Multiple Provisioning Domain Architecture
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Abstract

This document is a product of the work of MIF architecture design team. It outlines a solution framework for some of the issues, experienced by nodes that can be attached to multiple networks. The framework defines the notion of a Provisioning Domain (PVD) - a consistent set of network configuration information, and PVD-aware nodes - nodes which learn PVDs from the attached network(s) and/or other sources and manage and use multiple PVDs for connectivity separately and consistently.

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1. Introduction
Nodes attached to multiple networks may encounter problems due to conflict of the networks configuration and/or simultaneous use of the multiple available networks. While existing implementations apply various techniques ([RFC6419]) to tackle such problems, in many cases the issues may still appear. The MIF problem statement document [RFC6418] describes the general landscape as well as discusses many specific issues and scenarios details, and are not listed in this document.

Across the layers, problems enumerated in [RFC6418] can be grouped into 3 categories:

1. Lack of consistent and distinctive management of configuration elements, associated with different networks.

2. Inappropriate mixed use of configuration elements, associated with different networks, in the course of a particular network activity / connection.

3. Use of a particular network, not consistent with the intent of the scenario / involved parties, leading to connectivity failure and / or other undesired consequences.

As an illustration: an example of (1) is a single node-scoped list of DNS server IP addresses, learned from different networks, leading to failures or delays in resolution of name from particular namespaces; an example of (2) is use of an attempt to resolve a name of a HTTP proxy server, learned from a network A, with a DNS server, learned from a network B, likely to fail; an example of (3) is a use of employer-sponsored VPN connection for peer-to-peer connections, unrelated to employment activities.

This architecture describes a solution to these categories of problems, respectively, by:

1. Introducing a formal notion of the PVD, including PVD identity, and ways for nodes to learn the intended associations among acquired network configuration information elements.

2. Introducing a reference model for a PVD-aware node, preventing inadvertent mixed use of the configuration information, which may belong to different PVDs.

3. Providing recommendations on PVD selection based on PVD identity and connectivity tests for common scenarios.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Definitions and types of PVDs

Provisioning Domain: a consistent set of network configuration information. Classically, the entire set available on a single interface is provided by a single source, such as network administrator, and can therefore be treated as a single provisioning domain. In modern IPv6 networks, multihoming can result in more than one provisioning domain being present on a single link. In some scenarios, it is also possible for elements of the same domain to be present on multiple links.

Typical examples of information in a provisioning domain, learned from the network, are: source address prefixes, to be used by connections within the provisioning domain, IP address of DNS server, name of HTTP proxy server if available, DNS suffixes associated with the network etc.

PVD-aware node: a node that supports association of network configuration information into PVDs, and using the resultant PVDs to serve requests for network connections in ways, consistent with recommendations of this architecture.

2.1. Explicit PVDs

A node may receive explicit information from the network and/or other sources, about presence of PVDs and association of particular network information with a particular PVD. PVDs, constructed based on such information, are referred to in this document as "explicit".

Protocol changes/extensions will likely be required to support the explicit PVDs by IETF-defined mechanisms. As an example, one could think of one or several DHCP options, carrying PVD identity and / or its elements. A different approach could be to introduce a DHCP option, which only carries identity of a PVD, while the association of network information elements with that identity, is implemented by the respective protocols - such as e.g., with a Router Discovery [RFC4861] option associating an address range with a PVD.

Specific, existing or new, features of networking protocols to enable delivery of PVD identity and association with various network information elements will be defined in companion design documents.

Link-specific and/or vendor-proprietary mechanisms for discovery of PVD information, different from the IETF-defined mechanisms, can be used by the nodes separately from or together with IETF-defined mechanisms, as long as they allow to discover necessary elements of the PVD(s). Another example of a delivery mechanism for PVDs are key exchange or tunneling protocols, such as IKEv2 [RFC5996] that allow transporting host configuration information. In all cases, by default nodes must ensure that the lifetime of all dynamically
discovered PVD configuration is appropriately limited by the relevant events - for example, if an interface media state change was indicated, the previously discovered information may no longer be valid and needs to be re-discovered or confirmed.

It shall be possible for networks to communicate that some of their configuration elements could be used within a context of other networks/PVDs. Based on such declaration and their policies, PVD-aware nodes may choose to inject such elements into some or all other PVDs they connect to.

In some network topologies, the network infrastructure elements may need to advertise multiple PVDs. The details of how this is done generally will be defined in the individual companion design documents. However, where different design choices are possible, the choice that requires smaller number of packets shall be preferred for efficiency.

2.2. Implicit PVDs and incremental adoption of the explicit PVDs

It is likely that for a long time there may be networks which do not advertise explicit PVD information, since deployment of any new features in networking protocols is a relatively slow process.

When connected to networks, which don’t advertise explicit PVD information, PVD-aware shall automatically create separate PVDs for configuration received on multiple interfaces. Such PVDs are referred to in this document as "implicit".

