Large MeAsurement Platform Protocol

draft-bagnulo-lmap-http-03

Abstract

This document specifies the LMAP protocol based on HTTP for the Control and Report in Large Scale Measurement Platforms.

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1. Introduction

A Large MeAsurement Platform (LMAP) is an infrastructure deployed in the Internet that enables performing measurements from a very large number of vantage points.

The main components of a LMAP are the following:

- The Measurement Agents (MAs): these are the processes that perform the measurements. The measurements can be both active or passive.
The Controller: this is the element that controls the MAs. In particular it provides configuration information and it instructs the MA to perform a set of measurements.

The Collector: this is the repository where the MAs send the results of the measurements that they have performed.

These and other terms used in this document are defined in [I-D.ietf-lmap-framework]. We only include the definition of the main elements in this document so it is self-contained and can be read without the need to consult other documents. The reader is referred to the terminology draft for further details.

In order for a LMAP to work, the following protocols are required:

- Measurement protocols: These are the protocols used between the MA and the Measurement Peer in active measurements. These are the actual packets being used for the measurement operations.
- Control Protocol. This is the protocol between the Controller and the MAs. This protocol is used to convey measurement Instruction(s) from the Controller to the MA as well as logging, failure and capabilities information from the MA to the Controller.
- Report Protocol. This is the protocol between the MAs and the Collector. This protocol conveys information about the results of the measurements performed by the MA to the Collector.

Both the Control protocol and the Report protocol have essentially two parts: a transport and a data model. The data model represents the information about measurement instructions and logging/failure/capabilities (in the Control protocol) and the information about measurement results (in the Report protocol) that is being exchanged between the parties. The transport is the underlying protocol used to exchange that information. This document specifies the use of HTTP 1.1 [RFC7230] [RFC7231] [RFC7232] [RFC7233] [RFC7234] [RFC7235] as a transport for the Control and the Report protocol. This document also defines the data model for the Control and Report protocols. The data model described in this document follows the information model described in [I-D.ietf-lmap-information-model]. The Measurement protocols are out of the scope for this document.

At this stage, the goal of this document is to explore different options that can be envisioned to use the HTTP protocol to exchange LMAP information and to foster discussion about which one to use (if any). Because of that, the document contains several discussion paragraphs that explore different alternative approaches to perform the same function.
2. Overview

This section provides an overview of the architecture envisioned for a LMAP using HTTP as transport protocol. As we described in the previous section, a LMAP is formed by a large number of MAs, one or more Controllers and one or more Collectors. We assume that before the MAs are deployed, it is possible to pre-configure some information in them. Typically this includes information about the MA itself (like its identifier), security information (like some certificates) and information about the Controller(s) available in the measurement platform. Once that the MA is deployed it will retrieve additional configuration information from the pre configured Controller. After obtaining the configuration information, the MA is ready to receive Instructions from the Controller and initiate measurement tasks. The MA will perform the following operations:

- It will obtain Instructions from one of the configured Controllers. These Instructions include information about the set of measurement tasks to be performed, a schedule for the execution of the measurements as well as a set of report channels. This information is downloaded by the MA from the Controller. The MA will periodically check whether there are new Instructions available from the Controller. This document specifies how the MA uses the HTTP protocol to retrieve information from the Controller.
- The MA will execute measurement tasks either by passively listening to traffic or by actively sending and receiving measurement packets. How this is done is out of the scope of this document.
- After one or more measurements have been performed, the MA reports the results to the Collector. The timing of these uploads is specified in the measurement Instruction i.e. each measurement specified in a measurement Instruction contains a report information, defining when the MA should report the results back to the Collector. This document specifies how the MA uses the HTTP protocol to upload the measurement results to the Collector.
- In addition, the MA will periodically report back to the Controller information about its capabilities (like the number of interfaces it has, the corresponding IP addresses, the set of measurement methods it supports, etc) and also logging information (whether some of the requested measurement tasks failed and related information).

3. Naming Considerations

In this section we define how the different elements of the LMAP architecture are identified and named.
The Controller and the Collectors can be assumed to have both an IP address and a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). It is natural to use these as identifiers for these elements. In this document we will use FQDNs, but IP addresses can be used as well.

The MAs on the other hand, are likely to be executed in devices located in the end user premises and are likely to be located behind a NAT box. It is reasonable to assume they have neither a public IP address nor a FQDN. We propose then that the MAs are identified using an Universally Unique IDentifier URN as defined in RFC 4122 [RFC4122]. In particular each MA has a version 4 UUID, which is randomly or pseudo randomly generated.

DISCUSSION:

MA ID Configuration: Some open issues related to this are: a) whether the MA ID is configured before or after the MA is deployed, b) if configured after deployment whether the MA ID is generated locally and posted or fetched from the Controller and c) whether this is within the scope of this (or other) specification if any. These issues seem also to be related to the nature of the MA platform (whether the MA is a software downloaded into a general purpose device or it is a special purpose hardware box). Consider the case that the MA is located in a special purpose hardware box, then having the MA ID pre configure before deployment requires a per device customization that is expensive. It would be more costly efficient to reuse an existent (hopefully) unique identifier available in the hardware (such as a MAC address) to serve as a one-time pre configured identifier to be used to fetch (or post a self generated) the MA ID from the Controller once the MA is deployed. The requirement for such one-time identifier is that they must be unique (which is not always true for the MACs). About the local generation of the MA ID (as opposed to fetch it from the Controller), the generation process performed in the MA MUST be idempotent, i.e. if the MA was factory-reset then the server would still see it with the same MA ID when it came back up. This is probably easier to achieve if it is generated in the Controller and then fetched by the MA. Finally, it is not clear at this stage if this needs to be specified in this document or in the information model document or left open to the implementers.

Group identifiers. In some cases, like the case of measurements in mobile devices, it may be important because of privacy considerations for the MA not to have a unique identifier. It is possible then to assign "Group identifiers" to a set of devices that share relevant characteristics from the measurement perspective (e.g. devices from the same operator, with the same type of contract or other relevant feature). In this case, the MAs within the same group would retrieve common measurement
Instructions from the controller by presenting the same Group ID and would report results including the Group ID in the report. This would imply that it would not be possible for the platform to correlate specific measurement data with any given MA. The downside of this is that some MAs may be over-represented while other under-represented in the measurement data and it would not be possible to detect this case (for instance a given MA may have reported 20 results while another one only one). In order to deal with this issue, the MA behaviour must be programmed accordingly (e.g. the MA should not perform more than one measurement every given period of time). In addition, it should be noted that privacy is only achieved in a holistic way. This means that really anonymity of the MA is incompatible with strong authentication. In particular, if a measurement platform’s goal is to keep MAs anonymous, it cannot require any form of strong authentication (other than weak group authentication e.g. a password shared by a group), which has security implications. In particular, the threat for report forgery (i.e. enabling an attacker to submit forged reports as discussed in the security considerations) increases.

There are additional naming considerations related to:

- The measurements. In order to enable a Controller to properly convey a measurement schedule, it must be possible for the Controller to specify a measurement to be performed while providing the needed input parameters. While this is critical, it is out of the scope of this document. There is a proposed registry for metrics/measurements in [I-D.bagnulo-ippm-new-registry-independent])

- The resources being exchanged, namely, the configuration information, the measurement Instructions and the reports. These are being discussed in the upcoming sections.

4. Information model

The information model for LMAP is described [I-D.ietf-lmap-information-model]. It contains basically two models one for the control information (i.e. the Instructions from the Controller to the MA) and a model for the Report information. We briefly describe their overall structure here.

The control information (or Instruction) has the following five elements:

- The Set of Measurement Task Configurations: This element defines the measurements/test that the MA will perform without defining the schedule when they will be performed.
5. Transport protocol

5.1. Pre-configured information

As we mentioned earlier, the MAs contain pre-configured information before being deployed. The pre-configured information is the following:

- The UUID for the MA. This should be pre-configured so that the Controller is aware of the MA and can feed configuration information and measurement Instructions to it.
- Information about one or more Controllers. The MA MUST have enough information to create the URL for the Instruction resources. This includes the the FQDN of each of the Controller or the IP addresses of the Controller, as well as the well-known path prefix and its identifier.
- The certificate for the Certification authority that is used in the platform to generate the certificates for the Controller and the Collector. See the Security considerations section below.
- The security related information for the MA (it can be a certificate for the MA and the corresponding private key, or simply a key/password depending on the security method used, see the security considerations section below).

5.2. Control Protocol

The Control protocol is used by the MA to retrieve Instruction information from the Controller. In this section we describe how to use HTTP to transport Instructions. The Instruction information is structured as defined in the LMAP Information model [I-D.ietf-lmap-information-model] as described in the previous section. The MA uses the Control protocol to retrieve all the resources described above, namely, the Agent information, the Set of Measurement Task Configurations, the Set of Report Channels, the Set of Measurement Schedules for Repeated Tasks and the Set of
Measurement Schedules for Isolated Tasks. The main difference from the HTTP perspective is that the MA MUST have the URL for the Agent Information resource pre-configured as described in the previous section, while the URLs for all the other resources are contained in the Agent Information resource itself.

5.2.1. Retrieving Instructions

In order to retrieve the Instruction resources from the Controller the MA can use either the GET or the POST method using the corresponding URL.

