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3rd-Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) SIP URI Inter Operator Traffic
Leg parameter
draft-holmberg-dispatch-iotl-06.txt

Abstract

In 3rd-Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) networks, the signalling path between a calling user and a called user can be partitioned into segments, referred to as traffic legs. Each traffic leg may span networks belonging to different operators, and will have its own characteristics that can be different from other traffic legs in the same call. A traffic leg might be associated with multiple SIP dialogs, e.g. in case a B2BUA which modifies the SIP dialog identifier is located within the traffic leg.

This document defines a new SIP URI parameter, 'iotl'. The parameter can be used in a SIP URI to indicate that the entity associated with the address, or an entity responsible for the host part of the address, represents the end of a specific traffic leg (or multiple traffic legs).

The SIP URI 'iotl' parameter defined in this document has known uses in 3GPP networks. Usage in other networks is also possible.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

In a 3rd-Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) network, an end user device can be attached (e.g. using a radio access network) to its own operator network (home network) [TS.3GPP.24.229], or to another operator's network (visited network) [TS.3GPP.24.229]. In the latter case the user is referred to as a roaming user.

3GPP operator networks are often not connected directly to each other. Instead, there might be intermediate networks, referred to as 3GPP transit networks, between them. Such transit network act on SIP level or on IP level.

In 3GPP networks, the signalling path between a calling user and a called user can be partitioned into segments, referred to as traffic legs. Each traffic leg may span networks belonging to different operators, and will have its own characteristics that can be different from other traffic legs in the same call. A traffic leg might be associated with multiple SIP dialogs, e.g. in case a Back-To-Back User Agent (B2BUA) [RFC3261] which modifies the SIP dialog identifier is located within the traffic leg.

The traffic leg information can be used by intermediary entities to make policy decisions, related to e.g. media anchoring, signalling policy, insertion of media functions (e.g. transcoder) and charging.

The figure below shows two users (Alice and Bob) and the different type of networks that the signaling might traverse. The signalling path can be divided into multiple traffic legs, and the type of traffic legs depends on how the signalling is routed.




Figure 1: 3GPP operator network roaming roles

ORIG HNW = Originating 3GPP Home Network

TERM HNW = Terminating 3GPP Home Network

ORIG VNW = Originating 3GPP Visited Network

TERM VNW = Terminating 3GPP Visited Network

TRANSIT NW = 3GPP Transit Network

In Figure 1 Alice is a user initiating communication with Bob, and:

Alice is attached to an originating network, which is either the home network of Alice, or a visited network (in case Alice is roaming). In both cases any originating service is provided by the home network of Alice.

Bob is attached to a terminating network, which is either the home network of Bob, or a visited network (in case Bob is roaming). In both cases any terminating service is provided by the home network of Bob.

A transit network, providing transit functions (e.g. translation of free phone numbers), may be included between the originating and terminating networks and between visited and home networks.

This document defines a new SIP URI parameter [RFC3261], 'iotl' (an abbreviation of Inter Operator Traffic Leg). The parameter can be used in a SIP URI to indicate that the entity associated with the address, or an entity responsible for the host part of the address, represents the end of a specific traffic leg (or multiple traffic legs).

This document defines the following 'iotl' parameter values:

- o homea-homeb
- o homeb-visitedb
- o visiteda-homea
- o homea-visiteda
- o visiteda-homeb

SIP entities that do not support the SIP URI 'iotl' parameter will simply ignore it, if received, as defined in [RFC3261].

2. Applicability

The SIP URI 'iotl' parameter defined in this document has known uses in 3GPP networks. Usage in other networks is also possible.

3. Traffic leg examples

3.1. General

This section describes examples of different types of traffic legs in 3GPP networks.

3.2. Originating roaming call

In this case, Alice is located in a visited network. When Alice sends the initial SIP INVITE request for a call, one traffic leg (referred to as the 'visiteda-homea' traffic leg) represents the signalling path between the UA of Alice and the home S-CSCF [3GPP TS 24.229] of Alice.

3.3. Terminating roaming call

In this case, Bob is located in a visited network. When the home S-CSCF of Bob forwards the initial SIP INVITE request for a call towards Bob, one traffic leg (referred to as the 'homeb-visitedb' traffic leg) represents the signalling path between the home S-CSCF of Bob and the UA of Bob.

3.4. Originating home to terminating home call

In this case, the home S-CSCF of Alice forwards the initial SIP INVITE request towards the home S-CSCF of Bob. The signalling path between the S-CSCFs represents one traffic leg (referred to as the 'homea-homeb' traffic leg).

4. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

5. iotl SIP URI parameter

5.1. Usage

As specified in [RFC3261], when a SIP entity inserts a SIP URI in an initial request for a dialog, or in a stand-alone request, the SIP URI will be used to route the request to another SIP entity, addressed by the SIP URI, or to a SIP entity responsible for the host part of the SIP URI (e.g. a SIP registrar). If such entity represents the end of one or more traffic legs, the SIP entity inserting the SIP URI can add a SIP URI 'iotl' parameter to the SIP URI, to indicate the type(s) of traffic leg. Each parameter value indicates a type of traffic leg.