With implicit PVDs, PVD-aware nodes may still provide benefits to their users, compared to non-PVD aware nodes, by using network information from different interfaces separately and consistently to serve network connection requests, following best practices described in Section 5.

In the mixed mode, where e.g., multiple networks are available on the link the interface is attached to, and only some of the networks advertise PVD information, the PVD-aware node shall create explicit PVDs based on explicitly learned PVD information, and associate the rest of the configuration with an implicit PVD created for that interface.

2.3. Relationship between PVDs and interfaces

Implicit PVDs are limited to network configuration information received on a single interface. Explicit PVDs, in practice will often also be scoped to a configuration related to a particular interface, however per this architecture there is no such requirement or limitation and as defined in this architecture, explicit PVDs may include information related to more than one interfaces, if the node
learns presence of the same PVD on those interfaces and the authentication of the PVD ID meets the level required by the node policy.

It is an intent of this architecture to support such scenarios among others. Hence, it shall be noted that no hierarchical relationship exists between interfaces and PVDs: it is possible for multiple PVDs to be simultaneously accessible over one interface, as well as single PVD to be simultaneously accessible over multiple interfaces.

2.4. PVD identity/naming

For explicit PVDs, PVD ID (globally unique ID, that possibly is human-readable) is received as part of that information. For implicit PVDs, the node assigns a locally generated globally unique ID to each implicit PVD.

PVD-aware node may use these IDs to choose a PVD with matching ID for special-purpose connection requests, in accordance with node policy or choice by advanced applications, and/or to present human-readable IDs to the end-user for selection of Internet-connected PVDs.

A single network provider may operate multiple networks, including networks at different locations. In such cases, the provider may chose whether to advertise single or multiple PVD identities at all or some of those networks, as it suits their business needs. This architecture doesn’t impose specific requirements in this regard.

When multiple nodes are connected to the same link, where one or more explicit PVDs are available, this architecture assumes that the information about all available PVDs is advertized by the networks to all the connected nodes. At the same time, the connected nodes may have different heuristics, policies and/or other settings, including configured set of their trusted PVDs, which may lead to different PVDs actually being used by different nodes for their connections.

Possible extensions, where different sets of PVDs may be advertised by the networks to different connected nodes, are out of scope for this document.

2.5. Relationship to dual-stack networks

When applied to dual-stack networks, the PVD definition allows for multiple PVDs to be created, where each PVD contain information for only one address family, or for a single PVD that contains information about multiple address families. This architecture requires that accompanying design documents for accompanying protocol changes must support PVDs containing information from multiple
address families. PVD-aware nodes must be capable of dealing with both single-family and multi-family PVDs.

For explicit PVDs, the choice of either of the approaches is a policy decision of a network administrator and/or node user/administrator. Since some of the IP configuration information that can be learned from the network can be applicable to multiple address families (for instance DHCP address selection option [I-D.ietf-6man-addr-select-opt]), it is likely that dual-stack networks will deploy single PVDs for both address families.

For implicit PVDs, by default PVD-aware nodes shall including multiple IP families into single implicit PVD created for an interface. At the time of writing of this document in dual-stack networks it appears to be a common practice for configuration of both address families to be provided by a single source.

A PVD-aware node that provides API to use / enumerate / inspect PVDs and/or their properties shall provide ability to filter PVDs and/or their properties by address family.

2.6. Elements of PVD

3. Conveying PVD information using DHCPv6 and Router Advertisements

DHCPv6 and Router Advertisements are the two most common methods of configuring hosts and they would need to be extended to convey explicit PVD information. There are several things that need to be considered before finalizing a mechanism to augment DHCPv6 and RAs with PVD information.

3.1. Separate messages or one message

When information from several PVDs is available at the same configuration source, there are two possibilities regarding how to send these out. One way is to send information from different provisioning domains in separate messages. The other is to combine information from several PVDs onto one message. The latter method has the advantage of being more efficient but could have issues due to authentication and authorization issues as well as potential issues with accommodating common information and information not tagged with any PVD information.

3.2. Securing the PVD information

DHCPv6 and RAs both provide some form of authentication that ensures the identity of the source as well as the integrity of the contents that have been secured. While this is useful, the authenticity of the information provides no information whether the configuration source is actually allowed to provide information from a given PVD. In order to do be able to do this, there must be a mechanism for the
owner of the PVD to attach some form of authorization token to the
configuration information that is delivered.

3.3. Backward compatibility

The extensions to RAs and DHCPv6 should be defined in such a manner
than unmodified hosts (i.e. hosts not aware of PvDs) will continue
to function as well as they did before the PvD information got added.
This could imply that some information may need to be duplicated in
order to be conveyed to legacy hosts. Similarly PvD aware hosts need
to be able to handle legacy configuration sources which do not
provide PvD information. There are also several initiatives ongoing
that are aimed at adding some form of additional information to
prefixes [refs to draft-bhandari and draft-korhonen] and any new
mechanism should try to consider co-existence with these existing
mechanisms.