5.2.1.1. Using the GET method

One way of using the GET method to retrieve configuration information is to explicitly name the configuration information resources and then apply the GET method. The MA retrieves its Instruction when it is first connected to the network and periodically after that. The frequency for the periodical retrieval is contained in the Agent Information (???).

The URL for the Agent Information resource is formed as the FQDN of the Controller, a well-known path prefix and the MA UUID. The well-known path prefix is /.well-known/lmap/ma-info. The URL for the remaining resources that compose the Instruction are contained in the Agent Information.

Agent Information retrieval: In order to retrieve the Agent information the MA uses the HTTP GET method follows:

```
GET /.well-known/lmap/ma-info/<ma-iid> HTTP/1.1
Host: FQDN or IP of the Controller
Accept: application/json (as per [RFC7159])
```

The Agent Information should contain the Configuration Retrieval Schedule (i.e. how often the MA should retrieve configuration information) and also the Measurement Instruction Retrieval Schedule (i.e. how often the MA should retrieve the Measurement Instruction from the Controller). COMMENT: this is missing from the Data Model.

The retrieval of the remaining resources of the Instruction using the GET method is analogous, only that the URL is extracted from the Agent Information file rather than constructed with pre-configured information.

The format for the response should be described here.
Periodical Instruction retrieval: After having downloaded the initial Instruction information, the MA will periodically look for updated Instruction information. The frequency with which the MA polls for the new Instructions from the Controller is contained in the last Agent Information downloaded. In order to retrieve the Agent Information, the MA uses the GET method as follows:

GET /.well-known/lmap/ma-info/ma-iid/ HTTP/1.1
Host: FQDN or IP of the Controller
Accept: application/json (as per [RFC7159])
If-None-Match: the eTag of the last retrieved Agent Information
(an alternative option here is to use If-Modified-Since, not sure which one is best)

For the other Instruction resources, the GET method is applied in the same way just that the URL used are the ones retrieved in the last Agent Information.

The format for the response should be described here

Alternatively, instead of explicitly naming the Instruction resources for each MA, it is possible to perform a query using the GET method as well. In this case, the MA could perform a GET for the following URI http://controller.example.org/?ma=maid & q=ma-info (similar queries can be constructed for the other Instruction resources). (I am not sure how to express in this case the condition that the MA wishes to retrieve the configuration if it is newer than the last one it downloaded.)

5.2.1.2. Using the POST method

An alternative to retrieve Instruction resources is to use the POST method to perform a query (similar to the query using GET). In this case there is no explicit naming of the Instruction information of each MA, but a general Instruction resource and the POST method is used to convey a query for the Instruction information of a particular MA. For the case of the Agent Information resource, this would look like as follows:

POST /.well-known/lmap/ma-info/ma-iid/ HTTP/1.1
Host: controller.example.com
Content-Type: application/lmap-maid+json
Accept: application/lmap-config+json
{
    "ma-id" : "550e8400-e29b-11d4-a716-446655440000",
}
The reply for this query would contain the actual configuration information as follows:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: xxx
Content-Type: application/lmap-config+json
{
    // whatever config goes here
}
```

In this case, the URLs contained in the Agent information can be generic and not MA specific, since the MA will use the POST method including its own identifier when retrieving the Instruction resources.

The argument for this approach is that this is much more extensible since the POST can carry complex information and there is no need to "press" arguments into the strict hierarchy of URIs.

We need to describe how to use this to retrieve newer information in the periodic case.

5.2.2. Handling communication failures

The cases that the MA is unable to retrieve the Instructions are handled as follows:

- The MA will use a timeout for the communication of TIMEOUT seconds. The value of TIMEOUT MUST be configurable via the aforementioned Configuration Information retrieval protocol. The default value for the TIMEOUT is 3 seconds. If after the timeout, the communication with the Controller has not been established, the MA will retry doing an exponential backoff and doing a round robin between the different Controllers it has available.
- If a HTTP error message (5xx) is received from the Controller as a response to the GET request, the MA will retry doing an exponential back-off and doing a round robin between the different Controllers it has available. The 5xx error codes indicate that this Controller is currently incapable of performing the requested operation.

5.2.3. Pushing Information from the Controller to the MA

The previous sections described how the MA periodically polls the Controller to retrieve Instruction information. The frequency of the downloads is configurable. The question is whether this is enough or a mechanism for pushing Instruction information is needed. Such method would enable to contact the MA in any moment and take actions
like triggering a measurement right away or for instance to stop an ongoing measurement (e.g. because it is disturbing the network). The need for such a mechanism is likely to depend on the use case of the platform. Probably the ISP use case is more likely to require this feature than the regulator/benchmarking use case. It is probably useful then to provide this as an optional feature.

The main challenge in order to provide this feature is that the MAs are likely to be placed behind NATs, so it is not possible for the Controller to initiate a communication with the MA unless there is a binding in the NAT to forward the packets to the MA. There are several options that can be considered to enable this communication:

- The MA can use one of the NAT control protocols, such as PCP or UPNP. If this approach is used, the MA will create a binding in the NAT opening a hole. After that, the MA should inform the Controller about which is the IP address and port available for communication. It would be possible to re-use existing protocols to forward this information. The problem with this is that the NAT may not support these protocols or they may not be activated. In any case, a solution should try to use them in the case they are available.

- If it is not possible to use a NAT control protocol, then the MA can open a hole in the NAT by establishing a connection to the Controller and keeping it open. This allows the Controller to push information to the MA through that connection. One concern with this approach is that the MA is playing the role of the client and the Controller is playing the role of the server (the MA is initiating the TCP connection), but it would be the Controller who would use the PUT method towards the MA reversing the roles. An alternative approach is that the MA has a long running GET pending which is answered by the server if the measurement Instruction changes (or the server times out, in which case the MA restarts the long running GET. More discussion is needed about whether one of these options is acceptable or not. In addition, this would imply that the Controller should maintain as many open sessions as MAs it is managing, which imposes additional burden in the Controller. There are security considerations as well, but these are covered in the Security Considerations section below.

5.3. Report protocol

The MA after performing the measurements reports the results to a collector. There can be more than one collector within a LMAP framework. Each collector is identified by its FQDN or IP address which is retrieved as part of the Agent information from a pre-configured controller as previously discussed. The number of
Collectors that the MA uploads the results to as well as the schedule when it does so is defined in the measurement Instruction previously downloaded from the Controller. The MA themselves are identified by a UUID.

There are two options that can be considered for the MA to upload reports to the Collector either to use the PUT method or to use the POST method.

If the PUT method option is used, then the MA need to perform the PUT method using an explicit name for the report resource it is transferring to the Collector. The name of the resource is contained in the Agent Information previously retrieved by the MA.

The other option is for the MA to use the POST method to upload the measurement reports to one or more Collectors. In this case, the POST message body can contain the identifier of the MA and additional information describing the report in addition to the report itself.

One argument to consider is that PUT is idempotent. This means that if the network is bad at some point and the MA is not sure whether its request made it through, it can send it a second (or nth) time, and it is guaranteed that the request will have exactly the same effect as sending it for the first time. POST does not by itself guarantee this. This can be achieved by verifying the report data itself, and contrast it with data already stored in the Collector database.

5.3.1. Handling communication failures

The MA will use a timeout for the communication with the Collector of TIMEOUT seconds. The value of TIMEOUT MUST be configurable via the aforementioned Configuration Information retrieval protocol. The default value for the TIMEOUT is 3 seconds.

If the MA is uploading the report to several Collectors and it manages to establish the communication before TIMEOUT seconds with at least one of them, but not with one or more of the other Collectors, then the MA gives up after TIMEOUT seconds and it MAY issue an alarm. The definition of how to do that operation is out of the scope of this document.

If the MA is uploading the report to only one Collector, and it does not manage to establish a communication before TIMEOUT seconds, then it retry doing an exponential backoff and doing a round robin between the different Collectors it has available.
Similarly, if an HTTP error message (5xx) is received from the Collector as a response to the PUT request, the MA will retry doing an exponential backoff and doing a round robin between the different Collectors it has available. The 5xx error codes indicate that this Collector is currently incapable of performing the requested operation.

In order to support this, the information model must express the difference between a report sent to multiple collectors and multiple collectors used for fallback.

6. LMAP Data Model

This section will contain the data model in json.

6.1. Timing Information

An example immediate timing object with no defined randomness is shown below:

```json
{
    "timings": [
        {
            "id": 1,
            "ma_periodic_end": 1410017611,
            "ma_periodic_interval": 3600000,
            "ma_periodic_start": 1410017613,
            "ma_randomness_spread": 0,
            "ma_timing_name": "hourly"
        },
        {
            "id": 3,
            "ma_periodic_end": 1410017611,
            "ma_periodic_interval": 86400,
            "ma_periodic_start": 1410017613,
            "ma_randomness_spread": 0,
            "ma_timing_name": "daily"
        },
        {
            "id": 2,
            "ma_periodic_end": 1410017611,
            "ma_periodic_interval": 3600000,
            "ma_periodic_start": 1410017613,
            "ma_randomness_spread": 0,
            "ma_timing_name": "hourly"
        },
        {
        }
```
{"id": 4,
"ma_calendar_days_of_month": "",
"ma_calendar_days_of_week": "tuesday, thursday, sunday",
"ma_calendar_end": 1410017613,
"ma_calendar_hours": "18",
"ma_calendar_minutes": "04",
"ma_calendar_months": "",
"ma_calendar_seconds": "42",
"ma_calendar_start": 1410017612,
"ma_calendar_timezone_offset": 2,
"ma_randomness_spread": 0,
"ma_timing_name": "tuesday-thursday-sunday"
},
{"id": 5,
"ma_calendar_days_of_month": "",
"ma_calendar_days_of_week": "",
"ma_calendar_end": 1410017619,
"ma_calendar_hours": "0, 6 12 18",
"ma_calendar_minutes": "0",
"ma_calendar_months": "",
"ma_calendar_seconds": "0",
"ma_calendar_start": 1410017612,
"ma_calendar_timezone_offset": 2,
"ma_randomness_spread": 21600000,
"ma_timing_name": "once-every-six-hours"
},
{"id": 6,
"ma_one_off_time": 1410017613,
"ma_randomness_spread": 0,
"ma_timing_name": "immediate"
},
{"id": 7,
"ma_one_off_time": 1410017613,
"ma_randomness_spread": 0,
"ma_timing_name": "immediate"
},
{"id": 8,
"ma_randomness_spread": 12345,
"ma_timing_name": "startup"
]"}
6.2. Channels

An example channel object using the aforementioned timing object is shown below:

```json
{
    "channels": [
        {
            "id": 1,
            "ma_channel_credentials": "MIIFEzCCAvsCAQEwDQYJ...",
            "ma_channel_interface_name": "eth0",
            "ma_channel_name": "default-collector-channel",
            "ma_channel_target": "collector.example.org"
        },
        {
            "id": 2,
            "ma_channel_credentials": "MIIFEzCCAvsCAQEwDQYJ...",
            "ma_channel_interface_name": "eth0",
            "ma_channel_name": "default-controller-channel",
            "ma_channel_target": "controller.example.org"
        }
    ]
}
```

6.3. Configuration

An example config object using the aforementioned channel objects is shown below:

```json
{
    "config": [
        {
            "id": 1,
            "ma_agent_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
            "ma_channel_name": "default-controller-channel",
            "ma_control_channel_fail_tresh": "10",
            "ma_credentials": "MIIFEzCCAvsCAQEwDQYJ...",
            "ma_device_id": "01:23:45:67:89:ab",
            "ma_group_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440123",
            "ma_report_ma_id_flag": "1"
        }
    ]
}
```
6.4. Instruction

The instruction object is essentially a wrapper around suppression, schedule, task, channel objects.

6.5. Measurement Supression

An example suppression object used by the aforementioned instruction object is shown below:

```json
{
  "supression": [
    {
      "id": 1,
      "ma_supression_enabled": 0,
      "ma_supression_end": 0,
      "ma_supression_schedule_names": "icmp-latency-immediate",
      "ma_supression_start": 1410037509,
      "ma_supression_stop_ongoing_task": 0,
      "ma_supression_task_names": "iperf-server"
    }
  ]
}
```

6.6. Measurement Task Configurations

An example task object used by the aforementioned instruction object is shown below:

```json
{
  "tasks": [
    {
      "id": 1,
      "ma_role": "",
      "ma_task_cycle_id": "1",
      "ma_task_name": "udp-latency-test",
      "ma_task_options": "",
      "ma_task_registry_entry": "urn:...",
      "ma_task_supress_default": "true"
    },
    {
      "id": 5,
      "ma_role": "",
      "ma_task_cycle_id": "1",
      "ma_task_name": "reporting-daily",
      "ma_task_options": "",
      "ma_task_registry_entry": "urn:...",
      "ma_task_supress_default": "true"
    }
  ]
}
```
6.7. Measurement Schedules

An example schedule object used by the aforementioned instruction object is shown below:

```json
{
  "id": 2,
  "ma_role": "",
  "ma_task_cycle_id": "1",
  "ma_task_name": "icmp-latency-test",
  "ma_task_options": "",
  "ma_task_registry_entry": "urn:...",
  "ma_task_supress_default": "true"
},
{
  "id": 3,
  "ma_role": "",
  "ma_task_cycle_id": "1",
  "ma_task_name": "iperf-server",
  "ma_task_options": "{\"name\":\"role\",\n    \"value\":\"server\"}",
  "ma_task_registry_entry": "server",
  "ma_task_supress_default": "false"
},
{
  "id": 4,
  "ma_role": "",
  "ma_task_cycle_id": "1",
  "ma_task_name": "lmap-reporting-task",
  "ma_task_options": "",
  "ma_task_registry_entry": "lmap-reportd",
  "ma_task_supress_default": "true"
}
}
```
{  
  "schedules": [
    
    {  
      "id": 1,
      "ma_sched_channel_interface_select": "0",
      "ma_sched_channel_names": "default-collector-channel",
      "ma_sched_task_downstream_config_names": "reporting-daily",
      "ma_sched_task_output_selection": "1",
      "ma_schedule_name": "reporting-immediate",
      "ma_schedule_task_name": "icmp-latency-test",
      "ma_timing_name": "immediate"
    }  
  ]
}

6.8. Logging

An example log object is shown below:

{  
  "logging": [
    
    {  
      "id": 1,
      "ma_log_agent_id": "0e49b32b01fa11e4bcaf10ddb1bd23b5",
      "ma_log_code": "200",
      "ma_log_description": "OK",
      "ma_log_event_time": 1404313752    
    }  
  ]
}

6.9. Capability and Status

An example status object is shown below:
6.10. Reporting

An example report object is shown below:

```json
{
  "reporting": [
    {
      "id": 1,
      "ma_report_agent_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
      "ma_report_date": 1404315031,
      "ma_report_group_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440123",
      "ma_report_result_conflict_task": "0",
      "ma_report_result_cross_traffic": 20,
      "ma_report_result_end_time": 1404315031,
      "ma_report_result_start_time": 1404315031,
      "ma_report_result_values": "result_values",
      "ma_report_task_column_labels": "\"start-time\", "conflicting-tasks\", "cross-traffic\", "mean\",
    }
  ]
}
```
{"id": 1,
"ma_report_agent_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
"ma_report_date": 1404315031,
"ma_report_group_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440123",
"ma_report_result_conflict_task": "0",
"ma_report_result_cross_traffic": 20,
"ma_report_result_end_time": 1404315031,
"ma_report_result_start_time": 1404315031,
"ma_report_result_values": "result_values",
"ma_report_task_column_labels": ""start-time",
"conflicting-tasks", "cross-traffic",
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Large Measurement Platforms may result in a security hazard if they are not properly secured. This is so because they encompass a large number of MAs that can be managed and coordinated easily to generate traffic and they can potentially be used for generating DDoS attacks or other forms of security threats.

From the perspective of the protocols described in this documents, we can identify the following threats:

- **Hijacking**: Probably the worst threat is that an attacker takes over the control of one or more MAs. In this case the attacker would be able to instruct the MAs to generate traffic or to eavesdrop traffic in their location. It is then critical that the MA is able to strongly authenticate the Controller. An alternative way to achieve this attack is to alter the communication between the Controller and the MAs. In order to prevent this form of attack, integrity protection of the communication between the Controller and the MAs is required.

- **Polluting**: Another type of attack is that an attacker is able to pollute the Collectors database by providing false results. In this case, the attacker would attempt to impersonate one or more MAs and upload fake results in the Collector. In order to prevent this, the authentication of the MAs with the Collector is needed. An alternative way to achieve this is for an attacker to alter the communication between the MA and the Collector. In order to prevent this form of attack, integrity protection of the communication between the MA and the Collector is needed.

- **Disclosure**: Another threat is that an attacker may gather information about the MAs and their configuration and the Measurement schedules. In order to do that, it would connect to the Controller and download the information about one or more MAs. This can be prevented by using MA authentication with the Controller. An alternative mean to achieve this would be for the attacker to eavesdrop the communication between the MA and the Controller. In order to prevent this, confidentiality in the communication between the MA and the Collector is required. Similarly, an attacker may wish to obtain measurement result information by eavesdropping the communication between the MA and the Collector. In order to prevent this, confidentiality in the communication between the MA and the Collector is needed.

In order to address all the identified threats, the HTTPS protocol must be used for LMAP (i.e. using HTTP over TLS). HTTPS provides confidentiality, integrity protection and authentication, satisfying all the aforementioned needs. Ideally, mutual authentication should be used. In any case, server side authentication MUST be used. In
order to achieve that, both the Controller and the Collector MUST have certificates. The certificate of the CA used to issue the certificates for the Controller and the Collector MUST be pre-configured in the MAs, so they can properly authenticate them. As mentioned earlier, ideally, mutual authentication should be used. However, this implies that certificates for the MAs are needed. Certificate management for a large number of MAs may be expensive and cumbersome. Moreover, the major threats identified are the ones related to hijacking of the MAs, which are prevented by authenticating the Controller. MAs authentication is needed to prevent Polluting and Disclosure threats, which are less severe. So, in this case, alternative (cheaper) methods for authenticating MAs can be considered. The simplest method would be to simply use the MA UUID as a token to retrieve information. Since the MA UUID is 128 bit long, it is hard to guess. It would be also possible to use a password and use the HTTP method for authentication. It is not obvious that managing passwords for a large number of MAs is easier than managing certificates though.

An additional security consideration is posed by the mechanism to push information from the Controller to the MAs. If this method is used, it would be possible its abuse by an attacker to control the MAs. This threat is prevented by the use of HTTPS. If HTTPS is used in the established connection between the MA and the Controller, the only effect that a packet generated by an external attacker to the MA or the Controller would be to reset the HTTPS connection, requiring the connection to be re-established.

It is required in this document that both the Controller and that the Collector are authenticated using digital certificates. The current specification allows for the MA to have information about the certificate of the Certification authority used for generating the Controller and Collector certificates while the actual certificates are exchanged in band using TLS. Another (more secure) option is to perform certificate pinning i.e. to configure in the MAs the actual certificates rather than the certification authority certificate. Another measure to increase the security would be to limit the domains that the FQDNs of the Controller and/or the Collector (e.g. only names in the example.org domain).

Large scale measurements can have privacy implications, especially in some scenarios like mobile devices performing measurements. In this memo we have considered using Group IDs to the MA in order to avoid the possibility for the platform to track each individual MA that is feeding results.
8. IANA Considerations

Registration of the well-known URL

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Abstract

This document discusses the motivation and use-cases for collaborative LMAP practices, where multiple autonomous measurement systems collaborate together in performing large scale performance measurements to help with QoE enhancement by ICPs, network performance monitoring to guide ISP/Regulator coordination between autonomous network domains and/or regulatory policies and cross-boundary troubleshooting for complaints from end consumers.

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1 Introduction

With the rapid development of Internet technology and the increasing complexity of broadband network architecture, it is becoming difficult to do large scale network measurements due to the lack of the unified measurement system and cooperative protocols. Therefore, the Large-Scale Measurement of Broadband Performance (LMAP) working group is formed to standardize a large scale measurement system for the performance measurements of all kinds of broadband access methods.

There are 3 types of entities proposed in the LMAP architecture: [I-D.ietf-lmap-framework]

- Measurement Agents (MAs), implemented in network to perform measurement tasks;
- Controller, responsible for creating and assigning the measurement tasks; and
- Collector, in charge of collecting and storing measurement results.

LMAP’s current focus is to specify the information model, the associated data models, the control protocol for the secure communication between Controller and MA, and the report protocol for the secure communication between MA and Collector.

On the other hand, for a large network, collaboration between multiple Controllers may also be needed for performing local measurement tasks, either because there is a practical limit on the number of MAs a single Controller can manage simultaneously for scalability considerations, because that a local task may involve multiple MAs that are speaking different languages (i.e. different control/report protocols), or because different organizations want to interconnect their measurement systems.

Current LMAP protocols are designed under the following assumptions.

- All the involved entities are under the control of a single organization.
- An MA can only be controlled by a single controller at any given time.
There is no communication between Controllers, between Collectors, or between a Controller and a Collector.

However, cross-organization collaborations are increasingly common. For example, accurate troubleshooting for mobile services usually involves two or more organizations, and end-to-end performance measurement may be conducted across multiple ISPs. How to utilize LMAP practice to address these scenarios is still unsolved.

This document discusses the motivation and use-cases for collaborative LMAP practices, where multiple autonomous measurement systems collaborate together to help with QoE enhancement by ICPs, network performance monitoring to guide planning for network infrastructure and cross-boundary troubleshooting for SLA complaints from end consumers, as well as performing regulatory supervision by national regulators.

2 Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

The following acronyms are used extensively in this document.

- ICP, Internet Content Provider.
- QoE, Quality of Experience.
- QoS, Quality of Service.
- ISP, Internet Service Provider, or shortly Operator.
- SLA, Service Level Agreement.
- UE, User Equipment.
- MAN, Metro Area Network.
- WAN, Wide Area Network.

The following definitions are borrowed from LMAP framework [I-D.ietf-lmap-framework], and used to describe the corresponding entities within a participating LMAP system.

- Controller: A function that provides a Measurement Agent with its Instruction.
o Collector: A function that receives a Report from a Measurement Agent.

o Measurement Agent (MA): The function that receives Instruction Messages from a Controller and operates the Instruction by executing Measurement Tasks (using protocols outside the initial LMAP work scope and perhaps in concert with one or more other Measurement Agents or Measurement Peers) and (if part of the Instruction) by reporting Measurement Results to a Collector or Collectors.

o Measurement Method: The process for assessing the value of a Metric; the process of measuring some performance or reliability parameter associated with the transfer of traffic.

o Measurement Task: The action performed by a particular Measurement Agent that consists of the single assessment of a Metric through operation of a Measurement Method role at a particular time, with all of the role’s Input Parameters set to specific values.

o Measurement Result: The output of a single Measurement Task (the value obtained for the parameter of interest or Metric).

o Metric: The quantity related to the performance and reliability of the network that we’d like to know the value of.

The following definitions are used in this document to describe corresponding entities for a collaborative performance measurement among multiple LMAP systems.

o Initiator, the instructor for collaborative Measurement Tasks, potentially on behalf of a regulator, a third party ICPs or an end consumer.

o Reporter, the reporting party that aggregates partial Measurements Reports from collaborative LMAP task participants and produces the ultimate report to the task Initiator.

o Region, a geographical area or administrative domain under the regulation of a single regulator.

o Domain, a collection of network devices and their interconnections under the operation of a single administrative entity.

3 Motivations for Collaborative LMAP

End-to-end performance measurement and trouble-shooting are important
for multiple parties, including: (1) Internet Service Providers, in solving end user’s QoE issues by better managing and optimizing their networks, (2) Internet Content Providers, for enhance its service logic and application design, (3) regulators in examining the status of and guiding future regulation.

From ISP’s perspective, the importance of supporting LMAP for its own network construction and operation is without doubt. But taken into account the potential impact of introducing third-party LMAP MAs into key network entities, a sensible ISP would prefer to build its own LMAP system based on MAs embedded into its local network devices.