For routing of a SIP request, a SIP entity can add the 'iotl' parameter to the SIP URI of the Request-URI [RFC3261], or to the SIP URI of a Route header field [RFC3261], of an initial request for a dialog, or of a stand-alone request. SIP entities can add the 'iotl' parameter to the SIP URI of a Path header field [RFC3327] or a Service-Route header field [RFC3608], in order for the parameter to later occur in a Route header field.

When a SIP entity receives an initial request for a dialog, or a stand-alone request, which contains one or more SIP URI 'iotl' parameters, it identifies the type of traffic leg in the following way:

- o If the SIP request contains a single Route header field containing a SIP URI with an 'iotl' parameter, that parameter identifies the type of traffic leg;
- o If the SIP request contains multiple Route header fields containing a SIP URI with an 'iotl' parameter, the 'iotl' parameter associated with the SIP URI of the topmost Route header field (or, if the SIP URI of the topmost Route header field does not contain an 'iotl' parameter, the SIP URI of the Route header field closest to the topmost) identifies the type of traffic leg; or
- o If a SIP request contains an 'iotl' parameter only in the Request-URI SIP URI, the 'iotl' parameter identifies the type of traffic leg.

During SIP registration [RFC3261], entities can add the 'iotl' parameter to the SIP URI of a Path or Service-Route header field, if the entity is aware that SIP URI will be used to indicate the end of a specific traffic leg for initial requests for dialogs, or stand-alone requests, sent on the registration path.

As defined in [RFC3261], a SIP proxy must not modify or remove uri parameters from SIP URIs associated with other entities. This also applies to the 'iotl' parameter.

5.2. Parameter Values

5.2.1. General

This section describes the SIP URI 'iotl' parameter values defined in this specification.

5.2.2. homea-homeb

This value indicates that a SIP entity responsible for the host part of the SIP URI associated with the parameter represents the end of a traffic leg between the home network (originating) of the calling user and the home network (terminating) of the called user.

In 3GPP, this traffic leg is between two S-CSCFs.

5.2.3. homeb-visitedb

This value indicates that the SIP entity addressed by the SIP URI associated with the parameter represents the end of a traffic leg between the home network (terminating) of the called user and the visited network (terminating) in which the called user is located.

In 3GPP, this traffic leg is between the home S-CSCF and the UE of the called user, or between the Service Centralization and Continuity Application Server (SCC AS) in the home network of the called user and Access Transfer Control Function (ATCF) in the visited network of the called user.

5.2.4. visiteda-homea

This value indicates that a SIP entity responsible for the host part of the SIP URI associated with the parameter represents the end of a traffic leg between the visited network (originating) in which the calling user is located and the home network (originating) of the calling user.

In 3GPP, this traffic leg is between the UE and the home S-CSCF of the calling user, or between the P-CSCF in the visited network, serving the calling user, and the home S-CSCF of the calling user.

5.2.5. homea-visiteda

This value indicates that the SIP entity addressed by the SIP URI associated with the parameter represents the end of a traffic leg between the home network (originating) and the visited network (originating) in which the calling user is located.

In 3GPP, this traffic leg is between the home S-CSCF of the calling user and the Transit and Roaming Function (TRF) [3GPP TS 24.229] serving the calling user, and exists in scenarios where the home S-CSCF of the calling user forwards a request back to the visited network where the UE of the calling user is located. An example of this is when the Roaming Architecture for Voice over IMS with Local breakout (RAVEL) [3GPP TS 24.229] feature is enabled.

5.2.6. visiteda-homeb

This value indicates that a SIP entity responsible for the host part of the SIP URI associated with the parameter represents the end of a traffic leg between the visited network (originating) of the calling user and the home network (terminating) of the called user.

In 3GPP, this traffic leg is between the Transit and Roaming Function (TRF) [3GPP TS 24.229] serving the calling user and the home S-CSCF of the called user, and exists in scenarios where a request is forwarded from the visited network where the calling user is located directly to the home S-CSCF of the called user. An example of this is when the Roaming Architecture for Voice over IMS with Local breakout (RAVEL) [3GPP TS 24.229] feature is enabled.

6. Syntax

6.1. General

This section defines the ABNF for the 'iotl' SIP URI parameter. The ABNF defined in this specification is conformant to RFC 5234 [RFC5234].

This specification does not create an IANA registry for 'iotl' parameter values. A registry should be considered if new parameter values are defined in the future.