3.4. Selective propagation

When a configuration source has information regarding several PvDs it
is not clear whether it should provide information about all of them
to any host that requests info from it. While it may be reasonable
in some cases, this might become an unreasonable burden once the
number of PvDs starts increasing. One way to restrict the
propagation of useless information is for the host to select the PvD
information they desire in their request to the configuration source.
One way this could be accomplished is by using an ORO with the PvDs
that are of interest. The configuration source can then respond with
only the requested information.

By default, a configuration source SHOULD provide information related
to all provisioning domains without expecting the client to select
the PvD(s) it requires. This is necessary to ensure that hosts that
do not support requesting selective PvD information will continue to
work. Also note that IPv6 neighbor discovery does not provide any
functionality analogous to the DHCPv6 ORO.

In this case, when a host receives PvD information it does not
require, the information can simply be discarded. Also, in
constrained networks such as LLNs, the amount of configuration
information needs to be restricted to ensure that the load on the
hosts is bearable while keeping the information identical across all
the hosts.

In case selective propogation is required, some form of PvD discovery
mechanism needs to be specified so that hosts/applications can be
pre-provisioned to request a specific PvD. Alternately, the set of
PvDs that the network can provide to the host can be propagated to the host using RAs or stateless DHCPv6. The discovery mechanism may potentially support the discovery of available PvDs on a per-host basis.

3.5. Retracting/updating PvD information

After the PvD information is provided to the host it may be outdated or updated with newer information before the hosts would normally request updates. Thos would require the mechanism to be able to update and/or withdraw all (or some subset) of information related to a given PvD. For efficiency reasons, there should be a way to specify that all the information from the PvD needs to be reconfigured instead of individually updating each item associated with the PvD.

3.6. Conveying configuration information using IKEv2

Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2 (IKEv2) [RFC5996] [RFC5739] is another widely used and a popular method of configuring IP information in a host. In the case of IKEv2 the provisioning domain could actually be implicitly learnt from the Identification - Responder (IDr) payloads the IKEv2 initiator and the responder inject during the IKEv2 exchange. The IP configuration may depend on the named IDr. Another possibility could be adding specific provisioning domain identifying payload extensions to IKEv2. All of the considerations listed above for DHCPv6 and RAs potentialy apply to IKEv2 as well.

4. Example network configurations and number of PVDs

5. Reference model of PVD-aware node

5.1. Constructions and maintenance of separate PVDs

It is assumed that normally, configuration information contained in a single PVD, shall be sufficient for a node to fulfill a network connection request by an application, and hence there should be no need to attempt to merge information across different PVDs.

Nevertheless, even when a PVD lack some parts of the configuration, merging of information from different PVD(s) shall not be done automatically, since typically it would lead to issues described in [RFC6418].

A node may use other sources, such as e.g., node local policy, user input or other mechanisms, not defined by IETF, to either construct a PVD entirely (analogously to static IP configuration of an interface), or supplement with particular elements all or some PVDs learned from the network, or potentially merge information from different PVDs, if such merge is known to the node to be safe, based on explicit policies.
As an example, node administrator could inject a not ISP-specific DNS server into PVDs for any of the networks the node could become attached to. Such creation / augmentation of PVD(s) could be static or dynamic. The particular implementation mechanisms are outside of the scope of this document.

5.2. Consistent use of PVDs for network connections

PVDs enable PVD-aware nodes to use consistently a correct set of configuration elements to serve the specific network requests from beginning to end. This section describes specific examples of such consistent use.

5.2.1. Name resolution

When PVD-aware node needs to resolve a name of the destination used by a connection request, the node could decide to use one, or multiple PVDs for a given name lookup.

The node shall chose one PVD, if e.g., the node policy required to use a particular PVD for a particular purpose (e.g. to download an MMS using a specific APN over a cellular connection). To make the choice, the node could use a match of the PVD DNS suffix or other form of PVD ID, as determined by the node policy.

The node may pick multiple PVDs, if e.g., they are general purpose PVDs providing connectivity to the Internet, and the node desires to maximize chances for connectivity in Happy Eyeballs style. In this case, the node could do the lookups in parallel, or in sequence. Alternatively, the node may use for the lookup only one PVD, based on the PVD connectivity properties, user choice of the preferred Internet PVD, etc.

In either case, by default the node uses information obtained in a name service lookup to establish connections only within the same PVD from which the lookup results were obtained.

For simplicity, when we say that name service lookup results were obtained from a PVD, what we mean is that the name service query was issued against a name service the configuration of which is present in a particular PVD. In that sense, the results are "from" that particular PVD.