It is hence expected that the majority of end-to-end performance measurements will be conducted in a collaborative manner involving multiple autonomous LMAP systems, for the following reasons:

On one hand, for the regulator, in order to stimulate network development, it is necessary to have a clear picture of ISPs’ peering performance for interconnection points in addition to their own local network construction. Considering the prohibitive cost of a unified third-party deployment for LMAP MAs at various peering links among ISPs for a large geographic area, it may be more practical to make use of ISPs’ autonomous LMAP systems for collaboration.

Let us take the example in China for instance. China’s networks are complex, with more than 31 provinces and 300 regions come to hierarchical networks deployments. There are 3 ISP giants (CMCC, CTCC, CUCC) in mainland China, managing nationwide hierarchical networks, each is consisted of 3-4 national center points for interconnecting on the top, more than 30 provincial backbone networks in the middle, and more than 300 regions’ local networks on the bottom. In other words, the national regulator must know the network status of the 3 networks in each region of a province, of a province, and finally the whole country. It would be prohibitive for the national regulator authority, MIIT to deploy its own dedicated probes nationwide(900+).

Furthermore, regulators in different countries may want to interconnect their measurement systems to perform cross-border measurements.

On the other hand, for the ICP or user, it does not help much for service optimization or trouble shooting if the end-to-end performance measurement is conducted via a simple client-server model while treating the network as a black box. In the meantime, for the purpose of providing more value-added service to the ICPs as well as subscribers, there is motive for an ISP to open its LMAP system to
some extent and collaborate with the ICP/user in understanding the bottleneck and exploiting better network servicing for end-to-end QoE.

In the following sections, more specific use-cases and derived requirements of collaborative LMAP practices for end-to-end performance measurement are presented.

4 Use-cases for Collaborative LMAP

As stated above, there are motivations from the regulator, ISP/ICP and users to conduct collaborative measurements at the different levels in order to know if the current network conditions meet the expectations from the regulator policy, the ISP’s resource provision agreement or the ICP’s service provision agreement. In particular, the following use-cases are identified.

4.1 Use-cases for Regulators

A regulator may want to monitor the current status and the future deployment of network construction and operation of its region. In order to promote network development, the regulator needs to monitor the status of interconnection between different ISPs as well as the overall network status.

4.1.1 within a regulator’s own region

Understanding the current situation of its own region is necessary for a regulator to form guiding policies for stimulating further growth in high-speed networks. In order to get a clear picture of a large geographic area, the regulator may choose to not deploy a dedicated LMAP system on its own, while it’s necessary to deploy a large number of MAs. The regulator may achieve this goal by means of the ISP’s LMAP and the third-party LMAPs.

In that case, multiple organizations would simultaneously deploy their dedicated MAs for private LMAP systems within their network boundary in the same region, and by combining them together a measurement system can mainly cover the whole region’s network infrastructure. Through collaboration, MAs from multiple organizations can perform comprehensive measurement for the whole regional network in great depth, which can reflect the network’s operational state.

4.1.2 peering performance between ISPs

Low performance of peering links between different ISPs not only has great impact on ICP services, but also on an access ISPs relying on transit ISPs for Internet connectivity. For example, a mobile operator lacking access to an Internet resource will have to pay interconnections to other operators. The regulator can formulate policies to promote information sharing between ISP networks and investigate the user QoE problem by understanding the interconnection performance. For the same reason, an ISP/ICP can also benefit from a more clear understanding of the performance of the interconnection.

For example, the data flow for a service request from a mobile terminal to an ICP first goes through the access ISP network and then into the Internet via a transit ISP network. Similarly, before entering the ICP’s own private data-center, it may traverse another transit ISP network. As shown in Figure 1, the measurement can be implemented between ISP#1 MA and ISP#2 MA to understand the interconnection quality.

UE<=>access ISP<=>transit ISP #1<=>Internet<=>transit ISP #2<=>ICP

Figure 1 Cross-Domain data flow path

In a single administrative domain, there are also scenarios for collaborative measurement.

4.2 Use-cases for the ISP

4.2.1 measurements within a single domain

For one side, if the network scale is large enough, with many MAs, scalability of the Controller may become an issue [I-D.ooki-lmap-internet-measurement-system]. It would be a simple and scalable manner to construct an effective LMAP system by dividing the huge number of MAs into groups, and assign a Controller separately to manager each subset of MAs. The size of the MA groups are dependent on the number of MAs that a single Controller can manage at a time during the real deployment.

On the other hand, even the network scale is small, if there are many heterogeneous network devices as functioning MAs, the corresponding LMAP protocols/interface may be diverse. For example, browser built-in MAs can be conveniently implemented as HTTP clients, the CPE devices usually support TR.069 as their management protocol and network devices residing in the core network generally support and
runs SNMP protocol by default. In other words, different Controllers speaking different LMAP protocols may be needed to respectively manage different groups of MAs in the real deployment.

If a measurement task involves MAs that belong to different groups, collaboration among corresponding Controllers is needed for instructing the MAs with the task configuration and report collection.

4.2.2 measurements for multi-domain ISP networks

For a large ISP, it is common practice to divide its global network into several autonomous domains, each operated and managed by a regional branch. It is therefore, very likely that separate LMAP systems would be deployed into these autonomous domains, resulting in a call for collaborative measurement scenarios even within the same ISP’s network.

Take the case in China for instance, there are multiple nationwide ISP networks. Within these ISPs, relatively independent local branches, separated by physical territorial scope such as the province, operate their local network which has an autonomous domain or multiple autonomous domains. Each Provincial branch can deploy its own LMAP system to monitor its local network states.

4.3 Use-cases for the ICP

4.3.1 QoE-oriented performance enhancement

New applications or updated applications with newly-added functions/features are being pushed to the end user every day, with an increasing requirement for constant performance optimization based on realistic network utilization resultant from application dynamics. It is important to understand the practical performance and impact of various network segments (e.g. access network, transit network and Internet) on the end-to-end traffic path. For the design, experimental and operational phases of a new feature/technology introduction to an application is also of great importance. However, it is expensive and non-economic for each ICP to build its own dedicated LMAP system into various ISPs’ networks.

At the same time, with the transition of ISPs’ mindset from subscriber-centered charging for network access to ICP-centered...
charging, ISPs are motivated to offer assistance to ICPs’ exploration for better QoE through more efficient usage of network resources provisioned under the guidance of real-time performance measurements and optimization to accommodate application dynamics.

With ISPs’ cooperation, various network segments are no longer hidden behind the black box to end-to-end performance measurements. By combining inputs from both its own end-based LMAP system with ISPs’ measurement data, it is possible for an ICP to identify the bottleneck of service provision and develop corresponding enhancements via better guided technology introduction to the application as well as more targeted SLA negotiation with ISPs.

4.3.2 Trouble-shooting initiated by end consumers

With the growing influence of broadband access nowadays, more and more traditional ICPs are extending to the market of home gateways, as a result of the popularity of intelligent TVs and intelligent STBs. The services of end users in their home network are probably controlled by ICPs which may collaborate with the broadband access service providers to guarantee users the promised QoE. When malfunctions influencing user QoE occur in these types of services, it is necessary to have a mechanism with which the diagnostic measurement can be launched from the user side and identify the faulty party.

Generally the home gateway (such as a home WLAN router) is the border between the ISP network and the home network. The ISP network includes the access network, MAN and WAN. The home network includes home gateway, TV, STB, etc.

For a broadband access user who buys a third-party home gateway device, the typical service access path is shown in Figure 2. The home network between home gateway and UE is private and is not controlled by any ISP. However, the user may want to measure the link quality between the UE and the home gateway, the UE and the access ISP, or the UE to the ICP, separately. Thus in this scenario, it is difficult to deploy a single LMAP system which completely covers the whole path for accurate end-to-end QoE measurements and assists fault identification.

UE <=> home net <=> home GW <=> access ISP <=> transit ISP <=> Internet <=> ICP

Figure 2 Cross-Domain data traffic from home network to ICP

5 Derived Requirements
To make the requirements more clear, the following terms are defined:

LMAP domain: One LMAP domain is equal to one LMAP system specified in [i.d-ietf-lmap-framework], where all the MAs are controlled by a single controller.

This section presents derived requirements for LMAP protocols to enable the above collaborative use-cases across multiple LMAP domains. In particular:

* Current LMAP architecture MUST be extended to allow the MAs of a LMAP domain to accept the legal external measurement tasks initiated outside of the LMAP domain.

* When carrying out the outside measurement tasks, an LMAP domain MUST be able to coordinate the relevant controllers, MAs, and collectors of other LMAP domains for status updating or dynamical control.

* Current LMAP architecture MUST be extended to have a mechanism to gather and aggregate the measurement results from participating LMAP domains.

* An LMAP domain MUST be able to authenticate and authorize the measurement requests from outside of the LMAP domain.

* The extended mechanisms required above SHOULD NOT affect the current LMAP mechanisms in [i.d-ietf-lmap-framework]. If changes have to be made, they MUST be kept as small as possible.

6 Extension Discussions

In general, there are two basic approaches to extend the existing LMAP framework for the above requirements: the first is to add another layer of MA management and report collection for the additional information exchange; the other is to extend the existing controller/reporter’s function and make one of the relevant controller/reporter to take the responsibility of collaborative task instruction/data aggregation.

6.1 Adding Another Layer of Management/Aggregation

In particular, two entities for the general coordination of cross-organization interactions for collaborative LMAP tasks are introduced: the Initiator and the Reporter, for cross-domain measurement task assignment and result aggregation, respectively. Three protocols for interactions for the newly-introduced entities
and existing LMAP entities are discussed too.

6.1.1 Initiator-Controller exchange for task instruction

The globally trusted and verifiable Initiator instructs each participating LMAP Controller with corresponding Measurement Tasks to be performed within the LMAP system, indicating the corresponding Reporter, to whom the results of the Measurement Tasks are to be submitted. A globally unified identifier may be required for each collaborative Measurement Task.

