


ForCES Protocol Gap Analysis for I2RS

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ForCES Architecture In A Nutshell

- A protocol (The *Verbs*)
 - A modular transport for the protocol
- A data model (The *nouns describing resources*)
 - Logical Functional Block which are constructs that describe the resource
- Combine the above and you have a language
 - [*<verb> <noun> [args]*]⁺
 - Anti-RPC
 - Few verbs but infinite possibilities of nouns

ForCES Architecture In A Nutshell



Protocol Semantics

- Transport independence
- Simple Verbs
 - Content independence (unlike RPC approaches)
- Optional Transactional capability (2PC)
- Various Execution modes
- Desire for high throughput and low latency
 - optional data batching and command pipeline
 - Binary encoding key
- Security
- Traffic Sensitive Heartbeating
- Optional High Availability

Example Protocol Semantics

- ***Command*** *<path to resource> [Optional Parameters]*
- GET /RIB/2/interfaces/1
 - Client gets the entry with ifindex 1 from the RIB resource on controller
- GET /RIB/1/interfaces
 - Client gets the whole interface table from the RIB instance 1
- DEL /RIB/1/Rib/routes
 - Flush every route in the RIB table
- SET /RIB/1/Rib/routes {route entry contents}
 - Client creates or updates the RIB on instance 1 with a new route
- REPORT /RIB/10/Rib/RouteAdded {route entry contents}
 - Manager reports to subscribed agents a newly added route

ForCES Architecture Gaps

- Directionality
 - ForCES assumes the Resource owner (RIB manager/agent) will associate with the Resource Controller (Client)
- Requires Protocol change to allow the reverse

ForCES Architecture Gaps

- Client Knowledge
 - ForCES assumes the Client is a sage
 - Knows everything and controls every resource
 - Not true in the case of RIB manager controlled by many clients
- Requires small protocol changes to accommodate for a slightly dumber controller client
 - New Path flags: Table CREATE, Exclusive CREATE and APPEND

ForCES Architecture Gaps

- Authentication and Authorization
 - Assumption of single resource control point
 - Resource owner doesn't need to know who they are
- Would TLS and certificates solve this?
 - Implementation of the RIB manager would keep track of the different identities

ForCES Architecture Gaps

- Multi headed control missing
 - Assumption of single resource owner bites again
- May require a protocol change that allows ownership of specific LFB instances or parts-of to be tagged by some owner ID
 - Was originally brought up as a requirement for scaling the Resource ownership but rejected for the new charter
 - <http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/86/slides/slides-86-forces-7.pdf>

ForCES Architecture Gaps

- RFC 5811 TML may not be a good fit for I2RS
 - May Require creating a new TML
- Not being RPC based may be negative
 - An RPC may result in one message whereas an equivalent transaction for ForCES would need to be broken down to multiple messages
 - Not an atomicity problem but usability issue
 - An RPC message may be more descriptive
 - Example: In ForCES to subscribe to an event, you SET a property of the Event

Pros/Cons

- Cons

- Not RPC
- Protocol Changes required to fully meet requirements

- Pros

- Not RPC
- Simple and extensible protocol
- Designed for high throughput + low latency
- Transport independence
- Capability discovery/negotiation
- Pub-subscribe events
- Rich transactional features
- High Availability