Some nodes may support transports and/or APIs, which provide an abstraction of a single connection, aggregating multiple underlying connections. MPTCP [RFC6182] is an example of such transport protocol. For the connections provided by such transports/APIs, a PVD-aware node may use different PVDs for servicing of that logical connection, provided that all operations on the underlying
connections are done consistently within their corresponding PVD(s).

5.2.2. Next-hop and source address selection

For the purpose of this discussion, let’s assume the preceding name lookup succeeded in a particular PVD. For each obtained destination address, the node shall perform a next-hop lookup among routers, associated with that PVD. As an example, such association could be determined by the node via matching the source address prefixes/specific routes advertised by the router against known PVDs, or receiving explicit PVD affiliation advertised through a new Router Discovery [RFC4861] option.

For each destination, once the best next-hop is found, the node selects best source address according to the [RFC6724] rules, but with a constraint that the source address must belong to a range associated with the used PVD. If needed, the node would use the prefix policy from the same PVD for the best source address selection among multiple candidates.

When destination/source pairs are identified, then they are sorted using the [RFC6724] destination sorting rules and the prefix policy table from the used PVD.

5.3. Connectivity tests

Although some PVDs may appear as valid candidates for PVD selection (e.g., good link quality, consistent connection parameters, etc.), they may provide limited or no connectivity to the desired network or the Internet. For example, some PVDs provide limited IP connectivity (e.g., scoped to the link or to the access network), but require the node to authenticate through a web portal to get full access to the Internet. This may be more likely to happen for PVDs, which are not trusted by the given PVD-aware node.

An attempt to use such PVD may lead to limited network connectivity or connection failures for applications. To prevent the latter, a PVD-aware node may perform connectivity test for the PVD, before using it to serve network connection requests of the applications. In current implementations, some nodes do that, for instance, by trying to reach a dedicated web server (e.g., see [RFC6419]).

Per Section 5.2, a PVD-aware node shall maintain and use multiple PVDs separately. The PVD-aware node shall perform connectivity test and, only after validation of the PVD, consider using it to serve application connections requests. Ongoing connectivity tests are also required, since during the IP session, the end-to-end connectivity could be disrupted for various reasons (e.g., poor L2,
IP QoS issues); hence a connectivity monitoring function is needed to check the connectivity status and remove the PVD from the set of usable PVDs if necessary.

There may be cases where a connectivity test for PVD selection may be not appropriate and should be complemented, or replaced, by PVD selection based on other factors. This could be realized e.g., by leveraging some 3GPP and IEEE mechanisms, which would allow to expose some PVD characteristics to the node (e.g. 3GPP Access Network Discovery and Selection Function (ANDSF) [REF ANDSF], IEEE 802.11u/ANQP [REF 802.11u]).

5.4. Relationship to interface management and connection managers

Current devices such as mobile handsets make use of proprietary mechanisms and custom applications to manage connectivity in environments with multiple interfaces and multiple sets of network configurations. These mechanisms or applications are commonly known as connection managers [RFC6419].

Connection managers sometimes rely on policy servers to allow the node, connected to multiple networks, perform the network selection. They can also make use of routing guidance from the network (e.g. 3GPP ANDSF [REF ANDSF]). Although connection managers solve some connectivity problems, they rarely address the network selection problems in a comprehensive manner. With proprietary solutions, it is challenging to present a coherent behaviour to the end user of the device, as different platforms present different behaviours even when connected to the same network, with the same type of interface, and for the same purpose.

6. PVD support in APIs

In all cases changes in available PVDs must be somehow exposed, appropriately for each of the approaches.

6.1. Basic

Applications are not PVD-aware in any manner, and only submit connection requests. The node performs PVD selection implicitly, without any otherwise applications participation, and based purely on node-specific administrative policies and/or choices made by the user in a user interface provided by the operating environment, not by the application.

As an example, such PVD selection can be done at the name service lookup step, by using the relevant configuration elements, such as e.g., those described in [RFC6731]. As another example, the PVD
selection could be done based on application identity or type (i.e., a node could always use a particular PVD for a VOIP application).

6.2. Intermediate

Applications indirectly participate in selection of PVD by specifying hard requirements and soft preferences. The node performs PVD selection, based on applications inputs and policies and/or user preferences. Some / all properties of the resultant PVD may be exposed to applications.

6.3. Advanced

PVDs are directly exposed to applications, for enumeration and selection. Node polices and/or user choices, may still override the application preferences and limit which PVD(s) can be enumerated and/or used by the application, irrespectively of any preferences which application may have specified. Depending on the implementation, such restrictions, imposed per node policy and/or user choice, may or may not be visible to the application.

7. PVD-aware nodes trust to PVDs

7.1. Untrusted PVDs

Implicit and explicit PVDs for which no trust relationship exists are considered untrusted. Only PVDs, which meet the requirements in Section 7.2, are trusted; any other PVD is untrusted.

