddr *local_addr = NULL;
    struct sockaddr_in sockin, host;
    int tos = 0x60; /* CS3 */
    socklen_t socksiz = 0;
    char *buffer = NULL;

    sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
    if (sock < 0) {
        fprintf(stderr,"Error: %s\n", strerror(errno));
        exit(-1);
    }

    memset(&sockin, 0, sizeof(sockin));
    ```
sockin.sin_family = PF_INET;
sockin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("11.1.1.1");
socksz = sizeof(sockin);

local_addr = (struct sockaddr *) &sockin;

/* Set ToS/DSCP */
if (setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos,
               sizeof(tos)) < 0) {
    fprintf(stderr,"Error setting TOS: %s\n", strerror(errno));
}

/* Bind to a specific local address */
if (bind(sock, local_addr, socksz) < 0) {
    fprintf(stderr,"Error binding to socket: %s\n", strerror(errno));
    close(sock); sock=-1;
    exit(-1);
}

buffer = (char *) malloc(strlen(MSG) + 1);
if ( buffer == NULL ) {
    fprintf(stderr,"Error allocating memory: %s\n", strerror(errno));
    close( sock ); sock=-1;
    exit(-1);
}
strlcpy(buffer, MSG, strlen(MSG) + 1);
memset(&host, 0, sizeof(host));
host.sin_family = PF_INET;
host.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("10.1.1.1");
host.sin_port = htons(12345);

if (sendto(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer), 0,
           (struct sockaddr *) &host, sizeof(host)) < 0) {
    fprintf(stderr,"Error sending message: %s\n", strerror(errno));
    close(sock); sock=-1;
    free(buffer); buffer=NULL;
    exit(-1);
}

free(buffer); buffer=NULL;
close(sock); sock=-1;

return 0;
15. References

15.1. Normative References


15.2. Informative References


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Advice on network buffering
draft-fairhurst-tsvwg-buffers-00

Abstract

This document proposes an update to the advice given in RFC 3819. Subsequent research has altered understanding of buffer sizing and queue management. Therefore this document significantly revises the previous recommendations on buffering. The advice applies to all packet buffers, whether in network equipment, end hosts or middleboxes such as firewalls or NATs. And the advice applies to packet buffers at any layer: whether subnet, IP, transport or application.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

[RFC3819] provides guidance on the design of subnetworks and networking equipment. This document updates this guidance for the topic of Internet buffer configuration and control. The guidance is aimed at both equipment designers and network operators.

All networking devices use buffers to temporarily store packets that are waiting for transmission on an out-going link during traffic bursts or at times when the capacity of the ingress/egress changes.
The congestion control algorithms in TCP (and derivatives of TCP) are designed to try to fully utilise the link that has the least available capacity on the path across the network. This is called the bottleneck link. Network link capacities are typically arranged so that it will be rare for a bottleneck to arise in the network core. However, depending on prevailing patterns of traffic, any link might become the bottleneck (within the host, at an edge router, at a core router, at a switch in the subnet between routers or at some middlebox such as a firewall or a network address translator). Modern TCP stacks are capable of filling a link of any capacity.

A buffer that simply discards incoming packets when it is full is called a tail-drop buffer. A long-running TCP flow will fill a tail-drop buffer and keep it full, so that there is no longer any space to absorb bursts. This is called a standing queue. Packets arriving at the tail of a standing queue still work their way through the buffer until they emerge onto the link, but this introduces unnecessary delay to every packet, including those from other sessions sharing the link. This can intermittently add intolerable delay to a real-time interactive media session (e.g. voice or video). Also, most Web pages involve dozens of short back-and-forth exchanges, so adding even a small amount of queuing delay to each round can accumulate considerable delay in the completion of the whole task.

The recommended way to avoid these problems is to use an active queue management (AQM) algorithm in every potential bottleneck buffer (subnet, router, middlebox or host), and to enable explicit congestion notification (ECN). However, if AQM has not been implemented in existing equipment, the next best option is to at least size the buffer so that it is no larger than needed to absorb bursts.

This document gives advice on using and configuring AQM algorithms and ECN, and advice on buffer sizing in the absence of such algorithms.

The correct buffer size depends on the link rate, so a common problem is where equipment auto-adjusts its rate, often over a wide range, so the buffer size can be badly incorrect. Advice is also given on how to relate buffer auto-sizing algorithms to rate-adjusting algorithms, and the best static buffer size to configure if auto-sizing has not been implemented.

It is difficult to test whether a network might exhibit these problems. They only appear intermittently, because they depend on four pathologies co-inciding: i) a particular buffer has become the bottleneck for a long-running TCP flow, which depends on relative traffic levels in other links, ii) the TCP flow has run for long
enough to fill this buffer, iii) the buffer lacks AQM or the AQM is badly configured and iv) the buffer has been badly over-sized. When all four conditions co-incide, the delays can be bad enough to lead to support desk calls.

This document updates section 13 of RFC 3819, which gave guidance to subnet designers on the use and sizing of buffers. Appendix A reviews that guidance, which now requires considerable revision in the light of subsequent research. Also, whereas RFC 3819 addressed subnet designers, the advice in this document is relevant to a wider audience, because it concerns buffers wherever they are, including in end-systems and middleboxes not just in subnet technology.

2. Terminology

The document assumes familiarity with the terminology of RFC 3819 [RFC3819].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The term active queue management (AQM) has been applied to technologies that work only at the packet level as well as technologies that identify and police flows with above average rates or that enforce flow-level or user-level policies such as fair queuing. For this document, we will use the term 'AQM' for technologies or parts of technologies that treat packets indiscriminately, and the term 'policing' for the additional technologies that attempt to enforce some level of behaviour or isolation at the flow or user level of granularity.

3. Updated Recommendations on Buffering

This section updates the rules for network buffers in section 13 of RFC 3819.

3.1. Recommendations Applicable to Any Buffer

AQM is strongly recommended for any buffer. Auto-tuned configuration is recommended.

Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [RFC3168] is also strongly recommended for any buffer (this avoids delays due to timeouts after loss). It is safe to enable ECN for routers and servers. If concerns arise over the use of ECN, this can be fully addressed by
turning off ECN support at the endpoint. If routers and servers were not to enable ECN, where it is deemed safe, it will not be possible for endpoints to turn it on.

Buffer size: if AQM is implemented, there is no harm in having a large buffer to absorb bursts. However, if there is no AQM, it is important to keep the buffer small.

- Too little buffering can result in poor utilisation of the egress link, since many traffic flows are not smooth-paced and bursts of traffic may fail to be buffered.

- Large buffers can help ensure full utilisation of the egress link, but excessive buffering results in slow response to congestion and in unnecessary delay experienced by any flow that shares the egress link. Such events are not uncommon, since a single long-lived connection using a modern TCP stack can fill any size of network buffer.

Auto-sizing is recommended if the line rate is adjustable or auto-adjusts (e.g. setting buffer time, not byte-size). If auto-sizing has not been implemented, a large buffer is not best. Too small a buffer reduces link utilisation. If it is necessary to find a compromise size for adjustable line rates, should consider sacrificing some utilisation at lower rates to keep the buffer delay reasonable.

3.2. Buffering recommendations for end hosts

XX Work in Progress, to be included in next revision XX

Large buffers are not best. AQM and auto-tuning/auto-sizing are as applicable in end hosts as in network equipment.

ECN may even be appropriate (e.g. on a subsystem such as a NIC), but within a host it should be possible to use back-pressure messages instead.

Buffer sizing recommendations specific to end-systems.

3.3. Buffering recommendations for edge routers and switches

XX Work in Progress, to be included in next revision XX

Large is not best.

AQM and ECN are strongly recommended.
Buffer sizing recommendations specific to edge routers, switches & middleboxes.

3.4. Buffering recommendations for core routers and switches

XX Work in Progress, to be included in next revision XX

Large is not best.

Buffer sizing recommendations specific to core routers & switches.

3.5. Recommendations on Flow Isolation

XX Work in Progress, to be included in next revision XX

Still a subject of debate and research. May be able to recommend something here, but more likely will commentate on the debate.

4. Buffer Management Methods

This section provides informative documentation of current practice.

4.1. Examples of subnetwork buffering

This section provides informative examples of buffer configuration and their impact on network traffic (TBA: to consider whether to bless, deprecate or merely state each of these practices).

- An Ethernet subnetwork may operate over a range of speeds from a shared 10 Mbps of capacity to over 40 Gbps. The buffering required depends on the link speed and many device drivers and operating systems do not adjust their buffering to the available capacity. The first hop link from a host often has a higher speed than the subsequent links along a network path.

- Subnetwork flow-control can be triggered when a subnetwork link suffers congestion. An example is the use of Ethernet Pause frames (e.g. by consumer Ethernet switches) to slow a sender emitting traffic towards a congestion switch port. These methods can increase the buffering experienced by the end-to-end flow.

- Docsis 3.1 supports transmission up to 300Mbps. A current modem can be plugged into a current network. Then suppose a customers service only supports 10 Mbps, the network equipment may be 30 times over-buffered (assuming buffers are dimensioned based on the maximum bit rate). The buffer control amendment may be implemented in the modem, and in its provisioning system to address this type of issue. Similar issues apply for other link
technologies, were the offered service is often less than the maximum supported rate.

o On wireless, bandwidth (and hence network capacity) is often highly variable, unless you have a fixed point to point link. Even fixed links may use adaptive methods and propagation conditions can cause the capacity to var

4.2. Examples of methods for active buffer management

This section provides informative examples of active buffer management.

While large buffers can lead to an increase in experienced network delay, they do not necessarily impact the flow delay. The issue is not how much buffering is provided, but how the provided buffers are used to manage the flow of traffic.

Several active buffer/queue management methods have been proposed that can significantly improve performance of flows using a (potentially) congested bottleneck.

o RED

o CoDel

o Pi

o etc

5. Security Considerations

Decisions on queue management and buffer sizing are neutral to security considerations if they act indiscriminately over all packets. Recommendations on treatment or lack of treatment at the flow or user-level can have security considerations, which are TBA.

The question of whether end-systems respond to congestion signals is a valid security concern, but outside the scope of this document.

6. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any IANA considerations.

[RFC-ED]: Please remove this section prior to publication.

7. Acknowledgments
This work was part-funded by the European Community under its Seventh Framework Programme through the Reducing Internet Transport Latency (RITE) project (ICT-317700). The views expressed are solely those of the author.

The authors acknowledge contributions from: Jim Gettys.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Previous IETF guidance for configuring network buffers

This section reviews previous guidance for configuring network buffers and motivates the need to update these recommendations.

Guidance for the use of buffers was provided in section 13 of RFC 3819:

"each node should have enough buffering to hold one link_bandwidth*link_delay product’s worth of data for each TCP connection sharing the link."

However, in today’s Internet, a deployment following this recommendation would overly allocate buffering for a network link that supports multiple flows. This is discussed in the observations below:

- This buffering recommendation is appropriate for a device that supports a single or small number of bulk TCP flows [Villamizar].

- The buffering is unduly large when there are more than a small number of flows (e.g. >10). The goal of sharing between TCP flows requires only that the buffering is sufficient to hold one link_bandwidth*path_delay product’s worth of data for the longest path flow. The more flows share a link, the less buffering is needed [Appenzeller], unless the egress link becomes congested with so many flows that there are only a few packets per flow buffered.

- Many egress links have a higher level of multiplexing (e.g. >100 of uncorrelated flows). This is often found beyond the edge of a network. In this case, the buffer size may be inversely proportional to the square root of the number of flows (for medium numbers. For still higher levels of multiplexing, this may be of the order of the logarithm of the number of flows [Wischik][Ganjali].

- Note that while optimal buffering may be a function of the number of concurrent flows, it is not recommended to tune buffering by dynamically estimating the number of flows sharing a network device or path, or by attempting to classify flows as "long", "short", etc. Such estimates are difficult, due to the wide variety of flow behaviours and the use of aggregation methods (such as tunnels) that hide the traffic of individual flows.

- In deployed scenarios (apart from restricted deployments in operator-controlled subnetworks), it is usually impossible for a router or other network middlebox to know the experienced by a
flow. In the Internet service model this information is only available to end points (e.g. using feedback provided by TCP [RFC0793] or RTCP [RFC3550]). It is therefore not usually possible for operators to use the end-to-end path delay calculation to determine the size of buffering when configuring network equipment.

The discussion in section 13 of RFC 3819 summarises:

"In general, it is wise to err in favor of too much buffering rather than too little."

While this advice may have been appropriate when routers and subnetworks with small numbers of flows and low buffer memory [Villamizar], this advice is now not appropriate for many modern networks.

Section 13 of RFC 3819 also motivates using methods such as Active Queue Management, AQM and [RFC3168]. However, at the time of writing there was little deployment experience, and little understanding of how to configure these methods. We now argue that these methods should be considered for deployment in operational networks.

Appendix B. Revision notes

RFC-Editor: Please remove this section prior to publication

Draft 00

  o This contains the first draft for comment.

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DiffServ interconnection classes and practice
draft-geib-tsvwg-diffserv-intercon-02

Abstract

This document proposes a limited set of interconnection QoS PHBs and PHB groups. It further introduces some DiffServ deployment aspects. The proposals made here should be integrated into a revised version of RFC5127.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

This draft proposes a DiffServ interconnection class and codepoint scheme. At least one party of an interconnection often is a network provider. Aggregated DiffServ classes are often deployed within provider networks. To respect this, this draft also contains concepts and current practice relevant for a revised version of RFC5127 [RFC5127]. Its main purpose is to be considered as an input for the latter task.

DiffServ sees deployment in many networks for the time being. As described in the introduction of the draft diffserv problem statement [I-D.polk-tsvwg-diffserv-stds-problem-statement], remarking of packets at domain boundaries is a DiffServ feature. This draft proposes a set of standard QoS classes and codepoints at interconnection points to which and from which locally used classes and codepoints should be mapped. Such a scheme simplifies interconnection negotiations and ensures that end to end class properties remain roughly the same, even if codepoints change.

The proposed Interconnection class and codepoint scheme tries to reflect and consolidate related DiffServ and QoS standardisation efforts outside of the IETF, namely MEF, GSMA and ITU.

IP Precedence has been deprecated when DiffServ was standardised. It is common practice today however to copy the DSCPs "IP Precedence Bits" into MPLS TC or Ethernet P-Bits, whenever possible. This is reflected by the DiffServ codepoint definitions of AF and EF. This practice and it’s limits deserve to be documented and discussed briefly.

The draft further adds proposes a philosophy how to add or pick aggregated DiffServ classes. The set of available router and traffic management tools to configure and operate DiffServ classes is limited. This should be reflected by class definitions. These may in the end be more related to transport properties than to application requirements. Please interpret transport properties as "congestion aware" and "not congestion aware" rather than TCP or UDP.

Finally, this draft proposes to leave some MPLS TC codepoint space to allow for future DiffServ extensions like ECN/PCN and domain internal classes (network management traffic is a good example for the latter). An example for an internal PHB may be CS6, which some operators to protect their network internal routing and / or management traffic. This PHB may not be available to transport customer signaling and management traffic. It IETF is interested in this work, a later version may expand on internal PHBs and codepoints.
In addition to the standardisation activities which triggered this work, other authors published RFCs or drafts which may benefit from an interconnection class- and codepoint scheme. RFC 5160 suggests Meta-QoS-Classes to enable deployment of standardised end to end QoS classes [RFC5160]. The authors agree that the proposed interconnection class- and codepoint scheme as well as the idea of standardised end to end. Hence RFC 5160 and this work complement each other. Work on BGP Class of Service Interconnection signaled by BGP [I-D.knoll-idr-cos-interconnect] is beyond the the scope of this draft. Should the basic transport and class properties of end to end QoS utilising DiffServ based interconnection as proposed by this draft be standardised, work on signaled access to QoS classes may be of interest.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. Terminology

This draft tries to re-use existing terminology. It further tries to indicate, where duplicate terminology may exist.

Class    A class is a set of one or more PHBs. If a class consists of a set of PHBs and these obey to an ordering constraint. In that sense, a class is a single AF class (e.g. AF4 consisting of AF41, AF41 and AF43) [RFC2597]. A class is a PHB group [RFC2575] and a PHB scheduling class [RFC3260]. On IP level all DSCPs sharing the same IP precedence value belong to a single class. A class may consist of one or more PHBs. A single class uses forwarding resources, which are independent of the forwarding resources of any other class. Different classes must not be aggregated.

PHB     A single Per Hop Behaviour [RFC2575] is identified by a single DSCP on IP layer.

Many DiffServ related RFCs introduce new terminology duplicating the existing one. The above references are incomplete and refer to the early DiffServ RFCs only. Stopping terminology duplication may simplify discussion.

The following current practice issues relate to the concept of the DiffServ interconnection class proposal rather than to terminology. They serve as additional motivation of this activity:
Abstract class names like "EF" are preferential over those being close to an application, like "Voice". Unfortunately, non QoS experts can't handle abstract class names. Hence and usually sooner than later, classes are named for applications or groups of them. One consequence however is, that people tend to combine application group class names and SLA parameters. Based on an application specific name and some worst case performance numbers on a paper, they often decide that their application needs a separate new QoS class.

Worse than that, but very present in practice, is the class abstraction level which is preferred by those dealing with QoS (as experts or non experts): the DSCPs or the IP precedence values. These are the commodity abstractions applied for QoS classes. Most of these persons have fixed class to codepoint mappings in their minds, which they can't easily adapt on a per customer or interconnection partner basis.

While these issues aren't to be solved by IETF (QoS experts could and should of course teach staff to use proper DiffServ terminology and concepts), a simple and comprehensible QoS interconnection class scheme also is helpful in this area.

3. An Interconnection class and codepoint scheme

DiffServ deployments mostly follow loose class specification schemes (often one or two AF classes, EF and Best Effort). Especially DSCP assignment for the AF classes varies between deployments. Basic AF class definitions are often similar however. This is in line with the DiffServ architecture. This document doesn't propose to change that.

Interconnecting parties face the problem of matching classes to be interconnected and then to agree on codepoint mapping. As stated by draft diffserv problemb statement [I-D.polk-tsvwg-diffserv-stds-problem-statement], remarking is a standard behaviour at interconnection interfaces. This draft proposes a set of 4 QoS classes with a set of well defined DSCPs and IP-Precedence values as interconnection class and codepoint scheme. A sending party remarks DSCPs from internal schemes to the Interconnection codepoints. The receiving party remarks IP-Precedence and or DSCPs to their internal scheme. Thus the interconnection codepoint scheme fully complies with the DiffServ architecture. Such an interconnection class and codepoint scheme was introduced by ITU-T [Y.1566] (there also including Ethernet). It is specified to a higher level of detail in this document.
At first glance, this looks like an additional effort. But there are obvious benefits: each party sending or receiving traffic has to specify the mapping from or to the interconnection class and codepoint scheme only once. Without it, this is to be negotiated per interconnection party individually. Further, end-to-end QoS in terms of traffic being classified for the same class in all passed domains is likely to result if an interconnection codepoint scheme is used. It is not necessarily resulting from individual per network mapping negotiations.

The standards and deployments known to the author of this draft are limited to 4 DiffServ classes at interconnection points (or less). Draft RFC 4597 update [I-D.polk-tsvwg-rfc4594-update] doesn’t seem to generally contradict to this, as it proposes to standardise "many services classes, not all will be used in each network at any period of time." Some more good reasons favour working with 4 DiffServ interconnection classes for now:

- There should be a coding reserve for interconnection classes, leaving space for future standards, for bilateral agreements and for carrier internal classes.

- MPLS and Ethernet support only 8 PHBs, classes or ECN indications. Assignment of codepoints for whatever purpose must be well thought through. Limiting interconnection QoS to four classes is MPLS and Ethernet friendly in that sense.

- Migrations from one codepoint scheme to another may require spare QoS codepoints.

4. Consolidation of QoS standards by the interconnection codepoint scheme

The interconnection class and codepoint scheme proposed by Y.1566 also tries to consolidate related DiffServ and QoS standardisation efforts outside of the IETF [Y.1566]. The interconnection class and codepoint scheme may be a suitable approach to consolidate these standards. MEF 23.1 specifies 3 aggregated classes, consuming up to 5 codepoints on Ethernet layer (EF, AF3 and AF1 and Best Effort) and 6 PHBs [MEF23.1]. MEF aggregates AF1 and Default PHB in a single class. This is not recommended for interconnection, as it is not in line with RFC 2597 (which requires separate forwarding resources for each AF class and doesn’t foresee aggregation of Default PHB and an AF class).

GSMA IR.34 proposes four classes, EF, AF4, another AF class and Best Effort with 7 PHBs in sum [IR.34]. IR.34 specifies an "Interactive"
class consisting of 3 PHBs with different drop priorities. IR.34 specifies the PHBS AF31, AF21 and AF11 for this Interactive class. This definitely breaks RFC 2597. The interconnection class and codepoint scheme supports the Interactive class but assigns AF3 with PHBs AF31, AF32 and AF33.

If IETF picks up this draft, it may be a good idea to inform MEF and GSMA about conflicts of their standards with DiffServ and suggest joint activities to improve the situation. Information on interworkings with MEF 23 and GSMA IR.34 with the interconnection QoS scheme could be given by a later version of this draft.

The classes to be supported at interconnection interfaces are specified by Y.1566 as:

Class Priority: EF, expecting the figures of merit describing the PHB to be in the range of low single digit milliseconds. See [RFC3246].

Bulk inelastic: Optimised for low loss, low delay, low jitter at high bandwidth. Traffic load in this class must be controlled, e.g. by application servers. One example could be flow admission control. There may be infrequent retransmissions requested by the application layer to mitigate low levels of packet losses. Discard of packets through active queue management should be avoided in this class. Congestion in this class may result in bursty packet loss. If used to carry multimedia traffic, it is recommended to carry audio and video traffic in a single PHB. All of these properties influence the buffer design.

Assured: This class may be optimised to transport traffic without bandwidth requirements. It aims on very low loss at high bandwidths. Retransmissions after losses characterise the class and influence the buffer design. Active queue management with probabilistic dropping may be deployed.

Default: Default. This class may be optimised to transport traffic without bandwidth requirements. Retransmissions after losses characterise the class and influence the buffer design. Active queue management with probabilistic dropping may be deployed.

Note that other DiffServ related standards trim down class requirements to SLA parameters. To quote e.g RFC 4594-update, "A "service class" represents a similar set of traffic characteristics for delay, loss, and jitter as packets traverse routers in a network." This draft adds traffic conditioning properties.
corresponding to expected transport layer characteristics as a key factor to a class definition: the desired class performance like delay, jitter and worst case loss are met only if conditioning and transport properties meet the ones described by the class definition. This is not to say, the other standards ignore conditioner properties. They are e.g. a core part of RFC 4594-update. They do not directly refer to transport protocol properties, as most existing QoS standards prefer the approach of assigning QoS classes to applications or application sets. This may result in undesirable class mappings, if an e.g. IP TV application demanding low loss is matched to a class whose low loss guarantees depend on AQM mechanisms.

Y.1566 does not recommend all PHBs to be supported at an interconnection interface. This information is added by this draft. At interconnection points, the following PHBs should be accepted between interconnected parties:

Class: PHB (one or more)
Class Priority: EF
Bulk inelastic: AF41 (AF42 and AF43 are reserved for extension)
Assured: AF31, AF32 and AF33
Default: Default

Class names (and property specification) are picked from Y.1566. PHBs to the level of detail introduced here are not part of Y.1566.

5. MPLS, Ethernet and IP Precedence for aggregated classes

IP Precedence has been deprecated when DiffServ was standardised. Ethernet and MPLS support 3 bit codepoint fields to differentiate service quality. Mapping of the IP precedence to these 3 Bit fields has been a configuration restriction in the early days of DiffServ. The concept of paying attention to the three most significant bits of a DSCP has however been part of Diffserv from start on (EF’s IP Precedence is 5, that of AF4 is 4 and so on). The interconnection class and codepoint scheme respects this in different ways:

- It allows to classify four interconnection classes based on IP precedence.
- It supports a single PHB group (AF3), which may be mapped to up to three different MPLS TC’s or Ethernet P-Bits. Note that this
draft doesn’t favour or recommend doing that, but it is possible. The author isn’t aware of deployed service offers with 3 different drop levels in a single class.

This is of course no requirement to deprecate any DSCP to MPLS TC or Ethernet P-Bit mapping functionality. This functionality is very important as well.

6. QoS class name selection

This is more of an informational discussion, proposed best practice, and mainly relates to human behaviour (including QoS experts) rather than technical issues. Above the human preference for conceivable class names has been mentioned. Network engineers (including the former Diffserv WG authors) recommend to avoid application related QoS class names. Focus should be put on class properties. But these can be irritating again, as just looking at SLA parameters like Delay, Jitter and packet loss don’t tell the reader, which conditioning and transport properties guided the class engineering assumptions resulted in the conditioning of a class. A router produces QoS with a scheduling mechanism, a settable queue depth and optional active queue management (including ECN), and may be a policer. Some kind of resource management may be present (also in Diffserv domains). It’s beyond the imagination of the author how one would engineer more than half a dozen classes with distinguishable properties with this set of tools.

There’s no perfect solution to the problem, as conditioning configurations are not comprehensible to most readers, even if they were communicated (they are operational secrets of course). There are (or should be) engineering assumptions, when designing QoS conditioners. But they closer relate to layer 3 or layer 4 level properties than to specific applications. In general, an application responds to congestion by reducing traffic, or it ignores congestion. Active queue management doesn’t help to avoid congestion in the latter case, only resource management does. EF may be a special case. If the EF traffic is not responsive to congestion, and packets are assumed to be short, rather small jitter values can be reached if engineering ensures that the packet arrival rate never exceeds the transmission rate of that queue (see RFC 3246 [RFC3246]). There’s other non congestion-responsive traffic, for which the EF engineering assumptions may not fit. So conditioning) like bulk inelastic is reasonable.

Active queue management may be deployed for QoS classes, which are designed to transport traffic responding to congestion by traffic reduction.
The class names of this document follow Y.1566. TCP_optimised and especially UDP_optimised are inappropriate as class names, as some UDP based application are or may be expected to become TCP friendly.

7. Allow for DiffServ extendability on MPLS and Ethernet level

Any aggregated Diffserv deployment faces codepoint depletion issues rather soon, if deployed on MPLS or Ethernet. Coding space should be left for new features, like ECN, PCN or Conex. In addition to carrying customer traffic, internal routing and network management traffic may be protected by using a separate class. Offering interconnection with up to four classes and 4-6 MPLS TC’s (or Ethernet P-bits) to that respect is probably at least a fair compromise.

8. Acknowledgements

David Black gave many helpful comments to this work. Al Morton and Sebastien Jobert provided feedback on many aspects during private discussions. Brian Carpenter, Mohamed Boucadair and Thomas Knoll helped adding awareness of further potentially related work.

9. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

10. Security Considerations

This document does not introduce new features, it describes how to use existing ones. The security section of RFC 4597 [RFC4597] applies.

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Appendix A. Change log

00 to 01 Added terminology and references. Added details and information to interconnection class and codepoint scheme. Editorial changes.

01 to 02 Added some references regarding related work. Clarified class definitions. Further editorial improvements.

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IPv6 and UDP Checksums for Tunneled Packets
draft-ietf-6man-udpcheckums-08

Abstract

This document provides an update of the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) specification (RFC2460) to improve the performance in the use case where a tunnel protocol uses UDP with IPv6 to tunnel packets. The performance improvement is obtained by relaxing the IPv6 UDP checksum requirement for any suitable tunnel protocol where header information is protected on the "inner" packet being carried. This relaxation removes the overhead associated with the computation of UDP checksums on IPv6 packets used to carry tunnel protocols. The specification describes how the IPv6 UDP checksum requirement can be relaxed for the situation where the encapsulated packet itself contains a checksum. The limitations and risks of this approach are described, and restrictions specified on the use of the method.

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1. Introduction

This work constitutes an update of the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification [RFC2460], in the use case where a tunnel protocol uses UDP with IPv6 to tunnel packets. With the rapid growth of the Internet, tunnel protocols have become increasingly important to enable the deployment of new protocols. Tunnel protocols can be deployed rapidly, while the time to upgrade and deploy a critical mass of routers, middleboxes and hosts on the global Internet for a new protocol is now measured in decades. At the same time, the increasing use of firewalls and other security-related middleboxes means that truly new tunnel protocols, with new protocol numbers, are also unlikely to be deployable in a reasonable time frame, which has resulted in an increasing interest in and use of UDP-based tunnel protocols. In such protocols, there is an encapsulated "inner" packet, and the "outer" packet carrying the tunneled inner packet is a UDP packet, which can pass through firewalls and other middleboxes that perform filtering that is a fact of life on the current Internet.

Tunnel endpoints may be routers or middleboxes aggregating traffic from a number of tunnel users, therefore the computation of an additional checksum on the outer UDP packet may be seen as an unwarranted burden on nodes that implement a tunnel protocol, especially if the inner packet(s) are already protected by a checksum. In IPv4, there is a checksum over the IP packet header, and the checksum on the outer UDP packet may be set to zero. However in IPv6 there is no checksum in the IP header and RFC 2460 [RFC2460] explicitly states that IPv6 receivers MUST discard UDP packets with a zero checksum. So, while sending a UDP datagram with a zero checksum is permitted in IPv4 packets, it is explicitly forbidden in IPv6 packets. To improve support for IPv6 UDP tunnels, this document updates RFC 2460 to allow endpoints to use a zero UDP checksum under constrained situations (primarily IPv6 tunnel transports that carry checksum-protected packets), following the applicability statements and constraints in [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero].

"Unicast UDP Usage Guidelines for Application Designers" [RFC5405] should be consulted when reading this specification. It discusses both UDP tunnels (Section 3.1.3) and the usage of checksums (Section 3.4).

While the origin of this specification is the problem raised by the draft titled "Automatic Multicast Tunnels", also known as "AMT" [I-D.ietf-mboned-auto-multicast] we expect it to have wide applicability. Since the first version of this document, the need for an efficient UDP tunneling mechanism has increased. Other IETF Working Groups, notably LISP [RFC6830] and Softwires [RFC5619] have
expressed a need to update the UDP checksum processing in RFC 2460. We therefore expect this update to be applicable in the future to other tunnel protocols specified by these and other IETF Working Groups.

2. Some Terminology

This document discusses only IPv6, since this problem does not exist for IPv4. Therefore all reference to 'IP' should be understood as a reference to IPv6.

The document uses the terms "tunneling" and "tunneled" as adjectives when describing packets. When we refer to 'tunneling packets' we refer to the outer packet header that provides the tunneling function. When we refer to 'tunneled packets' we refer to the inner packet, i.e., the packet being carried in the tunnel.

2.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. Problem Statement

When using tunnel protocols based on UDP, there can be both a benefit and a cost to computing and checking the UDP checksum of the outer (encapsulating) UDP transport header. In certain cases, reducing the forwarding cost is important, e.g., for nodes that perform the checksum in software the cost may outweigh the benefit. This document provides an update for usage of the UDP checksum with IPv6. The update is specified for use by a tunnel protocol that transports packets that are themselves protected by a checksum.

4. Discussion

"Applicability Statement for the use of IPv6 UDP Datagrams with Zero Checksums" [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero] describes issues related to allowing UDP over IPv6 to have a valid zero UDP checksum and is the starting point for this discussion. Sections 4 and 5 of [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero], respectively identify node implementation and usage requirements for datagrams sent and received with a zero UDP checksum. These introduce constraints on the usage of a zero checksum for UDP over IPv6. The remainder of this section analyses the use of general tunnels and motivates why tunnel protocols are
being permitted to use the method described in this update. Issues with middleboxes are also discussed.

4.1. Analysis of Corruption in Tunnel Context

This section analyzes the impact of the different corruption modes in the context of a tunnel protocol. It indicates what needs to be considered by the designer and user of a tunnel protocol to be robust. It also summarizes why use of a zero UDP checksum is thought to be safe for deployment.

1. Context (i.e., tunneling state) should be established by exchanging application Protocol Data Units (PDUs) carried in checksummed UDP datagrams or by other protocols with integrity protection against corruption. These control packets should also carry any negotiation required to enable the tunnel endpoint to accept UDP datagrams with a zero checksum and identify the set of ports that are used. It is important that the control traffic is robust against corruption because undetected errors can lead to long-lived and significant failures that may affect much more than the single packet that was corrupted.

2. Keep-alive datagrams with a zero UDP checksum should be sent to validate the network path, because the path between tunnel endpoints can change and therefore the set of middleboxes along the path may change during the life of an association. Paths with middleboxes that drop datagrams with a zero UDP checksum will drop these keep-alives. To enable the tunnel endpoints to discover and react to this behavior in a timely way, the keep-alive traffic should include datagrams with a non-zero checksum and datagrams with a zero checksum.

3. Receivers should attempt to detect corruption of the address information in an encapsulating packet. A robust tunnel protocol should track tunnel context based on the 5-tuple (tunneled protocol number, IPv6 source address, IPv6 destination address, UDP source port, UDP destination port). A corrupted datagram that arrives at a destination may be filtered based on this check.

* If the datagram header matches the 5-tuple and the node has the zero checksum enabled for this port, the payload is matched to the wrong context. The tunneled packet will then be decapsulated and forwarded by the tunnel egress.

* If a corrupted datagram matches a different 5-tuple and the zero checksum was enabled for the port, the datagram payload is matched to the wrong context, and may be processed by the
wrong tunnel protocol, if it also passes the verification of that protocol.

* If a corrupted datagram matches a 5-tuple and the zero checksum has not been enabled for this port, the datagram will be discarded.

When only the source information is corrupted, the datagram could arrive at the intended applications/protocol, which will process the datagram and try to match it against an existing tunnel context. The likelihood that a corrupted packet enters a valid context is reduced when the protocol restricts processing to only the source addresses with established contexts. When both source and destination fields are corrupted, this increases the likelihood of failing to match a context, with the exception of errors replacing one packet header with another one. In this case, it is possible that both packets are tunneled and therefore the corrupted packet could match a previously defined context.

4. Receivers should attempt to detect corruption of source-fragmented encapsulating packets. A tunnel protocol may reassemble fragments associated with the wrong context at the right tunnel endpoint, or it may reassemble fragments associated with a context at the wrong tunnel endpoint, or corrupted fragments may be reassembled at the right context at the right tunnel endpoint. In each of these cases, the IPv6 length of the encapsulating header may be checked (though [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero] points out the weakness in this check). In addition, if the encapsulated packet is protected by a transport (or other) checksum, these errors can be detected (with some probability).

5. Tunnel protocols using UDP have some advantages that reduce the risk for a corrupted tunnel packet reaching a destination that will receive it, compared to other applications. This results from processing by the network of the inner (tunneled) packet after being forwarded from the tunnel egress using a wrong context:

* A tunneled packet may be forwarded to the wrong address domain, for example, a private address domain where the inner packet’s address is not routable, or may fail a source address check, such as Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding [RFC2827], resulting in the packet being dropped.

* The destination address of a tunneled packet may not at all be reachable from the delivered domain. For example, an Ethernet
frame where the destination MAC address is not present on the LAN segment that was reached.

* The type of the tunneled packet may prevent delivery. For example, an attempt to interpret an IP packet payload as an Ethernet frame, would likely result in the packet being dropped as invalid.

* The tunneled packet checksum or integrity mechanism may detect corruption of the inner packet caused at the same time as corruption to the outer packet header. The resulting packet would likely be dropped as invalid.

These checks each significantly reduce the likelihood that a corrupted inner tunneled packet is finally delivered to a protocol listener that can be affected by the packet. While the methods do not guarantee correctness, they can reduce the risk of relaxing the UDP checksum requirement for a tunnel application using IPv6.

4.2. Limitation to Tunnel Protocols

This document describes the applicability of using a zero UDP checksum to support tunnel protocols. There are good motivations behind this and the arguments are provided here.

- Tunnels carry inner packets that have their own semantics, which may make any corruption less likely to reach the indicated destination and be accepted as a valid packet. This is true for IP packets with the addition of verification that can be made by the tunnel protocol, the network processing of the inner packet headers as discussed above, and verification of the inner packet checksums. Non-IP inner packets are likely to be subject to similar effects that may reduce the likelihood of a misdelivered packet being delivered to a protocol listener that can be affected by the packet.

- Protocols that directly consume the payload must have sufficient robustness against misdelivered packets from any context, including the ones that are corrupted in tunnels and any other usage of the zero checksum. This will require an integrity mechanism. Using a standard UDP checksum reduces the computational load in the receiver to verify this mechanism.

- The design for stateful protocols or protocols where corruption causes cascade effects requires extra care. In tunnel usage, each encapsulating packet provides only a transport mechanism from tunnel ingress to tunnel egress. A corruption will commonly only affect the single tunneled packet, not the established protocol
state. One common effect is that the inner packet flow will only see a corruption and misdelivery of the outer packet as a lost packet.

- Some non-tunnel protocols operate with general servers that do not know the source from which they will receive a packet. In such applications, a zero UDP checksum is unsuitable because there is a need to provide the first level of verification that the packet was intended for the receiving server. A verification prevents the server from processing the datagram payload and without this it may spend significant resources processing the packet, including sending replies or error messages.

Tunnel protocols that encapsulate IP will generally be safe for deployment, since all IPv4 and IPv6 packets include at least one checksum at either the network or transport layer. The network delivery of the inner packet will then further reduce the effects of corruption. Tunnel protocols carrying non-IP packets may offer equivalent protection when the non-IP networks reduce the risk of misdelivery to applications. However, there is a need for further analysis to understand the implications of misdelivery of corrupted packets for that each non-IP protocol. The analysis above suggests that non-tunnel protocols can be expected to have significantly more cases where a zero checksum would result in misdelivery or negative side-effects.

One unfortunate side-effect of increased use of a zero-checksum is that it also increases the likelihood of acceptance when a datagram with a zero UDP checksum is misdelivered. This requires all tunnel protocols using this method to be designed to be robust to misdelivery.

4.3. Middleboxes

"Applicability Statement for the use of IPv6 UDP Datagrams with Zero Checksums" [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero] notes that middleboxes that conform to RFC 2460 will discard datagrams with a zero UDP checksum and should log this as an error. Tunnel protocols intending to use a zero UDP checksum need to ensure that they have defined a method for handling cases when a middlebox prevents the path between the tunnel ingress and egress from supporting transmission of datagrams with a zero UDP checksum.

5. The Zero-Checksum Update

This specification updates IPv6 to allow a zero UDP checksum in the outer encapsulating datagram of a tunnel protocol. UDP endpoints
that implement this update MUST follow the node requirements in "Applicability Statement for the use of IPv6 UDP Datagrams with Zero Checksums" [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero].

The following text in [RFC2460] Section 8.1, 4th bullet should be deleted:

"Unlike IPv4, when UDP packets are originated by an IPv6 node, the UDP checksum is not optional. That is, whenever originating a UDP packet, an IPv6 node must compute a UDP checksum over the packet and the pseudo-header, and, if that computation yields a result of zero, it must be changed to hex FFFF for placement in the UDP header. IPv6 receivers must discard UDP packets containing a zero checksum, and should log the error."

This text should be replaced by:

An IPv6 node associates a mode with each used UDP port (for sending and/or receiving packets).

Whenever originating a UDP packet for a port in the default mode, an IPv6 node MUST compute a UDP checksum over the packet and the pseudo-header, and, if that computation yields a result of zero, it MUST be changed to hex FFFF for placement in the UDP header as specified in [RFC2460]. IPv6 receivers MUST by default discard UDP packets containing a zero checksum, and SHOULD log the error.

As an alternative, certain protocols that use UDP as a tunnel encapsulation, MAY enable the zero-checksum mode for a specific port (or set of ports) for sending and/or receiving. Any node implementing the zero-checksum mode MUST follow the node requirements specified in Section 4 of "Applicability Statement for the use of IPv6 UDP Datagrams with Zero Checksums" [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero].

Any protocol that enables the zero-checksum mode for a specific port or ports MUST follow the usage requirements specified in Section 5 of "Applicability Statement for the use of IPv6 UDP Datagrams with Zero Checksums" [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero].

Middleboxes supporting IPv6 MUST follow requirements 9, 10 and 11 of the usage requirements specified in Section 5 of "Applicability Statement for the use of IPv6 UDP Datagrams with Zero Checksums" [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero].
6. Additional Observations

This update was motivated by the existence of a number of protocols being developed in the IETF that are expected to benefit from the change. The following observations are made:

- An empirically-based analysis of the probabilities of packet corruption (with or without checksums) has not (to our knowledge) been conducted since about 2000. At the time of publication, it is now 2012. We strongly suggest a new empirical study, along with an extensive analysis of the corruption probabilities of the IPv6 header. This can potentially allow revising the recommendations in this document.

- A key motivation for the increase in use of UDP in tunneling is a lack of protocol support in middleboxes. Specifically, new protocols, such as LISP [RFC6830], may prefer to use UDP tunnels to traverse an end-to-end path successfully and avoid having their packets dropped by middleboxes. If middleboxes were updated to support UDP-Lite [RFC3828], UDP-Lite would provide better protection than offered by this update. This may be suited to a variety of applications and would be expected to be preferred over this method for many tunnel protocols.

- Another issue is that the UDP checksum is overloaded with the task of protecting the IPv6 header for UDP flows (as is the TCP checksum for TCP flows). Protocols that do not use a pseudo-header approach to computing a checksum or CRC have essentially no protection from misdelivered packets.

7. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request of IANA.

Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an RFC.

8. Security Considerations

Less work is required to generate an attack using a zero UDP checksum than one using a standard full UDP checksum. However, this does not lead to significant new vulnerabilities because checksums are not a security measure and can be easily generated by any attacker.

In general any user of zero UDP checksums should apply the checks and context verification that are possible to minimize the risk of
unintended traffic to reach a particular context. This will however not protect against an intended attack that create packet with the correct information. Source address validation can help prevent injection of traffic into contexts by an attacker.

Depending on the hardware design, the processing requirements may differ for tunnels that have a zero UDP checksum and those that calculate a checksum. This processing overhead may need to be considered when deciding whether to enable a tunnel and to determine an acceptable rate for transmission. This can become a security risk for designs that can handle a significantly larger number of packets with zero UDP checksums compared to datagrams with a non-zero checksum, such as tunnel egress. An attacker could attempt to inject non-zero checksummed UDP packets into a tunnel forwarding zero checksum UDP packets and cause overload in the processing of the non-zero checksums, e.g. if this happens in a router's slow path. Protection mechanisms should therefore be employed when this threat exists. Protection may include source address filtering to prevent an attacker injecting traffic, as well as throttling the amount of non-zero checksum traffic. The latter may impact the function of the tunnel protocol.

9. Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Brian Haberman, Dan Wing, Joel Halpern, David Waltermire, J.W. Atwood, Peter Yee, Joe Touch and the IESG of 2012 for discussions and reviews. Gorry Fairhurst has been very diligent in reviewing and helping ensure alignment between this document and [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero].

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Applicability Statement for the use of IPv6 UDP Datagrams with Zero Checksums
draft-ietf-6man-udpzero-12

Abstract

This document provides an applicability statement for the use of UDP transport checksums with IPv6. It defines recommendations and requirements for the use of IPv6 UDP datagrams with a zero UDP checksum. It describes the issues and design principles that need to be considered when UDP is used with IPv6 to support tunnel encapsulations and examines the role of the IPv6 UDP transport checksum. The document also identifies issues and constraints for deployment on network paths that include middleboxes. An appendix presents a summary of the trade-offs that were considered in evaluating the safety of the update to RFC 2460 that updates use of the UDP checksum with IPv6.

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1. Introduction

The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [RFC0768] transport is defined for the Internet Protocol (IPv4) [RFC0791] and is defined in "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) [RFC2460] for IPv6 hosts and routers. The UDP transport protocol has a minimal set of features. This limited set has enabled a wide range of applications to use UDP, but these applications do need to provide many important transport functions on top of UDP. The UDP Usage Guidelines [RFC5405] provides overall guidance for application designers, including the use of UDP to support tunneling. The key difference between UDP usage with IPv4 and IPv6 is that RFC 2460 mandates use of a calculated UDP checksum, i.e. a non-zero value, due to the lack of an IPv6 header checksum. The inclusion of the pseudo header in the checksum computation provides a statistical check that datagrams have been delivered to the intended IPv6 destination node. Algorithms for checksum computation are described in [RFC1071].

The lack of a possibility to use an IPv6 datagram with a zero UDP checksum has been observed as a real problem for certain classes of application, primarily tunnel applications. This class of application has been deployed with a zero UDP checksum using IPv4. The design of IPv6 raises different issues when considering the safety of using a UDP checksum with IPv6. These issues can significantly affect applications, both when an endpoint is the intended user and when an innocent bystander (when a packet is received by a different endpoint to that intended).

This document examines the issues and an appendix compares the strengths and weaknesses of a number of proposed solutions. This identifies a set of issues that must be considered and mitigated to be able to safely deploy IPv6 applications that use a zero UDP checksum. The provided comparison of methods is expected to also be useful when considering applications that have different goals from the ones that initiated the writing of this document, especially the use of already standardized methods. The analysis concludes that using a zero UDP checksum is the best method of the proposed alternatives to meet the goals for certain tunnel applications.

This document defines recommendations and requirements for use of IPv6 datagrams with a zero UDP checksum. This usage is expected to have initial deployment issues related to middleboxes, limiting the usability more than desired in the currently deployed Internet. However, this limitation will be largest initially and will reduce as updates are provided in middleboxes that support the zero UDP checksum for IPv6. The document therefore derives a set of constraints required to ensure safe deployment of a zero UDP checksum.
Finally, the document also identifies some issues that require future consideration and possibly additional research.

1.1. Document Structure

Section 1 provides a background to key issues, and introduces the use of UDP as a tunnel transport protocol.

Section 2 describes a set of standards-track datagram transport protocols that may be used to support tunnels.

Section 3 discusses issues with a zero UDP checksum for IPv6. It considers the impact of corruption, the need for validation of the path and when it is suitable to use a zero UDP checksum.

Section 4 is an applicability statement that defines requirements and recommendations on the implementation of IPv6 nodes that support the use of a zero UDP checksum.

Section 5 provides an applicability statement that defines requirements and recommendations for protocols and tunnel encapsulations that are transported over an IPv6 transport that does not perform a UDP checksum calculation to verify the integrity at the transport endpoints.

Section 6 provides the recommendations for standardization of zero UDP checksum with a summary of the findings and notes remaining issues needing future work.

Appendix A evaluates the set of proposals to update the UDP transport behaviour and other alternatives intended to improve support for tunnel protocols. It concludes by assessing the trade-offs of the various methods, identifying advantages and disadvantages for each method.

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.3. Use of UDP Tunnels

One increasingly popular use of UDP is as a tunneling protocol, where a tunnel endpoint encapsulates the packets of another protocol inside UDP datagrams and transmits them to another tunnel endpoint. Using UDP as a tunneling protocol is attractive when the payload protocol is not supported by the middleboxes that may exist along the path,
because many middleboxes support transmission using UDP. In this use, the receiving endpoint decapsulates the UDP datagrams and forwards the original packets contained in the payload [RFC5405]. Tunnels establish virtual links that appear to directly connect locations that are distant in the physical Internet topology and can be used to create virtual (private) networks.

1.3.1. Motivation for new approaches

A number of tunnel encapsulations deployed over IPv4 have used the UDP transport with a zero checksum. Users of these protocols expect a similar solution for IPv6.

A number of tunnel protocols are also currently being defined (e.g. Automated Multicast Tunnels, AMT [I-D.ietf-mboned-auto-multicast], and the Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol, LISP [LISP]). These protocols motivated an update to IPv6 UDP checksum processing to benefit from simpler checksum processing for various reasons:

- Reducing forwarding costs, motivated by redundancy present in the encapsulated packet header, since in tunnel encapsulations, payload integrity and length verification may be provided by higher layer encapsulations (often using the IPv4, UDP, UDP-Lite, or TCP checksums).
- Eliminating a need to access the entire packet when forwarding the packet by a tunnel endpoint.
- Enhancing ability to traverse and function with middleboxes.
- A desire to use the port number space to enable load-sharing.

1.3.2. Reducing forwarding cost

It is a common requirement to terminate a large number of tunnels on a single router/host. The processing cost per tunnel includes both state (memory requirements) and per-packet processing at the tunnel ingress and egress.

Automatic IP Multicast Tunneling, known as AMT [I-D.ietf-mboned-auto-multicast] currently specifies UDP as the transport protocol for packets carrying tunneled IP multicast packets. The current specification for AMT states that the UDP checksum in the outer packet header should be zero (see Section 6.6 of [I-D.ietf-mboned-auto-multicast]). This argues that the computation of an additional checksum is an unwarranted burden on nodes implementing lightweight tunneling protocols when an inner packet is already adequately protected, . The AMT protocol needs to
replicate a multicast packet to each gateway tunnel. In this case, the outer IP addresses are different for each tunnel and therefore require a different pseudo header to be built for each UDP replicated encapsulation.

The argument concerning redundant processing costs is valid regarding the integrity of a tunneled packet. In some architectures (e.g. PC-based routers), other mechanisms may also significantly reduce checksum processing costs: There are implementations that have optimised checksum processing algorithms, including the use of checksum-offloading. This processing is readily available for IPv4 packets at high line rates. Such processing may be anticipated for IPv6 endpoints, allowing receivers to reject corrupted packets without further processing. However, there are certain classes of tunnel end-points where this off-loading is not available and unlikely to become available in the near future.

1.3.3. Need to inspect the entire packet

The currently-deployed hardware in many routers uses a fast-path processing that only provides the first n bytes of a packet to the forwarding engine, where typically n <= 128.

When this design is used to support a tunnel ingress and egress, it prevents fast processing of a transport checksum over an entire (large) packet. Hence the currently defined IPv6 UDP checksum is poorly suited to use within a router that is unable to access the entire packet and does not provide checksum-offloading. Thus enabling checksum calculation over the complete packet can impact router design, performance improvement, energy consumption and/or cost.

1.3.4. Interactions with middleboxes

Many paths in the Internet include one or more middleboxes of various types. There exist large classes of middleboxes that will handle zero UDP checksum packets, which would not support UDP-Lite or the other investigated proposals. These middleboxes includes load balancers (see Section 1.3.5) including Equal Cost Multipath Routing, traffic classifiers and other functions that reads some fields in the UDP headers but does not validate the UDP checksum.

There are also middleboxes that either validates or modify the UDP checksum. The two most common classes are Firewalls and NATs. In IPv4, UDP-encapsulation may be desirable for NAT traversal, since UDP support is commonly provided. It is also necessary due to the almost ubiquitous deployment of IPv4 NATs. There has also been discussion of NAT for IPv6, although not for the same reason as in IPv4. If
IPv6 NAT becomes a reality they hopefully do not present the same protocol issues as for IPv4. If NAT is defined for IPv6, it should take into consideration the use of a zero UDP checksum.

The requirements for IPv6 firewall traversal are likely to be similar to those for IPv4. In addition, it can be reasonably expected that a firewall conforming to RFC 2460 will not regard datagrams with a zero UDP checksum as valid. Use of a zero UDP checksum with IPv6 requires firewalls to be updated before the full utility of the change is available.

It can be expected that datagrams with zero UDP checksum will initially not have the same middlebox traversal characteristics as regular UDP (RFC 2460). However when implementations follow the requirements specified in this document, we expect the traversal capabilities to improve over time. We also note that deployment of IPv6-capable middleboxes is still in its initial phases. Thus, it might be that the number of non-updated boxes quickly become a very small percentage of the deployed middleboxes.

1.3.5. Support for load balancing

The UDP port number fields have been used as a basis to design load-balancing solutions for IPv4. This approach has also been leveraged for IPv6. An alternate method would be to utilise the IPv6 Flow Label [RFC6437] as a basis for entropy for load balancing. This would have the desirable effect of releasing IPv6 load-balancing devices from the need to assume semantics for the use of the transport port field and also works for all type of transport protocols.

This use of the flow-label for load balancing is consistent with the intended use, although further clarity was needed to ensure the field can be consistently used for this purpose, therefore an updated IPv6 Flow Label [RFC6437] and Equal-Cost Multi-Path routing usage, (ECMP) [RFC6438] was produced. Router vendors could be encouraged to start using the IPv6 Flow Label as a part of the flow hash, providing support for ECMP without requiring use of UDP.

However, the method for populating the outer IPv6 header with a value for the flow label is not trivial: If the inner packet uses IPv6, then the flow label value could be copied to the outer packet header. However, many current end-points set the flow label to a zero value (thus no entropy). The ingress of a tunnel seeking to provide good entropy in the flow label field would therefore need to create a random flow label value and keep corresponding state, so that all packets that were associated with a flow would be consistently given the same flow label. Although possible, this complexity may not be
desirable in a tunnel ingress.

The end-to-end use of flow labels for load balancing is a long-term solution. Even if the usage of the flow label is clarified, there would be a transition time before a significant proportion of endpoints start to assign a good quality flow label to the flows that they originate, with continued use of load balancing using the transport header fields until any widespread deployment is finally achieved.

2. Standards-Track Transports

The IETF has defined a set of transport protocols that may be applicable for tunnels with IPv6. There are also a set of network layer encapsulation tunnels such as IP-in-IP and GRE. These already standardized solutions are discussed here prior to the issues, as background for the issue description and some comparison of where the issue may already occur.

2.1. UDP with Standard Checksum

UDP [RFC0768] with standard checksum behaviour, as defined in RFC 2460, has already been discussed. UDP usage guidelines are provided in [RFC5405].

2.2. UDP-Lite

UDP-Lite [RFC3828] offers an alternate transport to UDP, specified as a proposed standard, RFC 3828. A MIB is defined in [RFC5097] and unicast usage guidelines in [RFC5405]. There is at least one open source implementation as a part of the Linux kernel since version 2.6.20.

UDP-Lite provides a checksum with optional partial coverage. When using this option, a datagram is divided into a sensitive part (covered by the checksum) and an insensitive part (not covered by the checksum). When the checksum covers the entire packet, UDP-Lite is fully equivalent with UDP, with the exception that it uses a different value in the Next Header field in the IPv6 header. Errors/corruption in the insensitive part will not cause the datagram to be discarded by the transport layer at the receiving endpoint. A minor side-effect of using UDP-Lite is that this was specified for damage-tolerant payloads and some link-layers may employ different link encapsulations when forwarding UDP-Lite segments (e.g. radio access bearers). Most link-layers will cover the insensitive part with the same strong layer 2 frame CRC that covers the sensitive part.
2.2.1. Using UDP-Lite as a Tunnel Encapsulation

Tunnel encapsulations can use UDP-Lite (e.g. Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points, CAPWAP [RFC5415]), since UDP-Lite provides a transport-layer checksum, including an IP pseudo header checksum, in IPv6, without the need for a router/middlebox to traverse the entire packet payload. This provides most of the verification required for delivery and still keeps a low complexity for the checksumming operation. UDP-Lite may set the length of checksum coverage on a per packet basis. This feature could be used if a tunnel protocol is designed to only verify delivery of the tunneled payload and uses a calculated checksum for control information.

There is currently poor support for middlebox traversal using UDP-Lite, because UDP-Lite uses a different IPv6 network-layer Next Header value to that of UDP, and few middleboxes are able to interpret UDP-Lite and take appropriate actions when forwarding the packet. This makes UDP-Lite less suited to protocols needing general Internet support, until such time that UDP-Lite has achieved better support in middleboxes and end-points.

2.3. General Tunnel Encapsulations

The IETF has defined a set of tunneling protocols or network layer encapsulations, e.g., IP-in-IP and GRE. These either do not include a checksum or use a checksum that is optional, since tunnel encapsulations are typically layered directly over the Internet layer (identified by the upper layer type in the IPv6 Next Header field) and are also not used as endpoint transport protocols. There is little chance of confusing a tunnel-encapsulated packet with other application data that could result in corruption of application state or data.

From the end-to-end perspective, the principal difference is that the network-layer Next Header field identifies a separate transport, which reduces the probability that corruption could result in the packet being delivered to the wrong endpoint or application. Specifically, packets are only delivered to protocol modules that process a specific Next Header value. The Next Header field therefore provides a first-level check of correct demultiplexing. In contrast, the UDP port space is shared by many diverse applications and therefore UDP demultiplexing relies solely on the port numbers.

2.4. Relation to UDP-Lite and UDP with checksum

The operation of IPv6 with UDP with a zero-checksum is not the same as IPv4 with UDP with a zero-checksum. Protocol designers should not
be fooled into thinking the two are the same. The requirements below list a set of additional considerations.

Where possible, existing general tunnel encapsulations, such as GRE, IP-in-IP, should be used. This section assumes that such existing tunnel encapsulations do not offer the functionally required to satisfy the protocol designer’s goals. The section considers the standardized alternative solutions, rather than the full set of ideas evaluated in Appendix A. The alternatives to UDP with a zero checksum are UDP with a (calculated) checksum, and UDP-Lite.

UDP with a checksum has the advantage of close to universal support in both endpoints and middleboxes. It also provides statistical verification of delivery to the intended destination (address and port). However, some classes of device have limited support for calculation of a checksum that covers a full datagram. For these devices, this can incur significant processing cost (e.g. requiring processing in the router slow-path) and can hence reduce capacity or fail to function.

UDP-Lite has the advantage of using a checksum that is calculated only over the pseudo header and the UDP header. This provides a statistical verification of delivery to the intended destination (address and port). The checksum can be calculated without access to the datagram payload, only requiring access to the part to be protected. A drawback is that UDP-Lite has currently limited support in both end-points (i.e. is not supported on all operating system platforms) and middleboxes (that require support for the UDP-Lite header type). A path verification method is therefore recommended.

IPv6 and UDP with a zero-checksum can also be used by nodes that do not permit calculation of a payload checksum. Many existing classes of middleboxes do not verify or change the transport checksum. For these middleboxes, IPv6 with a zero UDP checksum is expected to function where UDP-Lite would not. However, support for the zero UDP checksum in middleboxes that do change or verify the checksum is currently limited, and this may result in datagrams with a zero UDP checksum being discarded, therefore a path verification method is recommended.

There are sets of constrains for which no solution exist: A protocol designer that needs to originate or receive datagrams on a device that can not efficiently calculate a checksum over a full datagram and also needs these packets to pass through a middlebox that verifies or changes a UDP checksum, but does not support a zero UDP checksum, can not use the zero UDP checksum method. Similarly, one that originates datagrams on a device with UDP-Lite support, but needs the packets to pass through a middlebox that does not support
UDP-Lite, can not use UDP-Lite. For such cases, there is no optimal solution and the current recommendation is to use or fall-back to using UDP with full checksum coverage.

3. Issues Requiring Consideration

This informative section evaluates issues around the proposal to update IPv6 [RFC2460], to enable the UDP transport checksum to be set to zero. Some of the identified issues are shared with other protocols already in use. The section also provides background to the requirements and recommendations that follow.

The decision in RFC 2460 to omit an integrity check at the network level meant that the IPv6 transport checksum was overloaded with many functions, including validating:

- the endpoint address was not corrupted within a router, i.e., a packet was intended to be received by this destination and validate that the packet does not consist of a wrong header spliced to a different payload;
- that extension header processing is correctly delimited - i.e., the start of data has not been corrupted. In this case, reception of a valid Next Header value provides some protection;
- reassembly processing, when used;
- the length of the payload;
- the port values - i.e., the correct application receives the payload (applications should also check the expected use of source ports/addresses);
- the payload integrity.

In IPv4, the first four checks are performed using the IPv4 header checksum.

In IPv6, these checks occur within the endpoint stack using the UDP checksum information. An IPv6 node also relies on the header information to determine whether to send an ICMPv6 error message [RFC4443] and to determine the node to which this is sent. Corrupted information may lead to misdelivery to an unintended application socket on an unexpected host.
3.1. Effect of packet modification in the network

IP packets may be corrupted as they traverse an Internet path. Older evidence in "When the CRC and TCP Checksum Disagree" [Sigcomm2000] show that this was once an issue in year 2000 with IPv4 routers, and occasional corruption could result from bad internal router processing in routers or hosts. These errors are not detected by the strong frame checksums employed at the link-layer [RFC3819]. During the development of this document in 2009, individuals provided reports of observed rates for received UDP datagrams using IPv4 where the UDP checksum had been detected as corrupt. These rates were as high as 1.39E-4 for some paths, but also close to zero for some other paths.

There is extensive experience of deployment using tunnel protocols in well-managed networks (e.g. corporate networks or service provider core networks). This has shown the robustness of methods such as PWE and MPLS that do not employ a transport protocol checksum and have not specified mechanisms to protect from corruption of the unprotected headers (such as the VPN Identifier in MPLS). Reasons for the robustness may include:

- A reduced probability of corruption on paths through well-managed networks.
- IP form the majority of the inner traffic carried by these tunnel. Hence from a transport perspective, endpoint verification is already being performed when processing a received IPv4 packet or by the transport pseudo-header for an IPv6 packet. This update to UDP does not change this behaviour.
- In certain cases, a combination of additional filtering (e.g. filter of a MAC destination address in a L2 tunnel) significantly reduces the probability of final mis-delivery to the IP stack.
- The tunnel protocols did not use a UDP transport header, any corruption is therefore unlikely to result in misdelivery to another UDP-based application. This concern is specific to the use of UDP with IPv6.

While this experience can guide the present recommendations, any update to UDP must preserve operation in the general Internet. This is heterogeneous and can include links and systems of very varying characteristics. Transport protocols used by hosts need to be designed with this in mind, especially when there is need to traverse edge networks, where middlebox deployments are common.

For the general Internet, there is no current evidence that
corruption is rare, nor that this may not be applicable to IPv6. It therefore seems prudent not to relax checks on misdelivery. The emergence of low-end IPv6 routers and the proposed use of NAT with IPv6 further motivate the need to protect from misdelivery.

Corruption in the network may result in:

- A datagram being misdelivered to the wrong host/router or the wrong transport entity within an endpoint. Such a datagram needs to be discarded;

- A datagram payload being corrupted, but still delivered to the intended host/router transport entity. Such a datagram needs to be either discarded or correctly processed by an application that provides its own integrity checks;

- A datagram payload being truncated by corruption of the length field. Such a datagram needs to be discarded.

When a checksum is used, this significantly reduces the impact of errors, reducing the probability of undetected corruption of state (and data) on both the host stack and the applications using the transport service.

The following sections examine the impact of modifying each of these header fields.

3.1.1. Corruption of the destination IP address

An IPv6 endpoint destination address could be modified in the network (e.g. corrupted by an error). This is not a concern for IPv4, because the IP header checksum will result in this packet being discarded by the receiving IP stack. Such modification in the network can not be detected at the network layer when using IPv6. Detection of this corruption by a UDP receiver relies on the IPv6 pseudo header incorporated in the transport checksum.

There are two possible outcomes:

- Delivery to a destination address that is not in use (the packet will not be delivered, but could result in an error report);

- Delivery to a different destination address. This modification will normally be detected by the transport checksum, resulting in silent discard. Without a computed checksum, the packet would be passed to the endpoint port demultiplexing function. If an application is bound to the associated ports, the packet payload will be passed to the application (see the subsequent section on
3.1.2. Corruption of the source IP address

This section examines what happens when the source address is corrupted in transit. This is not a concern in IPv4, because the IP header checksum will normally result in this packet being discarded by the receiving IP stack. Detection of this corruption by a UDP receiver relies on the IPv6 pseudo header incorporated in the transport checksum.

Corruption of an IPv6 source address does not result in the IP packet being delivered to a different endpoint protocol or destination address. If only the source address is corrupted, the datagram will likely be processed in the intended context, although with erroneous origin information. When using Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding [RFC2827], a change in address may result in the router discarding the packet when the route to the modified source address is different to that of the source address of the original packet.

The result will depend on the application or protocol that processes the packet. Some examples are:

- An application that requires a per-established context may disregard the datagram as invalid, or could map this to another context (if a context for the modified source address was already activated).

- A stateless application will process the datagram outside of any context, a simple example is the ECHO server, which will respond with a datagram directed to the modified source address. This would create unwanted additional processing load, and generate traffic to the modified endpoint address.

- Some datagram applications build state using the information from packet headers. A previously unused source address would result in receiver processing and the creation of unnecessary transport-layer state at the receiver. For example, Real Time Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550] sessions commonly employ a source independent receiver port. State is created for each received flow. Reception of a datagram with a corrupted source address will therefore result in accumulation of unnecessary state in the RTP state machine, including collision detection and response (since the same synchronization source, SSRC, value will appear to arrive from multiple source IP addresses).

- ICMP messages relating to a corrupted packet can be misdirected to the wrong source node.
In general, the effect of corrupting the source address will depend upon the protocol that processes the packet and its robustness to this error. For the case where the packet is received by a tunnel endpoint, the tunnel application is expected to correctly handle a corrupted source address.

The impact of source address modification is more difficult to quantify when the receiving application is not that originally intended and several fields have been modified in transit.

3.1.3. Corruption of Port Information

This section describes what happens if one or both of the UDP port values are corrupted in transit. This can also happen with IPv4 is used with a zero UDP checksum, but not when UDP checksums are calculated or when UDP-Lite is used. If the ports carried in the transport header of an IPv6 packet were corrupted in transit, packets may be delivered to the wrong application process (on the intended machine) and/or responses or errors sent to the wrong application process (on the intended machine).

3.1.4. Delivery to an unexpected port

If one combines the corruption effects, such as destination address and ports, there is a number of potential outcomes when traffic arrives at an unexpected port. This section discusses these possibilities and their outcomes for a packet that does not use the UDP checksum validation:

- Delivery to a port that is not in use. The packet is discarded, but could generate an ICMPv6 message (e.g. port unreachable).

- It could be delivered to a different node that implements the same application, where the packet may be accepted, generating side-effects or accumulated state.

- It could be delivered to an application that does not implement the tunnel protocol, where the packet may be incorrectly parsed, and may be misinterpreted, generating side-effects or accumulated state.

The probability of each outcome depends on the statistical probability that the address or the port information for the source or destination becomes corrupt in the datagram such that they match those of an existing flow or server port. Unfortunately, such a match may be more likely for UDP than for connection-oriented transports, because:
1. There is no handshake prior to communication and no sequence numbers (as in TCP, DCCP, or SCTP). Together, this makes it hard to verify that an application process is given only the application data associated with a specific transport session.

2. Applications writers often bind to wild-card values in endpoint identifiers and do not always validate correctness of datagrams they receive (guidance on this topic is provided in [RFC5405]). While these rules could, in principle, be revised to declare naive applications as "Historic". This remedy is not realistic: the transport owes it to the stack to do its best to reject bogus datagrams.

If checksum coverage is suppressed, the application therefore needs to provide a method to detect and discard the unwanted data. A tunnel protocol would need to perform its own integrity checks on any control information if transported in datagrams with a zero UDP checksum. If the tunnel payload is another IP packet, the packets requiring checksums can be assumed to have their own checksums provided that the rate of corrupted packets is not significantly larger due to the tunnel encapsulation. If a tunnel transports other inner payloads that do not use IP, the assumptions of corruption detection for that particular protocol must be fulfilled, this may require an additional checksum/CRC and/or integrity protection of the payload and tunnel headers.

A protocol that uses a zero UDP checksum can not assume that it is the only protocol using a zero UDP checksum. Therefore, it needs to gracefully handle misdelivery. It must be robust to reception of malformed packets received on a listening port and expect that these packets may contain corrupted data or data associated with a completely different protocol.

3.1.5. Corruption of Fragmentation Information

The fragmentation information in IPv6 employs a 32-bit identity field, compared to only a 16-bit field in IPv4, a 13-bit fragment offset and a 1-bit flag, indicating if there are more fragments. Corruption of any of these field may result in one of two outcomes:

Reassembly failure: An error in the "More Fragments" field for the last fragment will for example result in the packet never being considered complete and will eventually be timed out and discarded. A corruption in the ID field will result in the fragment not being delivered to the intended context thus leaving the rest incomplete, unless that packet has been duplicated prior to corruption. The incomplete packet will eventually be timed out.
and discarded.

Erroneous reassembly: The re-assembled packet did not match the original packet. This can occur when the ID field of a fragment is corrupted, resulting in a fragment becoming associated with another packet and taking the place of another fragment. Corruption in the offset information can cause the fragment to be misaligned in the reassembly buffer, resulting in incorrect reassembly. Corruption can cause the packet to become shorter or longer, however completion of reassembly is much less probable, since this would require consistent corruption of the IPv6 headers payload length field and the offset field. The possibility of mis-assembly requires the reassembling stack to provide strong checks that detect overlap or missing data, note however that this is not guaranteed and has been clarified in "Handling of Overlapping IPv6 Fragments" [RFC5722].

The erroneous reassembly of packets is a general concern and such packets should be discarded instead of being passed to higher layer processes. The primary detector of packet length changes is the IP payload length field, with a secondary check by the transport checksum. The Upper-Layer Packet length field included in the pseudo header assists in verifying correct reassembly, since the Internet checksum has a low probability of detecting insertion of data or overlap errors (due to misplacement of data). The checksum is also incapable of detecting insertion or removal of all zero-data that occurs in a multiple of a 16-bit chunk.

The most significant risk of corruption results following mis-association of a fragment with a different packet. This risk can be significant, since the size of fragments is often the same (e.g. fragments resulting when the path MTU results in fragmentation of a larger packet, common when addition of a tunnel encapsulation header expands the size of a packet). Detection of this type of error requires a checksum or other integrity check of the headers and the payload. Such protection is anyway desirable for tunnel encapsulations using IPv4, since the small fragmentation ID can easily result in wrap-around [RFC4963], this is especially the case for tunnels that perform flow aggregation [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels].

Tunnel fragmentation behavior matters. There can be outer or inner fragmentation "Tunnels in the Internet Architecture" [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels]. If there is inner fragmentation by the tunnel, the outer headers will never be fragmented and thus a zero UDP checksum in the outer header will not affect the reassembly process. When a tunnel performs outer header fragmentation, the tunnel egress needs to perform reassembly of the outer fragments into an inner packet. The inner packet is either a complete packet or a
fragment. If it is a fragment, the destination endpoint of the fragment will perform reassembly of the received fragments. The complete packet or the reassembled fragments will then be processed according to the packet Next Header field. The receiver may only detect reassembly anomalies when it uses a protocol with a checksum. The larger the number of reassembly processes to which a packet has been subjected, the greater the probability of an error.

- An IP-in-IP tunnel that performs inner fragmentation has similar properties to a UDP tunnel with a zero UDP checksum that also performs inner fragmentation.

- An IP-in-IP tunnel that performs outer fragmentation has similar properties to a UDP tunnel with a zero UDP checksum that performs outer fragmentation.

- A tunnel that performs outer fragmentation can result in a higher level of corruption due to both inner and outer fragmentation, enabling more chances for reassembly errors to occur.

- Recursive tunneling can result in fragmentation at more than one header level, even for inner fragmentation unless it goes to the inner-most IP header.

- Unless there is verification at each reassembly, the probability for undetected error will increase with the number of times fragmentation is recursively applied, making IP-in-IP and UDP with zero UDP checksum both vulnerable to undetected errors.

In conclusion, fragmentation of datagrams with a zero UDP checksum does not worsen the performance compared to some other commonly used tunnel encapsulations. However, caution is needed for recursive tunneling without any additional verification at the different tunnel layers.

3.2. Where Packet Corruption Occurs

Corruption of IP packets can occur at any point along a network path, during packet generation, during transmission over the link, in the process of routing and switching, etc. Some transmission steps include a checksum or Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) that reduces the probability for corrupted packets being forwarded, but there still exists a probability that errors may propagate undetected.

Unfortunately the community lacks reliable information to identify the most common functions or equipment that result in packet corruption. However, there are indications that the place where corruption occurs can vary significantly from one path to another.
There is therefore a risk in applying evidence from one domain of usage to infer characteristics for another. Methods intended for general Internet usage must therefore assume that corruption can occur and deploy mechanisms to mitigate the effect of corruption and/or resulting misdelivery.

3.3. Validating the network path

IP transports designed for use in the general Internet should not assume specific path characteristics. Network protocols may reroute packets that change the set of routers and middleboxes along a path. Therefore transports such as TCP, SCTP and DCCP have been designed to negotiate protocol parameters, adapt to different network path characteristics, and receive feedback to verify that the current path is suited to the intended application. Applications using UDP and UDP-Lite need to provide their own mechanisms to confirm the validity of the current network path.

A zero value in the UDP checksum field is explicitly disallowed in RFC2460. Thus it may be expected that any device on the path that has a reason to look beyond the IP header, for example to validate the UDP checksum, will consider such a packet as erroneous or illegal and may discard it, unless the device is updated to support the new behavior. Any middlebox that modifies the UDP checksum, for example a NAT that changes the values of the IP and UDP header in such a way that the checksum over the pseudo header changes value, will need to be updated to support this behavior. Until then, a zero UDP checksum packet is likely to be discarded either directly in the middlebox or at the destination, when a zero UDP checksum has been modified to a non-zero by an incremental update.

A pair of end-points intending to use a new behavior will therefore not only need to ensure support at each end-point, but also that the path between them will deliver packets with the new behavior. This may require using negotiation or an explicit mandate to use the new behavior by all nodes that support the new protocol.

Enabling the use of a zero checksum places new requirements on equipment deployed within the network, such as middleboxes. A middlebox (e.g. Firewalls, Network Address Translators) may enable zero checksum usage for a particular range of ports. Note that checksum off-loading and operating system design may result in all IPv6 UDP traffic being sent with a calculated checksum. This requires middleboxes that are configured to enable a zero UDP checksum to continue to work with bidirectional UDP flows that use a zero UDP checksum in only one direction, and therefore they must not maintain separate state for a UDP flow based on its checksum usage.
3.4. Applicability of method

The update to the IPv6 specification defined in [I-D.ietf-6man-udpchecksums] only modifies IPv6 nodes that implement specific protocols designed to permit omission of a UDP checksum. This document therefore provides an applicability statement for the updated method indicating when the mechanism can (and can not) be used. Enabling this, and ensuring correct interactions with the stack, implies much more than simply disabling the checksum algorithm for specific packets at the transport interface.

When the method is widely available, it may be expected to be used by applications that are perceived to gain benefit. Any solution that uses an end-to-end transport protocol, rather than an IP-in-IP encapsulation, needs to minimise the possibility that application processes could confuse a corrupted or wrongly delivered UDP datagram with that of data addressed to the application running on their endpoint.

The protocol or application that uses the zero checksum method must ensure that the lack of checksum does not affect the protocol operation. This includes being robust to receiving a unintended packet from another protocol or context following corruption of a destination or source address and/or port value. It also includes considering the need for additional implicit protection mechanisms required when using the payload of a UDP packet received with a zero checksum.

3.5. Impact on non-supporting devices or applications

It is important to consider the potential impact of using a zero UDP checksum on end-point devices or applications that are not modified to support the new behavior or by default or preference, use the
regular behavior. These applications must not be significantly impacted by the update.

To illustrate why this necessary, consider the implications of a node that enables use of a zero UDP checksum at the interface level: This would result in all applications that listen to a UDP socket receiving datagrams where the checksum was not verified. This could have a significant impact on an application that was not designed with the additional robustness needed to handle received packets with corruption, creating state or destroying existing state in the application.

A zero UDP checksum therefore needs to be enabled only for individual ports using an explicit request by the application. In this case, applications using other ports would maintain the current IPv6 behavior, discarding incoming datagrams with a zero UDP checksum. These other applications would not be affected by this changed behavior. An application that allows the changed behavior should be aware of the risk of corruption and the increased level of misdirected traffic, and can be designed robustly to handle this risk.

4. Constraints on implementation of IPv6 nodes supporting zero checksum

This section is an applicability statement that defines requirements and recommendations on the implementation of IPv6 nodes that support use of a zero value in the checksum field of a UDP datagram.

All implementations that support this zero UDP checksum method MUST conform to the requirements defined below.

1. An IPv6 sending node MAY use a calculated RFC 2460 checksum for all datagrams that it sends. This explicitly permits an interface that supports checksum offloading to insert an updated UDP checksum value in all UDP datagrams that it forwards, however note that sending a calculated checksum requires the receiver to also perform the checksum calculation. Checksum offloading can normally be switched off for a particular interface to ensure that datagrams are sent with a zero UDP checksum.

2. IPv6 nodes SHOULD by default NOT allow the zero UDP checksum method for transmission.

3. IPv6 nodes MUST provide a way for the application/protocol to indicate the set of ports that will be enabled to send datagrams with a zero UDP checksum. This may be implemented by enabling a
transport mode using a socket API call when the socket is established, or a similar mechanism. It may also be implemented by enabling the method for a pre-assigned static port used by a specific tunnel protocol.

4. IPv6 nodes MUST provide a method to allow an application/protocol to indicate that a particular UDP datagram is required to be sent with a UDP checksum. This needs to be allowed by the operating system at any time (e.g. to send keep-alive datagrams), not just when a socket is established in the zero checksum mode.

5. The default IPv6 node receiver behaviour MUST discard all IPv6 packets carrying datagrams with a zero UDP checksum.

6. IPv6 nodes MUST provide a way for the application/protocol to indicate the set of ports that will be enabled to receive datagrams with a zero UDP checksum. This may be implemented via a socket API call, or similar mechanism. It may also be implemented by enabling the method for a pre-assigned static port used by a specific tunnel protocol.

7. IPv6 nodes supporting usage of zero UDP checksums MUST also allow reception using a calculated UDP checksum on all ports configured to allow zero UDP checksum usage. (The sending endpoint, e.g. encapsulating ingress, may choose to compute the UDP checksum, or may calculate this by default.) The receiving endpoint MUST use the reception method specified in RFC2460 when the checksum field is not zero.

8. RFC 2460 specifies that IPv6 nodes SHOULD log received datagrams with a zero UDP checksum. This remains the case for any datagram received on a port that does not explicitly enable processing of a zero UDP checksum. A port for which the zero UDP checksum has been enabled MUST NOT log the datagram solely because the checksum value is zero.

9. IPv6 nodes MAY separately identify received UDP datagrams that are discarded with a zero UDP checksum. It SHOULD NOT add these to the standard log, since the endpoint has not been verified. This may be used to support other functions (such as a security policy).

10. IPv6 nodes that receive ICMPv6 messages that refer to packets with a zero UDP checksum MUST provide appropriate checks concerning the consistency of the reported packet to verify that the reported packet actually originated from the node, before acting upon the information (e.g. validating the address and
port numbers in the ICMPv6 message body).

5. Requirements on usage of the zero UDP checksum

This section is an applicability statement that identifies requirements and recommendations for protocols and tunnel encapsulations that are transported over an IPv6 transport flow (e.g. tunnel) that does not perform a UDP checksum calculation to verify the integrity at the transport endpoints. Before deciding to use the zero UDP checksum and loose the integrity verification provided, a protocol developer should seriously consider if they can use checksummed UDP packets or UDP-Lite [RFC3828], because IPv6 with a zero UDP checksum is not equivalent in behavior to IPv4 with zero UDP checksum.

The requirements and recommendations for protocols and tunnel encapsulations using an IPv6 transport flow that does not perform a UDP checksum calculation to verify the integrity at the transport endpoints are:

1. Transported protocols that enable the use of zero UDP checksum MUST only enable this for a specific port or port-range. This needs to be enabled at the sending and receiving endpoints for a UDP flow.

2. An integrity mechanism is always RECOMMENDED at the transported protocol layer to ensure that corruption rates of the delivered payload is not increased (e.g. the inner-most packet of a UDP tunnel). A mechanism that isolates the causes of corruption (e.g. identifying misdelivery, IPv6 header corruption, tunnel header corruption) is expected to also provide additional information about the status of the tunnel (e.g. to suggest a security attack).