6.2. ABNF

The ABNF [RFC5234] grammar for the role SIP URI parameter is:

```
uri-parameter =/ iotl-param
iotl-param    = iotl-tag "=" iotl-value ["." iotl-value]
iotl-tag      = "iotl"
iotl-value    = "homea-homeb" / "homeb-visitedb" / "visiteda-homea"
               / "homea-visiteda" / "visiteda-homeb" / other-iotl
other-iotl    = 1*iotl-char
iotl-char     = alphanum / "-"
;; alphanum defined in RFC 3261
```

7. Security Considerations

The information in the 'iotl' parameter is used for making policy decisions. Such policies can be related to charging and triggering of services. In order to prevent abuse, which could cause user billing, or service failure, the parameter SHOULD only be used for making policy decisions based on the role by nodes within the same trust domain [RFC3325], and network boundary entities MUST NOT forward information received from untrusted entities. In addition, there MUST exist an agreement between the operators for usage of the roaming role information.

General security considerations for SIP are defined in [RFC3261]

8. IANA Considerations

[RFC EDITOR NOTE: Please replace RFC-XXXX with the RFC number of this document.] This specification adds one new value to the IANA registration in the "SIP/SIPS URI Parameters" registry as defined in [RFC3969].

Parameter Name	Predefined Values	Reference
iotl	Yes	[This RFC]

9. Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank everyone in the 3GPP community that gave comments on the initial version of this document, and contributed with comments and suggestion during the work. A special thanks to Paul Kyziwat, Dale Worley and Michael Hammer. Robert Sparks performed the Gen-ARTreview of the draft.

10. Change Log

[RFC EDITOR NOTE: Please remove this section when publishing]

draft-holmberg-dispatch-iotl-04

- o Change based on IESG review from Stephen Farrell:
- o - Editorial changes.

draft-holmberg-dispatch-iotl-04

- o Change based on IESG review from Spencer Dawkins:
- o - List of defined iotl parameter values listed in the Introduction.
- o - ABNF editorial fix.
- o Change based on IESG review from Barry Leiba:
- o - Only use lowercase when writing the iotl parameter values.
- o Change based on IESG review from Alissa Cooper:
- o - Sentence about usage in non-3GPP networks removed from the Introduction.
- o - Editorial correction in the Security Considerations.
- o Change based on IESG review from Benoit Claise:
- o - 'iotl' parameter name abbreviation extended in the Introduction.
- o Change based on IESG review from Kathleen Moriarty:
- o - Reference to RFC 3261 added to the Security Considerations.
- o Change based on IESG review from Stephen Farrell:
- o - Additional text and explanation added to the Security Considerations.

draft-holmberg-dispatch-iotl-03

- o Change based on Gen-ART review from Robert Sparks:

- o - Removed text saying that the mechanism is scoped for 3GPP networks only.
- o - Clarify that entities that do not support the parameter will ignore it.
- o - Clarify that the draft does not create an IANA registry for parameter values.
- o - Remove sentence regarding directionality.
- o - Reference to RFC 3327 added.
- o - Reference to RFC 3608 added.
- o - 'dialogue' -> 'dialog'.
- o Change based on Ops-ART review from Nevil Brownlee:
 - o - Reference to RFC 3261 added to 'B2BUA'.
 - o - Reference to 3GPP TS 24.229 added for 'S-CSCF'.

draft-holmberg-dispatch-iotl-02

- o Change based on comments from Richard Barnes:
 - o - 3GPP scope text modified.
 - o - Reference to 3GPP TS 24.229 added.
 - o - Reference to RFC 3325 added, and incorporated into the Security Considerations.
 - o - 'iotl' selection procedure made into a bullet list.

draft-holmberg-dispatch-iotl-01

- o Scope the SIP URI 'iotl' parameter to 3GPP, based on decision at IETF#90:
 - o - Document name changed.
 - o - Clarified that usage of the parameter is only defined within 3GPP networks.

draft-holmberg-dispatch-iotl-00

- o Added text on how to identify the traffic leg type when SIP-URIs of multiple Route header fields and/or the Request-URI contain an 'iotl' parameter.
- o Clarify that a traffic leg might span over multiple SIP dialogs.
- o Added text saying that entities supporting the 'iotl' parameter must not remove a parameter from a request, if the parameter is associated with a SIP URI belonging to another entity.
- o Modified ABNF, in order to allow multiple iotl values for a single URI.
- o In IANA section, changed indication that predefined values exist.
- o Example call flows added.

11. References

11.1. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
- [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.
- [RFC3327] Willis, D. and B. Hoeneisen, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension Header Field for Registering Non-Adjacent Contacts", RFC 3327, December 2002.
- [RFC3608] Willis, D. and B. Hoeneisen, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension Header Field for Service Route Discovery During Registration", RFC 3608, October 2003.
- [RFC3969] Camarillo, G., "The Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Parameter Registry for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", BCP 99, RFC 3969, December 2004.
- [RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
- [TS.3GPP.24.229] 3GPP, "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications", 3GPP TS 24.229 12.6.0, September 2014.