6.1.2 Reporter-Collector exchange for data aggregation

A Collector from each participating LMAP system interacts with the corresponding Reporter to report local measurement results.

6.1.3 Initiator-Reporter exchange for output instruction

The Initiator also notifies the Reporter with instructions on how to create the final measurement report (e.g. data aggregation methods to be used) as well as the identities of the participating Controllers.

6.2 Extension over Existing Management/Aggregation Layer

Another straightforward manner of extending the current LMAP framework to support collaborative measurements from multiple domains is to break the assumption that "any MA can only be controlled by a single Controller", and allow the MA within an LMAP domain to carry on the instructions from another Controller outside the domain, and/or report the measurement results to another outside Collector.

Note that it is expected that such collaborative measurement instructions are not meant to change the ownership of the participating MA to its home LMAP domain.

As long as there is not conflict of interest or competition of local resources at the MA, the outside measurement tasks (from an outside Controller outside the local LMAP domain) as well as all the inside measurement tasks (from the inside Controller in the local LMAP domain) can be carried on simultaneously.

Otherwise, the MA may refer to static priority policies (e.g. the inside tasks have the top priority, etc.) or report to its local
Controller/a third party for conflict resolution and task adaptation.

7 Security Considerations

The security threats elaborated in [I-D.ietf-lmap-use-cases] also apply to collaborative LMAP scenarios.

It is assumed that the security issues within a participating LMAP system can be addressed by its local security mechanisms, as specified in [I-D.ietf-lmap-framework], and out of scope of this document.

Each participating LMAP system may have its own consideration and policy regarding its local network and/or subscriber private information. In performing collaborative task, it is still possible for a Collector to enforce local protection schemes, e.g. filtering algorithms, onto local measurement data before submission to the Reporter, hence providing protection to sensitive information for both the subscriber and the network operator.

It is important for a participating LMAP system to be able to authenticate the Initiator/outside-controller and the Reporter/outside-collector for a given collaborative Measurement Task, provide differentiated service provision according to its local policies (e.g. flexible authorization based on the Initiator’s identity, the type of Measurement Task, Measurement Method, frequency, etc.), and protect itself from service abuse of malicious Initiators or information leakage to malicious Reporters.

A task/data verification scheme is needed for the Reporter to exclude un-authorized or non-intended Collectors from tampering the measurement report or blocking the Reporter/outside-collector from proper functioning with corrupted/forged/replayed local reports.

8 IANA Considerations

There is no IANA action in this document.

9 Acknowledgements

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10 References

10.1 Normative References


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A framework for Large-Scale Measurement of Broadband Performance (LMAP)
draft-ietf-lmap-framework-14

Abstract

Measuring broadband service on a large scale requires a description of the logical architecture and standardisation of the key protocols that coordinate interactions between the components. The document presents an overall framework for large-scale measurements. It also defines terminology for LMAP (Large-Scale Measurement of Broadband Performance).

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

There is a desire to be able to coordinate the execution of broadband measurements and the collection of measurement results across a large scale set of Measurement Agents (MAs). These MAs could be software based agents on PCs, embedded agents in consumer devices (such as TVs or gaming consoles), embedded in service provider controlled devices such as set-top boxes and home gateways, or simply dedicated probes. MAs may also be embedded on a device that is part of an ISP’s network, such as a DSLAM (Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer), router, Carrier Grade NAT (Network Address Translator) or ISP Gateway. It is expected that a measurement system could easily encompass a few hundred thousand or even millions of such MAs. Such a scale presents unique problems in coordination, execution and measurement result collection. Several use cases have been proposed for large-scale measurements including:

- Operators: to help plan their network and identify faults
- Regulators: to benchmark several network operators and support public policy development

Further details of the use cases can be found in [I-D.ietf-lmap-use-cases]. The LMAP framework should be useful for these, as well as other use cases, such as to help end users run diagnostic checks like a network speed test.

The LMAP Framework has three basic elements: Measurement Agents, Controllers and Collectors.

Measurement Agents (MAs) initiate the actual measurements, which are called Measurement Tasks in the LMAP terminology. In principle, there are no restrictions on the type of device in which the MA function resides.

The Controller instructs one or more MAs and communicates the set of Measurement Tasks an MA should perform and when. For example it may instruct a MA at a home gateway: "Measure the 'UDP latency' with www.example.org; repeat every hour at xx.05". The Controller also manages a MA by instructing it how to report the Measurement Results, for example: "Report results once a day in a batch at 4am". We refer to these as the Measurement Schedule and Report Schedule.

The Collector accepts Reports from the MAs with the Results from their Measurement Tasks. Therefore the MA is a device that gets Instructions from the Controller, initiates the Measurement Tasks, and reports to the Collector. The communications between these three
LMAP functions are structured according to a Control Protocol and a Report Protocol.

The desirable features for a large-scale Measurement Systems we are designing for are:

- **Standardised** - in terms of the Measurement Tasks that they perform, the components, the data models and protocols for transferring information between the components. Amongst other things, standardisation enables meaningful comparisons of measurements made of the same metric at different times and places, and provides the operator of a Measurement System with criteria for evaluation of the different solutions that can be used for various purposes including buying decisions (such as buying the various components from different vendors). Today’s systems are proprietary in some or all of these aspects.

- **Large-scale** - [I-D.ietf-lmap-use-cases] envisages Measurement Agents in every home gateway and edge device such as set-top boxes and tablet computers, and located throughout the Internet as well [RFC7398]. It is expected that a Measurement System could easily encompass a few hundred thousand or even millions of Measurement Agents. Existing systems have up to a few thousand MAs (without judging how much further they could scale).

- **Diversity** - a Measurement System should handle Measurement Agents from different vendors, that are in wired and wireless networks, can execute different sorts of Measurement Task, are on devices with IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, and so on.

- **Privacy Respecting** - the protocols and procedures should respect the sensitive information of all those involved in measurements.

### 2. Outline of an LMAP-based measurement system

In this section we provide an overview of the whole Measurement System. New LMAP-specific terms are capitalised; Section 3 provides a terminology section with a compilation of all the LMAP terms and their definition. Section 4 onwards considers the LMAP components in more detail.

Other LMAP specifications will define an information model, the associated data models, and select/extend one or more protocols for the secure communication: firstly, a Control Protocol, from a Controller to instruct Measurement Agents what performance metrics to measure, when to measure them, how/when to report the measurement results to a Collector; secondly, a Report Protocol, for a Measurement Agent to report the results to the Collector.
The Figure below shows the main components of a Measurement System, and the interactions of those components. Some of the components are outside the scope of initial LMAP work.

The MA performs Measurement Tasks. One possibility is that the MA observes existing traffic. Another possibility is for the MA to generate (or receive) traffic specially created for the purpose and measure some metric associated with its transfer. The Figure includes both possibilities (in practice, it may be more usual for a MA to do one) whilst Section 6.4 shows some examples of possible arrangements of the components.

The MAs are pieces of code that can be executed in specialised hardware (hardware probe) or on a general-purpose device (like a PC or mobile phone). A device with a Measurement Agent may have multiple physical interfaces (Wi-Fi, Ethernet, DSL (Digital Subscriber Line)); and non-physical interfaces such as PPPoE (Point-to-Point Protocol over Ethernet) or IPsec) and the Measurement Tasks may specify any one of these.

The Controller manages a MA through use of the Control Protocol, which transfers the Instruction to the MA. This describes the Measurement Tasks the MA should perform and when. For example the Controller may instruct a MA at a home gateway: "Count the number of TCP SYN packets observed in a 1 minute interval; repeat every hour at \( \text{xx.05 + Unif[0,180]} \) seconds". The Measurement Schedule determines when the Measurement Tasks are executed. The Controller also manages a MA by instructing it how to report the Measurement Results, for example: "Report results once a day in a batch at 4am \( + Unif[0,180] \) seconds; if the end user is active then delay the report 5 minutes". The Report Schedule determines when the Reports are uploaded to the Collector. The Measurement Schedule and Report Schedule can define one-off (non-recurring) actions ("Do measurement now", "Report as soon as possible"), as well as recurring ones.

The Collector accepts a Report from a MA with the Measurement Results from its Measurement Tasks. It then provides the Results to a repository (see below).

A Measurement Method defines how to measure a Metric of interest. It is very useful to standardise Measurement Methods, so that it is meaningful to compare measurements of the same Metric made at different times and places. It is also useful to define a registry for commonly-used Metrics \([I-D.ietf-ippm-metric-registry]\) so that a Metric with its associated Measurement Method can be referred to simply by its identifier in the registry. The registry will hopefully be referenced by other standards organisations. The
Measurement Methods may be defined by the IETF, locally, or by some other standards body.

Broadly speaking there are two types of Measurement Method. In both types a Measurement Agent measures a particular Observed Traffic Flow. It may involve a single MA simply observing existing traffic – for example, the Measurement Agent could count bytes or calculate the average loss for a particular flow. On the other hand, a Measurement Method may involve multiple network entities, which perform different roles. For example, a "ping" Measurement Method, to measure the round trip delay, would consist of an MA sending an ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) ECHO request to a responder in the Internet. In LMAP terms, the responder is termed a Measurement Peer (MP), meaning that it helps the MA but is not managed by the Controller. Other Measurement Methods involve a second MA, with the Controller instructing the MAs in a coordinated manner. Traffic generated specifically as part of the Measurement Method is termed Measurement Traffic; in the ping example, it is the ICMP ECHO Requests and Replies. The protocols used for the Measurement Traffic are out of the scope of initial LMAP work, and fall within the scope of other IETF WGs such as IPPM (IP Performance Metrics).

A Measurement Task is the action performed by a particular MA at a particular time, as the specific instance of its role in a Measurement Method. LMAP is mainly concerned with Measurement Tasks, for instance in terms of its Information Model and Protocols.