3. A transported protocol that encapsulates Internet Protocol (IPv4 or IPv6) packets MAY rely on the inner packet integrity checks, provided that the tunnel protocol will not significantly increase the rate of corruption of the inner IP packet. If a significantly increased corruption rate can occur, then the tunnel protocol MUST provide an additional integrity verification mechanism. Early detection is desirable to avoid wasting unnecessary computation, transmission capacity or storage for packets that will subsequently be discarded.

4. A transported protocol that supports use of a zero UDP checksum, MUST be designed so that corruption of this information does not result in accumulated state for the protocol.
5. A transported protocol with a non-tunnel payload or one that encapsulates non-IP packets MUST have a CRC or other mechanism for checking packet integrity, unless the non-IP packet is specifically designed for transmission over a lower layer that does not provide a packet integrity guarantee.

6. A transported protocol with control feedback SHOULD be robust to changes in the network path, since the set of middleboxes on a path may vary during the life of an association. The UDP endpoints need to discover paths with middleboxes that drop packets with a zero UDP checksum. Therefore, transported protocols SHOULD send keep-alive messages with a zero UDP checksum. An endpoint that discovers an appreciable loss rate for keep-alive packets MAY terminate the UDP flow (e.g. tunnel). Section 3.1.3 of RFC 5405 describes requirements for congestion control when using a UDP-based transport.

7. A protocol with control feedback that can fall-back to using UDP with a calculated RFC 2460 checksum is expected to be more robust to changes in the network path. Therefore, keep-alive messages SHOULD include both UDP datagrams with a checksum and datagrams with a zero UDP checksum. This will enable the remote endpoint to distinguish between a path failure and dropping of datagrams with a zero UDP checksum.

8. A middlebox implementation MUST allow forwarding of an IPv6 UDP datagram with both a zero and standard UDP checksum using the same UDP port.

9. A middlebox MAY configure a restricted set of specific port ranges that forward UDP datagrams with a zero UDP checksum. The middlebox MAY drop IPv6 datagrams with a zero UDP checksum that are outside a configured range.

10. When a middlebox forwards an IPv6 UDP flow containing datagrams with both a zero and standard UDP checksum, the middlebox MUST NOT maintain separate state for flows depending on the value of their UDP checksum field. (This requirement is necessary to enable a sender that always calculates a checksum to communicate via a middlebox with a remote endpoint that uses a zero UDP checksum.)

Special considerations are required when designing a UDP tunnel protocol, where the tunnel ingress or egress may be a router that may not have access to the packet payload. When the node is acting as a host (i.e., sending or receiving a packet addressed to itself), the checksum processing is similar to other hosts. However, when the node (e.g. a router) is acting as a tunnel ingress or egress that
forwards a packet to or from a UDP tunnel, there may be restricted access to the packet payload. This prevents calculating (or verifying) a UDP checksum. In this case, the tunnel protocol may use a zero UDP checksum and must:

- Ensure that tunnel ingress and tunnel egress router are both configured to use a zero UDP checksum. For example, this may include ensuring that hardware checksum offloading is disabled.
- The tunnel operator must ensure that middleboxes on the network path are updated to support use of a zero UDP checksum.
- A tunnel egress should implement appropriate security techniques to protect from overload, including source address filtering to prevent traffic injection by an attacker, and rate-limiting of any packets that incur additional processing, such as UDP datagrams used for control functions that require verification of a calculated checksum to verify the network path. Usage of common control traffic for multiple tunnels between a pair of nodes can assist in reducing the number of packets to be processed.

6. Summary

This document provides an applicability statement for the use of UDP transport checksums with IPv6.

It examines the role of the UDP transport checksum when used with IPv6 and presents a summary of the trade-offs in evaluating the safety of updating RFC 2460 to permit an IPv6 endpoint to use a zero UDP checksum field to indicate that no checksum is present.

Application designers should first examine whether their transport goals may be met using standard UDP (with a calculated checksum) or by using UDP-Lite. The use of UDP with a zero UDP checksum has merits for some applications, such as tunnel encapsulation, and is widely used in IPv4. However, there are different dangers for IPv6: There is an increased risk of corruption and misdelivery when using zero UDP checksum in IPv6 compared to using IPv4 due to the lack of an IPv6 header checksum. Thus, applications need to evaluate the risks of enabling use of a zero UDP checksum and consider a solution that at least provides the same delivery protection as for IPv4, for example by utilizing UDP-Lite, or by enabling the UDP checksum. The use of checksum off-loading may help alleviate the cost of checksum processing and permit use of a checksum using method defined in RFC 2460.

Tunnel applications using UDP for encapsulation can in many cases use
a zero UDP checksum without significant impact on the corruption rate. A well-designed tunnel application should include consistency checks to validate the header information encapsulated with a received packet. In most cases, tunnels encapsulating IP packets can rely on the integrity protection provided by the transported protocol (or tunneled inner packet). When correctly implemented, such an endpoint will not be negatively impacted by omission of the transport-layer checksum. Recursive tunneling and fragmentation is a potential issue that can raise corruption rates significantly, and requires careful consideration.

Other UDP applications at the intended destination node or another node can be impacted if they are allowed to receive datagrams that have a zero UDP checksum. It is important that already deployed applications are not impacted by a change at the transport layer. If these applications execute on nodes that implement RFC 2460, they will discard (and log) all datagrams with a zero UDP checksum. This is not an issue.

In general, UDP-based applications need to employ a mechanism that allows a large percentage of the corrupted packets to be removed before they reach an application, both to protect the data stream of the application and the control plane of higher layer protocols. These checks are currently performed by the UDP checksum for IPv6, or the reduced checksum for UDP-Lite when used with IPv6.

The transport of recursive tunneling and the use of fragmentation pose difficult issues that need to be considered in the design of tunnel protocols. There is an increased risk of an error in the inner-most packet when fragmentation when several layers of tunneling and several different reassembly processes are run without verification of correctness. This requires extra thought and careful consideration in the design of transported tunnels.

Any use of the updated method must consider the implications on firewalls, NATs and other middleboxes. It is not expected that IPv6 NATs handle IPv6 UDP datagrams in the same way that they handle IPv4 UDP datagrams. In many deployed cases this will require an update to support an IPv6 zero UDP checksum. Firewalls are intended to be configured, and therefore may need to be explicitly updated to allow new services or protocols. IPv6 middlebox deployment is not yet as prolific as it is in IPv4, and therefore new devices are expected to follow the methods specified in this document.

Each application should consider the implications of choosing an IPv6 transport that uses a zero UDP checksum, and consider whether other standard methods may be more appropriate, and may simplify application design.
7. Acknowledgements

Brian Haberman, Brian Carpenter, Margaret Wasserman, Lars Eggert, others in the TSV directorate. Barry Leiba, Ronald Bonica, Pete Resnick, and Stewart Bryant are thanked for resulting in a document with much greater applicability. Thanks to P.F. Chimento for careful review and editorial corrections.

Thanks also to: Remi Denis-Courmont, Pekka Savola, Glen Turner, and many others who contributed comments and ideas via the 6man, behave, lisp and mboned lists.

8. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any actions by IANA.

9. Security Considerations

Transport checksums provide the first stage of protection for the stack, although they can not be considered authentication mechanisms. These checks are also desirable to ensure packet counters correctly log actual activity, and can be used to detect unusual behaviours.

Depending on the hardware design, the processing requirements may differ for tunnels that have a zero UDP checksum and those that calculate a checksum. This processing overhead may need to be considered when deciding whether to enable a tunnel and to determine an acceptable rate for transmission. This can become a security risk for designs that can handle a significantly larger number of packets with zero UDP checksums compared to datagrams with a non-zero checksum, such as tunnel egress. An attacker could attempt to inject non-zero checksummed UDP packets into a tunnel forwarding zero checksum UDP packets and cause overload in the processing of the non-zero checksums, e.g. if this happens in a routers slow path.

Protection mechanisms should therefore be employed when this threat exists. Protection may include source address filtering to prevent an attacker injecting traffic, as well as throttling the amount of non-zero checksum traffic. The latter may impact the function of the tunnel protocol.

Transmission of IPv6 packets with a zero UDP checksum could reveal additional information to an on-path attacker to identify the operating system or configuration of a sending node. There is a need to probe the network path to determine whether the current path supports using IPv6 packets with a zero UDP checksum. The details of the probing mechanism may differ for different tunnel encapsulations.
and if visible in the network (e.g. if not using IPsec in encryption mode) could reveal additional information to an on-path attacker to identify the type of tunnel being used.

IP-in-IP or GRE tunnels offer good traversal of middleboxes that have not been designed for security, e.g. firewalls. However, firewalls may be expected to be configured to block general tunnels as they present a large attack surface. This applicability statement therefore permits this method to be enabled only for specific ranges of ports.

When the zero UDP checksum mode is enabled for a range of ports, nodes and middleboxes must forward received UDP datagrams that have either a calculated checksum or a zero checksum.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-6man-udpchecksums]
Eubanks, M., Chimento, P., and M. Westerlund, "IPv6 and UDP Checksums for Tunneled Packets",
draft-ietf-6man-udpchecksums-08 (work in progress), February 2013.


10.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels]

[I-D.ietf-mboned-auto-multicast]
Bumgardner, G., "Automatic Multicast Tunneling",
draft-ietf-mboned-auto-multicast-14 (work in progress),
June 2012.


Appendix A. Evaluation of proposal to update RFC 2460 to support zero checksum

This informative appendix documents the evaluation of the proposal to update IPv6 [RFC2460], to provide the option that some nodes may suppress generation and checking of the UDP transport checksum. It also compares the proposal with other alternatives, and notes that for a particular application some standard methods may be more appropriate than using IPv6 with a zero UDP checksum.

A.1. Alternatives to the Standard Checksum

There are several alternatives to the normal method for calculating the UDP Checksum [RFC1071] that do not require a tunnel endpoint to inspect the entire packet when computing a checksum. These include (in decreasing order of complexity):

- Delta computation of the checksum from an encapsulated checksum field. Since the checksum is a cumulative sum [RFC1624], an encapsulating header checksum can be derived from the new pseudo header, the inner checksum and the sum of the other network-layer fields not included in the pseudo header of the encapsulated packet, in a manner resembling incremental checksum update [RFC1141]. This would not require access to the whole packet, but does require fields to be collected across the header, and arithmetic operations on each packet. The method would only work for packets that contain a 2's complement transport checksum (i.e., it would not be appropriate for SCTP or when IP fragmentation is used).
o UDP-Lite with the checksum coverage set to only the header portion of a packet. This requires a pseudo header checksum calculation only on the encapsulating packet header. The computed checksum value may be cached (before adding the Length field) for each flow/destination and subsequently combined with the Length of each packet to minimise per-packet processing. This value is combined with the UDP payload length for the pseudo header, however this length is expected to be known when performing packet forwarding.

o The proposed UDP Tunnel Transport [UDPTT] suggested a method where UDP would be modified to derive the checksum only from the encapsulating packet protocol header. This value does not change between packets in a single flow. The value may be cached per flow/destination to minimise per-packet processing.

o There has been a proposal to simply ignore the UDP checksum value on reception at the tunnel egress, allowing a tunnel ingress to insert any value correct or false. For tunnel usage, a non standard checksum value may be used, forcing an RFC 2460 receiver to drop the packet. The main downside is that it would be impossible to identify a UDP datagram (in the network or an endpoint) that is treated in this way compared to a packet that has actually been corrupted.

o A method has been proposed that uses a new (to be defined) IPv6 Destination Options Header to provide an end-to-end validation check at the network layer. This would allow an endpoint to verify delivery to an appropriate end point, but would also require IPv6 nodes to correctly handle the additional header, and would require changes to middlebox behavior (e.g. when used with a NAT that always adjusts the checksum value).

o UDP modified to disable checksum processing [I-D.ietf-6man-udpchecksums]. This eliminates the need for a checksum calculation, but would require constraints on appropriate usage and updates to end-points and middleboxes.

o IP-in-IP tunneling. As this method completely dispenses with a transport protocol in the outer-layer it has reduced overhead and complexity, but also reduced functionality. There is no outer checksum over the packet and also no ports to perform demultiplexing between different tunnel types. This reduces the information available upon which a load balancer may act.

These options are compared and discussed further in the following sections.
A.2. Comparison

This section compares the above listed methods to support datagram tunneling. It includes proposals for updating the behaviour of UDP.

While this comparison focuses on applications that are expected to execute on routers, the distinction between a router and a host is not always clear, especially at the transport level. Systems (such as unix-based operating systems) routinely provide both functions. There is no way to identify the role of the receiving node from a received packet.

A.2.1. Middlebox Traversal

Regular UDP with a standard checksum or the delta encoded optimization for creating correct checksums have the best possibilities for successful traversal of a middlebox. No new support is required.

A method that ignores the UDP checksum on reception is expected to have a good probability of traversal, because most middleboxes perform an incremental checksum update. UDPTT would also have been able to traverse a middlebox with this behaviour. However, a middlebox on the path that attempts to verify a standard checksum will not forward packets using either of these methods, preventing traversal. A method that ignores the checksum has an additional downside in that it prevents improvement of middlebox traversal, because there is no way to identify UDP datagrams that use the modified checksum behaviour.

IP-in-IP or GRE tunnels offer good traversal of middleboxes that have not been designed for security, e.g. firewalls. However, firewalls may be expected to be configured to block general tunnels as they present a large attack surface.

A new IPv6 Destination Options header will suffer traversal issues with middleboxes, especially Firewalls and NATs, and will likely require them to be updated before the extension header is passed.

Datagrams with a zero UDP checksum will not be passed by any middlebox that validates the checksum using RFC 2460 or updates the checksum field, such as NAT or firewalls. This would require an update to correctly handle a datagram with a zero UDP checksum.

UDP-Lite will require an update of almost all type of middleboxes, because it requires support for a separate network-layer protocol number. Once enabled, the method to support incremental checksum update would be identical to that for UDP, but different for checksum...
A.2.2. Load Balancing

The usefulness of solutions for load balancers depends on the difference in entropy in the headers for different flows that can be included in a hash function. All the proposals that use the UDP protocol number have equal behavior. UDP-Lite has the potential for equally good behavior as for UDP. However, UDP-Lite is currently unlikely to be supported by deployed hashing mechanisms, which could cause a load balancer to not use the transport header in the computed hash. A load balancer that only uses the IP header will have low entropy, but could be improved by including the IPv6 the flow label, providing that the tunnel ingress ensures that different flow labels are assigned to different flows. However, a transition to the common use of good quality flow labels is likely to take time to deploy.

A.2.3. Ingress and Egress Performance Implications

IP-in-IP tunnels are often considered efficient, because they introduce very little processing and low data overhead. The other proposals introduce a UDP-like header incurring associated data overhead. Processing is minimised for the method that uses a zero UDP checksum, ignoring the UDP checksum on reception, and only slightly higher for UDPTT, the extension header and UDP-Lite. The delta-calculation scheme operates on a few more fields, but also introduces serious failure modes that can result in a need to calculate a checksum over the complete datagram. Regular UDP is clearly the most costly to process, always requiring checksum calculation over the entire datagram.

It is important to note that the zero UDP checksum method, ignoring checksum on reception, the Option Header, UDPTT and UDP-Lite will likely incur additional complexities in the application to incorporate a negotiation and validation mechanism.

A.2.4. Deployability

The major factors influencing deployability of these solutions are a need to update both end-points, a need for negotiation and the need to update middleboxes. These are summarised below:

- The solution with the best deployability is regular UDP. This requires no changes and has good middlebox traversal characteristics.

- The next easiest to deploy is the delta checksum solution. This does not modify the protocol on the wire and only needs changes in
tunnel ingress.

- IP-in-IP tunnels should not require changes to the end-points, but raise issues when traversing firewalls and other security devices, which are expected to require updates.

- Ignoring the checksum on reception will require changes at both end-points. The never ceasing risk of path failure requires additional checks to ensure this solution is robust and will require changes or additions to the tunnel control protocol to negotiate support and validate the path.

- The remaining solutions (including the zero checksum method) offer similar deployability. UDP-Lite requires support at both end-points and in middleboxes. UDPTT and the zero UDP checksum method with or without an extension header require support at both end-points and in middleboxes. UDP-Lite, UDPTT, and the zero UDP checksum method and use of extension headers may additionally require changes or additions to the tunnel control protocol to negotiate support and path validation.

A.2.5. Corruption Detection Strength

The standard UDP checksum and the delta checksum can both provide some verification at the tunnel egress. This can significantly reduce the probability that a corrupted inner packet is forwarded. UDP-Lite, UDPTT and the extension header all provide some verification against corruption, but do not verify the inner packet. They only provide a strong indication that the delivered packet was intended for the tunnel egress and was correctly delimited.

The methods using a zero UDP checksum, ignoring the UDP checksum on reception and IP-and-IP encapsulation all provide no verification that a received datagram was intended to be processed by a specific tunnel egress or that the inner encapsulated packet was correct. Section 3.1 discusses experience using specific protocols in well-managed networks.

A.2.6. Comparison Summary

The comparisons above may be summarised as "there is no silver bullet that will slay all the issues". One has to select which down side(s) can best be lived with. Focusing on the existing solutions, this can be summarized as:
Regular UDP: The method defined in RFC 2460 has good middlebox traversal and load balancing and multiplexing, requiring a checksum in the outer headers covering the whole packet.

IP in IP: A low complexity encapsulation, with limited middlebox traversal, no multiplexing support, and currently poor load balancing support that could improve over time.

UDP-Lite: A medium complexity encapsulation, with good multiplexing support, limited middlebox traversal, but possible to improve over time, currently poor load balancing support that could improve over time, in most cases requiring application level negotiation to select the protocol and validation to confirm the path forwards UDP-Lite.

The delta-checksum is an optimization in the processing of UDP, as such it exhibits some of the drawbacks of using regular UDP.

The remaining proposals may be described in similar terms:

Zero-Checksum: A low complexity encapsulation, with good multiplexing support, limited middlebox traversal that could improve over time, good load balancing support, in most cases requiring application level negotiation and validation to confirm the path forwards a zero UDP checksum.

UDPTT: A medium complexity encapsulation, with good multiplexing support, limited middlebox traversal, but possible to improve over time, good load balancing support, in most cases requiring application level negotiation to select the transport and validation to confirm the path forwards UDPTT datagrams.

IPv6 Destination Option IP in IP tunneling: A medium complexity, with no multiplexing support, limited middlebox traversal, currently poor load balancing support that could improve over time, in most cases requiring negotiation to confirm the option is supported and validation to confirm the path forwards the option.

IPv6 Destination Option combined with UDP Zero-checksumming: A medium complexity encapsulation, with good multiplexing support, limited load balancing support that could improve over time, in most cases requiring negotiation to confirm the option is supported and validation to confirm the path forwards the option.

Ignore the checksum on reception: A low complexity encapsulation, with good multiplexing support, medium middlebox traversal that never can improve, good load balancing support, in most cases requiring negotiation to confirm the option is supported by the
remote endpoint and validation to confirm the path forwards a zero
UDP checksum.

There is no clear single optimum solution. If the most important
need is to traverse middleboxes, then the best choice is to stay with
regular UDP and consider the optimizations that may be required to
perform the checksumming. If one can live with limited middlebox
traversal, low complexity is necessary and one does not require load
balancing, then IP-in-IP tunneling is the simplest. If one wants
strengthened error detection, but with currently limited middlebox
traversal and load-balancing, UDP-Lite is appropriate. Zero UDP
checksum addresses another set of constraints, low complexity and a
need for load balancing from the current Internet, providing it can
live with currently limited middlebox traversal.

Techniques for load balancing and middlebox traversal do continue to
evolve. Over a long time, developments in load balancing have good
potential to improve. This time horizon is long since it requires
both load balancer and end-point updates to get full benefit. The
challenges of middlebox traversal are also expected to change with
time, as device capabilities evolve. Middleboxes are very prolific
with a larger proportion of end-user ownership, and therefore may be
expected to take long time cycles to evolve.

One potential advantage is that the deployment of IPv6-capable
middleboxes are still in its initial phase and the quicker a new
method becomes standardized, the fewer boxes will be non-compliant.

Thus, the question of whether to permit use of datagrams with a zero
UDP checksum for IPv6 under reasonable constraints, is therefore best
viewed as a trade-off between a number of more subjective questions:

- Is there sufficient interest in using a zero UDP checksum with the
given constraints (summarised below)?

- Are there other avenues of change that will resolve the issue in a
better way and sufficiently quickly?

- Do we accept the complexity cost of having one more solution in
the future?

The analysis concludes that the IETF should carefully consider
constraints on sanctioning the use of any new transport mode. The
6man working group of the IETF has determined that the answer to the
above questions are sufficient to update IPv6 to standardise use of a
zero UDP checksum for use by tunnel encapsulations for specific
applications.
Each application should consider the implications of choosing an IPv6 transport that uses a zero UDP checksum. In many cases, standard methods may be more appropriate, and may simplify application design. The use of checksum off-loading may help alleviate the checksum processing cost and permit use of a checksum using method defined in RFC 2460.

Appendix B. Document Change History

{RFC EDITOR NOTE: This section must be deleted prior to publication}

Individual Draft 00  This is the first DRAFT of this document - It contains a compilation of various discussions and contributions from a variety of IETF WGs, including: mboned, tsv, 6man, lisp, and behave. This includes contributions from Magnus with text on RTP, and various updates.

Individual Draft 01

* This version corrects some typos and editorial NiTs and adds discussion of the need to negotiate and verify operation of a new mechanism (3.3.4).

Individual Draft 02

* Version -02 corrects some typos and editorial NiTs.

* Added reference to ECMP for tunnels.

* Clarifies the recommendations at the end of the document.

Working Group Draft 00

* Working Group Version -00 corrects some typos and removes much of rationale for UDPTT. It also adds some discussion of IPv6 extension header.

Working Group Draft 01

* Working Group Version -01 updates the rules and incorporates off-list feedback. This version is intended for wider review within the 6man working group.
Working Group Draft 02

* This version is the result of a major rewrite and re-ordering of the document.
* A new section comparing the results have been added.
* The constraints list has been significantly altered by removing some and rewording other constraints.
* This contains other significant language updates to clarify the intent of this draft.

Working Group Draft 03

* Editorial updates

Working Group Draft 04

* Resubmission only updating the AMT and RFC2765 references.

Working Group Draft 05

* Resubmission to correct editorial NiTs – thanks to Bill Atwood for noting these. Group Draft 05.

Working Group Draft 06

* Resubmission to keep draft alive (spelling updated from 05).

Working Group Draft 07

* Interim Version
* Submission after IESG Feedback Added
* Updates to enable the document to become a PS Applicability Statement

Working Group Draft 08

* First Version written as a PS Applicability Statement
* Changes to reflect decision to update RFC 2460, rather than recommend decision
* Updates to requirements for middleboxes
* Inclusion of requirements for security, API, and tunnel
* Move of the rationale for the update to an Annex (former section 4)

Working Group Draft 09
* Submission after second WGLC (note mistake corrected in -09).
* Clarified role of API for supporting full checksum.
* Clarified that full checksum is required in security considerations, and therefore noting that full checksum should not be treated as an attack - consistent with remainder of document.
* Added mention that API can set a mode in transport stack - to link to similar statement in RFC 2460 update.
* Fixed typos.

Working Group Draft 10
* Submission to correct unwanted removal of text from section 5 bullets 5-7 by GF.
* Replaced section 5 text with the text from 08, and reapplied the editorial correction.
* Note to reviewers: Please compare this revision with -08 used in the IETF LC).

Working Group Draft 11
* Added REF for 5097 (Noted by S.Turner)
* Added text in response to P. Resnick on place where checksum is calculated.
* Added text to note experience with MPLS/PWE; Appendix updated to refer to this (S. Bryant)
* Added text in response to P.Resnick’s 2nd comments.
* Request to make UDP-Lite more clearly recommended (J Touch, P.Resnick)
* Added considerations around usage of zero checksum in routers.
* Added text in response to Stewart Bryant’s comments on router requirements.

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Inter-domain SLA Exchange
draft-ietf-idr-sla-exchange-00

Abstract

Network administrators typically provision QoS policies for their application traffic (such as voice, video) based on SLAs negotiated with their providers, and translate those SLAs to vendor specific configuration language. Both learning of SLA, either thru SLA documents or via some other out-of-band method, and translating them to vendor specific configuration language is a complex, many times manual, process and prone to errors. This document proposes an in-band method of SLA signaling which can help to simplify some of the complexities.

This document defines an operational transitive attribute to signal SLA details in-band, across administrative boundaries (considered as Autonomous Systems (AS)), and thus simplify/speed-up some of the complex tasks.

Though the use-case with the proposed attribute is explicitly defined in this document, purpose of this attribute is not limited to this use-case only.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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1. Introduction

Typically there is a contractual Service Level Agreement (SLA) negotiated between Customer and Provider or between one Provider to another Provider [CPP]. This contractual agreement defines the nature of the various traffic classes (i.e. traffic match conditions) and services needed for each traffic class. The contract may exist at different levels of traffic granularity. The contract could be full line-rate or sub rate for aggregate traffic. Or it could be even finer granular traffic distinction with services defined for standard code-points or for specific set of prefix or for set of well-known application types.

Once the SLA is negotiated, it needs to be translated into enforcing configuration data and policies on the Provider’s Edge (PE) as well as on the Customer’s Edge (CE). At the Customer, a person administering the CE device may be a different person, or even a different department, from the ones negotiating SLA contracts with the Provider and thus an administrator at the CE first requires to manually learn negotiated SLA, thru SLA documents or via some other off-band method. In a subsequent step an administrator requires to translate SLA to QoS policies using router (vendor) specific provisioning language. In a multi-vendor environment, translating the SLA into technology-specific configuration and then enforcing that configuration requires to consider specificities of each vendor. There does not exist any standard protocol to translate SLA agreements into technical clauses and configurations and thus both the steps of out of band learning of negotiated SLA and provisioning them in a vendor specific language can be complex and error-prone.

For an example for voice service, the Provider may negotiate service for such traffic thru EF code-point in Diffserv networks. Administrator at the CE not only will have to know that Provider’s service for voice traffic is EF based but will also have to implement DSCP EF classification rule along with Low Latency Service rule as per vendor’s provisioning language.

Given the Provider also maintains established contracts, which very well may even be enforced at the PE, an in-band method of signaling it from the PE to the CE can help eliminate manual administrative process described above. Provider may have SLA negotiated with the Customer via some defined off-band method. Once negotiated, the Provider may translate that SLA in networking language on the PE (this process remains same as is done today). This SLA instance then can be signaled to the CE via some in-band protocol exchange. In reaction to that message, receiver CE router may automatically translate that to relevant QoS policy definition on the box. This in-band signaling method helps eliminate manual complex process required by administrator at the CE. Taking same voice service as an
example, given Provider already may provision definition of EF code-
point for such, signaling this code-point traffic class from PE to CE
along with low latency service definition, omits administrator at the
CE to worry about such translation.

For in-band signaling, we propose use of BGP transport. The details
of SLAs are independent of BGP and are specific to the granularity of
traffic classes and their subsequent treatment. Though we find BGP
as a suitable transport for inter-domain SLA exchange for the
following reasons:

- The most common use-case of SLA exchange is across Autonomous
  Systems. And BGP is the most suitable protocol for any
  inter-domain exchange
- There is no other suitable protocol available today for SLA
  exchange
- BGP updates already advertise specific set of prefixes (flow
  or flow-group). Other QoS-related attributes, apart from the
  the use of SLA advertisement, can be added to these updates
  in the future

The proposal is a definition of a new BGP attribute to advertise/
learn SLA details in-band. The BGP attribute proposed, in this
document, is intended to advertise SLA from one AS to a list of
interested AS. QoS services advertised could be for the incoming
traffic to the AS community, that is advertising SLA or could be for
the outgoing traffic from the advertiser or could be for both
directions. Reception of and reaction to advertised SLAs are
optional for the receiver.

The aim with the signaling of this attribute, across administrative
boundaries, is to help network administrators speed up and simplify
QoS provisioning with automatic learning of SLAs and thus avoiding
complexities and possible errors with manual learning.

We propose QoS as an optional transitive attribute, keeping SLA
advertisement and discovery (request) as one of the sub-types of QoS
attribute. This is to keep QoS attribute open for extensions, in
future, for other SLA specific requirements or even beyond SLA
specific needs. For example, SLA Negotiation and Assurance is out of
scope of this document which can be envisioned as another sub-type.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
3. QoS Attribute Definition

The QoS Attribute proposed, in BGP, is an optional transitive attribute (attribute type code to be assigned by IANA). SLA is defined as one of the sub-types in the QoS attribute.

```
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|   Attr flag   | QoS Attr type |                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
˜                                                               ˜
|                     QoS Attr length/Value                     |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+..........................
```

Attribute flags
highest order bit (bit 0) -
MUST be set to 1, since this is an optional attribute

2nd higher order bit (bit 1) -
MUST be set to 1, since this is a transitive attribute

The first octet in the Value field of the QoS attribute is QoS Attribute specific flags

highest order bit (bit 0) -
It defines if update message MUST be dropped (if set to 1) without updating routing data-base, when this is the last BGP receiver from the list of AS this attribute is announced to, or MUST announce (if set to 0) further to BGP peers

The purpose of this bit is discussed further in subsequent sections.

Remaining bits are currently unused and MUST be set to 0

3.1. SLA, QoS attribute sub-type, Definition

The value field of the QoS Attribute contains further TLVs, following QoS Attribute flags described in the previous section. One of the TLVs that we define is a tuple of (SLA sub-type, Length, Value)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------+---------------------+
| QoS Attr flags| subType | sub type Length | Value |
+---------------+-----------------+---------------------+

subType - 8 bits

0x00 = reserved
0x01 = SLA
0x02 - 0xf = for future use

SLA sub-type specific value field details 1) sender and receiver(s) and 2) SLA parameters. SLA Parameters include SLA event type (such as Advertise, Request) and content associated to that event type.

The format of SLA message is,

```
+----------------------------------+
| 32-bit source AS (Advertiser)    |
+----------------------------------+
| Optional advertiserid total len   | Advertiser id TLVs |
+----------------------------------+
|                                 |
+----------------------------------+
| 32-bit destination AS count      |
+----------------------------------+
| variable list of destination AS  |
| ....                             |
| ....                             |
+----------------------------------+
| Event | SLA id | SLA length |
|       |       |            |
+----------------------------------+
| Content as per SLA Event         |
+----------------------------------+
```

Source AS

32-bit source AS number. This is the AS that is advertising SLA
0 = ignore Source and Destination AS list from this Value field.
Instead refer to Source and Destination AS as defined by BGP
message. SLA sub-type specifics, from the QoS attribute,
MUST be removed by the receiver in such case.

Optional advertiser id total len
16-bit Source address identifier (optional).
0 = No optional identifier

In general any additional qualifier for an advertiser is not
required. The SLA definition is in the context of prefix
advertised in the NLRI definition. The exception is where a BGP
speaker, in the middle of an update path to the destination AS,
aggregates prefixes. We will refer this middle BGP speaker, that
aggregates routes, as an Aggregator. Aggregator is then required
to insert original NLRI details in the optional advertiser field

Optional Advertiser id TLV
4-bit type
0x0 = reserved
0x1 = ORIGIN_NLRI, variable length
0x2 to 0xf = for future use,

Destination AS count
32-bit destination AS count to take variable length AS list.
This count has no functional value when Source AS is 0
0 = broadcast

Destination AS list
32-bit destination AS number, this field is omitted if broadcast
....
.... [as many as AS count]
....

SLA Event Type
4-bits
0x0 = reserved
0x1 = ADVERTISE
0x2 = REQUEST
0x3 to 0xf, for future use

SLA Id
16-bit identifier unique within the scope of source AS

The significance of an SLA identifier is in the context of the source that is advertising SLA. SLA identifier is not globally unique but it MUST be unique in the context of the source AS (advertiser).

The SLA content is optional for an advertised SLA id. If SLA content does not exist in BGP update messages with advertised SLA attribute then receiver MUST inherit prior advertised SLA content for the same SLA id from the same Source AS.

If advertised SLA id is different from earlier advertised one, for the same prefix, previous SLA MUST be replaced with the new advertised one.

SLA is aggregate for all the traffic to prefixes that share same source AS and SLA id.

SLA Length
12-bits

The format of SLA ADVERTISE event is,

```
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| dir | Traffic Class count | Class Desc Len | |
| +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| Traffic Class Description |
| +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| Traffic Class Elements count/values |
| +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| Service Count | service type/value pair |
| +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| Repeat from Traffic Class Description for next Traffic Class |
| +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
```
Repeat from direction for SLA in the other direction

Direction
02-bit for incoming or outgoing traffic,
0x0 = reserved
0x1 = incoming, from destination AS towards source AS
0x2 = outgoing, from source AS towards destination AS
0x3 = for future use

Traffic Class count (Classifier Groups count)
16-bit, count of number of classifier groups
00 = Advertisement to invalidate previous advertised SLA if was any

Traffic Class Descr Length
08-bit, size of the length
0 = No description

Traffic Class Description
Ascii Description of the Traffic Class

Traffic Class Elements Count in a Traffic Class,
08-bit count of classifier elements in a specific Traffic Class

00 = this has relative definition. It means classify rest all traffic that is not classified via earlier described Traffic Classes.
It is RECOMMENDED to have 0 elements Traffic Class definition last in the ordered list. If Advertised SLA does not have this Traffic Class last in the advertised list, receivers MUST re-order it, for the forwarding purpose, as the last Traffic Class, in the ordered list, from the source AS. It is MUST that advertisement from a specific source does not have more than one Traffic classes with element count 0. If there are more than one such Traffic Classes then advertised SLA MUST be ignored. It is okay for SLA message though to have none Traffic Class with element count 0.
Classifier Element values in a Traffic Class (optional),

08-bit          = type of the Element
variable-length = based on type of the Element

Element Types (08-bit)
0x00 = Invalid
0x01 = Reserved
0x02 = IP_DSCP, (length = 06-bits, value = 0..63)
0x03 = MPLS_TC, (length = 03-bits, value = 0..7)
0x04 = 802_1Q_COS,(length = 03-bits, value = 0..7)
0x05 = 802_1Q_DEI,(length = 01-bit, value = 0..1)
0x06 = PHB_ID, (length = 12-bits, value = 0..4095)
0x07 to 0xff = for future use

Traffic Class Service count (for a Traffic Class under definition)
08-bit count of service attributes fields to follow with type/value pair

List of service types and relevant values are discussed below

00 = no bounded service (also means Best Effort)

Traffic Class Service (optional),

16-bit          = type of the field
variable-length = based on type of the service

- 0x00 = reserved

- 0x01 = MINRATE
  04-bit, unit type
  0x00 = reserved
  0x04 = PERCENT
  0x05 = KBPS
  0x06 to 0x0f = for future use
  32-bit, value in unit kbps

- 0x02 = MINRATE_BURST
  32-bit, value in bytes
- 0x03 = MINRATE_IN_PROFILE_MARKING
  04-bit, re-mark type
  0x00 = Invalid
  0x01 = Reserved
  0x02 = IP_DSCP
  0x03 = MPLS_TC
  0x04 = 802_1Q_COS
  0x05 = 802_1Q_DEI
  0x06 to 0x0f = for future use
  08-bit, value

- 0x04 = MINRATE_OUT_PROFILE_MARKING
  04-bit, re-mark type
  0x00 = Invalid
  0x01 = Reserved
  0x02 = IP_DSCP
  0x03 = MPLS_TC
  0x04 = 802_1Q_COS
  0x05 = 802_1Q_DEI
  0x06 to 0x0f = for future use
  08-bit, value

- 0x05 = MAXRATE
  04-bit, unit type
  0x00 = reserved
  0x04 = PERCENT
  0x05 = KBPS
  0x06 to 0x0f = for future use
  32-bit, value

- 0x06 = MAXRATE_BURST
  32-bit, value in bytes

- 0x07 = MAXRATE_IN_PROFILE_MARKING
  04-bit, re-mark type
  0x00 = Invalid
  0x01 = Reserved
  0x02 = IP_DSCP
  0x03 = MPLS_TC
  0x04 = 802_1Q_COS
  0x05 = 802_1Q_DEI
  0x06 to 0x0f = for future use
  08-bit, value
- 0x08 = MAXRATE_OUT_PROFILE_MARKING
  04-bit, re-mark type
  0x00 = Invalid
  0x01 = DROP
  0x02 = IP_DSCP
  0x03 = MPLS_TC
  0x04 = 802_1Q_COS
  0x05 = 802_1Q_DEI
  0x06 to 0x0f = for future use

  08-bit, value

  In the case when MINRATE_IN_PROFILE_MARKING, MINRATE_OUT_PROFILE_MARKING, MAXRATE_IN_PROFILE_MARKING and MAXRATE_OUT_PROFILE_MARKING all of them are advertised,
  - MINRATE_IN_PROFILE_MARKING takes highest precedence
    (that is over MAXRATE_IN_PROFILE_MARKING)

  - MAXRATE_IN_PROFILE_MARKING takes precedence over MINRATE_OUT_PROFILE_MARKING

  - and MAXRATE_OUT_PROFILE_MARKING takes precedence over MINRATE_OUT_PROFILE_MARKING

- 0x09 = DROP_THRESHOLD
  03-bit count of drop-priority fields to follow with
  (type,value,unit,value) tuple

  04-bit, drop priority type
  0x00 = Invalid
  0x01 = None
  0x02 = IP_DSCP
  0x03 = MPLS_EXP
  0x04 = 802_1Q_COS
  0x05 = 802_1Q_DEI
  0x06 to 0x0f = for future use

  08-bit, drop priority type value

  04-bit, unit type
  0x00 = reserved
  0x01 = TIME_US
  0x02 = PERCENT
  0x03 to 0x0f = for future use

  08-bit, drop threshold value as per unit type
- 0x0A = RELATIVE_PRIORITY
  04-bit, priority value
  lower the value, higher the priority

Relative priority indicates scheduling priority. For example voice traffic, that requires lowest latency compare to any other traffic, will have lowest value advertised in relative priority. For two different traffic classification groups where one application group may be considered more important than the other but from scheduling perspective do not require to be distinguish with different priority. Relative priority for those classification groups may be advertised with the same value.

- 0x0B = SUB_TRAFFIC_CLASSES
  variable-length, repeats all content described above from Traffic Class count onwards.

For SLAs where a specific Traffic Class may further have differentiated services for sub-group of Classifier Elements, this service type SHOULD be used to further divide Traffic Class in multiple sub-classes. Each sub-class then defined with their own classifier elements and service types.

4. Originating SLA Notification

QoS attribute to advertise SLA MUST be added by the originator of a BGP UPDATE message. Any BGP speaker in the forwarding path of a message MUST NOT insert QoS attribute for the same prefix.

SLA messages SHOULD NOT be sent periodically just for the purpose of keep alive. Since SLA changes are in-frequent, some sort of SLA policy change can be considered as a trigger for the advertisement.

For any SLA modification, originator MUST re-advertise entire SLA. There is no provision to advertise partial SLA. To invalidate previously advertised SLA, a message MUST be sent with new SLA advertisement with Traffic Class count as 0.
4.1. SLA Contexts

In certain cases, the advertisement may be to establish SLA for aggregate traffic on a point to point connection between a specific destination and a specific source. A point to point connection may be a physical link, connecting BGP peers, or may be a virtual link (like tunnel). A BGP update message, in such cases, with source AS number and NLRI prefix of source end-point can uniquely identify physical/virtual link and so establishes advertised SLA’s context for aggregate traffic for that point to point link.

In the simplest case where PE and CE are directly connected via a physical link and have only single link between them, CE can uniquely identify forwarding link to PE with AS number of the PE and NLRI prefix being an address of PE, to CE (that is next hop address from CE to PE). SLA advertised thru BGP update message from PE to CE, with PE’s AS number and IP address, establishes SLA context for the aggregate traffic through link CE to PE. SLA advertised thru BGP update message from PE to CE, with PE’s AS number and any other prefix establishes SLA for that specific prefix that is subset of traffic under CE to PE link.

Even though this example is in the context of IP prefix, SLA exchange does not have to be limited to IPv4 family only. SLA advertisement is generic to all forms of NLRI types that are supported by the BGP protocol specification (like IPv4, IPv6, VPN-IPv4, VPN-IPv6).

4.1.1. SLA advertisement for point to point connection

When SLA messages are intended to be advertised for the point to point connection (physical or logical), the message is destined for the next hop and advertised message is in the context of the prefix of the source end-point of the point to point connection.

The destination AS number set to, within QoS SLA attribute, typically is of the neighbor BGP speaker’s. Alternatively, originator MAY not encode source/destination AS numbers (that is source AS set to 0 and destination AS count set to 0), in the QoS attribute. The most significant bit of the QoS attribute flag MAY be set to 1, specifically it MUST be set to 1 when intention is to not install route update, at the receiver, for the advertised message.

4.1.2. SLA advertisement for destination AS multiple hops away

When SLA messages are to be advertised beyond next hop, value of source AS, in the QoS attribute, MUST be set by the originator of the update message. If such update is meant to be for specific list of AS(es) as receiver then list of destination AS MUST be populated in
the QoS attribute message to avoid flooding of the QoS attribute data in the network beyond those destinations.

When a new prefix is added in the AS, AS for which SLA has already been advertised before for other existing prefixes, then to advertise that new prefix to be part of earlier advertised SLA, a trigger of new BGP update message with QoS attribute containing SLA id is sufficient. Update message does not require to have whole SLA content.

When BGP update messages are triggered as a result of SLA policy change and so for the purpose of SLA exchange only, forwarding BGP update messages beyond intended receivers are not necessary. Highest order bit in the QoS Attribute flag MUST be set to suggest receiver to drop entire BGP update message [Note that it is an indication to drop entire update message, not only QoS attribute], after all intended receivers have processed it. If update message contains list of destination of AS then message MUST be dropped only after all intended receivers (destinations) have received it.

5. SLA Attribute handling at forwarding nodes

5.1. BGP node capable of processing QoS attribute

If a BGP node is capable of processing QoS attribute, it optionally MAY process the message. If advertised SLA has list of destination AS, it MAY trim list and so count of destination AS to exclude ones that are not required in further announcement of BGP updates.

BGP node MUST drop SLA related sub type from the QoS attribute, if none of the AS from the destination list is in the forwarding path. Rest of the QoS attributes message MAY be forwarded if there exist other sub-types of QoS attribute and forwarding rules meets other sub-types requirements. If there is no other sub-types existing in the QoS attribute message then node MUST drop QoS attribute all together. Rest other attributes and NLRI may be announced further if it meets rules defined by other attributes and BGP protocol.

If most significant bit in the QoS attribute flag is set to 1 then entire BGP update message MUST be dropped if there are no destination left in the list to advertise to. However, If SLA message is meant to be broadcast then message MUST not be dropped/trimmed.

Except extracting entire SLA sub-type of the QoS attribute, trimming the list of destination AS list and inserting NLRI at Aggregator...
node, rest all other content MUST not be modified by any intermediate receivers of the message.

5.2. BGP node not capable of processing QoS attribute

If BGP node is not capable of processing QoS attribute, it MUST forward attribute message as it is received.

5.3. Aggregator

It is RECOMMENDED to not aggregate prefixes from BGP update messages that contain QoS SLA attribute. If Aggregator MUST aggregate prefixes then it MUST copy QoS SLA attribute in new aggregated BGP update message. At the same time, it MUST also insert NLRI, from the original update message, as an optional advertiser id to go along with source AS in the QoS attribute.

To support SLA exchange multiple hops away in the path that has one of the forwarding node in the path acting as Aggregator, it is required Aggregator node to be capable of processing QoS attribute.

6. SLA attribute handling at Receiver

Reception of and reaction to advertised messages are optional for the receiver.

As described in earlier section, while reacting to SLA advertisement - receiver SHOULD invalidate previous advertised SLA and then if one exists for advertised NLRI. If new advertised SLA update is with non-zero Traffic Class count, new advertised SLA SHOULD be installed. If new advertised SLA update is with Traffic Class count 0, no action is required.

- If advertised QoS Attribute is with flag set to indicate to drop this message, receiver MUST drop message if it is the last receiver, in the update path, this message is advertised to.

If advertised SLA is from the next hop, in reverse path, the receiver can establish advertised SLA for the whole link, the link could be physical or virtual link, associated with the next hop. If NLRI advertised in update message is not of the next hop, receiver may establish advertised SLA for that specific prefix list under the relevant link. It is completely up to the receiver to decide for which prefixes to accept advertised SLA and for which ones to not.

For cases where if earlier message has not yet reached to the intended receiver, a re-signaling is required. A signaling event
REQUEST is required, for this purpose, to be triggered by intended receiver. Since BGP messages are considered reliable, discussion of REQUEST, for this purpose or any other purpose, is considered out of the scope of this document.

To handle error conditions, the approach of "attribute-discard" as mentioned in [IDR-ERR] MAY be used in an event if a QOS attribute parsing results in any attribute errors. Alternatively, an approach of "treat-as-withdraw" MAY be used as mentioned in [IDR-ERR] if an implementation also wishes to withdraw the associated prefix.

6.1. Traffic class mapping

It is common that switching/routing technologies used in 2 different AS could be different. For example, Provider may tunnel Customer’s IP traffic thru MPLS cloud. In such cases traffic class definition for QoS services is also different in both AS. For the meaningful use of advertised SLA in such cases, receiver is required to map traffic class from one type to another.

In the example given, traffic classification in Customer AS could be IP Diffserv based whereas traffic classification in Provider AS could be MPLS TC based. Thus for advertised MPLS TC based SLA from PE, CE would require to map traffic class from IP Diffserv based to MPLS TC type.

There are well-defined recommendations that exist for traffic class mapping between two technologies. Receiver MAY use those defined recommendations for traffic class mapping or MAY define its own as per its network Traffic Class service definition to map to advertised Traffic Classes. It is completely up to the receiver how to define such traffic class mapping.

7. Deployment Consideration

Typical use-case aimed with this proposal is for Provider to advertise contracted SLA to Customer Edge. SLA established between customer and Provider is provisioned by the provider on the PE device (facing Customer Edge). This provisioning, in a form supported by Provider, is advertised thru proposed BGP QoS attribute to the Customer Edge. Customer may read thru advertised SLA to provision one on the Customer Edge link facing towards PE.

Contracted SLA from PE to CE may be full line-rate or sub-rate of a link or finer granular controlled services. SLA is not required to be advertised if the SLA contract is simply a physical link. SLA advertise can be useful when contracted service is sub-rate of a link.
and/or if for finer granular traffic classes that are controlled. Like voice, video services may be capped to certain rate.

Another use-case can be to advertise SLA among different network sites within one Enterprise network. In Hub and Spoke deployments, Hub may define SLA for individual spokes and advertise this SLA thru BGP updates.

It very well could be possible that AS2 may first learn its SLA with Provider from Provider Edge it is connected to and then advertises
same or subset of the SLA to AS3 with AS2 to AS3 tunnel’s ip address as NLRI.

Deployment options are not limited to involving CEs only. For any contract between Provider to Provider, SLA may be advertised from one PE to another PE also.

8. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Fred Baker for his suggestions and to Ken Briley, Rahul Patel, Fred Yip, Lou Berger and Brian Carpenter for the review. Thanks to Bertrand Duvivier for his valuable contributions to help make subsequent revision better.

9. IANA Considerations

This document defines a new BGP attribute. IANA maintains the list of existing BGP attribute types. Proposal is to define a new attribute type code for the QoS attribute.

With the proposal, there is a list defined for Traffic Class Elements type and associated Service types. IANA will be required to maintain list of both new types.
Proposed definition of Traffic Class Element Types

0x00 = Invalid
0x01 = Reserved
0x02 = IP_DSCP, (length = 06-bits, value = 0..63)
0x03 = MPLS_TC, (length = 03-bits, value = 0..7)
0x04 = 802_1Q_COS, (length = 03-bits, value = 0..7)
0x05 = 802_1Q_DEI, (length = 01-bit, value = 0..1)
0x06 = PHB_ID, (length = 12-bits, value = 0..4095)

Proposed definition of Traffic Class Service Types

0x00 = reserved
0x01 = MINRATE
0x02 = MINRATE_BURST
0x03 = MINRATE_IN_PROFILE_MARKING
0x04 = MINRATE_OUT_PROFILE_MARKING
0x05 = MAXRATE
0x06 = MAXRATE_BURST
0x07 = MAXRATE_IN_PROFILE_MARKING
0x08 = MAXRATE_OUT_PROFILE_MARKING
0x09 = DROP_THRESHOLD
0x0A = RELATIVE_PRIORITY
0x0B = SUB_TRAFFIC_CLASSES

Proposed definition of Unit Types

0x00 = reserved
0x01 = TIME_US
0x02 = PERCENT
0x03 = KBPS

10. Security Considerations

There is a potential for mis-behaved AS to advertise wrong SLA, stealing identity of another AS. This resembles to problems already identified and resolved, in the routing world, thru reverse path forwarding check. One proposal, inline to RPF, to resolve such threats is to have each BGP speaker node, in the forwarding path, perform reverse path check on source AS.

Since we expect these messages to originate and distributed in the managed network, there should not be any risks for identity theft. Thus reverse path check is not considered in this proposal nor have we considered any alternates. Such solutions can be explored later if any such need.

11. References
11.1. Normative References


11.2. Informative References

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Abstract

This document provides recommendations of best current practice for dropping or marking packets using any active queue management (AQM) algorithm, including random early detection (RED), BLUE, pre-congestion notification (PCN) and newer schemes such as CoDel (Controlled Delay) and PIE (Proportional Integral controller Enhanced). We give three strong recommendations: (1) packet size should be taken into account when transports detect and respond to congestion indications, (2) packet size should not be taken into account when network equipment creates congestion signals (marking, dropping), and therefore (3) in the specific case of RED, the byte-mode packet drop variant that drops fewer small packets should not be used. This memo updates RFC 2309 to deprecate deliberate preferential treatment of small packets in AQM algorithms.
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1. Introduction

This document provides recommendations of best current practice for how we should correctly scale congestion control functions with respect to packet size for the long term. It also recognises that expediency may be necessary to deal with existing widely deployed protocols that don’t live up to the long term goal.

When signalling congestion, the problem of how (and whether) to take packet sizes into account has exercised the minds of researchers and practitioners for as long as active queue management (AQM) has been discussed. Indeed, one reason AQM was originally introduced was to reduce the lock-out effects that small packets can have on large packets in drop-tail queues. This memo aims to state the principles we should be using and to outline how these principles will affect future protocol design, taking into account the existing deployments we have already.

The question of whether to take into account packet size arises at three stages in the congestion notification process:

Measuring congestion: When a congested resource measures locally how congested it is, should it measure its queue length in time, bytes or packets?

Encoding congestion notification into the wire protocol: When a congested network resource signals its level of congestion, should it drop / mark each packet dependent on the size of the particular packet in question?

Decoding congestion notification from the wire protocol: When a transport interprets the notification in order to decide how much to respond to congestion, should it take into account the size of each missing or marked packet?

Consensus has emerged over the years concerning the first stage, which Section 2.1 records in the RFC Series. In summary: If possible it is best to measure congestion by time in the queue, but otherwise the choice between bytes and packets solely depends on whether the resource is congested by bytes or packets.

The controversy is mainly around the last two stages: whether to allow for the size of the specific packet notifying congestion i) when the network encodes or ii) when the transport decodes the congestion notification.

Currently, the RFC series is silent on this matter other than a paper trail of advice referenced from [RFC2309], which conditionally
recommends byte-mode (packet-size dependent) drop [pktByteEmail].
Reducing drop of small packets certainly has some tempting
advantages: i) it drops less control packets, which tend to be small
and ii) it makes TCP’s bit-rate less dependent on packet size.
However, there are ways of addressing these issues at the transport
layer, rather than reverse engineering network forwarding to fix the
problems.

This memo updates [RFC2309] to deprecate deliberate preferential
treatment of packets in AQM algorithms solely because of their size.
It recommends that (1) packet size should be taken into account when
transports detect and respond to congestion indications, (2) not when
network equipment creates them. This memo also adds to the
congestion control principles enumerated in BCP 41 [RFC2914].

In the particular case of Random early Detection (RED), this means
that the byte-mode packet drop variant should not be used to drop
fewer small packets, because that creates a perverse incentive for
transports to use tiny segments, consequently also opening up a DoS
vulnerability. Fortunately all the RED implementers who responded to
our admittedly limited survey (Section 4.2.4) have not followed the
earlier advice to use byte-mode drop, so the position this memo
argues for seems to already exist in implementations.

However, at the transport layer, TCP congestion control is a widely
deployed protocol that doesn’t scale with packet size (i.e. its
reduction in rate does not take into account the size of a lost
packet). To date this hasn’t been a significant problem because most
TCP implementations have been used with similar packet sizes. But,
as we design new congestion control mechanisms, this memo recommends
that we should build in scaling with packet size rather than assuming
we should follow TCP’s example.

This memo continues as follows. First it discusses terminology and
scoping. Section 2 gives the concrete formal recommendations,
followed by motivating arguments in Section 3. We then critically
survey the advice given previously in the RFC series and the research
literature (Section 4), referring to an assessment of whether or not
this advice has been followed in production networks (Appendix A).
To wrap up, outstanding issues are discussed that will need
resolution both to inform future protocol designs and to handle
legacy (Section 5). Then security issues are collected together in
Section 6 before conclusions are drawn in Section 8. The interested
reader can find discussion of more detailed issues on the theme of
byte vs. packet in the appendices.

This memo intentionally includes a non-negligible amount of material
on the subject. For the busy reader Section 2 summarises the
recommendations for the Internet community.

1.1. Terminology and Scoping

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

This memo applies to the design of all AQM algorithms, for example, Random Early Detection (RED) [RFC2309], BLUE [BLUE02], Pre-Congestion Notification (PCN) [RFC5670], Controlled Delay (CoDel) [I-D.nichols-tsvwg-codel] and the Proportional Integral controller Enhanced (PIE) [I-D.pan-tsvwg-pie]. Throughout, RED is used as a concrete example because it is a widely known and deployed AQM algorithm. There is no intention to imply that the advice is any less applicable to the other algorithms, nor that RED is preferred.

Congestion Notification: Congestion notification is a changing signal that aims to communicate the probability that the network resource(s) will not be able to forward the level of traffic load offered (or that there is an impending risk that they will not be able to).

The 'impending risk' qualifier is added, because AQM systems set a virtual limit smaller than the actual limit to the resource, then notify when this virtual limit is exceeded in order to avoid uncontrolled congestion of the actual capacity.

Congestion notification communicates a real number bounded by the range [ 0 , 1 ]. This ties in with the most well-understood measure of congestion notification: drop probability.

Explicit and Implicit Notification: The byte vs. packet dilemma concerns congestion notification irrespective of whether it is signalled implicitly by drop or using Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN [RFC3168] or PCN [RFC5670]). Throughout this document, unless clear from the context, the term marking will be used to mean notifying congestion explicitly, while congestion notification will be used to mean notifying congestion either implicitly by drop or explicitly by marking.

Bit-congestible vs. Packet-congestible: If the load on a resource depends on the rate at which packets arrive, it is called packet-congestible. If the load depends on the rate at which bits arrive it is called bit-congestible.

Examples of packet-congestible resources are route look-up engines and firewalls, because load depends on how many packet headers
they have to process. Examples of bit-congestible resources are transmission links, radio power and most buffer memory, because the load depends on how many bits they have to transmit or store. Some machine architectures use fixed size packet buffers, so buffer memory in these cases is packet-congestible (see Section 4.1.1).

The path through a machine will typically encounter both packet-congestible and bit-congestible resources. However, currently, a design goal of network processing equipment such as routers and firewalls is to size the packet-processing engine(s) relative to the lines in order to keep packet processing uncongested even under worst case packet rates with runs of minimum size packets. Therefore, packet-congestion is currently rare [RFC6077; S.3.3], but there is no guarantee that it will not become more common in future.

Note that information is generally processed or transmitted with a minimum granularity greater than a bit (e.g. octets). The appropriate granularity for the resource in question should be used, but for the sake of brevity we will talk in terms of bytes in this memo.

Coarser Granularity: Resources may be congestible at higher levels of granularity than bits or packets, for instance stateful firewalls are flow-congestible and call-servers are session-congestible. This memo focuses on congestion of connectionless resources, but the same principles may be applicable for congestion notification protocols controlling per-flow and per-session processing or state.

RED Terminology: In RED whether to use packets or bytes when measuring queues is called respectively "packet-mode queue measurement" or "byte-mode queue measurement". And whether the probability of dropping a particular packet is independent or dependent on its size is called respectively "packet-mode drop" or "byte-mode drop". The terms byte-mode and packet-mode should not be used without specifying whether they apply to queue measurement or to drop.

1.2. Example Comparing Packet-Mode Drop and Byte-Mode Drop

Taking RED as a well-known example algorithm, a central question addressed by this document is whether to recommend RED's packet-mode drop variant and to deprecate byte-mode drop. Table 1 compares how packet-mode and byte-mode drop affect two flows of different size packets. For each it gives the expected number of packets and of bits dropped in one second. Each example flow runs at the same bit-
rate of 48Mb/s, but one is broken up into small 60 byte packets and the other into large 1500 byte packets.

To keep up the same bit-rate, in one second there are about 25 times more small packets because they are 25 times smaller. As can be seen from the table, the packet rate is 100,000 small packets versus 4,000 large packets per second (pps).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Formula</th>
<th>Small packets</th>
<th>Large packets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Packet size</td>
<td>s/8</td>
<td>60B</td>
<td>1,500B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packet size</td>
<td>s</td>
<td>480b</td>
<td>12,000b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit-rate</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>48Mbps</td>
<td>48Mbps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packet-rate</td>
<td>u = x/s</td>
<td>100kpps</td>
<td>4kpps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Small packets</th>
<th>Large packets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Packet-mode Drop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pkt loss probability</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit loss-rate</td>
<td>p*u</td>
<td>100pps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p<em>u</em>s</td>
<td>48kbps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Small packets</th>
<th>Large packets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Byte-mode Drop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pkt loss probability</td>
<td>b = p*s/M</td>
<td>0.004%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit loss-rate</td>
<td>b*u</td>
<td>4pps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b<em>u</em>s</td>
<td>1.92kbps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Example Comparing Packet-mode and Byte-mode Drop

For packet-mode drop, we illustrate the effect of a drop probability of 0.1%, which the algorithm applies to all packets irrespective of size. Because there are 25 times more small packets in one second, it naturally drops 25 times more small packets, that is 100 small packets but only 4 large packets. But if we count how many bits it drops, there are 48,000 bits in 100 small packets and 48,000 bits in 4 large packets--the same number of bits of small packets as large.

The packet-mode drop algorithm drops any bit with the same probability whether the bit is in a small or a large packet.

For byte-mode drop, again we use an example drop probability of 0.1%, but only for maximum size packets (assuming the link maximum transmission unit (MTU) is 1,500B or 12,000b). The byte-mode algorithm reduces the drop probability of smaller packets proportional to their size, making the probability that it drops a small packet 25 times smaller at 0.004%. But there are 25 times more small packets, so dropping them with 25 times lower probability results in dropping the same number of packets: 4 drops in both cases. The 4 small dropped packets contain 25 times less bits than the 4 large dropped packets: 1,920 compared to 48,000.
The byte-mode drop algorithm drops any bit with a probability proportionate to the size of the packet it is in.

2. Recommendations

This section gives recommendations related to network equipment in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, and in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 we discuss the implications on the transport protocols.

2.1. Recommendation on Queue Measurement

Ideally, an AQM would measure the service time of the queue to measure congestion of a resource. However service time can only be measured as packets leave the queue, where it is not always expedient to implement a full AQM algorithm. To predict the service time as packets join the queue, an AQM algorithm needs to measure the length of the queue.

In this case, if the resource is bit-congestible, the AQM implementation SHOULD measure the length of the queue in bytes and, if the resource is packet-congestible, the implementation SHOULD measure the length of the queue in packets. Subject to the exceptions below, no other choice makes sense, because the number of packets waiting in the queue isn’t relevant if the resource gets congested by bytes and vice versa. For example, the length of the queue into a transmission line would be measured in bytes, while the length of the queue into a firewall would be measured in packets.

To avoid the pathological effects of drop tail, the AQM can then transform this service time or queue length into the probability of dropping or marking a packet (e.g. RED’s piecewise linear function between thresholds).

What this advice means for RED as a specific example:

1. A RED implementation SHOULD use byte mode queue measurement for measuring the congestion of bit-congestible resources and packet mode queue measurement for packet-congestible resources.

2. An implementation SHOULD NOT make it possible to configure the way a queue measures itself, because whether a queue is bit-congestible or packet-congestible is an inherent property of the queue.

Exceptions to these recommendations might be necessary, for instance where a packet-congestible resource has to be configured as a proxy bottleneck for a bit-congestible resource in an adjacent box that does not support AQM.
The recommended approach in less straightforward scenarios, such as fixed size packet buffers, resources without a queue and buffers comprising a mix of packet and bit-congestible resources, is discussed in Section 4.1. For instance, Section 4.1.1 explains that the queue into a line should be measured in bytes even if the queue consists of fixed-size packet-buffers, because the root-cause of any congestion is bytes arriving too fast for the line--packets filling buffers are merely a symptom of the underlying congestion of the line.

2.2. Recommendation on Encoding Congestion Notification

When encoding congestion notification (e.g. by drop, ECN or PCN), the probability that network equipment drops or marks a particular packet to notify congestion SHOULD NOT depend on the size of the packet in question. As the example in Section 1.2 illustrates, to drop any bit with probability 0.1% it is only necessary to drop every packet with probability 0.1% without regard to the size of each packet.

This approach ensures the network layer offers sufficient congestion information for all known and future transport protocols and also ensures no perverse incentives are created that would encourage transports to use inappropriately small packet sizes.

What this advice means for RED as a specific example:

1. The RED AQM algorithm SHOULD NOT use byte-mode drop, i.e. it ought to use packet-mode drop. Byte-mode drop is more complex, it creates the perverse incentive to fragment segments into tiny pieces and it is vulnerable to floods of small packets.

2. If a vendor has implemented byte-mode drop, and an operator has turned it on, it is RECOMMENDED to switch it to packet-mode drop, after establishing if there are any implications on the relative performance of applications using different packet sizes. The unlikely possibility of some application-specific legacy use of byte-mode drop is the only reason that all the above recommendations on encoding congestion notification are not phrased more strongly.

RED as a whole SHOULD NOT be switched off. Without RED, a drop tail queue biases against large packets and is vulnerable to floods of small packets.

Note well that RED’s byte-mode queue drop is completely orthogonal to byte-mode queue measurement and should not be confused with it. If a RED implementation has a byte-mode but does not specify what sort of byte-mode, it is most probably byte-mode queue measurement, which is
fine. However, if in doubt, the vendor should be consulted.

A survey (Appendix A) showed that there appears to be little, if any, installed base of the byte-mode drop variant of RED. This suggests that deprecating byte-mode drop will have little, if any, incremental deployment impact.

2.3. Recommendation on Responding to Congestion

When a transport detects that a packet has been lost or congestion marked, it SHOULD consider the strength of the congestion indication as proportionate to the size in octets (bytes) of the missing or marked packet.

In other words, when a packet indicates congestion (by being lost or marked) it can be considered conceptually as if there is a congestion indication on every octet of the packet, not just one indication per packet.

To be clear, the above recommendation solely describes how a transport should interpret the meaning of a congestion indication, as a long term goal. It makes no recommendation on whether a transport should act differently based on this interpretation. It merely aids interoperability between transports, if they choose to make their actions depend on the strength of congestion indications.

This definition will be useful as the IETF transport area continues its programme of;

- updating host-based congestion control protocols to take account of packet size
- making transports less sensitive to losing control packets like SYNs and pure ACKs.

What this advice means for the case of TCP:

1. If two TCP flows with different packet sizes are required to run at equal bit rates under the same path conditions, this SHOULD be done by altering TCP (Section 4.2.2), not network equipment (the latter affects other transports besides TCP).

2. If it is desired to improve TCP performance by reducing the chance that a SYN or a pure ACK will be dropped, this SHOULD be done by modifying TCP (Section 4.2.3), not network equipment.

To be clear, we are not recommending at all that TCPS under equivalent conditions should aim for equal bit-rates. We are merely
saying that anyone trying to do such a thing should modify their TCP algorithm, not the network.

These recommendations are phrased as 'SHOULD' rather than 'MUST', because there may be cases where expediency dictates that compatibility with pre-existing versions of a transport protocol make the recommendations impractical.

2.4. Recommendation on Handling Congestion Indications when Splitting or Merging Packets

Packets carrying congestion indications may be split or merged in some circumstances (e.g. at a RTP/RTCP transcoder or during IP fragment reassembly). Splitting and merging only make sense in the context of ECN, not loss.

The general rule to follow is that the number of octets in packets with congestion indications SHOULD be equivalent before and after merging or splitting. This is based on the principle used above; that an indication of congestion on a packet can be considered as an indication of congestion on each octet of the packet.

The above rule is not phrased with the word "MUST" to allow the following exception. There are cases where pre-existing protocols were not designed to conserve congestion marked octets (e.g. IP fragment reassembly [RFC3168] or loss statistics in RTCP receiver reports [RFC3550] before ECN was added [RFC6679]). When any such protocol is updated, it SHOULD comply with the above rule to conserve marked octets. However, the rule may be relaxed if it would otherwise become too complex to interoperate with pre-existing implementations of the protocol.

One can think of a splitting or merging process as if all the incoming congestion-marked octets increment a counter and all the outgoing marked octets decrement the same counter. In order to ensure that congestion indications remain timely, even the smallest positive remainder in the conceptual counter should trigger the next outgoing packet to be marked (causing the counter to go negative).

3. Motivating Arguments

This section is informative. It justifies the recommendations given in the previous section.

3.1. Avoiding Perverse Incentives to (Ab)use Smaller Packets

Increasingly, it is being recognised that a protocol design must take care not to cause unintended consequences by giving the parties in
the protocol exchange perverse incentives [Evol_cc][RFC3426]. Given there are many good reasons why larger path maximum transmission units (PMTUs) would help solve a number of scaling issues, we do not want to create any bias against large packets that is greater than their true cost.

Imagine a scenario where the same bit rate of packets will contribute the same to bit-congestion of a link irrespective of whether it is sent as fewer larger packets or more smaller packets. A protocol design that caused larger packets to be more likely to be dropped than smaller ones would be dangerous in both the following cases:

Malicious transports: A queue that gives an advantage to small packets can be used to amplify the force of a flooding attack. By sending a flood of small packets, the attacker can get the queue to discard more traffic in large packets, allowing more attack traffic to get through to cause further damage. Such a queue allows attack traffic to have a disproportionately large effect on regular traffic without the attacker having to do much work.

Non-malicious transports: Even if an application designer is not actually malicious, if over time it is noticed that small packets tend to go faster, designers will act in their own interest and use smaller packets. Queues that give advantage to small packets create an evolutionary pressure for applications or transports to send at the same bit-rate but break their data stream down into tiny segments to reduce their drop rate. Encouraging a high volume of tiny packets might in turn unnecessarily overload a completely unrelated part of the system, perhaps more limited by header-processing than bandwidth.

Imagine two unresponsive flows arrive at a bit-congestible transmission link each with the same bit rate, say 1Mbps, but one consists of 1500B and the other 60B packets, which are 25x smaller. Consider a scenario where gentle RED [gentle_RED] is used, along with the variant of RED we advise against, i.e. where the RED algorithm is configured to adjust the drop probability of packets in proportion to each packet’s size (byte mode packet drop). In this case, RED aims to drop 25x more of the larger packets than the smaller ones. Thus, for example if RED drops 25% of the larger packets, it will aim to drop 1% of the smaller packets (but in practice it may drop more as congestion increases [RFC4828; Appx B.4]). Even though both flows arrive with the same bit rate, the bit rate the RED queue aims to pass to the line will be 750kbps for the flow of larger packets but 990kbps for the smaller packets (because of rate variations it will actually be a little less than this target).

Note that, although the byte-mode drop variant of RED amplifies small
packet attacks, drop-tail queues amplify small packet attacks even more (see Security Considerations in Section 6). Wherever possible neither should be used.

3.2. Small != Control

Dropping fewer control packets considerably improves performance. It is tempting to drop small packets with lower probability in order to improve performance, because many control packets tend to be smaller (TCP SYNs & ACKs, DNS queries & responses, SIP messages, HTTP GETs, etc). However, we must not give control packets preference purely by virtue of their smallness, otherwise it is too easy for any data source to get the same preferential treatment simply by sending data in smaller packets. Again we should not create perverse incentives to favour small packets rather than to favour control packets, which is what we intend.

Just because many control packets are small does not mean all small packets are control packets.

So, rather than fix these problems in the network, we argue that the transport should be made more robust against losses of control packets (see 'Making Transports Robust against Control Packet Losses' in Section 4.2.3).

3.3. Transport-Independent Network

TCP congestion control ensures that flows competing for the same resource each maintain the same number of segments in flight, irrespective of segment size. So under similar conditions, flows with different segment sizes will get different bit-rates.

To counter this effect it seems tempting not to follow our recommendation, and instead for the network to bias congestion notification by packet size in order to equalise the bit-rates of flows with different packet sizes. However, in order to do this, the queuing algorithm has to make assumptions about the transport, which become embedded in the network. Specifically:

- The queuing algorithm has to assume how aggressively the transport will respond to congestion (see Section 4.2.4). If the network assumes the transport responds as aggressively as TCP NewReno, it will be wrong for Compound TCP and differently wrong for Cubic TCP, etc. To achieve equal bit-rates, each transport then has to guess what assumption the network made, and work out how to replace this assumed aggressiveness with its own aggressiveness.
Also, if the network biases congestion notification by packet size it has to assume a baseline packet size—all proposed algorithms use the local MTU (for example see the byte-mode loss probability formula in Table 1). Then if the non-Reno transports mentioned above are trying to reverse engineer what the network assumed, they also have to guess the MTU of the congested link.

Even though reducing the drop probability of small packets (e.g. RED’s byte-mode drop) helps ensure TCP flows with different packet sizes will achieve similar bit rates, we argue this correction should be made to any future transport protocols based on TCP, not to the network in order to fix one transport, no matter how predominant it is. Effectively, favouring small packets is reverse engineering of network equipment around one particular transport protocol (TCP), contrary to the excellent advice in [RFC3426], which asks designers to question "Why are you proposing a solution at this layer of the protocol stack, rather than at another layer?"

In contrast, if the network never takes account of packet size, the transport can be certain it will never need to guess any assumptions the network has made. And the network passes two pieces of information to the transport that are sufficient in all cases: i) congestion notification on the packet and ii) the size of the packet. Both are available for the transport to combine (by taking account of packet size when responding to congestion) or not. Appendix B checks that these two pieces of information are sufficient for all relevant scenarios.

When the network does not take account of packet size, it allows transport protocols to choose whether to take account of packet size or not. However, if the network were to bias congestion notification by packet size, transport protocols would have no choice; those that did not take account of packet size themselves would unwittingly become dependent on packet size, and those that already took account of packet size would end up taking account of it twice.

3.4. Partial Deployment of AQM

In overview, the argument in this section runs as follows:

- Because the network does not and cannot always drop packets in proportion to their size, it shouldn’t be given the task of making drop signals depend on packet size at all.

- Transports on the other hand don’t always want to make their rate response proportional to the size of dropped packets, but if they want to, they always can.
The argument is similar to the end-to-end argument that says "Don't do X in the network if end-systems can do X by themselves, and they want to be able to choose whether to do X anyway." Actually the following argument is stronger; in addition it says "Don't give the network task X that could be done by the end-systems, if X is not deployed on all network nodes, and end-systems won't be able to tell whether their network is doing X, or whether they need to do X themselves." In this case, the X in question is "making the response to congestion depend on packet size".

We will now re-run this argument taking each step in more depth. The argument applies solely to drop, not to ECN marking.

A queue drops packets for either of two reasons: a) to signal to host congestion controls that they should reduce the load and b) because there is no buffer left to store the packets. Active queue management tries to use drops as a signal for hosts to slow down (case a) so that drop due to buffer exhaustion (case b) should not be necessary.

AQM is not universally deployed in every queue in the Internet; many cheap Ethernet bridges, software firewalls, NATs on consumer devices, etc implement simple tail-drop buffers. Even if AQM were universal, it has to be able to cope with buffer exhaustion (by switching to a behaviour like tail-drop), in order to cope with unresponsive or excessive transports. For these reasons networks will sometimes be dropping packets as a last resort (case b) rather than under AQM control (case a).

When buffers are exhausted (case b), they don't naturally drop packets in proportion to their size. The network can only reduce the probability of dropping smaller packets if it has enough space to store them somewhere while it waits for a larger packet that it can drop. If the buffer is exhausted, it does not have this choice. Admittedly tail-drop does naturally drop somewhat fewer small packets, but exactly how few depends more on the mix of sizes than the size of the packet in question. Nonetheless, in general, if we wanted networks to do size-dependent drop, we would need universal deployment of (packet-size dependent) AQM code, which is currently unrealistic.

A host transport cannot know whether any particular drop was a deliberate signal from an AQM or a sign of a queue shedding packets due to buffer exhaustion. Therefore, because the network cannot universally do size-dependent drop, it should not do it all.

Whereas universality is desirable in the network, diversity is desirable between different transport layer protocols - some, like
NewReno TCP [RFC5681], may not choose to make their rate response proportionate to the size of each dropped packet, while others will (e.g. TFRC-SP [RFC4828]).

3.5. Implementation Efficiency

Biasing against large packets typically requires an extra multiply and divide in the network (see the example byte-mode drop formula in Table 1). Allowing for packet size at the transport rather than in the network ensures that neither the network nor the transport needs to do a multiply operation—multiplication by packet size is effectively achieved as a repeated add when the transport adds to its count of marked bytes as each congestion event is fed to it. Also the work to do the biasing is spread over many hosts, rather than concentrated in just the congested network element. These aren’t principled reasons in themselves, but they are a happy consequence of the other principled reasons.

4. A Survey and Critique of Past Advice

This section is informative, not normative.

The original 1993 paper on RED [RED93] proposed two options for the RED active queue management algorithm: packet mode and byte mode. Packet mode measured the queue length in packets and dropped (or marked) individual packets with a probability independent of their size. Byte mode measured the queue length in bytes and marked an individual packet with probability in proportion to its size (relative to the maximum packet size). In the paper’s outline of further work, it was stated that no recommendation had been made on whether the queue size should be measured in bytes or packets, but noted that the difference could be significant.

When RED was recommended for general deployment in 1998 [RFC2309], the two modes were mentioned implying the choice between them was a question of performance, referring to a 1997 email [pktByteEmail] for advice on tuning. A later addendum to this email introduced the insight that there are in fact two orthogonal choices:

- whether to measure queue length in bytes or packets (Section 4.1)
- whether the drop probability of an individual packet should depend on its own size (Section 4.2).

The rest of this section is structured accordingly.
4.1. Congestion Measurement Advice

The choice of which metric to use to measure queue length was left open in RFC2309. It is now well understood that queues for bit-congestible resources should be measured in bytes, and queues for packet-congestible resources should be measured in packets [pktByteEmail].

Congestion in some legacy bit-congestible buffers is only measured in packets not bytes. In such cases, the operator has to set the thresholds mindful of a typical mix of packets sizes. Any AQM algorithm on such a buffer will be oversensitive to high proportions of small packets, e.g. a DoS attack, and under-sensitive to high proportions of large packets. However, there is no need to make allowances for the possibility of such legacy in future protocol design. This is safe because any under-sensitivity during unusual traffic mixes cannot lead to congestion collapse given the buffer will eventually revert to tail drop, discarding proportionately more large packets.

4.1.1. Fixed Size Packet Buffers

The question of whether to measure queues in bytes or packets seems to be well understood. However, measuring congestion is confusing when the resource is bit congestible but the queue into the resource is packet congestible. This section outlines the approach to take.

Some, mostly older, queuing hardware allocates fixed sized buffers in which to store each packet in the queue. This hardware forwards to the line in one of two ways:

- With some hardware, any fixed sized buffers not completely filled by a packet are padded when transmitted to the wire. This case, should clearly be treated as packet-congestible, because both queuing and transmission are in fixed MTU-sized units. Therefore the queue length in packets is a good model of congestion of the link.

- More commonly, hardware with fixed size packet buffers transmits packets to line without padding. This implies a hybrid forwarding system with transmission congestion dependent on the size of packets but queue congestion dependent on the number of packets, irrespective of their size.

Nonetheless, there would be no queue at all unless the line had become congested--the root-cause of any congestion is too many bytes arriving for the line. Therefore, the AQM should measure the queue length as the sum of all the packet sizes in bytes that
are queued up waiting to be serviced by the line, irrespective of whether each packet is held in a fixed size buffer.

In the (unlikely) first case where use of padding means the queue should be measured in packets, further confusion is likely because the fixed buffers are rarely all one size. Typically pools of different sized buffers are provided (Cisco uses the term ‘buffer carving’ for the process of dividing up memory into these pools [IOSArch]). Usually, if the pool of small buffers is exhausted, arriving small packets can borrow space in the pool of large buffers, but not vice versa. However, there is no need to consider all this complexity, because the root-cause of any congestion is still line overload--buffer consumption is only the symptom. Therefore, the length of the queue should be measured as the sum of the bytes in the queue that will be transmitted to line, including any padding. In the (unusual) case of transmission with padding this means the sum of the sizes of the small buffers queued plus the sum of the sizes of the large buffers queued.

We will return to borrowing of fixed sized buffers when we discuss biasing the drop/marking probability of a specific packet because of its size in Section 4.2.1. But here we can repeat the simple rule for how to measure the length of queues of fixed buffers: no matter how complicated the buffering scheme is, ultimately a transmission line is nearly always bit-congestible so the number of bytes queued up waiting for the line measures how congested the line is, and it is rarely important to measure how congested the buffering system is.

4.1.2. Congestion Measurement without a Queue

AQM algorithms are nearly always described assuming there is a queue for a congested resource and the algorithm can use the queue length to determine the probability that it will drop or mark each packet. But not all congested resources lead to queues. For instance, power limited resources are usually bit-congestible if energy is primarily required for transmission rather than header processing, but it is rare for a link protocol to build a queue as it approaches maximum power.

Nonetheless, AQM algorithms do not require a queue in order to work. For instance spectrum congestion can be modelled by signal quality using target bit-energy-to-noise-density ratio. And, to model radio power exhaustion, transmission power levels can be measured and compared to the maximum power available. [ECNFixedWireless] proposes a practical and theoretically sound way to combine congestion notification for different bit-congestible resources at different layers along an end to end path, whether wireless or wired, and whether with or without queues.
In wireless protocols that use request to send / clear to send (RTS / CTS) control, such as some variants of IEEE802.11, it is reasonable to base an AQM on the time spent waiting for transmission opportunities (TXOPs) even though wireless spectrum is usually regarded as congested by bits (for a given coding scheme). This is because requests for TXOPs queue up as the spectrum gets congested by all the bits being transferred. So the time that TXOPs are queued directly reflects bit congestion of the spectrum.

4.2. Congestion Notification Advice

4.2.1. Network Bias when Encoding

4.2.1.1. Advice on Packet Size Bias in RED

The previously mentioned email [pktByteEmail] referred to by [RFC2309] advised that most scarce resources in the Internet were bit-congestible, which is still believed to be true (Section 1.1). But it went on to offer advice that is updated by this memo. It said that drop probability should depend on the size of the packet being considered for drop if the resource is bit-congestible, but not if it is packet-congestible. The argument continued that if packet drops were inflated by packet size (byte-mode dropping), "a flow’s fraction of the packet drops is then a good indication of that flow’s fraction of the link bandwidth in bits per second". This was consistent with a referenced policing mechanism being worked on at the time for detecting unusually high bandwidth flows, eventually published in 1999 [pBox]. However, the problem could and should have been solved by making the policing mechanism count the volume of bytes randomly dropped, not the number of packets.

