

# Identity, Payments, and Bitcoin: Big Changes Ahead

OneID

**Steve Kirsch**

CEO, OneID

Email: [stk@oneid.com](mailto:stk@oneid.com)

Twitter: [@stkirsch](https://twitter.com/stkirsch)

March 3, 2014

# My Focus Today

**Secure  
Payment  
Authorization**

# Authentication = Payment Authorization (*if* you do them securely)


“Log me into HSBC.com”

- Signed, Steve

“Pay 5 Euros to Amazon for Invoice #234343”

- Signed, Steve

**Same protocol** for authN and authZ;  
*only* the **requested action** is different



# The IETF Edition

## 15 MYTHS

## **MYTH #1**

**There is no way to fix  
mass password and  
credit card breaches**



iTunes



altrec.com  
OUTDOORS



TOSHIBA

GENESCO

charles SCHWAB



ACXION



UNM



Dropbox



bright house  
NETWORKS



Capital One

citi

Google

x-rite usbank

Genentech  
LESS FOR LIFE

ascensus

SEGA

Michaels  
Where Creativity Happens



serco

Walmart  
Save money. Live better.

DAY'S  
JEWELERS

care2  
make a difference

FIS  
FIDELITY NATIONAL  
INFORMATION SERVICES


SUBWAY



Hamilton Beach  
Good Thinking



**The Problem is Shared Secrets**





# The Problem is Magnified

**50% of users use  
the same password  
EVERYWHERE**

**Password1**

**Password1**

**Password1**

**Password1**



# How Do We Solve the Problem Once and For All?



# What We Need



# Solution is Easy!



OTP  
TOTP  
OAUTH  
SS#, DOB  
Pet's name  
Tokenization  
API key



- **Replace all those shared secrets with digital signatures. Duh!**

- **Solutions have been available for years ...**
- **So why aren't we using them?**





**Forbes**  
com

**February 18, 2014**

Dear Forbes.com Member:

**Recently, Forbes.com was targeted in a digital attack. ...**

Your Forbes.com password was encrypted in our database, but  
If you used the same password on other Web sites or accounts,  
we strongly suggest you change them.



What was **NOT** said:

**“We will give you an  
option in the future to  
login without using any  
shared secrets.”**

# Change is Hard... Even for a Billion Dollars!

## Analyst sees Target data breach costs topping \$1 billion

By Tom Webb

[twebb@pioneerpress.com](mailto:twebb@pioneerpress.com)

POSTED: 01/30/2014 12:01:00 AM CST

UPDATED: 01/31/2014 09:59:14 AM CST

Two months into the Target security breach, fraud is turning up on 10 percent to 15 percent of the stolen card accounts, a security specialist says.

Based on that brisk level of criminal activity, one Wall Street analyst estimates that the cost of the 40 million stolen



People leave Target headquarters in downtown Minneapolis on Jan. 22 after the company announced layoffs. (Pioneer Press)

# AFAIK

Not one company which has been breached has **EVER** offered consumers the option of logging in (or storing their credit card info) without using any **shared secrets**.

Not One.

**EVER.**

A man with a beard, wearing a grey checkered shirt, is covering his eyes with both hands. He has a pained or frustrated expression on his face. Above his head, several black arrows are drawn, pointing in various directions, some straight and some curved, suggesting a state of confusion or multiple paths. The background is a dark grey gradient. At the top left, there is an orange rectangular bar, and at the top right, there is a light grey rectangular bar.

**Changing Behavior is HARD**

# Pick an Excuse for Inaction from this Handy “Feel Good” List

1. We are not interested in hearing about your solution.
2. We are too busy right now to look into this.
3. This is not on the priority list for this year
4. You don't have enough users yet to make this interesting to us
5. We aren't allowed to use this because you have to be FICAM approved (and you can't be FICAM approved because you don't have enough users)
6. Conventional wisdom solution is 2FA; I'm sticking to what the consultants tell me
7. Nobody talks about this at RSA so this can't be credible
8. What if your servers are down?
9. So what's the difference between shared secrets and digital signature again?
10. Google Authenticator is secure and free. Why do I need this?
11. I can't tell the difference between OOB vs. in-band 2FA
12. Not aware of the solution
13. It's new and different, FUD
14. Nobody else is using it so it can't be good
15. “Our users aren't asking for it”
16. This will be too hard for our users to use
17. How can we trust you?
18. I am worried this might reduce security
19. Our internal team is making the decision and your solution was not invented here