For Measurement Results to be truly comparable, as might be required by a regulator, not only do the same Measurement Methods need to be used to assess Metrics, but also the set of Measurement Tasks should follow a similar Measurement Schedule and be of similar number. The details of such a characterisation plan are beyond the scope of work in IETF although certainly facilitated by IETF’s work.

Both control and report messages are transferred over a secure Channel. A Control Channel is between the Controller and a MA; the Control Protocol delivers Instruction Messages to the MA and Capabilities, Failure and Logging Information in the reverse direction. A Report Channel is between a MA and Collector, and the Report Protocol delivers Reports to the Collector.

Finally we introduce several components that are outside the scope of initial LMAP work and will be provided through existing protocols or applications. They affect how the Measurement System uses the Measurement Results and how it decides what set of Measurement Tasks to perform. As shown in the Figure, these components are: the bootstrapper, Subscriber parameter database, data analysis tools, and Results repository.
The MA needs to be bootstrapped with initial details about its Controller, including authentication credentials. The LMAP work considers the bootstrap process, since it affects the Information Model. However, LMAP does not define a bootstrap protocol, since it is likely to be technology specific and could be defined by the Broadband Forum, CableLabs or IEEE depending on the device. Possible protocols are SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol), NETCONF (Network Configuration Protocol) or (for Home Gateways) CPE WAN Management Protocol (CWMP) from the Auto Configuration Server (ACS) (as specified in TR-069 [TR-069]).

A Subscriber parameter database contains information about the line, such as the customer’s broadband contract (perhaps 2, 40 or 80Mb/s), the line technology (DSL or fibre), the time zone where the MA is located, and the type of home gateway and MA. These parameters are already gathered and stored by existing operations systems. They may affect the choice of what Measurement Tasks to run and how to interpret the Measurement Results. For example, a download test suitable for a line with an 80Mb/s contract may overwhelm a 2Mb/s line.

A Results repository records all Measurement Results in an equivalent form, for example an SQL (Structured Query Language) database, so that they can easily be accessed by the data analysis tools.

The data analysis tools receive the results from the Collector or via the Results repository. They might visualise the data or identify which component or link is likely to be the cause of a fault or degradation. This information could help the Controller decide what follow-up Measurement Task to perform in order to diagnose a fault. The data analysis tools also need to understand the Subscriber’s service information, for example the broadband contract.
3. Terminology

This section defines terminology for LMAP. Please note that defined terms are capitalized.

Bootstrap: A process that integrates a Measurement Agent into a Measurement System.
Capabilities: Information about the performance measurement capabilities of the MA, in particular the Measurement Method roles and measurement protocol roles that it can perform, and the device hosting the MA, for example its interface type and speed, but not dynamic information.

Channel: A bi-directional logical connection that is defined by a specific Controller and MA, or Collector and MA, plus associated security.

Collector: A function that receives a Report from a Measurement Agent.


Controller: A function that provides a Measurement Agent with its Instruction.

Control Channel: A Channel between a Controller and a MA over which Instruction Messages and Capabilities, Failure and Logging Information are sent.

Control Protocol: The protocol delivering Instruction(s) from a Controller to a Measurement Agent. It also delivers Capabilities, Failure and Logging Information from the Measurement Agent to the Controller. It can also be used to update the MA’s Configuration. It runs over the Control Channel.

Cycle-ID: A tag that is sent by the Controller in an Instruction and echoed by the MA in its Report. The same Cycle-ID is used by several MAs that use the same Measurement Method for a Metric with the same Input Parameters. Hence the Cycle-ID allows the Collector to easily identify Measurement Results that should be comparable.

Data Model: The implementation of an Information Model in a particular data modelling language [RFC3444].

Environmental Constraint: A parameter that is measured as part of the Measurement Task, its value determining whether the rest of the Measurement Task proceeds.

Failure Information: Information about the MA’s failure to action or execute an Instruction, whether concerning Measurement Tasks or Reporting.

Group-ID: An identifier of a group of MAs.
Information Model: The protocol-neutral definition of the semantics of the Instructions, the Report, the status of the different elements of the Measurement System as well of the events in the system [RFC3444].

Input Parameter: A parameter whose value is left open by the Metric and its Measurement Method and is set to a specific value in a Measurement Task. Altering the value of an Input Parameter does not change the fundamental nature of the Measurement Task.

Instruction: The description of Measurement Tasks for a MA to perform and the details of the Report for it to send. It is the collective description of the Measurement Task configurations, the configuration of the Measurement Schedules, the configuration of the Report Channel(s), the configuration of Report Schedule(s), and the details of any suppression.

Instruction Message: The message that carries an Instruction from a Controller to a Measurement Agent.

Logging Information: Information about the operation of the Measurement Agent, which may be useful for debugging.

Measurement Agent (MA): The function that receives Instruction Messages from a Controller and operates the Instruction by executing Measurement Tasks (using protocols outside the initial LMAP work scope and perhaps in concert with one or more other Measurement Agents or Measurement Peers) and (if part of the Instruction) by reporting Measurement Results to a Collector or Collectors.

Measurement Agent Identifier (MA-ID): a UUID [RFC4122] that identifies a particular MA and is configured as part of the Bootstrapping process.

Measurement Method: The process for assessing the value of a Metric; the process of measuring some performance or reliability parameter associated with the transfer of traffic.

Measurement Peer (MP): The function that assists a Measurement Agent with Measurement Tasks and does not have an interface to the Controller or Collector.

Measurement Result: The output of a single Measurement Task (the value obtained for the parameter of interest or Metric).

Measurement Schedule: The schedule for performing Measurement Tasks.
Measurement System: The set of LMAP-defined and related components that are operated by a single organisation, for the purpose of measuring performance aspects of the network.

Measurement Task: The action performed by a particular Measurement Agent that consists of the single assessment of a Metric through operation of a Measurement Method role at a particular time, with all of the role’s Input Parameters set to specific values.

Measurement Traffic: the packet(s) generated by some types of Measurement Method that involve measuring some parameter associated with the transfer of the packet(s).

Metric: The quantity related to the performance and reliability of the network that we’d like to know the value of.

Observed Traffic Flow: In RFC 7011, a Traffic Flow (or Flow) is defined as a set of packets or frames passing an Observation Point in the network during a certain time interval. All packets belonging to a particular Flow have a set of common properties, such as packet header fields, characteristics, and treatments. A Flow measured by the LMAP system is termed an Observed Traffic Flow. Its properties are summarized and tabulated in Measurement Results (as opposed to raw capture and export).

Report: The set of Measurement Results and other associated information (as defined by the Instruction). The Report is sent by a Measurement Agent to a Collector.

Report Channel: A Channel between a Collector and a MA over which Report messages are sent.


Report Schedule: the schedule for sending Reports to a Collector.

Subscriber: An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a subscription with a service provider.

Suspension: the temporary cessation of Measurement Tasks.

4. Constraints

The LMAP framework makes some important assumptions, which constrain the scope of the initial LMAP work.
4.1. The measurement system is under the direction of a single organisation

In the LMAP framework, the Measurement System is under the direction of a single organisation that is responsible for any impact that its measurements have on a user's quality of experience and privacy. Clear responsibility is critical given that a misbehaving large-scale Measurement System could potentially harm user experience, user privacy and network security.

However, the components of an LMAP Measurement System can be deployed in administrative domains that are not owned by the measuring organisation. Thus, the system of functions deployed by a single organisation constitutes a single LMAP domain which may span ownership or other administrative boundaries.

4.2. Each MA may only have a single Controller at any point in time

A MA is instructed by one Controller and is in one Measurement System. The constraint avoids different Controllers giving a MA conflicting instructions and so means that the MA does not have to manage contention between multiple Measurement (or Report) Schedules. This simplifies the design of MAs (critical for a large-scale infrastructure) and allows a Measurement Schedule to be tested on specific types of MA before deployment to ensure that the end user experience is not impacted (due to CPU, memory or broadband-product constraints). However, a Measurement System may have several Controllers.

5. Protocol Model

A protocol model [RFC4101] presents an architectural model for how the protocol operates and needs to answer three basic questions:

1. What problem is the protocol trying to address?
2. What messages are being transmitted and what do they mean?
3. What are the important, but unobvious, features of the protocol?

An LMAP system goes through the following phases:

- a Bootstrapping process before the MA can take part in the other three phases.
- a Control Protocol, which delivers Instruction Messages from a Controller to a MA (amongst other things).
the actual Measurement Tasks, which measure some performance or reliability parameter(s) associated with the transfer of packets.

- a Report Protocol, which delivers Reports containing the Measurement Results from a MA to a Collector.

The diagrams show the various LMAP messages and uses the following convention:

- (optional): indicated by round brackets
- [potentially repeated]: indicated by square brackets

The protocol model is closely related to the Information Model [I-D.ietf-lmap-information-model], which is the abstract definition of the information carried by the protocol. (If there is any difference between this document and the Information Model, the latter is definitive, since it is on the standards track.) The purpose of both is to provide a protocol and device independent view, which can be implemented via specific protocols. LMAP defines a specific Control Protocol and Report Protocol, but others could be defined by other standards bodies or be proprietary. However it is important that they all implement the same Information Model and protocol model, in order to ease the definition, operation and interoperability of large-scale Measurement Systems.

### 5.1. Bootstrapping process

The primary purpose of bootstrapping is to enable a MA to be integrated into a Measurement System. The MA retrieves information about itself (like its identity in the Measurement System) and about the Controller, the Controller learns information about the MA, and they learn about security information to communicate (such as certificates and credentials).

Whilst this memo considers the bootstrapping process, it is beyond the scope of initial LMAP work to define a bootstrap mechanism, as it depends on the type of device and access.

As a result of the bootstrapping process the MA learns information with the following aims ([I-D.ietf-lmap-information-model] defines the consequent list of information elements):

- its identifier, either its MA-ID or a device identifier such as one of its MAC or both.