A few months before RFC2309 was published, an addendum was added to the above archived email referenced from the RFC, in which the final paragraph seemed to partially retract what had previously been said. It clarified that the question of whether the probability of dropping/marketing a packet should depend on its size was not related to whether the resource itself was bit congestible, but a completely orthogonal question. However the only example given had the queue measured in packets but packet drop depended on the size of the packet in question. No example was given the other way round.

In 2000, Cnoddler et al [REDbyte] pointed out that there was an error in the part of the original 1993 RED algorithm that aimed to distribute drops uniformly, because it didn’t correctly take into account the adjustment for packet size. They recommended an algorithm called RED_4 to fix this. But they also recommended a further change, RED_5, to adjust drop rate dependent on the square of relative packet size. This was indeed consistent with one implied
motivation behind RED’s byte mode drop--that we should reverse engineer the network to improve the performance of dominant end-to-end congestion control mechanisms. This memo makes a different recommendations in Section 2.

By 2003, a further change had been made to the adjustment for packet size, this time in the RED algorithm of the ns2 simulator. Instead of taking each packet’s size relative to a ‘maximum packet size’ it was taken relative to a ‘mean packet size’, intended to be a static value representative of the ‘typical’ packet size on the link. We have not been able to find a justification in the literature for this change, however Eddy and Allman conducted experiments [REDbias] that assessed how sensitive RED was to this parameter, amongst other things. However, this changed algorithm can often lead to drop probabilities of greater than 1 (which gives a hint that there is probably a mistake in the theory somewhere).

On 10-Nov-2004, this variant of byte-mode packet drop was made the default in the ns2 simulator. It seems unlikely that byte-mode drop has ever been implemented in production networks (Appendix A), therefore any conclusions based on ns2 simulations that use RED without disabling byte-mode drop are likely to behave very differently from RED in production networks.

4.2.1.2. Packet Size Bias Regardless of AQM

The byte-mode drop variant of RED (or a similar variant of other AQM algorithms) is not the only possible bias towards small packets in queueing systems. We have already mentioned that tail-drop queues naturally tend to lock-out large packets once they are full.

But also queues with fixed sized buffers reduce the probability that small packets will be dropped if (and only if) they allow small packets to borrow buffers from the pools for larger packets (see Section 4.1.1). Borrowing effectively makes the maximum queue size for small packets greater than that for large packets, because more buffers can be used by small packets while less will fit large packets. Incidentally, the bias towards small packets from buffer borrowing is nothing like as large as that of RED’s byte-mode drop.

Nonetheless, fixed-buffer memory with tail drop is still prone to lock-out large packets, purely because of the tail-drop aspect. So, fixed size packet-buffers should be augmented with a good AQM algorithm and packet-mode drop. If an AQM is too complicated to implement with multiple fixed buffer pools, the minimum necessary to prevent large packet lock-out is to ensure smaller packets never use the last available buffer in any of the pools for larger packets.
4.2.2. Transport Bias when Decoding

The above proposals to alter the network equipment to bias towards smaller packets have largely carried on outside the IETF process. Whereas, within the IETF, there are many different proposals to alter transport protocols to achieve the same goals, i.e. either to make the flow bit-rate take account of packet size, or to protect control packets from loss. This memo argues that altering transport protocols is the more principled approach.

A recently approved experimental RFC adapts its transport layer protocol to take account of packet sizes relative to typical TCP packet sizes. This proposes a new small-packet variant of TCP-friendly rate control [RFC5348] called TFRC-SP [RFC4828]. Essentially, it proposes a rate equation that inflates the flow rate by the ratio of a typical TCP segment size (1500B including TCP header) over the actual segment size [PktSizeEquCC]. (There are also other important differences of detail relative to TFRC, such as using virtual packets [CCvarPktSize] to avoid responding to multiple losses per round trip and using a minimum inter-packet interval.)

Section 4.5.1 of this TFRC-SP spec discusses the implications of operating in an environment where queues have been configured to drop smaller packets with proportionately lower probability than larger ones. But it only discusses TCP operating in such an environment, only mentioning TFRC-SP briefly when discussing how to define fairness with TCP. And it only discusses the byte-mode dropping version of RED as it was before Cnodder et al pointed out it didn’t sufficiently bias towards small packets to make TCP independent of packet size.

So the TFRC-SP spec doesn’t address the issue of which of the network or the transport _should_ handle fairness between different packet sizes. In its Appendix B.4 it discusses the possibility of both TFRC-SP and some network buffers duplicating each other’s attempts to deliberately bias towards small packets. But the discussion is not conclusive, instead reporting simulations of many of the possibilities in order to assess performance but not recommending any particular course of action.

The paper originally proposing TFRC with virtual packets (VP-TFRC) [CCvarPktSize] proposed that there should perhaps be two variants to cater for the different variants of RED. However, as the TFRC-SP authors point out, there is no way for a transport to know whether some queues on its path have deployed RED with byte-mode packet drop (except if an exhaustive survey found that no-one has deployed it!—see Appendix A). Incidentally, VP-TFRC also proposed that byte-mode RED dropping should really square the packet-size compensation-factor
(like that of Cnodder’s RED_5, but apparently unaware of it).

Pre-congestion notification [RFC5670] is an IETF technology to use a virtual queue for AQM marking for packets within one Diffserv class in order to give early warning prior to any real queuing. The PCN marking algorithms have been designed not to take account of packet size when forwarding through queues. Instead the general principle has been to take account of the sizes of marked packets when monitoring the fraction of marking at the edge of the network, as recommended here.

4.2.3. Making Transports Robust against Control Packet Losses

Recently, two RFCs have defined changes to TCP that make it more robust against losing small control packets [RFC5562] [RFC5690]. In both cases they note that the case for these two TCP changes would be weaker if RED were biased against dropping small packets. We argue here that these two proposals are a safer and more principled way to achieve TCP performance improvements than reverse engineering RED to benefit TCP.

Although there are no known proposals, it would also be possible and perfectly valid to make control packets robust against drop by requesting a scheduling class with lower drop probability, by re-marking to a Diffserv code point [RFC2474] within the same behaviour aggregate.

Although not brought to the IETF, a simple proposal from Wischik [DupTCP] suggests that the first three packets of every TCP flow should be routinely duplicated after a short delay. It shows that this would greatly improve the chances of short flows completing quickly, but it would hardly increase traffic levels on the Internet, because Internet bytes have always been concentrated in the large flows. It further shows that the performance of many typical applications depends on completion of long serial chains of short messages. It argues that, given most of the value people get from the Internet is concentrated within short flows, this simple expedient would greatly increase the value of the best efforts Internet at minimal cost. A similar but more extensive approach has been evaluated on Google servers [GentleAggro].

The proposals discussed in this sub-section are experimental approaches that are not yet in wide operational use, but they are existence proofs that transports can make themselves robust against loss of control packets. The examples are all TCP-based, but applications over non-TCP transports could mitigate loss of control packets by making similar use of Diffserv, data duplication, FEC etc.
4.2.4. Congestion Notification: Summary of Conflicting Advice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>transport cc</th>
<th>RED_1 (packet mode drop)</th>
<th>RED_4 (linear byte mode drop)</th>
<th>RED_5 (square byte mode drop)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TCP or TFRC</td>
<td>s/sqrt(p)</td>
<td>sqrt(s/p)</td>
<td>1/sqrt(p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFRC-SP</td>
<td>1/sqrt(p)</td>
<td>1/sqrt(sp)</td>
<td>1/(s.sqrt(p))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Dependence of flow bit-rate per RTT on packet size, s, and drop probability, p, when network and/or transport bias towards small packets to varying degrees.

Table 2 aims to summarise the potential effects of all the advice from different sources. Each column shows a different possible AQM behaviour in different queues in the network, using the terminology of Cnodder et al outlined earlier (RED_1 is basic RED with packet-mode drop). Each row shows a different transport behaviour: TCP [RFC5681] and TFRC [RFC5348] on the top row with TFRC-SP [RFC4828] below. Each cell shows how the bits per round trip of a flow depends on packet size, s, and drop probability, p. In order to declutter the formulae to focus on packet-size dependence they are all given per round trip, which removes any RTT term.

Let us assume that the goal is for the bit-rate of a flow to be independent of packet size. Suppressing all inessential details, the table shows that this should either be achievable by not altering the TCP transport in a RED_5 network, or using the small packet TFRC-SP transport (or similar) in a network without any byte-mode dropping RED (top right and bottom left). Top left is the ‘do nothing’ scenario, while bottom right is the ‘do-both’ scenario in which bit-rate would become far too biased towards small packets. Of course, if any form of byte-mode dropping RED has been deployed on a subset of queues that congest, each path through the network will present a different hybrid scenario to its transport.

Whatever, we can see that the linear byte-mode drop column in the middle would considerably complicate the Internet. It’s a half-way house that doesn’t bias enough towards small packets even if one believes the network should be doing the biasing. Section 2 recommends that _all_ bias in network equipment towards small packets should be turned off—if indeed any equipment vendors have implemented it—leaving packet-size bias solely as the preserve of the transport layer (solely the leftmost, packet-mode drop column).

In practice it seems that no deliberate bias towards small packets
has been implemented for production networks. Of the 19% of vendors who responded to a survey of 84 equipment vendors, none had implemented byte-mode drop in RED (see Appendix A for details).

5. Outstanding Issues and Next Steps

5.1. Bit-congestible Network

For a connectionless network with nearly all resources being bit-congestible the recommended position is clear—that the network should not make allowance for packet sizes and the transport should. This leaves two outstanding issues:

- How to handle any legacy of AQM with byte-mode drop already deployed;
- The need to start a programme to update transport congestion control protocol standards to take account of packet size.

A survey of equipment vendors (Section 4.2.4) found no evidence that byte-mode packet drop had been implemented, so deployment will be sparse at best. A migration strategy is not really needed to remove an algorithm that may not even be deployed.

A programme of experimental updates to take account of packet size in transport congestion control protocols has already started with TFRC-SP [RFC4828].

5.2. Bit- & Packet-congestible Network

The position is much less clear-cut if the Internet becomes populated by a more even mix of both packet-congestible and bit-congestible resources (see Appendix B.2). This problem is not pressing, because most Internet resources are designed to be bit-congestible before packet processing starts to congest (see Section 1.1).

The IRTF Internet congestion control research group (ICCRG) has set itself the task of reaching consensus on generic forwarding mechanisms that are necessary and sufficient to support the Internet's future congestion control requirements (the first challenge in [RFC6077]). The research question of whether packet congestion might become common and what to do if it does may in the future be explored in the IRTF (the "Challenge 3: Packet Size" in [RFC6077]).

Note that sometimes it seems that resources might be congested by neither bits nor packets, e.g. where the queue for access to a wireless medium is in units of transmission opportunities. However,
the root cause of congestion of the underlying spectrum is overload of bits (see Section 4.1.2).

6. Security Considerations

This memo recommends that queues do not bias drop probability due to packets size. For instance dropping small packets less often than large creates a perverse incentive for transports to break down their flows into tiny segments. One of the benefits of implementing AQM was meant to be to remove this perverse incentive that drop-tail queues gave to small packets.

In practice, transports cannot all be trusted to respond to congestion. So another reason for recommending that queues do not bias drop probability towards small packets is to avoid the vulnerability to small packet DDoS attacks that would otherwise result. One of the benefits of implementing AQM was meant to be to remove drop-tail’s DoS vulnerability to small packets, so we shouldn’t add it back again.

If most queues implemented AQM with byte-mode drop, the resulting network would amplify the potency of a small packet DDoS attack. At the first queue the stream of packets would push aside a greater proportion of large packets, so more of the small packets would survive to attack the next queue. Thus a flood of small packets would continue on towards the destination, pushing regular traffic with large packets out of the way in one queue after the next, but suffering much less drop itself.

Appendix C explains why the ability of networks to police the response of _any_ transport to congestion depends on bit-congestible network resources only doing packet-mode not byte-mode drop. In summary, it says that making drop probability depend on the size of the packets that bits happen to be divided into simply encourages the bits to be divided into smaller packets. Byte-mode drop would therefore irreversibly complicate any attempt to fix the Internet’s incentive structures.

7. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

8. Conclusions

This memo identifies the three distinct stages of the congestion notification process where implementations need to decide whether to take packet size into account. The recommendations provided in Section 2 of this memo are different in each case:
When network equipment measures the length of a queue, if it is not feasible to use time it is recommended to count in bytes if the network resource is congested by bytes, or to count in packets if is congested by packets.

When network equipment decides whether to drop (or mark) a packet, it is recommended that the size of the particular packet should not be taken into account.

However, when a transport algorithm responds to a dropped or marked packet, the size of the rate reduction should be proportionate to the size of the packet.

In summary, the answers are 'it depends', 'no' and 'yes' respectively.

For the specific case of RED, this means that byte-mode queue measurement will often be appropriate but the use of byte-mode drop is very strongly discouraged.

At the transport layer the IETF should continue updating congestion control protocols to take account of the size of each packet that indicates congestion. Also the IETF should continue to make protocols less sensitive to losing control packets like SYNs, pure ACKs and DNS exchanges. Although many control packets happen to be small, the alternative of network equipment favouring all small packets would be dangerous. That would create perverse incentives to split data transfers into smaller packets.

The memo develops these recommendations from principled arguments concerning scaling, layering, incentives, inherent efficiency, security and policeability. But it also addresses practical issues such as specific buffer architectures and incremental deployment. Indeed a limited survey of RED implementations is discussed, which shows there appears to be little, if any, installed base of RED’s byte-mode drop. Therefore it can be deprecated with little, if any, incremental deployment complications.

The recommendations have been developed on the well-founded basis that most Internet resources are bit-congestible not packet-congestible. We need to know the likelihood that this assumption will prevail longer term and, if it might not, what protocol changes will be needed to cater for a mix of the two. The IRTF Internet Congestion Control Research Group (ICCRG) is currently working on these problems [RFC6077].
9. Acknowledgements

Thank you to Sally Floyd, who gave extensive and useful review comments. Also thanks for the reviews from Philip Eardley, David Black, Fred Baker, David Taht, Toby Moncaster, Arnaud Jacquet and Mirja Kuehlewind as well as helpful explanations of different hardware approaches from Larry Dunn and Fred Baker. We are grateful to Bruce Davie and his colleagues for providing a timely and efficient survey of RED implementation in Cisco’s product range. Also grateful thanks to Toby Moncaster, Will Dormann, John Regnault, Simon Carter and Stefaan De Cnodder who further helped survey the current status of RED implementation and deployment and, finally, thanks to the anonymous individuals who responded.

Bob Briscoe and Jukka Manner were partly funded by Trilogy, a research project (ICT-216372) supported by the European Community under its Seventh Framework Programme. The views expressed here are those of the authors only.

10. Comments Solicited

Comments and questions are encouraged and very welcome. They can be addressed to the IETF Transport Area working group mailing list <tsvwg@ietf.org>, and/or to the authors.

11. References

11.1. Normative References


11.2. Informative References


[CCvarPktSize] Widmer, J., Boutremans, C., and J-Y. Le


[I-D.nichols-tsvwg-codel] Nichols, K. and V. Jacobson, "Controlled Delay Active Queue Management",
draft-nichols-tsvwg-codel-01 (work in progress), February 2013.

[I-D.pan-tsvwg-pie] Pan, R., Natarajan, P., Piglione, C., and M. Prabhu, "PIE: A Lightweight Control Scheme To Address the Bufferbloat Problem", draft-pan-tsvwg-pie-00 (work in progress), December 2012.


RFC 2309, April 1998.


Appendix A. Survey of RED Implementation Status

This Appendix is informative, not normative.

In May 2007 a survey was conducted of 84 vendors to assess how widely drop probability based on packet size has been implemented in RED. Table 3. About 19% of those surveyed replied, giving a sample size...
of 16. Although in most cases we do not have permission to identify the respondents, we can say that those that have responded include most of the larger equipment vendors, covering a large fraction of the market. The two who gave permission to be identified were Cisco and Alcatel-Lucent. The others range across the large network equipment vendors at L3 & L2, firewall vendors, wireless equipment vendors, as well as large software businesses with a small selection of networking products. All those who responded confirmed that they have not implemented the variant of RED with drop dependent on packet size (2 were fairly sure they had not but needed to check more thoroughly). At the time the survey was conducted, Linux did not implement RED with packet-size bias of drop, although we have not investigated a wider range of open source code.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>No. of vendors</th>
<th>%age of vendors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not implemented</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not implemented (probably)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implemented</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total companies/orgs surveyed</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Vendor Survey on byte-mode drop variant of RED (lower drop probability for small packets)

Where reasons have been given, the extra complexity of packet bias code has been most prevalent, though one vendor had a more principled reason for avoiding it--similar to the argument of this document.

Our survey was of vendor implementations, so we cannot be certain about operator deployment. But we believe many queues in the Internet are still tail-drop. The company of one of the co-authors (BT) has widely deployed RED, but many tail-drop queues are bound to still exist, particularly in access network equipment and on middleboxes like firewalls, where RED is not always available.

Routers using a memory architecture based on fixed size buffers with borrowing may also still be prevalent in the Internet. As explained in Section 4.2.1, these also provide a marginal (but legitimate) bias towards small packets. So even though RED byte-mode drop is not prevalent, it is likely there is still some bias towards small packets in the Internet due to tail drop and fixed buffer borrowing.
Appendix B. Sufficiency of Packet-Mode Drop

This Appendix is informative, not normative.

Here we check that packet-mode drop (or marking) in the network gives sufficiently generic information for the transport layer to use. We check against a 2x2 matrix of four scenarios that may occur now or in the future (Table 4). The horizontal and vertical dimensions have been chosen because each tests extremes of sensitivity to packet size in the transport and in the network respectively.

Note that this section does not consider byte-mode drop at all. Having deprecated byte-mode drop, the goal here is to check that packet-mode drop will be sufficient in all cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>a) Independent of packet size of congestion notifications</th>
<th>b) Dependent on packet size of congestion notifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Predominantly bit-congestible network</td>
<td>Scenario a1)</td>
<td>Scenario b1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Mix of bit-congestible and pkt-congestible network</td>
<td>Scenario a2)</td>
<td>Scenario b2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Four Possible Congestion Scenarios

Appendix B.1 focuses on the horizontal dimension of Table 4 checking that packet-mode drop (or marking) gives sufficient information, whether or not the transport uses it—scenarios b) and a) respectively.

Appendix B.2 focuses on the vertical dimension of Table 4, checking that packet-mode drop gives sufficient information to the transport whether resources in the network are bit-congestible or packet-congestible (these terms are defined in Section 1.1).

Notation: To be concrete, we will compare two flows with different packet sizes, s_1 and s_2. As an example, we will take s_1 = 60B = 480b and s_2 = 1500B = 12,000b.

A flow’s bit rate, x [bps], is related to its packet rate, u [pps], by

\[ x(t) = s.u(t). \]
In the bit-congestible case, path congestion will be denoted by p_b, and in the packet-congestible case by p_p. When either case is implied, the letter p alone will denote path congestion.

B.1. Packet-Size (In)Dependence in Transports

In all cases we consider a packet-mode drop queue that indicates congestion by dropping (or marking) packets with probability p irrespective of packet size. We use an example value of loss (marking) probability, p=0.1%.

A transport like RFC5681 TCP treats a congestion notification on any packet whatever its size as one event. However, a network with just the packet-mode drop algorithm does give more information if the transport chooses to use it. We will use Table 5 to illustrate this.

We will set aside the last column until later. The columns labelled "Flow 1" and "Flow 2" compare two flows consisting of 60B and 1500B packets respectively. The body of the table considers two separate cases, one where the flows have equal bit-rate and the other with equal packet-rates. In both cases, the two flows fill a 96Mbps link. Therefore, in the equal bit-rate case they each have half the bit-rate (48Mbps). Whereas, with equal packet-rates, flow 1 uses 25 times smaller packets so it gets 25 times less bit-rate--it only gets 1/(1+25) of the link capacity (96Mbps/26 = 4Mbps after rounding). In contrast flow 2 gets 25 times more bit-rate (92Mbps) in the equal packet rate case because its packets are 25 times larger. The packet rate shown for each flow could easily be derived once the bit-rate was known by dividing bit-rate by packet size, as shown in the column labelled "Formula".
Parameter               Formula      Flow 1  Flow 2 Combined
----------------------- ----------- ------- ------- --------
Packet size             s/8             60B  1,500B    (Mix)
Packet size             s              480b 12,000b    (Mix)
Pkt loss probability    p              0.1%    0.1%     0.1%

EQUAL BIT-RATE CASE

Bit-rate                x            48Mbps  48Mbps   96Mbps
Packet-rate             u = x/s     100kpps   4kpps  104kpps
Absolute pkt-loss-rate  p*u          100pps    4pps   104pps
Absolute bit-loss-rate  p*u*s        48kbps  48kbps   96kbps
Ratio of lost/sent pkts p*u/u          0.1%    0.1%     0.1%
Ratio of lost/sent bits p*u*s/(u*s)    0.1%    0.1%     0.1%

EQUAL PACKET-RATE CASE

Bit-rate                x             4Mbps  92Mbps   96Mbps
Packet-rate             u = x/s       8kpps   8kpps   15kpps
Absolute pkt-loss-rate  p*u            8pps    8pps    15pps
Absolute bit-loss-rate  p*u*s         4kbps  92kbps   96kbps
Ratio of lost/sent pkts p*u/u          0.1%    0.1%     0.1%
Ratio of lost/sent bits p*u*s/(u*s)    0.1%    0.1%     0.1%

Table 5: Absolute Loss Rates and Loss Ratios for Flows of Small and Large Packets and Both Combined

So far we have merely set up the scenarios. We now consider congestion notification in the scenario. Two TCP flows with the same round trip time aim to equalise their packet-loss-rates over time. That is the number of packets lost in a second, which is the packets per second \((u)\) multiplied by the probability that each one is dropped \((p)\). Thus TCP converges on the "Equal packet-rate" case, where both flows aim for the same "Absolute packet-loss-rate" (both 8pps in the table).

Packet-mode drop actually gives flows sufficient information to measure their loss-rate in bits per second, if they choose, not just packets per second. Each flow can count the size of a lost or marked packet and scale its rate-response in proportion (as TFRC-SP does). The result is shown in the row entitled "Absolute bit-loss-rate", where the bits lost in a second is the packets per second \((u)\) multiplied by the probability of losing a packet \((p)\) multiplied by the packet size \((s)\). Such an algorithm would try to remove any imbalance in bit-loss-rate such as the wide disparity in the "Equal packet-rate" case (4kbps vs. 92kbps). Instead, a packet-size-dependent algorithm would aim for equal bit-loss-rates, which would drive both flows towards the "Equal bit-rate" case, by driving them to equal bit-loss-rates (both 48kbps in this example).
The explanation so far has assumed that each flow consists of packets of only one constant size. Nonetheless, it extends naturally to flows with mixed packet sizes. In the right-most column of Table 5 a flow of mixed size packets is created simply by considering flow 1 and flow 2 as a single aggregated flow. There is no need for a flow to maintain an average packet size. It is only necessary for the transport to scale its response to each congestion indication by the size of each individual lost (or marked) packet. Taking for example the "Equal packet-rate" case, in one second about 8 small packets and 8 large packets are lost (making closer to 15 than 16 losses per second due to rounding). If the transport multiplies each loss by its size, in one second it responds to 8*480b and 8*12,000b lost bits, adding up to 96,000 lost bits in a second. This double checks correctly, being the same as 0.1% of the total bit-rate of 96Mbps.

For completeness, the formula for absolute bit-loss-rate is p(u1*s1+ u2*s2).

Incidentally, a transport will always measure the loss probability the same irrespective of whether it measures in packets or in bytes. In other words, the ratio of lost to sent packets will be the same as the ratio of lost to sent bytes. (This is why TCP’s bit rate is still proportional to packet size even when byte-counting is used, as recommended for TCP in [RFC5681], mainly for orthogonal security reasons.) This is intuitively obvious by comparing two example flows; one with 60B packets, the other with 1500B packets. If both flows pass through a queue with drop probability 0.1%, each flow will lose 1 in 1,000 packets. In the stream of 60B packets the ratio of bytes lost to sent will be 60B in every 60,000B; and in the stream of 1500B packets, the loss ratio will be 1,500B out of 1,500,000B. When the transport responds to the ratio of lost to sent packets, it will measure the same ratio whether it measures in packets or bytes: 0.1% in both cases. The fact that this ratio is the same whether measured in packets or bytes can be seen in Table 5, where the ratio of lost to sent packets and the ratio of lost to sent bytes is always 0.1% in all cases (recall that the scenario was set up with p=0.1%).

This discussion of how the ratio can be measured in packets or bytes is only raised here to highlight that it is irrelevant to this memo! Whether a transport depends on packet size or not depends on how this ratio is used within the congestion control algorithm.

So far we have shown that packet-mode drop passes sufficient information to the transport layer so that the transport can take account of bit-congestion, by using the sizes of the packets that indicate congestion. We have also shown that the transport can choose not to take packet size into account if it wishes. We will now consider whether the transport can know which to do.
B.2. Bit-Congestible and Packet-Congestible Indications

As a thought-experiment, imagine an idealised congestion notification protocol that supports both bit-congestible and packet-congestible resources. It would require at least two ECN flags, one for each of bit-congestible and packet-congestible resources.

1. A packet-congestible resource trying to code congestion level $p_p$ into a packet stream should mark the idealised ‘packet congestion’ field in each packet with probability $p_p$ irrespective of the packet’s size. The transport should then take a packet with the packet congestion field marked to mean just one mark, irrespective of the packet size.

2. A bit-congestible resource trying to code time-varying byte-congestion level $p_b$ into a packet stream should mark the ‘byte congestion’ field in each packet with probability $p_b$, again irrespective of the packet’s size. Unlike before, the transport should take a packet with the byte congestion field marked to count as a mark on each byte in the packet.

This hides a fundamental problem—much more fundamental than whether we can magically create header space for yet another ECN flag, or whether it would work while being deployed incrementally. Distinguishing drop from delivery naturally provides just one implicit bit of congestion indication information—the packet is either dropped or not. It is hard to drop a packet in two ways that are distinguishable remotely. This is a similar problem to that of distinguishing wireless transmission losses from congestive losses.

This problem would not be solved even if ECN were universally deployed. A congestion notification protocol must survive a transition from low levels of congestion to high. Marking two states is feasible with explicit marking, but much harder if packets are dropped. Also, it will not always be cost-effective to implement AQM at every low level resource, so drop will often have to suffice.

We are not saying two ECN fields will be needed (and we are not saying that somehow a resource should be able to drop a packet in one of two different ways so that the transport can distinguish which sort of drop it was!). These two congestion notification channels are a conceptual device to illustrate a dilemma we could face in the future. Section 3 gives four good reasons why it would be a bad idea to allow for packet size by biasing drop probability in favour of small packets within the network. The impracticality of our thought experiment shows that it will be hard to give transports a practical way to know whether to take account of the size of congestion indication packets or not.
Fortunately, this dilemma is not pressing because by design most equipment becomes bit-congested before its packet-processing becomes congested (as already outlined in Section 1.1). Therefore transports can be designed on the relatively sound assumption that a congestion indication will usually imply bit-congestion.

Nonetheless, although the above idealised protocol isn't intended for implementation, we do want to emphasise that research is needed to predict whether there are good reasons to believe that packet congestion might become more common, and if so, to find a way to somehow distinguish between bit and packet congestion [RFC3714].

Recently, the dual resource queue (DRQ) proposal [DRQ] has been made on the premise that, as network processors become more cost effective, per packet operations will become more complex (irrespective of whether more function in the network is desirable). Consequently the premise is that CPU congestion will become more common. DRQ is a proposed modification to the RED algorithm that folds both bit congestion and packet congestion into one signal (either loss or ECN).

Finally, we note one further complication. Strictly, packet-congestible resources are often cycle-congestible. For instance, for routing look-ups load depends on the complexity of each look-up and whether the pattern of arrivals is amenable to caching or not. This also reminds us that any solution must not require a forwarding engine to use excessive processor cycles in order to decide how to say it has no spare processor cycles.

Appendix C. Byte-mode Drop Complicates Policing Congestion Response

This section is informative, not normative.

There are two main classes of approach to policing congestion response: i) policing at each bottleneck link or ii) policing at the edges of networks. Packet-mode drop in RED is compatible with either, while byte-mode drop precludes edge policing.

The simplicity of an edge policer relies on one dropped or marked packet being equivalent to another of the same size without having to know which link the drop or mark occurred at. However, the byte-mode drop algorithm has to depend on the local MTU of the line—it needs to use some concept of a ‘normal’ packet size. Therefore, one dropped or marked packet from a byte-mode drop algorithm is not necessarily equivalent to another from a different link. A policing function local to the link can know the local MTU where the congestion occurred. However, a policer at the edge of the network cannot, at least not without a lot of complexity.
The early research proposals for type (i) policing at a bottleneck link [pBox] used byte-mode drop, then detected flows that contributed disproportionately to the number of packets dropped. However, with no extra complexity, later proposals used packet mode drop and looked for flows that contributed a disproportionate amount of dropped bytes [CHOKe_Var_Pkt].

Work is progressing on the congestion exposure protocol (ConEx [RFC6789]), which enables a type (ii) edge policer located at a user’s attachment point. The idea is to be able to take an integrated view of the effect of all a user’s traffic on any link in the internetwork. However, byte-mode drop would effectively preclude such edge policing because of the MTU issue above.

Indeed, making drop probability depend on the size of the packets that bits happen to be divided into would simply encourage the bits to be divided into smaller packets in order to confuse policing. In contrast, as long as a dropped/marked packet is taken to mean that all the bytes in the packet are dropped/marked, a policer can remain robust against bits being re-divided into different size packets or across different size flows [Rate_fair_Dis].

Appendix D. Changes from Previous Versions

To be removed by the RFC Editor on publication.

Full incremental diffs between each version are available at <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/tsvwg/draft-ietf-tsvwg-byte-pkt-congest/> (courtesy of the rfcdiff tool):

From -11 to -12: Following the second pass through the IESG:

* Section 2.1 [Barry Leiba]:
  + s/No other choice makes sense,/Subject to the exceptions below, no other choice makes sense,/  
  + s/Exceptions to these recommendations MAY be necessary /Exceptions to these recommendations may be necessary /

* Sections 3.2 and 4.2.3 [Joel Jaeggli]:
  + Added comment to section 4.2.3 that the examples given are not in widespread production use, but they give evidence that it is possible to follow the advice given.
  + Section 4.2.3:
OLD: Although there are no known proposals, it would also be possible and perfectly valid to make control packets robust against drop by explicitly requesting a lower drop probability using their Diffserv code point [RFC2474] to request a scheduling class with lower drop.

NEW: Although there are no known proposals, it would also be possible and perfectly valid to make control packets robust against drop by requesting a scheduling class with lower drop probability, by re-marking to a Diffserv code point [RFC2474] within the same behaviour aggregate.

- appended "Similarly applications, over non-TCP transports could make any packets that are effectively control packets more robust by using Diffserv, data duplication, FEC etc."

+ Updated Wischik ref and added "Reducing Web Latency: the Virtue of Gentle Aggression" ref.

* Expanded more abbreviations (CoDel, PIE, MTU).

* Section 1. Intro [Stephen Farrell]:

+ In the places where the doc describes the dichotomy between 'long-term goal' and 'expediency' the words long term goal and expedient have been introduced, to more explicitly refer back to this introductory para (S.2.1 & S.2.3).

+ Added explanation of what scaling with packet size means.

* Conclusions [Benoit Claise]:

+ OLD: For the specific case of RED, this means that byte-mode queue measurement will often be appropriate although byte-mode drop is strongly deprecated.

NEW: For the specific case of RED, this means that byte-mode queue measurement will often be appropriate but the use of byte-mode drop is very strongly discouraged.

From -10 to -11: Following a further WGLC:

* Abstract: clarified that advice applies to all AQMs including newer ones

* Abstract & Intro: changed 'read' to 'detect', because you don't read losses, you detect them.
* S.1. Introduction: Disambiguated summary of advice on queue measurement.
* Clarified that the doc deprecates any preference based solely on packet size, it’s not only against preferring smaller packets.
* S.4.1.2. Congestion Measurement without a Queue: Explained that a queue of TXOPs represents a queue into spectrum congested by too many bits.
* S.5.2: Bit- & Packet-congestible Network: Referred to explanation in S.4.1.2 to make the point that TXOPs are not a primary unit of workload like bits and packets are, even though you get queues of TXOPs.
* 8. Conclusions: Made consistent with recommendation to use time if possible for queue measurement.

From -09 to -10: Following IESG review:
* Updates 2309: Left header unchanged reflecting eventual IESG consensus [Sean Turner, Pete Resnick].
* S.1 Intro: This memo adds to the congestion control principles enumerated in BCP 41 [Pete Resnick]
* Abstract, S.1, S.1.1, s.1.2 Intro, Scoping and Example: Made applicability to all AQMs clearer listing some more example AQMs and explained that we always use RED for examples, but this doesn’t mean it’s not applicable to other AQMs. [A number of reviewers have described the draft as "about RED"]
* S.1 & S.2.1 Queue measurement: Explained that the choice between measuring the queue in packets or bytes is only relevant if measuring it in time units is infeasible [So as not to imply that we haven’t noticed the advances made by PDPC & CoDel]
* S.1.1. Terminology: Better explained why hybrid systems congested by both packets and bytes are often designed to be treated as bit-congestible [Richard Barnes].
* S.2.1. Queue measurement advice: Added examples. Added a counter-example to justify SHOULDs rather than MUSTs. Pointed to S.4.1 for a list of more complicated scenarios. [Benson
Schliesser, OpsDir]

* S2.2. Recommendation on Encoding Congestion Notification: 
  Removed SHOULD treat packets equally, leaving only SHOULD NOT drop 
  dependent on packet size, to avoid it sounding like we're saying QoS is 
  not allowed. Pointed to possible app-specific legacy use of byte-mode 
  as a counter-example that prevents us saying MUST NOT. [Pete Resnick]

* S.2.3. Recommendation on Responding to Congestion: capitalised 
  the two SHOULDs in recommendations for TCP, and gave possible 
  counter-examples. [noticed while dealing with Pete Resnick’s point]

* S2.4. Splitting & Merging: RTCP -> RTP/RTCP [Pete McCann, Gen-ART]

* S.3.2 Small != Control: many control packets are small -> 
  ...tend to be small [Stephen Farrell]

* S.3.1 Perverse incentives: Changed transport designers to app 
  developers [Stephen Farrell]

* S.4.1.1. Fixed Size Packet Buffers: Nearly completely re-
  written to simplify and to reverse the advice when the 
  underlying resource is bit-congestible, irrespective of whether 
  the buffer consists of fixed-size packet buffers. [Richard 
  Barnes & Benson Schliesser]

* S.4.2.1.2. Packet Size Bias Regardless of AQM: Largely re-
  written to reflect the earlier change in advice about fixed-
  size packet buffers, and to primarily focus on getting rid of 
  tail-drop, not various nuances of tail-drop. [Richard Barnes & 
  Benson Schliesser]

* Editorial corrections [Tim Bray, AppsDir, Pete McCann, Gen-ART 
  and others]

* Updated refs (two I-Ds have become RFCs). [Pete McCann]

From -08 to -09: Following WG last call:

* S.2.1: Made RED-related queue measurement recommendations 
  clearer

* S.2.3: Added to "Recommendation on Responding to Congestion" to 
  make it clear that we are definitely not saying transports have 
  to equalise bit-rates, just how to do it and not do it, if you
want to.

* S.3: Clarified motivation sections S.3.3 "Transport-Independent Network" and S.3.5 "Implementation Efficiency"

* S.3.4: Completely changed motivating argument from "Scaling Congestion Control with Packet Size" to "Partial Deployment of AQM".

From -07 to -08:

* Altered abstract to say it provides best current practice and highlight that it updates RFC2309

* Added null IANA section

* Updated refs

From -06 to -07:

* A mix-up with the corollaries and their naming in 2.1 to 2.3 fixed.

From -05 to -06:

* Primarily editorial fixes.

From -04 to -05:

* Changed from Informational to BCP and highlighted non-normative sections and appendices

* Removed language about consensus

* Added "Example Comparing Packet-Mode Drop and Byte-Mode Drop"

* Arranged "Motivating Arguments" into a more logical order and completely rewrote "Transport-Independent Network" & "Scaling Congestion Control with Packet Size" arguments. Removed "Why Now?"

* Clarified applicability of certain recommendations

* Shifted vendor survey to an Appendix

* Cut down "Outstanding Issues and Next Steps"
* Re-drafted the start of the conclusions to highlight the three distinct areas of concern

* Completely re-wrote appendices

* Editorial corrections throughout.

From -03 to -04:

* Reordered Sections 2 and 3, and some clarifications here and there based on feedback from Colin Perkins and Mirja Kuehlewind.

From -02 to -03 (this version)

* Structural changes:

  + Split off text at end of "Scaling Congestion Control with Packet Size" into new section "Transport-Independent Network"

  + Shifted "Recommendations" straight after "Motivating Arguments" and added "Conclusions" at end to reinforce Recommendations

  + Added more internal structure to Recommendations, so that recommendations specific to RED or to TCP are just corollaries of a more general recommendation, rather than being listed as a separate recommendation.

  + Renamed "State of the Art" as "Critical Survey of Existing Advice" and retitled a number of subsections with more descriptive titles.

  + Split end of "Congestion Coding: Summary of Status" into a new subsection called "RED Implementation Status".

  + Removed text that had been in the Appendix "Congestion Notification Definition: Further Justification".

* Reordered the intro text a little.

* Made it clearer when advice being reported is deprecated and when it is not.

* Described AQM as in network equipment, rather than saying "at the network layer" (to side-step controversy over whether functions like AQM are in the transport layer but in network
equipment).

* Minor improvements to clarity throughout

From -01 to -02:

* Restructured the whole document for (hopefully) easier reading and clarity. The concrete recommendation, in RFC2119 language, is now in Section 8.

From -00 to -01:

* Minor clarifications throughout and updated references

From briscoe-byte-pkt-mark-02 to ietf-byte-pkt-congest-00:

* Added note on relationship to existing RFCs

* Posed the question of whether packet-congestion could become common and deferred it to the IRTF ICCRG. Added ref to the dual-resource queue (DRQ) proposal.

* Changed PCN references from the PCN charter & architecture to the PCN marking behaviour draft most likely to imminently become the standards track WG item.

From -01 to -02:

* Abstract reorganised to align with clearer separation of issue in the memo.

* Introduction reorganised with motivating arguments removed to new Section 3.

* Clarified avoiding lock-out of large packets is not the main or only motivation for RED.

* Mentioned choice of drop or marking explicitly throughout, rather than trying to coin a word to mean either.

* Generalised the discussion throughout to any packet forwarding function on any network equipment, not just routers.

* Clarified the last point about why this is a good time to sort out this issue: because it will be hard / impossible to design new transports unless we decide whether the network or the transport is allowing for packet size.
* Added statement explaining the horizon of the memo is long term, but with short term expediency in mind.

* Added material on scaling congestion control with packet size (Section 3.4).

* Separated out issue of normalising TCP’s bit rate from issue of preference to control packets (Section 3.2).

* Divided up Congestion Measurement section for clarity, including new material on fixed size packet buffers and buffer carving (Section 4.1.1 & Section 4.2.1) and on congestion measurement in wireless link technologies without queues (Section 4.1.2).

* Added section on ‘Making Transports Robust against Control Packet Losses’ (Section 4.2.3) with existing & new material included.

* Added tabulated results of vendor survey on byte-mode drop variant of RED (Table 3).

From -00 to -01:

* Clarified applicability to drop as well as ECN.

* Highlighted DoS vulnerability.

* Emphasised that drop-tail suffers from similar problems to byte-mode drop, so only byte-mode drop should be turned off, not RED itself.

* Clarified the original apparent motivations for recommending byte-mode drop included protecting SYN and pure ACKs more than equalising the bit rates of TCPs with different segment sizes. Removed some conjectured motivations.

* Added support for updates to TCP in progress (ackcc & ecn-syn-ack).

* Updated survey results with newly arrived data.

* Pulled all recommendations together into the conclusions.

* Moved some detailed points into two additional appendices and a note.
* Considerable clarifications throughout.
* Updated references

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Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Network Address Translation Support
draft-ietf-tsvwg-natsupp-23

Abstract

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) provides a reliable communications channel between two end-hosts in many ways similar to the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). With the widespread deployment of Network Address Translators (NAT), specialized code has been added to NAT functions for TCP that allows multiple hosts to reside behind a NAT function and yet share a single IPv4 address, even when two hosts (behind a NAT function) choose the same port numbers for their connection. This additional code is sometimes classified as Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT).

This document describes the protocol extensions needed for the SCTP endpoints and the mechanisms for NAT functions necessary to provide similar features of NAPT in the single point and multipoint traversal scenario.

Finally, a YANG module for SCTP NAT is defined.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2022.
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1. Introduction

Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960] provides a reliable communications channel between two end-hosts in many ways similar to TCP [RFC0793]. With the widespread deployment of Network Address Translators (NAT), specialized code has been added to NAT functions for TCP that allows multiple hosts to reside behind a NAT function using private-use addresses (see [RFC6890]) and yet share a single IPv4 address, even when two hosts (behind a NAT function) choose the same port numbers for their connection. This additional code is sometimes classified as Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT). Please note that this document focuses on the case where the NAT function maps a single or multiple internal addresses to a single external address and vice versa.

To date, specialized code for SCTP has not yet been added to most NAT functions so that only a translation of IP addresses is supported. The end result of this is that only one SCTP-capable host can successfully operate behind such a NAT function and this host can only be single-homed. The only alternative for supporting legacy NAT functions is to use UDP encapsulation as specified in [RFC6951].

The NAT function in the document refers to NAPT functions described in Section 2.2 of [RFC3022], NAT64 [RFC6146], or DS-Lite AFTR [RFC6333].

This document specifies procedures allowing a NAT function to support SCTP by providing similar features to those provided by a NAPT for TCP (see [RFC5382] and [RFC7857]), UDP (see [RFC4787] and [RFC7857]), and ICMP (see [RFC5508] and [RFC7857]). This document also specifies a set of data formats for SCTP packets and a set of SCTP endpoint procedures to support NAT traversal. An SCTP implementation supporting these procedures can assure that in both single-homed and multi-homed cases a NAT function will maintain the appropriate state without the NAT function needing to change port numbers.

It is possible and desirable to make these changes for a number of reasons:

* It is desirable for SCTP internal end-hosts on multiple platforms to be able to share a NAT function’s external IP address in the same way that a TCP session can use a NAT function.

* If a NAT function does not need to change any data within an SCTP packet, it will reduce the processing burden of NAT’ing SCTP by not needing to execute the CRC32c checksum used by SCTP.

* Not having to touch the IP payload makes the processing of ICMP messages by NAT functions easier.

An SCTP-aware NAT function will need to follow these procedures for generating appropriate SCTP packet formats.

When considering SCTP-aware NAT it is possible to have multiple levels of support. At each level, the Internal Host, Remote Host, and NAT function does or does not support the procedures described in this document. The following table illustrates the results of the various combinations of support and if communications can occur between two endpoints.
From the table it can be seen that no communication can occur when a NAT function does not support SCTP-aware NAT. This assumes that the NAT function does not handle SCTP packets at all and all SCTP packets sent from behind a NAT function are discarded by the NAT function.

In some cases, where the NAT function supports SCTP-aware NAT, but one of the two hosts does not support the feature, communication can possibly occur in a limited way. For example, only one host can have a connection when a collision case occurs.

2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Terminology

This document uses the following terms, which are depicted in Figure 1. Familiarity with the terminology used in [RFC4960] and [RFC5061] is assumed.

Internal-Address (Int-Addr)
An internal address that is known to the internal host.
Internal-Port (Int-Port)
The port number that is in use by the host holding the Internal-Address.

Internal-VTag (Int-VTag)
The SCTP Verification Tag (VTag) (see Section 3.1 of [RFC4960]) that the internal host has chosen for an association. The VTag is a unique 32-bit tag that accompanies any incoming SCTP packet for this association to the Internal-Address.

Remote-Address (Rem-Addr)
The address that an internal host is attempting to contact.

Remote-Port (Rem-Port)
The port number used by the host holding the Remote-Address.

Remote-VTag (Rem-VTag)
The Verification Tag (VTag) (see Section 3.1 of [RFC4960]) that the host holding the Remote-Address has chosen for an association. The VTag is a unique 32-bit tag that accompanies any outgoing SCTP packet for this association to the Remote-Address.

External-Address (Ext-Addr)
An external address assigned to the NAT function, that it uses as a source address when sending packets towards a Remote-Address.

4.  Motivation and Overview

4.1.  SCTP NAT Traversal Scenarios

This section defines the notion of single and multipoint NAT traversal.
4.1.1. Single Point Traversal

In this case, all packets in the SCTP association go through a single NAT function, as shown in Figure 2.

```
+--//--\--/--
| Host A | NAT | Network | Host B |
\|------|------|--------|------|
\+-------+-------+--------+
```

Figure 2: Single NAT Function Scenario

A variation of this case is shown in Figure 3, i.e., multiple NAT functions in the forwarding path between two endpoints.

```
+--//--\--/--\--//--\--/
| Host A | NAT | Network | Host B |
\|------|------|--------|------|
\+-------+-------+--------+
```

Figure 3: Serial NAT Functions Scenario

Although one of the main benefits of SCTP multi-homing is redundant paths, in the single point traversal scenario the NAT function represents a single point of failure in the path of the SCTP multi-homed association. However, the rest of the path can still benefit from path diversity provided by SCTP multi-homing.

The two SCTP endpoints in this case can be either single-homed or multi-homed. However, the important thing is that the NAT function in this case sees all the packets of the SCTP association.

4.1.2. Multipoint Traversal

This case involves multiple NAT functions and each NAT function only sees some of the packets in the SCTP association. An example is shown in Figure 4.
This case does not apply to a single-homed SCTP association (i.e., both endpoints in the association use only one IP address). The advantage here is that the existence of multiple NAT traversal points can preserve the path diversity of a multi-homed association for the entire path. This in turn can improve the robustness of the communication.

4.2. Limitations of Classical NAPT for SCTP

Using classical NAPT possibly results in changing one of the SCTP port numbers during the processing, which requires the recomputation of the transport layer checksum by the NAPT function. Whereas for UDP and TCP this can be done very efficiently, for SCTP the checksum (CRC32c) over the entire packet needs to be recomputed (see Appendix B of [RFC4960] for details of the CRC32c computation). This would considerably add to the NAT computational burden, however hardware support can mitigate this in some implementations.

An SCTP endpoint can have multiple addresses but only has a single port number to use. To make multipoint traversal work, all the NAT functions involved need to recognize the packets they see as belonging to the same SCTP association and perform port number translation in a consistent way. One possible way of doing this is to use a pre-defined table of port numbers and addresses configured within each NAT function. Other mechanisms could make use of NAT to NAT communication. Such mechanisms have not been deployed on a wide scale base and thus are not a preferred solution. Therefore an SCTP variant of NAT function has been developed (see Section 4.3).

4.3. The SCTP-Specific Variant of NAT

In this section it is allowed that there are multiple SCTP capable hosts behind a NAT function that share one External-Address. Furthermore, this section focuses on the single point traversal scenario (see Section 4.1.1).
The modification of outgoing SCTP packets sent from an internal host is simple: the source address of the packets has to be replaced with the External-Address. It might also be necessary to establish some state in the NAT function to later handle incoming packets.

Typically, the NAT function has to maintain a NAT binding table of Internal-VTag, Internal-Port, Remote-VTag, Remote-Port, Internal-Address, and whether the restart procedure is disabled or not. An entry in that NAT binding table is called a NAT-State control block. The function Create() obtains the just mentioned parameters and returns a NAT-State control block. A NAT function MAY allow creating NAT-State control blocks via a management interface.

For SCTP packets coming from the external realm of the NAT function the destination address of the packets has to be replaced with the Internal-Address of the host to which the packet has to be delivered, if a NAT state entry is found. The lookup of the Internal-Address is based on the Remote-VTag, Remote-Port, Internal-VTag and the Internal-Port.

The entries in the NAT binding table need to fulfill some uniqueness conditions. There can not be more than one entry NAT binding table with the same pair of Internal-Port and Remote-Port. This rule can be relaxed, if all NAT binding table entries with the same Internal-Port and Remote-Port have the support for the restart procedure disabled (see Section 5.3.1). In this case there can not be no more than one entry with the same Internal-Port, Remote-Port and Remote-VTag and no more than one NAT binding table entry with the same Internal-Port, Remote-Port, and Int-VTag.

The processing of outgoing SCTP packets containing an INIT chunk is illustrated in the following figure. This scenario is valid for all message flows in this section.
INIT[Initiate-Tag]
Int-Addr:Int-Port -------> Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
Rem-VTag=0

Create(Initiate-Tag, Int-Port, 0, Rem-Port, Int-Addr, IsRestartDisabled)
Returns(NAT-State control block)

Translate To:

INIT[Initiate-Tag]
Ext-Addr:Int-Port -------> Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
Rem-VTag=0

Normally a NAT binding table entry will be created.

However, it is possible that there is already a NAT binding table entry with the same Remote-Port, Internal-Port, and Internal-VTag but different Internal-Address and the restart procedure is disabled. In this case the packet containing the INIT chunk MUST be dropped by the NAT and a packet containing an ABORT chunk SHOULD be sent to the SCTP host that originated the packet with the M bit set and 'VTag and Port Number Collision' error cause (see Section 5.1.1 for the format). The source address of the packet containing the ABORT chunk MUST be the destination address of the packet containing the INIT chunk.

If an outgoing SCTP packet contains an INIT or ASCONF chunk and a matching NAT binding table entry is found, the packet is processed as a normal outgoing packet.

It is also possible that a NAT binding table entry with the same Remote-Port and Internal-Port exists without an Internal-VTag conflict but there exists a NAT binding table entry with the same port numbers but a different Internal-Address and the restart procedure is not disabled. In such a case the packet containing the INIT chunk MUST be dropped by the NAT function and a packet containing an ABORT chunk SHOULD be sent to the SCTP host that originated the packet with the M bit set and 'Port Number Collision' error cause (see Section 5.1.1 for the format).
The processing of outgoing SCTP packets containing no INIT chunks is described in the following figure.

```
+-------+ <--------+ | NAT | <--------+ | Network | <--------+ | Host B |
\        /        \        /        \        /        \        /        \    \\
| Host A | <------> | NAT | <------> | Network | <------> | Host B |
```

Int-Addr:Int-Port -------> Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
Rem-VTag

Translate To:

```
Ext-Addr:Int-Port -------> Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
Rem-VTag
```

The processing of incoming SCTP packets containing an INIT ACK chunk is illustrated in the following figure. The Lookup() function has as input the Internal-VTag, Internal-Port, Remote-VTag, and Remote-Port. It returns the corresponding entry of the NAT binding table and updates the Remote-VTag by substituting it with the value of the Initiate-Tag of the INIT ACK chunk. The wildcard character signifies that the parameter’s value is not considered in the Lookup() function or changed in the Update() function, respectively.

```
+-------+ <--------+ | NAT | <--------+ | Network | <--------+ | Host B |
        /        \        /        \        /        \        /        \    \\
| Host A | <------> | NAT | <------> | Network | <--------+ | Host B |
```

INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag]
Ext-Addr:Int-Port <----- Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
Int-VTag

Lookup(Int-VTag, Int-Port, *, Rem-Port)
Update(*, *, Initiate-Tag, *)

Returns(NAT-State control block containing Int-Addr)

```
INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag]
Int-Addr:Int-Port <------ Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
Int-VTag
```
In the case where the Lookup function fails because it does not find an entry, the SCTP packet is dropped. If it succeeds, the Update routine inserts the Remote-VTag (the Initiate-Tag of the INIT ACK chunk) in the NAT-State control block.

The processing of incoming SCTP packets containing an ABORT or SHUTDOWN COMPLETE chunk with the T bit set is illustrated in the following figure.

```
+-------------+       +--------+          +-----+       /----\-----+
| Host A      | <-------| NAT     | <--------| Network | <-------| Host B |
+-------------+       +--------+          \       /          +--------+
\--/\------/\------/\------/\------/\------/\------/\------/\------/\------/
Ext-Addr:Int-Port <------ Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
              Rem-VTag

Lookup(*, Int-Port, Rem-VTag, Rem-Port)

Returns(NAT-State control block containing Int-Addr)

Int-Addr:Int-Port <------ Rem-Addr:Rem-Port
              Rem-VTag
```

For an incoming packet containing an INIT chunk a table lookup is made only based on the addresses and port numbers. If an entry with a Remote-VTag of zero is found, it is considered a match and the Remote-VTag is updated. If an entry with a non-matching Remote-VTag is found or no entry is found, the incoming packet is silently dropped. If an entry with a matching Remote-VTag is found, the incoming packet is forwarded. This allows the handling of INIT collision through NAT functions.

The processing of other incoming SCTP packets is described in the following figure.
5. Data Formats

This section defines the formats used to support NAT traversal. Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 describe chunks and error causes sent by NAT functions and received by SCTP endpoints. Section 5.3 describes parameters sent by SCTP endpoints and used by NAT functions and SCTP endpoints.

5.1. Modified Chunks

This section presents existing chunks defined in [RFC4960] for which additional flags are specified by this document.

5.1.1. Extended ABORT Chunk

```
| 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|          Type = 6     | Reserved |M|T|          Length          |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\                      zero or more Error Causes                      /
\                                                                 /\        
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

The ABORT chunk is extended to add the new 'M bit'. The M bit indicates to the receiver of the ABORT chunk that the chunk was not generated by the peer SCTP endpoint, but instead by a middle box (e.g., NAT).

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: Assignment of M bit to be confirmed by IANA.]
5.1.2. Extended ERROR Chunk

The ERROR chunk defined in [RFC4960] is extended to add the new ‘M bit’. The M bit indicates to the receiver of the ERROR chunk that the chunk was not generated by the peer SCTP endpoint, but instead by a middle box.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: Assignment of M bit to be confirmed by IANA.]

5.2. New Error Causes

This section defines the new error causes added by this document.

5.2.1. VTag and Port Number Collision Error Cause

Cause Code: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the IANA defined cause code for the ‘VTag and Port Number Collision’ Error Cause. IANA is requested to assign the value 0x00B0 for this cause code.

Cause Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the length in bytes of the error cause. The value MUST be the length of the Cause-Specific Information plus 4.

Chunk: variable length
The Cause-Specific Information is filled with the chunk that caused this error. This can be an INIT, INIT ACK, or ASCONF chunk. Note that if the entire chunk will not fit in the ERROR chunk or ABORT chunk being sent then the bytes that do not fit are truncated.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: Assignment of cause code to be confirmed by IANA.]

5.2.2. Missing State Error Cause

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|    Cause Code = 0x00B1        |     Cause Length = Variable   |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
               Original Packet                        /
               /                                      /\
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Cause Code: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the IANA defined cause code for the ‘Missing State’ Error Cause. IANA is requested to assign the value 0x00B1 for this cause code.

Cause Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the length in bytes of the error cause. The value MUST be the length of the Cause-Specific Information plus 4.

Original Packet: variable length
The Cause-Specific Information is filled with the IPv4 or IPv6 packet that caused this error. The IPv4 or IPv6 header MUST be included. Note that if the packet will not fit in the ERROR chunk or ABORT chunk being sent then the bytes that do not fit are truncated.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: Assignment of cause code to be confirmed by IANA.]

5.2.3. Port Number Collision Error Cause
5.3. New Parameters

This section defines new parameters and their valid appearance defined by this document.

5.3.1. Disable Restart Parameter

This parameter is used to indicate that the restart procedure is requested to be disabled. Both endpoints of an association MUST include this parameter in the INIT chunk and INIT ACK chunk when establishing an association and MUST include it in the ASCONF chunk when adding an address to successfully disable the restart procedure.
This field holds the IANA defined parameter type for the Disable Restart Parameter. IANA is requested to assign the value 0xC007 for this parameter type.

Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the length in bytes of the parameter. The value MUST be 4.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: Assignment of parameter type to be confirmed by IANA.]

The Disable Restart Parameter MAY appear in INIT, INIT ACK and ASCONF chunks and MUST NOT appear in any other chunk.

5.3.2. VTags Parameter

This parameter is used to help a NAT function to recover from state loss.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter Type = 0xC008</th>
<th>Parameter Length = 16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASCONF-Request Correlation ID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Verification Tag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Verification Tag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Parameter Type: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the IANA defined parameter type for the VTags Parameter. IANA is requested to assign the value 0xC008 for this parameter type.

Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the length in bytes of the parameter. The value MUST be 16.

ASCONF-Request Correlation ID: 4 bytes (unsigned integer)
This is an opaque integer assigned by the sender to identify each request parameter. The receiver of the ASCONF Chunk will copy this 32-bit value into the ASCONF Response Correlation ID field of the ASCONF ACK response parameter. The sender of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk can use this same value in the ASCONF ACK chunk to find which request the response is for. The receiver MUST NOT change the value of the ASCONF-Request Correlation ID.
Internal Verification Tag: 4 bytes (unsigned integer)
The Verification Tag that the internal host has chosen for the
association. The Verification Tag is a unique 32-bit tag that
accompanies any incoming SCTP packet for this association to the
Internal-Address.

Remote Verification Tag: 4 bytes (unsigned integer)
The Verification Tag that the host holding the Remote-Address has
chosen for the association. The VTag is a unique 32-bit tag that
accompanies any outgoing SCTP packet for this association to the
Remote-Address.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: Assignment of parameter type to be confirmed by
IANA.]

The VTags Parameter MAY appear in ASCONF chunks and MUST NOT appear
in any other chunk.

6. Procedures for SCTP Endpoints and NAT Functions

If an SCTP endpoint is behind an SCTP-aware NAT, a number of problems
can arise as it tries to communicate with its peers:

* IP addresses can not be included in the SCTP packet. This is
discussed in Section 6.1.

* More than one host behind a NAT function could select the same
VTag and source port number when communicating with the same peer
server. This creates a situation where the NAT function will not
be able to tell the two associations apart. This situation is
discussed in Section 6.2.

* If an SCTP endpoint is a server communicating with multiple peers
and the peers are behind the same NAT function, then the these
peers cannot be distinguished by the server. This case is
discussed in Section 6.3.

* A restart of a NAT function during a conversation could cause a
loss of its state. This problem and its solution is discussed in
Section 6.4.

* NAT functions need to deal with SCTP packets being fragmented at
the IP layer. This is discussed in Section 6.5.

* An SCTP endpoint can be behind two NAT functions in parallel
providing redundancy. The method to set up this scenario is
discussed in Section 6.6.
The mechanisms to solve these problems require additional chunks and parameters, defined in this document, and modified handling procedures from those specified in [RFC4960] as described below.

6.1. Association Setup Considerations for Endpoints

The association setup procedure defined in [RFC4960] allows multi-homed SCTP endpoints to exchange its IP-addresses by using IPv4 or IPv6 address parameters in the INIT and INIT ACK chunks. However, this does not work when NAT functions are present.

Every association setup from a host behind a NAT function MUST NOT use multiple internal addresses. The INIT chunk MUST NOT contain an IPv4 Address parameter, IPv6 Address parameter, or Supported Address Types parameter. The INIT ACK chunk MUST NOT contain any IPv4 Address parameter or IPv6 Address parameter using non-global addresses. The INIT chunk and the INIT ACK chunk MUST NOT contain any Host Name parameters.

If the association is intended to be finally multi-homed, the procedure in Section 6.6 MUST be used.

The INIT and INIT ACK chunk SHOULD contain the Disable Restart parameter defined in Section 5.3.1.

6.2. Handling of Internal Port Number and Verification Tag Collisions

Consider the case where two hosts in the Internal-Address space want to set up an SCTP association with the same service provided by some remote hosts. This means that the Remote-Port is the same. If they both choose the same Internal-Port and Internal-VTag, the NAT function cannot distinguish between incoming packets anymore. However, this is unlikely. The Internal-VTags are chosen at random and if the Internal-Ports are also chosen from the ephemeral port range at random (see [RFC6056]) this gives a 46-bit random number that has to match.

The same can happen with the Remote-VTag when a packet containing an INIT ACK chunk or an ASCONF chunk is processed by the NAT function.

6.2.1. NAT Function Considerations

If the NAT function detects a collision of internal port numbers and verification tags, it SHOULD send a packet containing an ABORT chunk with the M bit set if the collision is triggered by a packet containing an INIT or INIT ACK chunk. If such a collision is triggered by a packet containing an ASCONF chunk, it SHOULD send a packet containing an ERROR chunk with the M bit. The M bit is a new
bit defined by this document to express to SCTP that the source of this packet is a "middle" box, not the peer SCTP endpoint (see Section 5.1.1). If a packet containing an INIT ACK chunk triggers the collision, the corresponding packet containing the ABORT chunk MUST contain the same source and destination address and port numbers as the packet containing the INIT ACK chunk. If a packet containing an INIT chunk or an ASCONF chunk, the source and destination address and port numbers MUST be swapped.

The sender of the packet containing an ERROR or ABORT chunk MUST include the error cause with cause code ‘VTag and Port Number Collision’ (see Section 5.2.1).

6.2.2. Endpoint Considerations

The sender of the packet containing the INIT chunk or the receiver of a packet containing the INIT ACK chunk, upon reception of a packet containing an ABORT chunk with M bit set and the appropriate error cause code for colliding NAT binding table state is included, SHOULD reinitiate the association setup procedure after choosing a new initiate tag, if the association is in COOKIE-WAIT state. In any other state, the SCTP endpoint MUST NOT respond.

The sender of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, upon reception of a packet containing an ERROR chunk with M bit set, MUST stop adding the path to the association.

6.3. Handling of Internal Port Number Collisions

When two SCTP hosts are behind an SCTP-aware NAT it is possible that two SCTP hosts in the Internal-Address space will want to set up an SCTP association with the same server running on the same remote host. If the two hosts choose the same internal port, this is considered an internal port number collision.

For the NAT function, appropriate tracking can be performed by assuring that the VTags are unique between the two hosts.

6.3.1. NAT Function Considerations

The NAT function, when processing the packet containing the INIT ACK chunk, SHOULD note in its NAT binding table if the association supports the disable restart extension. This note is used when establishing future associations (i.e. when processing a packet containing an INIT chunk from an internal host) to decide if the connection can be allowed. The NAT function does the following when processing a packet containing an INIT chunk:
* If the packet containing the INIT chunk is originating from an internal port to a remote port for which the NAT function has no matching NAT binding table entry, it MUST allow the packet containing the INIT chunk creating an NAT binding table entry.
* If the packet containing the INIT chunk matches an existing NAT binding table entry, it MUST validate that the disable restart feature is supported and, if it does, allow the packet containing the INIT chunk to be forwarded.
* If the disable restart feature is not supported, the NAT function SHOULD send a packet containing an ABORT chunk with the M bit set.

The ‘Port Number Collision’ error cause (see Section 5.2.3) MUST be included in the ABORT chunk sent in response to the packet containing an INIT chunk.

If the collision is triggered by a packet containing an ASCONF chunk, a packet containing an ERROR chunk with the ‘Port Number Collision’ error cause SHOULD be sent in response to the packet containing the ASCONF chunk.

6.3.2. Endpoint Considerations

For the remote SCTP server this means that the Remote-Port and the Remote-Address are the same. If they both have chosen the same Internal-Port the server cannot distinguish between both associations based on the address and port numbers. For the server it looks like the association is being restarted. To overcome this limitation the client sends a Disable Restart parameter in the INIT chunk.

When the server receives this parameter it does the following:

* It MUST include a Disable Restart parameter in the INIT ACK to inform the client that it will support the feature.
* It MUST disable the restart procedures defined in [RFC4960] for this association.

Servers that support this feature will need to be capable of maintaining multiple connections to what appears to be the same peer (behind the NAT function) differentiated only by the VTags.

6.4. Handling of Missing State
6.4.1. NAT Function Considerations

If the NAT function receives a packet from the internal network for which the lookup procedure does not find an entry in the NAT binding table, a packet containing an ERROR chunk SHOULD be sent back with the M bit set. The source address of the packet containing the ERROR chunk MUST be the destination address of the packet received from the internal network. The verification tag is reflected and the T bit is set. Such a packet containing an ERROR chunk SHOULD NOT be sent if the received packet contains an ASCONF chunk with the VTags parameter or an ABORT, SHUTDOWN COMPLETE or INIT ACK chunk. A packet containing an ERROR chunk MUST NOT be sent if the received packet contains an ERROR chunk with the M bit set. In any case, the packet SHOULD NOT be forwarded to the remote address.

If the NAT function receives a packet from the internal network for which it has no NAT binding table entry and the packet contains an ASCONF chunk with the VTags parameter, the NAT function MUST update its NAT binding table according to the verification tags in the VTags parameter and, if present, the Disable Restart parameter.

When sending a packet containing an ERROR chunk, the error cause 'Missing State' (see Section 5.2.2) MUST be included and the M bit of the ERROR chunk MUST be set (see Section 5.1.2).

6.4.2. Endpoint Considerations

Upon reception of this packet containing the ERROR chunk by an SCTP endpoint the receiver takes the following actions:

* It SHOULD validate that the verification tag is reflected by looking at the VTag that would have been included in an outgoing packet. If the validation fails, discard the received packet containing the ERROR chunk.

* It SHOULD validate that the peer of the SCTP association supports the dynamic address extension. If the validation fails, discard the received packet containing the ERROR chunk.

* It SHOULD generate a packet containing a new ASCONF chunk containing the VTags parameter (see Section 5.3.2) and the Disable Restart parameter (see Section 5.3.1) if the association is using the disable restart feature. By processing this packet the NAT function can recover the appropriate state. The procedures for generating an ASCONF chunk can be found in [RFC5061].
The peer SCTP endpoint receiving such a packet containing an ASCONF chunk SHOULD add the address and respond with an acknowledgment if the address is new to the association (following all procedures defined in [RFC5061]). If the address is already part of the association, the SCTP endpoint MUST NOT respond with an error, but instead SHOULD respond with a packet containing an ASCONF ACK chunk acknowledging the address and take no action (since the address is already in the association).

Note that it is possible that upon receiving a packet containing an ASCONF chunk containing the VTags parameter the NAT function will realize that it has an 'Internal Port Number and Verification Tag collision'. In such a case the NAT function SHOULD send a packet containing an ERROR chunk with the error cause code set to 'VTag and Port Number Collision' (see Section 5.2.1).

If an SCTP endpoint receives a packet containing an ERROR chunk with 'Internal Port Number and Verification Tag collision' as the error cause and the packet in the Error Chunk contains an ASCONF with the VTags parameter, careful examination of the association is necessary. The endpoint does the following:

* It MUST validate that the verification tag is reflected by looking at the VTag that would have been included in the outgoing packet. If the validation fails, it MUST discard the packet.

* It MUST validate that the peer of the SCTP association supports the dynamic address extension. If the peer does not support this extension, it MUST discard the received packet containing the ERROR chunk.

* If the association is attempting to add an address (i.e. following the procedures in Section 6.6) then the endpoint MUST NOT consider the address part of the association and SHOULD make no further attempt to add the address (i.e. cancel any ASCONF timers and remove any record of the path), since the NAT function has a VTag collision and the association cannot easily create a new VTag (as it would if the error occurred when sending a packet containing an INIT chunk).

* If the endpoint has no other path, i.e. the procedure was executed due to missing a state in the NAT function, then the endpoint MUST abort the association. This would occur only if the local NAT function restarted and accepted a new association before attempting to repair the missing state (Note that this is no different than what happens to all TCP connections when a NAT function looses its state).
6.5. Handling of Fragmented SCTP Packets by NAT Functions

SCTP minimizes the use of IP-level fragmentation. However, it can happen that using IP-level fragmentation is needed to continue an SCTP association. For example, if the path MTU is reduced and there are still some DATA chunk in flight, which require packets larger than the new path MTU. If IP-level fragmentation can not be used, the SCTP association will be terminated in a non-graceful way. See [RFC8900] for more information about IP fragmentation.

Therefore, a NAT function MUST be able to handle IP-level fragmented SCTP packets. The fragments MAY arrive in any order.

When an SCTP packet can not be forwarded by the NAT function due to MTU issues and the IP header forbids fragmentation, the NAT MUST send back a "Fragmentation needed and DF set" ICMPv4 or PTB ICMPv6 message to the internal host. This allows for a faster recovery from this packet drop.

6.6. Multi Point Traversal Considerations for Endpoints

If a multi-homed SCTP endpoint behind a NAT function connects to a peer, it MUST first set up the association single-homed with only one address causing the first NAT function to populate its state. Then it SHOULD add each IP address using packets containing ASCONF chunks sent via their respective NAT functions. The address used in the Add IP address parameter is the wildcard address (0.0.0.0 or ::0) and the address parameter in the ASCONF chunk SHOULD also contain the VTags parameter and optionally the Disable Restart parameter.

7. SCTP NAT YANG Module

This section defines a YANG module for SCTP NAT.

The terminology for describing YANG data models is defined in [RFC7950]. The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].

7.1. Tree Structure

This module augments NAT YANG module [RFC8512] with SCTP specifics. The module supports both classical SCTP NAT (that is, rewrite port numbers) and SCTP-specific variant where the ports numbers are not altered. The YANG "feature" is used to indicate whether SCTP-specific variant is supported.

The tree structure of the SCTP NAT YANG module is provided below:
Concretely, the SCTP NAT YANG module augments the NAT YANG module (policy, in particular) with the following:

* The `sctp-timeout` is used to control the SCTP inactivity timeout. That is, the time an SCTP mapping will stay active without SCTP packets traversing the NAT. This timeout can be set only for SCTP. Hence, "/nat:nat/nat:instances/nat:instance/nat:policy/nat:transport-protocols/nat:protocol-id" MUST be set to '132' (SCTP).

In addition, the SCTP NAT YANG module augments the mapping entry with the following parameters defined in Section 3. These parameters apply only for SCTP NAT mapping entries (i.e., "/nat/instances/instance/mapping-table/mapping-entry/transport-protocol" MUST be set to '132');

* The Internal Verification Tag (Int-VTag)
* The Remote Verification Tag (Rem-VTag)

7.2. YANG Module

```xml
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-nat-sctp@2020-11-02.yang"
module ietf-nat-sctp {
  yang-version 1.1;
  prefix nat-sctp;

  import ietf-nat {
    prefix nat;
    reference
      "RFC 8512: A YANG Module for Network Address Translation (NAT) and Network Prefix Translation (NPT)";
  }

  organization
    "IETF TSVWG Working Group";
  contact
    "WG Web:  <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/tsvwg/>"
}
```

Stewart, et al.             Expires 28 April 2022
This module augments NAT YANG module with Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) specifics. The extension supports both a classical SCTP NAT (that is, rewrite port numbers) and a, SCTP-specific variant where the ports numbers are not altered.

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices.

revision 2019-11-18 {
  description
    "Initial revision.";
  reference
    "RFC XXXX: Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Network Address Translation Support";
}

feature sctp-nat {
  description
    "This feature means that SCTP-specific variant of NAT is supported. That is, avoid rewriting port numbers.";
  reference
    "Section 4.3 of RFC XXXX.";
}

augment "/nat:nat/nat:instances/nat:instance"
  + "/nat:policy/nat:timers" {
    when "/nat:nat/nat:instances/nat:instance"
      + "/nat:policy/nat:transport-protocols"
      + "/nat:protocol-id = 132";
  description
    "Extends NAT policy with a timeout for SCTP mapping entries.";
leaf sctp-timeout {
    type uint32;
    units "seconds";
    description
        "SCTP inactivity timeout. That is, the time an SCTP mapping entry will stay active without packets traversing the NAT."
}

augment "/nat:nat/nat:instances/nat:instance"
    + "/nat:mapping-table/nat:mapping-entry" {
    when "nat:transport-protocol = 132";
    if-feature "sctp-nat";
    description
        "Extends the mapping entry with SCTP specifics."
    leaf int-VTag {
        type uint32;
        description
            "The Internal Verification Tag that the internal host has chosen for this communication."
    }
    leaf rem-VTag {
        type uint32;
        description
            "The Remote Verification Tag that the remote peer has chosen for this communication."
    }
}

8. Various Examples of NAT Traversals

Please note that this section is informational only.

The addresses being used in the following examples are IPv4 addresses for private-use networks and for documentation as specified in [RFC6890]. However, the method described here is not limited to this NAT44 case.

The NAT binding table entries shown in the following examples do not include the flag indicating whether the restart procedure is supported or not. This flag is not relevant for these examples.
8.1. Single-homed Client to Single-homed Server

The internal client starts the association with the remote server via a four-way-handshake. Host A starts by sending a packet containing an INIT chunk.

```
+--------+          +-----+           /        \
| Host A | <------> | NAT | <------> | Network | <------> | Host B |
\--------/          \-----/           \
NAT    |  Int    |  Int   |   Rem    |   Rem  |    Int    |
VTag   |  Port   | VTag   |   Port   |   Port |    Addr   |
+--------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+
INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
10.0.0.1:1 --------> 203.0.113.1:2
Rem-VTtag = 0
```

A NAT binding tabled entry is created, the source address is substituted and the packet is sent on:

```
+--------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+
| Host A | <------> | NAT | <------> | Network | <------> | Host B |
\--------/          \-----/           \
NAT    |  Int    |  Int   |   Rem    |   Rem  |    Int    |
VTag   |  Port   | VTag   |   Port   |   Port |    Addr   |
+--------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+
| 1234   |    1   |     0    |    2   |  10.0.0.1 |
+--------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+
INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 ------------------------> 203.0.113.1:2
Rem-VTtag = 0
```

Host B receives the packet containing an INIT chunk and sends a packet containing an INIT ACK chunk with the NAT’s Remote-address as destination address.
INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
192.0.2.1:1 <----------------------- 203.0.113.1:2
Int-VTag = 1234

NAT function updates entry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAT</th>
<th>Int VTag</th>
<th>Int Port</th>
<th>Rem VTag</th>
<th>Rem Port</th>
<th>Int Addr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5678</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.0.0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
10.0.0.1:1 <------ 203.0.113.1:2
Int-VTag = 1234

The handshake finishes with a COOKIE ECHO acknowledged by a COOKIE ACK.

COOKIE ECHO
10.0.0.1:1 ------> 203.0.113.1:2
Rem-VTag = 5678

COOKIE ECHO
192.0.2.1:1 ----------------------> 203.0.113.1:2
Rem-VTag = 5678

COOKIE ACK
192.0.2.1:1 <----------------------- 203.0.113.1:2
Int-VTag = 1234

COOKIE ACK
10.0.0.1:1 <------ 203.0.113.1:2
Int-VTag = 1234
8.2. Single-homed Client to Multi-homed Server

The internal client is single-homed whereas the remote server is multi-homed. The client (Host A) sends a packet containing an INIT chunk like in the single-homed case.

\[
\text{Host A} \longleftrightarrow \text{NAT} \longleftrightarrow \text{Network} \longleftrightarrow \text{Host B}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAT</th>
<th>Int VTag</th>
<th>Int Port</th>
<th>Rem VTag</th>
<th>Rem Port</th>
<th>Int Addr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.0.0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]} \\
10.0.0.1:1 \rightarrow 203.0.113.1:2 \\
\text{Rem-VTag = 0}
\]

The server (Host B) includes its two addresses in the INIT ACK chunk.
The NAT function does not need to change the NAT binding table for the second address:

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAT</th>
<th>Int VTag</th>
<th>Int Port</th>
<th>Rem VTag</th>
<th>Rem Port</th>
<th>Int Addr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5678</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.0.0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
10.0.0.1:1 <--- 203.0.113.1:2
Int-VTag = 1234

The handshake finishes with a COOKIE ECHO acknowledged by a COOKIE ACK.
8.3. Multihomed Client and Server

The client (Host A) sends a packet containing an INIT chunk to the server (Host B), but does not include the second address.

NAT 1  |  Int  |  Int  |  Rem  |  Rem  |  Int  |
--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| VTag   | Port  | VTag  | Port  | Addr  |

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
10.0.0.1:1 --------> 203.0.113.1:2
Rem-VTag = 0

NAT function 1 creates entry:

Host B includes its second address in the INIT ACK.

NAT function 1 does not need to update the NAT binding table for the second address:

The handshake finishes with a COOKIE ECHO acknowledged by a COOKIE ACK.
Host A announces its second address in an ASCONF chunk. The address parameter contains a wildcard address (0.0.0.0 or ::0) to indicate that the source address has to be be added. The address parameter within the ASCONF chunk will also contain the pair of VTags (remote and internal) so that the NAT function can populate its NAT binding table entry completely with this single packet.

ASCONF [ADD-IP=0.0.0.0, INT-VTag=1234, Rem-VTag = 5678]
10.1.0.1:1 --------> 203.0.113.129:2
Rem-VTag = 5678

NAT function 2 creates a complete entry:
8.4. NAT Function Loses Its State

Association is already established between Host A and Host B, when the NAT function loses its state and obtains a new external address. Host A sends a DATA chunk to Host B.

```
+---------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+
NAT       |  Int    |  Int   |   Rem    |   Rem  |    Int    |
|  VTag   |  Port  |   VTag   |   Port |    Addr   |
+---------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+
|  1234   |    1   |    5678  |    2   |  10.1.0.1 |
+---------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+
DATA
10.0.0.1:1 ----------> 203.0.113.1:2
Rem-VTag = 5678
```

The NAT function cannot find an entry in the NAT binding table for the association. It sends a packet containing an ERROR chunk with the M bit set and the cause "NAT state missing".
On reception of the packet containing the ERROR chunk, Host A sends a packet containing an ASCONF chunk indicating that the former information has to be deleted and the source address of the actual packet added.

```
+---------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+
| NAT     | Int    | Int-VTag | Rem    | Rem-VTag  |
| VTag    | Port   |          | VTag   | Port      |
| 1234    | 1      | 5678     | 2      | 10.0.0.1  |
```

ASCONF [ADD-IP, DELETE-IP, Int-VTag=1234, Rem-VTag = 5678]
10.0.0.1:1 ----------> 203.0.113.129:2
Rem-VTag = 5678

Host B adds the new source address to this association and deletes all other addresses from this association.
8.5. Peer-to-Peer Communications

If two hosts, each of them behind a NAT function, want to communicate with each other, they have to get knowledge of the peer’s external address. This can be achieved with a so-called rendezvous server. Afterwards the destination addresses are external, and the association is set up with the help of the INIT collision. The NAT functions create their entries according to their internal peer’s point of view. Therefore, NAT function A’s Internal-VTag and Internal-Port are NAT function B’s Remote-VTag and Remote-Port, respectively. The naming (internal/remote) of the verification tag in the packet flow is done from the sending host’s point of view.
INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
10.0.0.1:1 --> 203.0.113.1:2
Rem-VTag = 0

NAT function A creates entry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nat A</th>
<th>Int</th>
<th>Int</th>
<th>Rem</th>
<th>Rem</th>
<th>Int</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VTag</td>
<td>Port</td>
<td>VTag</td>
<td>Port</td>
<td>Addr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.0.0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 ----------------> 203.0.113.1:2
Rem-VTag = 0

NAT function B processes the packet containing the INIT chunk, but cannot find an entry. The SCTP packet is silently discarded and leaves the NAT binding table of NAT function B unchanged.
Now Host B sends a packet containing an INIT chunk, which is processed by NAT function B. Its parameters are used to create an entry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
<th>External</th>
<th>Internal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+--------+----------+----------+----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host A</td>
<td>&lt;---</td>
<td>NAT A</td>
<td>&lt;---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+--------+----------+----------+----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Network</td>
<td>&lt;---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+--------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|          |            |          | \--\-\-
|          |            |          |

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
192.0.2.1:1 <-- 10.1.0.1:2
Rem-VTag = 0

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAT B</th>
<th>Int VTag</th>
<th>Int Port</th>
<th>Rem VTag</th>
<th>Rem Port</th>
<th>Int Addr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+--------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5678</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.1.0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
192.0.2.1:1 <--------------- 203.0.113.1:2
Rem-VTag = 0

NAT function A processes the packet containing the INIT chunk. As the outgoing packet containing an INIT chunk of Host A has already created an entry, the entry is found and updated:
VTag != Int-VTag, but Rem-VTag == 0, find entry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAT A</th>
<th>Int VTag</th>
<th>Int Port</th>
<th>Rem VTag</th>
<th>Rem Port</th>
<th>Int Addr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5678</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.0.0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INIT[Initiate-tag = 5678]
10.0.0.1:1 <-- 203.0.113.1:2
Rem-VTag = 0

Host A sends a packet containing an INIT ACK chunk, which can pass through NAT function B:
INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
10.0.0.1:1 --> 203.0.113.1:2  
Rem-VTag = 5678

INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 -------------> 203.0.113.1:2  
Rem-VTag = 5678

NAT function B updates entry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAT B</th>
<th>Int VTag</th>
<th>Int Port</th>
<th>Rem VTag</th>
<th>Rem Port</th>
<th>Int Addr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5678</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.1.0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INIT ACK[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 --> 10.1.0.1:2  
Rem-VTag = 5678

The lookup for COOKIE ECHO and COOKIE ACK is successful.
9. Socket API Considerations

This section describes how the socket API defined in [RFC6458] is extended to provide a way for the application to control NAT friendliness.

Please note that this section is informational only.

A socket API implementation based on [RFC6458] is extended by supporting one new read/write socket option.
9.1. Get or Set the NAT Friendliness (SCTP_NAT_FRIENDLY)

This socket option uses the option_level IPPROTO_SCTP and the
option_name SCTP_NAT_FRIENDLY. It can be used to enable/disable the
NAT friendliness for future associations and retrieve the value for
future and specific ones.

