CFRG @ IETF 89 Minutes Document Status Sean Turner: applicability; say why and what for Paul Hoffman: but CFRG produces many mechanisms Bob Moscowitz: applicability statement is prefered Joe Salowey, Paul Hoffman: catalog Password Authenticated Key Exchange Presentation on AugPAKE (seonghan.shin@aist.go.jp) DragonFly quick status update Readers of COSE draft - not many, defer discussion Yoav Nir: dictionary attack against big-W? Hannes Tschofenig: what needs to get deployed? HTTP PAKE Protocol Paul: need to pay attention to licensing and IPR Kenny: what about the group membership test, and its impact on performance? PHB: nontangible (?) Bob Moscowitz: I might have a use case for this Hannes Tschofenig: I-D management: strong authentication, seamless authentication New Authenticated Encryption Mechanisms Presentation and DISCUSSION on ChaCha+Poly1305 (ynir@checkpoint.com) Yoav Nir: please check test cases Kenny Paterson: what about parsing attacks? Need to carefully check that those are not possible against the AEAD construction. Kevin Igoe: when we are asking people to review this draft, let's also ask DJB Many people, including Hannes and PHB, asked for better clarity. Please don't say "stream cipher" when you mean "additive encryption" or something else. Joe Salowey: TLS should not be using stream cipher. Sean Turner: registries are not really for policy. David McGrew: what we really need is a ciphersuite reputation database. Presentation on Authenticated Encryption using Replay Protection (AERO) draft-mcgrew-srtp-aero-01 (mcgrew@cisco.com) Bob Moscowitz: AERO should work well on short plaintexts - that's an important design goal. Stephen Farrel: in the IPR statement, why does it say "standard" when the draft is "informational"? New Elliptic Curve Crypto Status and DISCUSSION of non-standard curves (15 min) Edwards curves - 30% in favor, 60% need to learn more about it before coming to decision Many: it would be a good idea to have an interim meeting. Kenny: invite DJB and Tanja Lange David: good idea Paul: *focus* in interim meeting (solve the important problems) allow prep and write statements/drafts Consideration of new topics (15 min) Stephen: Post-Quantum (PQ) cryptography is good David: agreed. Paul: PQ crypto should not be a priority. Many people: invite experts in post-quantum security to participate in the RG, if/as we take on post-quantum algorithm definitions. Example: what is real security of algorithms relative to Grover's shake?