In order to avoid various forms of misinformation that can be asserted when PVDs are untrusted, nodes that implement PVD separation cannot assume that two explicit PVDs with the same identifier are actually the same PVD. A node that did make this assumption would be vulnerable to attacks where for example an open Wifi hotspot might assert that it was part of another PVD, and thereby might draw traffic intended for that PVD onto its own network.

Since implicit PVD identifiers are synthesized by the node, this issue cannot arise with implicit PVDs.

Mechanisms exist (for example, [RFC6731]) whereby a PVD can provide configuration information that asserts special knowledge about the reachability of resources through that PVD. Such assertions cannot be validated unless the node has a trust relationship with the PVD; assertions of this type therefore must be ignored by nodes that receive them from untrusted PVDs. Failure to ignore such assertions could result in traffic being diverted from legitimate destinations to spoofed destinations.

7.2. Trusted PVDs
Trusted PVDs are PVDs for which two conditions apply. First, a trust relationship must exist between the node that is using the PVD configuration and the source that provided that configuration; this is the authorization portion of the trust relationship. Second, there must be some way to validate the trust relationship. This is the authentication portion of the trust relationship. Two mechanisms for validating the trust relationship are defined.

It shall be possible to validate the trust relationship for all advertised elements of a trusted PVD, irrespectively of whether the PVD elements are communicated as a whole, e.g. in a single DHCP option, or separately, e.g. in supplementary RA options. Whether or not this is feasible to provide mechanisms to implement trust relationship for all PVD elements, will be determined in the respective companion design documents.

7.2.1. Authenticated PVDs

One way to validate the trust relationship between a node and the source of a PVD is through the combination of cryptographic authentication and an identifier configured on the node. In some cases, the two could be the same; for example, if authentication is done with a shared secret, the secret would have to be associated with the PVD identifier. Without a (PVD Identifier, shared key) tuple, authentication would be impossible, and hence authentication and authorization are combined.

However, if authentication is done using some public key mechanism such as a TLS cert or DANE, authentication by itself isn’t enough, since theoretically any PVD could be authenticated in this way. In addition to authentication, the node would need to be configured to trust the identifier being authenticated. Validating the authenticated PVD name against a list of PVD names configured as trusted on the node would constitute the authorization step in this case.

7.2.2. PVDs trusted by attachment

In some cases a trust relationship may be validated by some means other than described in Section 7.2.1, simply by virtue of the connection through which the PVD was obtained. For instance, a handset connected to a mobile network may know through the mobile network infrastructure that it is connected to a trusted PVD, and whatever mechanism was used to validate that connection constitutes the authentication portion of the PVD trust relationship. Presumably such a handset would be configured from the factory, or else through mobile operator or user preference settings, to trust the PVD, and this would constitute the authorization portion of this type of trust relationship.

8. Acknowledgements

9. IANA Considerations
10. Security Considerations

There are at least three different form of attacks that can be performed using configuration sources that use multiple provisioning domains.

Tampering with configuration information provided An attacker may attempt to modify the information provided inside the PVD container option. These attacks can easily be prevented by using the message integrity features provided by the underlying protocol used to carry the configuration information. e.g. SEND [RFC3971] would detect any form of tampering with the RA contents and the DHCPv6 [RFC3315] AUTH option that would detect any form of tampering with the DHCPv6 message contents. This attack can also be performed by a compromised configuration source by modifying information inside a specific , in which case the mitigations proposed in the next subsection may be helpful.

Rogue configuration source A compromised configuration source such as a router or a DHCPv6 server may advertise information about PVDs that it is not authorized to advertise. e.g. A coffee shop may advertise configuration information purporting to be from an enterprise and may try to attract enterprise related traffic. The only real way to avoid this is that the PVD related configuration container contains embedded authentication and authorization information from the owner of the PVD. Then, this attack can be detected by the client by verifying the authentication and authorization information provided inside the PVD container option after verifying its trust towards the PVD owner (e.g. a certificate with a well-known/common trust anchor).

Replay attacks A compromised configuration source or an on-link attacker may try to capture advertised configuration information and replay it on a different link or at a future point in time. This can be avoided by including some replay protection mechanism such as a timestamp or a nonce inside the PVD container to ensure freshness of the provided information.

11. References

11.1. Normative References


11.2. Informative References


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Abstract

The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple networks. One part of the solution requires associating configuration information with provisioning domains. This document details how configuration information provided through IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol can be associated with provisioning domains.
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1. Introduction

The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple networks based on the Multiple Provisioning Domains (MPVD) architecture work [I-D.anipko-mif-mpvd-arch]. One part of the solution requires associating configuration information with Provisioning Domains (PVD). This document describes an IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) [RFC4861] mechanism for explicitly indicating provisioning domain information along with any configuration that will be provided. The proposed mechanism uses an NDP option that indicates the identity of the provisioning domain and encapsulates the options that contain the configuration information as well as any accompanying authentication/authorization information. The solution defined in this document aligns as much as possible with the existing IPv6 Neighbor Discovery security, namely with Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) [RFC3971].