```c
struct sctp_assoc_value {
    sctp_assoc_t assoc_id;
    uint32_t assoc_value;
};
```

- **assoc_id**
  This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style sockets. For one-
to-many style sockets the application can fill in an association
identifier or SCTP_FUTURE_ASSOC for this query. It is an error to
use SCTP_{CURRENT|ALL}_ASSOC in assoc_id.

- **assoc_value**
  A non-zero value indicates a NAT-friendly mode.

10. IANA Considerations

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: "RFCXXXX" is to be replaced by the RFC number
you assign this document.]

[NOTE to RFC-Editor: The requested values for the chunk type and the
chunk parameter types are tentative and to be confirmed by IANA.]

This document (RFCXXXX) is the reference for all registrations
described in this section. The requested changes are described
below.

10.1. New Chunk Flags for Two Existing Chunk Types

As defined in [RFC6096] two chunk flags have to be assigned by IANA
for the ERROR chunk. The requested value for the T bit is 0x01 and
for the M bit is 0x02.

This requires an update of the "ERROR Chunk Flags" registry for SCTP:

ERROR Chunk Flags
As defined in [RFC6096] one chunk flag has to be assigned by IANA for the ABORT chunk. The requested value of the M bit is 0x02.

This requires an update of the "ABORT Chunk Flags" registry for SCTP:

**ABORT Chunk Flags**

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chunk Flag Value</th>
<th>Chunk Flag Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>T bit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>M bit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x20</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x40</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x80</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Table 2
10.2. Three New Error Causes

Three error causes have to be assigned by IANA. It is requested to use the values given below.

This requires three additional lines in the "Error Cause Codes" registry for SCTP:

Error Cause Codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Cause Code</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>176</td>
<td>VTag and Port Number Collision</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177</td>
<td>Missing State</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>Port Number Collision</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chunk Flag Value</th>
<th>Chunk Flag Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>T bit</td>
<td>[RFC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>M bit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x20</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x40</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x80</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4
10.3. Two New Chunk Parameter Types

Two chunk parameter types have to be assigned by IANA. IANA is requested to assign these values from the pool of parameters with the upper two bits set to ‘11’ and to use the values given below.

This requires two additional lines in the "Chunk Parameter Types" registry for SCTP:

Chunk Parameter Types

| ID Value | Chunk Parameter Type     | Reference |
|----------|--------------------------+-----------|
| 49159    | Disable Restart (0xC007) | [RFCXXXX] |
| 49160    | VTags (0xC008)           | [RFCXXXX] |

Table 5

10.4. One New URI

An URI in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML" registry has to be assigned by IANA ([RFC3688]):

Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

10.5. One New YANG Module

An YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" subregistry within the "YANG Parameters" registry has to be assigned by IANA ([RFC6020]):

Name: ietf-nat-sctp
Maintained by IANA: N
Prefix: nat-sctp
Reference: RFCXXXX

11. Security Considerations

State maintenance within a NAT function is always a subject of possible Denial Of Service attacks. This document recommends that at a minimum a NAT function runs a timer on any SCTP state so that old association state can be cleaned up.
Generic issues related to address sharing are discussed in [RFC6269] and apply to SCTP as well.

For SCTP endpoints not disabling the restart procedure, this document does not add any additional security considerations to the ones given in [RFC4960], [RFC4895], and [RFC5061].

SCTP endpoints disabling the restart procedure, need to monitor the status of all associations to mitigate resource exhaustion attacks by establishing a lot of associations sharing the same IP addresses and port numbers.

In any case, SCTP is protected by the verification tags and the usage of [RFC4895] against off-path attackers.

For IP-level fragmentation and reassembly related issues see [RFC4963].

The YANG module specified in this document defines a schema for data that is designed to be accessed via network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [RFC8446].

The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content.

All data nodes defined in the YANG module that can be created, modified, and deleted (i.e., config true, which is the default) are considered sensitive. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) applied to these data nodes without proper protection can negatively affect network operations. An attacker who is able to access the SCTP NAT function can undertake various attacks, such as:

* Setting a low timeout for SCTP mapping entries to cause failures to deliver incoming SCTP packets.

* Instantiating mapping entries to cause NAT collision.

12. Normative References
13. Informative References


Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Mohamed Boucadair, Gorry Fairhurst, Bryan Ford, David Hayes, Alfred Hines, Karen E. E. Nielsen, Henning Peters, Maksim Proshin, Timo Völker, Dan Wing, and Qiaobing Xie for their invaluable comments.

In addition, the authors wish to thank David Hayes, Jason But, and Grenville Armitage, the authors of [DOI_10.1145_1496091.1496095], for their suggestions.

The authors also wish to thank Mohamed Boucadair for contributing the text related to the YANG module.

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Abstract

This document provides recommendations to application and service protocol designers on how to use the assigned transport protocol port number space and when to request a port assignment from IANA. It provides designer guidelines on how to interact with the IANA processes defined in RFC6335, thus serving to complement (but not update) that document.

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1. Introduction

This document provides information and advice to application and service designers on the use of assigned transport port numbers. It provides a detailed historical background of the evolution of transport port numbers and their multiple meanings. It also provides specific recommendations to designers on how to use assigned port numbers. Note that this document provides information to potential port number applicants that complements the IANA process described in BCP165 [RFC6335], but it does not change any of the port number
assignment procedures described therein. This document is intended to address concerns typically raised during Expert Review of assigned port number applications, but it is not intended to bind those reviews. RFC 6335 also describes the interaction between port experts and port requests in IETF consensus document. Authors of IETF consensus documents should nevertheless follow the advice in this document and can expect comment on their port requests from the port experts during IETF last call or at other times when review is explicitly sought.

2. Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be interpreted as carrying RFC-2119 significance.

In this document, the characters "=>" preceding an indented line(s) indicates a statement using the key words listed above. This convention aids reviewers in quickly identifying or finding requirements for registration and recommendations for use of port numbers in this RFC.

3. History

The term 'port' was first used in [RFC33] to indicate a simplex communication path from an individual process and originally applied to only the Network Control Program (NCP) connection-oriented protocol. At a meeting described in [RFC37], an idea was presented to decouple connections between processes and links that they use as paths, and thus to include numeric source and destination socket identifiers in packets. [RFC38] provides further detail, describing how processes might have more than one of these paths and that more than one path may be active at a time. As a result, there was the need to add a process identifier to the header of each message so that incoming messages could be demultiplexed to the appropriate process. [RFC38] further suggested that 32 bit numbers would be used for these identifiers. [RFC48] discusses the current notion of listening on a specific port number, but does not discuss the issue of port number determination. [RFC61] notes that the challenge of knowing the appropriate port numbers is "left to the processes" in general, but introduces the concept of a "well-known" port number for common services.
[RFC76] proposed a "telephone book" by which an index would allow port numbers to be used by name, but still assumed that both source and destination port numbers are fixed by such a system. [RFC333] proposed that a port number pair, rather than an individual port number, would be used on both sides of the connection for demultiplexing messages. This is the final view in [RFC793] (and its predecessors, including [IEN112]), and brings us to their current meaning. [RFC739] introduced the notion of generic reserved port numbers for groups of protocols, such as "any private RJE server" [RFC739]. Although the overall range of such port numbers was (and remains) 16 bits, only the first 256 (high 8 bits cleared) in the range were considered assigned.

[RFC758] is the first to describe port numbers as being used for TCP (previous RFCs all refer to only NCP). It includes a list of such well-known port numbers, as well as describing ranges used for different purposes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decimal</th>
<th>Octal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-63</td>
<td>0-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-127</td>
<td>100-177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128-223</td>
<td>200-337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224-255</td>
<td>340-377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In [RFC820] those range meanings disappeared, and a single list of number assignments is presented. This is also the first time that port numbers are described as applying to a connectionless transport (UDP) rather than only connection-oriented transports.

By [RFC900] the ranges appeared as decimal numbers rather than the octal ranges used previously. [RFC1340] increased this range from 0..255 to 0..1023, and began to list TCP and UDP port number assignments individually (although the assumption was that once assigned a port number applies to all transport protocols, including TCP, UDP, recently SCTP and DCCP, as well as ISO-TP4 for a brief period in the early 1990s). [RFC1340] also established the Registered range of 1024-59151, though it notes that it is not controlled by the IANA at that point. The list provided by [RFC1700] in 1994 remained the standard until it was declared replaced by an on-line version, as of [RFC3232] in 2002.
4. Current Port Number Use

RFC6335 indicates three ranges of port number assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Binary</th>
<th>Hex</th>
<th>System (also Well-Known)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1023</td>
<td>0x0000-0x03FF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1024-49151</td>
<td>0x0400-0xBFFF</td>
<td>User (also Registered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49152-65535</td>
<td>0xC000-0xFFFF</td>
<td>Dynamic (also Private)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

System (also Well-Known) encompasses the range 0..1023. On some systems, use of these port numbers requires privileged access, e.g., that the process run as ‘root’ (i.e., as a privileged user), which is why these are referred to as System port numbers. The port numbers from 1024..49151 denotes non-privileged services, known as User (also Registered), because these port numbers do not run with special privileges. Dynamic (also Private) port numbers are not assigned.

Both System and User port numbers are assigned through IANA, so both are sometimes called ‘registered port numbers’. As a result, the term ‘registered’ is ambiguous, referring either to the entire range 0-49151 or to the User port numbers. Complicating matters further, System port numbers do not always require special (i.e., ‘root’) privilege. For clarity, the remainder of this document refers to the port number ranges as System, User, and Dynamic, to be consistent with IANA process [RFC6335].

5. What is a Port Number?

A port number is a 16-bit number used for two distinct purposes:

- Demultiplexing transport endpoint associations within an end host
- Identifying a service

The first purpose requires that each transport endpoint association (e.g., TCP connection or UDP pairwise association) using a given transport between a given pair of IP addresses use a different pair of port numbers, but does not require either coordination or registration of port number use. It is the second purpose that drives the need for a common registry.
Consider a user wanting to run a web server. That service could run on any port number, provided that all clients knew what port number to use to access that service at that host. Such information can be explicitly distributed - for example, by putting it in the URI:

http://www.example.com:51509/

Ultimately, the correlation of a service with a port number is an agreement between just the two endpoints of the association. A web server can run on port number 53, which might appear as DNS traffic to others but will connect to browsers that know to use port number 53 rather than 80.

As a concept, a service is the combination of ISO Layers 5-7 that represents an application protocol capability. For example www (port number 80) is a service that uses HTTP as an application protocol and provides access to a web server [RFC7230]. However, it is possible to use HTTP for other purposes, such as command and control. This is why some current services (HTTP, e.g.) are a bit overloaded - they describe not only the application protocol, but a particular service.

IANA assigns port numbers so that Internet endpoints do not need pairwise, explicit coordination of the meaning of their port numbers. This is the primary reason for requesting port number assignment by IANA - to have a common agreement between all endpoints on the Internet as to the default meaning of a port number, which provides the endpoints with a default port number for a particular protocol or service.

Port numbers are sometimes used by intermediate devices on a network path, either to monitor available services, to monitor traffic (e.g., to indicate the data contents), or to intercept traffic (to block, proxy, relay, aggregate, or otherwise process it). In each case, the intermediate device interprets traffic based on the port number. It is important to recognize that any interpretation of port numbers - except at the endpoints - may be incorrect, because port numbers are meaningful only at the endpoints. Further, port numbers may not be visible to these intermediate devices, such as when the transport protocol is encrypted (as in network- or link-layer tunnels), or when a packet is fragmented (in which case only the first fragment has the port number information). Such port number invisibility may interfere with these in-network port number-based capabilities.

Port numbers can also be used for other purposes. Assigned port numbers can simplify end system configuration, so that individual
installations do not need to coordinate their use of arbitrary port numbers. Such assignments may also have the effect of simplifying firewall management, so that a single, fixed firewall configuration can either permit or deny a service that uses the assigned ports.

It is useful to differentiate a port number from a service name. The former is a numeric value that is used directly in transport protocol headers as a demultiplexing and service identifier. The latter is primarily a user convenience, where the default map between the two is considered static and resolved using a cached index. This document focuses on the former because it is the fundamental network resource. Dynamic maps between the two, i.e., using DNS SRV records, are discussed further in Section 7.1.

6. Conservation

Assigned port numbers are a limited resource that is globally shared by the entire Internet community. As of 2014, approximately 5850 TCP and 5570 UDP port numbers have been assigned out of a total range of 49151. As a result of past conservation, current assigned port use is small and the current rate of assignment avoids the need for transition to larger number spaces. This conservation also helps avoid the need for IANA to rely on assigned port number reclamation, which is practically impossible even though procedurally permitted [RFC6335].

IANA aims to assign only one port number per service, including variants [RFC6335], but there are other benefits to using fewer port numbers for a given service. Use of multiple assigned port numbers can make applications more fragile, especially when firewalls block a subset of those port numbers or use ports numbers to route or prioritize traffic differently. As a result:

>> Each assigned port requested MUST be justified by the applicant as an independently useful service.

6.1. Guiding Principles

This document provides recommendations for users that also help conserve assigned port number space. Again, this document does not update BCP165 [RFC6335], which describes the IANA procedures for managing assigned transport port numbers and services. Assigned port number conservation is based on a number of basic principles:
o A single assigned port number can support different functions over separate endpoint associations, determined using in-band information. An FTP data connection can transfer binary or text files, the latter translating line-terminators, as indicated in-band over the control port number [RFC959].

o A single assigned port number can indicate the Dynamic port number(s) on which different capabilities are supported, as with passive-mode FTP [RFC959].

o Several existing services can indicate the Dynamic port number(s) on which other services are supported, such as with mDNS and portmapper [RFC1833] [RFC6762] [RFC6763].

o Copies of some existing services can be differentiated using in-band information (e.g., URIs in HTTP Host field and TLS Server Name Indication extension) [RFC7230] [RFC6066].

o Services requiring varying performance properties can already be supported using separate endpoint associations (connections or other associations), each configured to support the desired properties. E.g., a high-speed and low-speed variant can be determined within the service using the same assigned port.

Assigned port numbers are intended to differentiate services, not variations of performance, replicas, pairwise endpoint associations, or payload types. Assigned port numbers are also a small space compared to other Internet number spaces; it is never appropriate to consume assigned port numbers to conserve larger spaces such as IP addresses, especially where copies of a service represent different endpoints.

6.2. Firewall and NAT Considerations

Ultimately, port numbers numbers indicate services only to the endpoints, and any intermediate device that assigns meaning to a value can be incorrect. End systems might agree to run web services (HTTP) over port number 53 (typically used for DNS) rather than port number 80, at which point a firewall that blocks port number 80 but permits port number 53 would not have the desired effect. Nonetheless, assigned port numbers are often used to help configure firewalls and other port-based systems for access control.

Using Dynamic port numbers, or explicitly-indicated port numbers indicated in-band over another service (such as with FTP) often complicates firewall and NAT interactions [RFC959]. FTP over firewalls often requires direct support for deep-packet inspection.
7. Considerations for Requesting Port Number Assignments

Port numbers are assigned by IANA by a set of documented procedures [RFC6335]. The following section describes the steps users can take to help assist with responsible use of assigned port numbers, and with preparing an application for a port number assignment.

7.1. Is a port number assignment necessary?

First, it is useful to consider whether a port number assignment is required. In many cases, a new number assignment may not be needed, for example:

- Is this really a new service, or can an existing service suffice?

- Is this an experimental service [RFC3692]? If so, consider using the current experimental ports [RFC2780].

- Is this service independently useful? Some systems are composed from collections of different service capabilities, but not all component functions are useful as independent services. Port numbers are typically shared among the smallest independently-useful set of functions. Different service uses or properties can be supported in separate pairwise endpoint associations after an initial negotiation, e.g., to support software decomposition.

- Can this service use a Dynamic port number that is coordinated out-of-band, e.g.:
  - By explicit configuration of both endpoints.
  - By internal mechanisms within the same host (e.g., a configuration file, indicated within a URI, or using interprocess communication).
  - Using information exchanged on a related service: FTP, SIP, etc. [RFC959] [RFC3261].
  - Using an existing port discovery service: portmapper, mDNS, etc. [RFC1833] [RFC6762] [RFC6763].
There are a few good examples of reasons that more directly suggest that not only is a port number assignment not necessary, but it is directly counter-indicated:

- Assigned port numbers are not intended to differentiate performance variations within the same service, e.g., high-speed vs. ordinary speed. Performance variations can be supported within a single assigned port number in context of separate pairwise endpoint associations.

- Additional assigned port numbers are not intended to replicate an existing service. For example, if a device is configured to use a typical web browser then it the port number used for that service is a copy of the http service that is already assigned to port number 80 and does not warrant a new assignment. However, an automated system that happens to use HTTP framing – but is not primarily accessed by a browser – might be a new service. A good way to tell is "can an unmodified client of the existing service interact with the proposed service"? If so, that service would be a copy of an existing service and would not merit a new assignment.

- Assigned port numbers not intended for intra-machine communication. Such communication can already be supported by internal mechanisms (interprocess communication, shared memory, shared files, etc.). When Internet communication within a host is desired, the server can bind to a Dynamic port that is indicated to the client using these internal mechanisms.

- Separate assigned port numbers are not intended for insecure versions of existing (or new) secure services. A service that already requires security would be made more vulnerable by having the same capability accessible without security.

Note that the converse is different, i.e., it can be useful to create a new, secure service that replicates an existing insecure service on a new port number assignment. This can be necessary when the existing service is not backward-compatible with security enhancements, such as the use of TLS [RFC5246] or DTLS [RFC6347].
Assigned port numbers are not intended for indicating different service versions. Version differentiation should be handled in-band, e.g., using a version number at the beginning of an association (e.g., connection or other transaction). This may not be possible with legacy assignments, but all new services should incorporate support for version indication.

Some services may not need assigned port numbers at all, e.g., SIP allows voice calls to use Dynamic ports [RFC3261]. Some systems can register services in the DNS, using SRV entries. These services can be discovered by a variety of means, including mDNS, or via direct query [RFC6762] [RFC6763]. In such cases, users can more easily request a SRV name, which are assigned first-come, first-served from a much larger namespace.

IANA assigns port numbers, but this assignment is typically used only for servers, i.e., the host that listens for incoming connections or other associations. Clients, i.e., hosts that initiate connections or other associations, typically refer to those assigned port numbers but do not need port number assignments for their endpoint.

Finally, an assigned port number is not a guarantee of exclusive use. Traffic for any service might appear on any port number, due to misconfiguration or deliberate misuse. Application and service designers are encouraged to validate traffic based on its content.

7.2. How Many Assigned Port Numbers?

As noted earlier, systems might require a single port number assignment, but rarely require multiple port numbers. There are a variety of known ways to reduce assigned port number consumption. Although some may be cumbersome or inefficient, they are nearly always preferable to consuming additional port number assignments.

Such techniques include:

- Use of a discovery service, either a shared service (mDNS), or a discovery service for a given system [RFC6762] [RFC6763].

- Multiplex packet types using in-band information, either on a per-message or per-connection basis. Such demultiplexing can even hand-off different messages and connections among different processes, such as is done with FTP [RFC959].

There are some cases where NAT and firewall traversal are significantly improved by having an assigned port number. Although
NAT traversal protocols supporting automatic configuration have been proposed and developed (e.g., STUN [RFC5389], TURN [RFC5766], and ICE [RFC5245]), not all application and service designers can rely on their presence as of yet.

In the past, some services were assigned multiple port numbers or sometimes fairly large port ranges (e.g., X11). This occurred for a variety of reasons: port number conservation was not as widely appreciated, assignments were not as ardently reviewed, etc. This no longer reflects current practice and such assignments are not considered to constitute a precedent for future assignments.

7.3. Picking an Assigned Port Number

Given a demonstrated need for a port number assignment, the next question is how to pick the desired port number. An application for a port number assignment does not need to include a desired port number; in that case, IANA will select from those currently available.

Users should consider whether the requested port number is important. For example, would an assignment be acceptable if IANA picked the port number value? Would a TCP (or other transport protocol) port number assignment be useful by itself? If so, a port number can be assigned to a service for one transport protocol where it is already (or can be subsequently) assigned to a different service for other transport protocols.

The most critical issue in picking a number is selecting the desired range, i.e., System vs. User port numbers. The distinction was intended to indicate a difference in privilege; originally, System port numbers required privileged (‘root’) access, while User port numbers did not. That distinction has since blurred because some current systems do not limit access control to System port numbers and because some System services have been replicated on User numbers (e.g., IRC). Even so, System port number assignments have continued at an average rate of 3-4 per year over the past 7 years (2007-2013), indicating that the desire to keep this distinction continues.

As a result, the difference between System and User port numbers needs to be treated with caution. Developers are advised to treat services as if they are always run without privilege.

Even when developers seek a System port number assignment, it may be very difficult to obtain. System port number assignment requires IETF Review or IESG Approval and justification that both User and
Dynamic port number ranges are insufficient [RFC6335]. Thus this document recommends both:

>> Developers SHOULD NOT apply for System port number assignments because the increased privilege they are intended to provide is not always enforced.

>> System implementers SHOULD enforce the need for privilege for processes to listen on System port numbers.

At some future date, it might be useful to deprecate the distinction between System and User port numbers altogether. Services typically require elevated (‘root’) privileges to bind to a System port number, but many such services go to great lengths to immediately drop those privileges just after connection or other association establishment to reduce the impact of an attack using their capabilities. Such services might be more securely operated on User port numbers than on System port numbers. Further, if System port numbers were no longer assigned, as of 2014 it would cost only 180 of the 1024 System values (17%), or 180 of the overall 49152 assigned (System and User) values (<0.04%).

7.4. Support for Security

Just as a service is a way to obtain information or processing from a host over a network, a service can also be the opening through which to compromise that host. Protecting a service involves security, which includes integrity protection, source authentication, privacy, or any combination of these capabilities. Security can be provided in a number of ways, and thus:

>> New services SHOULD support security capabilities, either directly or via a content protection such as TLS [RFC5246] or DTLS [RFC6347] or transport protection such as TCP-AO [RFC5925]. Insecure versions of new or existing secure services SHOULD be avoided because of the new vulnerability they create.

Secure versions of legacy services that are not already security-capable via in-band negotiations can be very useful. However, there is no IETF consensus on when separate ports should be used for secure and insecure variants of the same service [RFC2595] [RFC2817] [RFC6335]. The overall preference is for use of a single port, as noted in Section 6 of this document and Section 7.2 of [RFC6335], but the appropriate approach depends on the specific characteristics of the service. As a result:
When requesting both secure and insecure port assignments for the same service, justification is expected for the utility and safety of each port as an independent service (Section 6). Precedent (e.g., citing other protocols that use a separate insecure port) is inadequate justification by itself.

It’s also important to recognize that port number assignment is not itself a guarantee that traffic using that number provides the corresponding service, or that a given service is always offered only on its assigned port number. Port numbers are ultimately meaningful only between endpoints and any service can be run on any port. Thus:

Security SHOULD NOT rely on assigned port number distinctions alone; every service, whether secure or not, is likely to be attacked.

Applications for a new service that requires both a secure and insecure port may be found, on expert review, to be unacceptable, and may not be approved for allocation. Similarly, an application for a new port to support an insecure variant of an existing secure protocol may be found unacceptable. In both cases, the resulting security of the service in practice will be a significant consideration in the decision as to whether to assign an insecure port.

7.5. Support for Future Versions

Requests for assigned port numbers are expected to support multiple versions on the same assigned port number [RFC6335]. Versions are typically indicated in-band, either at the beginning of a connection or other association, or in each protocol message.

Version support SHOULD be included in new services rather than relying on different port number assignments for different versions.

Version numbers SHOULD NOT be included in either the service name or service description, to avoid the need to make additional port number assignments for future variants of a service.

Again, the assigned port number space is far too limited to be used as an indicator of protocol version or message type. Although this has happened in the past (e.g., for NFS), it should be avoided in new requests.
7.6. Transport Protocols

IANA assigns port numbers specific to one or more transport protocols, typically UDP [RFC768] and TCP [RFC793], but also SCTP [RFC4960], DCCP [RFC4340], and any other standard transport protocol. Originally, IANA port number assignments were concurrent for both UDP and TCP, and other transports were not indicated. However, to conserve the assigned port number space and to reflect increasing use of other transports, assignments are now specific only to the transport being used.

In general, a service should request assignments for multiple transports using the same service name and description on the same port number only when they all reflect essentially the same service. Good examples of such use are DNS and NFS, where the difference between the UDP and TCP services are specific to supporting each transport. E.g., the UDP variant of a service might add sequence numbers and the TCP variant of the same service might add in-band message delimiters. This document does not describe the appropriate selection of a transport protocol for a service.

>> Service names and descriptions for multiple transport port number assignments SHOULD match only when they describe the same service, excepting only enhancements for each supported transport.

When the services differ, it may be acceptable or preferable to use the same port number, but the service names and descriptions should be different for each transport/service pair, reflecting the differences in the services. E.g., if TCP is used for the basic control protocol and UDP for an alarm protocol, then the services might be "name-ctl" and "name-alarm". A common example is when TCP is used for a service and UDP is used to determine whether that service is active (e.g., via a unicast, broadcast, or multicast test message) [RFC1122]. IANA has, for several years, used the suffix "-disc" in service names to distinguish discovery services, such as are used to identify endpoints capable of a given service:

>> Names of discovery services SHOULD use an identifiable suffix; the suggestion is "-disc".

Some services are used for discovery, either in conjunction with a TCP service or as a stand-alone capability. Such services will be more reliable when using multicast rather than broadcast (over IPv4) because IP routers do not forward "all nodes" broadcasts (all 1’s, i.e., 255.255.255.255 for IPv4) and have not been required to support subnet-directed broadcasts since 1999 [RFC1812] [RFC2644].
This issue is relevant only for IPv4 because IPv6 does not support broadcast.

>> UDP over IPv4 multi-host services SHOULD use multicast rather than broadcast.

Designers should be very careful in creating services over transports that do not support congestion control or error recovery, notably UDP. There are several issues that should be considered in such cases, as summarized in Table 1 in [RFC5405]. In addition, the following recommendations apply to service design:

>> Services that use multipoint communication SHOULD be scalable, and SHOULD NOT rely solely on the efficiency of multicast transmission for scalability.

>> Services SHOULD NOT use UDP as a performance enhancement over TCP, e.g., to circumnavigate TCP’s congestion control.

7.7. When to Request an Assignment

Assignments are typically requested when a user has enough information to reasonably answer the questions in the IANA application. IANA applications typically take up to a few weeks to process, with some complex cases taking up to a month. The process typically involves a few exchanges between the IANA Ports Expert Review team and the applicant.

An application needs to include a description of the service, as well as to address key questions designed to help IANA determine whether the assignment is justified. The application should be complete and not refer solely to the Internet Draft, RFC, a website, or any other external documentation.

Services that are independently developed can be requested at any time, but are typically best requested in the last stages of design and initial experimentation, before any deployment has occurred that cannot easily be updated.

>> Users MUST NOT deploy implementations that use assigned port numbers prior their assignment by IANA.

>> Users MUST NOT deploy implementations that default to using the experimental System port numbers (1021 and 1022 [RFC4727]) outside a controlled environment where they can be updated with a subsequent assigned port [RFC3692].
Deployments that use unassigned port numbers before assignment complicate IANA management of the port number space. Keep in mind that this recommendation protects existing assignees, users of current services, and applicants for new assignments; it helps ensure that a desired number and service name are available when assigned. The list of currently unassigned numbers is just that—*currently* unassigned. It does not reflect pending applications. Waiting for an official IANA assignment reduces the chance that an assignment request will conflict with another deployed service.

Applications made through Internet Draft / RFC publication (in any stream) typically use a placeholder ("PORTNUM") in the text, and implementations use an experimental port number until a final assignment has been made [RFC6335]. That assignment is initially indicated in the IANA Considerations section of the document, which is tracked by the RFC Editor. When a document has been approved for publication, that request is forwarded to IANA for handling. IANA will make the new assignment accordingly. At that time, IANA may also request that the applicant fill out the application form on their website, e.g., when the RFC does not directly address the information expected as per [RFC6335]. "Early" assignments can be made when justified, e.g., for early interoperability testing, according to existing process [RFC7120] [RFC6335].

>> Users writing specifications SHOULD use symbolic names for port numbers and service names until an IANA assignment has been completed. Implementations SHOULD use experimental port numbers during this time, but those numbers MUST NOT be cited in documentation except as interim.

7.8. Squatting

"Squatting" describes the use of a number from the assignable range in deployed software without IANA assignment for that use, regardless of whether the number has been assigned or remains available for assignment. It is hazardous because IANA cannot track such usage and thus cannot avoid making legitimate assignments that conflict with such unauthorized usage.

Such "squatted" port numbers remain unassigned, and IANA retains the right to assign them when requested by other applicants. Application and service designers are reminded that is never appropriate to use port numbers that have not been directly assigned [RFC6335]. In particular, any unassigned code from the assigned ranges will be assigned by IANA, and any conflict will be easily resolved as the protocol designer’s fault once that happens (because they would not be the assignee). This may reflect in the public’s judgment on the
quality of their expertise and cooperation with the Internet
community.

Regardless, there are numerous services that have squatted on such
numbers that are in widespread use. Designers who are using such
port numbers are encouraged to apply for an assignment. Note that
even widespread de-facto use may not justify a later IANA assignment
of that value, especially if either the value has already been
assigned to a legitimate applicant or if the service would not
qualify for an assignment of its own accord.

7.9. Other Considerations

As noted earlier, System port numbers should be used sparingly, and
it is better to avoid them altogether. This avoids the potentially
incorrect assumption that the service on such port numbers run in a
privileged mode.

Assigned port numbers are not intended to be changed; this includes
the corresponding service name. Once deployed, it can be very
difficult to recall every implementation, so the assignment should
be retained. However, in cases where the current assignee of a name
or number has reasonable knowledge of the impact on such uses, and
is willing to accept that impact, the name or number of an
assignment can be changed [RFC6335]

Aliases, or multiple service names for the same assigned port
number, are no longer considered appropriate [RFC6335].

8. Security Considerations

This document focuses on the issues arising when designing services
that require new port assignments. Section 7.4 addresses the
security and security-related issues of that interaction.

When designing a secure service, the use of TLS [RFC5246], DTLS
[RFC6347], or TCP-AO [RFC5925] mechanisms that protect transport
protocols or their contents is encouraged. It may not be possible to
use IPsec [RFC4301] in similar ways because of the different
relationship between IPsec and port numbers and because applications
may not be aware of IPsec protections.

This document reminds application and service designers that port
numbers do not protect against denial of service attack or guarantee
that traffic should be trusted. Using assigned numbers for port
filtering isn’t a substitute for authentication, encryption, and
integrity protection. The port number alone should not be used to
avoid denial of service attacks or to manage firewall traffic
because the use of port numbers is not regulated or validated.

The use of assigned port numbers is the antithesis of privacy
because they are intended to explicitly indicate the desired
application or service. Strictly, port numbers are meaningful only
at the endpoints, so any interpretation elsewhere in the network can
be arbitrarily incorrect. However, those numbers can also expose
information about available services on a given host. This
information can be used by intermediate devices to monitor and
intercept traffic as well as to potentially identify key endpoint
software properties ("fingerprinting"), which can be used to direct
other attacks.

9. IANA Considerations

The entirety of this document focuses on suggestions that help
ensure the conservation of port numbers and provide useful hints for
issuing informative requests thereof.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate

[RFC2780] Bradner, S., and V. Paxson, "IANA Allocation Guidelines
For Values In the Internet Protocol and Related Headers",
BCP 37, RFC 2780, March 2000.


[RFC4727] Fenner, B., "Experimental Values in IPv4, IPv6, ICMPv4,
ICMPv6, UDP, and TCP Headers", RFC 4727, November 2006.


Guidelines for Application Designers", BCP 145, RFC 5405,
Nov. 2008.

10.2. Informative References


11. Acknowledgments

This work benefitted from the feedback from David Black, Lars Eggert, Gorry Fairhurst, and Eliot Lear, as well as discussions of the IETF TSVWG WG.

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Abstract

RFC 2872 defines an Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) object for application identifiers. This document uses that App-ID and gives implementers specific guidelines for differing voice and video stream identifications to nodes along a reservation path, creating specific profiles for voice and video session identification.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

RFC 2872 [RFC2872] describes the usage of policy elements for providing application information in Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) signaling [RFC2205]. The intention of providing this information is to enable application-based policy control. However, RFC 2872 does not enumerate any application profiles. The absence of explicit, uniform profiles leads to incompatible handling of these values and misapplied policies. An application profile used by a sender might not be understood by the intermediaries or receiver in a different domain. Therefore, there is a need to enumerate application profiles that are universally understood and applied for correct policy control.

Call control between endpoints has the ability to bind or associate many attributes to a reservation. One new attribute is currently being defined so as to establish the type of traffic contained in that reservation. This is accomplished via assigning a traffic label to the call (or session or flow) [ID-TRAF-CLASS].

This document takes the application traffic classes from [ID-TRAF-CLASS] and places those strings in the APP-ID object defined in RFC 2872. Thus, the intermediary devices (e.g., routers) processing the RSVP message can learn the identified profile within the Application-ID policy element for a particular reservation, and possibly be configured with the profile(s) to understand them.
correctly, thus performing the correct admission control.

Another goal of this document is to the ability to signal an application profile which can then be translated into a DSCP value as per the choice of each domain. While the DCLASS object [RFC2996] allows the transfer of DSCP value in an RSVP message, that RFC does not allow the flexibility of having different domains choosing the DSCP value for the traffic classes that they maintain.

How these labels indicate the appropriate Differentiated Services Codepoint (DSCP) is out of scope for this document.

This document will break out each application type and propose how the values in application-id template should be populated for uniformity and interoperability.

1.1 Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC 2119].

2. RSVP Application ID Template

The template from RFC 2872 is as follows:

```
+-----------------------------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| PE Length (8)                     | P-type = AUTH_APP |
|-----------------------------------|----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Attribute Length                  | A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR | Sub-type = ASCII_DN |
|-----------------------------------|----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Application name as ASCII string  | (e.g. SAP.EXE) |
|-----------------------------------|----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
```

In line with how this policy element is constructed in RFC 2872, the A-type will remain "POLICY_LOCATOR".

The P-type field is first created in [RFC2752]. This document uses the existing P-type "AUTH_APP" for application traffic class.

The first Sub-type will be mandatory for every profile within this document, and will be "ASCII_DN". No other Sub-types are defined by any profile within this document, but MAY be included by individual implementations - and MUST be ignored if not understood by receiving implementations along the reservation path.
RFC 2872 states the #1 sub-element from RFC 2872 as the "identifier that uniquely identifies the application vendor", which is optional to include. This document modifies this vendor limitation so that the identifier need only be unique - and not limited to an application vendor (identifier). For example, this specification now allows an RFC that defines an industry recognizable term or string to be a valid identifier. For example, a term or string taken from another IETF document, such as "conversational" or "avconf" from [ID-TRAFF-CLASS]. This sub-element is still optional to include.

The following subsections will define the values within the above template into specific profiles for voice and video identification.

3. The Voice and Video Application-ID Profiles

This section contains the elements of the Application ID policy object which is used to signal the application classes defined in [ID-TRAFF-CLASS].

3.1 The Broadcast Profiles

Broadcast profiles are for minimally buffered one-way streaming flows, such as video surveillance, or Internet based concerts or non-VOD TV broadcasts such as live sporting events.

This document creates Broadcast profiles for

- Broadcast IPTV for audio and video
- Broadcast Live-events for audio and video
- Broadcast Surveillance for audio and video

Here is an example profile for identifying Broadcast Video-Surveillance

AUTH_APP, POLICY_LOCATOR, ASCII_DN,
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt, APP=broadcast.video.surveillance, VER="

[Editor’s Note: "rfcXXXX" will be replaced with the RFC number assigned to the [ID-TRAFF-CLASS] reference. This ‘note’ should be removed during the RFC-Editor review process.]

Where the Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) indicates the documented reference that created this well-known string [ID-TRAFF-CLASS], the APP is the profile name with no spaces, and the "VER=" is included, but has no value at this time.
3.2 The Realtime Interactive Profiles

Realtime Interactive profiles are for on-line gaming, and both remote and virtual avconf applications, in which the timing is particularly important towards the feedback to uses of these applications. This traffic type will generally not be UDP based, with minimal tolerance to RTT delays.

This document creates Realtime Interactive profiles for

- Realtime-Interactive Gaming
- Realtime-Interactive Remote-Desktop
- Realtime-Interactive Virtualized-Desktop

Here is the profile for identifying Realtime-Interactive Gaming

AUTH_APP, POLICY_LOCATOR, ASCII_DN,
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=realtime-interactive.gaming, VER="

Where the Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) indicates the documented reference that created this well-known string [ID-TRAF-CLASS], the APP is the profile name with no spaces, and the "VER=" is included, but has no value, but MAY if versioning becomes important.

3.3 The Multimedia Conferencing Profiles

There will be Multimedia Conferencing profiles for presentation data, application sharing and whiteboarding, where these applications will most often be associated with a larger Conversational (audio and/or audio/video) conference. Timing is important, but some minimal delays are acceptable, unlike the case for Realtime-Interactive traffic.

This document creates Multimedia-Conferencing profiles for

- Multimedia-Conferencing presentation-data
- Multimedia-Conferencing presentation-video
- Multimedia-Conferencing presentation-audio
- Multimedia-Conferencing application-sharing
- Multimedia-Conferencing whiteboarding

Here is the profile for identifying Multimedia-Conferencing Application-sharing

AUTH_APP, POLICY_LOCATOR, ASCII_DN,
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=multimedia-conferencing.application-sharing, VER="

Where the Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) indicates the RFC reference that created this well-known string [ID-TRAF-CLASS], the
APP is the profile name with no spaces, and the "VER=" is included, but has no value, but MAY if versioning becomes important.

3.4 The Multimedia Streaming Profiles

Multimedia Streaming profiles are for more significantly buffered one-way streaming flows than Broadcast profiles. These include...

This document creates Multimedia Streaming profiles for

- Multimedia-Streaming multiplex
- Multimedia-Streaming webcast

Here is the profile for identifying Multimedia Streaming webcast

AUTH_APP, POLICY_LOCATOR, ASCII_DN,
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=multimedia-streaming.webcast, VER="

Where the Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) indicates the documented reference that created this well-known string [ID-TRAF-CLASS], the APP is the profile name with no spaces, and the "VER=" is included, but has no value, but MAY if versioning becomes important.

3.5 The Conversational Profiles

Conversational category is for realtime bidirectional communications, such as voice or video, and is the most numerous due to the choices of application with or without adjectives. The number of profiles is then doubled because there needs to be one for unadmitted and one for admitted. The IANA section lists all that are currently proposed for registration at this time, therefore there will not be an exhaustive list provided in this section.

This document creates Conversational profiles for

- Conversational Audio
- Conversational Audio Admitted
- Conversational Video
- Conversational Video Admitted
- Conversational Audio Avconf
- Conversational Audio Avconf Admitted
- Conversational Video Avconf
- Conversational Video Avconf Admitted
- Conversational Audio Immersive
- Conversational Audio Immersive Admitted
- Conversational Video Immersive
- Conversational Video Immersive Admitted

Here is an example profile for identifying Conversational Audio:
4. Security considerations

The security considerations section within RFC 2872 sufficiently covers this document, with one possible exception - someone using the wrong template values (e.g., claiming a reservation is Multimedia Streaming when it is in fact Real-time Interactive).

Given that each traffic flow is within separate reservations, and RSVP does not have the ability to police the type of traffic within any reservation, solving for this appears to be administratively handled at best. This is not meant to be a 'punt', but there really is nothing this template creates that is going to make things any harder for anyone (that we know of now).

5. IANA considerations

5.1 Application Profiles

This document requests IANA create a new registry for the application identification classes similar to the following table within the Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) Parameters registry:

Registry Name: RSVP APP-ID Profiles
Reference: [this document]
Registration procedures: Standards Track document [RFC5226]

[Editor’s Note: "rfcXXXX" will be replaced with the RFC number assigned to the [ID-TRAFF-CLASS] reference. This 'note' should be removed during the RFC-Editor review process.]

5.1.1 Broadcast Profiles IANA Registry

Broadcast Audio IPTV Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=conversational.audio, VER="

Where the Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) indicates the documented reference that created this well-known string [ID-TRAFF-CLASS], the APP is the profile name with no spaces, and the "VER=" is included, but has no value, but MAY if versioning becomes important.
Broadcast Video IPTV Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=broadcast.video.iptv, VER="
Reference: [this document]

Broadcast Audio Live-events Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=broadcast.audio.live-events, VER="
Reference: [this document]

Broadcast Video Live-events Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=broadcast.video.live-events, VER="
Reference: [this document]

Broadcast Audio-Surveillance Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=broadcast.audio.surveillance, VER="
Reference: [this document]

Broadcast Video-Surveillance Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=broadcast.video.surveillance, VER="
Reference: [this document]

5.1.2 Realtime-Interactive Profiles IANA Registry

Realtime-Interactive Gaming Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator = "GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt, APP= realtime-interactive.gaming, VER="
Reference: [this document]

Real-time Interactive Remote-Desktop Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator = "GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt, APP=realtime-interactive.remote-desktop, VER="
Reference: [this document]

Real-time Interactive Virtualized-Desktop Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator = "GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt, APP=realtime-interactive.remote-desktop.virtual, VER="
Reference: [this document]

Real-time Interactive Telemetry Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator = "GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt, APP=realtime-interactive.telemetry, VER="
Reference: [this document]

5.1.3 Multimedia-Conferencing Profiles IANA Registry

Multimedia-Conferencing Presentation-Data Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator = "GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt, APP= multimedia-conferencing.presentation-data, VER="
Reference: [this document]

Multimedia-Conferencing Presentation-Video Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator = "GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
Multimedia-Conferencing Presentation-Audio Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP= multimedia-conferencing.presentation-audio,
VER="

Reference: [this document]

Multimedia-Conferencing Application-Sharing Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP= multimedia-conferencing.application-sharing,
VER="

Reference: [this document]

Multimedia-Conferencing Whiteboarding Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP= multimedia-conferencing.whiteboarding, VER="

Reference: [this document]

5.1.4 Multimedia-Streaming Profiles IANA Registry

Multimedia-Streaming Multiplex Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=multimedia-streaming.multiplex, VER="

Reference: [this document]

Multimedia-Streaming Webcast Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=multimedia-streaming.webcast, VER="

Reference: [this document]
5.1.5 Conversational Profiles IANA Registry

Conversational Audio Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=conversational.audio, VER="

Reference: [this document]

Conversational Audio Admitted Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=conversational.audio.aq:admitted, VER="

Reference: [this document]

Conversational Video Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=conversational.video, VER="

Reference: [this document]

Conversational Video Admitted Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=conversational.video.aq:admitted, VER="

Reference: [this document]

Conversational Audio Avconf Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=conversational.audio.avconf, VER="

Reference: [this document]

Conversational Audio Avconf Admitted Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
Conversational Video Avconf Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=conversational.video.avconf, VER="
Reference: [this document]

Conversational Video Avconf Admitted Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=conversational.video.avconf.aq:admitted, VER="
Reference: [this document]

Conversational Audio Immersive Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=conversational.audio.immersive, VER="
Reference: [this document]

Conversational Audio Immersive Admitted Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
APP=conversational.audio.immersive.aq:admitted, VER="
Reference: [this document]

Conversational Video Immersive Profile
P-type = AUTH_APP
A-type = POLICY_LOCATOR
Sub-type = ASCII_DN
Conformant policy locator =
"GUID=http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt,
6. Acknowledgments

To Francois Le Faucheur, Paul Jones, Ken Carlberg, Georgios Karagiannis and Glen Lavers for their helpful comments, document reviews and encouragement.

7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


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Appendix - Changes to ID

[Editor’s Note: this appendix should be removed in the RFC-Editor’s process.]

A.1 - Changes from WG version -00 to WG version -01

The following changes were made in this version:

- corrected nits
- globally replaced GUID link from the MMUSIC Trafficclass ID to the future RFC of that document.
- added profiles for presentation-video and presentation-audio

A.2 - Changes from Individual -04 to WG version -00

The following changes were made in this version:
- changed P-Type from APP_TC back to AUTH_APP, which is already defined.
- fixed nits and inconsistencies

A.3 - Changes from Individual -03 to -04

The following changes were made in this version:

- clarified security considerations section to mean RSVP cannot police the type of traffic within a reservation to know if a traffic flow should be using a different profile, as defined in this document.

- changed existing informative language regarding "... other Sub-types ..." from ‘can’ to normative ‘MAY’.
- editorial changes to clear up minor mistakes

A.4 - Changes from Individual -02 to -03

The following changes were made in this version:

- Added [ID-TRAF-CLASS] as a reference
- Changed to a new format of the profile string.
- Added many new profiles based on the new format into each parent category of Section 3.

- changed the GUID to refer to draft-ietf-mmusic-traffic-class-for-sdp-03.txt

- changed ‘desktop’ adjective to ‘avconf’ to keep in alignment with [ID-TRAF-CLASS]

- Have a complete IANA Registry proposal for each application-ID discussed in this draft.

- General text clean-up of the draft.
Abstract

This document specifies extensions to Generic Aggregated RSVP RFC 4860 for support of the PCN Controlled Load (CL) and Single Marking (SM) edge behaviors over a Diffserv cloud using Pre-Congestion Notification.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 6, 2015.
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1. Introduction

1.1 Objective

Pre-Congestion Notification (PCN) can support the quality of service (QoS) of inelastic flows within a Diffserv domain in a simple, scalable, and robust fashion. Two mechanisms are used: admission control and flow termination. Admission control is used to decide whether to admit or block a new flow request, while flow termination is used in abnormal circumstances to decide whether to terminate some of the existing flows. To support these two features, the overall rate of PCN-traffic is metered on every link in the domain, and PCN-packets are appropriately marked when certain configured rates are exceeded. These configured rates are below the rate of the link, thus providing notification to boundary nodes about overloads before any congestion occurs (hence "pre-congestion" notification). The PCN-egress-nodes measure the rates of differently marked PCN traffic in periodic intervals and report these rates to the Decision Points for admission control and flow termination; the Decision Points use these rates to make decisions. The Decision Points may be collocated with the PCN-ingress-nodes, or their function may be implemented in another node. For more details see [RFC5559], [RFC6661], and [RFC6662].

The main objective of this document is to specify the signaling protocol that can be used within a Pre-Congestion Notification (PCN) domain to carry reports from a PCN-ingress-node to a PCN Decision point, considering that the PCN Decision Point and PCN-egress-node are collocated. If the PCN Decision Point is not collocated with the PCN-egress-node then additional signaling procedures are required that are out of the scope of this document. Moreover, as mentioned above this architecture conforms with PBAC (Policy-Based Admission Control), when the Decision Point is located in a another node then the PCN-ingress-node [RFC2753].

Several signaling protocols can be used to carry information between PCN-boundary-nodes (PCN-ingress-node and PCN-egress-node). However, since (1) both PCN-egress-node and PCN-ingress-nodes are located on the data path and (2) the admission control procedure needs to be done at PCN-egress-node, a signaling protocol that follows the same path as the data path, like RSVP (Resource Reservation Protocol), is more suited for this purpose. In particular, this document specifies extensions to Generic Aggregated RSVP [RFC4860] for support of the PCN Controlled Load (CL) and Single Marking (SM) edge behaviors over a Diffserv cloud using Pre-Congestion Notification.

This draft is intended to be published as Experimental in order to:

o) validate industry interest by allowing implementation and deployment

o) gather operational experience, in particular around dynamic interactions of RSVP signaling and PCN notification and
corresponding levels of performance.

Support for the techniques specified in this document involves RSVP functionality in boundary nodes of a PCN domain whose interior nodes forward RSVP traffic without performing RSVP functionality.

1.2 Overview and Motivation

Two main Quality of Service (QoS) architectures have been specified by the IETF. These are the Integrated Services (Intserv) [RFC1633] architecture and the Differentiated Services (DiffServ) architecture ([RFC2475]).

Intserv provides methods for the delivery of end-to-end Quality of Service (QoS) to applications over heterogeneous networks. One of the QoS signaling protocols used by the Intserv architecture is the Resource reServation Protocol (RSVP) [RFC2205], which can be used by applications to request per-flow resources from the network. These RSVP requests can be admitted or rejected by the network. Applications can express their quantifiable resource requirements using Intserv parameters as defined in [RFC2211] and [RFC2212]. The Controlled Load (CL) service [RFC2211] is a quality of service (QoS) closely approximating the QoS that the same flow would receive from a lightly loaded network element. The CL service is useful for inelastic flows such as those used for real-time media.

The DiffServ architecture can support the differentiated treatment of packets in very large scale environments. While Intserv and RSVP classify packets per-flow, Diffserv networks classify packets into one of a small number of aggregated flows or "classes", based on the Diffserv codepoint (DSCP) in the packet IP header. At each Diffserv router, packets are subjected to a "per-hop behavior" (PHB), which is invoked by the DSCP. The primary benefit of Diffserv is its scalability, since the need for per-flow state and per-flow processing, is eliminated.

However, DiffServ does not include any mechanism for communication between applications and the network. Several solutions have been specified to solve this issue. One of these solutions is Intserv over Diffserv [RFC2998] including resource-based admission control (RBAC), PBAC, assistance in traffic identification/classification, and traffic conditioning. Intserv over Diffserv can operate over a statically provisioned or a RSVP aware Diffserv region. When it is RSVP aware, several mechanisms may be used to support dynamic provisioning and topology-aware admission control, including aggregate RSVP reservations, per-flow RSVP, or a bandwidth broker. [RFC3175] specifies aggregation of Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) end-to-end reservations over aggregate RSVP reservations. In [RFC3175] the RSVP generic aggregated reservation is characterized by a RSVP SESSION object using the 3-tuple <source IP address, destination IP address, Diffserv Code Point>.

Several scenarios require the use of multiple generic aggregate reservations that are established for a given PHB from a given source.
IP address to a given destination IP address, see [SIG-NESTED], [RFC4860]. For example, multiple generic aggregate reservations can be applied in the situation that multiple E2E reservations using different preemption priorities need to be aggregated through a PCN-domain using the same PHB. By using multiple aggregate reservations for the same PHB, it allows enforcement of the different preemption priorities within the aggregation region. This allows more efficient management of the DiffServ resources, and in periods of resource shortage, this allows sustainment of a larger number of E2E reservations with higher preemption priorities. In particular, [SIG-NESTED] discusses in detail how end-to-end RSVP reservations can be established in a nested VPN environment through RSVP aggregation.

[RFC4860] provides generic aggregate reservations by extending [RFC3175] to support multiple aggregate reservations for the same source IP address, destination IP address, and PHB (or set of PHBs). In particular, multiple such generic aggregate reservations can be established for a given PHB from a given source IP address to a given destination IP address. This is achieved by adding the concept of a Virtual Destination Port and of an Extended Virtual Destination Port in the RSVP SESSION object. In addition to this, the RSVP SESSION object for generic aggregate reservations uses the PHB Identification Code (PHB-ID) defined in [RFC3140], instead of using the DiffServ Code Point (DSCP) used in [RFC3175]. The PHB-ID is used to identify the PHB, or set of PHBs, from which the DiffServ resources are to be reserved.

The RSVP like signaling protocol required to carry (1) requests from a PCN-egress-node to a PCN-ingress-node and (2) reports from a PCN-ingress-node to a PCN-egress-node needs to follow the PCN signaling requirements defined in [RFC6663]. In addition to that the signaling protocol functionality supported by the PCN-ingress-nodes and PCN-egress-nodes needs to maintain logical aggregate constructs (i.e. ingress-egress-aggregate state) and be able to map E2E reservations to these aggregate constructs. Moreover, no actual reservation state is needed to be maintained inside the PCN domain, i.e., the PCN-interior-nodes are not maintaining any reservation state.

This can be accomplished by two possible approaches:

Approach (1):

- adapting the RFC 4860 aggregation procedures to fit the PCN requirements with as little change as possible over the RFC 4860 functionality
- hence performing aggregate RSVP signaling (even if it is to be ignored by PCN interior nodes)
- using this aggregate RSVP signaling procedures to carry PCN information between the PCN-boundary-nodes (PCN-ingress-node and PCN-egress-node).
Approach (2):

- adapting the RFC 4860 aggregation procedures to fit the PCN requirements with more significant changes over RFC4860 (i.e. the aspect of the procedures that have to do with maintaining aggregate states and to do with mapping the E2E reservations to aggregate constructs are kept, but the procedures that have to do with the aggregate RSVP signaling and aggregate reservation establishment/maintenance are dropped).

- hence not performing aggregate RSVP signaling

- piggy-backing of the PCN information inside the E2E RSVP signaling.

Both approaches are probably viable, however, since the RFC 4860 operations have been thoroughly studied and implemented, it can be considered that the RFC 4860 solution can better deal with the more challenging situations (rerouting in the PCN domain, failure of an PCN-ingress-node, failure of an PCN-egress-node, rerouting towards a different edge, etc.). This is the reason for choosing Approach (1) for the specification of the signaling protocol used to carry PCN information between the PCN-boundary-nodes (PCN-ingress-node and PCN-egress-node).

In particular, this document specifies extensions to Generic Aggregated RSVP [RFC4860] for support of the PCN Controlled Load (CL) and Single Marking (SM) edge behaviors over a Diffserv cloud using Pre-Congestion Notification.

This document follows the PCN signaling requirements defined in [RFC6663] and specifies extensions to Generic Aggregated RSVP [RFC4860] for support of PCN edge behaviors as specified in [RFC6661] and [RFC6662]. Moreover, this document specifies how RSVP aggregation can be used to setup and maintain: (1) Ingress Egress Aggregate (IEA) states at Ingress and Egress nodes and (2) generic aggregation of RSVP end-to-end RSVP reservations over PCN (Congestion and Pre-Congestion Notification) domains.

To comply with this specification, PCN-nodes MUST be able to support the functionality specified in [RFC5670], [RFC5559], [RFC6660], [RFC6661], [RFC6662]. Furthermore, the PCN-boundary-nodes MUST support the RSVP generic aggregated reservation procedures specified in [RFC4860] which are augmented with procedures specified in this document.

1.3. Terminology

This document uses terms defined in [RFC4860], [RFC3175], [RFC5559], [RFC5670], [RFC6661], [RFC6662].

For readability, a number of definitions from [RFC3175] as well as definitions for terms used in [RFC5559], [RFC6661], and [RFC6662] are provided here, where some of them are augmented with new meanings:
Aggregator
This is the process in (or associated with) the router at the ingress edge of the aggregation region (with respect to the end-to-end RSVP reservation) and behaving in accordance with [RFC4860]. In this document, it is also the PCN-ingress-node. It is important to notice that in the context of this document the Aggregator must be able to determine the Deaggregator using the procedures specified in Section 4 of [RFC4860] and in Section 1.4.2 of [RFC3175].

Congestion level estimate (CLE):
The ratio of PCN-marked to total PCN-traffic (measured in octets) received for a given ingress-egress-aggregate during a given measurement period. The CLE is used to derive the PCN-admission-state and is also used by the report suppression procedure if report suppression is activated.

Deaggregator
This is the process in (or associated with) the router at the egress edge of the aggregation region (with respect to the end-to-end RSVP reservation) and behaving in accordance with [RFC4860]. In this document, it is also the PCN-egress-node and Decision Point.

E2E
end to end

E2E Reservation
This is an RSVP reservation such that:

(i) corresponding RSVP Path messages are initiated upstream of the Aggregator and terminated downstream of the Deaggregator, and

(ii) corresponding RSVP Resv messages are initiated downstream of the Deaggregator and terminated upstream of the Aggregator, and

(iii) this RSVP reservation is aggregated over an Ingress Egress Aggregate (IEA) between the Aggregator and Deaggregator.

An E2E RSVP reservation may be a per-flow reservation, which in this document is only maintained at the PCN-ingress-node and PCN-egress-node. Alternatively, the E2E reservation may itself be an aggregate reservation of various types (e.g., Aggregate IP reservation, Aggregate IPsec reservation, see [RFC4860]). As per regular RSVP operations, E2E RSVP reservations are unidirectional.

E2E microflow
a microflow where its associated packets are being forwarded on an E2E path.
Extended vDstPort (Extended Virtual Destination Port)

An identifier used in the SESSION that remains constant over the life of the generic aggregate reservation. The length of this identifier is 32-bits when IPv4 addresses are used and 128 bits when IPv6 addresses are used.

A sender (or Aggregator) that wishes to narrow the scope of a SESSION to the sender-receiver pair (or Aggregator-Deaggregator pair) should place its IPv4 or IPv6 address here as a network unique identifier. A sender (or Aggregator) that wishes to use a common session with other senders (or Aggregators) in order to use a shared reservation across senders (or Aggregators) must set this field to all zeros. In this document, the Extended vDstPort should contain the IPv4 or IPv6 address of the Aggregator.

ETM-rate

The rate of excess-traffic-marked PCN-traffic received at a PCN-egress-node for a given ingress-egress-aggregate in octets per second.

Ingress-egress-aggregate (IEA):

The collection of PCN-packets from all PCN-flows that travel in one direction between a specific pair of PCN-boundary-nodes. In this document one RSVP generic aggregated reservation is mapped to only one ingress-egress-aggregate, while one ingress-egress-aggregate is mapped to either one or to more than one RSVP generic aggregated reservations. PCN-flows and their PCN-traffic that are mapped into a specific RSVP generic aggregated reservation can also easily be mapped into their corresponding ingress-egress-aggregate.

Microflow:

(a single instance of an application-to-application flow of packets which is identified by source address, destination address, protocol id, and source port, destination port (where applicable).

PCN-domain:

(a PCN-capable domain; a contiguous set of PCN-enabled nodes that perform Diffserv scheduling [RFC2474]; the complete set of PCN-nodes that in principle can, through PCN-marking packets, influence decisions about flow admission and termination within the domain; includes the PCN-egress-nodes, which measure these PCN-marks, and the PCN-ingress-nodes.

PCN-boundary-node: a PCN-node that connects one PCN-domain to a node either in another PCN-domain or in a non-PCN-domain.
PCN-interior-node: a node in a PCN-domain that is not a PCN-boundary-node.

PCN-node: a PCN-boundary-node or a PCN-interior-node.

PCN-egress-node: a PCN-boundary-node in its role in handling traffic as it leaves a PCN-domain. In this document the PCN-egress-node operates also as a Decision Point and Deaggregator.

PCN-ingress-node: a PCN-boundary-node in its role in handling traffic as it enters a PCN-domain. In this document the PCN-ingress-node operates also as a Aggregator.

PCN-traffic, PCN-packets, PCN-BA: a PCN-domain carries traffic of different Diffserv behavior aggregates (BAs) [RFC2474]. The PCN-BA uses the PCN mechanisms to carry PCN-traffic, and the corresponding packets are PCN-packets. The same network will carry traffic of other Diffserv BAs. The PCN-BA is distinguished by a combination of the Diffserv codepoint (DSCP) and ECN fields.

PCN-flow: the unit of PCN-traffic that the PCN-boundary-node admits (or terminates); the unit could be a single E2E microflow (as defined in [RFC2474]) or some identifiable collection of microflows.

PCN-admission-state: The state ("admit" or "block") derived by the Decision Point for a given ingress-egress-aggregate based on statistics about PCN-packet marking. The Decision Point decides to admit or block new flows offered to the aggregate based on the current value of the PCN-admission-state.

PCN-sent-rate: The rate of PCN-traffic received at a PCN-ingress-node and destined for a given ingress-egress-aggregate in octets per second.

PHB-ID (Per Hop Behavior Identification Code): A 16-bit field containing the Per Hop Behavior Identification Code of the PHB, or of the set of PHBs, from which Diffserv resources are to be reserved. This field must be encoded as specified in Section 2 of [RFC3140].

RSVP generic aggregated reservation: an RSVP reservation that is identified by using the RSVP SESSION object for generic RSVP aggregated reservation. This RSVP
SESSION object is based on the RSVP SESSION object specified in [RFC4860] augmented with the following information:

- the IPv4 DestAddress, IPv6 DestAddress should be set to the IPv4 or IPv6 destination addresses, respectively, of the Deaggregator (PCN-egress-node)
- PHB-ID (Per Hop Behavior Identification Code) should be set equal to PCN-compatible Diffserv codepoint(s).
- Extended vDstPort should be set to the IPv4 or IPv6 destination addresses, of the Aggregator (PCN-ingress-node)

VDstPort (Virtual Destination Port)
A 16-bit identifier used in the SESSION that remains constant over the life of the generic aggregate reservation.

1.4. Organization of This Document

This document is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of RSVP extensions and operations. The elements of the used procedures are specified in Section 3. Section 4 describes the protocol elements. The security considerations are given in section 5 and the IANA considerations are provided in Section 6.

2. Overview of RSVP extensions and Operations

2.1 Overview of RSVP Aggregation Procedures in PCN domains

The PCN-boundary-nodes, see Figure 1, can support RSVP SESSIONS for generic aggregated reservations [RFC4860], which are depending on ingress-egress-aggregates. In particular, one RSVP generic aggregated reservation matches to only one ingress-egress-aggregate.

However, one ingress-egress-aggregate matches to either one, or more than one, RSVP generic aggregated reservations. In addition, to comply with this specification, the PCN-boundary nodes need to distinguish and process (1) RSVP SESSIONS for generic aggregated sessions and their messages according to [RFC4860], (2) E2E RSVP sessions and messages according to [RFC2205].

This document locates all RSVP processing for a PCN domain at PCN-Boundary nodes. PCN-interior-nodes do not perform any RSVP functionality or maintain RSVP-related state information. Rather, PCN-interior nodes forward all RSVP messages (for both generic aggregated reservations [RFC4860] and end to end reservations [RFC2205]) as if they were ordinary network traffic.
Moreover, each Aggregator and Deaggregator (i.e., PCN-boundary-nodes) need to support policies to initiate and maintain for each pair of PCN-boundary-nodes of the same PCN-domain one ingress-egress-aggregate.

![Diagram of Aggregation of E2E Reservations over Generic Aggregate RSVP Reservations in PCN domains, based on [RFC4860]](image)

- **H** = Host requesting end-to-end RSVP reservations
- **R** = RSVP router
- **Agg** = Aggregator (PCN-ingress-node)
- **Deag** = Deaggregator (PCN-egress-node)
- **I** = Interior Router (PCN-interior-node)
- **--->** = E2E RSVP reservation
- **==>** = Aggregate RSVP reservation

**Figure 1**: Aggregation of E2E Reservations over Generic Aggregate RSVP Reservations in PCN domains, based on [RFC4860]

Both the Aggregator and Deaggregator can maintain one or more RSVP generic aggregated Reservations, but the Deaggregator is the entity that initiates these RSVP generic aggregated reservations. Note that one RSVP generic aggregated reservation matches to only one ingress-egress-aggregate, while one ingress-egress-aggregate matches to either one or to more than one RSVP generic aggregated reservations. This can be accomplished by using for the different RSVP generic aggregated reservations the same combinations of ingress and egress identifiers, but with a different PHB-ID value (see [RFC4860]). The procedures for aggregation of E2E reservations over generic aggregate RSVP reservations are the same as the procedures specified in Section 4 of [RFC4860], augmented with the ones specified in Section 2.5.

One significant difference between this document and [RFC4860] is the fact that in this document the admission control of E2E RSVP reservations over the PCN core is performed according to the PCN procedures, while in [RFC4860] this is achieved via first admitting aggregate RSVP reservations over the aggregation region and then admitting the E2E reservations over the aggregate RSVP reservations. Therefore, in this document, the RSVP generic aggregate RSVP reservations are not subject to admission control in the PCN-core, and the E2E RSVP reservations are not subject to admission control.
over the aggregate reservations. In turn, this means that several procedures of [RFC4860] are significantly simplified in this document:

- unlike [RFC4860], the generic aggregate RSVP reservations need not be admitted in the PCN core.
- unlike [RFC4860], the RSVP aggregated traffic does not need to be tunneled between Aggregator and Deaggregator, see Section 2.3.
- unlike [RFC4860], the Deaggregator need not perform admission control of E2E reservations over the aggregate RSVP reservations.
- unlike [RFC4860], there is no need for dynamic adjustment of the RSVP generic aggregated reservation size, see Section 2.6.

2.2 PCN Marking and encoding and transport of pre-congestion information

The method of PCN marking within the PCN domain is specified in [RFC5670]. In addition, the method of encoding and transport of pre-congestion information is specified in [RFC6660]. The PHB-ID (Per Hop Behavior Identification Code) used SHOULD be set equal to PCN-compatible Diffserv codepoint(s).

2.3. Traffic Classification Within The Aggregation Region

The PCN-ingress marks a PCN-BA using PCN-marking (i.e., combination of the DSCP and ECN fields), which interior nodes use to classify PCN-traffic. The PCN-traffic (e.g., E2E microflows) belonging to a RSVP generic aggregated reservation can be classified only at the PCN-boundary-nodes (i.e., Aggregator and Deaggregator) by using the RSVP SESSION object for RSVP generic aggregated reservations, see Section 2.1 of [RFC4860]. Note that the DSCP value included in the SESSION object, SHOULD be set equal to a PCN-compatible Diffserv codepoint. Since no admission control procedures over the RSVP generic aggregated reservations in the PCN-core are required, unlike [RFC4860], the RSVP aggregated traffic need not to be tunneled between Aggregator and Deaggregator. In this document one RSVP generic aggregated reservation is mapped to only one ingress-egress-aggregate, while one ingress-egress-aggregate is mapped to either one or to more than one RSVP generic aggregated reservations. PCN-flows and their PCN-traffic that are mapped into a specific RSVP generic aggregated reservation can also easily be classified into their corresponding ingress-egress-aggregate. The method of traffic conditioning of PCN-traffic and non-PCN traffic and PHB configuration is described in [RFC6661] and [RFC6662].

2.4. Deaggregator Determination

The present document assumes the same dynamic Deaggregator determination method as used in [RFC4860].

2.5. Mapping E2E Reservations Onto Aggregate Reservations

To comply with this specification for the mapping of E2E reservations

onto aggregate reservations, the same methods MUST be used as the ones described in Section 4 of [RFC4860], augmented by the following rules:

- An Aggregator (also PCN-ingress-node in this document) or Deaggregator (also PCN-egress-node and Decision Point in this document) MUST use one or more policies to determine whether an RSVP generic aggregated reservation can be mapped into an ingress-Egress-aggregate. This can be accomplished by using for the different RSVP generic aggregated reservations the same combinations of ingress and egress identifiers, but with a different PHB-ID value (see [RFC4860]) corresponding to the PCN specifications. In particular, the RSVP SESSION object specified in [RFC4860] augmented with the following information:
  - the IPv4 DestAddress, IPv6 DestAddress MUST be set to the IPv4 or IPv6 destination addresses, respectively, of the Deaggregator (PCN-egress-node), see [RFC4860]. Note that the PCN-domain is considered as being only one RSVP hop (for Generic aggregated RSVP or E2E RSVP). This means that the next RSVP hop for the Aggregator in the downstream direction is the Deaggregator and the next RSVP hop for the Deaggregator in the upstream direction is the Aggregator.
  - PHB-ID (Per Hop Behavior Identification Code) SHOULD be set equal to PCN-compatible Diffserv codepoint(s).
  - Extended vDstPort SHOULD be set to the IPv4 or IPv6 destination addresses, of the Aggregator (PCN-ingress-node), see [RFC4860].

2.6. Size of Aggregate Reservations

Since: (i) no admission control of E2 reservations over the RSVP aggregated reservations is required, and (ii) no admission control of the RSVP aggregated reservation over the PCN core is required, the size of the generic aggregate reservation is irrelevant and can be set to any arbitrary value by the Deaggregator. The Deaggregator SHOULD set the value of a generic aggregate reservation to a null bandwidth. We also observe that there is no need for dynamic adjustment of the RSVP aggregated reservation size.

2.7. E2E Path ADSPEC update

To comply with this specification, for the update of the E2E Path ADSPEC, the same methods can be used as the ones described in [RFC4860].

2.8. Intra-domain Routes

The PCN-interior-nodes are neither maintaining E2E RSVP nor RSVP generic aggregation states and reservations. Therefore, intra-domain route changes will not affect intra-domain reservations since such reservations are not maintained by the PCN-interior-nodes.
Furthermore, it is considered that by configuration, the PCN-interior-nodes are not able to distinguish neither RSVP generic aggregated sessions and their associated messages [RFC4860], nor E2E RSVP sessions and their associated messages [RFC2205].

2.9. Inter-domain Routes

The PCN-charter scope precludes inter-domain considerations. However, for solving inter-domain routes changes associated with the operation of the RSVP messages, the same methods SHOULD be used as the ones described in [RFC4860] and in Section 1.4.7 of [RFC3175].

2.10. Reservations for Multicast Sessions

PCN does not consider reservations for multicast sessions.

2.11. Multi-level Aggregation

PCN does not consider multi-level aggregations within the PCN domain. Therefore, the PCN-interior-nodes are not supporting multi-level aggregation procedures. However, the Aggregator and Deaggregator SHOULD support the multi-level aggregation procedures specified in [RFC4860] and in Section 1.4.9 of [RFC3175].

2.12. Reliability Issues

To comply with this specification, for solving possible reliability issues, the same methods MUST be used as the ones described in Section 4 of [RFC4860].

3. Elements of Procedure

This section describes the procedures used to implement the aggregated RSVP procedure over PCN. It is considered that the procedures for aggregation of E2E reservations over generic aggregate RSVP reservations are same as the procedures specified in Section 4 of [RFC4860] except where a departure from these procedures is explicitly described in the present section. Please refer to [RFC4860] for all the below error cases:

- Incomplete message
- Unexpected objects

3.1. Receipt of E2E Path Message by Aggregating router

When the E2E Path message arrives at the exterior interface of the Aggregator, (also PCN-ingress-node in this document), then standard RSVP generic aggregation [RFC4860] procedures are used.
3.2. Handling Of E2E Path Message by Interior Routers

The E2E Path messages traverse zero or more PCN-interior-nodes. The PCN-interior-nodes receive the E2E Path message on an interior interface and forward it on another interior interface. It is considered that, by configuration, the PCN-interior-nodes ignore the E2E RSVP signaling messages [RFC2205]. Therefore, the E2E Path messages are simply forwarded as normal IP datagrams.

3.3. Receipt of E2E Path Message by Deaggregating router

When receiving the E2E Path message the Deaggregator (also PCN-egress-node and Decision Point in this document) performs the regular [RFC4860] procedures, augmented with the following rules:

- The Deaggregator MUST NOT perform the RSVP-TTL vs IP TTL-check and MUST NOT update the ADspec Break bit. This is because the whole PCN-domain is effectively handled by E2E RSVP as a virtual link on which integrated service is indeed supported (and admission control performed) so that the Break bit MUST NOT be set, see also [draft-lefaucheur-rsvp-ecn-01].

The Deaggregator forwards the E2E Path message towards the receiver.

3.4. Initiation of new Aggregate Path Message by Aggregating Router

To comply with this specification, for the initiation of the new RSVP generic aggregated Path message by the Aggregator (also PCN-ingress-node in this document), the same methods MUST be used as the ones described in [RFC4860].

3.5. Handling Of Aggregate Path Message By Interior Routers

The Aggregate Path messages traverse zero or more PCN-interior-nodes. The PCN-interior-nodes receive the Aggregated Path message on an interior interface and forward it on another interior interface. It is considered that, by configuration, the PCN-interior-nodes ignore the Aggregated Path signaling messages. Therefore, the Aggregated Path messages are simply forwarded as normal IP datagrams.

3.6. Handling Of Aggregate Path Message By Deaggregating Router

When receiving the Aggregated Path message, the Deaggregator (also PCN-egress-node and Decision Point in this document) performs the regular [RFC4860] procedures, augmented with the following rules:

- When the received Aggregated Path message by the Deaggregator contains the RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-response or RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-response PCN objects, which carry the PCN-sent-rate, then the procedures specified in Section 3.18 of this document MUST be followed.
3.7. Handling of E2E Resv Message by Deaggregating Router

When the E2E Resv message arrives at the exterior interface of the Deaggregator, (also PCN-egress-node and Decision Point in this document) then standard RSVP aggregation [RFC4860] procedures are used, augmented with the following rules:

o) The E2E RSVP session associated with an E2E Resv message that arrives at the external interface of the Deaggregator is mapped/matched with an RSVP generic aggregate and with a PCN ingress-egress-aggregate.

o) Depending on the type of the PCN edge behavior supported by the Deaggregator, the PCN admission control procedures specified in Section 3.3.1 of [RFC6661] or [RFC6662] MUST be followed. Since no admission control procedures over the RSVP aggregated reservations in the PCN-core are required, unlike [RFC4860], the Deaggregator does not perform any admission control of the E2E Reservation over the mapped generic aggregate RSVP reservation. If the PCN based admission control procedure is successful then the Deaggregator MUST allow the new flow to be admitted onto the associated RSVP generic aggregation reservation and onto the PCN ingress-egress-aggregate, see [RFC6661] and [RFC6662]. If the PCN based admission control procedure is not successful, then the E2E Resv MUST NOT be admitted onto the associated RSVP generic aggregate reservation and onto the PCN ingress-egress-aggregation. The E2E Resv message is further processed according to [RFC4860].

The way of how the PCN-admission-state is maintained is specified in [RFC6661] and [RFC6662].

3.8. Handling Of E2E Resv Message By Interior Routers

The E2E Resv messages traversing the PCN core are IP addressed to the Aggregating router and are not marked with Router Alert, therefore the E2E Resv messages are simply forwarded as normal IP datagrams.

3.9. Initiation of New Aggregate Resv Message By Deaggregating Router

To comply with this specification, for the initiation of the new RSVP generic aggregated Resv message by the Deaggregator (also PCN-egress-node and Decision Point in this document), the same methods MUST be used as the ones described in Section 4 of [RFC4860] augmented with the following rules:

o) The size of the generic aggregate reservation is irrelevant, see Section 2.6, and can be set to any arbitrary value by the PCN-egress node. The Deaggregator SHOULD set the value of a RSVP generic aggregate reservation to a null bandwidth. We also observe that there is no need for dynamic adjustment of the RSVP generic aggregated reservation size.
When [RFC6661] is used and the ETM-rate measured by the Deaggregator contains a non-zero value for some ingress-egress-aggregate, see [RFC6661] and [RFC6662], the Deaggregator MUST request the PCN-ingress-node to provide an estimate of the rate (PCN-sent-rate) at which the Aggregator (also PCN-ingress-node in this document) is receiving PCN-traffic that is destined for the given ingress-egress-aggregate.

When [RFC6662] is used and the PCN-admission-state computed by the Deaggregator, on the basis of the CLE is "block" for the given ingress-egress-aggregate, the Deaggregator MUST request the PCN-ingress-node to provide an estimate of the rate (PCN-sent-rate) at which the Aggregator is receiving PCN-traffic that is destined for the given ingress-egress-aggregate.

In the above two cases and when the PCN-sent-rate needs to be requested from the Aggregator, the Deaggregator MUST generate and send an (refresh) Aggregated Resv message to the Aggregator that MUST carry one of the following PCN objects, see Section 4.1, depending on whether IPv4 or IPv6 is supported:

- RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-request
- RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-request.

Handling of Aggregate Resv Message by Interior Routers

The Aggregated Resv messages traversing the PCN core are IP addressed to the Aggregating router and are not marked with Router Alert, therefore the Aggregated Resv messages are simply forwarded as normal IP datagrams.

Handling of E2E Resv Message by Aggregating Router

When the E2E Resv message arrives at the interior interface of the Aggregator (also PCN-ingress-node in this document), then standard RSVP aggregation [RFC4860] procedures are used.

Handling of Aggregated Resv Message by Aggregating Router

When the Aggregated Resv message arrives at the interior interface of the Aggregator, (also PCN-ingress-node in this document), then standard RSVP aggregation [RFC4860] procedures are used, augmented with the following rules:

- the Aggregator SHOULD use the information carried by the PCN objects, see Section 4, and follow the steps specified in [RFC6661], [RFC6662]. If the "R" flag carried by the RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-request or RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-request PCN objects is set to ON, see Section 4.1, then the Aggregator follows the steps described in Section 3.4 of [RFC6661] and [RFC6662] on calculating the PCN-sent-rate. In particular, the Aggregator MUST provide the estimated current rate of PCN-traffic received at that node and destined for a given ingress-egress-aggregate in octets per second (the PCN-sent-rate). The way this rate estimate is derived is a matter of implementation, see [RFC6661] or [RFC6662].
the Aggregator initiates an Aggregated Path message. In particular, when the Aggregator receives an Aggregated Resv message which carries one of the following PCN objects: RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-request or RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-request, with the flag "R" set to ON, see Section 4.1, the Aggregator initiates an Aggregated Path message, and includes the calculated PCN-sent-rate into the RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-response or RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-response PCN objects, see Section 4.1, which that MUST be carried by the Aggregated Path message. This Aggregated Path message is sent towards the Deaggregator (also PCN-egress-node and Decision Point in this document) that requested the calculation of the PCN-sent-rate.

3.13. Removal of E2E Reservation

To comply with this specification, for the removal of E2E reservations, the same methods MUST be used as the ones described in Section 4 of [RFC4860] and [RFC4495].


To comply with this specification, for the removal of RSVP generic aggregated reservations, the same methods MUST be used as the ones described in Section 4 of [RFC4860] and Section 2.10 of [RFC3175]. In particular, should an aggregate reservation go away (presumably due to a configuration change, route change, or policy event), the E2E reservations it supports are no longer active. They MUST be treated accordingly.

3.15. Handling of Data On Reserved E2E Flow by Aggregating Router

The handling of data on the reserved E2E flow by Aggregator (also PCN-ingress-node in this document) uses the procedures described in [RFC4860] augmented with:

o) Regarding, PCN marking and traffic classification the procedures defined in Section 2.2 and 2.3 of this document are used.

3.16. Procedures for Multicast Sessions

In this document no multicast sessions are considered.

3.17. Misconfiguration of PCN-node

In an event where a PCN-node is misconfigured within a PCN-domain, the desired behavior is same as described in Section 3.10.

3.18 PCN based Flow Termination

When the Deaggregator (also PCN-egress-node and Decision Point in this document) needs to terminate an amount of traffic associated with one ingress-egress-aggregate (see Section 3.3.2 of [RFC6661] and [RFC6662]), then several procedures of terminating E2E microflows can be deployed. The default procedure of terminating E2E microflows (i.e., PCN-flows) is as follows, see i.e., [RFC6661] and [RFC6662].
For the same ingress-egress-aggregate, select a number of E2E microflows to be terminated in order to decrease the total incoming amount of bandwidth associated with one ingress-egress-aggregate by the amount of traffic to be terminated, see above. In this situation the same mechanisms for terminating an E2E microflow can be followed as specified in [RFC2205]. However, based on a local policy, the Deaggregator could use other ways of selecting which microflows should be terminated. For example, for the same ingress-egress-aggregate, select a number of E2E microflows to be terminated or to reduce their reserved bandwidth in order to decrease the total incoming amount of bandwidth associated with one ingress-egress-aggregate by the amount of traffic to be terminated. In this situation the same mechanisms for terminating an E2E microflow or reducing bandwidth associated with an E2E microflow can be followed as specified in [RFC4495].

4. Protocol Elements

The protocol elements in this document are using the ones defined in Section 4 of [RFC4860] and Section 3 of [RFC3175] augmented with the following rules:

- The DSCP value included in the SESSION object, SHOULD be set equal to a PCN-compatible Diffserv codepoint.
- Extended vDstPort SHOULD be set to the IPv4 or IPv6 destination addresses, of the Aggregator (also PCN-ingress-node in this document), see [RFC4860].
- When the Deaggregator (also PCN-egress-node and Decision Point in this document) needs to request the PCN-sent-rate from the PCN-ingress-node, see Section 3.9 of this document, the Deaggregator MUST generate and send an (refresh) Aggregate Resv message to the Aggregator that MUST carry one of the following PCN objects, see Section 4.1, depending on whether IPv4 or IPv6 is supported:
  - RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-request
  - RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-request.
- When the Aggregator receives an Aggregate Resv message which carries one of the following PCN objects: RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-request or RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-request, with the flag "R" set to ON, see Section 4.1, then the Aggregator MUST generate and send to the Deaggregator an Aggregated Path message which carries one of the following PCN objects, see Section 4.1, depending on whether IPv4 or IPv6 is supported:
  - RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-response
  - RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-response.

4.1 PCN objects

This section describes four types of PCN objects that can be carried by the (refresh) Aggregate Path or the (refresh) Aggregate Resv messages specified in [RFC4860].
These objects are:
  o RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-request,
  o RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-request,
  o RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-response,
  o RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-response.

o) RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-request: PCN request object, when IPv4 addresses are used:
   Class = 248 (PCN)
   C-Type = 1 (RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-request

   +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
   |     IPv4 PCN-ingress-node Address (4 bytes)           |
   +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
   |     IPv4 PCN-egress-node Address (4 bytes)            |
   +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
   |     IPv4 Decision Point Address (4 bytes)             |
   +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
   |R|     Reserved                                        |
   +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+

o) RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-request: PCN object, when IPv6 addresses are used:
   Class = 248 (PCN)
   C-Type = 2 (RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-request

   +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
   |     IPv6 PCN-ingress-node Address (16 bytes)          |
   +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
   |     IPv6 PCN-egress-node Address (16 bytes)           |
   +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
   |     Decision Point Address (16 bytes)                 |
   +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
   |R|     Reserved                                        |
   +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
o) RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-response: PCN object, IPv4 addresses are used:
Class = 248 (PCN)
C-Type = 3 (RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-response)

+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
|     IPv4 PCN-ingress-node Address (4 bytes)           |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
|     IPv4 PCN-egress-node Address (4 bytes)            |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
|     IPv4 Decision Point Address (4 bytes)             |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| PCN-sent-rate                                       |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+

o) RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-response: PCN object, IPv6 addresses are used:
Class = 248 (PCN)
C-Type = 4 (RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-response)

+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
|     IPv6 PCN-ingress-node Address (16 bytes)          |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
|     IPv6 PCN-egress-node Address (16 bytes)           |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
|     Decision Point Address (16 bytes)                 |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| PCN-sent-rate                                       |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+

The fields carried by the PCN object are specified in [RFC6663], [RFC6661] and [RFC6662]:

5. Security Considerations

The security considerations specified in [RFC2205], [RFC4860] and [RFC5559] apply to this document. In addition, [RFC4230] and [RFC6411] provide useful guidance on RSVP security mechanisms.

Security within a PCN domain is fundamentally based on the controlled environment trust assumption stated in Section 6.3.1 of [RFC5559], in particular that all PCN-nodes are PCN-enabled and are trusted to perform accurate PCN-metering and PCN-marking.

In the PCN domain environments addressed by this document, Generic Aggregate Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) messages specified in [RFC4860] are used for support of the PCN Controlled Load (CL) and Single Marking (SM) edge behaviors over a Diffserv cloud using Pre-Congestion Notification. Hence the security mechanisms discussed in [RFC4860] are applicable. Specifically, the INTEGRITY object [RFC2747]/[RFC3097] can be used to provide hop-by-hop RSVP message integrity, node authentication and replay protection, thereby protecting against corruption and spoofing of RSVP messages and PCN feedback conveyed by RSVP messages.

For these reasons, this document does not introduce significant additional security considerations beyond those discussed in
IANA has modified the RSVP parameters registry, ‘Class Names, Class Numbers, and Class Types’ subregistry, to add a new Class Number and assign 4 new C-Types under this new Class Number, as described below, see Section 4.1:

Class Number  Class Name                        Reference
---------  ----------------------                  --------
248       PCN                                      this document

Class Types or C-Types:
1 RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-request               this document
2 RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-request               this document
3 RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv4-PCN-response              this document
4 RSVP-AGGREGATE-IPv6-PCN-response              this document

When this draft is published as an RFC, IANA should update the reference for the above 5 items to that published RFC (and the RFC Editor should remove this sentence).

7. Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the authors of [draft-lefaucheur-rsvp-ecn-01.txt], since some ideas used in this document are based on the work initiated in [draft-lefaucheur-rsvp-ecn-01.txt]. Moreover, we would like to thank Bob Briscoe, David Black, Ken Carlberg, Tom Taylor, Philip Eardley, Michael Menth, Toby Moncaster, James Polk, Scott Bradner, Lixia Zhang and Robert Sparks for the provided comments. In particular, we would like to thank Francois Le Faucheur for contributing in addition to comments also to a significant amount of text.

8. Normative References


9. Informative References


10. Appendix A: Example Signaling Flow

This appendix is based on the appendix provided in [RFC4860]. In particular, it provides an example signaling flow of the specification detailed in Section 3 and 4. This signaling flow assumes an environment where E2E reservations are aggregated over generic aggregate RSVP reservations and applied over a PCN domain. In particular the Aggregator (PCN-ingress-node) and Deaggregator (PCN-egress-node) are located at the boundaries of the PCN domain. The PCN-interior-nodes are located within the PCN-domain, between the PCN-boundary nodes, but are not shown in this Figure. It illustrates a possible RSVP message flow that could take place in the successful establishment of a unicast E2E reservation that is the first between a given pair of Aggregator/Deaggregator.
Aggregator (PCN-ingress-node)     Deaggregator (PCN-egress-node)

E2E Path
------------->
(1)  E2E Path

------------->
(2)  E2E PathErr(New-agg-needed,SOI=GApcn)

(3)  AggPath(Session=GApcn)

(4)  E2E Path

------------->
(5)  E2E Path

------------->
(6)  AggResv (Session=GApcn) (PCN object)

(7)  E2E Resv

------------->
(8)  E2E Resv (SOI=GApcn)

(9)  E2E Resv

(1) The Aggregator forwards E2E Path into the aggregation region after modifying its IP protocol number to RSVP-E2E-IGNORE.

(2) Let’s assume no Aggregate Path exists. To be able to accurately update the ADSPEC of the E2E Path, the Deaggregator needs the ADSPEC of Aggregate Path. In this example, the Deaggregator elects to instruct the Aggregator to set up an Aggregate Path state for the PCN PHB-ID. To do that, the Deaggregator sends an E2E PathErr message with a New-Agg-Needed PathErr code.

The PathErr message also contains a SESSION-OF-INTEREST (SOI) object. The SOI contains a GENERIC-AGGREGATE SESSION (GApcn) whose PHB-ID is set to the PCN PHB-ID. The GENERIC-AGGREGATE SESSION contains an interface-independent Deaggregator address inside the DestAddress and appropriate values inside the vDstPort and Extended vDstPort fields. In this document, the Extended vDstPort SHOULD contain the IPv4 or IPv6 address of the Aggregator.

(3) The Aggregator follows the request from the Deaggregator and
signals an Aggregate Path for the GENERIC-AGGREGATE Session (GApnc).

(4) The Deaggregator takes into account the information contained in the ADSPEC from both Aggregate Paths and updates the E2E Path ADSPEC accordingly. The PCN-egress-node MUST NOT perform the RSVP-TTL vs IP TTL-check and MUST NOT update the ADspec Break bit. This is because the whole PCN-domain is effectively handled by E2E RSVP as a virtual link on which integrated service is indeed supported (and admission control performed) so that the Break bit MUST NOT be set, see also [draft-lefaucheur-rsvp-ecn-01]. The Deaggregator also modifies the E2E Path IP protocol number to RSVP before forwarding it.

(5) In this example, the Deaggregator elects to immediately proceed with establishment of the generic aggregate reservation. In effect, the Deaggregator can be seen as anticipating the actual demand of E2E reservations so that the generic aggregate reservation is in place when the E2E Resv request arrives, in order to speed up establishment of E2E reservations. Here it is also assumed that the Deaggregator includes the optional Resv Confirm Request in the Aggregate Resv message.

(6) The Aggregator merely complies with the received ResvConfirm Request and returns the corresponding Aggregate ResvConfirm.

(7) The Deaggregator has explicit confirmation that the generic aggregate reservation is established.

(8) On receipt of the E2E Resv, the Deaggregator applies the mapping policy defined by the network administrator to map the E2E Resv onto a generic aggregate reservation. Let’s assume that this policy is such that the E2E reservation is to be mapped onto the generic aggregate reservation with the PCN PHB-ID=x. The Deaggregator knows that a generic aggregate reservation (GApnc) is in place for the corresponding PHB-ID since (7). At this step the Deaggregator maps the generic aggregated reservation onto one ingress-egress-aggregate maintained by the Deaggregator (as a PCN-egress-node), see Section 3.7. The Deaggregator performs admission control of the E2E Resv onto the generic Aggregate reservation for the PCN PHB-ID (GApnc). The Deaggregator takes also into account the PCN admission control procedure as specified in [RFC6661] and [RFC6662], see Section 3.7. If one or both the admission control procedures (PCN based admission control procedure and admission control procedure specified in [RFC4860]) are not successful, then the E2E Resv is not admitted onto the associated RSVP generic aggregate reservation for the PCN PHB-ID (GApnc). Otherwise, assuming that the generic aggregate reservation for the PCN (GApnc) had been established with sufficient bandwidth to support the E2E Resv, the Deaggregator adjusts its counter, tracking the unused bandwidth on the generic aggregate reservation. Then it forwards the E2E Resv to the Aggregator including a SESSION-OF-INTEREST
object conveying the selected mapping onto GApcn (and hence onto the PCN PHB-ID).

(9) The Aggregator records the mapping of the E2E Resv onto GApcn (and onto the PCN PHB-ID). The Aggregator removes the SOI object and forwards the E2E Resv towards the sender.

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DTLS Encapsulation of SCTP Packets
draft-ietf-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-encaps-09.txt

Abstract

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a transport protocol originally defined to run on top of the network protocols IPv4 or IPv6. This document specifies how SCTP can be used on top of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. Using the encapsulation method described in this document, SCTP is unaware of the protocols being used below DTLS; hence explicit IP addresses cannot be used in the SCTP control chunks. As a consequence, the SCTP associations carried over DTLS can only be single homed.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 28, 2015.

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1.  Overview

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) as defined in [RFC4960] is a transport protocol running on top of the network protocols IPv4 [RFC0791] or IPv6 [RFC2460].  This document specifies how SCTP is used on top of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol.  DTLS 1.0 is defined in [RFC4347] and the latest version when this RFC was published, DTLS 1.2, is defined in [RFC6347].  This encapsulation is used for example within the WebRTC protocol suite (see [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview] for an overview) for transporting non-SRTP data between browsers.  The architecture of this stack is described in [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel].

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:

Please ensure that the authors double check the above statement about DTLS 1.2 during AUTH48 and then remove this note before publication.

]
Figure 1: Basic stack diagram

This encapsulation of SCTP over DTLS over UDP or ICE/UDP (see [RFC5245]) can provide a NAT traversal solution in addition to confidentiality, source authentication, and integrity protected transfers. Please note that using ICE does not necessarily imply that a different packet format is used on the wire.

Please note that the procedures defined in [RFC6951] for dealing with the UDP port numbers do not apply here. When using the encapsulation defined in this document, SCTP is unaware about the protocols used below DTLS.

2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Encapsulation and Decapsulation Procedure

When an SCTP packet is provided to the DTLS layer, the complete SCTP packet, consisting of the SCTP common header and a number of SCTP chunks, is handled as the payload of the application layer protocol of DTLS. When the DTLS layer has processed a DTLS record containing a message of the application layer protocol, the payload is passed to the SCTP layer. The SCTP layer expects an SCTP common header followed by a number of SCTP chunks.

4. General Considerations

An implementation of SCTP over DTLS MUST implement and use a path maximum transmission unit (MTU) discovery method that functions without ICMP to provide SCTP/DTLS with an MTU estimate. An implementation of "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery" [RFC4821] either in SCTP or DTLS is RECOMMENDED.

The path MTU discovery is performed by SCTP when SCTP over DTLS is used for data channels (see Section 5 of [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel]).
5. DTLS Considerations

The DTLS implementation MUST support DTLS 1.0 [RFC4347] and SHOULD support the most recently published version of DTLS, which was DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] when this RFC was published. In the absence of a revision to this document, the latter requirement applies to all future versions of DTLS when they are published as RFCs. This document will only be revised if a revision to DTLS or SCTP makes a revision to the encapsulation necessary.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:

Please ensure that the authors double check the above statement about DTLS 1.2 during AUTH48 and then remove this note before publication.
]

SCTP performs segmentation and reassembly based on the path MTU. Therefore the DTLS layer MUST NOT use any compression algorithm.

The DTLS MUST support sending messages larger than the current path MTU. This might result in sending IP level fragmented messages.

If path MTU discovery is performed by the DTLS layer, the method described in [RFC4821] MUST be used. For probe packets, the extension defined in [RFC6520] MUST be used.

If path MTU discovery is performed by the SCTP layer and IPv4 is used as the network layer protocol, the DTLS implementation SHOULD allow the DTLS user to enforce that the corresponding IPv4 packet is sent with the Don’t Fragment (DF) bit set. If controlling the DF bit is not possible, for example due to implementation restrictions, a safe value for the path MTU has to be used by the SCTP stack. It is RECOMMENDED that the safe value does not exceed 1200 bytes. Please note that [RFC1122] only requires end hosts to be able to reassemble fragmented IP packets up to 576 bytes in length.

The DTLS implementation SHOULD allow the DTLS user to set the Differentiated services code point (DSCP) used for IP packets being sent (see [RFC2474]). This requires the DTLS implementation to pass the value through and the lower layer to allow setting this value. If the lower layer does not support setting the DSCP, then the DTLS user will end up with the default value used by protocol stack. Please note that only a single DSCP value can be used for all packets belonging to the same SCTP association.
Using explicit congestion notifications (ECN) in SCTP requires the DTLS layer to pass the ECN bits through and its lower layer to expose access to them for sent and received packets (see [RFC3168]). The implementation of DTLS and its lower layer have to provide this support. If this is not possible, for example due to implementation restrictions, ECN can't be used by SCTP.

6. SCTP Considerations

This section describes the usage of the base protocol and the applicability of various SCTP extensions.

6.1. Base Protocol

This document uses SCTP [RFC4960] with the following restrictions, which are required to reflect that the lower layer is DTLS instead of IPv4 and IPv6 and that SCTP does not deal with the IP addresses or the transport protocol used below DTLS:

- A DTLS connection MUST be established before an SCTP association can be set up.

- Multiple SCTP associations MAY be multiplexed over a single DTLS connection. The SCTP port numbers are used for multiplexing and demultiplexing the SCTP associations carried over a single DTLS connection.

- All SCTP associations are single-homed, because DTLS does not expose any address management to its upper layer. Therefore it is RECOMMENDED to set the SCTP parameter path.max.retrans to association.max.retrans.

- The INIT and INIT-ACK chunk MUST NOT contain any IPv4 Address or IPv6 Address parameters. The INIT chunk MUST NOT contain the Supported Address Types parameter.

- The implementation MUST NOT rely on processing ICMP or ICMPv6 packets, since the SCTP layer most likely is unable to access the SCTP common header in the plain text of the packet, which triggered the sending of the ICMP or ICMPv6 packet. This applies in particular to path MTU discovery when performed by SCTP.

- If the SCTP layer is notified about a path change by its lower layers, SCTP SHOULD retest the Path MTU and reset the congestion state to the initial state. The window-based congestion control method specified in [RFC4960], resets the congestion window and slow start threshold to their initial values.
6.2. Padding Extension

When the SCTP layer performs path MTU discovery as specified in [RFC4821], the padding extension defined in [RFC4820] MUST be supported and used for probe packets (HEARTBEAT chunks bundled with PADDING chunks [RFC4820]).

6.3. Dynamic Address Reconfiguration Extension

If the dynamic address reconfiguration extension defined in [RFC5061] is used, ASCONF chunks MUST use wildcard addresses only.

6.4. SCTP Authentication Extension

The SCTP authentication extension defined in [RFC4895] can be used with DTLS encapsulation, but does not provide any additional benefit.

6.5. Partial Reliability Extension

Partial reliability as defined in [RFC3758] can be used in combination with DTLS encapsulation. It is also possible to use additional PR-SCTP policies, for example the ones defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-prpolicies].

6.6. Stream Reset Extension

The SCTP stream reset extension defined in [RFC6525] can be used with DTLS encapsulation. It is used to reset SCTP streams and add SCTP streams during the lifetime of the SCTP association.

6.7. Interleaving of Large User Messages

SCTP as defined in [RFC4960] does not support the interleaving of large user messages that need to be fragmented and reassembled by the SCTP layer. The protocol extension defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-ndata] overcomes this limitation and can be used with DTLS encapsulation.

7. IANA Considerations

This document requires no actions from IANA.

8. Security Considerations

Security considerations for DTLS are specified in [RFC4347] and for SCTP in [RFC4960], [RFC3758], and [RFC6525]. The combination of SCTP and DTLS introduces no new security considerations.
SCTP should not process the IP addresses used for the underlying
communication since DTLS provides no guarantees about them.

It should be noted that the inability to process ICMP or ICMPv6
messages does not add any security issue. When SCTP is carried over
a connection-less lower layer like IPv4, IPv6, or UDP, processing of
these messages is required to protect other nodes not supporting
SCTP. Since DTLS provides a connection-oriented lower layer, this
kind of protection is not necessary.

9. Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank David Black, Benoit Claise, Spencer
Dawkins, Francis Dupont, Gorry Fairhurst, Stephen Farrell, Christer
Holmberg, Barry Leiba, Eric Rescorla, Tom Taylor, Joe Touch and
Magnus Westerlund for their invaluable comments.

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[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel]

[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-prpolicies]

[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-ndata]

Appendix A. NOTE to the RFC-Editor

Although the references to [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-prpolicies] and [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-ndata] are informative, put this document in REF-HOLD until these two references have been approved and update these references to the corresponding RFCs.

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SCTP-PF: Quick Failover Algorithm in SCTP
draft-ietf-tsvwg-sctp-failover-16.txt

Abstract

SCTP supports multi-homing. However, when the failover operation
specified in RFC4960 is followed, there can be significant delay and
performance degradation in the data transfer path failover. To
overcome this problem this document specifies a quick failover
algorithm (SCTP-PF) based on the introduction of a Potentially Failed
(PF) state in SCTP Path Management.

The document also specifies a dormant state operation of SCTP. This
dormant state operation is required to be followed by an SCTP-PF
implementation, but it may equally well be applied by a standard
RFC4960 SCTP implementation.

Additionally, the document introduces an alternative switchback
operation mode called Primary Path Switchover that will be beneficial
in certain situations. This mode of operation applies to both a
standard RFC4960 SCTP implementation as well as to a SCTP-PF
implementation.

The procedures defined in the document require only minimal
modifications to the RFC4960 specification. The procedures are
sender-side only and do not impact the SCTP receiver.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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1. Introduction

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) specified in [RFC4960] supports multi-homing at the transport layer. SCTP’s multi-homing features include failure detection and failover procedures to provide network interface redundancy and improved end-to-end fault tolerance. In SCTP’s current failure detection procedure, the sender must experience Path.Max.Retrans (PMR) number of consecutive failed timer-based retransmissions on a destination address before detecting a path failure. Until detecting the path failure, the sender continues to transmit data on the failed path. The prolonged time in which [RFC4960] SCTP continues to use a failed path severely degrades the performance of the protocol. To address this problem, this document specifies a quick failover algorithm (SCTP-PF) based on the introduction of a new Potentially Failed (PF) path state in SCTP path management. The performance deficiencies of the [RFC4960] failover operation, and the improvements obtainable from the introduction of a Potentially Failed state in SCTP, were proposed and documented in [NATARAJAN09] for Concurrent Multipath Transfer SCTP [IYENGAR06].

While SCTP-PF can accelerate failover process and improve performance, the risks that an SCTP endpoint enters the dormant state where all destination addresses are inactive can be increased. [RFC4960] leaves the protocol operation during dormant state to implementations and encourages to avoid entering the state as much as possible by careful tuning of the Path.Max.Retrans (PMR) and Association.Max.Retrans (AMR) parameters. We specify a dormant state operation for SCTP-PF which makes SCTP-PF provide the same disruption tolerance as [RFC4960] despite that the dormant state may be entered more quickly. The dormant state operation may equally well be applied by an [RFC4960] implementation and will here serve to provide added fault tolerance for situations where the tuning of the Path.Max.Retrans (PMR) and Association.Max.Retrans (AMR) parameters fail to provide adequate prevention of the entering of the dormant state.

The operation after the recovery of a failed path also impacts the performance of the protocol. With the procedures specified in
SCTP-PF will, after a failover from the primary path, switch back to use the primary path for data transfer as soon as this path becomes available again. From a performance perspective such a forced switchback of the data transmission path can be suboptimal as the CWND towards the original primary destination address has to be rebuilt once data transfer resumes, [CARO02]. As an optional alternative to the switchback operation of [RFC4960], this document specifies an alternative Primary Path Switchover procedure which avoid such forced switchbacks of the data transfer path. The Primary Path Switchover operation was originally proposed in [CARO02].

While SCTP-PF primarily is motivated by a desire to improve the multi-homed operation, the feature applies also to SCTP single-homed operation. Here the algorithm serves to provide increased failure detection on idle associations, whereas the failover or switchback aspects of the algorithm will not be activated. This is discussed in more detail in Appendix C.

A brief description of the motivation for the introduction of the Potentially Failed state including a discussion of alternative approaches to mitigate the deficiencies of the [RFC4960] failover operation are given in the Appendices. Discussion of path bouncing effects that might be caused by frequent switchovers, are also provided there.

2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. SCTP with Potentially Failed Destination State (SCTP-PF)

3.1. Overview

To minimize the performance impact during failover, the sender should avoid transmitting data to a failed destination address as early as possible. In the [RFC4960] SCTP path management scheme, the sender stops transmitting data to a destination address only after the destination address is marked inactive. This process takes a significant amount of time as it requires the error counter of the destination address to exceed the Path.Max.Retrans (PMR) threshold. The issue cannot simply be mitigated by lowering of the PMR threshold because this may result in spurious failure detection and unnecessary prevention of the usage of a preferred primary path. Also due to the coupled tuning of the Path.Max.Retrans (PMR) and the Association.Max.Retrans (AMR) parameter values in [RFC4960], lowering
of the PMR threshold may result in lowering of the AMR threshold, which would result in decrease of the fault tolerance of SCTP.

The solution provided in this document is to extend the SCTP path management scheme of [RFC4960] by the addition of the Potentially Failed (PF) state as an intermediate state in between the active and inactive state of a destination address in the [RFC4960] path management scheme, and let the failover of data transfer away from a destination address be driven by the entering of the PF state instead of by the entering of the inactive state. Thereby SCTP may perform quick failover without negatively impacting the overall fault tolerance of [RFC4960] SCTP. At the same time, RTO-based HEARTBEAT probing is initiated towards a destination address once it enters PF state. Thereby SCTP may quickly ascertain whether network connectivity towards the destination address is broken or whether the failover was spurious. In the case where the failover was spurious data transfer may quickly resume towards the original destination address.

The new failure detection algorithm assumes that loss detected by a timeout implies either severe congestion or network connectivity failure. It recommends that by default a destination address is classified as PF at the occurrence of the first timeout.

3.2. Specification of the SCTP-PF Procedures

The SCTP-PF operation is specified as follows:

1. The sender maintains a new tunable SCTP Protocol Parameter called PotentiallyFailed.Max.Retrans (PFMR). The PFMR defines the new intermediate PF threshold on the destination address error counter. When this threshold is exceeded the destination address is classified as PF. The RECOMMENDED value of PFMR is 0. If PFMR is set to be greater than or equal to Path.Max.Retrans (PMR), the resulting PF threshold will be so high that the destination address will reach the inactive state before it can be classified as PF.

2. The error counter of an active destination address is incremented or cleared as specified in [RFC4960]. This means that the error counter of the destination address in active state will be incremented each time the T3-rtx timer expires, or each time a HEARTBEAT chunk is sent when idle and not acknowledged within an RTO. When the value in the destination address error counter exceeds PFMR, the endpoint MUST mark the destination address as in the PF state.
3. A SCTP-PF sender SHOULD NOT send data to destination addresses in PF state when alternative destination addresses in active state are available. Specifically this means that:

   i. When there is outbound data to send and the destination address presently used for data transmission is in PF state, the sender SHOULD choose a destination address in active state, if one exists, and use this destination address for data transmission.

   ii. As specified in [RFC4960] section 6.4.1, when the sender retransmits data that has timed out, it should attempt to pick a new destination address for data retransmission. In this case, the sender SHOULD choose an alternate destination transport address in active state if one exists.

   iii. When there is outbound data to send and the SCTP user explicitly requests to send data to a destination address in PF state, the sender SHOULD send the data to an alternate destination address in active state if one exists.

When choosing among multiple destination addresses in active state an SCTP sender will follow the guiding principles of section 6.4.1 of [RFC4960] of choosing most divergent source-destination pairs compared with, for i.: the destination address in PF state that it performs a failover from, and for ii.: the destination address towards which the data timed out. Rules for picking the most divergent source-destination pair are an implementation decision and are not specified within this document.

In all cases, the sender MUST NOT change the state of chosen destination address, whether this state be active or PF, and it MUST NOT clear the error counter of the destination address as a result of choosing the destination address for data transmission.

4. When the destination addresses are all in PF state or some in PF state and some in inactive state, the sender MUST choose one destination address in PF state and SHOULD transmit or retransmit data to this destination address using the following rules:

   A. The sender SHOULD choose the destination in PF state with the lowest error count (fewest consecutive timeouts) for data transmission and transmit or retransmit data to this destination.
B. When there are multiple destination addresses in PF state with same error count, the sender should let the choice among the multiple destination addresses in PF state with equal error count be based on the [RFC4960], section 6.4.1, principles of choosing most divergent source-destination pairs when executing (potentially consecutive) retransmission. Rules for picking the most divergent source-destination pair are an implementation decision and are not specified within this document.

The sender MUST NOT change the state and the error counter of any destination addresses as the result of the selection.

5. The HB.interval of the Path Heartbeat function of [RFC4960] MUST be ignored for destination addresses in PF state. Instead HEARTBEAT chunks are sent to destination addresses in PF state once per RTO. HEARTBEAT chunks SHOULD be sent to destination addresses in PF state, but the sending of HEARTBEATS MUST honor whether the Path Heartbeat function (Section 8.3 of [RFC4960]) is enabled for the destination address or not. I.e., if the Path Heartbeat function is disabled for the destination address in question, HEARTBEATS MUST NOT be sent. Note that when Heartbeat function is disabled, it may take longer to transition a destination address in PF state back to active state.

6. HEARTBEATS are sent when a destination address reaches the PF state. When a HEARTBEAT chunk is not acknowledged within the RTO, the sender increments the error counter and exponentially backs off the RTO value. If the error counter is less than PMR, the sender transmits another packet containing the HEARTBEAT chunk immediately after timeout expiration on the previous HEARTBEAT. When data is being transmitted to a destination address in the PF state, the transmission of a HEARTBEAT chunk MAY be omitted in case where the receipt of a SACK of the data or a T3-rtx timer expiration on the data can provide equivalent information, such as the case where the data chunk has been transmitted to a single destination address only. Likewise, the timeout of a HEARTBEAT chunk MAY be ignored if data is outstanding towards the destination address.

7. When the sender receives a HEARTBEAT ACK from a HEARTBEAT sent to a destination address in PF state, the sender SHOULD clear the error counter of the destination address and transition the destination address back to active state. However, there may be a situation where HEARTBEAT chunks can go through while DATA chunks cannot. Hence, in a situation where a HEARTBEAT ACK arrives while there is data outstanding towards the destination address to which the HEARTBEAT was sent, then an implementation
MAY choose to not have the HEARTBEAT ACK reset the error
counter, but have the error counter reset await the fate of the
outstanding data transmission. This situation can happen when
data is sent to a destination address in PF state. When the
sender resumes data transmission on a destination address after
a transition of the destination address from PF to active state,
it MUST do this following the prescriptions of Section 7.2 of
[RFC4960].

8. Additional (PMR - PFMR) consecutive timeouts on a destination
address in PF state confirm the path failure, upon which the
destination address transitions to the inactive state. As
described in [RFC4960], the sender (i) SHOULD notify the ULP
about this state transition, and (ii) transmit HEARTBEAT chunks
to the inactive destination address at a lower HB.interval
frequency as described in Section 8.3 of [RFC4960] (when the
Path Heartbeat function is enabled for the destination address).

9. Acknowledgments for chunks that have been transmitted to
multiple destinations (i.e., a chunk which has been
retransmitted to a different destination address than the
destination address to which the chunk was first transmitted)
SHOULD NOT clear the error count for an inactive destination
address and SHOULD NOT move a destination address in PF state
back to active state, since a sender cannot disambiguate whether
the ACK was for the original transmission or the
retransmission(s). A SCTP sender MAY clear the error counter
and move a destination address back to active state by
information other than acknowledgments, when it can uniquely
determine which destination, among multiple destination
addresses, the chunk reached. This document makes no reference
to what such information could consist of, nor how such
information could be obtained.

10. Acknowledgments for data chunks that has been transmitted to one
destination address only MUST clear the error counter for the
destination address and MUST transition a destination address in
PF state back to active state. This situation can happen when
new data is sent to a destination address in the PF state. It
can also happen in situations where the destination address is
in the PF state due to the occurrence of a spurious T3-rtx timer
and acknowledgments start to arrive for data sent prior to
occurrence of the spurious T3-rtx and data has not yet been
retransmitted towards other destinations. This document does
not specify special handling for detection of or reaction to
spurious T3-rtx timeouts, e.g., for special operation vis-a-vis
the congestion control handling or data retransmission operation
towards a destination address which undergoes a transition from
active to PF to active state due to a spurious T3-rtx timeout. But it is noted that this is an area which would benefit from additional attention, experimentation and specification for single-homed SCTP as well as for multi-homed SCTP protocol operation.

11. When all destination addresses are in inactive state, and SCTP protocol operation thus is said to be in dormant state, the prescriptions given in Section 4 shall be followed.

12. The SCTP stack SHOULD expose the PF state of its destination addresses to the ULP as well as provide the means to notify the ULP of state transitions of its destination addresses from active to PF, and vice-versa. However it is recommended that an SCTP stack implementing SCTP-PF also allows for that the ULP is kept ignorant of the PF state of its destinations and the associated state transitions, thus allowing for retain of the simpler state transition model of RFC4960 in the ULP. For this reason it is recommended that an SCTP stack implementing SCTP-PF also provides the ULP with the means to suppress exposure of the PF state and the associated state transitions.

4. Dormant State Operation

In a situation with complete disruption of the communication in between the SCTP Endpoints, the aggressive HEARTBEAT transmissions of SCTP-PF on destination addresses in PF state may make the association enter dormant state faster than a standard [RFC4960] SCTP implementation given the same setting of Path.Max.Retrans (PMR) and Association.Max.Retrans (AMR). For example, an SCTP association with two destination addresses typically would reach dormant state in half the time of an [RFC4960] SCTP implementation in such situations. This is because a SCTP PF sender will send HEARTBEATS and data retransmissions in parallel with RTO intervals when there are multiple destinations addresses in PF state. This argument presumes that RTO << HB.interval of [RFC4960]. With the design goal that SCTP-PF shall provide the same level of disruption tolerance as an [RFC4960] SCTP implementation with the same Path.Max.Retrans (PMR) and Association.Max.Retrans (AMR) setting, we prescribe for that an SCTP-PF implementation SHOULD operate as described below in Section 4.1 during dormant state.

An SCTP-PF implementation MAY choose a different dormant state operation than the one described below in Section 4.1 provided that the solution chosen does not decrease the fault tolerance of the SCTP-PF operation.
The below prescription for SCTP-PF dormant state handling MUST NOT be coupled to the value of the PFMR, but solely to the activation of SCTP-PF logic in an SCTP implementation.

It is noted that the below dormant state operation is considered to provide added disruption tolerance also for an [RFC4960] SCTP implementation, and that it can be sensible for an [RFC4960] SCTP implementation to follow this mode of operation. For an [RFC4960] SCTP implementation the continuation of data transmission during dormant state makes the fault tolerance of SCTP be more robust towards situations where some, or all, alternative paths of an SCTP association approach, or reach, inactive state before the primary path used for data transmission observes trouble.

4.1. SCTP Dormant State Procedure

a. When the destination addresses are all in inactive state and data is available for transfer, the sender MUST choose one destination and transmit data to this destination address.

b. The sender MUST NOT change the state of the chosen destination address (it remains in inactive state) and it MUST NOT clear the error counter of the destination address as a result of choosing the destination address for data transmission.

c. The sender SHOULD choose the destination in inactive state with the lowest error count (fewest consecutive timeouts) for data transmission. When there are multiple destinations with same error count in inactive state, the sender SHOULD attempt to pick the most divergent source-destination pair from the last source-destination pair where failure was observed. Rules for picking the most divergent source-destination pair are an implementation decision and are not specified within this document. To support differentiation of inactive destination addresses based on their error count SCTP will need to allow for increment of the destination address error counters up to some reasonable limit above PMR+1, thus changing the prescriptions of [RFC4960], section 8.3, in this respect. The exact limit to apply is not specified in this document but it is considered reasonable to require for the limit to be an order of magnitude higher than the PMR value. A sender MAY choose to deploy other strategies that the strategy defined here. The strategy to prioritize the last active destination address, i.e., the destination address with the fewest error counts is optimal when some paths are permanently inactive, but suboptimal when a path instability is transient.
5. Primary Path Switchover

The objective of the Primary Path Switchover operation is to allow the SCTP sender to continue data transmission on a new working path even when the old primary destination address becomes active again. This is achieved by having SCTP perform a switchover of the primary path to the new working path if the error counter of the primary path exceeds a certain threshold. This mode of operation can be applied not only to SCTP-PF implementations, but also to [RFC4960] implementations.

The Primary Path Switchover operation requires only sender side changes. The details are:

1. The sender maintains a new tunable parameter, called Primary.Switchover.Max.Retrans (PSMR). For SCTP-PF implementations, the PSMR MUST be set greater or equal to the PFMR value. For [RFC4960] implementations the PSMR MUST be set greater or equal to the PMR value. Implementations MUST reject any other values of PSMR.

2. When the path error counter on a set primary path exceeds PSMR, the SCTP implementation MUST autonomously select and set a new primary path.

3. The primary path selected by the SCTP implementation MUST be the path which at the given time would be chosen for data transfer. A previously failed primary path can be used as data transfer path as per normal path selection when the present data transfer path fails.

4. For SCTP-PF, the recommended value of PSMR is PFMR when Primary Path Switchover operation mode is used. This means that no forced switchback to a previously failed primary path is performed. An SCTP-PF implementation of Primary Path Switchover MUST support the setting of PSMR = PFMR. A SCTP-PF implementation of Primary Path Switchover MAY support setting of PSMR > PFMR.

5. For [RFC4960] SCTP, the recommended value of PSMR is PMR when Primary Path Switchover is used. This means that no forced switchback to a previously failed primary path is performed. A [RFC4960] SCTP implementation of Primary Path Switchover MUST support the setting of PSMR = PMR. An [RFC4960] SCTP implementation of Primary Path Switchover MAY support larger settings of PSMR > PMR.
6. It MUST be possible to disable the Primary Path Switchover operation and obtain the standard switchback operation of [RFC4960].

The manner of switchover operation that is most optimal in a given scenario depends on the relative quality of a set primary path versus the quality of alternative paths available as well as on the extent to which it is desired for the mode of operation to enforce traffic distribution over a number of network paths. I.e., load distribution of traffic from multiple SCTP associations may be sought to be enforced by distribution of the set primary paths with [RFC4960] switchback operation. However as [RFC4960] switchback behavior is suboptimal in certain situations, especially in scenarios where a number of equally good paths are available, an SCTP implementation MAY support also, as alternative behavior, the Primary Path Switchover mode of operation and MAY enable it based on applications’ requests.

For an SCTP implementation that implements the Primary Path Switchover operation, this specification RECOMMENDS that the standard RFC4960 switchback operation is retained as the default operation.

6. Suggested SCTP Protocol Parameter Values

This document does not alter the [RFC4960] value recommendation for the SCTP Protocol Parameters defined in [RFC4960].

The following protocol parameter is RECOMMENDED:

    PotentiallyFailed.Max.Retrans (PFMR) - 0

7. Socket API Considerations

This section describes how the socket API defined in [RFC6458] is extended to provide a way for the application to control and observe the SCTP-PF behavior as well as the Primary Path Switchover function.

Please note that this section is informational only.

A socket API implementation based on [RFC6458] is, by means of the existing SCTP_PEER_ADDR_CHANGE event, extended to provide the event notification when a peer address enters or leaves the potentially failed state as well as the socket API implementation is extended to expose the potentially failed state of a peer address in the existing SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO structure.

Furthermore, two new read/write socket options for the level IPPROTO_SCTP and the name SCTP_PEER_ADDR_THLDS and
SCTP_EXPOSE_POTENTIALLY_FAILED_STATE are defined as described below. The first socket option is used to control the values of the PFMR and PSMR parameters described in Section 3 and in Section 5. The second one controls the exposition of the potentially failed path state.

Support for the SCTP_PEER_ADDR_THLDS and SCTP_EXPOSE_POTENTIALLY_FAILED_STATE socket options need also to be added to the function sctp_opt_info().

7.1. Support for the Potentially Failed Path State

As defined in [RFC6458], the SCTP_PEER_ADDR_CHANGE event is provided if the status of a peer address changes. In addition to the state changes described in [RFC6458], this event is also provided, if a peer address enters or leaves the potentially failed state. The notification as defined in [RFC6458] uses the following structure:

