

# Network Time Security

**draft-ietf-ntp-network-time-security-02**

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IETF 89 (London), March 2-7, 2014

1. Introduction
2. Changes from version 02
3. Next steps

- ▶ **IETF 83:** Presentation of security issues of RFC 5906 (autokey)
- ▶ **IETF 84:** Presentation of plan for a new autokey standard
- ▶ **IETF 85:** I-D “draft-sibold-autokey-00”
- ▶ **IETF 86:** I-D “draft-sibold-autokey-02”
- ▶ **IETF 87:** Renaming of I-D and presentation as “draft-ietf-ntp-network-time-security-00”
- ▶ **IETF 88:** Presentation of results from input and further development as “draft-ietf-ntp-network-time-security-01”

## **Network Time Security shall provide:**

- ▶ Authenticity of time servers
- ▶ Integrity of synchronization data packets
- ▶ Conformity with the TICTOC Security Requirements
- ▶ Support of NTP (all of its modes)
- ▶ Support of PTP as far as possible

- ▶ **Considered:** authorization as well as recursive authentication and authorization
- ▶ **Revised:** comparison with TICTOC requirements
- ▶ **Split section:** “Protocol Sequence”
  - “Protocol Messages”: list of message types
    - generic description
    - realization for NTP  
(important: Internet-Draft “Using NTP Extension Fields without Authentication”)
  - “Protocol Sequence”: behavior description
    - client’s behavior given as chronological sequence
    - server’s behavior described as reactions to incoming messages
- ▶ **Added:** two appendices
  - list of extensions field types needed for realization of NTS message types in NTP
  - flow diagrams for the client’s behavior
- ▶ **Altered:** negotiation of cryptographic algorithms during association

► **Comments during last meeting:**

- About usage of DANE for certificate exchange:  
under consideration

► **Comments from the mailing list:**

- About usage of asymmetric signatures for broadcast mode:  
will be considered for future version

► **External comments:**

- Requests regarding a more generic formulation of authentication/certification methods:  
under consideration
- About details of negotiations:
  - format for negotiation of algorithms
  - wrapping schemesnot yet considered, scheduled for future version

- ▶ **Delay attack:**
  - Scheduled to be addressed in a subsection in Security Considerations
- ▶ **Formal verification of the protocol:**
  - Inductive Approach
  - Model Checking
- ▶ **Review and comments are requested from:**
  - TICTOC Working Group
  - NTP Working Group
  - NTP development team