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. PVD Container option

The PVD container option (PVD_CO) is used to encapsulate and group together all the configuration options that belong to the explicitly identified provisioning domain. The PVD container option MUST encapsulate exactly one PVD identifier option (PVD_ID). The PVD container option MAY occur multiple times in the same NDP message but each of these PVD container options MUST have a different PVD identity specified under its PVD identity option. A PVD container is intended to be used in IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA) NDP messages. However, including a PVD container inside a Router Solicitation (RS) NDP messages is also possible (actually, a host can in this way solicit for information from a specific PVD).

For the backward compatibility and the reuse of existing NDP options, the PVD container can encapsulate any (meaningful) existing IPv6 NDP options. For example, the PVD container could encapsulate a Prefix Information Option (PIO), which would mark that a certain advertised IPv6 prefix belongs and originates from a specific PVD. Furthermore, for the backward compatibility reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that options critical for establishing IP communication (such as the prefix and DNS information) are encapsulated inside the PVD container.
as well as in the RA (although this will cause duplication of
information in most cases). This ensures hosts that do not
understand provisioning domain concept, will at least receive the
implicit provisioning domain configuration. Hosts that understand
provisioning domain SHOULD always give configuration information
encapsulated inside the PVD container a higher priority than the ones
outside the PVD container(s). It should be noted that a router can
do smart advertisement of "legacy" configuration information and the
PVD container encapsulated. The router MAY leave some of the
provisioning domain specific information outside the "legacy
[RFC4861] way" of advertising them in RAs.

The optional security for the PVD container is based on X.509
certificates [RFC6487] and reuses mechanisms already defined for SeND
[RFC3971] [RFC6495]. However, the use of PVD containers does not
assume or depend on SeND being deployed or even implemented. The PVD
containers SHOULD be signed per PVD certificates, which provides both
integrity protection and proves that the configuration information
source is authorized for advertising the given information.

```
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Type=PVD_CO |    Length     | Options Count |   Name Type   |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
:                                                               :
| Suboptions (padded to 8 octet boundary)                       |
:                                                               :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <+
  :                                                                  |
  : Key Hash                                                      :
  :                                                             :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
  : Digital Signature                                           :
  :                                                         :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
  : Padding (zeroes)                                           :
  :                                                          :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <+
```

Figure 1: PVD Container Option

Type

PVD Container; Set to TBA1.
Length

Length of the PVD_CO. The actual length depends on the number of suboptions and the optional Key Hash/Digital Signature/Padding.

Options Count

The number of suboptions in this PVD container. MUST be 1 or greater.

Name Type

Names the algorithm used to identify a specific X.509 certificate using the method defined for the Subject Key Identifier (SKI) extension for the X.509 certificates. The usage and the Name Type registry aligns with the mechanism defined for SeND [RFC6494][RFC6495]. Name Type values starting from 3 are supported and an implementation MUST at least support SHA-1 (value 3).

Suboptions

One or more suboptions that describe properties and other meta data attached to the provisioning domain. See Section 4 for description of the PVD_ID suboption. All suboptions MUST be multiple of 8 octets and provide required padding with '\0' octets, when needed. Unknown suboptions MUST be silently discarded.

Key Hash

A hash of the public key using the algorithm identified by the Name Type. The procedure how the Key Hash is calculated is defined in [RFC3971] and [RFC6495].

Digital Signature

A signature calculated over the PVD_CO option including all option data from the beginning of the option until the Key Hash field. The procedure of calculating the signature is identical to the one defined for SeND [RFC3971].

Padding

Zero or more '\0' octets to make the PVD_CO to multiple of 8 octets.

The presence of the optional Key Hash and Digital Signature field is
determined from the Length field, i.e. the option length is greater than 0 after subtracting ‘Options Count’ times suboptions from it, then the signature part of the option is present. If the PVD_CO does not contain a digital signature, then other means to secure the integrity of the NDP message SHOULD be provided, such as utilizing SeND. However, the security provided by SeND is for the entire NDP message and does not allow verifying whether the sender of the NDP message is actually authorized for the information for the provisioning domain.

If the PVD_CO contains a signature and the verification fails, then the whole PVD_CO MUST be silently discarded and the event SHOULD be logged.