```
struct sctp_paddr_change {
    uint16_t spc_type;
    uint16_t spc_flags;
    uint32_t spc_length;
    struct sockaddr_storage spc_aaddr;
    uint32_t spc_state;
    uint32_t spc_error;
    sctp_assoc_t spc_assoc_id;
}
```

[RFC6458] defines the constants SCTP_ADDR_AVAILABLE, SCTP_ADDR_UNREACHABLE, SCTP_ADDR_REMOVED, SCTP_ADDR_ADDED, and SCTP_ADDR_MADE_PRIM to be provided in the spc_state field. This document defines in addition to that the new constant SCTP_ADDR_POTENTIALLY_FAILED, which is reported if the affected address becomes potentially failed.

The SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO socket option defined in [RFC6458] can be used to query the state of a peer address. It uses the following structure:

```
struct sctp_paddrinfo {
    sctp_assoc_t spinfo_assoc_id;
    struct sockaddr_storage spinfo_address;
    int32_t spinfo_state;
    uint32_t spinfo_cwnd;
    uint32_t spinfo_srtt;
    uint32_t spinfo_rto;
    uint32_t spinfo_mtu;
};
```
[RFC6458] defines the constants SCTP_UNCONFIRMED, SCTP_ACTIVE, and
SCTP_INACTIVE to be provided in the spinfo_state field. This
document defines in addition to that the new constant
SCTP_POTENTIALLY_FAILED, which is reported if the peer address is
potentially failed.

7.2. Peer Address Thresholds (SCTP_PEER_ADDR_THLDS) Socket Option

Applications can control the SCTP-PF behavior by getting or setting
the number of consecutive timeouts before a peer address is
considered potentially failed or unreachable. The same socket option
is used by applications to set and get the number of timeouts before
the primary path is changed automatically by the Primary Path
Switchover function. This socket option uses the level IPPROTO_SCTP
and the name SCTP_PEER_ADDR_THLDS.

The following structure is used to access and modify the thresholds:

```
struct sctp_paddrthlds {
    sctp_assoc_t spt_assoc_id;
    struct sockaddr_storage spt_address;
    uint16_t spt_pathmaxrxt;
    uint16_t spt_pathpfthld;
    uint16_t spt_pathcpthld;
};
```

spt_assoc_id: This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style
sockets. For one-to-many style sockets the application may fill
in an association identifier or SCTP_FUTURE_ASSOC. It is an error
to use SCTP_(CURRENT|ALL)_ASSOC in spt_assoc_id.

spt_address: This specifies which peer address is of interest. If a
wild card address is provided, this socket option applies to all
current and future peer addresses.

spt_pathmaxrxt: Each peer address of interest is considered
unreachable, if its path error counter exceeds spt_pathmaxrxt.

spt_pathpfthld: Each peer address of interest is considered
Potentially Failed, if its path error counter exceeds
spt_pathpfthld.

spt_pathcpthld: Each peer address of interest is not considered the
primary remote address anymore, if its path error counter exceeds
spt_pathcpthld. Using a value of 0xffff disables the selection of
a new primary peer address. If an implementation does not support
the automatically selection of a new primary address, it should
indicate an error with errno set to EINVAL if a value different

from 0xffff is used in spt_pathcpthld. For SCTP-PF, the setting of spt_pathcpthld < spt_pathpfthld should be rejected with errno set to EINVAL. For [RFC4960] SCTP, the setting of spt_pathcpthld < spt_pathmaxrxt should be rejected with errno set to EINVAL. A SCTP-PF implementation may support only setting of spt_pathcpthld = spt_pathpfthld and spt_pathcpthld = 0xffff and a [RFC4960] SCTP implementation may support only setting of spt_pathcpthld = spt_pathmaxrxt and spt_pathcpthld = 0xffff. In these cases SCTP shall reject setting of other values with errno set to EINVAL.

7.3. Exposing the Potentially Failed Path State
(SCTP_EXPOSE_POTENTIALLY_FAILED_STATE) Socket Option

Applications can control the exposure of the potentially failed path state in the SCTP_PEER_ADDR_CHANGE event and the SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO as described in Section 7.1. The default value is implementation specific.

This socket option uses the level IPPROTO_SCTP and the name SCTP_EXPOSE_POTENTIALLY_FAILED_STATE.

The following structure is used to control the exposition of the potentially failed path state:

```
struct sctp_assoc_value {
    sctp_assoc_t assoc_id;
    uint32_t assoc_value;
};
```

assoc_id: This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style sockets. For one-to-many style sockets the application may fill in an association identifier or SCTP_FUTURE_ASSOC. It is an error to use SCTP_{CURRENT|ALL}_ASSOC in assoc_id.

assoc_value: The potentially failed path state is exposed if and only if this parameter is non-zero.

8. Security Considerations

Security considerations for the use of SCTP and its APIs are discussed in [RFC4960] and [RFC6458].

The logic introduced by this document does not impact existing SCTP messages on the wire. Also, this document does not introduce any new SCTP messages on the wire that require new security considerations.

SCTP-PF makes SCTP not only more robust during primary path failure/congestion but also more vulnerable to network connectivity/
congestion attacks on the primary path. SCTP-PF makes it easier for an attacker to trick SCTP to change data transfer path, since the duration of time that an attacker needs to negatively influence the network connectivity is much shorter than [RFC4960]. However, SCTP-PF does not constitute a significant change in the duration of time and effort an attacker needs to keep SCTP away from the primary path. With the standard switchback operation [RFC4960] SCTP resumes data transfer on its primary path as soon as the next HEARTBEAT succeeds.

On the other hand, usage of the Primary Path Switchover mechanism, does change the threat analysis. This is because on-path attackers can force a permanent change of the data transfer path by blocking the primary path until the switchover of the primary path is triggered by the Primary Path Switchover algorithm. This especially will be the case when the Primary Path Switchover is used together with SCTP-PF with the particular setting of PSMR = PFMR = 0, as Primary Path Switchover here happens already at the first RTO timeout experienced. Users of the Primary Path Switchover mechanism should be aware of this fact.

The event notification of path state transfer from active to potentially failed state and vice versa gives attackers an increased possibility to generate more local events. However, it is assumed that event notifications are rate-limited in the implementation to address this threat.

9. MIB Considerations

SCTP-PF introduces new SCTP algorithms for failover and switchback with associated new state parameters. It is recommended that the SCTP-MIB defined in [RFC3873] is updated to support the management of the SCTP-PF implementation. This can be done by extending the sctpAssocRemAddrActive field of the SCTPAssocRemAddrTable to include information of the PF state of the destination address and by adding new fields to the SCTPAssocRemAddrTable supporting PotentiallyFailed.Max.Retrans (PFMR) and Primary.Switchover.Max.Retrans (PSMR) parameters.

10. IANA Considerations

This document does not create any new registries or modify the rules for any existing registries managed by IANA.

11. Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Michael Tuexen for his many invaluable comments and for his very substantial support with the making of this document.
12. Proposed Change of Status (to be Deleted before Publication)

Initially this work looked to entail some changes of the Congestion Control (CC) operation of SCTP and for this reason the work was proposed as Experimental. These intended changes of the CC operation have since been judged to be irrelevant and are no longer part of the specification. As the specification entails no other potential harmful features, consensus exists in the WG to bring the work forward as PS.

Initially concerns have been expressed about the possibility for the mechanism to introduce path bouncing with potential harmful network impacts. These concerns are believed to be unfounded. This issue is addressed in Appendix B.

It is noted that the feature specified by this document is implemented by multiple SCTP SW implementations and furthermore that various variants of the solution have been deployed in telephony signaling environments for several years with good results.

13. References

13.1. Normative References


13.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Discussions of Alternative Approaches

This section lists alternative approaches for the issues described in this document. Although these approaches do not require to update RFC4960, we do not recommend them from the reasons described below.

A.1. Reduce Path.Max.Retrans (PMR)

Smaller values for Path.Max.Retrans shorten the failover duration and in fact this is recommended in some research results [JUNGMAIER02] [GRINNEMO04] [FALLON08]. However to significantly reduce the failover time it is required to go down (as with PFMR) to Path.Max.Retrans=0 and with this setting SCTP switches to another
destination address already on a single timeout which may result in spurious failover. Spurious failover is a problem in [RFC4960] SCTP as the transmission of HEARTBEATS on the left primary path, unlike in SCTP-PF, is governed by ‘HB.interval’ also during the failover process. ‘HB.interval’ is usually set in the order of seconds (recommended value is 30 seconds) and when the primary path becomes inactive, the next HEARTBEAT may be transmitted only many seconds later. Indeed as recommended, only 30 secs later. Meanwhile, the primary path may since long have recovered, if it needed recovery at all (indeed the failover could be truly spurious). In such situations, post failover, an endpoint is forced to wait in the order of many seconds before the endpoint can resume transmission on the primary path and furthermore once it returns on the primary path the CWND needs to be rebuilt anew - a process which the throughput already have had to suffer from on the alternate path. Using a smaller value for ‘HB.interval’ might help this situation, but it would result in a general waste of bandwidth as such more frequent HEARTBEATING would take place also when there are no observed troubles. The bandwidth overhead may be diminished by having the ULP use a smaller ‘HB.interval’ only on the path which at any given time is set to be the primary path, but this adds complication in the ULP.

In addition, smaller Path.Max.Retrans values also affect the ‘Association.Max.Retrans’ value. When the SCTP association’s error count exceeds Association.Max.Retrans threshold, the SCTP sender considers the peer endpoint unreachable and terminates the association. Section 8.2 in [RFC4960] recommends that Association.Max.Retrans value should not be larger than the summation of the Path.Max.Retrans of each of the destination addresses. Else the SCTP sender considers its peer reachable even when all destinations are INACTIVE and to avoid this dormant state operation, [RFC4960] SCTP implementation SHOULD reduce Association.Max.Retrans accordingly whenever it reduces Path.Max.Retrans. However, smaller Association.Max.Retrans value decreases the fault tolerance of SCTP as it increases the chances of association termination during minor congestion events.

A.2. Adjust RTO related parameters

As several research results indicate, we can also shorten the duration of failover process by adjusting RTO related parameters [JUNGMAYER02] [FALLON08]. During failover process, RTO keeps being doubled. However, if we can choose smaller value for RTO.max, we can stop the exponential growth of RTO at some point. Also, choosing smaller values for RTO.initial or RTO.min can contribute to keep the RTO value small.
Similar to reducing Path.Max.Retrans, the advantage of this approach is that it requires no modification to the current specification, although it needs to ignore several recommendations described in the Section 15 of [RFC4960]. However, this approach requires to have enough knowledge about the network characteristics between end points. Otherwise, it can introduce adverse side-effects such as spurious timeouts.

The significant issue with this approach, however, is that even if the RTO.max is lowered to an optimal low value, then as long as the Path.Max.Retrans is kept at the [RFC4960] recommended value, the reduction of the RTO.max doesn’t reduce the failover time sufficiently enough to prevent severe performance degradation during failover.

Appendix B. Discussions for Path Bouncing Effect

The methods described in the document can accelerate the failover process. Hence, they might introduce the path bouncing effect where the sender keeps changing the data transmission path frequently. This sounds harmful to the data transfer, however several research results indicate that there is no serious problem with SCTP in terms of path bouncing effect [CARO04] [CARO05].

There are two main reasons for this. First, SCTP is basically designed for multipath communication, which means SCTP maintains all path related parameters (CWND, ssthresh, RTT, error count, etc) per each destination address. These parameters cannot be affected by path bouncing. In addition, when SCTP migrates the data transfer to another path, it starts with the minimal or the initial CWND. Hence, there is little chance for packet reordering or duplicating.

Second, even if all communication paths between the end-nodes share the same bottleneck, the SCTP-PF results in a behavior already allowed by [RFC4960].

Appendix C. SCTP-PF for SCTP Single-homed Operation

For a single-homed SCTP association the only tangible effect of the activation of SCTP-PF operation is enhanced failure detection in terms of potential notification of the PF state of the sole destination address as well as, for idle associations, more rapid entering, and notification, of inactive state of the destination address and more rapid end-point failure detection. It is believed that neither of these effects are harmful, provided adequate dormant state operation is implemented, and furthermore that they may be particularly useful for applications that deploys multiple SCTP associations for load balancing purposes. The early notification of
the PF state may be used for preventive measures as the entering of
the PF state can be used as a warning of potential congestion.
Depending on the PMR value, the aggressive HEARTBEAT transmission in
PF state may speed up the end-point failure detection (exceed of AMR
threshold on the sole path error counter) on idle associations in
case where relatively large HB.interval value compared to RTO (e.g.
30secs) is used.

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Abstract

This document updates RFC 4960 by defining a method for the sender of a DATA chunk to indicate that the corresponding SACK chunk should be sent back immediately and not be delayed. It is done by specifying a bit in the DATA chunk header, called the I-bit, which can get set either by the SCTP implementation or by the application using an SCTP stack. Since unknown flags in chunk headers are ignored by SCTP implementations, this extension does not introduce any interoperability problems.

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1. Introduction

According to [RFC4960] the receiver of a DATA chunk should use delayed SACKs. This delaying is completely controlled by the receiver of the DATA chunk and remains the default behavior.

In specific situations the delaying of SACKs results in reduced performance of the protocol:

1. If such a situation can be detected by the receiver, the corresponding SACK can be sent immediately. For example, [RFC4960] recommends the immediate sending if the receiver has detected message loss or message duplication.
2. However, if the situation can only be detected by the sender of the DATA chunk, [RFC4960] provides no method of avoiding a delay in sending the SACK. Examples of these situations include ones which require interaction with the application (e.g. applications using the SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT, see Section 4.1) and ones which can be detected by the SCTP stack itself (e.g. closing the association, hitting window limits or resetting streams, see Section 4.2).

To overcome the limitation described in the second case, this document describes a simple extension of the SCTP DATA chunk by defining a new flag, the I-bit. The sender of a DATA chunk indicates by setting this bit that the corresponding SACK chunk should not be delayed.

2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. The I-bit in the DATA Chunk Header

The following Figure 1 shows the extended DATA chunk.

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|   Type = 0    |  Res  |I|U|B|E|           Length              |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                              TSN                              |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|        Stream Identifier      |     Stream Sequence Number    |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                  Payload Protocol Identifier                  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/                           User Data                           /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 1: Extended DATA chunk format

The only difference between the DATA chunk in Figure 1 and the DATA chunk defined in [RFC4960] is the addition of the I-bit in the flags field of the DATA chunk header.
This bit was Reserved in [RFC4960]. [RFC4960] specified that this bit should be set to 0 by the sender and ignored by the receiver.

4. Use Cases

The setting of the I-bit can either be triggered by the application using SCTP or by the SCTP stack itself. The following two subsections provide a non-exhaustive list of examples.

4.1. Triggering at the Application Level

One example of a situation in which it may be desirable for an application to trigger setting of the I-bit involves the SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT in the SCTP socket API [RFC6458]. Upper layers of SCTP using the socket API as defined in [RFC6458] may subscribe to the SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT for getting a notification as soon as no user data is outstanding anymore. To avoid an unnecessary delay while waiting for such an event, the application can request the setting of the I-Bit when sending the last user message before waiting for the event. This results in setting the I-bit of the last DATA chunk corresponding to the user message and is possible using the extension of the socket API described in Section 7.

4.2. Triggering at the SCTP Level

There are also situations in which the SCTP implementation can set the I-bit without interacting with the upper layer.

If the association is in the SHUTDOWN-PENDING state, setting the I-bit reduces the number of simultaneous associations for a busy server handling short living associations.

Another case is where the sending of a DATA chunk fills the congestion or receiver window. Setting the I-bit in these cases improves the throughput of the transfer.

If an SCTP association supports the SCTP Stream Reconfiguration extension defined in [RFC6525], the performance can be improved by setting the I-bit when there are pending reconfiguration requests that require that there be no outstanding DATA chunks.

5. Procedures
5.1. Sender Side Considerations

Whenever the sender of a DATA chunk can benefit from the corresponding SACK chunk being sent back without delay, the sender MAY set the I-bit in the DATA chunk header. Please note that it is irrelevant to the receiver why the sender has set the I-bit.

Reasons for setting the I-bit include, but are not limited to, the following (see Section 4 for the benefits):

- The application requests to set the I-bit of the last DATA chunk of a user message when providing the user message to the SCTP implementation (see Section 7).
- The sender is in the SHUTDOWN-PENDING state.
- The sending of a DATA chunk fills the congestion or receiver window.
- The sending of an Outgoing SSN Reset Request Parameter or an SSN/TSN Reset Request Parameter is pending, if the association supports the Stream Reconfiguration extension defined in [RFC6525].

5.2. Receiver Side Considerations

On reception of an SCTP packet containing a DATA chunk with the I-bit set, the receiver SHOULD NOT delay the sending of the corresponding SACK chunk, i.e., the receiver SHOULD immediately respond with the corresponding SACK chunk.

6. Interoperability Considerations

According to [RFC4960] the receiver of a DATA chunk with the I-bit set should ignore this bit when it does not support the extension described in this document. Since the sender of the DATA chunk is able to handle this case, there is no requirement for negotiating the support of the feature described in this document.

7. Socket API Considerations

This section describes how the socket API defined in [RFC6458] is extended to provide a way for the application to set the I-bit.

Please note that this section is informational only.
A socket API implementation based on [RFC6458] needs to be extended to allow the application to set the I-bit of the last DATA chunk when sending each user message.

This can be done by setting a flag called SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY in the snd_flags field of the struct sctp_sndinfo structure when using sctp_sendv() or sendmsg(). If the deprecated struct sctp_sndrcvinfo structure is used instead when calling sctp_send(), sctp_sendx(), or sendmsg(), the SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY flag can be set in the sinfo_flags field. When using the deprecated function sctp_sendmsg() the SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY flag can be in the flags parameter.

8. IANA Considerations

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:

"RFCXXXX" is to be replaced by the RFC number you assign this document.
]

Following the chunk flag registration procedure defined in [RFC6096], IANA should register a new bit, the I-bit, for the DATA chunk. The suggested value is 0x08 and the reference should be RFCXXXX.

This requires an update of the "DATA Chunk Flags" registry for SCTP:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chunk Flag Value</th>
<th>Chunk Flag Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>E bit</td>
<td>[RFC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>B bit</td>
<td>[RFC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>U bit</td>
<td>[RFC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>I Bit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x20</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x40</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x80</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Security Considerations

See [RFC4960] for general security considerations for SCTP. In addition, a malicious sender can force its peer to send packets containing a SACK chunk for each received packet containing DATA chunks instead of every other. This could impact the network, resulting in more packets sent on the network, or the peer because the generating and sending of the packets has some processing cost. However, the additional packets can only contain the most simplest SACK chunk (no gap reports, no duplicate TSNs), since in case of packet drop or reordering in the network a SACK chunk would be sent immediately anyway. Therefore this does neither introduce a significant additional processing cost on the receiver side. This does not result in more traffic in the network than a receiver that sends a SACK for every packet, which is already permitted.

10. Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Mark Allmann, Brian Bidulock, David Black, Anna Brunstrom, Gorry Fairhurst, Janardhan Iyengar, Kacheong Poon, and Michael Welzl for their invaluable comments.

11. References

11.1. Normative References


11.2. Informative References


Authors’ Addresses
Abstract

This document formally deprecates the use of ICMP Source Quench messages by transport protocols, formally updating RFC 792, RFC 1122, and RFC 1812.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 28, 2012.

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1. Introduction

The ICMP specification [RFC0792] defined the ICMP Source Quench message (type 4, code 0), which was meant as a mechanism for congestion control. ICMP Source Quench has been known to be an ineffective (and unfair) antidote for congestion, and generation of ICMP Source Quench messages by routers has been formally deprecated by [RFC1812] since 1995. However, reaction to ICMP Source Quench messages in transport protocols has never been formally deprecated.

This document formally deprecates reaction to ICMP Source Quench messages by transport protocols such as TCP, formally updating [RFC0792], [RFC1122], and [RFC1812]. Additionally, it provides recommendation against the implementation of [RFC1016]. The rationale for these specification updates is:

- Processing of ICMP Source Quench messages by routers has been deprecated for more than 20 years [RFC1812].
- Virtually all popular host implementations have removed support for ICMP Source Quench messages since (at least) 2005 [RFC5927].
- Widespread deployment of ICMP filtering makes it impossible to rely on ICMP Source Quench messages for congestion control.
- The IETF has moved away from ICMP Source Quench messages for congestion control (note e.g. the development of ECN [RFC3168], and the fact that ICMPv6 [RFC4443] does not even specify a Source Quench message).

ICMP Source Quench messages are not normally seen in the deployed Internet and were considered rare at least as far back as 1994. [Floyd1994]

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. ICMP Source Quench messages

The ICMP specification [RFC0792] defined the ICMP Source Quench message (type 4, code 0), which was meant to provide a mechanism for congestion control. The Host Requirements RFC [RFC1122] stated in Section 4.2.3.9 that hosts MUST react to ICMP Source Quench messages by slowing transmission on the connection, and further added that the RECOMMENDED procedure was to put the corresponding connection in the slow-start phase of TCP’s congestion control algorithm [RFC5681].
[RFC1812] noted that research suggested that ICMP Source Quench was an ineffective (and unfair) antidote for congestion, and formally deprecated the generation of ICMP Source Quench messages by routers, stating that routers SHOULD NOT send ICMP Source Quench messages in response to congestion.

[RFC5927] discussed the use of ICMP Source Quench messages for performing "blind throughput-reduction" attacks, and noted that most TCP implementations silently ignore ICMP Source Quench messages.

We note that TCP implements its own congestion control mechanisms [RFC5681] [RFC3168], that do not depend on ICMP Source Quench messages.

It is interesting to note that ICMPv6 [RFC4443] does not specify a "Source Quench" message.

3. Updating RFC 1122

This document hereby updates Section 3.2.2.3 of [RFC1122] as follows:

A host MUST NOT send ICMP Source Quench messages.

If a Source Quench message is received, the IP layer MAY silently discard it.

Section 4.2.3.9 of [RFC1122] is updated as follows:

TCP MUST silently discard any received ICMP Source Quench messages.

The consensus of the TSV WG was that there are no valid reasons for a host to generate or react to an ICMP Source Quench message in the current Internet. The recommendation that a sender "MUST NOT" send an ICMP Source Quench message is because there is no known valid reason for a host to generate this message. The only known impact of a sender ignoring this requirement is that it may necessarily consume network and endpoint resources. Discarding ICMP Source Quench messages at the internet-layer (rather than at the transport layer) is a performance optimization that is permitted by this update.

4. Updating RFC 1812

This document hereby updates Section 4.3.3.3 of [RFC1812] as follows:
A router MUST ignore any ICMP Source Quench messages it receives.

The consensus of the TSV WG was that there are no valid reasons for a router to react to ICMP Source Quench messages in the current Internet.

5. Clarification for UDP, SCTP, and DCCP

UDP did not explicitly specify support for ICMP Source Quench messages. Hereby we clarify that UDP end-points MUST silently discard received ICMP Source Quench messages.

It is understood that SCTP and DCCP did not specify support for processing received ICMP Source Quench messages. Hereby we clarify that DCCP and SCTP end-points MUST silently discard received ICMP Source Quench messages.

6. General Advice to Transport Protocols

If a Source Quench message is received by any other transport-protocol instance, it MUST be silently ignored.

The TSV WG is not aware of any use that requires processing of these messages, and therefore expects other transports to follow the recommendations in Section 3. Note that for IETF-specified transports, this document formally deprecates reaction to ICMP Source Quench messages, and that generation of ICMP Source Quench messages has been deprecated for both hosts and routers. Therefore, future applications can not expect to receive these messages.

7. Recommendation Regarding RFC 1016

RFC 1016 [RFC1016] described an experimental approach to ICMP Source Quench message handling in hosts that was being thought about in 1987. The IETF notes that RFC 1016 has never been on the IETF standards-track, but for clarity and avoidance of doubt, we note that the approach described in RFC 1016 [RFC1016] MUST NOT be implemented.

8. Security Considerations

ICMP Source Quench messages could be leveraged for performing blind throughput-reduction attacks against TCP and similar protocols. This attack vector, along with possible countermeasures, has been discussed in great detail in [RFC5927] and [CPNI-TCP]. Silently
ignoring ICMP Source Quench messages, as specified in this document, eliminates the aforementioned attack vector.

For current TCP implementations, receipt of an ICMP Source Quench message should not result in security issues because, as noted in [RFC5927] and [CPNI-TCP], virtually all current versions of popular TCP implementations already silently ignore ICMP Source Quench messages. This is also the case for SCTP and DCCP implementations.

Hosts, security gateways, and firewalls MUST silently discard received ICMP Source Quench packets and SHOULD log such drops as a security fault with at least minimal details (IP Source Address, IP Destination Address, ICMP message type, and date/time the packet was seen).

We note that security devices such as the Snort Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) has logged ICMP Source Quench messages as such for more than ten years. [Anderson2002].

9. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to mark ICMP type 4 (Source Quench) as "Deprecated" in the ICMP Parameters registry [ICMPPARREG] with a reference to this document.

10. Acknowledgements

The author of this document would like to thank Ran Atkinson, who contributed text that was incorporated into this document and also provided valuable feedback on earlier versions of this document.

The author of this document would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Fred Baker, David Black, Scott Bradner, James Carlson, Antonio De Simone, Wesley Eddy, Gorry Fairhurst, Alfred Hoenes, Mahesh Jethanandani, Kathleen Moriarty, Carlos Pignataro, James Polk, Anantha Ramaiah, Randall Stewart, Dan Wing, and Andrew Yourtchenko, for providing valuable feedback on earlier versions of this document.

This document has benefited from discussions within the TCPM Working Group while working on [RFC5927].

11. References
11.1. Normative References


11.2. Informative References


[OpenBSD] The OpenBSD Project, "http://www.openbsd.org".
Appendix A. Survey of support of ICMP Source Quench in some popular TCP/IP implementations

A large number of implementations completely ignore ICMP Source Quench messages meant for TCP connections. This behavior has been implemented in, at least, Linux [Linux] since 2004, and in FreeBSD [FreeBSD], NetBSD [NetBSD], OpenBSD [OpenBSD], and Solaris 10 since 2005. Additionally, OpenSolaris [OpenSolaris] has always shipped with support for ICMP Source Quench messages disabled.

Appendix B. Changes from previous versions of the draft (to be removed by the RFC Editor before publishing this document as an RFC)

B.1. Changes from draft-ietf-tsvwg-source-quench-05
   o Fixes minor writeo in Section 7.

B.2. Changes from draft-ietf-tsvwg-source-quench-04
   o Removes request to move RFC 1016 to "Historic" status.
   o Updates the Security Considerations section.

B.3. Changes from draft-ietf-tsvwg-source-quench-03
   o Added 'Obsoletes' metadata, and moved the reference to [RFC1016] from the 'Normative References' to the 'Informative References'.
B.4. Changes from draft-ietf-tsvwg-source-quench-02
   o Clarifies the requirements language.

B.5. Changes from draft-ietf-tsvwg-source-quench-01
   o Changes deprecation of ICMP SQ from "SHOULD NOT" to "MUST NOT" in
     response of feedback from Scott Bradner and the TSV WG.

B.6. Changes from draft-ietf-tsvwg-source-quench-00
   o Discusses the motivation for deprecating ICMP Source Quench
     messages (as suggested by Anantha Ramaiah).
   o Incorporates IANA considerations such that ICMP Source Quench
     messages are deprecated in the corresponding registry.

B.7. Changes from draft-gont-tsvwg-source-quench-01
   o Addresses nits and editorial changes suggested by Gorry Fairhurst.
   o Added the status of Solaris and OpenSolaris to Appendix A.
   o Document resubmitted as draft-ietf.

B.8. Changes from draft-gont-tsvwg-source-quench-00
   o This revision reflects the recent discussion about ICMP Source
     Quench messages on the tsvwg mailing-list. A detailed list of the
     changes is available at:
       http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tsvwg/current/msg10407.html

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Abstract

Minion uses TCP-format packets on-the-wire, to provide full compatibility with existing NATs, Firewalls, and similar middleboxes, but provides a richer set of facilities to the application. Minion’s richer facilities include a message-oriented API rather than TCP’s unstructured byte-stream service model, multiplexing of multiple messages (or message streams) on a single connection, interleaving of multiplexed messages (to eliminate head-of-line blocking), message cancellation, request/reply support, ordered and unordered messages, chained messages, multiple priority levels with byte-granularity preemption, and DTLS Security.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Conventions and Terminology Used in this Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119].

2. Introduction

Back in 1983 application developers had the choice of UDP [RFC0768] or TCP [RFC0793]. UDP preserves message boundaries, but provides no reliability, ordering, flow control, or congestion control, and only supports small messages (typically UDP packets larger than 1468 bytes result in undesirable IP fragmentation). TCP provides these important facilities, and doesn’t impose any message size limit -- but only because it doesn’t have any concept of messages, and doesn’t claim to preserve message boundaries. Consequently, whichever base protocol the application developer chose, they were left building part of the transport-layer solution themselves.

Thirty years later, in 2013, little has changed. Application developers on mainstream platforms like Android and iOS still have the same two choices -- UDP and TCP.

Attempts to provide richer application facilities have failed to achieve widespread adoption. Protocols like SCTP are not supported by mainstream NAT gateways. Consequently, mainstream apps for platforms like Android and iOS don’t use SCTP, because it would severely limit their real-world deployment. Consequently, operating systems like Android and iOS don’t have in-kernel native implementations of SCTP, because there’s little developer demand for a protocol they can’t use. Consequently, there’s little incentive for NAT gateway vendors to do the work to add support for a protocol that’s neither supported in the popular operating systems nor used by mainstream applications.
Like SCTP, Minion goes beyond UDP and TCP by providing richer application facilities, making it possible to create applications that work better and more reliably (and can be brought to market quicker and easier) than is possible when each application has to re-create those facilities from scratch every time.

However, unlike SCTP, Minion provides facilities that can be used by an application developer immediately, without having to wait for OS support or NAT gateway support. OS support and NAT gateway support can come later, and provide additional incremental improvements. This incremental deployment path -- which begins first with the application developer who can choose to use Minion and immediately reap the benefits of that decision -- is an important property of Minion, and removes one of the major obstacles that hindered SCTP adoption.

When used without kernel support, Minion acts like a typical TCP-based application protocol, and as such, performs as well as any other TCP-based application protocol. However, unlike most application-specific protocols, Minion also offers the potential of kernel support giving better low-latency message performance and better prioritization. A general application protocol is unlikely to receive special-case kernel support tailored to support that one specific application, but as a general-purpose transport protocol built to support a wide range of applications, special kernel support for Minion is feasible.

Minion preserves the important properties of TCP, like congestion control, while adding a range of richer application facilities:

Message Oriented
Rather than an unstructured byte stream, Minion supports messages. TCP provides an unstructured byte stream, but virtually every application needs to send and receive semantic messages, which means that virtually every application needs to build its own message framing mechanism on top of TCP. In contrast, Minion respects and preserves semantic boundaries. If an application writes a 27-byte message followed by a 53-byte message, then a 27-byte message and a 53-byte message are delivered to the receiving client, not a single combined block of 80 bytes.

Arbitrary Size Messages
While most Minion messages are expected to be small, Minion itself imposes no upper limit on message size. For example, a 6 gigabyte movie download could be sent as a single Minion message. Messages do not have to fit in memory. A very large message can be generated incrementally by the sender, and will be delivered incrementally to the receiver.
Multiplexing
Multiple messages can be sent, in both directions, on a single Minion connection. Unlike protocols like HTTP/1.0 where each request used a separate connection, many Minion messages can share a connection.

Interleaving
When multiple (possibly large) messages are being sent concurrently on a single Minion connection, the connection bandwidth is shared round-robin between the messages. This avoids head-of-line blocking, where messages are blocked waiting for a large message to complete.

Cancellation
Messages do not have to be sent to completion. If either the sender or the receiver determines that a message is no longer needed, then that single message can be cancelled without having to tear down the entire Minion connection.

Request/Reply Support
Many application protocols are request/reply-oriented. Minion facilitates this by allowing an outgoing message to be explicitly identified as a reply to a previously-received message, which causes the reply message to be delivered automatically to the appropriate message handler at the receiving end.

Replies do not have to be delivered in the same order that the requests were received. When multiple (possibly large) replies are in flight at the same time, the interleaving and bandwidth-sharing described above applies, as it does for all Minion messages.

Replies can themselves generate further replies, resulting in an unbounded back-and-forth of ping-pong messages, each going to the appropriate reply handler on the receiving side.

Unordered Messages
One of the main arguments that is often presented to justify why a particular application protocol is built on UDP instead of TCP is that, "UDP is better for 'real time' applications." The supporting reasoning for this is often that, "TCP insists on continuing to retransmit data long after the client doesn’t need any more." In truth the real problem is not retransmission; it is that the conventional TCP APIs don’t allow received data to be delivered out of order. Suppose a TCP sender has 50 packets in flight at any given time (e.g. the bandwidth x delay product is 75 kB) then the loss of a single packet causes all 49 following packets to stall at the receiver because the API doesn’t allow for
them to be delivered to the client until the missing packet has been received. A simple kernel extension (in the form of a new socket option) removes this limitation, and allows out-of-order data to be delivered to the client. This avoids the problem where a single lost TCP segment causes all the following TCP segments to be delayed.

Note that this kernel extension is not *required* for a client to use Minion; it is an optional extension that provides better performance for real-time applications in situations where there is packet loss or reordering. For many applications it is an irrelevant benefit and they can operate perfectly well without it. For a few applications it is a significant benefit, and it allows Minion to provide the low-latency performance that often drives developers to use UDP.

**Receiver Ordering**

Although sometimes it can be desirable to receive messages out of order as they arrive, often it is not. In many cases the application cannot usefully use (certain) messages out of order, and delivering them potentially out of order would burden the application with the task of sorting the messages back into the correct order before processing them. In such cases, it is more convenient for the application to have Minion deliver messages to it in the right order. For this reason Minion supports ordered messages as well as unordered messages. Unordered messages and ordered messages are supported simultaneously on a single Minion connection.

Other transport protocols support the notion of multiple message streams sharing a single connection. Minion takes this idea and generalizes it to the more expressive notion of Receiver Ordering Message Dependencies. Receiver Ordering Message Dependencies indicate that a dependent message must not be delivered before the message it depends upon.

Traditional message streams can be created in Minion by using a sequence of Receiver Ordering Message Dependencies: If message B is specified to follow message A, and message C is specified to follow message B, and so on, then messages A,B,C... form an ordered "stream". Similarly, if at the same time message Q is specified to follow message P, and message R is specified to follow message Q, and so on, then messages P,Q,R... form another independent ordered "stream" of their own.

In addition to such disjoint ordered streams (A,B,C... and P,Q,R...), Receiver Ordering Message Dependencies also allow richer relationships to be expressed. For example, in H.264...
video, P-frames reference I-frames, but P-frames do not reference other P-frames. If a single P-frame is lost or delayed, it is not necessary to delay all subsequent P-frames. Each P-frame has a time it is due to be displayed, and when that time arrives the frame should be displayed if possible, even if (or especially if) preceding P-frames did not arrive in time. However, there is no benefit in delivering a P-frame to the application before the I-frame it depends upon.

To give another example, a web browser client may need to retrieve many resources to display a page, but it cannot display *any* of the page until it has received the style sheet. Consequently it would be beneficial if the web browser client could request all of the resources it needs, but for each one, indicate that it depends on the style sheet resource (or upon some other resource which depends by transitive closure on the sheet resource). This dependency information tells the sender that it should not devote *any* bytes of available bandwidth to delivering other resources until after it has completed sending the all-important style sheet.

Sender Ordering
Even in cases where the receiver does not have a strict ordering requirement, it may still be useful to cause data packets to be sent in a favourable order. For example, with a group of H.264 video P-frames, the first frame of the group is likely to be needed for playback sooner than the last frame of the group. Therefore, delivering them all concurrently by sharing bandwidth between them may cause the first frame to be delivered too late to be played. In this case the sender uses Sender Ordering to indicate that a particular message should follow another message on the wire.

Sender Ordering is more lightweight than Receiver Ordering; it is used solely to control the transmission order, and is not communicated to the receiver. If a message is lost or delayed in transit then following messages are still delivered to the application immediately, except when an explicit Receiver Ordering Message Dependency indicates that they should not be.

Chained Messages
Minion is intended to be used to deliver messages containing a single logical semantic unit. Although Minion can "stream" a message of unbounded size to the receiver, Minion is not generally intended to be used to batch multiple logical semantic units into single large message, which is then "streamed" to the receiver, which then parses the incoming "streamed" message as it arrives for the logical semantic units contained within it. Part of the
purpose of Minion is to take the burden of message framing off the application writer; treating a single unbounded "streaming" Minion message like a TCP connection places the burden of parsing firmly back in the hands of the application developer.

In the event that a logical message contains multiple related parts, like a header with an associated body, Minion can facilitate this structuring through the use of Chained Messages.

Chained Messages are substantially similar to Receiver Ordering Message Dependencies, except that in addition to controlling the order of data transmission on the wire, and the order of message delivery to the client, the chained message relationship is also exposed to the client application at the receiving end. Instead of being delivered to the Minion connection’s main message handler function, the way most messages are, Chained Messages are delivered instead to the Chained Message handler function of the previous message in the chain.

The Chained Message mechanism allows an application to provide a main message handler function that receives and processes the "header" portion of each two-part message, and that main message handler function in turn provides a different message handler function that receives and processes the subsequent "body" portion.

As with other messages, each component in a message chain can optionally generate an explicit reply, which is delivered to the reply handler for the originating message.

If any message in a chain is cancelled by the sender or the receiver, then all subsequent messages in that chain are implicitly cancelled.

The sender of a chain of messages may wait at each step for a reply confirming that the previous message was acceptable before sending the next message of the chain, or it may send the entire chain and let the receiver cancel the message chain if an error occurs.

Priority Levels

While Receiver Ordering, Sender Ordering, and Message Chaining allow relationships between messages to be adequately expressed where they are known in advance, sometimes there are urgent messages that need to be sent at short notice that are not known in advance. For example, consider a music application which is streaming out audio data with a generous playback buffer, and then the user performs a user-interface operation to change the volume...
level. We would like this volume change to be performed as promptly as possible, regardless of how much audio data is queued up in the transmit buffer. For this reason Minion supports four priority levels. A higher-priority message can preempt a lower-priority message at any arbitrary byte boundary in the lower-priority data stream. (This byte-granularity preemption is made possible by the Minion wire protocol [minprot]).

Minion provides strict priorities, meaning that no lower-priority data at all is sent as long as there is higher-priority data waiting. This means that a sustained flow of higher-priority data can starve lower-priority data indefinitely. For this reason, Minion priorities are intended to support small amounts of high-priority data intermixed with larger amounts of lower-priority data. If the amount of high-priority data exceeds the current throughput of the Minion connection then all the available throughput will be consumed attempting to meet the high-priority data demand, and no lower-priority data will be sent. If this outcome is undesirable to the application, it should ensure that it does not generate sustained high-priority data at a rate exceeding the network throughput for a prolonged period of time. Minion does not attempt to provide proportional or weighted bandwidth allocation between different priority levels.

The Minion model is that if message B has a Receiver Ordering or Sender Ordering dependency upon message A, then Minion should not expend any available throughput delivering any part of message B until after message A has been entirely sent. Similarly, if message C is higher priority than messages A and B, then Minion should not expend any available throughput delivering any part of messages A or B until after message C has been entirely sent.

DTLS Security
Minion includes security support. Because of the potential for out-of-order message reception, Minion uses DTLS (which includes an explicit record number) instead of TLS (which assumes strictly-ordered delivery over TCP).

3. Conceptual API

While different implementations in different languages may provide APIs that differ in details and programming model, the common conceptual framework of Minion APIs is as follows:

- Outbound Connections
  - Create new Minion Connection to remote peer, with handler function or object to receive incoming messages.
* Close Minion Connection when it is no longer needed.

- Inbound Connections
  * Listen on a port for incoming connections.
  * Upon receipt of incoming connection request, a new Minion Connection object (substantially similar to the Outbound Minion Connection object above) is generated, and delivered to the application.
  * Set handler function or object to handle incoming messages received on an inbound connection.
  * Stop listening for incoming connections.

- Sending Messages
  * Create new Outbound Minion Message, associated with an existing connection (either outbound or inbound), specifying the priority level for the message.
  * Optionally, indicate Sender Ordering for this message by reference to some previously-created Minion message.
  * Optionally, indicate Receiver Ordering for this message, or Chaining for this message, or that this message is a reply to some previously received Minion message. Note that these three options are mutually exclusive. An outgoing message can be identified as a response to a received message, or a subsequent member of a multi-part message chain, or a message with a Receiver Ordering Message Dependency, but not more than one of these three things.
  * Optionally, provide a reply handler function or object to receive replies to this message.
  * Provide (possibly incomplete) data for the message.
  * Optionally, add further units of data to the message.
  * Indicate when message is complete. This tells the Minion implementation layer that it should now send the message. Alternatively, a message can also be cancelled if it is no longer needed.
  * Dispose of the message when it is no longer needed.
Receiving Messages

- Upon receipt of a message, a handler function or object is handed a new inbound message:

  - If the message is a chained continuation message, and a specific handler exists for that chain, then that specific handler is invoked.

  - Else, if the message is a reply, and a specific handler exists for the originating message, then that specific handler is invoked.

  - Else, the Minion Connection’s generic message handler is invoked.

  - Read data from the message. For large messages, this may not be the entire message. After one or more reads, a return code (or similar) indicates to the application when the message is complete (or alternatively, that is is incomplete, and will not be completed, because it has been cancelled by the sender).

  - The application may decide to reject a message before it has been entirely received, by canceling it.

  - The message handler may generate outbound messages in response to the received message, including outbound explicit reply messages, outbound chained messages, and simple outbound standalone messages.

  - Dispose of the received message when it is no longer needed.

4. Client Isolation

Minion allows multiple messages to share the available throughput of a single connection. The sources of those multiple messages (if not the same application) are assumed to be mutually trusting. Minion does not attempt to prevent one message source on a connection from consuming an unfair share of the bandwidth, nor does Minion attempt to guard against a client that fails to read its messages, causing the receive window to close, thereby preventing any messages from being received.

In the event that some proxy or similar technology allows multiple mutually untrusting clients to share a single Minion connection, that application-layer code that is allowing the single Minion connection to be shared is responsible for policing the traffic so that the single Minion connection is shared reasonably.
5. IANA Considerations

No IANA actions are required by this document.

6. Security Considerations

No new security risks occur as a result of using this protocol.

7. Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Bryan Ford, Padma Bhooma and Anumita Biswas for their contributions to the development of the Minion API.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


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Abstract

Minion uses TCP-format packets on-the-wire, for compatibility with existing NATs, Firewalls, and similar middleboxes, but provides a richer set of facilities to the application, as described in the Minion Service Model document. This document specifies the details of the on-the-wire protocol used to provide those services.

Status of This Memo

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1. Conventions and Terminology Used in this Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119].

This document uses terminology like "kernel" and "user-level", as those terms pertain to many of today's Unix-like operating systems. Equivalent concepts apply to software that is built using a different architectural model than may not include such an obvious kernel/user split.

2. Introduction

Minion uses TCP-format packets on-the-wire, to provide full compatibility with existing NATs, Firewalls, and similar middleboxes, but provides a richer set of facilities to the application, described in the Minion Service Model and Conceptual API document [minserv].

This document specifies the details of the on-the-wire protocol used to provide those services. Before reading this protocol specification document, familiarity with the Minion Service Model [minserv] is strongly recommended. That information is not repeated here.

Minion runs over a standard TCP connection. Therefore, IP addresses and TCP ports are used just as they are with TCP [RFC0793].

Minion is also designed to be able to use a modified TCP connection which supports out-of-order delivery, giving better low-latency performance on lossy networks, for use by the kinds of application that today would use UDP [RFC0768] to achieve low-latency delivery. The goal of providing low-latency delivery -- and consequently the need to be able to handle a data stream that may have gaps -- is reflected in various aspects of the Minion protocol design, such as the use of DTLS instead of TLS, and the use of Consistent Overhead Byte Stuffing [COBS] for reliably extracting messages from an incomplete data stream. Minion is able to take advantage of out-of-order delivery where the network stack offers that, but Minion does not require it. Minion still works correctly when the performance benefits of out-of-order delivery are not available.

Minion supports messages of arbitrary size. Large messages are broken into chunks a little under 16 kilobytes each (the DTLS maximum record size, minus a few bytes for Minion header). At the receiving
end the Minion chunks are reassembled into Minion messages and delivered to the client application. Small messages are sent in a single Minion chunk.

Normally messages are sent by the client as a single atomic unit, and delivered to the receiving client as a single atomic unit. For messages too large to fit conveniently in memory, the message may be built incrementally by the sender, and delivered to the receiving client incrementally, a chunk at a time.

When a Minion message is complete, or has at least one maximum Minion chunk size of data accumulated, then if it is eligible to be sent according to the message ordering facilities offered by the Minion Service Model [minserv] (Sender Ordering, Receiver Ordering, and Chaining) a Minion chunk is generated.

Each Minion chunk contains a Minion chunk header followed by the client’s message data, as described in Section 3 "Minion Chunk Format".

Each Minion chunk is encrypted using DTLS [RFC6347].

Each encrypted DTLS payload is then framed using RECOBS, as described in Section 4 "Recursively Embeddable COBS", so that it begins with a 00 byte and ends with an FF byte.

The framed, encrypted chunk is then enqueued for transmission.

If the kernel networking code supports multiple priorities, then the framed, encrypted chunk is placed in the transmission queue for the stated priority level. Any time the TCP congestion window and/or receive window rules allow more data to be sent, data is drawn from the highest-priority non-empty transmit buffer, assigned the next block of unused TCP sequence numbers, formed into a TCP segment, and transmitted on the wire. This just-in-time TCP sequencing mechanism has the effect of causing higher-priority data to be inserted right at the front of the conceptual combined transmit buffer, at the earliest possible byte boundary, unconstrained by message or chunk boundaries in the lower-priority messages. This is possible because the RECOBS framing is robust to pre-emption at any arbitrary byte boundary.

Note that, when priorities are supported, chunks above the lowest priority MUST be delivered to the kernel in such a way that they are sent completely before the kernel resumes sending the lower-priority traffic. The RECOBS framing supports interrupting a lower priority stream with a higher-priority chunk, but not alternating back and forth between two priority levels. Once a higher-priority chunk
interrupts lower-priority traffic, the higher-priority chunk must be completed before the lower-priority traffic resumes. Typically this is easily achieved by delivering the chunk to the kernel atomically in a single write call.

3. Minion Chunk Format

A Minion Chunk begins with an eight-byte header, followed by the client’s message data:

```
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------------------------------------+
|C|    Code     |Pri|     This Minion Chunk ID                  |
+---------------------------------------------+
| Reserved      |RCP|     Referenced Minion Chunk ID            |
+---------------------------------------------+
:                     Minion Chunk Data                     :
+---------------------------------------------+
```

Figure 1: Minion Chunk Format

If the Complete (‘C’) bit is zero, this message is incomplete; the receiver should expect to receive additional continuation chunks for this message. If the Complete bit is one, this message is complete; there will be no subsequent continuation chunks for this message.

The seven-bit chunk code identifies what type of chunk this is, as described below.

The two-bit priority field indicates the priority level for this message, with 0 being the highest priority and 3 being the default (lowest-level) priority.

Every Minion chunk has a Chunk ID. This is a 22-bit value assigned from a monotonically increasing 22-bit cyclic counter. This means that Chunk IDs are reused every $2^{22}$ chunks. At any given moment in time though, only a small portion of the 22-bit ID space is actively in use, so Chunk IDs are not ambiguous. Each of the four priority levels has its own 22-bit Chunk ID space, i.e., Priority 1 Chunk 7 and Priority 2 Chunk 7 are different chunks. Also, the Chunk ID spaces in opposite directions on a connection are separate. Each sender is responsible for selecting the Chunk IDs for the chunks it sends.
In some cases it is useful to refer to messages by ID, and the terms "Message ID" and "Chunk ID" are sometimes used interchangeably. For a message that is sent using a single chunk, the Message ID is the same as the Chunk ID. For a message that is sent using multiple chunks, the Message ID is the Chunk ID of the *final* chunk of the message. One implication of this is that a message’s ID is undefined until the message is complete.

Because Chunk IDs are eventually reused, issues of ID lifetime must be carefully considered in the Minion protocol design. For example, since a remote peer could, in principle, wait an arbitrary long length of time before replying to a message, the Message ID of a request that is awaiting a response MUST NOT be reused until the response has been received, and the client has disposed of the request message. Otherwise, a reply could be ambiguous, if there were two outstanding request messages both using the same Message ID at the same time. Likewise, the last Chunk ID of an incomplete message MUST NOT be reused until some subsequent chunk has been added to that message, referencing the previous Chunk ID.

The Reserved field MUST be set to zero on transmission, and MUST be ignored on reception.

For chunk types that need to refer to some other chunk, the Referenced Minion Chunk Priority (RCP) and Referenced Minion Chunk ID fields identify the referenced chunk. Note that some chunk types refer to chunks going in the same direction (e.g. a continuation chunk) and some chunk types refer to chunks going in the reverse direction (e.g. a reply chunk). For chunk types that do not refer to any other chunk, these two fields MUST be set to zero on transmission, and MUST be ignored on reception.

The Minion Chunk payload data follows the Minion Chunk Header.

There is no explicit length field in the Minion Chunk Header, because the chunk length is determined implicitly in the RECOBS decoding step.

3.1. Minion Chunk Codes

The seven-bit chunk code identifies what kind of chunk this is. 128 chunk codes are available. The following eight chunk codes are currently defined:
Continuation. This is a continuation of a previously incomplete message. The Referenced Minion Chunk ID identifies what previous chunk this is adding to. (If the Complete bit is one then this chunk is the final chunk and completes the message; no further chunks for this message will be arriving.)

Cancellation. This is a cancellation of a previously incomplete message. The Referenced Minion Chunk ID identifies what previous chunk this is cancelling. In this case Complete bit is unused; the Complete bit MUST be set to zero on transmission, and MUST be ignored on reception.

Unordered Message. This chunk begins a new unordered message. The Referenced Minion Chunk ID is unused, and MUST be set to zero on transmission, and MUST be ignored on reception.

Ordered Message. This chunk begins a new ordered message. This message is subject to Receiver Ordering; it MUST NOT be delivered to the receiving client until the message indicated by the Referenced Minion Chunk ID field has been delivered.

Chained Message. This chunk begins a new message that chains on after a preceding message. The Referenced Minion Chunk ID identifies the preceding message. This message MUST NOT be delivered to the receiving client until the previous message of the chain as been delivered to the receiving client, and this message MUST be delivered to the receiving client in a manner that indicates to the client that it is related to the previous message.

Reply/Acknowledge. This chunk begins a new message which is an explicit reply to a previously received message. The Referenced Minion Chunk ID identifies the received message to which this is a reply. A reply may be empty, in which case it serves as a simple acknowledgement that the request was received and accepted, or it may contain data. It is anticipated that future Minion protocol development will create additional Minion chunk codes to negotiate future protocol features. For these capability negotiation messages, an empty reply referencing the request serves as an acknowledgement that the requested protocol feature is supported.

Reject. A Minion Reject code indicates that the referenced received message had an error or was not accepted for some other reason. A Reject Message may be empty, or may contain data giving information concerning the reason for the rejection. It is possible to reject an incomplete message that is still arriving, by sending a Reject referencing the most recent Chunk
ID for that partial message. The sender will respond by sending a Cancellation for that message, confirming that no further chunks will be sent. When used for Minion protocol capability negotiation, a Reject message referencing the request indicates that the requested protocol feature is not supported.

07 End Minion. It is anticipated that there will be existing application protocols that initially add Minion as an optional feature, which they use only when the remote peer indicates it also has Minion support, and otherwise they will communicate using the existing protocol without the Minion features. Such application protocols typically will first connect using their existing protocol, and then negotiate an "upgrade" to Minion framing. For symmetry, it would be good if such an "upgrade" were not an irreversible one-way path. We would like to offer the ability for applications to connect over raw TCP, switch to Minion for some message exchanges, and then drop back to raw TCP for some subsequent communication. For this reason the Minion chunk code 8 exists, which signals, "This is the final Minion-format message you will receive in this particular Minion session; after this you’re on your own."

4. Recursively Embeddable COBS

Consistent Overhead Byte Stuffing [COBS] allows complete messages to be reliably located within an incomplete data stream that may contain gaps.

COBS works by transforming the payload data to eliminate all occurrences of zero bytes. This is like PPP byte stuffing, but more efficient; COBS has a worst-case data size overhead below 0.5%. Having created a zero-free payload, the payloads can then be concatenated into a single byte stream, separated by single zero bytes, and the zero bytes unambiguously mark the boundaries between payloads, because we know the payloads themselves no longer contain any zero bytes. At the receiving end the transformation is reversed to recreate the original payload data.

The transformation process [COBS] is, in effect, a simple run length encoding. An extremely simplified summary of the original 1997 COBS encoding is as follows:

- If the payload begins with three nonzero bytes followed by a zero, then the output is the byte value 4 (the run length) followed by the three nonzero bytes, and the subsequent zero is skipped.
If that is followed by fifty nonzero bytes followed by a zero, then the output is the byte value 51 (the run length) followed by the fifty nonzero bytes, and the subsequent zero is skipped.

This process is repeated until the entire payload has been replaced by its zero-free equivalent.

Recursively Embeddable COBS (RECOBS) is a derivative of the original 1997 COBS encoding. RECOBS code bytes have the following meanings:

- 00 New payload begins
- 01 Represents a single zero byte
- 02 Two bytes: a single nonzero byte, followed by a single zero byte
- 03 Three bytes: two nonzero bytes, followed by a single zero byte
- n Represents n bytes: n-1 nonzero bytes, followed by a zero byte
- FD 253 bytes: 252 nonzero bytes, followed by a single zero byte
- FE 253 bytes: 253 nonzero bytes, with *no* following zero byte
- FF Payload ends

This has the effect that, after encoding, every payload has unambiguous bookends; every payload begins with a single 00, and ends with a single FF. Using this encoding, recursive embedding becomes possible. At *any* point in the encoded byte stream it is now possible to interrupt the byte stream, insert a new RECOBS-encoded payload, and then resume the previous byte stream.

At the receiving end, the decoder is part-way through decoding a payload when the interruption occurs. The decoder sees a 00, which is not legal in RECOBS-encoded data, so the decoder knows a new payload is beginning. Because the decoder has not yet seen the FF end-marker for the previous payload, it knows that payload is incomplete, so it saves its decoding state for later resumption. The decoder then proceeds to decode the embedded payload. When the decoder sees the FF end-marker for the embedded payload, it delivers that fully decoded payload to the waiting client, and then resumes its decoding of the previously interrupted payload.

In principle this recursive embedding could be nested arbitrarily deeply, limited only by the amount of storage the decoder has available for partially-received payloads and their associated decoding state.

In practice, Minion limits RECOBS embedding to four levels (the base level plus three levels of nested interruption) to establish a defined upper bound on the amount of storage required by a decoder.

5. Flow Control
TCP [RFC0793] implements flow control in the form of the advertised receive window. This is to prevent a faster sender from overwhelming a slower receiver. Minion requires similar protection to prevent a slower receiver running out of memory trying to buffer messages arriving faster than it can handle them.

For a pure user-level library implementation of Minion, this is achieved by having the library set an upper bound on the amount of memory it will use for storing received messages that have not yet been handled by the client. Once this limit is met, the library ceases reading TCP data from the kernel, which causes the TCP receive window to fill up, which causes the sender to stop sending. Once the client consumes some messages, the library then reads more data from the kernel, the TCP receive window opens up, and the sender is permitted to send more data.

However, this means that there is some duplication of buffering -- the TCP receive window in the kernel and additional buffering in the user-level library. For this reason a kernel extension is proposed where a client (the Minion library in this case) can read data from the connection *without* raising the TCP receive window. In a sense it is reading the data "secretly", without admitting to the sender at the other end that it has been read. Those bytes, even though read into user space, are still counted against the TCP receive window. Later, after the client application has actually consumed the message, another kernel call is made to acknowledge consumption of those bytes, and the TCP receive window is raised.

This mechanism integrates message-level flow control with TCP’s byte-level flow control, rather than having two independent flow control mechanisms happening concurrently at different levels, in ways that might interact badly with each other.

Note that the Minion protocol design will have to consider possible deadlock situations. For example, suppose one Minion host is refusing to consume any more Minion Chunks because it wishes to send a Reject message for them, but it cannot, because the peer’s receive window is closed. Suppose also that the reason the peer’s receive window is closed is because the peer also is sitting on a pile of unwanted Minion Chunks that it refuses to consume until it can send a Reject message for them. Possible deadlocks such as these need to be considered, and mechanisms to avoid them created.
6. Retransmission Policy

One of the main arguments that is often presented to justify why a particular application protocol is built on UDP instead of TCP is that, "UDP is better for ‘real time’ applications." The supporting reasoning for this is often that, "TCP insists on continuing to retransmit data long after the client doesn’t need any more." In truth the real problem is not retransmission; it is that the conventional TCP APIs don’t allow received data to be delivered out of order. Suppose a TCP sender has 50 packets in flight at any given time (e.g. the bandwidth x delay product is 75 kB) then the loss of a single packet causes all 49 following packets to stall at the receiver because the API doesn’t allow for them to be delivered to the client until the missing packet has been received.

Minion solves this problem by allowing data to be delivered as it arrives, even if there are gaps. But the argument still remains that even after removing the ordering requirement at the receiver, it may still be a waste of bandwidth to retransmit data that will arrive too late to be useful. And indeed, it is possible with TCP to fraudulently acknowledge segments that were in fact not received, and this will cause the sender to not retransmit those segments.

However, we chose not to use fraudulent acknowledgements to suppress retransmissions, because certain NATs, Firewalls and other middleboxes may block traffic if they observe implausible protocol actions which they find suspicious. One of the important goals of Minion is 100% compatibility with today’s existing Internet devices, not 99% compatibility.

We expect packet loss to be about 1% (at most a few percent) in a functioning network, and the cost of retransmitting those lost packets, even in the extreme case where *all* the retransmissions turn out to be unnecessary, is an overhead of about 1%. We argue that an overhead of about 1% is an acceptable price to pay in exchange for 100% compatibility with existing NATs, Firewalls and other middleboxes.

7. Optional Kernel Extensions

While Minion can be implemented entirely as a user-level library built on top of existing standard networking APIs like BSD sockets, it can also benefit from some optional kernel extensions:

Send Priorities

Normal TCP APIs transmit data strictly in the order is is given to the kernel. The addition of priority support allows a sendmsg() call to be used in conjunction with cmmsg ancillary data to
indicate the priority level of the data. For normal applications this capability would be of little use because it would most likely result in corruption of the data stream, but it is useful with Minion because the RECOBS encoding is robust against message insertion at arbitrary byte boundaries. An alternative way to achieve a similar effect is, instead of buffering data in the kernel, to keep the data in the user-space library for as long as possible. When the TCP congestion window and/or receive window rules allow more data to be sent, the kernel generates some kind of upcall (e.g., a kevent notification) to the user-space library informing it of the ability to transmit, and the user-space library responds by selecting which particular block of data to hand to the kernel next.

Immediate Receive

Normal TCP APIs deliver data only in TCP sequence number order. The addition of support for new cmsg ancillary data in the recvmsg() call allows the user-space library to request *any* available data, not only in-order data. The cmsg ancillary data returned from the recvmsg() call indicates to the user-space library where in the TCP sequence space this particular block of data lies.

Integrated Receive Window

Normal TCP APIs raise the receive window any time data is read out of the kernel into user space. The addition of new cmsg ancillary data in the recvmsg() call allows the user-space library to request that the kernel return received data *without* reflecting this in its receive window calculation. After the client application has consumed the message data from the user-space Minion library, the Minion library makes a subsequent recvmsg() call with appropriate cmsg ancillary data to inform the kernel how many bytes to add back into its receive window. In essence, the receive window boundary is stretched outside the kernel to account for data held by *both* the kernel *and* the user-space Minion library.

These optional kernel extensions are a key part of what makes Minion compelling. Minion can be adopted today by any application, using Minion as a purely user-space library. Such an application performs as well as any application can when it is built on top of standard TCP. However, unlike an application built on top of standard TCP, Minion offers the promise of future kernel support for even better performance. Any given application with its own application-specific protocol is unlikely to receive special kernel support to make just that one application work better. But when many applications all use the Minion protocol, it then becomes reasonable to add kernel support to improve all of those applications.
8. IANA Considerations

No IANA actions are required by this document.

9. Security Considerations

No new security risks occur as a result of using this protocol.

10. Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Bryan Ford, Padma Bhooma and Anumita Biswas for their contributions to the development of Minion.

11. References

11.1. Normative References


11.2. Informative References


Authors' Addresses
Normalization Marker for AF PHB Group in DiffServ
draft-lai-tsvwg-normalizer-02

Abstract

In DiffServ, preferential dropping of packets in AF PHB groups has long been considered beneficial, typically for video flows with discardable packets. Unfortunately, the ecosystem of bandwidth contention at congestion is very likely to discourage those video endpoints from generating packets with lower precedence markings, i.e. they would lose more packets if doing so. Thus, to offer an incentive for more collaborative and mutually beneficial behaviors of video endpoints in AF PHB groups, we propose a Normalization Marker (NM) for traffic conditioning at network edges. Deployment of NM will encourage the video endpoints to generate finer layers of intra-flow precedence (IFP) with discardable packets in more balanced distributions.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Authors’ Addresses ................................... 14
1. Introduction

Assured Forwarding (AF) Per-Hop Behavior (PHB) groups are described in [RFC2597] (with terminology clarified in [RFC3260]) for DiffServ (DS) multimedia service classes such as realtime video conferencing and on-demand streaming. Four AF PHB groups have been defined in [RFC4594] with DS codepoint (DSCP): AF1x, AF2x, AF3x and AF4x where x=1, 2 or 3 for drop precedence in each independent AF PHB group. The DS nodes that support an AF PHB group must set configuration of Active Queue Management (AQM) properly w.r.t. those DSCP markings. For example, for AF4x PHB group which includes AF41, AF42 and AF43 markings, an AQM implementation by Weighted Random Early Detection (WRED) should be configured with some drop probabilities and queue thresholds such that the packet loss rate of AF41 <= AF42 <= AF43 on congestion of the queue.

For an AF PHB group, a DS boundary node or host in the DS domain should use a marking algorithm that properly assigns AF markings of drop precedence to all packets w.r.t. the traffic profiles and Service Level Agreements (SLA). For example, [RFC2697] and [RFC2698] use a token-bucket mechanism for metering each stream of packets and respectively define "srTCM" and "trTCM" markers, to mark packets by the data rate and burst size limit in traffic profiles. Those rate-control markers can be useful at DS boundary nodes for traffic conditioning [RFC2475] and to support IntServ/RSVP traffic over DS regions [RFC2998]. Multiple markers may be applied to the same stream, either on the same or multiple DS nodes along the path. For example, srTCM and trTCM can operate in a so-called "color-aware" mode such that for each incoming packet that already carries an AF marking, the local srTCM/trTCM either keeps the same or lowers the drop precedence of that packet by metering.

However, modern video codec technologies are being advanced not only in coding efficiency (i.e. better compression ratio) but also in two key areas for transport on IP networks: (1) encoder rate-control and dynamic adaptation; (2) ability to generate discardable packets in multiple layers to tolerate packet losses in the network without significant degradation of video quality observed at the decoder. For (1), the encoder dynamically limits its output rate of packets into the AF PHB group, i.e., the encoder’s host is the first DS node equipped with srTCM/trTCM if it marks packets in that behavior. The next DS node is the first-hop router which may add extra srTCM/trTCM to enforce the traffic conditioning or policing from the network’s perspective. Thus, we consider this an incentive for (1) because an encoder using a self rate-control is less likely to see packet losses by the network. Unfortunately, an incentive for (2) is arguably missing today.
To see the missing incentive for (2), consider the following example where 2 video flows A and B with rate control are sent in AF4x PHB group. Each sends 5Mbps on average with some burstiness, but still complies with the rate and burst limit in its traffic profile. However, A and B generate packets with AF4x markings in different distributions of percentage:

Flow A
- 80% or 4Mbps in AF41
- 20% or 1Mbps in AF42
- 0% or 0Mbps in AF43

Flow B
- 40% or 2Mbps in AF41
- 40% or 2Mbps in AF42
- 20% or 1Mbps in AF43

Flow B at above is likely using a more advanced video technology to generate multiple layers of discardable video packets, and thus, its distribution of AF4x markings looks finer and more balanced. That is, flow B acts more friendly to other flows in this AF4x PHB group.

Thus, we argue that the ecosystem in practical deployment should offer an incentive for flows to behave similarly to what flow B is doing above, i.e., on congestion, the AF4x PHB group should try to drop packets in the same amount from each flow, while a flow with finer layers of discardable packets and/or in a more balanced distribution should be able to benefit from its own efforts and see good results in video quality preservation.

Unfortunately, this incentive is still missing today. Suppose that congestion occurs in the AF4x WRED queue where A and B compete for bandwidth and there is no other flow, for simplicity. B’s packet loss rate is very likely to become higher than A’s, despite B’s effort of acting friendly:

- If the queue drops 1Mbps in total,
  - A sees 0% or 0Mbps loss;
  - B sees 20% or 1Mbps loss (all its AF43 are lost).
If the queue drops 4Mbps in total,

A sees 20% or 1Mbps loss (all its AF42 are lost);

B sees 60% or 3Mbps loss (all its AF42 and AF43 are lost).

Thus, to create the missing incentive at above, we propose a new "Normalization Marker" (NM) and describe it in this memo. NM can be deployed on DS boundary nodes for traffic conditioning in practical deployment with AF PHB groups for multimedia service classes. In summary, if NM is applied to a DS boundary node for an AF PHB group, it re-assigns the AF markings of all packets per flow such that the distributions of the AF markings are similar in all flows, i.e., it "normalizes" the distributions of AF markings in all flows. It also attempts to maintain the original orders of the intra-flow drop precedence carried by the input AF markings, as linearly as possible. After the AF-marking distributions are normalized, all those flows should see very similar packet loss rates at AQM for this AF PHB group on congestion of the queue. Then, a codec implementation may have better video quality preservation on network congestion if it employs a more advanced video technology to generate discardable packets with finer markings of drop precedence in a more balanced distribution.

---

Note that the use of NM is not necessarily limited to video service classes, but could be extended to wherever AF PHB groups can be used, or to any other PHB groups that require a similar incentive NM can provide.
Modern video codec technologies such as ITU-T H.264/MPEG-4 AVC [H264] typically generate a stream of encoded video packets with internal structure of data dependency for decoding. This has been designed for at least 3 fundamental reasons:

- **Coding Efficiency:** An encoder improves its coding efficiency typically by reducing spatial and temporal redundancy of the input. For video, spatial redundancy is reduced by intra-frame motion prediction and compensation, while temporal redundancy refers to inter-frame since a video stream is composed of a sequence of frames or pictures in the temporal order. With motion prediction, a frame can be encoded by referencing some pixels of the picture data that will be decoded earlier either in the same (intra) or another (inter) frame so that it can use significantly fewer bits to encode this frame. The frame where the pixels are referenced by any other frame is thus called a referenced frame in the video stream; for example, Instantaneous Decoding Refresh (IDR) in H.264 or Intra (I) frames are typically referenced by subsequent frames, while Predictive (P) frames may be referenced at the encoder’s choice, by the Group of Picture (GOP) profile, and/or by some proprietary algorithm in the codec implementation.

- **Lossy Network:** To use network transport that may lose packets, the encoder may choose to generate a stream with two or more layers each of which the packets are marked with some layer identifier (ID). The network can simply use the layer ID to determine the drop precedence of each packet in the video stream.

  * Layers in Hierarchy of Dependency: If these layers are coded in hierarchy of dependency, the packets in an "enhancement" layer will depend on 1 or more "base" layers to get decoded without errors, while packets in a base layer without dependency can be independently decoded without errors.

    + If some enhancement layer packets are lost, the decoding errors in that picture frame will not stay or cascade to other frames given that no others depend on those lost data. This nice property allows the network to safely drop packets in some enhancement layers, if needed, without badly impacting the video quality at decoder.

    + If some base layer packets are lost, the impact can be severe since these decoding errors will stay in buffer and
cascade to all other picture pixels that depend on the lost data to decode in the current and/or a later frame. This impact can last tens of seconds as the video quality continues getting worse, resulting in unpleasant user experiences, until the decoder receives the next IDR or I frame, either on-demand or periodically, to remove those errors.

For example, H.264 Annex G defines Scalable Video Coding (SVC) using a 3-dimensional (i.e. spatial, temporal and quality) hierarchy of layer dependency at the encoder's choice, but for simplicity, it also defines a scalar number called Priority ID (PID) in its header so the network could instead use PID, if set by the encoder, to determine drop precedence in the stream.

* Layers NOT in Hierarchy of Dependency: Sometimes the encoder will generate multiple layers without any dependency between those layers. These mechanisms usually enlarge the amount of encoded video data for various purposes. For example,

+ Forward Error Correction (FEC) may be used at the encoder to generate extra FEC packets, so that the decoder can tolerate certain amounts of packet losses.

+ Simulcast (i.e. simultaneous multicast) by an encoder will actually generate multiple layers each of which can be transmitted and decoded independently, in parallel by IP or application multicast. Each layer carries video in a different resolution and/or quality. The decoder can choose 1 or more of those layers to receive according to the required, available or detected bandwidth, packet losses, delays, jitter etc. in its network service.

With FEC and/or Simulcast, the encoder can still mark the packets with different drop precedence in those layers to better protect the more important data for video quality at decoding when congestion occurs.

o In-Band Signaling: An encoded video stream usually carries in-band control messages that are most critical for adequate encoder and decoder behaviors. For example,

* H.264 Annex D defines Supplemental Enhancement Information (SEI), which could also carry proprietary codec parameters. These in-band control signals should be given the highest drop precedence.
* Real Time Control Protocol (RTCP) carries in-band control messages for Real Time Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550], which is mostly used for realtime multimedia transmission on IP networks. RTCP messages are defined as RTP packets with special payload types in the RTP stream. RTCP packets should be given the highest drop precedence but should receive the same delay/jitter as regular RTP packets in the same stream.

2.2. Intra-Flow Precedence (IFP)

For abstraction, we define "Intra-Flow Precedence" (IFP) to represent the drop precedence in one individual flow that may carry a video stream of IP packets in multimedia networks. Here is a summary of IFP characteristics:

- IFPs are drop precedence levels that are only significant within each individual flow.
- IFPs are integer numbers that can be numerically compared if needed. 0 represents the highest precedence. The larger numerical value an IFP is, the lower precedence it represents.
- The number of IFP levels in each flow is not necessarily the same.
- IFPs between any 2 flows should NOT be compared to determine drop precedence between their packets in a queue.
- IFPs may be assigned by the original encoder of the stream and carried in some bits field of all packets in the stream.
- IFPs may be assigned or re-assigned by a middle box or router if it is capable of understanding the stream packet format and codec symantics.

For example, an H.264 AVC flow may have the following IFP assignments at the video encoder’s choice.

IFP = 0 for in-band signals

IFP = 1 for IDR frames

IFP = 2 for referenced P (rP) frames

IFP = 3 for non-referenced P (nrP) frames and others

IFP assignments as well as their distribution can vary a lot among different encoder implementations and codec profiles. For example, some encoders may generate both long-term and short-term referenced P
frames, where a long-term referenced P frame should have higher drop precedence. In case of H.264 SVC, the IPP assignments could simply be the same as the PID assignments if set by the encoder properly, or be calculated based on the SVC layer ID that has 3 tuples for the spatial, temporal and quality dimensions, respectively.

2.3. Mapping IPP to AF Markings

When a flow is sent in an AF PHB group, the number of its IPP levels is not necessarily equal to the number of the AF markings. In fact, since each of the currently defined AF PHB groups has only 3 AF markings, it is likely that an encoder or DS node needs to apply an n-to-1 mapping from IPPs to AF markings in practice.

The mapping decision is made usually by the encoder, but can also be made by another DS node if necessary and if the DS node is able to understand the encoded video packets, which may require Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), e.g. to read in RTP payload and parse the H.264 headers [RFC6184], or in a proprietary bits field in the IP payload, to retrieve or calculate the IPP of each packet in a flow before locally mapping the IPP to an AF marking.

This n-to-1 mapping can be arbitrary but should be appropriate. Consider 2 IPPs, say x and y, where x and y are mapped to AF markings AF(x) and AF(y), respectively. Then, the mapping should ideally obey the following criteria to keep linearity from IPPs to AF markings.

If x < y, AF(x) <= AF(y);

If x > y, AF(x) >= AF(y).

Although the above two do NOT imply that if x = y, AF(x) = AF(y), it is usually so in practical implementation as it is straightforward. Then, if the encoder algorithm generates a lot of packets with the same IPP, all those packets will be assigned the same AF marking, possibly resulting in an unbalanced distribution of AF markings in the AF PHB group. Thus, an encoder with advanced technologies should make good efforts to generate packets with a finer and more balanced IPP distribution in the first place.

For example, if AF4x PHB group is used to send an H.264 AVC flow with the IPP assignments in the example of Section 2.2, one possible IPP-to-AF4x mapping is:

AF(0) = AF41

AF(1) = AF41
AF(2) = AF42  
AF(3) = AF43  

This mapping actually results in the following AF markings:  
AF41 for in-band signals and IDR frames  
AF42 for referenced P (rP) frames  
AF43 for non-referenced P (nrP) frames and others  

Now, consider two encoders that generate flow A and B, respectively, both using this mapping, but with different IFP distributions as follows.  

Flow A  
5% in IFP=0 for in-band signals  
75% in IFP=1 for IDR frames  
20% in IFP=2 for rP frames  

Flow B  
5% in IFP=0 for in-band signals  
35% in IFP=1 for IDR frames  
40% in IFP=2 for rP frames  
20% in IFP=3 for nrP frames  

Thus,  

Flow A  
80% in AF41  
20% in AF42  
0% in AF43  

Flow B  
40% in AF41
40% in AF42

20% in AF43

This results in exactly the two AF marking distributions that we have previously used in Section 1.

Note that in terms of encoded data size, an IDR frame is typically 10 times larger than a P frame on average. Assume that flow B’s coding efficiency has rP twice as large as nrP. Then, flow A and B might be sending frames periodically in patterns by Group of Picture (GOP) as follows:

Flow A: IDR, rP, rP, rP

Flow B: IDR, rP, nrP, rP, nrP, rP, nrP, rP, nrP

If so, it shows that flow B’s encoder is making efforts to generate discardable packets with more layers in a more balanced distribution, which is desirable.

3. Normalization Marker (NM)

Referring to Figure 2, NM has 3 major components: IFP reconstructor, IFP distribution meter, and normalizer. NM may operate in either "color-aware" (CA) or "color-blind" (CB) mode.

The packets arrive at the IFP reconstructor which determines the IFP of each packet depending on whether NM is in CA or CB mode. This is fed into the IFP distribution meter that keeps a runtime statistics. Then, by the runtime statistics and the IFP of the very packet, the normalizer writes a proper AF-marking in that packet.
3.1. Color-Aware vs. Color-Blind Mode

When NM operates in "color-aware" (CA) mode, it reads the incoming AF-markings that are carried in the packets as the drop precedence. This CA mode should be supported in all NM implementations.

When NM operates in "color-blind" (CB) mode, which is optionally supported, it reads certain bits field(s) other than the AF-markings in the packets to determine the actual drop precedence of that packet. This implies that NM may need DPI in the packets, e.g. parsing into H.264 AVC header in each RTP packets, or alternatively use some method where the drop precedence is carried from the encoder in a customized bits field other than the AF-marking in each packet.

In comparison, CB is more complex than CA in implementation. However, CB could probably produce better normalization results because the AF-markings are actually outcomes of an n-to-1 mapping from IFPs, as previously mentioned in Section 2.3, which can reduce granularity, e.g. for IFPs x and y, if x > y at encoder, it is possible that AF(x) = AF(y) when NM sees those packets in CA mode. On the contrary, NM in CB mode may reconstruct IFPs x > y for those packets by local DPI.

Note that NM in CB mode may fail to determine the IFP of a packet for various reasons at runtime. If so, NM should randomly assign an IFP to each of those packets with an even distribution over the IFPs. The failure could be due to payload encryption that prevents DPI. Another reason may be that the NM does not support the codec used for encoding those packets in the flow. For example, an NM might only support H.264 AVC but is unable to parse packets in H.264 Annex G (SVC), so it fails to determine the IFPs of packets in an H.264 SVC flow.

3.2. Distribution Meter

The IFP distribution meter keeps a runtime statistics of the IFPs per flow so that the normalizer will be able to assign a proper AF-marking for each packet. The types of statistics to collect at runtime depend on the NM algorithm in the implementation.

For example, an NM implementation may keep a counter of packets per IFP in a flow since the beginning of the flow’s lifetime. Another implementation may choose to keep only the running average of the packet counter per IFP. An even simpler implementation may choose to keep only the running average of IFPs of all packets per flow.
3.3. Normalizer

The normalizer should reference the runtime statistics kept by the IFP distribution meter, and adaptively map the IFP of the very packet to an AF marking, such that the resulting AF-marking distributions for all flows are similar or even identical to a target distribution.

The target distribution of an NM can be simply an even distribution over all possible AF-markings in the AF PHB group. However, in a more complex NM implementation, it may allow configuration for other target distributions as appropriate with the AQM configuration.

4. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank many colleagues for comments and supports, and thank Shuai Dai for testing NM with actual H.264 video endpoints.

5. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

6. Security Considerations

This memo has no security consideration at the time of writing.

7. References

7.1. Normative References


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7.2. Informative References


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Abstract

This document creates the framework for a new Resource Reservation Protocol version 1 (RSVP) object for instances in which there are multiple occurrences of existing RSVP objects to be included within the same RSVP message. This document offers two instances for multiple versions of the same object will be valid in RSVP messages, for more than one traffic specification object (TSPEC), and more than one TSPEC priority object (PREEMPTION_PRI).

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1. Introduction

This document creates the framework for a new Resource Reservation Protocol version 1 (RSVP) [RFC2205] object for instances in which there is a need to carry multiple occurrences of included RSVP object within the same RSVP message. The need for multiple versions of existing objects is for environments in which the information conveyed within these objects may or may not be grantable by the network. To optimization this operation, if a different version of the same object, with different information or demands, can be included without the need for that rejecting entire RSVP message. For example, the initial RSVP PATH message contains a request for a 12Mbps bandwidth reservation, but that amount is not grantable by one or more network nodes. If a reduced amount of bandwidth can still granted, and is acceptable to the network as well as both endpoints, allowing that PATH message to contain a backup bandwidth request for, say 4Mbps, saves the time of completely rejecting the initial PATH and having the sender generate a new PATH. A complete rejection to this scenario is how RSVP operates today.

This is a general purpose optimization for RSVP, and will allow any RSVP object to have multiple versions of an existing object, provided that existing object is specified to do so. It is important to understand that RSVP operates normally, with all Objects and elements in their native locations. This document offers two instances for multiple versions of the same object will be valid in RSVP messages, for more than one traffic specification object (TSPEC) [RFC2210], and more than one priority element (PREEMPTION_PRI) [RFC3181]. This extension will bring RSVP more in line with existing application layer protocols that offer multiple choices for the specifics within a call or session. At the same
time, all extra versions of Objects or elements are contained in a single location that is ignored if not understood. Thus, backwards compatibility is assured.

Realtime session set-up protocols such as SIP [RFC3261] carry a Session Description Protocol (SDP) [RFC4566] payload which establishes the parameters for rich media calls (i.e., voice, video) between two or more endpoints. Since the late 1990s, SDP has had the capability to offer more than one codec per application type (i.e., more than one audio payload type and/or more than one video payload type), which can be carried in the same session set-up message. This means a calling endpoint can give the called party a list of codecs to choose from for that call, as well as multiple applications for that call.

With this RSVP extension, for example, a SIP voice and/or video call can have a reservation adapt to whichever codec(s) are picked for that call, without wasting unnecessary bandwidth that will not be utilized.

Visually, Figure 1. is a normal RSVP reservation set-up exchange that is accepted by all RSVP enabled nodes.

```
  Sender   Rtr-1  Rtr-2 ... Rtr-N   Receiver
                                        
       PATH (with a TSPEC)         
--------->|---------><-------------|<-------------|

       RESV (with a FLOWSPEC)     
--------->|---------><-------------|<-------------|
```

**Figure 1. Concept of RSVP in a Single Direction**

However, Figure 2. is a normal RSVP reservation set-up exchange that is rejected as the reservation is partially established. We will use bandwidth as the reason for the rejection because it is probably the easiest thing to understand about RSVP, that it creates reservation of fixed bandwidth.

```
Sender   Rtr-1  Rtr-2 ... Rtr-N   Receiver

       PATH (with a TSPEC)         
--------->|---------><-------------|<-------------|

       RESV (with a FLOWSPEC)     
--------->|---------><-------------|<-------------|
```
Rtr-2 in the above example reservation attempt rejects the bandwidth requested for this reservation. Once the Sender receives the PathErr message indicating why the rejection occurred, it can attempt a new reservation requesting less bandwidth. Regrettably, this is a bit of a guessing game put on the Sender to figure out how much bandwidth to request next. When this scenario is complicated when the reservation request is initiated because of a layer 7 signaling protocol, such as SIP, to establish a call between two endpoints, as defined in [RFC3312]. All the users experience is further delay as RSVP attempts to successfully establish the reservation before "the phone can ring".

Presently, translating a (SIP) layer 7 operation into RSVP at layer 4, only a single reservation can be established per application (i.e., one for voice, one for video) at a time (without creating chaos). This one reservation request would most probably its bandwidth request using the codec with the largest bandwidth requirements. Bandwidth parameters are conveyed within a traffic specification (TSPEC), as defined in [RFC2210]. Once one considers the bandwidth needs of present day video codecs, always initially setting up the maximum bandwidth reservation is less than optimal (some might argue criminal).

If, on the other hand, the initial RSVP PATH message could contain more than one version of a TSPEC, say one per codec. Then the reservation would be established with the greatest amount of bandwidth the network could grant at its most congested node in the signaling path, which would in turn choose for the endpoints which codec within SDP is selected for this call.

Thus, this extension would solve the problem in Figure 2. in this way,
Figure 3. Concept of RSVP Rejection due to Limited Bandwidth

Figure 3. shows a RSVP PATH message containing 3 TSPECs (12Mbps, 4Mbps, and 1.5Mbps), placed in that order in the PATH. Router 2 (Rtr-2) cannot grant the RESV message at 12Mbps, but can grant the 4Mbps bandwidth request. Rtr-2 trims the bandwidth upstream with a slight modification to the procedures defined in RFC 4495, and transmits the RESV downstream without the 12Mbps bandwidth request, which was removed from the RESV. The Sender, in this example, receives the RESV with 4Mbps and the reservation is established.

In Section 3., we will create the framework and format for the MULTI_INSTANCE Object. In Section 4., we will show how to include multiple TSPEC Objects within this MULTI_INSTANCE Object, as well as stipulate the rules for TSPEC usage. In Section 5., we will show how to include multiple PREEMPTION_PRI Objects within this MULTI_INSTANCE Object, as well as stipulate the rules for PREEMPTION_PRI usage. Section 6. will have the IANA registry considerations, and Section 7. will have the Security considerations.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] when they appear in ALL CAPS. These words may also appear in this document in lower case as plain English words, absent their normative meanings.
3. Framework for the MULTI_INSTANCE Object

The format of all RSVP Objects is based on a series of 32-bit words. This is true with the MULTI_INSTANCE Object as well. Normally, RSVP and IntServ documents specify Objects in a 32-bit wide, top down format, where the most significant bit is the top left bit, and the least significant bit on the right. This is loosely shown in Figure 4. below.

```
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
|       |       |       |       |       |
|       |       |       |       |       |
|       |       |       |       |       |
|       |       |       |       |       |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
```

```
1 | value | reserved |       | value |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
2 | value | [0] reserved |       | value |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
3 | value |       | value |       |
```

Figure 4. Generic RSVP Format for Illustration Purposes

The individual field value lengths within each RSVP Object depend on the Object, thus Figure 4. is merely an example (which happens to be the first 3 words format of a TSPEC).

However, RSVP messages can be quite long in this format, so what one usually sees in documents are each individual Object and no overall RSVP message format. Each Object has an field identifier indicating which RSVP message this Object is within (e.g., PATH, RESV, REFRESH), as well as a ‘Parameter ID’ indicating which Object within this (e.g., TSPEC, Rspec, Policy_Data).

Looking at RSVP another way, to illustrate the point about where certain parts can be within an overall RSVP message, Figure 5. Shows an example RSVP message on its side, where the top of the message is on the left and the bottom of the message is on the right. With that in mind, the most significant bit of the top 32-bit word is on the lower left of Figure 5., and the least significant bit is on the upper left. The length of this message can vary and does not represent anything other than this message has some size to it; i.e., it has a number of Objects within this message, including a sender_descriptor where the ‘primary’ TSPEC Object resides, and Policy_Data Object where the PREEMPTION_PRI Object resides. Additionally in the RSVP message is the proposed MULTI_INSTANCE Object, which is neither in the sender_descriptor or Policy_Data Object.
It is important to remember that RSVP enabled nodes will always ignore Objects that are not understood. This allows the protocol to be extended before all the RSVP nodes are upgraded to understand new functions and capabilities. In other words, no one expects a single ‘flag day’ upgrade to occur in all routers at the same time in the same network, which could be disruptive if not performed correctly.

An important aspect of this new Object is that the initial copy or instance of the Object, however many Objects have multiple instances in this RSVP message, MUST remain in its original place within the message. We will refer to this original version of an Object or element to be the ‘primary’ version or copy. Its placement allows RSVP to operate normally. The MULTI_INSTANCE Object only carries a second, third, etc. versions of Objects. Once the RSVP node determines that it cannot grant what is asked for in an existing Object, it will look to the MULTI_INSTANCE Object for the next instance of that Object to replace the original with. Failing this, the RSVP message will mostly likely be rejected through the normal procedures already defined in RSVP documentation.

To give a practical example of this, we will use the message flow from Figure 3. In it, we have a PATH message carrying not one, but three TSPECs for 12Mbps, 4Mbps and 1.5Mbps. Once Rtr-2 cannot grant the primary TSPEC asking for 12Mbps, that router discards that TSPEC, from the RSVP message. It knows to look into the MULTI_INSTANCE Object for a second version of the TSPEC. Finding two (4Mbps and 1.5Mbps), Rtr-2 moves the 4Mbps TSPEC completely into the sender_descriptor as the new ‘primary’ TSPEC and attempts to establish the reservation at 4Mbps. In this case, 4Mbps is granted and transmits the RESV upstream towards Rtr-1 with only one remaining TSPEC in the MULTI_INSTANCE Object.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: It is important to state that, so far, we have not defined where this MULTI_INSTANCE Object goes within the RSVP message.]

The MULTI_INSTANCE Object can have a number of versions of the same Object that is within the RSVP message, as well as can have more than one different type of Object. To this end, here is the proposed
generic format for the MULTI_INSTANCE Object that is only carrying a single other Object

Figure 6. MULTI_INSTANCE with 1 Object

Figure 6. shows a complete second version of an existing RSVP Object, which can be removed and copied bit-for-bit into the normal placement of this Object within the RSVP message. It is important to note that this MUST be a complete new copy of a valid Object.

Figure 7. shows a MULTI_INSTANCE Object with a second and third version of the same RSVP Object

Figure 7. MULTI_INSTANCE with 2 Objects

Again, version 2 and 3 are completely valid versions of the RSVP Object they are meant to replace, with no change in any value allowed.
Figure 8. MULTI_INSTANCE with 2 Objects

Figure 8. adds a second type of Object to the MULTI_INSTANCE Object that is shown in Figure 7. To be able to add another type of Object, and not a second copy of the same Object, a new Object Type header is REQUIRED to preface the first 32-bit word of the new Object. These two different Objects carried within the MULTI_INSTANCE Object can be related, or they might not have anything to do with each other.

3.1 The MULTI_INSTANCE Object Format

The multi-32-bit word format of the MULTI_INSTANCE Object is TBD in a subsequent revision of this document.

3.2 Rules for building a MULTI_INSTANCE Object

The following are the rules for implementations of the MULTI_INSTANCE object:

#1 - having only 1 *SPEC or Object is allowed in the MULTI_INSTANCE

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#2 - more than one *SPEC or Object is allowed in the MULTI_INSTANCE Object (i.e., separate groups can have a single entry each)

#3 - more than one *SPEC or Object is allowed in the MULTI_INSTANCE Object (i.e., separate groups can have a multiple entries each)

#4 - some groupings within MULTI_INSTANCE MUST be paired each whenever a single instance occurs in any group.

In other words, based on rule #3, if a TSPEC is in each group, so MUST there be an RSPEC if any RSPEC is within this MULTI_INSTANCE Object. An RSPEC is an example of a *SPEC that MUST NOT be alone without its TSPEC.

4. Multiple TSPEC Objects in the MULTI_INSTANCE Object

This document defines the framework for the MULTI_INSTANCE Object, as well as for two Objects to be available for inclusion within this new Object: the TSPEC Object and the PREEMPTION_PRI Object (detailed in Section 5.). This section deals with how to include one or more TSPEC Objects within the MULTI_INSTANCE Object.

This document specifies if the reservation is to be Controlled Load [RFC2211], the entire TSPEC, including the two 32-bit word headers (totaling eight 32-bit words), are included in the MULTI_INSTANCE object. An example of a TSPEC from RFC 2210 is here in Figure 9.:

```
31 24 23 16 15 8 7 0
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  | 0 (a) | reserved | 7 (b) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  | X (c) | 0 reserved | 6 (d) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  | 127 (e) | 0 (f) | 5 (g) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  | Token Bucket Rate [r] (32-bit IEEE floating point number) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  | Token Bucket Size [b] (32-bit IEEE floating point number) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  | Peak Data Rate [p] (32-bit IEEE floating point number) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  | Minimum Policed Unit [m] (32-bit integer) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  | Maximum Packet Size [M] (32-bit integer) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 9. Controlled Load SENDER_TSPEC in a PATH

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Object (i.e., a grouping can have a single entry)
This document specifies if the reservation is to be Guaranteed Service, the entire TSPEC and RSPEC, including the two 32-bit word headers (totaling eleven 32-bit words), are included in the MULTI_INSTANCE object as a single consecutive chunk.

A request guaranteed service reservation contains a TSPEC and RSPEC [RFC2215], as shown in Figure 10:

```
31 24 23 16 15 8 7 0
+-----------------------------------------------+
1 | 0 (a) | Unused | 10 (b) |
+-----------------------------------------------+
2 | 2 (c) | reserved | 9 (d) |
+-----------------------------------------------+
3 | 127 (e) | 0 (f) | 5 (g) |
+-----------------------------------------------+
4 | Token Bucket Rate \([r]\) (32-bit IEEE floating point number) |
+-----------------------------------------------+
5 | Token Bucket Size \([b]\) (32-bit IEEE floating point number) |
+-----------------------------------------------+
6 | Peak Data Rate \([p]\) (32-bit IEEE floating point number) |
+-----------------------------------------------+
7 | Minimum Policed Unit \([m]\) (32-bit integer) |
+-----------------------------------------------+
8 | Maximum Packet Size \([M]\) (32-bit integer) |
+-----------------------------------------------+
9 | 130 (h) | 0 (i) | 2 (j) |
+-----------------------------------------------+
10 | Rate \([R]\) (32-bit IEEE floating point number) |
+-----------------------------------------------+
11 | Slack Term \([S]\) (32-bit integer) |
+-----------------------------------------------+
```

Figure 10. Guaranteed Service SENDER_TSPEC in a PATH
The difference in structure between the Controlled-Load FLOWSPEC and Guaranteed FLOWSPEC is the RSPEC, defined in [RFC2212]. The difference with respect to the MULTI_INSTANCE Object is found in the first 32-bit word, value ‘b’ above – the TSPEC Object overall length. This will tell a node whether it is a Controlled Load or Guaranteed Service TSPEC.

As a reminder, TSPECs contained in the MULTI_INSTANCE Object MUST NOT be altered when moved from the MULTI_INSTANCE Object to the sender_descriptor or FLOWSPEC. Generically, this needs to be a simple cut and paste operation.

If there are multiple TSPECs in the MULTI_INSTANCE Object, each MUST be the same type of TSPEC. In other words, there MUST NOT be a mix of Controlled Load with Guaranteed Service TSPECs in the same MULTI_INSTANCE Object.

RFC 4495 defines how existing reservations can partially preemption (trim) the agreed upon bandwidth assigned to an existing reservation. This specification extends RFC 4495 by allowing that trimming of bandwidth assigned to a reservation to occur during reservation establishment downstream. This occurs when a node upstream cannot grant the bandwidth already granted downstream, but that upstream node can grant a reduced amount of bandwidth from another TSPEC within FLOWSPEC, from within the MULTI_INSTANCE Object. This operation is shown in Figure 3.

5. Multiple PREEMPTION_PRI Elements in the MULTI_INSTANCE Object

The order of the TSPECs within the MULTI_INSTANCE Object is one way to determine which is the next TSPEC to be processed by a router. Another way of determining which TSPEC is the next one to be processed is by allowing the dynamic bandwidth selection to reflect a different reservation priority for each of the multiple "bandwidth" associated with a reservation.

[RFC2750] presents a set of extensions for supporting generic policy based admission control in RSVP. These extensions include the standard format of POLICY_DATA objects, and a description of RSVP’s handling of policy events. These extensions are consistent with the framework for policy-based admission control presented in [RFC2753]. POLICY_DATA objects are carried by RSVP messages and contain policy information. The exchange of POLICY_DATA objects between policy-capable nodes along the data path, supports the generation
and enforcement of consistent end-to-end admission control policies.

POLICY_DATA objects contain a list of Policy Elements that each contain a single unit of information necessary for the evaluation of policy rules. Multiple policy elements are already specified. For example, [RFC2872] specifies the Application and Sub Application Identity policy element for use with RSVP.

[RFC3181] specifies another policy element, the Preemption Priority Policy Element, that can be signaled in RSVP so that network node may take into account this policy element in order to preempt some previously admitted low priority sessions in order to make room for a newer, higher priority session. The Preemption Priority Policy Element (PREEMPTION_PRI) contains:

- one Preemption Priority specifying the priority of the new flow compared with the defending priority of previously admitted flows.
- one Defending Priority that is used once this reservation is established to compare with the preemption priority of new flows.

The format of preemption priority policy element (copied from RFC 3181) is as follows:

```
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| Length (12)               | P-Type = PREEMPTION_PRI   |
| +------+------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| Flags       | M. Strategy | Error Code  | Reserved(0) |
| +------+------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| Preemption Priority       | Defending Priority        |
+------+------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
```

Figure 11. Preemption Priority Policy Element Format

Length: 16 bits
Always 12. The overall length of the policy element, in bytes.

P-Type: 16 bits
PREEMPTION_PRI = 1
This value is registered with IANA, see Section 7.

Flags: 8 bits
Reserved (always 0).

Merge Strategy: 8 bit
1    Take priority of highest QoS: recommended
2    Take highest priority: aggressive
3    Force Error on heterogeneous merge
Reserved: 8 bits
Error code: 8 bits

0 NO_ERROR     Value used for regular PREEMPTION_PRI elements
1 PREEMPTION  This previously admitted flow was preempted
2 HETEROGENEOUS This element encountered heterogeneous merge

Reserved: 8 bits
Always 0.

Preemption Priority: 16 bit (unsigned)
The priority of the new flow compared with the defending priority
of previously admitted flows. Higher values represent higher
Priority.

Defending Priority: 16 bits (unsigned)
Once a flow was admitted, the preemption priority becomes
irrelevant. Instead, its defending priority is used to compare
with the preemption priority of new flows.

For any specific flow, its preemption priority MUST always be less
than or equal to the defending priority.

The preemption priority and defending priority of the Preemption
Priority Policy Element carried in a RESV message MUST be associated
with the flow specification carried in the FLOWSPEC object. There
MUST be either no Preemption Priority Policy Element carried in the
MULTI_INSTANCE Object, or there needs to be the exact same number of
Preemption Priority Policy Element as there are TSPEC Objects. This
MUST be a one-to-one mapping of numbers. For example, the preemption
priority and defending priority of the first (respectively second)
sub-element (when present) of the MULTI_INSTANCE Object is to be
associated with the first (respectively second) flow specification
(when present) in the MULTI_INSTANCE Object.

If a RESV message contains a dissimilar number of TSPECs than
Preemption Priority Policy Elements in the MULTI_INSTANCE object,
but contains a Preemption Priority Policy Element in the POLICY_DATA
object, then the Preemption Priority Policy Element in the
MULTI_INSTANCE object MUST be ignored, and all TSPECs retain the
priority properties of the Preemption Priority Policy Element in the
POLICY_DATA object.

An example MULTI_INSTANCE Object with 2 TSPEC Objects and 2
Preemption Priority Policy Element is showing generically in Figure
12.
Figure 12. MULTI_INSTANCE with 2 TSPECs and 2 PREEMPTION_PRIs

6. IANA Considerations

This document IANA registers the following new parameter name in the rsvp-parameters assignments at [IANA]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registry Name: Parameter Names</th>
<th>Registry:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Multiple_Instance_object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where RFCXXXX is replaced with the RFC number assigned to this Document.

This document IANA registers the following new error subcode in the
Error code section, under the Admission Control Failure (error=1), of the rsvp-parameters assignments at [IANA]:

Registry Name: Error Codes and Globally-Defined Error Value
Sub-Codes

Registry:
"Admission Control Failure"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Subcode</th>
<th>meaning</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>MULTI_INSTANCE bandwidth unavailable</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Security Considerations

The security considerations for this document do not exceed what is already in RFC 2205 (RSVP), as nothing in either of those documents prevent a node from requesting a lot of bandwidth in a single TSPEC, or what priority values are given in a Preemption Priority Policy Element. This document merely reduces the signaling traffic load on the network by allowing many requests that fall under the same policy controls to be included in a single round-trip message exchange.

Further, this document does not increase the security risk(s) to that defined in RFC 4495, where this document creates additional meaning to the RFC 4495 created error code 102.

A misbehaving Sender can include too many TSPECs in the MULTI_INSTANCE object, which can lead to an amplification attack. That said, a bad implementation can create a reservation for each TSPEC received from within the RESV message. The number of TSPECs in the new MULTI_INSTANCE object is limited, and the spec clearly states that only a single reservation is to be set up per RESV message.

To ensure the integrity of RSVP, the RSVP Authentication mechanisms defined in [RFC2747] and [RFC3097] SHOULD be used. Those protect RSVP message integrity hop-by-hop and provide node authentication as well as replay protection, thereby protecting against corruption and spoofing of RSVP messages.

8. Contributing Authors

The authors here would like to thank the authors of draft-lefaucheur-tsvwg-rsvp-multiple-preemption-02 for allowing that draft to be merged with this draft, specifically for the Preemption Priority Policy Element discussion in Section 5. They are:

Francois Le Faucheur
Arun Kudur and
Ashok Narayanan
9. Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Fred Baker, Joe Touch, Bruce Davie, Dave Oran, Ashok Narayanan, Lou Berger, Lars Eggert, Arun Kudur, Janet Gunn and Ken Carlberg for their helpful comments and guidance in this effort.

10. References

10.1 Normative References


10.2 Informative References

draft-lefaucheur-tsvwg-rsvp-multiple-preemption
draft-ietf-tsvwg-intserv-multiple-tspec

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Appendix A - History

This history of how we got to this phase of the development in this document can be traced to the work and choices articulated in the appendix within

draft-ietf-tsvwg-intserv-multiple-tspec

From there, another team developed

draft-lefaucheur-tsvwg-rsvp-multiple-preemption

Then Lou Berger (yeah, blame him!) came up with the bright idea of
combining the two efforts in such a way that one can take a complete
Object or element, and replace the primary instance of that within
an RSVP message for whatever reason (perhaps the message would be
rejected if that piece was not replaced with more reasonable demands
on the network; who knows). Anyway, that’s how we got here. That’s
the story and I’m sticking to it... :-p
Differentiated Services Delay-and-Loss vs. Loss-Rate-Adaptive Service Classes
draft-polk-tsvwg-delay-vs-loss-ds-service-classes-00.txt

Abstract

This document discusses how RTCWeb/RMCAT applications could best leverage existing and new DiffServ assignments and why we think it is necessary to differentiate the assignments of delay-and-loss-based vs. just-loss-based rate-adaptive video applications.

Status of this Memo

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1. Introduction

The current guidelines for DSCP assignments of traffic in the IETF is the informational RFC 4594 [RFC4594]. The TSV Working Group is currently reviewing how to update these assignments with one proposal being [ID-4594bis].

This document discusses how RTCWeb/RMCAT applications could best leverage [RFC4594] & [ID-4594bis] assignments and why we think it is necessary to differentiate the assignments of video for these type of applications from non-rate adaptive video flows (i.e., MPEG2).

The current text of [ID-4594bis] has audio flows within an interactive communication assigned to EF. The current text of [RFC4594] has interactive video flows would be assigned to AF4x.

The definition of AF4x directly matches the requirements for delay and loss-based rate-adaptive, self-friendly video traffic as targeted by RTCWeb applications and RMCAT congestion mechanisms. Splitting audio and video this way into separate traffic classes would specifically provide the benefit of guaranteeing no congestion/loss for the audio part while allowing congestion in video to cause rate adaptation where there is contention in the network. Unfortunately, the reality of deployments of AF4x in network in the last decade or longer does not match this original target of [RFC4594], instead relying only on loss in the network to indicate congestion.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] when they appear in ALL CAPS. These words may also appear in this document in lower case as plain English words, absent their normative meanings.

3. Rate-Adaptive Traffic is Inelastic (and often badly provisioned)

Because delay-based rate-adaptive video for conferencing has for the most part been a fairly recent development, the majority of video traffic deployed in many networks into AF41 or AF4x in general has been inelastic, highly loss-sensitive video traffic at fixed bitrates. This type of video deployment is accompanied by some form of either

- a vendor specific "Locations CAC" (LCAC) mechanism,
- an on-path RSVP based CAC or
o a much more commonly what is perceived to be sufficient overprovisioning.

This is because LCAC is often considered to be too provisioning intense and RSVP CAC is not supported on a critical mass of application/devices to be deployable in most networks.

In addition to Video, AF4x often also carries in practice, the (non-rate adaptive) voice part of collaborative sessions, primarily because creating lip-sync between EF audio and AF4x video traffic when they experiences differing jitter and latency in the network was seen as a complexity that especially lower end hardware based video endpoints wanted to avoid implementing. Additional reasons for this:

o Endpoints are too lazy to mark, so network devices mark and cannot tell what flow is video vs. audio;

o Implementers simply did not give the option to mark voice or video differently;

o People want the same per-hop behavior for audio and video. After all, getting one type of media there faster is of little value since it just has to be put in a buffer and queued, waiting for the other flow.

Alas, what might have been sufficient overprovisioning often turns out to be "pray and suffer" in the face of often badly controllable addition of new applications, devices, users or increased in utilization. For example, the busy hour in large enterprises often shrinks and becomes even more busy when expanding operations across multiple time zones. All these problems are the primary reason to propose the move to rate adaptive video, as seen in many recent products and IETF RTCweb/RMCAT work, but with the often long-term investments in a lot of this equipment in enterprises and cost of migrating deployment designs, the issues with this current use of AF4x is not going to go away for a long time. The recent interest in more application or network based circuit-breaker methods [ID-AVT-CB] for this type of inelastic traffic is also a good proof for this pain point (including the demands within the IETF to support them on any inelastic solution (i.e., RTCWeb & RMCAT efforts)).

Because of these fairly widespread deployments of AF4x and their issues, these flows make for a fairly bad PHB to put RMCAT/RTCweb traffic into. Rate adaptive traffic will always come up short against non-rate adaptive, incongestible traffic when being put into the same queue. This is especially true when provisioning for AF4x is leveraging the above "pray and suffer + circuit breaker" approach.
4. Jitter from Non-Rate Adaptive Video Traffic is Bad

Even if the existing non-rate-adaptive traffic was correctly provisioned such that there is no congestion, and even if all that traffic is known in a particular deployment to only use AF41, it would still not be a good idea to put rate-adaptive RTCweb/RMCAT traffic into AF42/AF43. The reason is that according to the definition of these traffic classes, all AF4x traffic should be in a single queue because there must be no reordering between AF4x packets. The permissible differentiation between AF41/AF42/AF43 therefore are differential drop profiles via WRED or other methods. This means that even if there is never ongoing congestion caused by badly behaving legacy non-rate adaptive traffic, the new rate-adaptive video traffic would still suffer from the jitter introduced by that old video traffic because it has to share a queue. And it would suffer proportional to the amount of traffic in the queue, aka: it would suffer most during the busy hours.

This jitter from unknown/legacy/bad video traffic is especially troublesome because delay variation schemes considered for rate-control in RMCAT will be conscious of that jitter and likely work less well when exposed to it.

It is hard enough - even unavoidable - for RMCAT to figure out how deal with competing TCP traffic on a single BE "Internet Queue". It is a total waste of effort and easily avoidable for RMCAT having to figure out how to deal with the jitter and loss introduced by legacy non-rate-adaptive video traffic in controlled environments where traffic can be separated by DSCP.

5. Suggested Behavior in the Network

5.1 CS4 and CS4-Discardable for rate-adaptive video

This document is therefore asking to assign a Service Class to delay and loss-based rate-adaptive, self-friendly conversational video traffic that is separate from AF4x.

We think that CS4 has been a traffic class that so far has seen little use and most likely is the easiest traffic class to use for this traffic.

In addition, it would be very helpful for future improvements in delay and loss-based rate-adaptive video traffic in the network if there is a second traffic class, e.g., "CS4-Discardable", for lower-priority packets within video flows that can easily be dropped.

Given how rate-adaptive video will not always be able to avoid all
packet drops, video codecs can improve the visual quality in conjunction with the network by creating discardable P-frames (e.g., P-frames not referenced by other P-frames) and having the network preferentially drop those frames. This can easily achieved with two DSCP assigned values, where one has a higher drop priority that the other. This, of course, is exactly the logic also designated for AF41/AF42/AF43, in other words we are simply asking for a new PHB be assigned to the existing AF41 (suggest: CS4) and a new AF42 (suggested: CS4-Discardable).

5.2 AF4x for Non-Rate-Adaptive Video

To represent the reality of deployments in the IETF guidelines, AF41 should be re-designated for non-rate adaptive conversational video with explicit admission control (off-path or non-path). AF42 should be re-designated for non-rate-adaptive conversational video without explicit admission control (e.g., relying solely on circuit breakers).

This proposal, in effect, is suggesting the text in RFC 4594 regarding AF4X, as written, be ported/moved over to replace the text in that same RFC that was for CS4 PHB. New text will need to be written in the RFC4594bis document addressing AF4X taking over the more legacy traffic behaviors from non-adaptive (based on loss) video traffic.

6. Additional Recommendations for Other PHBs Affected

Specifying that delay and loss-based rate-adaptive video use CS4 (and ‘CS4+’ or ‘CS4-Discardable’ or ‘CS4-D’) means the current RFC 4594 assignment of CS4 to the Realtime-Interactive (RTI) service class needs modification. Rather than create new definitions for CS4, currently occupied with the Realtime Interactive (RTI) PHB traffic according to RFC 4594, our proposal is to move the RTI service class definitions to CS5 (as is the case in [ID-4594bis]) — where the RTI will have a minimal effect on the existing installed base of implementations because it has few.

The CS5 PHB, which is assigned for H.323 and SIP signaling, would be then moved to another DSCP. Perhaps near Low-Latency Data (CS2) according to [ID-4594bis].

7. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Paul Jones, Charles Eckel, Charles Ganzhorn, Fred Baker, Mo Zanaty, Michael Ramalho for their active participation in this effort.
8. IANA Considerations

If the WG agrees with this effort, then there will need to be a reassignment of AF4X and CS4, as well as the new assignment of an additional CS4+ or CS4-discardable PHB.

9. Security Considerations

TBW

10. References

10.1 Normative References


10.2 Informative References

none at this time

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Abstract

This document describes service classes configured with DiffServ and identifies how they are used and how to construct them using Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCPs), traffic conditioners, Per-Hop Behaviors (PHBs), and Active Queue Management (AQM) mechanisms. There is no intrinsic requirement that particular DSCPs, traffic conditioners, PHBs, and AQM be used for a certain service class, but for consistent behavior under the same network conditions, configuring networks as described here is appropriate.

Status of this Memo

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1. Introduction

Differentiated Services [RFC2474][RFC2475] provides the ability to mark/label/classify IP packets differently to distinguish how individual packets need to be treated differently through (or throughout) a network on a per-hop basis. Local administrators are who configure each router for which Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCP) are to be treated differently, which are to be ignored (i.e., no differentiated treatment), and which DSCPs are to have their packets remarked (to different DSCPs) as they pass through a router. Local administrators are also who assign which applications, or traffic types, should use which DSCPs to receive the treatment the administrators expect within their network.

What most people fail to understand is that DSCPs provide a per hop behavior (PHB) through that router, but not the previous or next router. In this way of understanding PHB markings, one can understand that Differentiated Services (DiffServ) is not a Quality of Service (QoS) mechanism, but rather a Classification of Service (CoS) mechanism.

For instance, there are 64 possible DSCP values, i.e., using 6 bits of the old Type of Service (TOS) byte [RFC0791]. Each can be configured locally to have greater or less treatment relative to any other DSCP with two exceptions*.

* Expedited Forwarding (EF) [RFC3246] DSCPs have a treatment requirement that any packet marked within an EF class has to be the next packet transmitted out its egress interface. If there are more than one EF marked packet in the queue, obviously the queue sets the order they are transmitted. Further, if there are more than one EF DSCP, local configuration determines if each are treated the same or differently relate to each other EF DSCP. Currently, there are two Expedited Forwarding DSCPs: EF (101110) [RFC3246] and VOICE-ADMIT (101100) [RFC5865].

* Class Selector 6 (CS6) [RFC2474] is for routing protocol traffic. There are deemed important because if the network does not transmit and receive its routing protocol traffic in a timely manner, the network stops operating properly.
Not all are configured to mean anything other than best effort forwarding by local administrators of a network. Let us say there are 5 DSCPs configured within network A. Network A’s administrator chooses and configures which order (obeying the two exceptions noted above) which application packets are treated differently than any other packets within that network (A). The DSCPs are not fixed to a linear order for relative priority on a per hop basis. Further, and this is often the case, there might be packets with the same DSCP arriving at multiple interfaces of a node, each egressing that node out the same interface. At ingress to this node, everything was fine, with no poor behavior or noticeably excessive amount of packets with the same DSCP. However, at the egress interface, there might not be enough capacity to satisfy the load, thus the departing packets transmit at their maximum rate for that DSCP, but have additional latency due to the overload within that one node. This is called fan-in congestion (or problem). By itself, DiffServ will not remedy this problem for the application that is intolerant to added latency because DiffServ only functions within 1 node at a time.

An additional mechanism is needed to ensure each flow or session receives the amount of packets at its destination that the application requires to perform properly; a mechanism such as IntServ, by way of RSVP [RFC2205] or NSIS [RFC4080]. With this added capability to be session aware, something DiffServ is not, the packets transmitted within a single session have a very good probability of arriving in such a way the receiving application can make full use of each. That said, signaling reservations for each session or flow adds complexity, which creates more work for those who maintain and administer such a network. Adding bandwidth and using DiffServ marking is an easier pill to swallow. The deployment of not few, but more and more audio and (particularly bandwidth hogging) video codecs and their respective application rigidity has caused some to conclude that throwing bandwidth at the problem is no longer acceptable.

With this in mind, this document incorporates five of the six new DSCPs from [ID-DSCP] identified as capacity-admitted DSCPs for most of the service classes in this document. As explained in [ID-DSCP], the five new capacity-admitted DSCPs are from Pool 3. [ID-DSCP] goes further to explain that many layer 2 technologies use fewer bits for marking and prioritization. Instead of six bits like DiffServ, they have three bits, which yields a maximum of 8 values, which tend to line up quite will with the TOS field values. Thus, aggregation of DSCPs is typically accomplished by simply ignoring or reducing the number of bits used to the most significant ones available, such as

EF is 101110, at layer 2 this is merely 101;

Broadcast is 011000, at layer 2 this is merely 011.

However, that was not a premise DiffServ was built upon, to merely
reduce the number of bits. In other words, within DiffServ, XXX is not the same as XXX000 (where XXX is the same binary value in both cases).

This document is originally built upon the RFC 4594 effort, while updating some of the usages and expanding the scope for newer applications that are in use today. The idea in RFC 4594 remains true here, to define a set of service classes, each having unique traffic characteristics, and assigning one or more DSCPs to each service class. As much as the focus could be on the DSCP values, it is not. The focus of this document is the unique traffic characteristics of each service class.

There are many services classes defined in this document, not all will be used in each network at any period of time. This consistency packet markings we talk about is for several reasons, including in a network that does not currently implement a certain service class because they do not have that type of traffic in their network, or that the network merely gives that traffic best effort service. Having a solid guideline to know where to progress or reconfigure a network and endpoints to, say from best effort for a particular traffic type, is a very good thing to do more uniformly than not. A fair amount of burden is placed at DS boundaries needing to keep up with which markings turn into which other markings at both ingress and egress to a network. The same holds true for application developers choosing a default DSCP for their application, lacking a guideline means everyone picks for themselves - and usually with a highly inflated sense of self importance for their application or service.

Another point to make is that there are 20+ service classes defined within the IETF, and that is far too many for most service providers to manage effectively. So, they have formed groups around certain aggregation solutions of service classes. One such aggregation group is based on RFC 5127, which defines what it calls a treatment aggregate, which is taking RFC 4594’s service classes and placing them each into one of four treatment aggregates for service providers to handle as a group. SG12 within the ITU-T has an alternative that has nine aggregate groups, so there is work to be done to harmonize aggregates of service classes. This discussion is articulated more in section 2.4. At the end of Section 2.4 we have introduced a series of example configurations which provide examples of how only a few service classes - yet still most treatment aggregates - can be configured in example networks.

Does RFC 4594 need updating? That document is an informational guideline on how networks can or should mark certain packet flows with differing traffic characteristics using DiffServ. There are several reasons why this informational RFC lacks the necessary clarity and strength to reach widespread adoption:

- confusion between RFC 4594 and RFC 5127 [RFC5127], the latter of
which is for aggregating many 6-bit DSCP values into a 3-bit (8 value) field used specifically by service provider (SP) networks.

- Some believe both RFCs are for SPs, while others ignore RFC 5127 and use RFC 4594 as if it were standards track or BCP.

- Some believe RFC 5127 is for SPs only, and want RFC 4594 to reduce the number of DSCP values within its guidelines to recommend using only 3 or 4 DSCPs. This seems to stem from a manageability and operational perspective.

- Some know RFC 4594 is informational and do not follow its guidelines specifically because it is informational.

- Some use DSCP values that are not defined within RFC 4594, making mapping between different networks using similar or identical application flows difficult.

- Some believe enterprise networks should not use either RFC except at the edge of their networks, where they directly connect to SP networks.

- Some argue that the services classes guidance per class is too broad and are therefore not sure in which service class a particular application is to reside.

- Time has shown that video has become a dominant application on the Internet, and many believe it now requires to be treated uniquely in environments that want to. Video does not always plan nice with audio, so knowing the two use the same transport (RTP) [RFC3550], a means of separation is in order.

Service class definitions are based on the different traffic characteristics and required performance of the applications/services. There are a greater number of service classes in this document than there were when RFC 4594 [RFC4594] was published (the RFC this document intends to obsolete). The required performance of applications/services has also changed since the publication of RFC 4594, specifically in the area of conversational real time communications. As a result, this document has a greater number of real time applications with more granular set of DSCP values due to their different required performances. Like RFC 4594 before, this approach allows those applications with similar traffic characteristics and performance requirements to be placed in the same service class.

The notion of traffic characteristics and required performance is a per application concept, therefore the label name of each service class remains the same on an end-to-end basis, even if we understand that DiffServ is only a PHB and cannot guarantee anything, even packet delivery at the intended destination node. That said, several applications can be configured to have the same DSCP, or
each have different DSCPs that have the same treatment per hop within a network.

Since RFC 4594 was first published, a new concept has been introduced that will appear throughout this document, including DSCP assignments -- the idea of "admitted" traffic, initially introduced into DiffServ within RFC 5865 [RFC5865]. The VOICE-ADMIT Expedited Forwarding class differentiates itself from the EF Expedited Forwarding by having the packets marked be for admitted traffic. This concept of "admitted" traffic is spread throughout the real time traffic classes.

Thus, the document flow is as follows:

- maintain the general format of RFC 4594;
- augment the content with the concept of capacity-admission;
- incorporate more video into this document, as it has become a dominant application in enterprises and other managed networks, as well as on the open public Internet;
- reduce the discussion on voice and its examples;
- articulate the subtle differences learned since RFC 4594 was published.

The goal here is to provide a standard configuration for DiffServ DSCP assignments and expected PHBs for enterprises and other managed networks, as well as towards the public Internet with specific traffic characteristics per Service class/DSCP, and example applications shown for each.

This document describes service classes configured with DiffServ and defines how they can be used and how to construct them using Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCPs), and recommends how to construct them using traffic conditioners, Per-Hop Behaviors (PHBs), and Active Queue Management (AQM) mechanisms. There is no intrinsic requirement that particular traffic conditioners, PHBs, and AQM be used for a certain service class, but as a policy and for interoperability it is useful to apply them consistently.

We differentiate services and their characteristics in Section 2. Network control traffic, as well as user oriented traffic are discussed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. We analyze the security considerations in Section 6. Section 7 offers a tribute to the authors of RFC 4594, from which this document is based. It is in its own section, and not part of the normal acknowledgements portion of each IETF document.
1.1. Requirements Notation

The key words "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] when they appear in ALL CAPS. These words may also appear in this document in lower case as plain English words, absent their normative meanings.

1.2. Expected Use in the Network

In the Internet today, corporate LANs and ISP WANs are increasingly utilized, to the point in which network congestion is affecting performance of applications. For this reason, congestion, loss, and variation in delay within corporate LANs and ISP backbones is becoming known to the users collectively as "the network is slow for this application" or just "right now" or "for today". Users do not directly detect network congestion. They react to applications that run slow, or to downloads that take too long in their mind(s). The explosion of video traffic on the internet recently has cause much of this, and is often the application the user is using when they have this slowness.

In the past, application slowness occurred for three very good reasons.

- The networks the user oriented traffic traverses moves through cycles of bandwidth boom and bandwidth bust, the latter of which become apparent with the periodic deployment of new bandwidth-hungry applications.
- In access networks, the state is often different. This may be because throughput rates are artificially limited or over-subscribed, or because of access network design trade-offs.
- Other characteristics, such as database design on web servers (that may create contention points, e.g., in filestore) and configuration of firewalls and routers, often look externally like a bandwidth limitation.

The intent of this document is to provide a standardized marking, plus a conditioning and packet treatment strategy so that it can be configured and put into service on any link that is itself congested.

1.3. Service Class Definition

A "service class" represents a similar set of traffic characteristics for delay, loss, and jitter as packets traverse routers in a network. For example, "High-Throughput Data" service class for store-and-forward applications, or a "Broadcast" service
A service class is a naming convention which is defined as a word, phrase or initialism/acronym representing a set of necessary traffic characteristics of a certain type of data flow. The necessary characteristics of these traffic flows can be realized by the use of defined per-hop behavior that started with [RFC2474]. The actual specification of the expected treatment of a traffic aggregate within a domain may also be defined as a per-domain behavior (PDB) [RFC3086].