## **MYTH #2**

**Adopting 2FA eliminates  
password breaches**



## 2FA Prevents Keylogging Attacks...

- **...but does NOTHING to prevent mass breaches** because (99% of the time) 2FA/browser token is just another shared secret!
  - **Users get frustrated**
  - **Few users adopt** (unless forced to)
  - **Users hate it**
  - **There are safer and easier ways**
- 

## MYTH #3

**This is OOB 2FA.  
Banks use this  
(So it must be safe)**



## That's in-band 2FA!

- Enter code on the *same* computer...
- MITM, MITB single point attackable
- Not digitally signed  
Like signing a blank check



The screenshot shows a web interface for entering a security code. At the top, there is a lock icon followed by the text "Enter security code". Below this, a message states "We sent a security code to your phone number ending in [redacted]". There is a text input field containing "6-digit code" and a blue "Submit code" button. Below the input field, there is a checkbox labeled "Trust this computer" with an information icon. At the bottom, there are two links: "Didn't receive one?" and "I lost my phone".

# In-band 2FA/MFA has not reduced fraud!

Home > Articles

## FFIEC Guidance: Has It Reduced Fraud?

Two Years Later, Experts Weigh In on Authentication Updates

By Tracy Kitten, July 12, 2013. Follow Tracy @FraudBlogger



Email

Tweet

Like



Share

Username

login|


Password

.....

Two years after federal banking regulators issued updated guidelines aimed at enhancing **authentication** for online-banking transactions, *BankInfoSecurity* asked industry leaders whether that new guidance has been effective at curbing account takeover losses.

Federal banking regulators declined to comment about the progress they've seen since June 2011, when the updated guidance was issued. But according to financial fraud analysts, vendors and bankers, the institutions have made to conform with the Federal **authentication**

# *This is an Example of OOB 2FA*



Re-hashed and signed here...

# MYTH #4

**Biometrics  
will fix this**

•SCANNING\_

64%

•MATCHING ID\_

QMPYUJKWUC  
ILOLRKVVUC  
DGO  
FOI



# Biometrics are a “Shared un-Secret”

- **Biometrics are like a password you cannot change**
- **Biometrics *ARE* useful locally ...**
- **...if the relying party controls the reader**



## **MYTH #5**


**Storing credit cards  
can't be made secure**



# World's safest PCI compliant vault

- **Use crypto secret on user's device to encrypt the card**
  - **Store in federated identity (in cloud)**
  - **When need to purchase, the user's device asks for the encrypted card data, decrypts it, passes it to merchant**
  - **Over 50 NGOs using Salsa Labs are **using this method today** for donations**
- 

# World's Safest PCI Compliant Vault



# MYTH #6



**Passwords  
are Bad**

# Passwords are Inherently Good

- Passwords are 1 of 3 factors:  
“something you know”

Why would we want to eliminate that?!?


- The problem is not passwords *per se*
- The problem is **how** we use them

“Password1”



**WRONG**  
(as a shared secret)

# Right Way (pwd, PIN)



**Combine password (or PIN) with local high entropy salt  
and use that as private ECDSA signing key.  
Password/PIN NEVER leaves your device. NEVER!**




## Short Passwords are Just Fine (When they aren't Shared Secrets)

- My OneID username is:  
**stk@oneid.com**
- My password is:  
**x**
- Try to log in as me 😊

## MYTH #7

# PKI, RSA Crypto, and EMV are all safe



# Well...Not as Safe as you Thought

- **PKI**  
Not end-to-end secure.  
Proof: DigiNotar. QED.
- **RSA Crypto**  
May be broken soon  
Use ECC and ECDSA
- **EMV**  
Not end-to-end secure  
You do not know what you are approving





## MYTH #8

**FIDO will fix  
all of This**

***WOOF, WOOF***

FIDO (Fast IDentity Online) Alliance <http://www.fidoalliance.org/>

# FIDO is Authentication Only

- FIDO can eliminate risk of cloning private key
- FIDO is **authentication** only, not **authorization**
- FIDO is *not* a federated identity system

No device, key management

Point-to-point auth

If you have 10 devices and 500 RPs, painful

If you lose a device, how register the replacement  
everywhere?