4. PVD Identity option

The PVD identity option (PVD_ID) is used to explicitly indicate the identity of the provisioning domain that is associated with the configuration information encapsulated by the PVD container option. A PVD container MUST have exactly one PVD identity option.

```
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Type=PVD_ID  |    Length     | ID-Type       | ID-Length     |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                  Provisioning Domain Identifier               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 2: PVD_ID Option

Type

PVD identifier; Set to TBA2.

Length

Length of the PVD_ID.

ID-Type

Describes the type of identification information. This document defines four types of PVD identity information:

0x01: UUID [RFC4122]
0x02: UTF-8 string
0x03: OID [OID]
0x03: NAI Realm [RFC4282]

ID-Length
Length of the Provisioning Domain Identifier in octets.

Provisioning Domain Identifier

The PVD identification that is based on the id-type. The identifier MUST be ‘\0’ octet padded until the PVD_ID option length is multiple of 8 octet.

If the receiver of the PVD_ID option does not understand any of the ID-Types, then the whole encapsulating PVD_CO MUST be silently discarded.

5. Set of allowable options

The PVD container option MAY be used to encapsulate any allocated IPv6 NDP options but MUST NOT be used to encapsulate another PVD_CO option. [TODO: Should we add any other exclusions?].

6. Security Considerations

An attacker may attempt to modify the information provided inside the PVD container option. These attacks can easily be prevented by using SeND [RFC3971] or per PVD container signature that would detect any form of tampering with the IPv6 NDP message contents.

A compromised router may advertise configuration information related to PvDs it is not authorized to advertise. e.g. A coffee shop router may provide configuration information purporting to be from an enterprise and may try to attract enterprise related traffic. The only real way to avoid this is that the Pvd container contains embedded authentication and authorization information from the owner of the Pvd. Then, this attack can be detected by the client by verifying the authentication and authorization information provided inside the PVD container option after verifying its trust towards the Pvd owner (e.g. a certificate with a well-known/common trust anchor).

A compromised configuration source or an on-link attacker may try to capture advertised configuration information and replay it on a different link or at a future point in time. This can be avoided by...
including some replay protection mechanism such as a timestamp or a nonce inside the PvD container to ensure freshness of the provided information.

7. IANA Considerations

This document defines new IPv6 Neighbor discovery options from the registry at http://www.iana.org/assignments/icmpv6-parameters/icmpv6-parameters.xhtml#icmpv6-parameters-5

PVD_CO: TBA1
PVD_ID: TBA2

This document reuses information from a new registry for PVD Identity types

http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/

8. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the members of the MIF architecture design team for their comments that led to the creation of this draft.

9. References

9.1. Normative References


[RFC6495] Gagliano, R., Krishnan, S., and A. Kukec, "Subject Key Identifier (SKI) SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) Name Type Fields", RFC 6495, February 2012.

9.2. Informative References


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Support for multiple provisioning domains in DHCPv6
draft-kkb-mpvd-dhcp-support-00

Abstract

The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple networks. One part of the solution requires associating configuration information with provisioning domains. This document details how configuration information provided through DHCPv6 can be associated with provisioning domains.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple networks based on the Multiple Provisioning Domains (MPVD) architecture work [I-D.anipko-mif-mpvd-arch]. One part of the solution requires associating configuration information with provisioning domains. This document describes a DHCPv6 mechanism for explicitly indicating provisioning domain information along with any configuration that will be provided. The proposed mechanism uses a DHCPv6 option that indicates the identity of the provisioning domain and encapsulates the options that contain the configuration information as well as any accompanying authentication/authorization information.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. PVD Container option

The PVD container option is used to encapsulate and group together all the configuration options that belong to the explicitly identified provisioning domain. The PVD container option MUST encapsulate exactly one OPTION_PVD_ID. The PVD container option MAY occur multiple times in the same message, but each of these PVD container options MUST have a different PVD identity specified under its PVD identity option. The PVD container option SHOULD contain exactly one OPTION_PVD_AUTH.

```
0                   1                   2                   3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|        OPTION_PVD             |         option-length         |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
+            encapsulated-options (variable length)             .
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 1: PVD Container Option
4. PVD Identity option

The PVD identity option is used to explicitly indicate the identity of the provisioning domain that is associated with the configuration information encapsulated by the PVD container option.

```
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|       OPTION_PVD_ID           |         option-length         |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|    id-type    |         PVD identity information              |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|          | (variable length)                  |
+            +
.                                                               .
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
```

Figure 2: PVD ID Option

- option-code: OPTION_PVD_ID (TBA2)
- option-length: Length of PVD identity information + 1
- id-type: Describes the type of identification information.
  This document defines four types of PVD identity information:
  - 0x01: UUID [RFC4122]
  - 0x02: UTF-8 string
  - 0x03: OID [OID]
  - 0x03: NAI Realm [RFC4282]

Further types can be added by IANA action.

