

Identity in SIP (and in-band)

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
In-band precedents

- **RFC3325** (short-term identity)
 - Advantages: deployable, deployed!
 - Disadvantages: requires trusted network, and...
 - Impersonation thrives in existing trusted networks
- **RFC4474** (long-term identity)
 - Advantages: Great for SIP URIs and RFC3261 compliance
 - Disadvantages: doesn't play well with telephone numbers, much of the world isn't RFC3261-compliant
- Many subsequent attempts to do better
 - Alternative signature scopes, tokens, etc.
 - VIPR notably tried to solve identity and a host of related problems

Components of an in-band solution

- A field to carry a signature over various headers in a SIP request
 - e.g., RFC4474 Identity header
 - Intended to provide a cryptographic assertion of authority over the From header field and other components of the message:
 - Prevent replay by cut-and-paste attacker
 - **Problem:** many elements are changed by SIP intermediaries, which to choose?
- A way to acquire and validate the public key of the signer over those headers
 - e.g., the RFC4474 Identity-Info header
 - Includes carrying the key in band
 - **Problem:** Many viable approaches, which to allow/disallow?
 - RFC4474 vaguely assumed public ENUM would have certs for numbers in the DNS

In-band STIR Logical Architecture



Revisiting what?

Which RFC4474 assumptions **failed**?

- SIP deployments remained focused on **PSTN interworking**
 - IP-PSTN, PSTN-IP, IP-PSTN-IP, PSTN-IP-PSTN
 - **Telephone numbers** are therefore the primary identifier of SIP
 - No story for certs in e164.arpa ever took hold
- Lack of unmediated **end-to-end** SIP signaling
 - Deployments are highly mediated, intermediary agency is not bounded
 - Mediated for various reasons, from NAT to interop to security
 - Policy enforcement of many kinds
 - Many calls still drop to the PSTN due to lack of IP routes
- RFC4474 solved for SIP requests in general
 - Assumed a world with MESSAGEs and NOTIFYs, not just INVITEs

Rescoping to the Problem

- For threats like robocalling and voicemail hacking, man-in-the-middle attacks are not a real concern
- How best to separate the **replay-protection** goal from the **man-in-the-middle prevention** goal?
 - Not an entirely clean split
 - Scope the **To/From** protection to just the telephone number, when a telephone number is present
 - Domain or other parameters not helpful
 - Canonicalization required, a non-trivial problem
 - Necessarily include some kind of timestamp (**Date**)
 - Handle body protection separately, when you need it
 - Ultimately, possible to create some kind of linked two-layer signature

Limits of in-band

- It's in-band
 - At best, this addresses the SIP-to-SIP use case
 - Maybe, e.g. IKES, with something else in the middle
 - Not going to help with SIP-to-PSTN, PSTN-to-PSTN
 - But we believe IP-to-IP is the future, right?
 - So we still need in-band
- Will SIP networks allow it?
 - Difficult to anticipate what will survive deployments
 - No guarantees are possible
 - Needs to change existing service behavior
 - Intermediaries need to do new things