Lots of issues left open

**fido**<sup>™</sup>  
alliance  
simpler stronger  
authentication

**fido** - FORGET!  
PASSWORDS!




## **MYTH #9**

**All Federated  
Identity Providers are  
Untrustable**

# You Can't Trust **Most** Federated IdPs

- Federated IdP examples: Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Twitter, ...
- A breach/goof @ IdP and your identity is toast 🍞



# Trustable Federated Identity

- Trustable = “IdP can’t assert my identity without my express consent” (no matter what happens @ IdP)
- Requires a crypto secret on the user’s device  
Test: New device requires an existing device?
- Trustable IdP uses **end-to-end secure protocols**




# Trustable Federated Identity (TFI)

- **Security Guaranteed by Architecture, not Operational Policy**
- **ECDSA Digital Signatures Replace all Shared Secrets**
- **Simple protocols** (complexity is the enemy of security)
- **No Single Point of Compromise**
  - Uses multiple digital signatures



# A trustable federated identity: OneID



Patents granted and pending

# TFI Benefits

- **Store attributes securely (across all devices)**
  - Private keys (e.g., for login, Bitcoin, ...)
  - Secret keys
  - PII: Name, address, phone, etc.
- **A user's public keys are lifetime stable @ RP**
- **Add 2FA to SSH, VPN**
  - Simple modification to `authorized_keys` file
- **One password, PIN across all sites**



## **MYTH #10**

**Trustable Federated Identity  
is too hard to use and  
not as safe as  
Proprietary Identity**



## Really?! Says who?


- **TFI is so easy that most users can't tell**  
(feels just like “login with Facebook” button)
  - **TFI is highly immune to all known threats.**
  - **According to crypto security experts, for practical use, you can't get more secure than a properly designed TFI system**
- 

## **MYTH #11**

**An IETF Standard is  
the Best Way to  
Fix This**

# Do not treat this presentation as a “Shared Secret”

- **Spread the word and walk the talk!**
  - **Why is IETF still using username/pwd for IETF mailing lists?**
  - **Deploy on your website, use with VPN, SSH, etc.**
  - **Share this presentation with your friends at high impact places... Target, AT&T, ...**



# BITCOIN MYTH #1

## Bitcoin is Going to Die



New Mt. Gox logo

**“Rumors of my death have  
been greatly exaggerated”  
-Satoshi Nakamoto**

- **Vital signs stable  
even after disasters**
- **Nothing on the  
horizon that looks  
lethal**





**BITCOIN MYTH #2:  
Bitcoin is the Future of  
Payments**

# The Future is End-to-End Secure Payments



- **Bitcoin is just a crypto currency**  
It may or may not be THE winner
- **The winner will be**  
Digitally signed end-to-end secure transactions  
Open APIs, simple money transfer protocol

```
Send(1.32, "BTC", "Amazon", "Invoice 123")
```

## BITCOIN MYTH #3

 **bitcoin**

ACCEPTED HERE  
**Bitcoin Can't  
be Regulated**

  
 **bitcoin**  


# Bitcoin can be made compliant

- Companies are being started now to solve the Bitcoin compliance problem in a **new** way that the regulators **really** like
- Can protect consumers from another Mt. Gox and Bitinstant disaster



cointrust

## **BITCOIN MYTH #4**

**It is safe to keep my  
Bitcoin in Coinbase or  
Bitstamp**



**Steve Kirsch,**

You were mentioned in a Tweet!



**Aaron Pressman** @ampressman

 Follow

Smart: “If you have any amount [of bitcoins] in any of the exchanges today, you’re a fool,” @stkirsch warned 12/31/13  
[technologyreview.com/news/522411/bi...](http://technologyreview.com/news/522411/bi...)

06:12 PM - 26 Feb 14

 Reply to @ampressman



Retweet



Favorite

# Coinbase and Bitstamp Use the Same Protection as Mt Gox: In-band 2FA

- Can you say “shared secrets”?
- Susceptible to mass breach and malware on your computer
- Recommendation: Only keep as much as you can afford to use.
- I use “Bitcoin Armory”
- Safe *and* easy coming in 2014



# How Can the IETF Help?

I'm not sure yet



## Contact

**stk@oneid.com**

**Steve Kirsch on  
LinkedIn**