- PVD identity information: The PVD identification that is based on the id-type.
5. PVD Authentication and Authorization option

The PVD authentication and authorization option contains information that could be used by the DHCPv6 client to verify whether the configuration information provided was not tampered with by the DHCPv6 server as well as establishing that the DHCPv6 server was authorized to advertise the information on behalf of the PVD per OPTION_PVD basis. The contents of the authentication/authorization information are completely opaque to the DHCPv6 server that passes along the information. Every OPTION_PVD option SHOULD contain at most one OPTION_PVD_AUTH option. The OPTION_PVD_AUTH option MUST be the last option inside the OPTION_PVD option.

```
0                   1                   2                   3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|      OPTION_PVD_AUTH          |         option-length         |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|   name-type   |               key-hash                        :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                      digital-signature                        :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 3: PVD Auth Option
6. Set of allowable options

The PVD container option MAY be used to encapsulate any allocated DHCPv6 options but MUST NOT be used to encapsulate another OPTION_PVD option. [TODO: Should we add any other exclusions?]

7. Behaviour of DHCPv6 entities

This section describes role of DHCPv6 entities involved in requesting and receiving DHCPv6 configuration or prefix and address allocation.

7.1. Client and Requesting Router Behavior

DHCPv6 client or requesting router can request for configuration from provisioning domain in the following ways:
In the SOLICIT message it MAY include OPTION_PVD_ID requesting configuration for the specific PVD ID indicated in the OPTION_PVD_ID option. It can include multiple OPTION_PVD_ID options to indicate its preference for more than one provisioning domain. The PVD ID it requests is learnt via configuration or any other out of band mechanism not defined in this document.

In the SOLICIT message include an OPTION_ORO option with the OPTION_PVD option code to request configuration from all the PVDs that the DHCPv6 server can provide.

The client or requesting router parses OPTION_PVD options in the response message. The Client or Requesting router MUST then include all or subset of the received OPTION_PVD options in the REQUEST message so that it will be responsible for the configuration information selected.

If DHCPv6 client or requesting router receives OPTION_PVD options but does not support PVD, it SHOULD ignore the received option(s).

7.2. Server and Delegating Router Behavior

If the Server or Delegating router supports PVD and it is configured to provide configuration data in one or more provisioning domains, it selects configuration for the PVD based allocation in the following way:

- If OPTION_PVD option code within OPTION_ORO is not present in the request, it MUST NOT include provisioning domain based configuration. It MAY select configuration and prefix allocation from a default PVD defined.
- If OPTION_PVD_ID is included, it selects information to be offered from that specific PVD if available.
- If OPTION_PVD option code within OPTION_ORO is included, then based on its configuration and policy it MAY offer configuration from the available PVD(s).

When PVD information and configuration are selected for address and prefix allocation the server or delegating router responds with an ADVERTISE message after populating OPTION_PVD.

If OPTION_PVD is not included, then the server or delegating router MAY allocate the prefix and provide configuration as specified in [RFC3315] and[RFC3633] and MUST NOT include OPTION_PVD option in the response.

If OPTION_ORO option includes the OPTION_PVD option code but the server or delegating router does not support PVD, then it SHOULD ignore the OPTION_PVD and OPTION_PVD_ID options received.

If both client/requesting router and server/delegating router support
PVD but cannot offer configuration with PVD for any other reason, it MUST respond to client/requesting router with appropriate status code as specified in [RFC3315] and [RFC3633].

8. Security Considerations

An attacker may attempt to modify the information provided inside the PVD container option. These attacks can easily be prevented by using the DHCPv6 AUTH option [RFC3315] that would detect any form of tampering with the DHCPv6 message contents.

A compromised DHCPv6 server or relay agent may insert configuration information related to PvDs it is not authorized to advertise. e.g. A coffee shop DHCPv6 server may provide configuration information purporting to be from an enterprise and may try to attract enterprise related traffic. The only real way to avoid this is that the PvD container contains embedded authentication and authorization information from the owner of the PvD. Then, this attack can be detected by the client by verifying the authentication and authorization information provided inside the PVD container option after verifying its trust towards the PvD owner (e.g. a certificate with a well-known/common trust anchor).

A compromised configuration source or an on-link attacker may try to capture advertised configuration information and replay it on a different link or at a future point in time. This can be avoided by including some replay protection mechanism such as a timestamp or a nonce inside the PVD container to ensure freshness of the provided information.

9. IANA Considerations

This document defines three new DHCPv6 options to be allocated out of the registry at http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/  

- OPTION_PVD (TBA1)
- OPTION_PVD_ID (TBA2)
- OPTION_PVD_AUTH (TBA3)

This document creates a new registry for PVD id types. The initial values are listed below

- 0x01: UUID [RFC4122]
- 0x02: UTF-8 string
- 0x03: OID [OID]
- 0x03: NAI Realm [RFC4282]
10. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the members of the MIF architecture design team for their comments that led to the creation of this draft.

11. Normative References

[I-D.anipko-mif-mpvd-arch]

[OID]

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC3315]

[RFC3633]

[RFC4122]

[RFC4282]

[RFC6494]

[RFC6495]
Gagliano, R., Krishnan, S., and A. Kukec, "Subject Key Identifier (SKI) SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) Name Type Fields", RFC 6495, February 2012.
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