11.2. Informative References

- [RFC3325] Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325, November 2002.


Appendix A. 3GPP Examples

A.1. General

This section contains example call flows based on 3GPP usage of the SIP URI 'iotl' parameter.

A.2. The UE registers via P-CSCF

The Visited Proxy (P-CSCF) adds the iotl value 'homeb-visitedb' to the Path header field of the REGISTER request, to be used for terminating routing towards Alice. The Home Proxy (S-CSCF) adds the iotl value 'visiteda-homea' to the Service-Route header field, to be used for originating initial/stand-alone requests from Alice.



F1 REGISTER Alice -> P-CSCF
REGISTER sip:registrar.home1.net SIP/2.0

F2 REGISTER P-CSCF -> IBCF-V
REGISTER sip:registrar.home1.net SIP/2.0
Path: <p-cscf URI;iotl=homeb-visitedb>

```
F3 REGISTER IBCF-V -> IBCF-H
REGISTER sip:registrar.homel.net SIP/2.0
Path: <p-cscf URI;iotl=homeb-visitedb>

F4 REGISTER IBCF-H -> S-CSCF
REGISTER sip:registrar.homel.net SIP/2.0
Path: <p-cscf URI;iotl=homeb-visitedb>

F5 200 OK S-CSCF -> IBCF-H
200 OK
Path: <p-cscf URI;iotl=homeb-visitedb>
Service-Route: <s-cscf URI;iotl=visiteda-homea>

F6 200 OK IBCF-H -> IBCF-V
200 OK
Path: <p-cscf URI;iotl=homeb-visitedb>
Service-Route: <s-cscf URI;iotl=visiteda-homea>


F7 200 OK IBCF-V -> P-CSCF
200 OK
Path: <p-cscf URI;iotl=homeb-visitedb>
Service-Route: <s-cscf URI;iotl=visiteda-homea>

F8 200 OK P-CSCF -> Alice
200 OK
Path: <p-cscf URI;iotl=homeb-visitedb>
Service-Route: <s-cscf URI;iotl=visiteda-homea>
```

Figure 2: The UE registers via P-CSCF

A.3. Originating IMS call

In the originating INVITE request from Alice, the iotl value 'visiteda-homea', received in the Service-Route header field during registration, is added to the Route header field representing the Home Proxy S-CSCF, to indicate the traffic leg type between the Visited Proxy P-CSCF and the Home Proxy S-CSCF.



F1 INVITE Alice -> P-CSCF
 INVITE sip:Bob@homeb.net SIP/2.0
 Route: <p-cscf URI>,<s-cscf URI;iotl=visiteda-homea>

F2 INVITE P-CSCF -> IBCF-V
 INVITE sip:Bob@homeb.net SIP/2.0
 Route: <ibcf-v URI>,<s-cscf URI;iotl=visiteda-homea>


F3 INVITE IBCF-V -> IBCF-H
 INVITE sip:Bob@homeb.net SIP/2.0
 Route: <ibcf-h URI>,<s-cscf URI;iotl=visiteda-homea>

F4 INVITE IBCF-H -> S-CSCF
 INVITE sip:Bob@homeb.net SIP/2.0
 Route: <s-cscf URI;iotl=visiteda-homea>

Figure 3: Originating IMS call

A.4. Terminating IMS call

In the terminating INVITE request towards Alice, the iotl value 'homeb-visitedb', provided to the Home Proxy S-CSCF during registration, is added to the Route header field representing the Visited Proxy P-CSCF, to indicate the traffic leg type between the Home Proxy S-CSCF and the Visited Proxy P-CSCF.



F1 INVITE S-CSCF -> IBCF-H
 INVITE sip:Bob@visitedb.net SIP/2.0
 Route: <ibcf-h URI>,<p-cscf-v URI;iotl=homeb-visitedb

F2 INVITE IBCF-H -> IBCF-V
 INVITE sip:Bob@visitedb.net SIP/2.0
 Route: <ibcf-v URI>,<p-cscf-v URI;iotl=homeb-visitedb


F3 INVITE IBCF-V -> P-CSCF
 INVITE sip:Bob@visitedb.net SIP/2.0
 Route: <p-cscf-v URI;iotl=homeb-visitedb

F4 INVITE P-CSCF -> Bob
 INVITE sip:Bob@visitedb.net SIP/2.0

Figure 4: Terminating IMS call

A.5. Call between originating home and terminating home network

The S-CSCF of the originating home network adds the iotl value 'homea-homeb' in the Request-URI of the INVITE, sent towards the S-CSCF of the terminating network, to indicate the traffic leg type between the S-CSCFs.



