

# **Problems with STUN Authentication for TURN**

**draft-reddy-behave-turn-auth-02**

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# *Background*

- Applications like WebRTC may choose to use TURN for privacy.
- NAT/Firewall traversal.
- TURN server could be deployed in Enterprise DMZ for Auditing etc
- Mobility.
- TURN includes IPv4-to-IPv6, IPv6-to-IPv6, and IPv6-to-IPv4 relaying.

# *Related proposals*

- draft-thomson-mmusic-rtcweb-bw-consent proposes extensions to TURN for requesting bandwidth allocation at a TURN server.
- draft-ietf-rtcweb-use-cases-and-requirements refers to deploying a TURN server for auditing.

# *TURN Auth*

TURN uses key derived from username and password to generate message integrity for TURN request/response.


```
key = MD5(username ":" realm ":"  
SASLprep(password))
```

# *Problems with STUN Auth*

1. “log-in” username and password will not change for extended periods of time
  - Password susceptible to offline dictionary attacks
2. TURN server needs to be aware of username and password (management overhead).

# Attackers verses TURN Servers

3. Adversary can learn USERNAME by snooping TURN messages.  
Attacker can learn USERNAME of the user.



# *Problems with STUN Authentication*

4. TURN credential exposed to Java Script
  - TURN could be deployed in cloud and comes at a cost on SaaS provider.
  
5. No support for multiple realms

# *Problems with STUN Authentication*

- This makes STUN authentication important to prevent un-authorized users from accessing the TURN Server.

# *Solutions*

- draft-uberti-behave-turn-rest addresses the problem for third party authorization.
  - No revocation of temporary credential.
  - Could be misused by malicious Java Script
  - Static shared secret.
- There is still need to resolve first party authentication.
  - Auditing use case in Enterprise

# *Next steps*

- Is the WG interested in documenting the problem ?
- Is the WG interested in solving the problem ?