Operational Concerns for Implementations of TLS

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Introduction

• This will be a draft in the future, and the WG might want to adopt it
• Operational concerns when implementing TLS
• Mostly about TLS handshake, some about application data
Purpose of the new draft

• As with any protocol in wide deployment, bugs and varying interpretations of the standard have resulted in an implementation ecosystem which contains many potholes
• We can document recommendations (not requirements) that will help avoid the potholes
Relationship to WPKOPS

• A few of the recommendations apply to PKI, but many don’t
• Could split these into two documents, but so few implementers know about them it might be better to have them all together here
• Another way to think about this: if the handshake doesn’t happen, the web PKI doesn’t even get a chance to work
Handshake recommendations

- Certificates payload brings up many PKIX and related issues
- ClientHello particularly rife with issues
- Extensions, ServerHello, and ServerKeyExchange have some pitfalls too
- Security issues with fallback to less capable versions of TLS
- Application data issues: ciphersuites, record sizes, AES-GCM nonces
Next steps

• Authors will create a real draft (very soon)
• WG can consider if this has enough to do with WPKOPS to keep it in the charter