F1 INVITE S-CSCF-A -> IBCF-A
 INVITE sip:Bob@visitedb.net;iotl=homea-homeb SIP/2.0

F2 INVITE IBCF-a -> IBCF-B
 INVITE sip:Bob@visitedb.net;iotl=homea-homeb SIP/2.0

F3 INVITE IBCF-B -> I-CSCF-B
 INVITE sip:Bob@visitedb.net;iotl=homea-homeb SIP/2.0

F4 INVITE I-CSCF-B -> S-CSCF-B
 INVITE sip:Bob@visitedb.net;iotl=homea-homeb SIP/2.0

Figure 5: Call between originating home and terminating home network

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WEBPUSH
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: June 15, 2015

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Mozilla
December 12, 2014

Generic Event Delivery Using HTTP Push
draft-thomson-webpush-http2-02

Abstract

A simple protocol for the delivery of realtime events to clients is described. This scheme uses HTTP/2 server push.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

Mobile computing devices are increasingly relied upon for a great many applications. Mobile devices typically have limited power reserves, so finding more efficient ways to serve application requirements is an important part of any mobile platform.

One significant contributor to power usage mobile devices is the radio. Radio communications consumes a significant portion of the energy budget on a wirelessly connected mobile device.

Many applications require continuous access to network communications so that real-time events - such as incoming calls or messages - can be conveyed (or "pushed") to the user in a timely fashion. Uncoordinated use of persistent connections or sessions from multiple applications can contribute to unnecessary use of the device radio, since each independent session independently incurs overheads. In particular, keep alive traffic used to ensure that middleboxes do not prematurely time out sessions, can result in significant waste.

Maintenance traffic tends to dominate over the long term, since events are relatively rare.

Consolidating all real-time events into a single session ensures more efficient use of network and radio resources. A single service consolidates all events, distributing those events to applications as they arrive. This requires just one session, avoiding duplicated overhead costs.

The W3C Web Push API [API] describes an API that enables the use of a consolidated push service from web applications. This expands on that work by describing a protocol that can be used to:

- o request the delivery of a push message to a user agent,
- o register a new user agent,
- o create new push message delivery subscriptions, and
- o monitor for new push messages.

This is intentionally split into these two categories because requesting the delivery of events is required for immediate use by the Web Push API. The registration, management and monitoring functions are currently fulfilled by proprietary protocols; these are adequate, but do not offer any of the advantages that standardization affords.

The monitoring function described in this document is intended to be replaceable, enabling the use of monitoring schemes that are better optimized for the network environment and the user agent. For instance, using notification systems like the 3GPP Short Message Service (SMS) [TS.3GPP.23.040] can take advantage of the native paging capabilities of a cellular network, avoiding the ongoing maintenance cost of a persistent TCP connection.

This document intentionally does not describe how a push service is discovered. Discovery of push services is left for future efforts, if it turns out to be necessary at all. User agents are expected to be configured with a URL for a push service.

Similarly, discovery of support for and negotiation of use of alternative monitoring schemes is left to documents that extend this basic protocol.

1.1. Conventions and Terminology

In cases where normative language needs to be emphasized, this document falls back on established shorthands for expressing interoperability requirements on implementations: the capitalized words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD" and "MAY". The meaning of these is described in [RFC2119].

This document defines the following terms:

application: Both the sender and ultimate consumer of push messages. Many applications have components that are run on a user agent and other components that run on servers.

application server: The component of an application that runs on a server and requests the delivery of a push message.

push message: A message, sent from an application server to a user agent via a push service.

push service: A service that delivers push messages to user agents.

registration: A session that is established between the user agent and the push service. A registration has any number of associated subscriptions.


subscription: A message delivery context that is established between the user agent and the push service and shared with applications. All push messages are associated with a subscription.

user agent: A device and software that is the recipient of push messages.

Examples in this document use the HTTP/1.1 message format [RFC7230]. Many of the exchanges can be completed using HTTP/1.1, where HTTP/2 is necessary, the more verbose frame format from [I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2] is used.

2. Overview

A general model for push services includes three basic actors: a user agent, a push service, and an application (server).



At the very beginning of the process, the device creates a registration resource at the push service. The registration is the basis of all future interactions between the user agent and push service. The registration aggregates push messages that the user agent receives from all subscriptions.

The registration resource describes how the user agent is expected to monitor for incoming push messages. This document describes one such mechanism, though more efficient means of monitoring could be defined.

The registration resource also describes how the user agent might create a subscription. A new subscription is created by the user agent and then distributed by to an application server.

It is expected that a different subscription will be provided to each application; however, there are no inherent cardinality constraints in the protocol. Multiple subscriptions might be created for the same application, or multiple applications could use the same subscription. Note however that sharing subscriptions can have security and privacy implications.

Application servers use subscriptions to deliver push messages to devices, via the push service.

Both registrations and subscriptions have a limited lifetime. They can also be terminated by either push service or user agent at any time. User agents and application servers need to be prepared to handle changes in registrations and subscriptions; the protocol

described here supports any number of either resource concurrently with minimal overhead.