Each domain will locally choose to:

- implement one or more service classes with traffic characteristics as defined here, or
- implement one or more service classes with similar traffic characteristics as defined here, or
- implement one or more service classes with similar traffic characteristics as defined here and to aggregate one or more service classes to reduce the number of unique DSCPs within their network, or
- implement one or more non-standard service classes with traffic characteristics not as defined here, or
- not use DiffServ within their domain.

For example, low delay, low loss, and minimal jitter may be realized using the EF PHB, or with an over-provisioned AF PHB. This must be done with care as it may disrupt the end-to-end performance required by the applications/services. If the packet sizes are similar within an application, but different between two applications, say small voice packets and large video packets, these two applications may not realize optimum results if merged into the same aggregate if there are any bottlenecks in the network. We provide for this flexibility on a per hop or per domain basis within this document.

This document provides standardized markings for traffic with similar characteristics, and usage expectations for PHBs for specific service classes for their consistent implementation.

The Default Forwarding "Standard" service class is REQUIRED; all other service classes are OPTIONAL. That said, each service class lists traffic characteristics that are expected when using that type of traffic. It is RECOMMENDED that applications and protocols that fit a certain traffic characteristic use the appropriate service
class mark, i.e., the DSCP, for consistent behavior. It is expected that network administrators will base their endpoint application and router configuration choices on the level of service differentiation they require to meet the needs of their customers (i.e., their end-users).

1.4. Key Differentiated Services Concepts

In order to fully understand this document, a reader needs to familiarize themselves with the principles of the Differentiated Services Architecture [RFC2474]. We summarize some key concepts here only to provide convenience for the reader, the referenced RFCs providing the authoritative definitions.

1.4.1. Queuing

A queue is a data structure that holds packets that are awaiting transmission. A router interface can only transmit one packet at a time, however fast the interface speed is. If there is only 1 queue at an interface, the packets are transmitted in the order they are received into that queue - called FIFO, or "first in, first out". Sometimes there is a lag in the time between a packet arrives in the queue and when it is transmitted. This delay might be due to lack of bandwidth, or if there are multiple queues on that interface, because a packet is low in priority relative to other packets that are awaiting to transmit. The scheduler is the system entity that chooses which packet is next in line for transmission when more than one packet are awaiting transmission out the same router interface.

1.4.1.1 Priority Queuing

A priority queuing system is a combination of a set of queues and a scheduler that empties the queues (of packets) in priority sequence. When asked for a packet, the scheduler inspects the highest priority queue and, if there is data present, returns a packet from that queue. Failing that, it inspects the next highest priority queue, and so on. A freeway onramp with a stoplight for one lane that allows vehicles in the high-occupancy-vehicle lane to pass is an example of a priority queuing system; the high-occupancy-vehicle lane represents the "queue" having priority.

In a priority queuing system, a packet in the highest priority queue will experience a readily calculated delay. This is proportional to the amount of data remaining to be serialized when the packet arrived plus the volume of the data already queued ahead of it in the same queue. The technical reason for using a priority queue relates exactly to this fact: it limits delay and variations in delay and should be used for traffic that has that requirement.
A priority queue or queuing system needs to avoid starvation of lower-priority queues. This may be achieved through a variety of means, such as admission control, rate control, or network engineering.

1.4.1.2. Rate Queuing

Similarly, a rate-based queuing system is a combination of a set of queues and a scheduler that empties each at a specified rate. An example of a rate-based queuing system is a road intersection with a stoplight. The stoplight acts as a scheduler, giving each lane a certain opportunity to pass traffic through the intersection.

In a rate-based queuing system, such as Weighted Fair Queuing (WFQ) or Weighted Round Robin (WRR), the delay that a packet in any given queue will experience depends on the parameters and occupancy of its queue and the parameters and occupancy of the queues it is competing with. A queue whose traffic arrival rate is much less than the rate at which it lets traffic depart will tend to be empty, and packets in it will experience nominal delays. A queue whose traffic arrival rate approximates or exceeds its departure rate will tend not to be empty, and packets in it will experience greater delay. Such a scheduler can impose a minimum rate, a maximum rate, or both, on any queue it touches.

1.4.2 Active Queue Management

Active Queue Management, or AQM, is a generic name for any of a variety of procedures that use packet dropping or marking to manage the depth of a queue. The canonical example of such a procedure is Random Early Detection (RED), in that a queue is assigned a minimum and maximum threshold, and the queuing algorithm maintains a moving average of the queue depth. While the mean queue depth exceeds the maximum threshold, all arriving traffic is dropped. While the mean queue depth exceeds the minimum threshold but not the maximum threshold, a randomly selected subset of arriving traffic is marked or dropped. This marking or dropping of traffic is intended to communicate with the sending system, causing its congestion avoidance algorithms to kick in. As a result of this behavior, it is reasonable to expect that TCP’s cyclic behavior is desynchronized and that the mean queue depth (and therefore delay) should normally approximate the minimum threshold.

A variation of the algorithm is applied in Assured Forwarding PHB [RFC2597], in that the behavior aggregate consists of traffic with multiple DSCP marks, which are intermingled in a common queue. Different minima and maxima are configured for the several DSCPs separately, such that traffic that exceeds a stated rate at ingress is more likely to be dropped or marked than traffic that is within its contracted rate.
1.4.3 Traffic Conditioning

In addition, at the first router in a network that a packet crosses, arriving traffic may be measured and dropped or marked according to a policy, or perhaps shaped on network ingress, as in "A Rate Adaptive Shaper for Differentiated Services" [RFC2963]. This may be used to bias feedback loops, as is done in "Assured Forwarding PHB" [RFC2597], or to limit the amount of traffic in a system, as is done in " Expedited Forwarding PHB" [RFC3246]. Such measurement procedures are collectively referred to as "traffic conditioners". Traffic conditioners are normally built using token bucket meters, for example with a committed rate and burst size, as in Section 1.5.3 of the DiffServ Model [RFC3290]. The Assured Forwarding PHB [RFC2597] uses a variation on a meter with multiple rate and burst size measurements to test and identify multiple levels of conformance.

Multiple rates and burst sizes can be realized using multiple levels of token buckets or more complex token buckets; these are implementation details. The following are some traffic conditioners that may be used in deployment of differentiated services:

- For Class Selector (CS) PHBs, a single token bucket meter to provide a rate plus burst size control.
- For Expedited Forwarding (EF) PHB, a single token bucket meter to provide a rate plus burst size control.
- For Assured Forwarding (AF) PHBs, usually two token bucket meters configured to provide behavior as outlined in "Two Rate Three Color Marker (trTCM)" [RFC2698] or "Single Rate Three Color Marker (srTCM)" [RFC2697]. The two-rate, three-color marker is used to enforce two rates, whereas the single-rate, three-color marker is used to enforce a committed rate with two burst lengths.

1.4.4 Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP)

The DSCP is a number in the range 0..63 that is placed into an IP packet to mark it according to the class of traffic it belongs in. These are divided into 3 groups, or pools, defined in RFC 2474, arranged as follows:

- Pool-1 has 32 values designated for standards assignment (of the form ‘xxxx0’).
- Pool-2 has 16 values designated for experimental or local use only (EXP/LU) assignment (of the form ‘xxxx11’).
- Pool-3 has 16 values designated for experimental or local use (EXP/LU) assignment (of the form ‘xxxx01’).
However, pool-3 is allowed to be assigned for one of two reasons,

#1 - if the values in pool-1 are exhausted, or

#2 - if there is a justifiable reason for assigning a pool-3 DSCP
prior to pool-1’s exhaustion.

1.4.5 Per-Hop Behavior (PHB)

In the end, the mechanisms described above are combined to form a
specified set of characteristics for handling different kinds of
traffic, depending on the needs of the application. This document
seeks to identify useful traffic aggregates and to specify what PHB
should be applied to them.

1.5 Key Service Concepts

While Differentiated Services is a general architecture that may be
used to implement a variety of services, three fundamental
forwarding behaviors have been defined and characterized for general
use. These are basic Default Forwarding (DF) behavior for elastic
traffic, the Assured Forwarding (AF) behavior, and the Expedited
Forwarding (EF) behavior for real-time (inelastic) traffic. The
facts that four code points are recommended for AF and that one code
point is recommended for EF are arbitrary choices, and the
architecture allows any reasonable number of AF and EF classes
simultaneously. The choice of four AF classes and one EF class in
the current document is also arbitrary, and operators MAY choose to
operate more or fewer of either.

The terms "elastic" and "real-time" are defined in [RFC1633],
Section 3.1, as a way of understanding broad-brush application
requirements. This document should be reviewed to obtain a broad
understanding of the issues in quality of service, just as [RFC2475]
should be reviewed to understand the data plane architecture used in
today’s Internet.

1.5.1 Default Forwarding (DF)

The basic forwarding behaviors applied to any class of traffic are
those described in [RFC2474] and [RFC2309]. Best-effort service may
be summarized as "I will accept your packets" and is typically
configured with some bandwidth guarantee. Packets in transit may be
lost, reordered, duplicated, or delayed at random. Generally,
networks are engineered to limit this behavior, but changing traffic
loads can push any network into such a state.

Application traffic in the internet that uses default forwarding is
expected to be "elastic" in nature. By this, we mean that the
sender of traffic will adjust its transmission rate in response to
For the basic best-effort service, a single DSCP value is provided to identify the traffic, a queue to store it, and active queue management to protect the network from it and to limit delays.

1.5.2 Assured Forwarding (AF)

The Assured Forwarding PHB [RFC2597] behavior is explicitly modeled on Frame Relay’s Discard Eligible (DE) flag or ATM’s Cell Loss Priority (CLP) capability. It is intended for networks that offer average-rate Service Level Agreements (SLAs) (as FR and ATM networks do). This is an enhanced best-effort service; traffic is expected to be "elastic" in nature. The receiver will detect loss or variation in delay in the network and provide feedback such that the sender adjusts its transmission rate to approximate available capacity.

For such behaviors, multiple DSCP values are provided (two or three, perhaps more using local values) to identify the traffic, a common queue to store the aggregate, and active queue management to protect the network from it and to limit delays. Traffic is metered as it enters the network, and traffic is variously marked depending on the arrival rate of the aggregate. The premise is that it is normal for users occasionally to use more capacity than their contract stipulates, perhaps up to some bound. However, if traffic should be marked or lost to manage the queue, this excess traffic will be marked or lost first.

1.5.3. Expedited Forwarding (EF)

The intent of Expedited Forwarding PHB [RFC3246] is to provide a building block for low-loss, low-delay, and low-jitter services. It can be used to build an enhanced best-effort service: traffic remains subject to loss due to line errors and reordering during routing changes. However, using queuing techniques, the probability of delay or variation in delay is minimized. For this reason, it is generally used to carry voice and for transport of data information that requires "wire like" behavior through the IP network. Voice is an inelastic "real-time" application that sends packets at the rate the codec produces them, regardless of availability of capacity. As such, this service has the potential to disrupt or congest a network if not controlled. It also has the potential for abuse.

To protect the network, at minimum one SHOULD police traffic at various points to ensure that the design of a queue is not overrun, and then the traffic SHOULD be given a low-delay queue (often using priority, although it is asserted that a rate-based queue can do this) to ensure that variation in delay is not an issue, to meet application needs.
1.5.4 Class Selector (CS)

Class Selector, those DSCPs that end in zeros (xxx000), provide support for historical codepoint definitions and PHB requirement. The CS fields provide a limited backward compatibility with legacy practice, as described in [RFC2474], Section 4. Backward compatibility is addressed in two ways,

- First, there are per-hop behaviors that are already in widespread use (e.g., those satisfying the IPv4 Precedence queuing requirements specified in [RFC1812]), and
- this document will continue to permit their use in DS-compliant networks.

In addition, there are some DSCPs that correspond to historical use of the IP Precedence field,

- CS0 (000000) will remain ‘Default Forwarding’ (also known as ‘Best Effort’)  
- 11xxxx will remain for routing traffic and will map to PHBs that meet the general requirements specified in [RFC2474], Section 4.2.2.2.

No attempt is made to maintain backward compatibility with the "DTR" or Type of Service (TOS) bits of the IPv4 TOS octet, as defined in [RFC0791] and [RFC1349].

A DS-compliant network can be deployed exclusively by using one or more CS-compliant PHB groups. Thus, for example, codepoint ‘011000’ would map to the same PHB as codepoint ‘011010’.

1.5.5 Admission Control

Admission control (including refusal when policy thresholds are crossed) can ensure high-quality communication by ensuring the availability of bandwidth to carry a load. Inelastic real-time flows such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) (audio) or video conferencing services can benefit from use of an admission control mechanism, as generally the audio or video service is configured with over-subscription, meaning that some users may not be able to make a call during peak periods.

For VoIP (audio) service, a common approach is to use signaling protocols such as SIP, H.323, H.248, MEGACO, along with Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) to negotiate admittance and use of network transport capabilities. When a user has been authorized to send voice traffic, this admission procedure has verified that data rates will be within the capacity of the network that it will use.
Many RTP voice and video payloads are inelastic and cannot react to loss or delay in any substantive way. For these payload types, the network needs to police at ingress to ensure that the voice traffic stays within its negotiated bounds. Having thus assured a predictable input rate, the network may use a priority queue to ensure nominal delay and variation in delay.

1.5.5.1 Capacity Admitted (*-Admit)

This is a newer group of traffic types that started with RFC 5865 and the Voice-Admit service type. Voice-Admit is an EF class marking but has capacity-admission always applied to it to ensure each of these flows are managed through a network, though not necessarily on an end-to-end basis. This depends on how many networks each flow transits and the load on each transited network. There are a series of new DSCPs proposed in [ID-DSCP], each specifying unique characteristics necessitating a separate marking from what existing before that document.

This document will import in four new ‘*-Admit’ DSCPs from [ID-DSCP], 2 others that are new but not capacity-admitted, one from RFC 5865, and change the existing usage of 2 DSCPs from RFC 4594. This is discussed throughout the rest of this document.

1.6 What Changes are Proposed Here from RFC 4594?

Changing an entire network DiffServ configuration has proven to be a painful experience for both individuals and companies. It is not done very often, and for good reason. This effort is based on experience learned since the publication of RFC 4594 (circa 2006). Audio, once thought to be ok grouped with video, needs to be in separate service classes. Collaboration has taken off, mostly because of mobility, but also because of a worldwide recession that has limited physical travel, and relying on people to do more with their computers. With that in mind, there has been an explosion in application development for the individual (seems everyone has an "app-store"). The following set of bullets has this world - that needs a robust layer 3 - in mind.

- Scope of document is changed to tighten it up for standards track consideration.

- This document explicitly states there is a fundamental requirement that a particular DSCP(s) be used for each service class, each with a recommended set of applications to be used by that service class - at least on that individual’s externally facing (public) interface.

- Created the Conversational group of service classes to focus on realtime, mostly bidirectional communications (unless multicast is
used).

- **"Realtime-Interactive"**
  
  Moved to (near) realtime TCP-based apps

  Why the change? TCP based transports have proven, in certain environments, to be a bidirectional realtime transport, e.g., for multiplayer gaming and virtual desktops applications.

- **"Audio"**
  
  Same as Telephony (which is now gone), adds Voice-Admit for capacity-admitted traffic

  Why the change? RFC 5865 (Voice-Admit) needed to be added to the Audio service class. Video needed to be separate from audio, hence the name change from Telephony (which includes video) to just audio.

- **"Video"**
  
  NEW for video and audio/video conferencing, was in Multimedia-Conferencing service classification

  Why the change? Many networks are using the AF4X for video, but others are throwing anything "multimedia" into the same service class (like elastic TCP flows). Video has become so dominant that it should be what mostly goes into one service class.

- **"Hi-Res"**
  
  NEW for video and audio/video conferencing

  Why the change? This entirely new service class is for local policy based higher end video (think Telepresence). Without congestion, this service class has the same treatment as Video, but if there is any pushback from the network, Hi-Res (note: not married to the name) has a better PHB.

- **"Multimedia-Conferencing"**
  
  Now without audio or human video

  Why the change? The change is taking bidirectional human audio and video out of this service class. This is all about non-realtime collaboration - even in conjunction with an audio and/or video flow.

- **"Broadcast"**
  
  Remains the same, added CS3-Admit for capacity-admitted

  Why the change? Removing the "-Video" from the name because there are so many more flows that are Broadcast in realtime than video.

- **"Low-Latency Data"**
  
  Remains the same, adds IM & Presence traffic explicitly

  Why the change? Merely explicitly stating a place for some
additional traffic types that otherwise could go elsewhere.

- "Conversational Signaling" (A/V-Sig)
  
  Was 'Signaling'

Why the change? This change is merely a renaming of a service class, and acknowledgement that some of the previous authors inaccurate beliefs that DSCPs were linearly ordered with those values having a higher value definitely getting better treatment than lower values.

2. Service Differentiation

There are practical limits on the level of service differentiation that should be offered in the IP networks. We believe we have defined a practical approach in delivering service differentiation by defining different service classes that networks may choose to support in order to provide the appropriate level of behaviors and performance needed by current and future applications and services. The defined structure for providing services allows several applications having similar traffic characteristics and performance requirements to be grouped into the same service class. This approach provides a lot of flexibility in providing the appropriate level of service differentiation for current and new, yet unknown applications without introducing significant changes to routers or network configurations when a new traffic type is added to the network.

2.1 Service Classes

Traffic flowing in a network can be classified in many different ways. We have chosen to divide it into two groupings, network control and user/subscriber traffic. To provide service differentiation, different service classes are defined in each grouping. The network control traffic group can further be divided into two service classes (see Section 3 for detailed definition of each service class):

- "Network Control" for routing and network control function.
- "OAM" (Operations, Administration, and Management) for network configuration and management functions.

The user/subscriber traffic group is broken down into ten service classes to provide service differentiation for all the different types of applications/services (see Section 4 for detailed definition of each service class):

- Conversational service group consists of three service classes:
  
  - Audio, which includes both 'admitted' and 'unadmitted' audio
service classes, is for non-one way (i.e., generally bidirectional) audio media packets between human users of smaller size and at a constant delivery rate.

- Hi-Res Video, which includes both ‘admitted’ and ‘unadmitted’ Hi-Res Video service classes, is for video traffic from higher end endpoints between human users necessitating different treatment that from desktop or video phone endpoints. This has a clearly business differentiation, and not a technical differentiation – as both Hi-Res-Video and Video will be treated similarly on the wire when no congestion occurs.

- Video, which includes both ‘admitted’ and ‘unadmitted’ video service classes, is for video traffic from lower end endpoints between human users necessitating different treatment that from higher end (i.e., Telepresence) endpoints. This has a clearly business differentiation, and not a technical differentiation – as both Hi-Res-Video and Video will be treated similarly on the wire when no congestion occurs.

  o Conversational Signaling service class is for peer-to-peer and client-server signaling and control functions using protocols such as SIP, H.323, H.248, and Media Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP). This traffic needs to not be starved on the network.

Editor’s note: RFC 4594 had this DSCP marking as CS5, but with clearly different characteristics (i.e., no sensitivity to jitter or (unreasonable) delay), this DSCP has been moved to a more appropriate (new) value, defined in [ID-DSCP].

  o Real-Time Interactive, which includes both ‘admitted’ and ‘unadmitted’ Realtime-Interactive service class, is for bidirectional variable rate inelastic applications that require low jitter and loss and very low delay, such as interactive gaming applications that use RTP/UDP streams for game control commands, and Virtualized Desktop applications between the user and content source, typically in a centralized data center.

  o Multimedia Conferencing, which includes both ‘admitted’ and ‘unadmitted’ multimedia conferencing service class, is for applications that require minimal delay, but not like those of realtime application requirements. This service class can be bursty in nature, as well as not transmit packets for some time. Applications such as presentation data or collaborative application sharing will use this service class.

  o Multimedia Streaming, which includes both ‘admitted’ and ‘unadmitted’ multimedia streaming service class, is for one-way bufferable streaming media applications such as Video on Demand (VOD) and webcasts.
Broadcast, which includes both ‘admitted’ and ‘unadmitted’ broadcast service class, is for inelastic streaming media applications that may be of constant or variable rate, requiring low jitter and very low packet loss, such as broadcast TV and live events, video surveillance, and security.

Low-Latency Data service class is for data processing applications such as client/server interactions or Instant Messaging (IM) and Presence data.

Conversational Signaling (A/V-Sig) service class is for all signaling messages, whether in-band (i.e., along the data path) or out-of-band (separate from the data path), for the purposes of setting up, maintaining, managing and terminating bi- or multi-directional realtime sessions.

High-Throughput Data service class is for store and forward applications such as FTP and billing record transfer.

Standard service class, commonly called best effort (BE), is for traffic that has not been identified as requiring differentiated treatment.

Low-Priority Data service class, which some could call the scavenger class, is for packet flows where bandwidth assurance is not required.

### 2.2 Categorization of User Oriented Service Classes

The ten defined user/subscriber service classes listed above can be grouped into a small number of application categories. For some application categories, it was felt that more than one service class was needed to provide service differentiation within that category due to the different traffic characteristic of the applications, control function, and the required flow behavior. Figure 1 provides a summary of service class grouping into four application categories.

#### Application Control Category

The Conversational Signaling service class is intended to be used to control applications or user endpoints. Examples of protocols that would use this service class are SIP, XMPP or H.323 for voice and/or video over IP services. User signaling flows have similar performance requirements as Low-Latency Data, they require a separate DSCP to be distinguished other traffic and allow for a treatment that is unique.

#### Media-Oriented Category

Due to the vast number of new (in process of being deployed) and already-in-use media-oriented services in IP networks, seven service..
classes have been defined.

- Audio service class is intended for Voice-over-IP (VoIP) services. It may also be used for other applications that meet the defined traffic characteristics and performance requirements.

- Video service class is intended for Video over IP services. It may also be used for other applications that meet the defined traffic characteristics and performance requirements.

- Hi-Res service class is intended for higher end video services that have the same traffic characteristics as the video service class, but have a business requirement(s) to be treated differently. One example of this is Telepresence video applications.

- Realtime-Interactive service class is intended for inelastic applications such as desktop virtualization applications and for interactive gaming.

- Multimedia Conferencing service class is for everything about or within video conferencing solutions that does not include the voice or (human) video components. Several examples are
  - the presentation data part of an IP conference (call).
  - the application sharing part of an IP conference (call).
  - the whiteboarding aspect of an IP conference (call).

Each of the above can be part of a lower end web-conferencing application or part of a higher end Telepresence video conference. Each also has the ability to reduce their transmission rate on detection of congestion. These flows can therefore be classified as rate adaptive and most often more elastic than their voice and video counterparts.

- Broadcast Video service class is to be used for inelastic traffic flows specifically with minimal buffering expected by the source or destination, which are intended for broadcast HDTV service, as well as for transport of live video (sports or concerts) and audio events.

- Multimedia Streaming service class is to be used for elastic multimedia traffic flows where buffering is expected. This is the fundamental difference between the Broadcast and multimedia streaming service classes. Multimedia streaming content is typically stored before being transmitted. It is also buffered at the receiving end before being played out. The buffering is sufficiently large to accommodate any variation in transmission rate that is encountered in the network. Multimedia entertainment over IP delivery services that are being developed
can generate both elastic and inelastic traffic flows; therefore, two service classes are defined to address this space, respectively: Multimedia Streaming and Broadcast Video.

Data Category

The data category is divided into three service classes.

- **Low-Latency Data**: for applications/services that require low delay or latency for bursty but short-lived flows.

- **High-Throughput Data**: for applications/services that require good throughput for long-lived bursty flows. High Throughput and Multimedia Streaming are close in their traffic flow characteristics with High Throughput being a bit more bursty and not as long-lived as Multimedia Streaming.

- **Low-Priority Data**: for applications or services that can tolerate short or long interruptions of packet flows. The Low-Priority Data service class can be viewed as "don’t care" to some degree.

Best-Effort Category

- **All traffic** that is not differentiated in the network falls into this category and is mapped into the Standard service class. If a packet is marked with a DSCP value that is not supported in the network, it SHOULD be forwarded using the Standard service class.

Figure 1, below, provides a grouping of the defined user/subscriber service classes into four categories, with indications of which ones use an independent flow for signaling or control; type of flow behavior (elastic, rate adaptive, or inelastic); and the last column provides end user Class of Service (CoS) rating as defined in ITU-T Recommendation G.1010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application Categories</th>
<th>Service Class</th>
<th>Signaled</th>
<th>Flow Behavior</th>
<th>G.1010 Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Application Control</td>
<td>A/V Sig</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Inelastic</td>
<td>Responsive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realtime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Inelastic</td>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Inelastic</td>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Inelastic</td>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi-Res</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Inelastic</td>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media- Multimedia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Moderately</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Here is a short explanation of the end user CoS category as defined in ITU-T Recommendation G.1010. User oriented traffic is divided into four different categories, namely, interactive, responsive, timely, and non-critical. An example of interactive traffic is between two humans and is most sensitive to delay, loss, and jitter. Another example of interactive traffic is between two servers where very low delay and loss are needed. Responsive traffic is typically between a human and a server but can also be between two servers. Responsive traffic is less affected by jitter and can tolerate longer delays than interactive traffic. Timely traffic is either between servers or servers and humans and the delay tolerance is significantly longer than responsive traffic. Non-critical traffic is normally between servers/machines where delivery may be delay for period of time.

2.3. Service Class Characteristics

This document specifies what network administrators are to expect when configuring service classes identified by their differing characteristics. Figure 2 identifies these service classes along with their characteristics, as well as the tolerance to loss, delay and jitter for each service class. Properly engineered networks to these PHBs will achieve expected results. That said, not all of the identified service classes are expected in each operator’s network.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Class Name</th>
<th>Traffic Characteristics</th>
<th>Tolerance to Loss</th>
<th>Delay</th>
<th>Jitter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network Control</td>
<td>Variable size packets, mostly inelastic short messages, but traffic can also burst (BGP)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realtime Interactive</td>
<td>Inelastic, mostly variable rate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>Fixed-size small packets, inelastic</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video</td>
<td>Fixed-size small-large packets, inelastic</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi-Res A/V</td>
<td>Fixed-size small-large packets, inelastic</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multimedia Conferencing</td>
<td>Variable size packets, constant transmit interval, rate adaptive, reacts to loss</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multimedia Streaming</td>
<td>Variable size packets, elastic with variable rate</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast</td>
<td>Constant and variable rate, inelastic, non-bursty flows</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Latency Data</td>
<td>Variable rate, bursty short-lived elastic flows</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low - Medium</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversational Signaling</td>
<td>Variable size packets, some what bursty short-lived flows</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAM</td>
<td>Variable size packets, elastic &amp; inelastic flows</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Throughput Data</td>
<td>Variable rate, bursty long-lived elastic flows</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium - High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>A bit of everything</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Priority Data</td>
<td>Non-real-time and elastic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Service Class Characteristics
Notes for Figure 2: A "Yes" in the jitter-tolerant column implies that received data is buffered at the endpoint and that a moderate level of server or network-induced variation in delay is not expected to affect the application. Applications that use TCP or SCTP as a transport are generally good examples. Routing protocols and peer-to-peer signaling also fall in this class; although loss can create problems in setting up calls, a moderate level of jitter merely makes call placement a little less predictable in duration.

Service classes indicate the required traffic forwarding treatment in order to meet user, application, and/or network expectations. Section 3 defines the service classes that MAY be used for forwarding network control traffic, and Section 4 defines the service classes that MAY be used for forwarding user oriented traffic with examples of intended application types mapped into each service class. Note that the application types are only examples and are not meant to be all-inclusive or prescriptive. Also, note that the service class naming or ordering does not imply any priority ordering. They are simply reference names that are used in this document with associated QoS behaviors that are optimized for the particular application types they support. Network administrators MAY choose to assign different service class names to the service classes that they will support. Figure 3 defines the RECOMMENDED relationship between service classes and DS codepoint assignment with application examples. It is RECOMMENDED that this relationship be preserved end to end.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Class Name</th>
<th>DSCP Name</th>
<th>DSCP Value</th>
<th>Application Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network Control</td>
<td>CS6&amp;CS7</td>
<td>11xxxx</td>
<td>Network routing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realtime</td>
<td>CS5, CS5-Admit</td>
<td>101000, 101001</td>
<td>Remote/Virtual Desktop and Interactive gaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>EF, Voice-Admit</td>
<td>101110, 101100</td>
<td>Voice bearer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi-Res A/V</td>
<td>CS4, CS4-Admit</td>
<td>100000, 100001</td>
<td>Conversational Hi-Res Audio/Video bearer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video</td>
<td>AF41,AF42,AF43</td>
<td>100010,100100,100110</td>
<td>Audio/Video conferencing bearer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multimedia</td>
<td>MC, MC-Admit</td>
<td>011101, 100101</td>
<td>Presentation Data and App Sharing/Whiteboarding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streaming</td>
<td>AF31,AF32,AF33</td>
<td>011010,011100,011110</td>
<td>Streaming video and audio on demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Class</td>
<td>DSCP</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast</td>
<td>CS3, CS3-Admit</td>
<td>011000, 011001</td>
<td>Broadcast TV, live events &amp; video surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Latency Data</td>
<td>AF21, AF22, AF23</td>
<td>010010, 010100, 010110</td>
<td>Client/server trans., Web-based ordering, IM/Pres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversational Signaling</td>
<td>A/V-Sig</td>
<td>010001</td>
<td>Conversational signaling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAM</td>
<td>CS2</td>
<td>010000</td>
<td>OAM&amp;P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Throughput Data</td>
<td>AF11, AF12, AF13</td>
<td>001010, 001100, 001110</td>
<td>Store and forward applications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Priority Data</td>
<td>CS1</td>
<td>001000</td>
<td>Any flow that has noBW assurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Effort Data</td>
<td>CS0</td>
<td>000000</td>
<td>Undifferentiated applications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. DSCP to Service Class Mapping

Notes for Figure 3:

- Default Forwarding (DF) and Class Selector 0 (CS0) (i.e., Best Effort) provide equivalent behavior and use the same DS codepoint, '000000'.

- RFC 2474 identifies any DSCP with a value of 11xxxx to be for network control. This remains true, while it removes 12 DSCPs from the overall pool of 64 available DSCP values (the 4 that are x11 from this group are within pool 2 of RFC 2474, and remain as only experimentally assignable/useable).

- All PHB names that say "-Admit" are to be used only when a capacity-admission protocol is utilized for that or each traffic flow.

Changes from table 3 of RFC 4594 are as follows:

- The old term "Signaling" was using CS5 (101000), now is exclusively for the "Conversational Signaling" service group using the DSCP name of "A/V-Sig" (010001), which is newly defined in [ID-DSCP]. This is because CS5 aggregates into the 101xxx aggregate when using layer 2 technologies such as 802.3 Ethernet, 802.11 Wireless Ethernet MPLS, etc - each of which only have 3 bits to mark with. A traffic type that can have very large packets and is not delay sensitive (within reason) is not appropriate for have a 101xxx marking. A REQUIRED behavior for this PHB is that it not be starved in any node.
"Conversational" is a new term to include all interactive audio and video. The Conversational service group consists of the audio service class, the video service class and the new Hi-Res service class.

"Audio" obsoletes the term "Telephony", which has generally not retained the "video" aspect within the IETF, where video is still commonly called out as a separate thing. Audio retains the nonadmitted traffic PHB of EF (101110), while capacity-admitted audio has been added via the RFC 5865 defined PHB Voice-Admit.

"Video" now is AF4x, with AF41 specifically for capacity-admitted video traffic, while AF42 and AF43 are nonadmitted video traffic.

"Hi-Res A/V", part of the Conversational service group, is created by [ID-DSCP] for an additional business differentiation interactive video marking for higher end traffic. It is within the 100xxx as CS4 (for nonadmitted traffic) and CS4-Admit (100001) (for capacity-admitted traffic).

"Realtime Interactive" is now using CS5 (for nonadmitted traffic), but adds a capacity-admitted DSCP CS5-Admit (101001).

"Multimedia Conferencing" is no longer using the AF4x DSCP's, rather it will use the new PHB MC (100101) (for capacity-admitted) and MC-Admit (011101) (for nonadmitted traffic).

"Multimedia Streaming" retains using AF3x, however, AF31 is now used for capacity-admitted traffic, while AF32/33 are nonadmitted.

"Broadcast" replaces "Broadcast Video" using CS3 (for nonadmitted traffic), and adds a capacity-admitted PHB CS3-Admit (011001).

It is expected that network administrators will base their choice of the service classes that they will support on their need.

Figure 4 provides a summary of DiffServ CoS mechanisms that MUST be used for the defined service classes that are further detailed in Sections 3 and 4 of this document. According to what applications/services need to be differentiated, network administrators MAY choose the service class(es) that need to be supported in their network.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Class</th>
<th>DSCP</th>
<th>Conditioning at DS Edge</th>
<th>PHB Used</th>
<th>Queuing</th>
<th>AQM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network Control</td>
<td>CS6/CS7</td>
<td>See Section 3.1</td>
<td>RFC2474</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realtime</td>
<td>CS5,</td>
<td>Police using sr+bs</td>
<td>RFC2474</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Class</td>
<td>CoS</td>
<td>Mechanism</td>
<td>RFC</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>DSCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td>CS5-Admit*</td>
<td>Police using sr+bs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[ID-DSCP]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>EF, Voice-Admit*</td>
<td>Using two-rate, three-color marker (such as RFC 2698)</td>
<td>RFC2597</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Yes per DSCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi-Res A/V</td>
<td>CS4, CS4-Admit*</td>
<td>Police using sr+bs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[ID-DSCP]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video</td>
<td>AF41*, AF42, AF43</td>
<td>Using two-rate, three-color marker (such as RFC 2698)</td>
<td>RFC2597</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Yes per DSCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multimedia</td>
<td>MC, MC-Admit*</td>
<td>Police using sr+bs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferencing</td>
<td></td>
<td>[ID-DSCP]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multimedia</td>
<td>AF31*, AF32, AF33</td>
<td>Using two-rate, three-color marker (such as RFC 2698)</td>
<td>RFC2597</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Yes per DSCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streaming</td>
<td>CS3, CS3-Admit*</td>
<td>Police using sr+bs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[ID-DSCP]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast</td>
<td>AF21, AF22, AF23</td>
<td>Using single-rate, three-color marker (such as RFC 2697)</td>
<td>RFC2597</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Yes per DSCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversational</td>
<td>AV-Sig</td>
<td>Police using sr+bs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signaling</td>
<td></td>
<td>[ID-DSCP]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAM</td>
<td>CS2</td>
<td>Police using sr+bs</td>
<td>RFC2474</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Throughput</td>
<td>AF11, AF12, AF13</td>
<td>Using two-rate, three-color marker (such as RFC 2698)</td>
<td>RFC2597</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Yes per DSCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>RFC2474</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>CS1</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>RFC3662</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Summary of CoS Mechanisms Used for Each Service Class

* denotes each DSCP identified for capacity-admission traffic only.

Notes for Figure 4:
o Conditioning at DS edge means that traffic conditioning is performed at the edge of the DiffServ network where untrusted user devices are connected to two different administrative DiffServ networks.

o "sr+bs" represents a policing mechanism that provides single rate with burst size control.

o The single-rate, three-color marker (srTCM) behavior SHOULD be equivalent to RFC 2697, and the two-rate, three-color marker (trTCM) behavior SHOULD be equivalent to RFC 2698.

o The PHB for Realtime-Interactive service class SHOULD be configured to provide high bandwidth assurance. It MAY be configured as another EF PHB (one capacity-admitted and one non-capacity-admitted, if both are to be used) that uses relaxed performance parameters and a rate scheduler.

o The PHB for Multimedia Conferencing service class SHOULD be configured to provide high bandwidth assurance. It MAY be configured as another EF PHB (one capacity-admitted and one non-capacity-admitted, if both are to be used) that uses relaxed performance parameters and a rate scheduler.

o The PHB for Broadcast service class SHOULD be configured to provide high bandwidth assurance. It MAY be configured as another EF PHB (one capacity-admitted and one non-capacity-admitted, if both are to be used) that uses relaxed performance parameters and a rate scheduler.

2.4. Service Classes vs. Treatment Aggregates (from RFC 5127)

There are misconceptions about the differences between RFC 4594 specified service classes, and RFC 5127 specified treatment aggregates. Often the two are conflated, and more often the phrase service class is used to mean both definitions. Almost all of the text previous to this section is used in defining service classes, and how one service class is different than another service class (based on traffic characteristics of the applications). Treatment aggregates are groupings of service classes with similar, but not identical, traffic characteristics to give similar treatment from a SP’s network.

Below is taken from appendix of RFC 5127 as its recommended groupings of service classes into aggregates based in RFC 4594 specified traffic characteristic expectations.

+------------------------------------------------------------+
| Treatment | Treatment | DSCP                          |
| Aggregate | Aggregate | Behavior                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------+

Polk Expires August 25, 2013 [Page 29]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CS</th>
<th>CS6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(RFC 2474)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real-Time*</td>
<td>EF (RFC 3246)</td>
<td>EF, CS5, AF41, AF42, AF43, CS4, CS3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assured Elastic</td>
<td>AF (RFC 2597)</td>
<td>AF2, AF31, AF21, AF11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AF32, AF22, AF12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AF33, AF23, AF13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elastic</td>
<td>Default (RFC 2474)</td>
<td>Default, (CS0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CS1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: RFC 5127 Defined Treatment Aggregate Behavior**

*NOTE: The RFC 5865 created VOICE-ADMIT is absence from the above figure because VOICE-ADMIT was created far later than this recommendation was. VOICE-ADMIT is appropriate for the Realtime Traffic Aggregate.

**NOTE: Figure 5 is directly from the appendix of RFC 5127 as that RFC’s recommendation for configuration. This draft does not directly affect RFC 5127. That is left for an update to RFC 5127 itself. Based on the WG’s take on this draft, RFC 5127 will necessitate an update to match this document’s new service classes and additional DSCPs. The number of treatment aggregates are not expected to change in the RFC 5127 Update draft though, with the possible exception of a new treatment aggregate for capacity admitted flows; meaning there *might* be a 5th treatment aggregate proposed.

Treatment Aggregates are designed to nicely fit into technologies that do not have many different treatment levels to use. Here are 3 examples of technologies limited to an 8-value field,

- MPLS with its 3 Traffic Class (TC) bits [RFC5462].
- IEEE LANs with its 8-value Priority Code Point (PCP) field, as part of the 802.1Q header spec [IEEE1Q].
- IEEE 802.1e, which defines QoS over Wi-Fi, also only defines 8 levels (called User Priority or UP codes) [IEEE1E].

Treatment Aggregates are dependent on service classes to exist. Therefore many service classes can exist without the need to consider the use of treatment aggregates or their 8-value technologies. For example, a Layer 3 VPN can be all that is needed.
to transit traffic flows, regardless of desired treatment, between enterprise LAN campuses. From this reality, the number of treatment aggregates has no direct bearing on the number of service classes.

2.4.1 Examples of Service Classes in Treatment Aggregates

It is *not* expected that all traffic characteristics are to be experienced across an SP’s network for any given customer. For example, if VOICE-ADMIT is added to the Realtime Treatment Aggregate in Figure 5, there are 8 different service classes within the Realtime Treatment Aggregate. It is not expected that all 8 service classes will be deployed by customer networks traversing SP networks. RFC 5127’s Treatment Aggregates are a table to configure which service class goes into which treatment aggregate. If there are 8 services classes in the Realtime treatment aggregate, there is very little difference than if there were one service within that same Realtime treatment aggregate - it would still be necessary to configure that treatment aggregate. Thus, it becomes a question of not

"how many service classes are there that go into treatment aggregates?"

but

"how many treatment aggregates have one or more services classes requiring configuration"?

Of the 4 treatment aggregates shown in Figure 5, if there are existing service classes in only 3 of the aggregates, then only 3 treatment aggregates are necessary. Of the 3 following examples, notice that examples 2 and 3 have the same number of treatment aggregates, but example 3 has more applications in their own service classes.

Examples 2 and 3 are made under the following assumptions:

- this draft’s Service Classes and DSCP assignments are utilized.
- the new AF-Sig DSCP in the Assured Elastic treatment aggregate.
- the Audio, Video service classes are in the EF treatment aggregate.
- the VOICE-ADMIT DSCP is in the EF treatment aggregate.

2.4.1.1 Example 1 - Simple Voice Configuration/SLA

For example 1, we have an SP running MPLS and has an SLA to deliver Network Control, Voice and everything else is Best Effort. The
following table would apply to this configuration/SLA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applications</th>
<th>Service Class</th>
<th>DSCP(s)</th>
<th>Treatment Aggregate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network Control</td>
<td>Network Control</td>
<td>CS6</td>
<td>Network Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>EF</td>
<td>Realtime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everything else</td>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Default (CS0)</td>
<td>Elastic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. Example 1 Configuration

Insert different treatments for this example (i.e., AQM, RED, WFQ, colors, etc from above charts)

2.4.1.2 Example 2 - Voice/Video/Surveillance Configuration/SLA

For example 1, we have an SP running MPLS and has an SLA to deliver Control, audio, video, surveillance, audio & video signaling, and everything else is BE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applications</th>
<th>Service Class</th>
<th>DSCP(s)</th>
<th>Treatment Aggregate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network Control</td>
<td>Network Control</td>
<td>CS6</td>
<td>Network Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice, video, surveillance</td>
<td>Audio, Video, Broadcast</td>
<td>EF, AF42, CS3</td>
<td>Realtime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>audio &amp; video signaling</td>
<td>Conversational Signaling</td>
<td>AV-Sig</td>
<td>Assured Elastic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everything else</td>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Default (CS0)</td>
<td>Elastic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. Example 2 Configuration

Insert different treatments for this example (i.e., AQM, RED, WFQ, colors, etc from above charts)

2.4.1.2 Example 3 - Complex CAC realtime/Surveillance/+apps Configuration/SLA

For example 1, we have an SP running MPLS and has an SLA to deliver...
Control, voice, CAC voice, CAC video, streaming, signaling, LL data, Network Mgmt., and everything else is BE (including non-CAC video because it is not authorized or authenticated on network)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applications</th>
<th>Service Class</th>
<th>DSCP(s)</th>
<th>Treatment Aggregate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network Control</td>
<td>Network Control</td>
<td>CS6</td>
<td>Network Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice, CAC-Voice, CAC-video,</td>
<td>Audio, Video, Broadcast</td>
<td>Voice-Admit EF, AF41 CS3</td>
<td>Realtime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surveillance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>audio &amp; video signaling,</td>
<td>Conversational</td>
<td>AV-Sig</td>
<td>Assured Elastic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOD (streaming), Network Mgmt.</td>
<td>Signaling, Low-Latency Data, Multimedia Streaming, OAM</td>
<td>AF21 AF31 CS2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everything else</td>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Default (CS0)</td>
<td>Elastic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8. Example 3 Configuration

Insert different treatments for this example (i.e., AQM, RED, WFQ, colors, etc from above charts)

3. Network Control Traffic

Network control traffic is defined as packet flows that are essential for stable operation of an administered network, as well as the information exchanged between neighboring networks across a peering point where SLAs are in place. Network control traffic is different from user application control (signaling) that may be generated by some applications or services. Network control traffic is mostly between routers and network nodes (e.g., routing or mgmt protocols) that are used for operating, administering, controlling, or managing whole networks, network parts or just network segments. Network Control Traffic may be split into two service classes, i.e., Network Control and OAM.

3.1. Current Practice in the Internet

Based on today’s routing protocols and network control procedures that are used in the Internet, we have determined that CS6 DSCP value SHOULD be used for routing and control and that CS7 DSCP value SHOULD be reserved for future use, specifically if needed for future
routing or control protocols. Network administrators MAY use a Local/Experimental DSCP, any value that contains 11xx11; therefore, they may use a locally defined service class within their network to further differentiate their routing and control traffic.

RECOMMENDED Network Edge Conditioning for CS7 DSCP marked packets:

- Drop or remark 111xxx packets at ingress to DiffServ network domain.

- 111xxx marked packets SHOULD NOT be sent across peering points. Exchange of control information across peering points SHOULD be done using CS6 DSCP and the Network Control service class.

- any internally defined 11xxx1 values, valid within that network domain, be remarked to CS6 upon egress at network peering points.

3.2. Network Control Service Class

The Network Control service class is used for transmitting packets between network devices (routers) that require control (routing) information to be exchanged between similar devices within the administrative domain, as well as across a peering point between adjacent administrative domains. Traffic transmitted in this service class is very important as it keeps the network operational, and it needs to be forwarded in a timely manner.

The Network Control service class SHOULD be configured using the DiffServ CS6 PHB, defined in [RFC2474]. This service class MUST be configured so that the traffic receives a minimum bandwidth guarantee, to ensure that the packets always receive timely service. The configured forwarding resources for Network Control service class MUST be such that the probability of packet drop under peak load is very low. The Network Control service class SHOULD be configured to use a Rate Queuing system such as defined in Section 1.4.1.2 of this document.

The following are examples of protocols and applications that MUST use the Network Control service class if present in a network:

- Routing packet flows: OSPF, BGP, ISIS, RIP.

- Control information exchange within and between different administrative domains across a peering point where SLAs are in place.

- LSP setup using CR-LDP and RSVP-TE.

The following protocols and applications MUST NOT use the Network Control service class:

- User oriented traffic is not allowed to use this service class.
By user oriented traffic, we mean packet flows that originate from user-controlled end points that are connected to the network.

- even if originating from a server or a device acting on behalf of a user or endpoint,
- even if it is application or in-band signaling to establish a connection wholly within a single network or across peering points of/to adjacent networks (e.g., creating a tunnel such as a VPN, or data path control signaling).

The following are traffic characteristics of packet flows in the Network Control service class:

- Mostly messages sent between routers and network servers.
- Variable size packets, normally one packet at a time, but traffic can also burst (BGP, OSPF, etc).
- IGMP, hen is used only for the normal multicast routing purpose.

The REQUIRED DSCP marking is CS6 (Class Selector 6).

RECOMMENDED Network Edge Conditioning:

- At peering points (between two DiffServ networks) where SLAs are in place, CS6 marked packets MUST be policed, e.g., using a single rate with burst size (sr+bs) token bucket policer to keep the CS6 marked packet flows to within the traffic rate specified in the SLA.

- CS6 marked packet flows from untrusted sources (for example, end user devices) MUST be dropped or remarked at ingress to the DiffServ network. What a network admin remarks this user oriented traffic to if a matter of local policy, and inspection of the packets can determine which application is used for proper marking to a more appropriate DSCP, such as from table 3. of this document.

- Packets from users/subscribers are not permitted access to the Network Control service classes.

The fundamental service offered to the Network Control service class is enhanced best-effort service with high bandwidth assurance. Since this service class is used to forward both elastic and inelastic flows, the service SHOULD be engineered so that the Active Queue Management (AQM) [RFC2309] is applied to CS6 marked packets.

If RED [RFC2309] is used as an AQM algorithm, the min-threshold specifies a target queue depth, and the max-threshold specifies the queue depth above which all traffic is dropped or ECN marked. Thus,
in this service class, the following inequality should hold in queue configurations:

- \text{min-threshold CS6} < \text{max-threshold CS6}
- \text{max-threshold CS6} \leq \text{memory assigned to the queue}

Note: Many other AQM algorithms exist and are used; they should be configured to achieve a similar result.

### 3.3. OAM Service Class

The OAM (Operations, Administration, and Management) service class is RECOMMENDED for OAM&P (Operations, Administration, and Management and Provisioning) using protocols such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP), FTP, Telnet, and Common Open Policy Service (COPS). Applications using this service class require a low packet loss but are relatively not sensitive to delay. This service class is configured to provide good packet delivery for intermittent flows.

The OAM service class SHOULD use the Class Selector (CS) PHB defined in [RFC2474]. This service class SHOULD be configured to provide a minimum bandwidth assurance for CS2 marked packets to ensure that they get forwarded. The OAM service class SHOULD be configured to use a Rate Queuing system such as defined in Section 1.4.1.2 of this document.

The following applications SHOULD use the OAM service class:

- Provisioning and configuration of network elements.
- Performance monitoring of network elements.
- Any network operational alarms.

The following are traffic characteristics:

- Variable size packets.
- Intermittent traffic flows.
- Traffic may burst at times.
- Both elastic and inelastic flows.
- Traffic not sensitive to delays.

RECOMMENDED DSCP marking:

- All flows in this service class are marked with CS2 (Class Selector 2).
Applications or IP end points SHOULD pre-mark their packets with CS2 DSCP value. If the end point is not capable of setting the DSCP value, then the router topologically closest to the end point SHOULD perform Multifield (MF) Classification, as defined in [RFC2475].

RECOMMENDED conditioning performed at DiffServ network edge:

- Packet flow marking (DSCP setting) from untrusted sources (end user devices) SHOULD be verified at ingress to DiffServ network using Multifield (MF) Classification methods, defined in [RFC2475].
- Packet flows from untrusted sources (end user devices) SHOULD be policed at ingress to DiffServ network, e.g., using single rate with burst size token bucket policer to ensure that the traffic stays within its negotiated or engineered bounds.
- Packet flows from trusted sources (routers inside administered network) MAY not require policing.
- Normally OAM&P CS2 marked packet flows are not allowed to flow across peering points. If that is the case, then CS2 marked packets SHOULD be policed (dropped) at both egress and ingress peering interfaces.

The fundamental service offered to "OAM" traffic is enhanced best-effort service with controlled rate. The service SHOULD be engineered so that CS2 marked packet flows have sufficient bandwidth in the network to provide high assurance of delivery. Since this service class is used to forward both elastic and inelastic flows, the service SHOULD be engineered so that Active Queue Management [RFC2309] is applied to CS2 marked packets.

If RED [RFC2309] is used as an AQM algorithm, the min-threshold specifies a target queue depth for each DSCP, and the max-threshold specifies the queue depth above which all traffic with such a DSCP is dropped or ECN marked. Thus, in this service class, the following inequality should hold in queue configurations:

- min-threshold CS2 < max-threshold CS2
- max-threshold CS2 <= memory assigned to the queue

Note: Many other AQM algorithms exist and are used; they should be configured to achieve a similar result.

4. User Oriented Traffic

User oriented traffic is defined as packet flows between different users or subscribers, or from servers/nodes on behalf of a user. It is the traffic that is sent to or from end-terminals and that
supports a very wide variety of applications and services, to include traffic about a user or application that assists a user communicate. User oriented traffic can be classified in many different ways. What we have articulated throughout this document is a series of non-exhaustive list of categories for classifying user oriented traffic. We differentiated user oriented traffic that is real-time versus non-real-time, elastic or rate-adaptive versus inelastic, sensitive versus insensitive to loss as well as considering whether the traffic is interactive vs. one way communication, its responsiveness, whether it requires timely delivery, and critical verses non-critical. In the final analysis, we used all of the above for service differentiation, mapping application types that seemed to have different sets of performance sensitivities, and requirements to different service classes.

Network administrators can categorize their applications according to the type of behavior that they require and MAY choose to support all or a subset of the defined service classes. At the same time, we include a public facing default DSCP value, with its associated PHB, that is expected for each traffic type to ensure common or pervasive performance. Figure 3 provides some common applications and the forwarding service classes that best support them, based on their performance requirements.

4.1. Conversational Service Class Group

The Conversational Service Class Group consists of 3 different service classes, audio, video, and Hi-Res. We are describing the media sample, or bearer, packets for applications (e.g., RTP from [RFC3550]) that require bi-directional real-time, very low delay, very low jitter, and very low packet loss for relatively constant-rate traffic sources (inelastic traffic sources). It is RECOMMENDED that RTCP feedback use the same service class and be marked with the same DSCP as the bearer traffic for that (audio and/or video) call. This ensures comparable treatment within the network between endpoints.

The signaling to set-up these bearer flows is part of the Conversational Signaling service group that will be discussed later in Section 4. The following 3 subsections will detail what is expected within each bearer service class.

4.1.1 Audio Service Class

This service class MUST be used for IP Audio service.

The fundamental service offered to traffic in the Audio service class is minimum jitter, delay, and packet loss service up to a specified upper bound. There are two PHB, both EF based, for the Audio service class:

Nonadmitted Audio traffic - MUST use the EF DSCP [RFC3246], and
is for traffic that has not had any capacity admission signaling performed for that flow or session.

Capacity-Admitted Audio traffic - MUST use the Voice-Admit DSCP [RFC5865], and is for traffic that has had any capacity admission signaling performed for that flow or session, e.g., RSVP [RFC2205] or NSIS [RFC4080].

The capacity-admitted Audio traffic operation is similar to an ATM CBR service, which has guaranteed bandwidth and which, if it stays within the negotiated rate, experiences nominal delay and no loss.

The nonadmitted Audio traffic, on the other hand, has had no such explicit guarantee, but has a favorable PHB ensuring high probability of delivery as well as nominal delay and no loss - implicitly assuming there is not too much like marked traffic between users within a flow.

There are two typical scenarios in which audio calls are established, on the public open Internet using protocols such as SIP, XMPP or H.323, or in more managed networks like enterprises or certain service providers which offer a audio service with some feature benefits and take part in the call signaling. These SPs or enterprises also use protocols like SIP, XMPP, H.323, but also use H.248/MEGACO and MGCP.

On the open Internet, typically there is no SP actively involved in the session set-up of calls, and therefore no servers providing assistance or features to help one user contact another user. Often, this traffic is marked or remarked with the DF (i.e., Best Effort) DSCP.

In more managed networks in which one or more operators have active servers aiding the audio call set-up, where DiffServ can be used and preserved to differentiate traffic, networks are offering a service, therefore need to do some, or a lot of engineering to ensure that capacity offered to one or more applications does not exceed the load to the network. Otherwise, the operator will have unhappy users, at least for that application’s usage. This is true for any application, but is especially true for inelastic applications in which the application is rigid in its delivery requirements. Audio bearer traffic is typically such an application, video is another such application, but we will get to video in the next subsection.

When a user in a managed network has been authorized to send Audio traffic (i.e., call initiation via the operator’s servers was not rejected), the call admission procedure should have verified that the newly admitted flow will be within the capacity of the Audio service class forwarding capability in the network. Capacity verification is a non-trivial thing, and can either be implicitly assumed by the call server(s) based on the operator’s network design, or it can be explicitly signaled from an in-data-path
signaling mechanism that verifies the capacity is available now for this call, for each call made within that network. In the latter case, those that do not have verifiable network capacity along the data path are rejected. An in between means method is for call servers to count calls between two or more endpoints. By topologically understanding where the caller and called party is and have configured a known maximum it will allow between the two locations. This is especially true over WAN links that have far less capacity than LAN links or core parts of a network. Network operators will need to understand the topology between any two callers to ensure the appropriate amount of bandwidth is available for an expected number of simultaneous audio calls.

Once more than one bandwidth amount can be used for audio calls, for example – by allowing more than one codec with different bandwidths per codec for such calls, network engineering becomes more difficult. Since the inelastic nature of RTP payloads from this class do not react well to loss or significant delay in any substantive way, the Audio service class MUST forward packets as soon as possible.

The Audio service class that does not have capacity admission performed in the data path MUST use the Expedited Forwarding (EF) PHB, as defined in [RFC3246], so that all packets are forwarded quickly. The Audio service class that does have capacity admission performed in the data path MUST use the Voice-Admit PHB, as defined in [RFC5865], so that all packets are forwarded quickly. The Audio service class SHOULD be configured to use a Priority Queuing system such as that defined in Section 1.4.1.1 of this document.

The following applications SHOULD use the Audio service class:

- VoIP (G.711, G.729, iLBC and other audio codecs).
- Voice-band data over IP (modem, fax).
- T.38 fax over IP.
- Circuit emulation over IP, virtual wire, etc.
- IP Virtual Private Network (VPN) service that specifies single-rate, mean network delay that is slightly longer then network propagation delay, very low jitter, and a very low packet loss.

The following are traffic characteristics:

- Mostly fixed-size packets for VoIP (30, 60, 70, 120 or 200 bytes in size).
- Packets emitted at constant time intervals.
Admission control of new flows is provided by Audio call server, media gateway, gatekeeper, edge router, end terminal, access node or in-data-path signaling that provides flow admission control function.

Applications or IP end points SHOULD pre-mark their packets with EF or Voice-Admit DSCP value, whichever is appropriate. If the end point is not capable of setting the DSCP value, then the router topologically closest to the end point SHOULD perform Multifield (MF) Classification, as defined in [RFC2475].

The RECOMMENDED DSCP marking is EF for nonadmitted audio flows, and Voice-Admit for capacity-admitted flows for the following applications:

- VoIP (G.711, G.729 and other codecs).
- Voice-band data over IP (modem and fax).
- T.38 fax over IP.
- Circuit emulation over IP, virtual wire, etc.

RECOMMENDED Network Edge Conditioning:

- Packet flow marking (DSCP setting) from untrusted sources (end user devices) SHOULD be verified at ingress to DiffServ network using Multifield (MF) Classification methods, defined in [RFC2475]. If untrusted, the network edge SHOULD know if capacity-admission has been applied, since the edge router will have taken part in the admission signaling; therefore will know whether EF or Voice-Admit is the proper marking for that flow.

- Packet flows from untrusted sources (end user devices) SHOULD be policed at ingress to DiffServ network, e.g., using single rate with burst size token bucket policer to ensure that the Audio traffic stays within its negotiated bounds.

- Policing is OPTIONAL for packet flows from trusted sources whose behavior is ensured via other means (e.g., administrative controls on those systems).

- Policing of Audio packet flows across peering points where SLA is in place is OPTIONAL as Audio traffic will be controlled by admission control mechanism between peering points.

The fundamental service offered to "Audio" traffic is enhanced best-effort service with controlled rate, very low delay, and very low loss. The service MUST be engineered so that EF marked packet flows have sufficient bandwidth in the network to provide guaranteed delivery. Otherwise, the service will have in place an explicit capacity-admission signaling protocol such as RSVP or NSIS and thus...
mark the packets within the flow as Voice-Admit. Normally traffic in
this service class does not respond dynamically to packet loss. As
such, Active Queue Management [RFC2309] SHOULD NOT be applied to EF
marked packet flows.

4.1.2 Video Service Class

The Video service class is for bidirectional applications that
require real-time service for both constant and rate-adaptive
traffic. SIP and H.323/V2 (and later) versions of video
conferencing equipment with constant and dynamic bandwidth
adjustment are such applications. The traffic sources in this
service class either have a fixed bandwidth requirement (e.g.,
MPEG2, etc.), or have the ability to dynamically change their
transmission rate (e.g., MPEG4/H.264, etc.) based on feedback from
the receiver. This feedback SHOULD be accomplished using RTCP
[RFC3550]. One approach for this downspeeding has the receiver
detect packet loss, thus signaling in an RTCP message to the source
the indication of lost (or delayed or out of order) packets in
transit. When necessary the source then selects a lower rate
encoding codec. When available, the source merely sends less data,
resulting in lower resolution of the same visual display.

The Video service class is not for video downloads, webcasts, or
single directional video or audio/video traffic of any kind. It is
for human-to-human visual interaction between two users, or more if
an MTP is used.

Typical video conferencing configurations negotiate the setup of
audio/video session using protocols such as SIP and H.323. Just as
with networks that have audio traversing them, video typically
traverses the same two types of networks: the open big "I" Internet,
in which most every type of traffic is best effort (DF), or on a
more managed network such as an enterprise or SP’s managed network
in which servers within either network take part in the call
signaling, thereby offering the video service.

When a user in a managed network has been authorized to send video
traffic (i.e., call initiation via the operator’s servers was not
rejected), the call admission procedure should have verified that
the newly admitted flow will be within the capacity of the video
service class forwarding capability in the network. Capacity
verification is a non-trivial thing, and can either be implicitly
assumed by the call server(s) based on the operator’s network
design, or it can be explicitly signaled from an in-data-path
signaling mechanism that verifies the capacity is available now for
this call, for each call made within that network. In the latter
case, those that do not have verifiable network capacity along the
data path are rejected. An in between means method is for call
servers to count calls between two or more endpoints. By
topologically understanding where the caller and called party is and
have configured a known maximum it will allow between the two locations. Video is larger in bandwidth than audio, and the difference can be significant. For example, for a single G.711 audio call that is 80kbps, an associated video bandwidth for the same call can easily be 4Mbps. This is especially true over WAN links that have far less capacity than LAN links or core parts of a network. Network operators will need to understand the topology between any two callers to ensure the appropriate amount of bandwidth is available for an expected number of simultaneous video and/or audio/video calls.

Note that it is OPTIONALLY the case in these networks that the accompanying audio for the video call will be marked as the video is marked (i.e., using the same DSCP), but not always. One reason this has been done is for lip-sync.

The Video service class MUST use the Assured Forwarding (AF) PHB, defined in [RFC2597]. This service class MUST be configured to provide a bandwidth assurance for AF41, AF42, and AF43 marked packets to ensure that they get forwarded. The Video service class SHOULD be configured to use a Rate Queuing system for AF42 and AF43 traffic flows, such as that defined in Section 1.4.1.2 of this document. However, AF41 MUST be designated as the DSCP for use when capacity-admission signaling has been used, such as RSVP or NSIS, to guarantee delivery through the network. AF42 and AF43 will be used for non-admitted video calls, as well as overflows from AF41 sources that send more packets than they have negotiated bandwidth for that call.

The following applications MUST use the Video service class:

- SIP and H.323/V2 (and later) versions of video conferencing applications (interactive video).
- Video conferencing applications with rate control or traffic content importance marking.
- Interactive, time-critical, and mission-critical applications.

  NOTE with regards to the above bullet: this usage SHOULD be minimized, else the video traffic will suffer - unless this is engineered into the topology.

The following are traffic characteristics:

- Variable size packets (i.e., small to large in size).
- The higher the resolution or change rate between each image, the higher the duration of large packets.
- Usually constant inter-packet time interval.
Applications or IP end points SHOULD pre-mark their packets with DSCP values as shown below. If the end point is not capable of setting the DSCP value, then the router topologically closest to the end point SHOULD perform Multifield (MF) Classification, as defined in [RFC2475] and mark all packets as AF4x. Note: In this case, the two-rate, three-color marker will be configured to operate in Color-Blind mode.

Mandatory DSCP marking when performed by router closest to source:

- AF41 = up to specified rate "A", which is dedicated to non-Hi-Res capacity-admitted video traffic.
  
  Note the audio of an A/V call can be marked AF41 as well.

- AF42 = all non-Hi-Res video traffic marked AF41 in excess of specified rate "A", or new non-admitted video traffic but below specified rate "B".

- AF43 = in excess of specified rate "B".

Where "A" < "B".

Note: One might expect "A" to approximate the peak rates of sum of all admitted video flows, plus the sum of the mean rates and "B" to approximate the sum of the peak rates of those same two flows.

Mandatory DSCP marking when performed by SIP or H.323/V2 videoconferencing equipment:

- AF41 = SIP or H.323 video conferencing audio stream RTP.

- AF41 = SIP or H.323 video conferencing video control RTCP.

- AF41 = SIP or H.323 video conferencing video stream up to specified rate "A".

- AF42 = SIP or H.323 video conferencing video stream in excess of specified rate "A" but below specified rate "B".

- AF42 = SIP or H.323 video conferencing video control RTCP, for those video streams that were generated using AF42.

- AF43 = SIP or H.323 video conferencing video stream in excess of specified rate "B".
AF43 = SIP or H.323 video conferencing video control RTCP, for those video streams that were generated using AF43.

Where "A" < "B".

Mandatory conditioning performed at DiffServ network edge:

1. The two-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to provide the behavior as defined in trTCM [RFC2698].

2. If packets are marked by trusted sources or a previously trusted DiffServ domain and the color marking is to be preserved, then the two-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to operate in Color-Aware mode.

3. If the packet marking is not trusted or the color marking is not to be preserved, then the two-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to operate in Color-Blind mode.

The fundamental service offered to nonadmitted "Video" traffic is enhanced best-effort service with controlled rate and delay. The fundamental service offered to capacity-admitted "Video" traffic is a guaranteed service using in-data-path signaling to ensure expected delivery in a timely manner. For a non-admitted video conferencing service, if a 1% packet loss detected at the receiver triggers an encoding rate change, thus dropping to the next lower provisioned video encoding rate then Active Queue Management [RFC2309] SHOULD be used primarily to switch the video encoding rate under congestion, changing from high rate to lower rate, i.e., 1472 kbps to 768 kbps. This rule applies to all AF42 and 43 flows. The probability of loss of AF41 traffic MUST NOT exceed the probability of loss of AF42 traffic, which in turn MUST NOT exceed the probability of loss of AF43 traffic.

Capacity-admitted video service should not result in packet loss. However, administratively this MAY be allowed to cause a purposeful downspeeding event (i.e., a change in resolution or a change in codec) to occur due to congestion.

If RED [RFC2309] is used as an AQM algorithm, the min-threshold specifies a target queue depth for each DSCP, and the max-threshold specifies the queue depth above which all traffic with such a DSCP is dropped or ECN marked. Thus, in this service class, the following inequality should hold in queue configurations:

1. min-threshold AF43 < max-threshold AF43
2. max-threshold AF43 <= min-threshold AF42
3. min-threshold AF42 < max-threshold AF42
4. max-threshold AF42 <= min-threshold AF41
Note: This configuration tends to drop AF43 traffic before AF42 and AF42 before AF41. Many other AQM algorithms exist and are used; they should be configured to achieve a similar result.

### 4.1.3 Hi-Res Service Class

The Hi-Res service class is for higher end (i.e., deemed ‘more important’) bidirectional applications that require real-time service for both constant and rate-adaptive traffic. There are two PHBs, both EF based, for the Hi-Res video conferencing service class:

- **Nonadmitted Hi-Res traffic** - MUST use the CS4 DSCP [RFC2474], and is for traffic that has not had any capacity admission signaling performed for that flow or session.

- **Capacity-Admitted Hi-Res traffic** - MUST use the CS4-Admit DSCP [ID-DSCP], and is for traffic that has had any capacity admission signaling performed for that flow or session, e.g., RSVP [RFC2205] or NSIS [RFC4080].

The capacity-admitted Hi-Res video conferencing traffic operation is similar to an ATM CBR service, which has guaranteed bandwidth and which, if it stays within the negotiated rate, experiences nominal delay and no loss.

SIP and H.323/V2 (and later) versions of video conferencing equipment with constant and dynamic bandwidth adjustment are such applications. The traffic sources in this service class either have a fixed bandwidth requirement (e.g., MPEG2), or have the ability to dynamically change their transmission rate (e.g., MPEG4/H.264) based on feedback from the receiver. This feedback SHOULD be accomplished using RTCP [RFC3550]. One approach for this downspeeding has the receiver detect packet loss, thus signaling in an RTCP message to the source the indication of lost (or delayed or out of order) packets in transit. When necessary the source then selects a lower rate encoding codec. When available, the source merely sends less data, resulting in lower resolution of the same visual display.

The Hi-Res service class, as with the Video service class, is not for video downloads, webcasts, or single directional video or audio/video traffic of any kind. It is for human-to-human visual interaction between two users, or more if an video conference bridge is used.

Typical Hi-Res video conferencing configurations negotiate the setup
of audio/video session using protocols such as SIP and H.323. Hi-Res video conferencing is generally not over the big "I" Internet, rather nearly exclusively over more managed networks such as an enterprise or special purpose SP’s managed network in which servers within either network take part in the call signaling, thereby offering the video service. In addition, typically this type of audio/video service has high business expectations for minimized packet loss, pixilation or other issues with the audio/video experience. In the recent past, entire T3s have been dedicated to a signal Hi-Res call; sometimes one T3 per site of a multi-site video conference.

Hi-Res video conferencing often has larger in bandwidth than the typical video call. The audio portion can be increased as well, as stereo capabilities are often necessary to provide an in-room experience from a distance. The difference can be significant (or another step up from just a typical video service). For example, for a single G.711 audio call that is 80kbps, a Hi-Res conference usually runs G.722 wideband audio at 256kbps. Typical video delivery is up to 4Mbps, whereas a Hi-Res conference can have three 1080p/30fps widescreen displays requiring at least 12Mbps, with a burst capability of much more.

If there were no congestion on the wire, the expected treatment between a video service and a Hi-Res conference would be the same. However, it is typically the case that the Hi-Res conferencing flows have more rigid requirements for quality and business-wise, need to be experience far less errors than the regular video service on the same network.

Note that it is likely the case in these networks that the accompanying audio to the Hi-Res video call will be marked as the Hi-Res video is marked (i.e., using the same DSCP.

The Hi-Res service class MUST use the Class Selector 5 (CS4) PHB, defined in [RFC2474], for non-capacity-admitted conferences. While the capacity-admitted Hi-Res conferences MUST use the CS4-Admit PHB, defined in [ID-DSCP]. This service class MUST be configured to provide a bandwidth assurance for CS4 and CS4-Admit marked packets to ensure that they get forwarded. The Hi-Res service class SHOULD be configured to use a Priority Queuing system such as that defined in Section 1.4.1.1 of this document. Further, CS4-Admit will be designated as the DSCP for use when capacity-admission signaling has been used, such as RSVP or NSIS, to guarantee delivery through the network. CS4 will be used for non-admitted Hi-Res conferences, as well as overflows from CS4-Admit sources that send more packets than they have negotiated bandwidth for that call.

The following applications MUST use the Hi-Res service class:

- SIP and H.323/V2 (and later) versions of Hi-Res video conferencing applications (interactive Hi-Res video).
Video conferencing applications with rate control or traffic content importance marking.

The following are traffic characteristics:

- Variable size packets.
- The higher the resolution or change rate between each image, the higher the duration of large packets.
- Usually constant inter-packet time interval.
- Can be Variable rate in transmission.
- Source is capable of reducing its transmission rate based on being told receiver is detecting packet loss.

Applications or IP end points SHOULD pre-mark their packets with DSCP values as shown below. If the end point is not capable of setting the DSCP value, then the router topologically closest to the end point SHOULD perform Multifield (MF) Classification, as defined in [RFC2475] and mark all packets as AF4x.

Mandatory DSCP marking when performed by router closest to source:

- CS4-Admit = up to specified rate "A", which is dedicated to capacity-admitted Hi-Res traffic.
  
  Note the audio of an A/V call can be marked CS4-Admit as well.

- CS4 = all video traffic marked CS4-Admit in excess of specified rate "A", or new non-admitted video traffic but below specified rate "B".
  
  Where "A" < "B".

Note: One might expect "A" to approximate the peak rates of sum of all admitted video flows, plus the sum of the mean rates and "B" to approximate the sum of the peak rates of those same two flows.

Mandatory DSCP marking when performed by SIP or H.323/V2 videoconferencing equipment:

- CS4-Admit = SIP or H.323 video conferencing audio stream RTP/UDP.
- CS4-Admit = SIP or H.323 video conferencing video control RTCP/TCP.
- CS4-Admit = SIP or H.323 video conferencing video stream up to specified rate "A".
o CS4 = SIP or H.323 video conferencing video stream in excess of
   specified rate "A" but below specified rate "B".

o Where "A" < "B".

Mandatory conditioning performed at DiffServ network edge:

o The two-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to provide
   the behavior as defined in trTCM [RFC2698].

o If packets are marked by trusted sources or a previously trusted
   DiffServ domain and the color marking is to be preserved, then
   the two-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to operate
   in Color-Aware mode.

o If the packet marking is not trusted or the color marking is not
   to be preserved, then the two-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be
   configured to operate in Color-Blind mode.

The fundamental service offered to nonadmitted "Hi-Res" traffic is
enhanced best-effort service with controlled rate and delay. The
fundamental service offered to capacity-admitted "Hi-Res" traffic is
a guaranteed service using in-data-path signaling to ensure expected
or timely delivery. Capacity-admitted video service SHOULD NOT
result in packet loss. However, administratively this MAY be allowed
to cause a purposeful downspeeding event (i.e., a change in
resolution or a change in codec) to occur.

4.2. Realtime-Interactive Service Class

The Realtime-Interactive service class is for bidirectional
applications that require low loss and jitter and very low delay for
constant or variable rate inelastic traffic sources. Interactive
gaming applications that do not have the ability to change encoding
rates or to mark packets with different importance indications is
one good example of such an application. Another set of
applications is virtualized desktop applications in which a remote
user has a keyboard, mouse and display monitor, but the desktop is
virtualized with the memory/processor/applications back in a common
data center, requiring near instantaneous feedback on the user’s
monitor of any changes caused by the application or an action by the
user. Rich media protocols for voice and video MUST NOT use the
Realtime-Interactive service class, but rather the appropriate
service class from the Conversational service group discussed early
in Section 4.1.

The Realtime-Interactive service class will use two PHBs:

Nonadmitted Realtime-Interactive traffic - MUST use the CS5 DSCP
[RFC2474], and is for traffic that has not had any capacity
admission signaling performed for that flow or session.

Capacity-Admitted Realtime-Interactive traffic - MUST use the CS5-Admit DSCP [ID-DSCP], and is for traffic that has had any capacity admission signaling performed for that flow or session, e.g., RSVP [RFC2205] or NSIS [RFC4080].

The capacity-admitted Realtime-Interactive traffic operation is similar to an ATM CBR service, which has guaranteed bandwidth and which, if it stays within the negotiated rate, experiences nominal delay and no loss.

Either of the above service classes can be configured as EF based by using a relaxed performance parameter and a rate scheduler.

When a user/endpoint has been authorized to start a new session (i.e., joins a networked game or logs onto a virtualized workstation), the admission procedure should have verified that the newly admitted data rates will be within the engineered capacity of the Realtime-Interactive service class. The bandwidth in the core network and the number of simultaneous Realtime-Interactive sessions that can be supported SHOULD be engineered to control traffic load for this service.

This service class SHOULD be configured to provide a high assurance for bandwidth for CS5 PHB, defined in [RFC2474], or CS5-Admit [ID-DSCP] for guaranteed service through a capacity-admission signaling protocol. The Realtime-Interactive service class SHOULD be configured to use a Rate Queuing system such as that defined in Section 1.4.1.2 of this document. Note that either Realtime-Interactive PHB MAY be configured as another EF PHB, specifically CS5-Admit, that uses a relaxed performance parameter and a rate scheduler, in the priority queue as defined in Section 1.4.1.1 of this document.

The following applications MUST use the Realtime-Interactive service class:

- Interactive gaming and control.
- Remote Desktop applications
- Virtualized Desktop applications.
- Application server-to-application server non-bursty data transfer requiring very low delay.
- Inelastic, interactive, time-critical, and mission-critical applications requiring very low delay.

The following are traffic characteristics:
Variable size packets.

Variable rate, though sometimes bursty, which will require engineering of the network to accommodate.

Application is sensitive to delay variation between flows and sessions.

Lost packets, if any, are usually ignored by application.

**RECOMMENDED DSCP marking:**

- All non-admitted flows in this service class are marked with CS5 (Class Selector 5).
- All capacity-admitted flows in this service class are marked with CS5-Admit.

Applications or IP end points SHOULD pre-mark their packets with CS5 or CS5-Admit DSCP value, depending on whether a capacity-admission signaling protocol is used for a flow. If the end point is not capable of setting the DSCP value, then the router topologically closest to the end point SHOULD perform Multifield (MF) Classification, as defined in [RFC2475].

**RECOMMENDED conditioning performed at DiffServ network edge:**

- Packet flow marking (DSCP setting) from untrusted sources (end user devices) SHOULD be verified at ingress to DiffServ network using Multifield (MF) Classification methods defined in [RFC2475].

- Packet flows from untrusted sources (end user devices) SHOULD be policed at ingress to DiffServ network, e.g., using single rate with burst size token bucket policer to ensure that the traffic stays within its negotiated or engineered bounds.

- Packet flows from trusted sources (application servers inside administered network) MAY not require policing.

- Policing of packet flows across peering points MUST adhere to the Service Level Agreement (SLA).

The fundamental service offered to nonadmitted "Realtime-Interactive" traffic is enhanced best-effort service with controlled rate and delay. The fundamental service offered to capacity-admitted "Realtime-Interactive" traffic is a guaranteed service using in-data-path signaling to ensure expected or timely delivery. Capacity-admitted Realtime-Interactive service SHOULD NOT result in packet loss. The service SHOULD be engineered so that CS5 marked packet flows have sufficient bandwidth in the network to provide high assurance of delivery. Normally, traffic in this...
service class does not respond dynamically to packet loss. As such, Active Queue Management [RFC2309] SHOULD NOT be applied to CS5 marked packet flows.

4.3. Multimedia Conferencing Service Class

The Multimedia Conferencing service class is for applications that have a low to medium tolerance to delay, and are rate adaptive to lost packets in transit from sources. Presentation Data applications that are operational in conjunction with an audio/video conference is one good example of such an application. Another set of applications is application sharing or whiteboarding applications, also in conjunction to an A/V conference. In either case, the audio & video part of the flow MUST NOT use the Multimedia Conferencing service class, rather the more appropriate service class within the Conversational service group discussed earlier in Section 4.1.

The Multimedia Conferencing service class will use two PHBs:

Nonadmitted Multimedia Conferencing traffic - MUST use the (new) MC DSCP [ID-DSCP], and is for traffic that has not had any capacity admission signaling performed for that flow or session.

Capacity-Admitted Multimedia Conferencing traffic - MUST use the (new) MC-Admit DSCP [ID-DSCP], and is for traffic that has had any capacity admission signaling performed for that flow or session, e.g., RSVP [RFC2205] or NSIS [RFC4080].

The capacity-admitted Multimedia Conferencing traffic operation is similar to an ATM CBR service, which has guaranteed bandwidth and which, if it stays within the negotiated rate, experiences nominal delay and no loss.

When a user/endpoint initiates a presentation data, application sharing or whiteboarding session, it will typically be part of an audio or audio/video conference such as web-conferencing or an existing Telepresence call. The authorization procedure SHOULD be controlled through the coordinated effort to bind the A/V call with the correct Multimedia Conferencing packet flow through some use of identifiers not in scope of this document. The managed network this flow traverse and the number of simultaneous Multimedia Conferencing sessions that can be supported SHOULD be engineered to control traffic load for this service.

The non-capacity admitted Multimedia Conferencing service class SHOULD use the new MC PHB, defined in [ID-DSCP]. This service class SHOULD be configured to provide a high assurance for bandwidth for CS5 marked packets to ensure that they get forwarded. The Multimedia Conferencing service class SHOULD be configured to use a
Rate Queuing system such as that defined in Section 1.4.1.2 of this document. Note that this service class MAY be configured as another EF PHB that uses a relaxed performance parameter, a rate scheduler, and MC-Admit DSCP value, which MUST use the priority queue as defined in Section 1.4.1.1 of this document.

The following applications MUST use the Multimedia Conferencing service class:

- Presentation Data applications, which can utilize vector graphics, raster graphics or video delivery.
- Virtualized Desktop applications.
- Application server-to-application server non-bursty data transfer requiring very low delay.

The following are traffic characteristics:

- Variable size packets.
- Variable rate, though sometimes bursty, which will require engineering of the network to accommodate.
- Application is sensitive to delay variation between flows and sessions.
- Lost packets, if any, can be ignored by the application.

RECOMMENDED DSCP marking:

- All non-admitted flows in this service class are marked with the new MC DSCP.
- All capacity-admitted flows in this service class are marked with MC-Admit.

Applications or IP end points SHOULD pre-mark their packets with the MC DSCP value. If the end point is not capable of setting the DSCP value, then the router topologically closest to the end point SHOULD perform Multifield (MF) Classification, as defined in [RFC2475].