2.1. HTTP Resources

This protocol uses HTTP resources [RFC7230] and link relations [RFC5988]. The following resources are defined:

push service: This resource is used in Registration (Section 3). It is configured into user agents.

registration: A link relation of type "urn:ietf:params:push:reg" refers to a registration resource. This resource is used by a user agent in requesting the delivery of push messages. A process for monitoring for messages using this resource is described in Section 6.

subscribe: A link relation of type "urn:ietf:params:push:sub" refers to a resource where a user agent can create new subscriptions. Creating a subscription is described in Section 4.

subscription: A link relation of type "urn:ietf:params:push" refers to a subscription resource. Subscription resources are used to deliver push messages. An application server sends push messages (Section 5) and a user agent receives push messages (Section 6) using this resource.

3. Registration

A user agent that wishes to establish a new or replacement registration sends an HTTP POST request to its configured push service resource.

A request to create a registration contains no entity body. A future specification MAY define a format and semantics for the entity body on this request.

The push service creates a new registration and subscribe resource in response to this request. URIs for these resources are included in Link header fields in the response. The push server includes the "registration" link relation in a Location header field.

For example, the following request requests the creation of a new registration:

```
POST /register HTTP/1.1
Host: push.example.net
```


The following response might be generated in response to this request:

```
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 23:56:47 GMT
Link: </monitor/1G_GIPMorg_n-IrQvqZr6g>;
      rel="urn:ietf:params:push:reg"
Link: </subscribe/1G_GIPMorg_n-IrQvqZr6g>;
      rel="urn:ietf:params:push:sub"
Location: https://push.example.net/reg/1G_GIPMorg_n-IrQvqZr6g
Cache-Control: max-age=8640000, private
```

The push server SHOULD provide a URI for the associated "subscribe" resource and any known expiration information in response to requests to the "registration" resource.

4. Subscribing

A client sends a POST request to the "subscribe" resource to create a new subscription.

```
POST /subscribe/1G_GIPMorg_n-IrQvqZr6g HTTP/1.1
Host: push.example.net
```

A response with a 201 (Created) status code includes a URI for the subscription in the Location header field.

```
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 23:56:52 GMT
Link: </p/LBhhw0OohO-Wl40i971UGsB7sdQGUibx>;
      rel="urn:ietf:params:push"
Location: https://push.example.net/p/LBhhw0OohO-Wl40i971UGsB7sdQGUibx
Cache-Control: max-age:864000, private
```

5. Requesting Push Message Delivery

A push subscription is an HTTP resource [RFC7230].

An application server requests the delivery of a push message by sending an HTTP PUT request to this resource, including the push message in the body of the request.

```
PUT /p/LBhhw0OohO-Wl4Oi97lUGsB7sdQGUibx HTTP/1.1
Host: push.example.net
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf8
Content-Length: 15
```

Hello, World!

A simple 200 response is sufficient to indicate that the push message was accepted. This does not indicate that the message was delivered to the user agent.

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 23:56:55 GMT
Cache-Control: max-age=600
```

A push service MAY generate a 413 (Payload Too Large) status code in response to PUT requests that include an entity body that is too large. Push services MUST NOT generate a 413 status code in responses to an entity body that is 4k (4096 bytes) or less in size.

A push service that does not store messages can stream the payload of push messages to the user agent. Flow control SHOULD be used to limit the state commitment for delivery of large messages.

6. Receiving Push Messages

A user agent requests the delivery of new push messages by making a GET request to the "registration" resource. The push service does not respond to this request, it instead uses HTTP/2 server push [I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2] to send the contents of push messages as they are sent by application servers.

Each push message is pushed in response to a synthesized GET request. The GET request is made to the same "subscription" URI that is used by the application server to send the message. The response body is the entity body from the most recent PUT request sent to the subscription resource.

The following example request is made over HTTP/2.

```
HEADERS      [stream 7] +END_STREAM +END_HEADERS
:method      = GET
:path        = /monitor/1G_GIPMorg_n-IrQvqZr6g
:authority   = push.example.net
```

The push service permits the request to remain outstanding. When a push message is sent by an application server, a server push is associated with the initial request. The response includes the push message.

```
PUSH_PROMISE [stream 7; promised stream 4] +END_HEADERS
:method      = GET
:path        = /p/LBhhw0OohO-Wl40i971UGsB7sdQGUibx
:authority   = push.example.net
```

```
HEADERS      [stream 4] +END_HEADERS
:status      = 200
date         = Thu, 11 Dec 2014 23:56:55 GMT
last-modified = Thu, 11 Dec 2014 23:56:55 GMT
cache-control = private
content-type  = text/plain;charset=utf8
content-length = 15
```

```
DATA          [stream 4] +END_STREAM
Hello World!\r\n
```

A user agent can request the contents of the "registration" resource immediately by including a `Prefer` header field [RFC7240] with a "wait" parameter set to "0". The push server **SHOULD** return a link reference to the "registration" resource and expiration information in response to this request. This request also triggers the delivery of all push messages that the push service has stored but not yet delivered.

A user agent can request the last push message for a "subscription" resource by sending `GET` requests to its URI. A 200 (OK) status response contains the last push message sent to the subscription. A 204 (No Content) status code indicates that no messages are presently available.

7. Operational Considerations

A push service is likely to have to maintain a very large number of open TCP connections. Effective management of those connections can depend on being able to move connections between server instances.

7.1. Load Management

A user agent **MUST** support the 307 (Temporary Redirect) status code [RFC7231], which can be used by a push service to redistribute load at the time that a new registration is requested.

A server that wishes to redistribute load can do so using the alternative services mechanisms that are part of HTTP/2 [I-D.ietf-httpbis-alt-svc]. Alternative services allows for redistribution of load whilst maintaining the same URIs for various resources. User agents can ensure a graceful transition by using the GOAWAY frame once it has established a replacement connection.

7.2. Push Message Expiration

Push services typically store messages for some time to allow for limited recovery from transient faults. If a push message is stored, but not delivered, the push service can indicate the probable duration of storage by including expiration information in the response to the push request.

A push service is not obligated to store messages indefinitely. If a user agent is not actively monitoring for push messages, those messages can be lost or overridden by newer messages on the same subscription.

Push messages that were stored and not delivered to a client are delivered when a client recommences monitoring. Stored push messages SHOULD include a Last-Modified header field (see Section 2.2 of [RFC7232]) indicating when delivery was requested by an application server.

A GET request to a "subscription" resource that has expired messages results in a 204 (No Content) status response, equivalent to if no push message were ever sent.

Push services might need to limit the size and number of stored push messages to avoid overloading. In addition to using the 413 (Payload Too Large) status code for too large push messages, a push service MAY expire push messages prior to any advertised expiration time.

7.3. Registration and Subscription Expiration

In some cases, it may be necessary to terminate registrations or subscriptions so that they can be refreshed.

A push service might choose to set a fixed expiration time. If a resource has a known expiration time, expiration information is included in responses to requests that create the resource, or in requests that retrieve a representation of the resource.

Expiration is indicated using either the Expires header field, or by setting a "max-age" parameter on a Cache-Control header field (see

[RFC7234])). The Cache-Control header field MUST also include the "private" directive.

A push service can invalidate a registration or subscription at any time. If a user agent has an outstanding request to the "registration" resource (see Section 6), this can be signaled by returning a 400-series response code, such as 410 (Gone). A push service uses server push to indicate that a subscription has expired; a pushed 400-series status code for the subscription resource signals the termination of a subscription.

A user agent can request that a registration or subscription be removed by sending a DELETE request to the corresponding URI.

7.4. Implications for Application Reliability

An application developer might find it tempting to create alternative mechanisms for message delivery in case the push service fails to deliver a critical message. Setting up a polling mechanism or a backup messaging channel in order to compensate for these shortcomings negates almost all of the advantages a push service provides.

Applications are encouraged to instead provide a means to detect situations where push messages were not delivered and recover gracefully. For instance, an application server might include a sequence number in push messages; a gap in the sequence can then be used to trigger some form of state resynchronization. For instance, the missing messages might be requested from the application server directly. Push service failures are expected to be rare, therefore performance optimization of any recovery mechanism might be unnecessary.

8. Security Considerations

This protocol MUST use HTTP over TLS [RFC2818]; this includes any communications between user agent and push service, plus communications between the application and the push service. Thus, all URIs use the "https" scheme. This provides confidentiality and integrity protection for registrations and push messages from external parties.

8.1. Confidentiality from Push Service Access

The protection afforded by TLS does not protect content from the push service. Without additional safeguards, a push service is able to see and modify the content of the messages.

Applications are able to provide additional confidentiality, integrity or authentication mechanisms within the push message itself. The application server sending the push message and the application on the user agent that receives it are frequently just different instances of the same application, so no standardized protocol is needed to establish a proper security context. The process of providing the application server with subscription information provides a convenient medium for key agreement.

The Web Push API codifies this practice by requiring that each push subscription created by the browser be bound to a browser generated encryption key. Pushed messages are authenticated and decrypted by the browser before delivery to applications. This scheme ensures that the push service is unable to examine the contents of push messages.

The public key for a subscription ensures that applications using that subscription can identify messages from unknown sources and discard them. This depends on the public key only being disclosed to entities that are authorized to send messages on the channel. The push server does not require access to this public key.

8.2. Privacy Considerations

Push message confidentiality does not ensure that the identity of who is communicating and when they are communicating is protected. However, the amount of information that is exposed can be limited.