RECOMMENDED conditioning performed at DiffServ network edge:

- Packet flow marking (DSCP setting) from untrusted sources (end user devices) SHOULD be verified at ingress to DiffServ network using Multifield (MF) Classification methods defined in [RFC2475].
- Packet flows from untrusted sources (end user devices) SHOULD be policed at ingress to DiffServ network, e.g., using single rate with burst size token bucket policer to ensure that the traffic
The fundamental service offered to nonadmitted "Multimedia Conferencing" traffic is enhanced best-effort service with controlled rate and delay. The fundamental service offered to capacity-admitted "Multimedia Conferencing" traffic is a guaranteed service using in-data-path signaling to ensure expected or timely delivery. Capacity-admitted Multimedia Conferencing service SHOULD NOT result in packet loss. The service SHOULD be engineered so that Multimedia Conferencing marked packet flows have sufficient bandwidth in the network to provide high assurance of delivery. Normally, traffic in this service class does not respond dynamically to packet loss. As such, Active Queue Management [RFC2309] SHOULD NOT be applied to MC or MC-Admit marked packet flows.

4.4. Multimedia Streaming Service Class

The Multimedia Streaming service class is RECOMMENDED for applications that require near-real-time packet forwarding of variable rate elastic traffic sources that are not as delay sensitive as applications using the Broadcast service class. Such applications include streaming audio and video, some video (movies) on-demand applications, and non-interactive webcasts. In general, the Multimedia Streaming service class assumes that the traffic is buffered at the source/destination; therefore, it is less sensitive to delay and jitter.

The Multimedia Streaming service class MUST use the Assured Forwarding (AF3x) PHB, defined in [RFC2597]. This service class MUST be configured to provide a minimum bandwidth assurance for AF31, AF32, and AF33 marked packets to ensure that they get forwarded. The Multimedia Streaming service class SHOULD be configured to use Rate Queuing system for AF32 and AF33 traffic flows, such as that defined in Section 1.4.1.2 of this document. However, AF31 MUST be designated as the DSCP for use when capacity-admission signaling has been used, such as RSVP or NSIS, to guarantee delivery through the network. AF32 and AF33 will be used for non-admitted streaming flows, as well as overflows from AF31 sources that send more packets than they have negotiated bandwidth for that call.

The following applications SHOULD use the Multimedia Streaming service class:

- Buffered streaming audio (unicast).
o Buffered streaming video (unicast).

o Non-interactive Webcasts.

o IP VPN service that specifies two rates and is less sensitive to delay and jitter.

The following are traffic characteristics:

o Variable size packets.

o The higher the rate, the higher the density of large packets.

o Variable rate.

o Elastic flows.

o Some bursting at start of flow from some applications, as well as an expected stepping up and down on the rate of the flow based on changes in resolution due to network conditions.

Applications or IP end points SHOULD pre-mark their packets with DSCP values as shown below. If the end point is not capable of setting the DSCP value, then the router topologically closest to the end point SHOULD perform Multifield (MF) Classification, as defined in [RFC2475], and mark all packets as AF3x. Note: In this case, the two-rate, three-color marker will be configured to operate in Color-Blind mode.

RECOMMENDED DSCP marking:

o AF31 = up to specified rate "A".

o AF32 = all traffic marked AF31 in excess of specified rate "A", or new AF32 traffic but below specified rate "B".

o AF33 = in excess of specified rate "B".

o Where "A" < "B".

Note: One might expect "A" to approximate the peak rates of sum of all streaming flows, plus the sum of the mean rates and "B" to approximate the sum of the peak rates of those same two flows.

RECOMMENDED conditioning performed at DiffServ network edge:

o The two-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to provide the behavior as defined in trTCM [RFC2698].

o If packets are marked by trusted sources or a previously trusted DiffServ domain and the color marking is to be preserved, then
the two-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to operate in Color-Aware mode.

- If the packet marking is not trusted or the color marking is not to be preserved, then the two-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to operate in Color-Blind mode.

The fundamental service offered to nonadmitted "Multimedia Streaming" traffic is enhanced best-effort service with controlled rate and delay. The fundamental service offered to capacity-admitted "Multimedia Streaming" traffic is a guaranteed service using in-data-path signaling to ensure expected delivery in a reasonable manner. The service SHOULD be engineered so that AF31 marked packet flows have sufficient bandwidth in the network to provide high assurance of delivery. Since the AF3k traffic is elastic and responds dynamically to packet loss, Active Queue Management [RFC2309] SHOULD be used primarily to reduce forwarding rate to the minimum assured rate at congestion points, unless AF31 has had a capacity-admission signaling protocol applied to the flow, such as RSVP or NSIS.

If a capacity-admission signaling protocol applied to the AF31 flow, which SHOULD be the case always, the AF31 PHB MAY be configured as another EF PHB that uses a relaxed performance parameter and a rate scheduler, in the priority queue as defined in Section 1.4.1.1 of this document.

The probability of loss of AF31 traffic MUST NOT exceed the probability of loss of AF32 traffic, which in turn MUST NOT exceed the probability of loss of AF33.

If RED [RFC2309] is used as an AQM algorithm, the min-threshold specifies a target queue depth for each DSCP, and the max-threshold specifies the queue depth above which all traffic with such a DSCP is dropped or ECN marked. Thus, in this service class, the following inequality MUST hold in queue configurations:

- min-threshold AF33 < max-threshold AF33
- max-threshold AF33 <= min-threshold AF32
- min-threshold AF32 < max-threshold AF32
- max-threshold AF32 <= min-threshold AF31
- min-threshold AF31 < max-threshold AF31
- max-threshold AF31 <= memory assigned to the queue

Note#1: this confirmation MUST be modified if AF31 has a capacity-admission signaling protocol applied to those flows, and the above will only apply to AF32 and AF33, while
AF31 (theoretically) has no packet loss.

Note 2: This configuration tends to drop AF33 traffic before AF32 and AF32 before AF31. Note: Many other AQM algorithms exist and are used; they SHOULD be configured to achieve a similar result.

4.5. Broadcast Service Class

The Broadcast service class is RECOMMENDED for applications that require near-real-time packet forwarding with very low packet loss of constant rate and variable rate inelastic traffic sources that are more delay sensitive than applications using the Multimedia Streaming service class. Such applications include broadcast TV, streaming of live audio and video events, some video-on-demand applications, and video surveillance. In general, the Broadcast service class assumes that the destination end point has a dejitter buffer, for video application usually a 2 - 8 video-frame buffer (66 to several hundred of milliseconds), thus expecting far less buffering before play-out than Multimedia Streaming, which can buffer in the seconds to minutes (to hours).

The Broadcast service class will use two PHBs:

- Nonadmitted Broadcast traffic - MUST use the CS3 DSCP [RFC2474], and is for traffic that has not had any capacity admission signaling performed for that flow or session.

- Capacity-Admitted Broadcast traffic - MUST use the CS3-Admit DSCP [ID-DSCP], and is for traffic that has had any capacity admission signaling performed for that flow or session, e.g., RSVP [RFC2205] or NSIS [RFC4080].

The capacity-admitted Broadcast traffic operation is similar to an ATM CBR service, which has guaranteed bandwidth and which, if it stays within the negotiated rate, experiences nominal delay and no loss.

Either of the above service classes can be configured as EF based by using a relaxed performance parameter and a rate scheduler.

When a user/endpoint initiates a new Broadcast session (i.e., starts an Internet radio application, starts a live Internet A/V event or a camera comes online to do video-surveillance), the admission procedure should be verified within the application that triggers the flow. The newly admitted data rates will SHOULD be within the engineered capacity of the Broadcast service class within that network. The bandwidth in the core network and the number of simultaneous Broadcast sessions that can be supported SHOULD be engineered to control traffic load for this service.
This service class SHOULD be configured to provide high assurance for bandwidth for CS3 marked packets to ensure that they get forwarded. The Broadcast service class SHOULD be configured to use Rate Queueing system such as that defined in Section 1.4.1.2 of this document. Note that either Broadcast PHB MAY be configured as another EF PHB, specifically CS3-Admit, that uses a relaxed performance parameter and a rate scheduler, in the priority queue as defined in Section 1.4.1.1 of this document.

The following applications SHOULD use the Broadcast service class:

- Video surveillance and security (unicast).
- TV broadcast including HDTV (likely multicast, but can be unicast).
- Video on demand (unicast) with control (virtual DVD).
- Streaming of live audio events (both unicast and multicast).
- Streaming of live video events (both unicast and multicast).

The following are traffic characteristics:

- Variable size packets.
- The higher the rate, the higher the density of large packets.
- Mixture of variable rate and constant rate flows.
- Fixed packet emission time intervals.
- Inelastic flows.

RECOMMENDED DSCP marking:

- All non-admitted flows in this service class are marked with CS3 (Class Selector 3).
- All capacity-admitted flows in this service class are marked with CS3-Admit.
- In some cases, such as those for security and video surveillance applications, it is NOT RECOMMENDED, but allowed to use a different DSCP marking.

If so, then locally user definable (EXP/LU) codepoints in the range ‘01lx1’ MAY be used to provide unique traffic identification. The locally administrator definable (EXP/LU, from pool 2 of RFC 2474) codepoint(s) MAY be associated with the PHB that is used for CS3 or CS3-Admit traffic. Furthermore, depending on the network scenario, additional network edge
conditioning policy MAY be needed for the EXP/LU codepoint(s) used.

Applications or IP end points SHOULD pre-mark their packets with CS3 or CS3-Admit DSCP value. If the end point is not capable of setting the DSCP value, then the router topologically closest to the end point SHOULD perform Multifield (MF) Classification, as defined in [RFC2475].

RECOMMENDED conditioning performed at DiffServ network edge:

- Packet flow marking (DSCP setting) from untrusted sources (end user devices) SHOULD be verified at ingress to DiffServ network using Multifield (MF) Classification methods defined in [RFC2475].

- Packet flows from untrusted sources (end user devices) SHOULD be policed at ingress to DiffServ network, e.g., using single rate with burst size token bucket policer to ensure that the traffic stays within its negotiated or engineered bounds.

- Packet flows from trusted sources (application servers inside administered network) MAY not require policing.

- Policing of packet flows across peering points MUST be performed to the Service Level Agreement (SLA) of those peering entities.

The fundamental service offered to "Broadcast" traffic is enhanced best-effort service with controlled rate and delay. The fundamental service offered to capacity-admitted "Broadcast" traffic is a guaranteed service using in-data-path signaling to ensure expected or timely delivery. Capacity-admitted Broadcast service SHOULD NOT result in packet loss. The service SHOULD be engineered so that CS3 and CS3-Admit marked packet flows have sufficient bandwidth in the network to provide high assurance of delivery. Normally, traffic in this service class does not respond dynamically to packet loss. As such, Active Queue Management [RFC2309] SHOULD NOT be applied to CS3 marked packet flows.

4.6. Low-Latency Data Service Class

The Low-Latency Data service class is RECOMMENDED for elastic and responsive typically client-/server-based applications. Applications forwarded by this service class are those that require a relatively fast response and typically have asymmetrical bandwidth need, i.e., the client typically sends a short message to the server and the server responds with a much larger data flow back to the client. The most common example of this is when a user clicks a hyperlink (~ few dozen bytes) on a web page, resulting in a new web page to be loaded (Kbytes or MBs of data). This service class is configured to provide good response for TCP [RFC1633] short-lived flows that require real-time packet forwarding of variable rate
traffic sources.

The Low-Latency Data service class SHOULD use the Assured Forwarding (AF) PHB, defined in [RFC2597]. This service class SHOULD be configured to provide a minimum bandwidth assurance for AF21, AF22, and AF23 marked packets to ensure that they get forwarded. The Low-Latency Data service class SHOULD be configured to use a Rate Queuing system such as that defined in Section 1.4.1.2 of this document.

The following applications SHOULD use the Low-Latency Data service class:

- Client/server applications.
- Systems Network Architecture (SNA) terminal to host transactions (SNA over IP using Data Link Switching (DLSw)).
- Web-based transactions (E-commerce).
- Credit card transactions.
- Financial wire transfers.
- Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) applications (e.g., SAP/Baan).
- VPN service that supports Committed Information Rate (CIR) with up to two burst sizes.
- Instant Messaging and Presence protocols (e.g., SIP, XMPP).

The following are traffic characteristics:

- Variable size packets.
- Variable packet emission rate.
- With packet bursts of TCP window size.
- Short traffic bursts.
- Source capable of reducing its transmission rate based on detection of packet loss at the receiver or through explicit congestion notification.

Applications or IP end points SHOULD pre-mark their packets with DSCP values as shown below. If the end point is not capable of setting the DSCP value, then the router topologically closest to the end point SHOULD perform Multifield (MF) Classification, as defined in [RFC2475] and mark all packets as AF2x. Note: In this case, the single-rate, three-color marker will be configured to operate in Color-Blind mode.
RECOMMENDED DSCP marking:

- AF21 = flow stream with packet burst size up to "$A" bytes.
- AF22 = flow stream with packet burst size in excess of "$A" but below "$B" bytes.
- AF23 = flow stream with packet burst size in excess of "$B" bytes.
- Where "$A" < "$B".

RECOMMENDED conditioning performed at DiffServ network edge:

- The single-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to provide the behavior as defined in srTCM [RFC2697].
- If packets are marked by trusted sources or a previously trusted DiffServ domain and the color marking is to be preserved, then the single-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to operate in Color-Aware mode.
- If the packet marking is not trusted or the color marking is not to be preserved, then the single-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to operate in Color-Blind mode.

The fundamental service offered to "Low-Latency Data" traffic is enhanced best-effort service with controlled rate and delay. The service SHOULD be engineered so that AF21 marked packet flows have sufficient bandwidth in the network to provide high assurance of delivery. Since the AF2x traffic is elastic and responds dynamically to packet loss, Active Queue Management [RFC2309] SHOULD be used primarily to control TCP flow rates at congestion points by dropping packets from TCP flows that have large burst size. The probability of loss of AF21 traffic MUST NOT exceed the probability of loss of AF22 traffic, which in turn MUST NOT exceed the probability of loss of AF23. Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [RFC3168] MAY also be used with Active Queue Management.

If RED [RFC2309] is used as an AQM algorithm, the min-threshold specifies a target queue depth for each DSCP, and the max-threshold specifies the queue depth above which all traffic with such a DSCP is dropped or ECN marked. Thus, in this service class, the following inequality should hold in queue configurations:

- min-threshold AF23 < max-threshold AF23
- min-threshold AF23 <= min-threshold AF22
- min-threshold AF22 < max-threshold AF22
- max-threshold AF22 <= min-threshold AF21
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- o  min-threshold AF21 < max-threshold AF21
  
- o  max-threshold AF21 <= memory assigned to the queue

Note: This configuration tends to drop AF23 traffic before AF22 and AF22 before AF21. Many other AQM algorithms exist and are used; they should be configured to achieve a similar result.

4.7. Conversational Signaling Service Class

The Signaling service class is MUST be limited to delay-sensitive signaling traffic only, and then only applying to signaling that involves the Conversational service group. Audio signaling includes signaling between IP phone and soft-switch, soft-client and soft-switch, and media gateway and soft-switch as well as peer-to-peer using various protocols. Video and Hi-Res signaling includes video endpoint to video endpoint, as well as to Media transfer Point (MTP), to call control server(S), etc. This service class is intended to be used for control of voice and video sessions and applications. Protocols using this service class require a relatively fast response, as there are typically several messages of different sizes sent for control of the session. This service class is configured to provide good response for short-lived, intermittent flows that require real-time packet forwarding. This is not the service class for Instant Messaging (IM), that’s within the bounds of the Low-Latency Data service class. The Conversational Signaling service class MUST be configured so that the probability of packet drop or significant queuing delay under peak load is very low in IP network segments that provide this interface.

The Conversational Signaling service class MUST use the new A/V-Sig PHB, defined in [ID-DSCP]. This service class MUST be configured to provide a minimum bandwidth assurance for A/V-Sig marked packets to ensure that they get forwarded. In other words, this service class MUST NOT be starved from transmission within a reasonable timeframe, given that the entire Conversational service group depends on these signaling messages successful delivery. Network engineering SHOULD be done to ensure there is roughly 1-4% available per node interface that audio and video traverse. Local conditions MUST be considered when determining exactly how much bandwidth is given to this service class. The Conversational Signaling service class SHOULD be configured to use a Rate Queuing system such as that defined in Section 1.4.1.2 of this document.

The following applications SHOULD use the Conversational Signaling service class:

- o Peer-to-peer IP telephony signaling (e.g., SIP, H.323, XMPP).
  
- o Peer-to-peer signaling for multimedia applications (e.g., SIP, H.323, XMPP).

- Peer-to-peer real-time control function.
- Client-server IP telephony signaling using H.248, MEGACO, MGCP, IP encapsulated ISDN, or other proprietary protocols.
- Signaling to control IPTV applications using protocols such as IGMP.
- Signaling flows between high-capacity telephony call servers or soft switches using protocol such as SIP-T. Such high-capacity devices may control thousands of telephony (VoIP) calls.
- Signaling for one-way video flows, such as RTSP [RFC2326].
- IGMP, when used for multicast session control such as channel changing in IPTV systems.
- OPTIONALLY, this service class can be used for on-path reservation signaling for the traffic flows that will use the "admitted" DSCPs. The alternative is to have the on-path signaling (for reservations) use the DSCP within that service class. This provides a similar treatment of the signaling to the data flow, which might be desired.

The following are traffic characteristics:
- Variable size packets, normally one packet at a time.
- Intermittent traffic flows.
- Traffic may burst at times.
- Delay-sensitive control messages sent between two end points.

RECOMMENDED DSCP marking:
- All flows in this service class are marked with A/V-Sig.

Applications or IP end points SHOULD pre-mark their packets with A/V-Sig DSCP value. If the end point is not capable of setting the DSCP value, then the router topologically closest to the end point SHOULD perform Multifield (MF) Classification, as defined in [RFC2475].

RECOMMENDED conditioning performed at DiffServ network edge:
- Packet flow marking (DSCP setting) from untrusted sources (end user devices) SHOULD be verified at ingress to DiffServ network using Multifield (MF) Classification methods defined in [RFC2475].
Packet flows from untrusted sources (end user devices) SHOULD be policed at ingress to DiffServ network, e.g., using single rate with burst size token bucket policer to ensure that the traffic stays within its negotiated or engineered bounds.

Packet flows from trusted sources (application servers inside administered network) MAY not require policing.

Policing of packet flows across peering points in which each peer is participating in the call set-up MUST be performed to the Service Level Agreement (SLA).

The fundamental service offered to "Conversational Signaling" traffic is enhanced best-effort service with controlled rate and delay. The service SHOULD be engineered so that A/V-Sig marked packet flows have sufficient bandwidth in the network to provide high assurance of delivery and low delay. Normally, traffic in this service class does not respond dynamically to packet loss. As such, Active Queue Management [RFC2309] SHOULD NOT be applied to A/V-Sig marked packet flows.

4.8. High-Throughput Data Service Class

The High-Throughput Data service class is RECOMMENDED for elastic applications that require timely packet forwarding of variable rate traffic sources and, more specifically, is configured to provide good throughput for TCP longer-lived flows. TCP [RFC1633] or a transport with a consistent Congestion Avoidance Procedure [RFC2581] [RFC3782] normally will drive as high a data rate as it can obtain over a long period of time. The FTP protocol is a common example, although one cannot definitively say that all FTP transfers are moving data in bulk.

The High-Throughput Data service class SHOULD use the Assured Forwarding (AF) PHB, defined in [RFC2597]. This service class SHOULD be configured to provide a minimum bandwidth assurance for AF11, AF12, and AF13 marked packets to ensure that they are forwarded in a timely manner. The High-Throughput Data service class SHOULD be configured to use a Rate Queuing system such as that defined in Section 1.4.1.2 of this document.

The following applications SHOULD use the High-Throughput Data service class:

- Store and forward applications.
- File transfer applications (e.g., FTP, HTTP, etc).
- Email.
- VPN service that supports two rates (committed information rate
and excess or peak information rate).

The following are traffic characteristics:

- Variable size packets.
- Variable packet emission rate.
- Variable rate.
- With packet bursts of TCP window size.
- Source capable of reducing its transmission rate based on detection of packet loss at the receiver or through explicit congestion notification.

Applications or IP end points SHOULD pre-mark their packets with DSCP values as shown below. If the end point is not capable of setting the DSCP value, then the router topologically closest to the end point SHOULD perform Multifield (MF) Classification, as defined in [RFC2475], and mark all packets as AF1x. Note: In this case, the two-rate, three-color marker will be configured to operate in Color-Blind mode.

RECOMMENDED DSCP marking:

- AF11 = up to specified rate "A".
- AF12 = in excess of specified rate "A" but below specified rate "B".
- AF13 = in excess of specified rate "B".
- Where "A" < "B".

RECOMMENDED conditioning performed at DiffServ network edge:

- The two-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to provide the behavior as defined in trTCM [RFC2698].

- If packets are marked by trusted sources or a previously trusted DiffServ domain and the color marking is to be preserved, then the two-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to operate in Color-Aware mode.

- If the packet marking is not trusted or the color marking is not to be preserved, then the two-rate, three-color marker SHOULD be configured to operate in Color-Blind mode.

The fundamental service offered to "High-Throughput Data" traffic is enhanced best-effort service with a specified minimum rate. The service SHOULD be engineered so that AF11 marked packet flows have
sufficient bandwidth in the network to provide assured delivery. It can be assumed that this class will consume any available bandwidth and that packets traversing congested links may experience higher queuing delays or packet loss. Since the AF1x traffic is elastic and responds dynamically to packet loss, Active Queue Management [RFC2309] SHOULD be used primarily to control TCP flow rates at congestion points by dropping packets from TCP flows that have higher rates first. The probability of loss of AF11 traffic MUST NOT exceed the probability of loss of AF12 traffic, which in turn MUST NOT exceed the probability of loss of AF13. In such a case, if one network customer is driving significant excess and another seeks to use the link, any losses will be experienced by the high-rate user, causing him to reduce his rate. Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [RFC3168] MAY also be used with Active Queue Management.

If RED [RFC2309] is used as an AQM algorithm, the min-threshold specifies a target queue depth for each DSCP, and the max-threshold specifies the queue depth above which all traffic with such a DSCP is dropped or ECN marked. Thus, in this service class, the following inequality should hold in queue configurations:

- \( \text{min-threshold AF13} < \text{max-threshold AF13} \)
- \( \text{max-threshold AF13} \leq \text{min-threshold AF12} \)
- \( \text{min-threshold AF12} < \text{max-threshold AF12} \)
- \( \text{max-threshold AF12} \leq \text{min-threshold AF11} \)
- \( \text{min-threshold AF11} < \text{max-threshold AF11} \)
- \( \text{max-threshold AF11} \leq \text{memory assigned to the queue} \)

Note: This configuration tends to drop AF13 traffic before AF12 and AF12 before AF11. Many other AQM algorithms exist and are used; they should be configured to achieve a similar result.

4.9. Standard Service Class

The Standard service class is RECOMMENDED for traffic that has not been classified into one of the other supported forwarding service classes in the DiffServ network domain. This service class provides the Internet’s "best-effort" forwarding behavior. This service class typically has minimum bandwidth guarantee.

The Standard service class MUST use the Default Forwarding (DF) PHB, defined in [RFC2474], and SHOULD be configured to receive at least a small percentage of forwarding resources as a guaranteed minimum. This service class SHOULD be configured to use a Rate Queuing system such as that defined in Section 1.4.1.2 of this document.
The following applications SHOULD use the Standard service class:

- Network services, DNS, DHCP, BootP.
- Any undifferentiated application/packet flow transported through the DiffServ enabled network.

The following is a traffic characteristic:

- Non-deterministic, mixture of everything.

The RECOMMENDED DSCP marking is DF (Default Forwarding) ‘000000’.

Network Edge Conditioning:

There is no requirement that conditioning of packet flows be performed for this service class.

The fundamental service offered to the Standard service class is best-effort service with active queue management to limit overall delay. Typical configurations SHOULD use random packet dropping to implement Active Queue Management [RFC2309] or Explicit Congestion Notification [RFC3168], and MAY impose a minimum or maximum rate on the queue.

If RED [RFC2309] is used as an AQM algorithm, the min-threshold specifies a target queue depth, and the max-threshold specifies the queue depth above which all traffic is dropped or ECN marked. Thus, in this service class, the following inequality should hold in queue configurations:

- min-threshold DF < max-threshold DF
- max-threshold DF <= memory assigned to the queue

Note: Many other AQM algorithms exist and are used; they should be configured to achieve a similar result.

4.10. Low-Priority Data

The Low-Priority Data service class serves applications that run over TCP [RFC0793] or a transport with consistent congestion avoidance procedures [RFC2581] [RFC3782] and that the user is willing to accept service without guarantees. This service class is specified in [RFC3662] and [QBSS].

The following applications MAY use the Low-Priority Data service class:

- Any TCP based-application/packet flow transported through the DiffServ enabled network that does not require any bandwidth assurances.
The following is a traffic characteristic:

- Non-real-time and elastic.

Network Edge Conditioning:

There is no requirement that conditioning of packet flows be performed for this service class.

The RECOMMENDED DSCP marking is CS1 (Class Selector 1).

The fundamental service offered to the Low-Priority Data service class is best-effort service with zero bandwidth assurance. By placing it into a separate queue or class, it may be treated in a manner consistent with a specific Service Level Agreement.

Typical configurations SHOULD use Explicit Congestion Notification [RFC3168] or random loss to implement Active Queue Management [RFC2309].

If RED [RFC2309] is used as an AQM algorithm, the min-threshold specifies a target queue depth, and the max-threshold specifies the queue depth above which all traffic is dropped or ECN marked. Thus, in this service class, the following inequality should hold in queue configurations:

- min-threshold CS1 < max-threshold CS1
- max-threshold CS1 <= memory assigned to the queue

Note: Many other AQM algorithms exist and are used; they should be configured to achieve a similar result.

5. Additional Information on Service Class Usage

In this section, we provide additional information on how some specific applications should be configured to use the defined service classes.

5.1. Mapping for NTP

From tests that were performed, indications are that precise time distribution requires a very low packet delay variation (jitter) transport. Therefore, we suggest that the following guidelines for Network Time Protocol (NTP) be used:

- When NTP is used for providing high-accuracy timing within an administrator's (carrier's) network or to end users/clients, the audio service class SHOULD be used, and NTP packets should be marked with EF DSCP value.
For applications that require "wall clock" timing accuracy, the Standard service class should be used, and packets should be marked with DF DSCP.

5.2. VPN Service Mapping

"Differentiated Services and Tunnels" [RFC2983] considers the interaction of DiffServ architecture with IP tunnels of various forms. Further to guidelines provided in RFC 2983, below are additional guidelines for mapping service classes that are supported in one part of the network into a VPN connection. This discussion is limited to VPNs that use DiffServ technology for traffic differentiation.

- The DSCP value(s) that is/are used to represent a PHB or a PHB group SHOULD be the same for the networks at both ends of the VPN tunnel, unless remarking of DSCP is done as ingress/egress processing function of the tunnel. DSCP marking needs to be preserved along the tunnel, end to end.

- The VPN MAY be configured to support one or more service classes. It is left up to the administrators of the two networks to agree on the level of traffic differentiation that will be provided in the network that supports VPN service. Service classes are then mapped into the supported VPN traffic forwarding behaviors that meet the traffic characteristics and performance requirements of the encapsulated service classes.

- The traffic treatment in the network that is providing the VPN service needs to be such that the encapsulated service class or classes receive comparable behavior and performance in terms of delay, jitter, and packet loss and that they are within the limits of the service specified.

- The DSCP value in the external header of the packet forwarded through the network providing the VPN service can be different from the DSCP value that is used end to end for service differentiation in the end network.

- The guidelines for aggregation of two or more service classes into a single traffic forwarding treatment in the network that is providing the VPN service is for further study.

6. Security Considerations

This document discusses policy and describes a common policy configuration, for the use of a Differentiated Services Code Point by transports and applications. If implemented as described, it should require that the network do nothing that the network has not already allowed. If that is the case, no new security issues should arise from the use of such a policy.
It is possible for the policy to be applied incorrectly, or for a wrong policy to be applied in the network for the defined service class. In that case, a policy issue exists that the network SHOULD detect, assess, and deal with. This is a known security issue in any network dependent on policy-directed behavior.

A well-known flaw appears when bandwidth is reserved or enabled for a service (for example, voice and/or video transport) and another service or an attacking traffic stream uses it. This possibility is inherent in DiffServ technology, which depends on appropriate packet markings. When bandwidth reservation or a priority queuing system is used in a vulnerable network, the use of authentication and flow admission is recommended. To the author’s knowledge, there is no known technical way to respond to an unauthenticated data stream using service that it is not intended to use, and such is the nature of the Internet.

The use of a service class by a user is not an issue when the SLA between the user and the network permits him to use it, or to use it up to a stated rate. In such cases, simple policing is used in the Differentiated Services Architecture. Some service classes, such as Network Control, are not permitted to be used by users at all; such traffic should be dropped or remarked by ingress filters. Where service classes are available under the SLA only to an authenticated user rather than to the entire population of users, authentication and authorization services are required, such as those surveyed in [AUTHMECH].

7. Contributing Authors

This section specifically calls out the authors of RFC 4594, from which this document is based on.

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Of note, two of the three mentioned authors above worked for Nortel Networks at the time of writing RFC 4594, a company that no longer exists. This author has not seen or heard from those two in many, many years or IETF meetings - as a result of not knowing their new email addresses (or phone numbers).

While much of this document has been rewritten with either edited or
brand new material, there are many short paragraphs that remain as they were from RFC 4594, as well as many sentences that were also left unchanged. Additionally, there were no new graphs, charts, diagrams, or tables introduced, meaning the first 4 tables within this document existed in RFC 4594, created by those authors. Presently, each of those tables contain modified and new information. The last 3 tables, specifically tables 5, 6, & 7 were removed because the examples section was removed.

This author believes there must be proper credit given for all the contributions, including the framework this document retains from that RFC. Periodically, throughout this document, what was written remains the best way of conveying a thought, rule, or otherwise stated behavior or mechanism. Because RFC 4594 was rather large, there is no realistic way of identifying each part that was left untouched. Further, properly quoting that RFC and leaving those sentences embedded in this document would render this document highly unreadable. Another application could be used to show the changes, deletions and additions - but not one that the IETF accepts presently.

This author has created this "Contributing Authors" section as a way of properly identifying those 3 individuals that provided text within this document. We will let the community judge if this is 'good enough' (i.e., rough consensus), or if another way is better.

8. Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Paul Jones, Glen Lavers, Mo Zanaty, David Benham, Michael Ramalho, Gorry Fairhurst, David Black, Brian Carpenter, Al Morton, Ruediger Geib and Shitanshu Shah for their comments and questions about this effort that ultimately helped shape this document.

Below are the folks that were acknowledged in RFC 4594, and this author does not want to lose their recognition of contributions to the original effort.

"The authors thank the TSWWG reviewers, David Black, Brian E. Carpenter, and Alan O’Neill for their review and input to this document.

The authors acknowledge a great many inputs, most notably from Bruce Davie, Dave Oran, Ralph Santitiro, Gary Kenward, Francois Audet, Morgan Littlewood, Robert Milne, John Shuler, Nalin Mistry, Al Morton, Mike Pierce, Ed Koehler Jr., Tim Rahrer, Fil Dickinson, Mike Fidler, and Shane Amante. Kimberly King, Joe Zebarth, and Alistair Munroe each did a thorough proofreading,
9. References

9.1. Normative References


[RFC3662] Bless, R., Nichols, K., and K. Wehrle, "A Lower Effort Per-Domain Behavior (PDB) for Differentiated Services",
9.2. Informative References


[IEEE1Q] IEEE, 802.1Q Specification


Appendix A – Changes

Here is a list of all the changes that were captured during the editing process. This will not be a complete list, and others are free to point out what the authors missed, and we’ll include that in the next release.

A.1 Since Individual -02 to -03

- Inserted section 1.6 to explain fundamentally what has changed since RFC 4594, and why changes are necessary.

A.2 Since Individual -01 to -02

- Added text to the Intro section on the justification from DiffServ Problem Statement draft, as to more of why this update is necessary.

- Added text to the Intro section expanding on the concept of service classes vs. treatment aggregates (from RFC 5127).
A.3 Since Individual -00 to -01

- Added Section 2.4 which covers the conflation issues regarding the differences between service classes and treatment aggregates.
- Added example operational configurations of treatment aggregates applied to this draft’s new set of service classes and additional DSCPs.
- Added references RFC 5865, RFC 5462, IEEE 802.1E and IEEE 802.1Q.

A.4 Since RFC 4594 to Individual Update -00

- rewrote Intro to emphasize current topics
- Created a Conversational Service group, comprising the audio, video and Hi-Res service classes - because they have similar characteristics.
- Incorporated the 6 new DSCPs from [ID-DSCP].
- moved the example section, en mass, to an appendix that might not be kept for this version. We’re not sure it accomplishes what it needs to, and might not provide any real usefulness.
- Moved ‘Realtime-Interactive’ service class to CS5, from CS4
- Changed ‘Broadcast Video’ service class to ‘Broadcast’ service class
- Changed AF4X to ‘Video’ service class, replacing ‘Multimedia Conferencing’ service class
- Moved ‘Multimedia Conferencing’ service class to different DSCPs
- Added the ‘Hi-Res’ service class
- Removed section 5.1 on signaling choices. It has been included in the main body of the text.
- Changed document title
- ...

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Abstract

The multi-recipient nature of Multicast prevents the use of any point-to-point connection-oriented transport, therefore restricts all Multicast data to be sent over the User Datagram Protocol (UDP). UDP provides a minimal message-passing transport that has no inherent congestion control mechanisms. Because congestion control is critical to the stable operation of the Internet, applications and upper-layer protocols that choose to use Multicast UDP as an Internet service must employ mechanisms to prevent congestion collapse and to establish some degree of fairness with concurrent traffic. This document provides guidelines on the use of UDP for the designers of multicast applications and higher-level protocols.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [RFC0768] provides a minimal, unreliable, best-effort, message-passing transport to applications and upper-layer protocols (both simply called "applications" in the remainder of this document). [RFC5405] is scoped to provide guidelines for unicast applications only, but all of the general requirements, references, and use cases apply to multicast [RFC1112][RFC4607] UDP application designers as well. This document chooses to only make recommendations in requirements, use cases, and references where they differ from [RFC5405] or are unique for applications sending multicast UDP data (simply called "multicast" in the remainder of this document).

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]
2. Multicast UDP Usage Guidelines

2.1. Congestion Control Guidelines

[RFC2309] discusses the dangers of congestion-unresponsive flows and states that "all UDP-based streaming applications should incorporate effective congestion avoidance mechanisms". Many large-scale multicast deployments are within a single administrative domain, and are provisioned over a bandwidth-reserved path or paths where congestion control is less relevant. But there are a growing number of deployment cases where multicast is transiting multiple domains, is tunneled across the unicast Internet, or transits the Internet through a unicast overlay network. This document is only concerned with the latter case of multicast data transiting the larger Internet, either as native IP multicast or encapsulated in a unicast tunnel and does not apply to administratively scoped deployments.

When the multicast traffic exits the administrative domain of a single network or the bi-laterally agreed path between networks, or is tunneled across the unicast Internet either to another multicast network or to an end device, the application SHOULD provide a TCP-compatible aggregate flow over the end-to-end path to each leaf.

There are currently two models of multicast delivery: the Any-Source Multicast (ASM) model as defined in [RFC1112] and the Source-Specific Multicast (SSM) model as defined in [RFC4607]. ASM group members will receive all data sent to the group by any source, while SSM constrains the distribution tree to only one single source. Many congestion-controlled transport protocols are often not applicable to multicast distribution services, or simply won’t scale well to very large multicast trees since they require bi-directional communication and adapt the data-rate to accommodate the network conditions to a single receiver. Multicast distribution trees can often fan out to massive numbers of receivers limiting the scalability of an in-band return channel to control the data-rate, and the one-to-many nature of multicast distribution trees prevent adapting the data-rate to individual receiver requirements. For this reason, TCP-compatible aggregate flow for Internet multicast data, either native or tunneled, is the responsibility of the application.

2.1.1. Bulk Transfer Applications

Applications that perform bulk transmission of data over a multicast distribution tree, i.e., applications that exchange more than a small number of UDP datagrams per maximum receiver RTT, SHOULD implement Asynchronous Layered Coding (ALC) [RFC5775], TCP-Friendly Multicast Congestion Control (TFMCC) [RFC4654], Wave and Equation Based Rate Control (WEBRC) [RFC3738], NACK-Oriented Reliable Multicast (NORM)
transport protocol [RFC5740], File Delivery over Unidirectional Transport (FLUTE) [RFC6726], Real Time Protocol/Control Protocol (RTP/RTCP), [RFC3550] or another congestion control scheme following the guidelines of [RFC2887] and utilizing the framework of [RFC3048].

Bulk transfer applications that choose not to implement [RFC4654], [RFC5775], [RFC3738], [RFC5740], [RFC6726], or [RFC3550] SHOULD implement a congestion control scheme that results in bandwidth use that competes fairly with TCP within an order of magnitude. Section 2 of [RFC3551] suggests that applications SHOULD monitor the packet loss rate to ensure that it is within acceptable parameters. Packet loss is considered acceptable if a TCP flow across the same network path under the same network conditions would achieve an average throughput, measured on a reasonable timescale, that is not less than that of the UDP flow. The comparison to TCP cannot be specified exactly, but is intended as an "order-of-magnitude" comparison in timescale and throughput.

Finally, some bulk transfer applications may choose not to implement any congestion control mechanism and instead rely on transmitting across reserved path capacity. This might be an acceptable choice for a subset of restricted networking environments, but is by no means a safe practice for operation in the Internet. When the multicast traffic of such applications leaks out on unprovisioned Internet paths, it can significantly degrade the performance of other traffic sharing the path and even result in congestion collapse. Applications that support an uncontrolled or unadaptive transmission behavior SHOULD NOT do so by default and SHOULD instead require users to explicitly enable this mode of operation.

2.1.2. Low Data-Volume Applications

All of the recommendations in section 3.1.2 of [RFC5405] are applicable to multicast as well.

2.1.3. UDP Tunnels

All of the recommendations in section 3.1.3 of [RFC5405] are applicable to multicast carried inside of unicast UDP tunnels. There are, however deployment cases and solutions where the outer header of a UDP tunnel contains a multicast destination address, such as [RFC6513], but these are primarily deployed in bandwidth reserved environments within a single administrative domain, or between two domains where a bi-laterally agreed upon path and bandwidth is in place and so congestion control is not an issue.

2.1.4. Message Size Guidelines
IP fragmentation lowers the efficiency and reliability of Internet communication. The loss of a single fragment results in the loss of an entire fragmented packet, because even if all other fragments are received correctly, the original packet cannot be reassembled and delivered. This fundamental issue with fragmentation exists for both IPv4 and IPv6, unicast and multicast packets. In addition, some network address translators (NATs) and firewalls drop IP fragments. The network address translation performed by a NAT only operates on complete IP packets, and some firewall policies also require inspection of complete IP packets. Even with these being the case, some NATs and firewalls simply do not implement the necessary reassembly functionality, and instead choose to drop all fragments. Finally, [RFC4963] documents other issues specific to IPv4 fragmentation.

Due to these issues, a multicast application SHOULD NOT send UDP datagrams that result in IP packets that exceed the effective MTU as described in section 3 of [RFC6807]. Consequently, an application SHOULD either use the effective MTU information provided by the Population Count Extensions to Protocol Independent Multicast [RFC6807] or implement path MTU discovery itself [RFC1191][RFC1981][RFC4821] to determine whether the path to each destination will support its desired message size without fragmentation.

If the multicast application is incapable of, or choose not to implement a worst-cast path MTU solution, the application SHOULD assume the maximum MTU of any link will be affected by multiple levels of encapsulation and SHOULD NOT send any packet larger than 1280 bytes.

3. Acknowledgements

This template was derived from an initial version written by Pekka Savola and contributed by him to the xml2rfc project.

This document is part of a plan to make xml2rfc indispensable [DOMINATION].

4. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.
All drafts are required to have an IANA considerations section (see the update of RFC 2434 [I-D.narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis] for a guide). If the draft does not require IANA to do anything, the section contains an explicit statement that this is the case (as above). If there are no requirements for IANA, the section will be removed during conversion into an RFC by the RFC Editor.

5. Security Considerations

All drafts are required to have a security considerations section. See RFC 3552 [RFC3552] for a guide.

6. References

6.1. Normative References


6.2. Informative References


Appendix A.  Additional Stuff

This becomes an Appendix.

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A New Data Chunk for Stream Control Transmission Protocol
draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ndata-03.txt

Abstract

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a message oriented transport protocol supporting arbitrary large user messages. However, the sender can not interleave different user messages which causes head of line blocking at the sender side. To overcome this limitation, this document adds a new data chunk to SCTP.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

1.1. Overview

When SCTP [RFC4960] was initially designed it was mainly envisioned for transport of small signaling messages. Late in the design stage it was decided to add support for fragmentation and reassembly of larger messages with the thought that someday Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] style signaling messages may also need to use SCTP and a single MTU sized message would be too small. Unfortunately this design decision, though valid at the time, did not account for other applications which might send very large messages over SCTP. When such large messages are now sent over SCTP a form of sender side head of line blocking becomes created within the protocol. This head of line blocking is caused by the use of the Transmission Sequence Number (TSN) for two different purposes:

1. As an identifier for DATA chunks to provide a reliable transfer.
2. As an identifier for the sequence of fragments to allow reassembly.

The protocol requires all fragments of a user message to have consecutive TSNs. Therefore the sender can not interleave different messages.

This document describes a new Data chunk called N-DATA. This chunk incorporates all the flags and properties of the current SCTP Data chunk but also adds a new field in its chunk header, the Fragment Sequence Number (FSN). Then the FSN is only used for reassembly and...
the TSN only for the reliability. Therefore, the head of line blocking caused by the original design is avoided.

1.2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. N-DATA Chunk

The following Figure 1 shows the new data chunk N-DATA.

```
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|   Type = 17   |  Res  |I|U|B|E|           Length              |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                              TSN                              |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|        Stream Identifier      |     Stream Sequence Number    |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|          Payload Protocol Identifier               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                  Message Identifier               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|             Fragment Sequence Number             |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    \                                         \  
    |                                         |   
    /                                         /   
User Data
```

Figure 1: N-DATA chunk format

The only differences between the N-DATA chunk in Figure 1 and the DATA chunk defined in [RFC4960] and [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-sack-immediately] is the addition of the new Message Identifier (MID) and Fragment Sequence Number (FSN).

Message Identifier (MID): 32 bits (unsigned integer)

The Message Identifier. Please note that the MID is in "network byte order", a.k.a. Big Endian.

Fragment Sequence Number (FSN): 32 bits (unsigned integer)

Identifies the fragment number of this piece of a message. FSN’s are unsigned number, the first fragment MUST start at 0 and MUST have the ‘B’ bit set. The last fragment of a message MUST have
the 'E' bit set. Note that the FSN may wrap completely multiple
times allowing arbitrary large messages. Please note that the FSN
is in "network byte order", a.k.a. Big Endian.

3. Procedures

3.1. Sender Side Considerations

A sender MUST NOT send a N-DATA chunk unless the peer has indicated
its support of the N-DATA chunk type within the Supported Extensions
Parameter as defined in [RFC5061].

A sender MUST NOT use the N-DATA chunk unless the user has requested
that use via the socket API (see Section 4). This constraint is made
since usage of this chunk requires that the application be willing to
interleave messages upon reception within an association. This is
not the default choice within the socket API (see [RFC6458]) thus the
user MUST indicate support to the protocol of the reception of
completely interleaved messages. Note that for stacks that do not
implement [RFC6458] they may use other methods to indicate
interleaved message support and thus enable the usage of the N-DATA
chunk, the key is that the the stack MUST know the application has
indicated its choice in wanting to use the extension.

Sender side usage of the N-Data chunk is quite simple. Instead of
using the TSN for fragmentation purposes, the sender uses the new FSN
field to indicate which fragment number is being sent. The first
fragment MUST have the 'B' bit set. The last fragment MUST have the
'E' bit set. All other fragments MUST NOT have the 'B' or 'E' bit
set. If the 'I' bit is set the 'E' bit MUST also be set, i.e. the
'I' bit may only be set on the last fragment of a message. All other
properties of the existing SCTP DATA chunk also apply to the N-DATA
chunk, i.e. congestion control as well as receiver window conditions
MUST be observed as defined in [RFC4960].

Note that the usage of this chunk should also imply late binding of
the actual TSN to any chunk being sent. This way other messages from
other streams may be interleaved with the fragmented message.

The sender MUST NOT have more than one ordered fragmented message
being produced in any one stream. The sender MUST NOT have more than
one un-ordered fragmented message being produced in any one stream.
The sender MAY have one ordered and one unordered fragmented message
being produced within a single stream. At any time multiple streams
MAY be producing an ordered or unordered fragmented message.

3.2. Receiver Side Considerations
Upon reception of an SCTP packet containing a N-DATA chunk if the message needs to be reassembled, then the receiver MUST use the FSN for reassembly of the message and not the TSN. Note that a non-fragmented message is indicated by the fact that both the 'E' and 'B' bits are set. An ordered or unordered fragmented message is thus identified with any message not having both bits set.

4. Socket API Considerations

This section describes how the socket API defined in [RFC6458] is extended to allow applications to use the extension described in this document.

Please note that this section is informational only.

4.1. Socket Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>option name</th>
<th>data type</th>
<th>get</th>
<th>set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_NDATA_ENABLE</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_PLUGGABLE_SS</td>
<td>struct sctp_assoc_value</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_VALUE</td>
<td>struct sctp_stream_value</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.1. Enable or Disable the Interleaving Capability (SCTP_NDATA_ENABLE)

A new socket option to turn on/off the usage of the N-DATA chunk. Turning this option on only effect future associations, and MUST be turned on for the protocol stack to indicate support of the N-DATA chunk to the peer during association setup. Turning this option off, will prevent the N-DATA chunk from being indicated supported in future associations, and will also prevent current associations from producing N-DATA chunks for future large fragmented messages. Note that this does not stop the peer from sending N-DATA chunks.

An N-DATA chunk aware application should also set the fragment interleave level to 2. This allows the reception from multiple streams simultaneously. Failure to set this option can possibly lead to application deadlock.
4.1.2. Get or Set the Stream Scheduler (SCTP\_PLUGGABLE\_SS)

A stream scheduler can be selected with the SCTP\_PLUGGABLE\_SS option for setsockopt(). The struct sctp\_assoc\_value is used to specify the association for which the scheduler should be changed and the value of the desired algorithm.

The definition of struct sctp\_assoc\_value is the same as in [RFC6458]:

```c
struct sctp_assoc_value {
    sctp_assoc_t assoc_id;
    uint32_t assoc_value;
};
```

**assoc\_id**: Holds the identifier for the association of which the scheduler should be changed. The special SCTP\_{FUTURE\|CURRENT\|ALL}\_ASSOC can also be used. This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style sockets.

**assoc\_value**: This specifies which scheduler is used. The following constants can be used:

- **SCTP\_SS\_DEFAULT**: The default scheduler used by the SCTP implementation. Typical values are SCTP\_SS\_ROUND\_ROBIN or SCTP\_SS\_FIRST\_COME.
- **SCTP\_SS\_ROUND\_ROBIN**: This scheduler provides a fair scheduling based on the number of user messages by cycling around non-empty stream queues.
- **SCTP\_SS\_ROUND\_ROBIN\_PACKET**: This is a round-robin scheduler but only bundles user messages of the same stream in one packet. This minimizes head-of-line blocking when a packet is lost because only a single stream is affected.
- **SCTP\_SS\_PRIORITY**: Scheduling with different priorities is used. Streams having a higher priority will be scheduled first and when multiple streams have the same priority, the default scheduling should be used for them. The priority can be assigned with the sctp\_stream\_value struct. The higher the assigned value, the lower the priority, that is the default value 0 is the highest priority and therefore the default scheduling will be used if no priorities have been assigned.
- **SCTP\_SS\_FAIR\_BANDWIDTH**: A fair bandwidth distribution between the streams can be activated using this value. This scheduler
considers the lengths of the messages of each stream and schedules them in a certain way to maintain an equal bandwidth for all streams.

SCTP_SS_FIRST_COME: The simple first-come, first-serve algorithm is selected by using this value. It just passes through the messages in the order in which they have been delivered by the application. No modification of the order is done at all.

4.1.3. Get or Set the Stream Scheduler Parameter (SCTP_SS_VALUE)

Some schedulers require additional information to be set for single streams as shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>name</th>
<th>per stream info</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_DEFAULT</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_RR</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_RR_INTER</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_RR_PKT</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_RR_PKT_INTER</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_PRIO</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_PRIO_INTER</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_FB</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_FB_INTER</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_FCFS</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is achieved with the SCTP_SS_VALUE option and the corresponding struct sctp_stream_value. The definition of struct sctp_stream_value is as follows:

```c
struct sctp_stream_value {
    sctp_assoc_t assoc_id;
    uint16_t stream_id;
    uint16_t stream_value;
};
```

assoc_id: Holds the identifier for the association of which the scheduler should be changed. The special SCTP_{FUTURE|CURRENT|ALL}_ASSOC can also be used. This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style sockets.
stream_id: Holds the stream id for the stream for which additional information has to be provided.

stream_value: The meaning of this field depends on the scheduler specified. It is ignored when the scheduler does not need additional information.

5. IANA Considerations

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:

"RFCXXXX" is to be replaced by the RFC number you assign this document.
]

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:

The suggested values for the chunk type and the chunk flags are tentative and to be confirmed by IANA.
]

This document (RFCXXXX) is the reference for all registrations described in this section.

A new chunk type has to be assigned by IANA. IANA should assign this value from the pool of chunks with the upper two bits set to ‘00’. This requires an additional line in the "Chunk Types" registry for SCTP:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID Value</th>
<th>Chunk Type</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>New DATA chunk (N-DATA)</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The registration table as defined in [RFC6096] for the chunk flags of this chunk type is initially given by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chunk Flag Value</th>
<th>Chunk Flag Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>E bit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>B bit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>U bit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>I bit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Security Considerations

This document does not add any additional security considerations in addition to the ones given in [RFC4960] and [RFC6458].

7. Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Lixia Zhang for her invaluable comments.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


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Additional Policies for the Partial Delivery Extension of the Stream Control Transmission Protocol
draft-tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-prpolicies-03.txt

Abstract

This document defines policies for the Partial Reliability Extension of the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (PR-SCTP) allowing to limit the number of retransmissions or to prioritize user messages for more efficient send buffer usage.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Overview

The SCTP Partial Reliability Extension (PR-SCTP) defined in [RFC3758] provides a generic method for senders to abandon user messages. The decision to abandon a user message is sender side only and the exact condition is called a PR-SCTP policy. [RFC3758] also defines one particular PR-SCTP policy, called Timed Reliability. This allows the sender to specify a timeout for a user message after which the SCTP stack abandons the user message.

This document specifies two additional PR-SCTP policies:

Limited Retransmission Policy: Allows to limit the number of retransmissions.

Priority Policy: Allows to discard lower priority messages if space for higher priority messages is needed in the send buffer.

1.2. Data Types
This document uses data types from Draft 6.6 (March 1997) of POSIX 1003.1g: uintN_t means an unsigned integer of exactly N bits (e.g. uint16_t). This is the same as in [RFC6458]

2. Additional PR-SCTP Policies

2.1. Limited Retransmissions Policy

Using the Limited Retransmission Policy allows the sender of a user message to specify an upper limit for the number of retransmissions for each DATA chunk of the given user messages. The sender must abandon a user message if the number of retransmissions of any of the DATA chunks of the user message would exceed the provided limit. Please note that the number of retransmissions includes the fast and the timer based retransmissions.

Limiting the number of retransmissions to 0 is allowed. This provides a service similar to UDP, which also does not send any retransmissions either.

The Limited Retransmissions Policy is used for data channels in the RTCWeb protocol stack.

2.2. Priority Policy

Using the Priority Policy allows the sender of a user message to specify a priority. When storing a user message in the send buffer while there is not enough available space, the SCTP stack may abandon other user messages with a priority lower than the provided one.

After lower priority messages have been abandoned high priority messages can be transferred without blocking the send() call.

The Priority Policy can be used in the IPFIX protocol stack. See [RFC7011] for more information.

3. Socket API Considerations

This section describes how the socket API defined in [RFC6458] is extended to support the newly defined PR-SCTP policies and to provide some statistical information.

Please note that this section is informational only.

3.1. Support for Added PR-SCTP Policies

As defined in [RFC6458], the PR-SCTP policy is specified and configured by using the following sctp_prinfo structure:
struct sctp_prinfo {
    uint16_t pr_policy;
    uint32_t pr_value;
};

When the Limited Retransmission Policy described in Section 2.1 is used, pr_policy has the value SCTP_PR_SCTP_RTX and the number of retransmissions is given in pr_value.

For using the Priority Policy described in Section 2.2, pr_policy has the value SCTP_PR_SCTP_PRIO. The priority is given in pr_value. The value of zero is the highest priority and larger numbers in pr_value denote lower priorities.

The following table summarizes the possible parameter settings defined in [RFC6458] and this document:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>pr_policy</th>
<th>pr_value</th>
<th>Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>[RFC6458]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_PR_SCTP_TTL</td>
<td>Lifetime in ms</td>
<td>[RFC6458]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_PR_SCTP_RTX</td>
<td>Number of retransmissions</td>
<td>Section 2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_PR_SCTP_PRIO</td>
<td>Priority</td>
<td>Section 2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2. Socket Option for Getting the PR-SCTP Status (SCTP_PR_STATUS)

This socket option uses IPPROTO_SCTP as its level and SCTP_PR_STATUS as its name. It can only be used with getsockopt(), but not with setsockopt(). The socket option value uses the following structure:

struct sctp_prstatus {
    sctp_assoc_t sprstat_assoc_id;
    uint32_t sprstat_abandoned_unsent;
    uint32_t sprstat_abandoned_sent;
};

sprstat_assoc_id: This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style sockets. For one-to-many style sockets this parameter indicates for which association the user wants the information. It is an error to use SCTP_{CURRENT|ALL|FUTURE}_ASSOC in sprstat_assoc_id

sprstat_abandoned_unsent: The number of user messages which have been abandoned, before any part of the user message could be sent.
sprstat_abandoned_sent: The number of user messages which have been abandoned, after a part of the user message has been sent.

There are separate counters for unsent and sent user messages because the SCTP_SEND_FAILED_EVENT supports a similar differentiation. Please note that an abandoned large user messages requiring an SCTP level fragmentation is reported in the sprstat_abandoned_sent counter as soon as at least one fragment of it has been sent. Therefore each abandoned user messages is either counted in sprstat_abandoned_unsent or sprstat_abandoned_sent.

If more detailed information about abandoned user messages is required, the subscription to the SCTP_SEND_FAILED_EVENT is recommended.

sctp_opt_info() needs to be extended to support SCTP_PR_STATUS.

4. IANA Considerations

This document requires no actions from IANA.

5. Security Considerations

This document does not add any additional security considerations in addition to the ones given in [RFC4960], [RFC3758], and [RFC6458].

6. Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Irene Ruengeler, Jamal Hadi Salim, and Vlad Yasevich for there invaluable comments.

7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


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Tunnel Congestion Feedback
draft-wei-tsvwg-tunnel-congestion-feedback-00

Abstract

This document describes a mechanism to calculate congestion of a
_tunnel segment based on RFC 6040 recommendations, and a feedback
protocol by which to send the measured congestion of the tunnel from
egress to ingress router. A basic model for measuring tunnel
congestion and feedback is described, and a protocol for carrying the
feedback data is outlined.

Status of this Memo

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1. Introduction

This document describes a mechanism for feedback of congestion observed in IP-in-IP tunnels (also referred to as IP tunnels). Common tunnel deployments such as mobile backhaul networks, VPNs and other IP-in-IP tunnels can be congested as a result of sustained high load.

Network providers use a number of methods to deal with high load conditions including proper network dimensioning, policies for preferential flow treatment and selective offloading among others. The mechanism proposed in this draft is expected to complement them and provide congestion information that to allow making better, policies and decisions.

The model and general solution proposed in chapters 4 consist of identifying congestion marks set in the tunnel segment, and feeding back the congestion signal from the egress to the ingress of the tunnel. Measuring congestion of a tunnel segment is based on counting outer packet CE marks for packets that have ECT marks in the inner packet. This proposal depends on statistical marking of congestion and uses the method described in RFC 6040, Appendix C.

Chapter 5 describes the protocol mechanisms to feed back the calculated congestion from egress to ingress. The desired properties of a protocol are outlined and IPFIX as a candidate protocol for these extensions is explored further.

2. Conventions and Terminology

2.1 Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.2 Terminology

Tunnel: A channel over which encapsulated packets traverse across a network.

Encapsulation: The process of adding control information as it passes through the layered model.

Encapsulator: The tunnel endpoint function that adds an outer IP header to tunnel a packet, the encapsulator is considered as the "ingress" of the tunnel.
Decapsulator: The tunnel endpoint function that removes an outer IP header from a tunnelled packet, the decapsulator is considered as the "egress" of the tunnel.

Outer header: The header added to encapsulate a tunneled packet.

Inner header: The header encapsulated by the outer header.

E2E: End to End.

VPN: Virtual Private Network is a technology for using the Internet or another intermediate network to connect computers to isolated remote computer networks that would otherwise be inaccessible.

GRE: Generic Routing Encapsulation.

IPFIX: IP Flow Information Export. An IETF protocol to export flow information from routers and other devices.

RED: Random Early Detection

3. Problem Statement

IP backhaul networks such as those of mobile networks are provisioned and managed to provide the subscribed levels of end user service. These networks are traffic engineered, and have defined mechanisms for providing differentiated services and QoS per user or flow. Policy to configure per user flow attributes in these networks have traditionally been based on monitoring and static configuration.

Currently, these networks are increasingly used for applications that demand high bandwidth. The nature of the flows and length of end user sessions can lead to significant variability in aggregate bandwidth demands and latency. In such cases, it would be useful to have a more dynamic feedback of congestion information. This aggregate congestion feedback could be used to determine flow handling and admission control.

Tunnels such as PMIP, GTP or other IP-in-IP maybe used to carry end user flows within the backhaul network such as shown in Figure 1. ECN handling mechanisms in RFC 6040 specifies how ECN should be handled for tunneling. In addition, RFC 6040, Appendix C provides guidance on how to calculate congestion experienced in the tunnel itself. However, there is no standardized mechanism by which the congestion information inside the tunnel can be fed back from egress to ingress...
In addition, it should be noted that these tunnels may carry ECT or Not-ECT traffic. A well defined mechanism for aggregate congestion calculation should be able to work in the presence of all kinds of traffic and would benefit from a common feedback mechanism and protocol.

![Diagram of Mobile Network and Tunnels]

Figure 1: Example - Mobile Network and Tunnels

4. Congestion Model

To support traffic management and congestion feedback in tunnel, there are mainly two issues that this document discusses: calculation of congestion information in ECT and Not-ECT flows, and feeding back the congestion information from egress to ingress router.

4.1 Congestion Calculation

Calculation of congestion in the tunnel is based on the method described in RFC 6040, Appendix C.

The egress can calculate congestion using moving averages. The
proportion of packets not marked in the inner header that have a CE marking in the outer header is considered to have experienced congestion in the tunnel. Note that the packets are ECN capable and not congestion-marked before tunnel. Since routers implementing RED randomly select a percentage of packets to mark, this method can be effectively used to expose congestion in the tunnel.

When the ingress is RFC6040 compliant, the packets collected by egress can be divided into four categories, shown in figure 2. The tag before "|" stands for ECN field in outer header; and the tag after "|" stands for ECN field in inner header.

"Not-ECN|Not-ECN" indicates traffic that does not support ECN, for example UDP and Not-ECT marked TCP; "CE|CE" indicates ECN capable packets that have CE-mark before entering the tunnel; "CE|ECT" indicates ECN capable packets that are CE-marked in the tunnel; "ECT|ECT" indicates ECN capable packets that have not experienced congested in tunnel (or outside the tunnel).

![Figure 2: ECN marking categories by outer/inner packet](image)

Out of the total number of packets, if the quantity of CE|ECT packets is A, the quantity of ECT|ECT packets is B, then the congestion level (C) can be calculated as follows:

\[
C = \frac{A}{A+B}
\]

As an example, consider 100 packets to calculate the moving average as shown in RFC 6040, Appendix C. Say that there are 12 packets that have CE|ECT marks indicating that they have experienced congestion in the tunnel. And, there are 58 packets that have ECT|ECT marks indicating that there was no congestion in either the tunnel or elsewhere. The egress can calculate congestions as:
4.2 Congestion Feedback

The figure below introduces an abstract view of the tunnel and outlines a tunnel congestion feedback model.

The basic model consists of the following components: Ingress, Egress, Feedback, Meter, Collector and Manager.

At the egress, a module named Meter is used to estimate the congestion level of the tunnel as described in the section above. A congestion information feedback module, called Feedback, is used to control the congestion information feedback.

The metering module (Meter) in the Egress node accounts the congestion marks it receives. The Feedback module calculates the amount of congestion and feeds back the congestion information to the
Ingress node. The Collector at the Ingress receives the congestion information which is fed back from the Egress node. The Manager has admission control and flow control functions which are out of the scope of this document.

It should be assumed that the ingress and egress of the tunnel are ECN-enabled and the intermediate routers in the tunnel path are also ECN-enabled. Congestion feedback signals in the figure are fed back using protocols described in section 5.
5. Congestion Feedback Protocol

5.1 Properties of Candidate Protocol

To feedback congestion efficiently there are some properties that are desirable in the feedback protocol.

1. Congestion friendliness. The feeding back traffics are coexistence with other traffics, so when congestion happens in the network, the feeding back traffic should be reduced, So that feedback itself will not congest the network further when the network is already getting congested. In other words, feedback frequency should adjust to network's congestion level.

2. Extensibility. The authors consider that using an existing protocol, or extensions to an existing protocol is preferable. The ability of a protocol to support modular extensions to report congestion level as feedback is a key attribute of the protocol under consideration.

3. Compactness. In different situations, there may be different congestion information to be conveyed, and in order to reduce network load, the information to be conveyed should be selectable, i.e. only the required information should be possible to convey.

5.2 IPFIX Extensions for Congestion Feedback

This section outlines IPFIX extensions for feedback of congestion. The authors consider that IPFIX is a suitable protocol that is reasonably easy to extend to carry tunnel congestion reporting.

Since IPFIX uses TCP transport, it has the foundation for congestion-friendly behavior. When congestion occurs in the network, the Exporter (Egress) can reduce the IPFIX traffic. Thus the feedback itself will not congest the network further when the network is already getting congested. When the Exporter detects network congestion, it can also reduce IPFIX traffic frequency to avoid more congestion in network while being able to sufficiently convey congestion status.

Because the template mechanism in IPFIX is flexible, it allows the export of only the required information. Sending only the required information can also reduce network load.

The basic procedure for feedback using IPFIX is as follows:
(1) The exporter inform the collector how to interpret the IEs in
IPFIX message using template. Collector just accepts template passively; which IEs to send is configured by other means that not included in IPFIX specification.

(2) The exporter meters the traffic and sends the congestion level to collector.

Congestion feedback using IPFIX is shown in the figures below. There are two variations to congestion feedback model using IPFIX. In the first one shown in Figure 4(a), congestion information is sent directly from egress to ingress and ingress makes decisions according this information. In the second case shown in Figure 4(b), congestion information is sent to a mediation controller instead of tunnel ingress; the controller is in charge of making decisions according to network congestion and control the behavior of ingress node, for example, reducing traffic or forbidding new traffic flows. In this model the congestion information from egress to controller is conveyed by IPFIX, but how controller controls the behavior of ingress is out of scope of this document.
To support feeding back congestion information, some extensions to the IPFIX protocol are necessary. A new IE conveying congestion level is defined for this purpose.
Definition of new IE indicating congestion level.

Description:
The congestion level calculated by exporter.
Abstract Data Type: unsigned8
Data Type Semantics: quantity
ElementId: TBD.
Status: current

The example below shows how IPFIX can be used for congestion feedback (note: the information conveyed here may be incomplete).

(1) Sending Template Set The exporter use Template Set to inform the collector how to interpret the IEs in the following Data Set.

```
+------------------------+--------------------+
| Set ID=2                | Length=n            |
+------------------------+--------------------+
| Template ID=257         | Field Count=m      |
+------------------------+--------------------+
| exporterIPv4Address=130 | Field Length=4     |
+------------------------+--------------------+
| collectorIPv4Address=211| Field Length=4     |
+------------------------+--------------------+
| CongestionLevel=TBD1    | Field Length=2     |
+------------------------+--------------------+
| Enterprise Number=TBD2  |                     |
+------------------------+--------------------+
```

(2) Sending Data Set The exporter meters the traffic and sends the congestion information to collector by Data Set.

```
+------------------+-------------------+
| Set ID=257        | Length=n          |
+------------------+-------------------+
| 192.0.2.12        |                   |
+------------------+-------------------+
| 192.0.2.34        |                   |
+------------------+-------------------+
| 15                |                   |
```
Figure 5: IPFIX Congestion Flow

The Exporter can send congestion information periodically or when triggered to the Collector. Before sending congestion data to the collector, the exporter sends a Template set to Collector. The Template set specifies the structure and semantics of the subsequent Data Set containing congestion-related information. The Collector understands the Data Sets that follow according to Template Set that was sent previously. The exporting Process transmits the Template Set in advance of any Data Sets that use that Template ID, to help ensure that the Collector has the Template Record before receiving the first Data Record. Data Records that correspond to a Template Record may appear in the same and/or subsequent IPFIX Message(s).

The Exporter meters the traffic passing through it and generates flow records. At this point, the Exporter may cache the records and then send congestion cumulative information to the collector. When Exporter detects that the network is heavily congested, it can change the feedback frequency to avoid adding more congestion to network.

When receiving congestion related information, the Collector will make decisions to control the traffic entering the tunnel to reduce tunnel congestion.

5.3 Other Protocols

A thorough evaluation of other protocols have not been performed at this time.
6. Security Considerations

This document describes the tunnel congestion calculation and feedback. For feeding back congestion, security mechanisms of IPFIX are expected to be sufficient. No additional security concerns are expected.

7. IANA Considerations

IANA assignment of parameters for IPFIX extension may need to be considered in this document.

8. References

8.1 Normative References


8.2 Informative References


Scenario*, draft-ietf-conex-mobile-00, July 09, 2012.


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Generic UDP Encapsulation for IP Tunneling
draft-yong-tsvwg-gre-in-udp-encap-02

Abstract
This document describes a method of encapsulating arbitrary protocols within GRE and UDP headers. In this encapsulation, the source UDP port may be used as an entropy field for purposes of loadbalancing while the payload protocol may be identified by the GRE Protocol Type.

Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 24, 2014.
1.  Introduction

Load balancing, or more specifically, statistical multiplexing of traffic using Equal Cost Multi-Path (ECMP) and/or Link Aggregation Groups (LAGs) in IP networks is a widely used technique for creating higher capacity networks out of lower capacity links. Most existing routers in IP networks are already capable of distributing IP traffic flows over ECMP paths and/or LAGs on the basis of a hash function performed on flow invariant fields in IP packet headers and their payload protocol headers. Specifically, when the IP payload is a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [RFC0768] or Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) packet, router hash functions frequently operate on the five-tuple of the source IP address, the destination IP address, the source port, the destination port, and the protocol/next-header...
Several tunneling techniques are in common use in IP networks, such as Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) [RFC2784], MPLS [RFC4023] and L2TPv3 [RFC3931]. GRE is an increasingly popular encapsulation choice, especially in environments where MPLS is unavailable or unnecessary. Unfortunately, use of common GRE endpoints may reduce the entropy available for use in load balancing, especially in environments where the GRE Key field [RFC2890] is not readily available for use as entropy in forwarding decisions.

This document defines a generic GRE-in-UDP encapsulation for tunneling arbitrary network protocol payloads across an IP network environment where ECMP or LAGs are used. The GRE header provides payload protocol de-multiplexing by way of its protocol type field [RFC2784] while the UDP header provides additional entropy by way of its source port.

This encapsulation method requires no changes to the transit IP network. Hash functions in most existing IP routers may utilize and benefit from the use of a GRE-in-UDP tunnel without needing any change or upgrade to their ECMP implementations. The encapsulation mechanism is applicable to a variety of IP networks including Data Center and wide area networks.

2. Terminology

The terms defined in [RFC0768] are used in this document.

3. Procedures

When a tunnel ingress device conforming to this document receives a packet, the ingress MUST encapsulate the packet in UDP and GRE headers and set the destination port of the UDP header to [TBD] Section 6. The ingress device must also insert the payload protocol type in the GRE Protocol Type field. The ingress device SHOULD set the UDP source port based on flow invariant fields from the payload header, otherwise it should be set to a randomly selected constant value, e.g. zero, to avoid packet flow reordering. How a tunnel ingress generates entropy from the payload is outside the scope of this document. The tunnel ingress MUST encode its own IP address as the source IP address and the egress tunnel endpoint IP address. The TTL field in the IP header must be set to a value appropriate for delivery of the encapsulated packet to the tunnel egress endpoint.

When the tunnel egress receives a packet, it must remove the outer UDP and GRE headers. Section 5 describes the error handling when this entity is not instantiated at the tunnel egress.
To simplify packet processing at the tunnel egress, packets destined to this assigned UDP destination port [TBD] SHOULD have their UDP checksum and Sequence flags set to zero because the egress tunnel only needs to identify this protocol. Although IPv6 [RFC2460] restricts the processing a packet with the UDP checksum of zero, [RFC6935] and [RFC6936] relax this constraint to allow the zero UDP checksum.

The tunnel ingress may set the GRE Key Present, Sequence Number Present, and Checksum Present bits and associated fields in the GRE header defined by [RFC2784] and [RFC2890].

In addition IPv6 nodes MUST conform to the following:

1. the IPv6 tunnel ingress and egress SHOULD follow the node requirements specified in Section 4 of [RFC6936] and the usage requirements specified in Section 5 of [RFC6936]

2. IPv6 transit nodes SHOULD follow the requirements 9, 10, 11 specified in Section 5 of [RFC6936].

The format of the GRE-in-UDP encapsulation for both IPv4 and IPv6 outer headers is shown in the following figures:

IPv4 Header:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version</th>
<th>IHL</th>
<th>Type of Service</th>
<th>Total Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flags</td>
<td>Fragment Offset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time to Live</td>
<td>Protocol=17[UDP]</td>
<td>Header Checksum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Source IPv4 Address</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destination IPv4 Address</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UDP Header:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Port = XXXX</th>
<th>Dest Port = TBD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UDP Length</td>
<td>UDP Checksum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRE Header:
Figure 1: UDP+GRE IPv4 headers

IPv6 Header:

```
+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
|  Version       |  Traffic Class  |           Flow Label                  |
|----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
|  Payload Length |  NxtHdr=17[UDP]|   Hop Limit                           |
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
|                  |                |                                       |
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
| Outer Source IPv6 Address                           |
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
| Outer Destination IPv6 Address                        |
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
```

UDP Header:

```
+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Source Port = XXXX | Dest Port = TBD |
|----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
| UDP Length | UDP Checksum |
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
```

Figure 1: UDP+GRE IPv4 headers

```
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
```

IPv6 Header:

```
+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
|  Version       |  Traffic Class  |           Flow Label                  |
|----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
|  Payload Length |  NxtHdr=17[UDP]|   Hop Limit                           |
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
|                  |                |                                       |
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
| Outer Source IPv6 Address                           |
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
| Outer Destination IPv6 Address                        |
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
```

UDP Header:

```
+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Source Port = XXXX | Dest Port = TBD |
|----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
| UDP Length | UDP Checksum |
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------------------|
```
4. Encapsulation Considerations

GRE-in-UDP encapsulation allows the tunneled traffic to be unicast, broadcast, or multicast traffic. Entropy may be generated from the header of tunneled unicast or broadcast/multicast packets at tunnel ingress. The mapping mechanism between the tunneled multicast traffic and the multicast capability in the IP network is transparent and independent to the encapsulation and is outside the scope of this document.

If tunnel ingress must perform fragmentation on a packet before encapsulation, it MUST use the same source UDP port for all packet fragments. This ensures that the transit routers will forward the packet fragments on the same path. GRE-in-UDP encapsulation introduces some overhead as mentioned in section 3, which reduces the effective Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) size. An operator should factor in this addition overhead bytes when considering an MTU size for the payload to reduce the likelihood of fragmentation.

To ensure the tunneled traffic gets the same treatment over the IP network, prior to the encapsulation process, tunnel ingress should process the payload to get the proper parameters to fill into the IP header such as DiffServ [[RFC2983]]. Tunnel end points that support ECN MUST use the method described in [RFC6040] for ECN marking propagation. This process is outside of the scope of this document.
Note that the IPv6 header [RFC2460] contains a flow label field that may be used for load balancing in an IPv6 network [RFC6438]. Thus in an IPv6 network, either GRE-in-UDP or flow labels may be used in order to improve load balancing performance. Use of GRE-in-UDP encapsulation provides a unified hardware implementation for load balancing in an IP network independent of the IP version(s) in use.

5. Backward Compatibility

It is assumed that tunnel ingress routers must be upgraded in order to support the encapsulations described in this document.

No change is required at transit routers to support forwarding of the encapsulation described in this document.

If a router that is intended for use as a tunnel egress does not support the GRE-in-UDP encapsulation described in this document, it will not be listening on destination port [TBD]. In these cases, the router will conform to normal UDP processing and respond to the tunnel ingress with an ICMP message indicating "port unreachable" according to [RFC0792]. Upon receiving this ICMP message, the tunnel ingress MUST NOT continue to use GRE-in-UDP encapsulation toward this tunnel egress without management intervention.

6. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to make the following allocation: Service Name: GRE-in-UDP Transport Protocol(s): UDP Assignee: IESG iesg@ietf.org Contact: IETF Chair chair@ietf.org Description: GRE-in-UDP Encapsulation Reference: [This.I-D] Port Number: TBD Service Code: N/A Known Unauthorized Uses: N/A Assignment Notes: N/A

7. Security Considerations

7.1. Vulnerability

Neither UDP nor GRE encapsulation effects security for the payload protocol. When using GRE-in-UDP, Network Security in a network is similar to that of a network using GRE.

Use of ICMP for signaling of the GRE-in-UDP encapsulation capability adds a security concern. Tunnel ingress devices may want to validate the origin of ICMP Port Unreachable messages before taking action. The mechanism for performing this validation is out of the scope of this document.

In an instance where the UDP src port is not set based on the flow invariant fields from the payload header, a random port SHOULD be
selected in order to minimize the vulnerability to off-path attacks. [RFC6056] How the src port randomization occurs is outside scope of this document.

8. Acknowledgements

The Authors would like to thank Vivek Kumar, Ron Bonica, Joe Touch, Ruediger Geib, Gorry Fairhurst, and David Black for their review and valuable input on this draft.

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10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


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Flow Metadata Signaling with RSVP

draft-zamfir-tsvwg-flow-metadata-rsvp-00

Abstract

This specification proposes RSVP protocol extensions for signaling flow metadata attributes.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

Flow Metadata attributes are information elements (attributes) that identify flow characteristics, such as the type of media carried by application flows (e.g. video), the service class, the application that originated the flow, and others. The description of the Flow Metadata technology and some of the attribute definitions can be found in [I-D.eckert-intarea-flow-metadata-framework]. The flow attributes can be signaled over the flow path and inspected by intermediate network nodes for the purpose of applying differentiated flow treatment or collect network analytics. This specification proposes the use of RSVP as signaling protocol to carry the Flow Metadata using a new RSVP object. Two C-Type values are proposed for this object to allow for two possible encodings.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2.1. FLOW_METADATA Class

FLOW_METADATA Class = 234

Two encodings are defined, both of which carry the same IPFIX registered attributes as defined in [I-D.eckert-intarea-flow-metadata-framework]. The first encoding (Basic IPFIX FLOW_METADATA) has less flexibility and lower encoding efficiency. This version of the encoding is referenced here for legacy reasons. It does not support a range of options that the second one does, including the signaling of sender and receiver attributes, security elements, distinction of originator of the attributes and ease of extensibility.

2.1.1. Basic IPFIX FLOW_METADATA Object

Basic IPFIX FLOW_METADATA Object: Class = 234, C-Type = 1

- The metadata attributes are encoded in IPFIX format, as described in [RFC5101], with the following restrictions when creating the object:
  - Options Template Record MUST NOT be present
  - One and only one Template Record MUST be present
  - One and only one Data Record MUST be included

- An intermediate node that supports this specification SHOULD ignore any Options Template Record. It SHOULD only decode and process the first occurring Template and Data Records.

2.1.2. Enhanced Protocol Independent FLOW_METADATA Object

Enhanced Protocol Independent FLOW_METADATA Object: Class = 234, C-Type = 2

- The contents and encoding rules for this object are specified in [I-D.eckert-intarea-flow-metadata-framework] and [I-D.choukir-tsvwg-flow-metadata-encoding].

2.2. Semantic of carrying the Metadata Object

The Metadata Object included in the Path message carries attributes from the sender of the flow towards the receiver. In some cases, e.g. if the sender does not support the generation and signaling of Metadata attribute, these attributes may be inserted by a proxy along the path of the flow. Metadata RSVP nodes on path may modify the
metadata attributes for purpose of influencing policy toward the receiver.

The node that originates Metadata information in a Path message may do so for the sole purpose of signaling Metadata information. In this case, the SENDER_TSPEC objects fields (as defined by [RFC2210]) should be set to 0:

- Token Bucket Rate \( [r] \)
- Token Bucket Size \( [b] \)
- Peak Data Rate \( [p] \)
- Minimum Policed Unit \( [m] \)

If the Metadata object is inserted in a Path message used for IntServ service ([RFC2210]) reservation requests, then all the rules of RSVP reservation request apply and in addition any actions driven purely by the metadata attributes may equally take place.

While the Metadata Object may be included in a Resv message, the specific processing rules for this option is left for followup documents or future versions of this specification.

2.3. Processing by a Non-Metadata Capable RSVP Router

As described in [RFC2205], a node that does not understand the Metadata object, should ignore but forward it, unexamined and unmodified. When received in Path or Resv messages, it should be saved with the corresponding state and forwarded in any refresh message resulting from that state.

2.4. Processing by a Metadata Capable RSVP Router

The Metadata object may be inserted by the data flow initiating endpoint or network nodes along the path. The means by which an implementation determines the content of the Metadata object is outside the scope of this document.

Intermediate nodes that support this specification, decode the Flow Metadata information as indicated by the C-Type field only when received in Path message. Depending on the attributes, local configuration and policies, the node may take some actions. The Metadata attribute semantics are described in [I-D.eckert-intarea-flow-metadata-framework]. The received Flow Metadata object is stored against the Path state. When a subsequent Path message is received with a modified Metadata object, the
intermediate node determines the attributes that have been removed, modified and/or added by comparing the old and new objects, and takes appropriate actions.

As a result of these actions, an intermediate node may add new attributes to the Metadata object received in the Path message and signal them downstream. It can also modify some of the attributes present in the Flow Metadata object. RSVP does not have any transport protocol specific restrictions and the exact set of attributes that can be inserted and modified by intermediate nodes is described in [I-D.eckert-intarea-flow-metadata-framework]. Depending on local policies, an intermediate node may also remove some of the attributes received in the Metadata object of a Path message before forwarding downstream.

An intermediate node that receives a Resv message with a Metadata Object SHOULD store the object against the state and forward it unexamined and unmodified.

3. References

3.1. Normative References


3.2. Informative References


Applications and the Network", draft-eckert-intarea-flow-metadata-framework-00 (work in progress), July 2013.

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