Subscription URIs MUST NOT provide any basis to correlate communications for a given user agent. It MUST NOT be possible to correlate any two subscription URIs based solely on the content of the subscription URIs. This allows a user agent to control correlation across different applications, or over time.

In particular, user and device information MUST NOT be exposed through the subscription URI.

In addition, subscription URIs established by the same user agent MUST NOT include any information that allows them to be correlated with the associated registration or the user agent. The push service is the only entity that needs to be able to correlate subscriptions with a registration.

Note: This need not be perfect as long as the resulting anonymity set (see [RFC6973], Section 6.1.1) is sufficiently large. A subscription URI necessarily identifies a push service or a single server instance. It is also possible that traffic analysis could be used to correlate subscriptions.

A user agent **MUST** be able to create new registrations and subscriptions with new identifiers at any time.

8.3. Authorization

This protocol does not define how a push service establishes whether a user agent is permitted to create a registration or subscription, or whether push messages can be delivered to the user agent. A push service **MAY** choose to authorize request based on any HTTP-compatible authorization method available, of which there are numerous options. The authorization process and any associated credentials are expected to be configured in the user agent along with the URI for the "push service".

Authorization for sending push messages is managed using capability URLs (see [CAP-URI]). A capability URL grants access to a resource based solely on knowledge of the URL. Capability URLs are used for their "easy onward sharing" and "easy client API" properties. These make it possible to avoid relying on relationships between push services and application servers, with the protocols necessary to build and support those relationships.

A subscription URI therefore acts as a bearer token: knowledge of the URI implies authorization to send push messages. Subscription URIs **MUST** be extremely difficult to guess. Encoding a large amount of random entropy (at least 120 bits) in the path component ensures that it is difficult to successfully guess a valid subscription URI.

8.4. Denial of Service Considerations

Discarding unwanted messages at the user agent based on message authentication doesn't protect against a denial of service attack on the user agent. Even a relatively small volume of push messages can cause battery-powered devices to exhaust power reserves. Limiting the number of entities with access to push channels limits the number of entities that can generate value push requests of the push server.

An application can limit where push messages can originate by limiting the distribution of subscription URIs to authorized entities. Ensuring that subscription URIs are hard to guess ensures that only applications servers that have been given a subscription URI can use it.

A malicious application with a valid subscription use the greater resources of a push service to mount a denial of service attack on a user agent. Push service **SHOULD** limit the rate at which push messages are sent to individual user agents. A push service or user

agent MAY terminate subscriptions (Section 7.3) that receives too many push messages.

End-to-end confidentiality mechanisms, such as those in [API], prevent an entity with a registration URI from learning the contents of push messages. In both cases, push messages that are not successfully authenticated will not be delivered by the API, but this can present a denial of service risk.

Conversely, a push service is also able to deny service to user agents. Intentional failure to deliver messages is difficult to distinguish from faults, which might occur due to transient network errors, interruptions in device availability, or genuine service outages.

8.5. Logging Risks

Server request logs can reveal registration and subscription URIs. Acquiring a registration URI permits the creation of new subscriptions, as well as potentially enabling the receipt of messages. Acquiring a subscription URI permits the sending of push messages. Logging could also reveal relationships between different subscription URIs for the same registration, or between different registrations for the same device.

Limitations on log retention and strong access control mechanisms can ensure that URIs are not learned by unauthorized entities.

9. IANA Considerations

This document registers three URNs for use in identifying link relation types. These are added to a new "Web Push Identifiers" registry according to the procedures in Section 4 of [RFC3553]; the corresponding "push" sub-namespace is entered in the "IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol Parameter Identifiers" registry.

The "Web Push Identifiers" registry operates under the IETF Review policy [RFC5226].

Registry name: Web Push Identifiers

URN Prefix: urn:ietf:params:push

Specification: (this document)

Respository: [Editor/IANA note: please include a link to the final registry location.]

Index value: Values in this registry are URNs or URN prefixes that start with the prefix "urn:ietf:params:push". Each is registered independently.

New registrations in the "Web Push Identifiers" are encouraged to include the following information:

URN: A complete URN or URN prefix.

Description: A summary description.

Specification: A reference to a specification describing the semantics of the URN or URN prefix.

Contact: Email for the person or group making the registration.

Index value: As described in [RFC3553], URN prefixes that are registered include a description of how the URN is constructed. This is not applicable for specific URNs.

Three values are entered as the initial content of the "Web Push Identifiers" registry.

URN: urn:ietf:params:push

Description: This link relation type is used to identify a web push subscription.

Specification: (this document)

Contact: Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@gmail) or the Web Push WG (webpush@ietf.org)

URN: urn:ietf:params:push:reg

Description: This link relation type is used to identify a web push registration.

Specification: (this document)

Contact: Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@gmail) or the Web Push WG (webpush@ietf.org)

URN: urn:ietf:params:push:sub

Description: This link relation type is used to identify a resource that can be used to create new web push subscriptions.

Specification: (this document)

Contact: Martin Thomson (martin.thomson@gmail) or the Web Push WG
(webpush@ietf.org)

10. Acknowledgements

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