- (optionally) a Group-ID. A Group-ID would be shared by several MAs and could be useful for privacy reasons. For instance,
reporting the Group-ID and not the MA-ID could hinder tracking of a mobile device.

  - the Control Channel, which is defined by:
    * the address which identifies the Control Channel, such as the Controller’s FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) [RFC1035]
    * security information (for example to enable the MA to decrypt the Instruction Message and encrypt messages sent to the Controller)

The details of the bootstrapping process are device/access specific. For example, the information could be in the firmware, manually configured or transferred via a protocol like TR-069 [TR-069]. There may be a multi-stage process where the MA contacts a ‘hard-coded’ address, which replies with the bootstrapping information.

The MA must learn its MA-ID before getting an Instruction, either during Bootstrapping or via Configuration (Section 5.2.1).

5.2. Control Protocol

The primary purpose of the Control Protocol is to allow the Controller to configure a Measurement Agent with an Instruction about what Measurement Tasks to do, when to do them, and how to report the Measurement Results (Section 5.2.2). The Measurement Agent then acts on the Instruction autonomously. The Control Protocol also enables the MA to inform the Controller about its Capabilities and any Failure and Logging Information (Section 5.2.2). Finally, the Control Protocol allows the Controller to update the MA’s Configuration.

5.2.1. Configuration

Configuration allows the Controller to update the MA about some or all of the information that it obtained during the bootstrapping process: the MA-ID, the (optional) Group-ID and the Control Channel. The Measurement System might use Configuration for several reasons. For example, the bootstrapping process could ‘hard code’ the MA with details of an initial Controller, and then the initial Controller could configure the MA with details about the Controller that sends Instruction Messages. (Note that a MA only has one Control Channel, and so is associated with only one Controller, at any moment.)

Note that an implementation may choose to combine Configuration information and an Instruction Message into a single message.
5.2.2. Instruction

The Instruction is the description of the Measurement Tasks for a Measurement Agent to do and the details of the Measurement Reports for it to send. In order to update the Instruction the Controller uses the Control Protocol to send an Instruction Message over the Control Channel.

The Instruction defines information with the following aims ([I-D.ietf-lmap-information-model] defines the consequent list of information elements):

- the Measurement Task configurations, each of which needs:
  - the Metric, specified as a URI to a registry entry; it includes the specification of a Measurement Method. The registry could...
be defined by a standards organisation or locally by the operator of the Measurement System. Note that, at the time of writing, the IETF works on such a registry specification [I-D.ietf-ippm-metric-registry].

* the Measurement Method role. For some Measurement Methods, different parties play different roles; for example (see Section 6.4) an iperf sender and receiver. Each Metric and its associated Measurement Method will describe all measurement roles involved in the process.

* a boolean flag (suppress or do-not-suppress) indicating if such a Measurement Task is impacted by a Suppression message (see Section 5.2.2.1). Thus, the flag is an Input Parameter.

* any Input Parameters that need to be set for the Metric and the Measurement Method. For example, the address of a Measurement Peer (or other Measurement Agent) that may be involved in a Measurement Task, or traffic filters associated with the Observed Traffic Flow.

* if the device with the MA has multiple interfaces, then the interface to use (if not defined, then the default interface is used).

* optionally, a Cycle-ID.

* optionally, the measurement point designation [RFC7398] of the MA and, if applicable, of the MP or other MA. This can be useful for reporting.

  - configuration of the Schedules, each of which needs:
    * the timing of when the Measurement Tasks are to be performed, or the Measurement Reports are to be sent. Possible types of timing are periodic, calendar-based periodic, one-off immediate and one-off at a future time

  - configuration of the Report Channel(s), each of which needs:
    * the address of the Collector, for instance its URL
    * security for this Report Channel, for example the X.509 certificate

  Suppression information, if any (see Section 5.2.1.1)
A single Instruction Message may contain some or all of the above parts. The finest level of granularity possible in an Instruction Message is determined by the implementation and operation of the Control Protocol. For example, a single Instruction Message may add or update an individual Measurement Schedule — or it may only update the complete set of Measurement Schedules; a single Instruction Message may update both Measurement Schedules and Measurement Task configurations — or only one at a time; and so on. However, Suppression information always replaces (rather than adds to) any previous Suppression information.

The MA informs the Controller that it has successfully understood the Instruction Message, or that it cannot action the Instruction — for example, if it doesn’t include a parameter that is mandatory for the requested Metric and Measurement Method, or it is missing details of the target Collector.

The Instruction Message instructs the MA; the Control Protocol does not allow the MA to negotiate, as this would add complexity to the MA, Controller and Control Protocol for little benefit.

5.2.2.1. Suppression

The Instruction may include Suppression information. The main motivation for Suppression is to enable the Measurement System to eliminate Measurement Traffic, because there is some unexpected network issue for example. There may be other circumstances when Suppression is useful, for example to eliminate inessential Reporting traffic (even if there is no Measurement Traffic).

The Suppression information may include any of the following optional fields:

- a set of Measurement Tasks to suppress; the others are not suppressed. For example, this could be useful if a particular Measurement Task is overloading a Measurement Peer with Measurement Traffic.

- a set of Measurement Schedules to suppress; the others are not suppressed. For example, suppose the Measurement System has defined two Schedules, one with the most critical Measurement Tasks and the other with less critical ones that create a lot of Measurement Traffic, then it may only want to suppress the second.

- a set of Reporting Schedules to suppress; the others are not suppressed. This can be particularly useful in the case of a Measurement Method that doesn’t generate Measurement Traffic; it
may need to continue observing traffic flows but temporarily suppress Reports due to the network footprint of the Reports.

- if all the previous fields are included then the MA suppresses the union - in other words, it suppresses the set of Measurement Tasks, the set of Measurement Schedules, and the set of Reporting Schedules.

- if the Suppression information includes neither a set of Measurement Tasks nor a set of Measurement Schedules, then the MA does not begin new Measurement Tasks that have the boolean flag set to "suppress"; however, the MA does begin new Measurement Tasks that have the flag set to "do-not-suppress".

- a start time, at which suppression begins. If absent, then Suppression begins immediately.

- an end time, at which suppression ends. If absent, then Suppression continues until the MA receives an un-Suppress message.

- a demand that the MA immediately ends on-going Measurement Task(s) that are tagged for suppression. (Most likely it is appropriate to delete the associated partial Measurement Result(s).) This could be useful in the case of a network emergency so that the operator can eliminate all inessential traffic as rapidly as possible. If absent, the MA completes on-going Measurement Tasks.

An un-Suppress message instructs the MA no longer to suppress, meaning that the MA once again begins new Measurement Tasks, according to its Measurement Schedule.

Note that Suppression is not intended to permanently stop a Measurement Task (instead, the Controller should send a new Measurement Schedule), nor to permanently disable a MA (instead, some kind of management action is suggested).
5.2.3. Capabilities, Failure and Logging Information

The Control Protocol also enables the MA to inform the Controller about various information, such as its Capabilities and any Failures. It is also possible to use a device-specific mechanism which is beyond the scope of the initial LMAP work.

Capabilities are information about the MA that the Controller needs to know in order to correctly instruct the MA, such as:

- the Measurement Method (roles) that the MA supports
- the measurement protocol types and roles that the MA supports
- the interfaces that the MA has
- the version of the MA
- the version of the hardware, firmware or software of the device with the MA
- its Instruction (this could be useful if the Controller thinks something has gone wrong, and wants to check what Instruction the MA is using)
- but not dynamic information like the currently unused CPU, memory or battery life of the device with the MA.

Failure Information concerns why the MA has been unable to execute a Measurement Task or deliver a Report, for example:

- the Measurement Task failed to run properly because the MA (unexpectedly) has no spare CPU cycles
o the MA failed to record the Measurement Results because it (unexpectedly) is out of spare memory
o a Report failed to deliver Measurement Results because the Collector (unexpectedly) is not responding
o but not if a Measurement Task correctly doesn’t start. For example, the first step of some Measurement Methods is for the MA to check there is no cross-traffic.

Logging Information concerns how the MA is operating and may help debugging, for example:

o the last time the MA ran a Measurement Task
o the last time the MA sent a Measurement Report
o the last time the MA received an Instruction Message
o whether the MA is currently Suppressing Measurement Tasks

Capabilities, Failure and Logging Information are sent by the MA, either in response to a request from the Controller (for example, if the Controller forgets what the MA can do or otherwise wants to resynchronize what it knows about the MA), or on its own initiative (for example when the MA first communicates with a Controller or if it becomes capable of a new Measurement Method). Another example of the latter case is if the device with the MA re-boots, then the MA should notify its Controller in case its Instruction needs to be updated; to avoid a "mass calling event" after a widespread power restoration affecting many MAs, it is sensible for an MA to pause for a random delay, perhaps in the range of one minute or so.
5.3. Operation of Measurement Tasks

This LMAP framework is neutral to what the actual Measurement Task is. It does not define Metrics and Measurement Methods, these are defined elsewhere.

The MA carries out the Measurement Tasks as instructed, unless it gets an updated Instruction. The MA acts autonomously, in terms of operation of the Measurement Tasks and reporting of the Results; it doesn’t do a ‘safety check’ with the Controller to ask whether it should still continue with the requested Measurement Tasks.

The MA may operate Measurement Tasks sequentially or in parallel (see Section 5.3.2).

5.3.1. Starting and Stopping Measurement Tasks

This LMAP framework does not define a generic start and stop process, since the correct approach depends on the particular Measurement Task; the details are defined as part of each Measurement Method. This section provides some general hints. The MA does not inform the Controller about Measurement Tasks starting and stopping.

Before beginning a Measurement Task the MA may want to run a pre-check. (The pre-check could be defined as a separate, preceding Task or as the first part of a larger Task.)

For Measurement Tasks that observe existing traffic, action could include:

- checking that there is traffic of interest;

- checking that the device with the MA has enough resources to execute the Measurement Task reliably. Note that the designer of the Measurement System should ensure that the device’s capabilities are normally sufficient to comfortably operate the Measurement Tasks.

For Measurement Tasks that generate Measurement Traffic, a pre-check could include:

- the MA checking that there is no cross-traffic. In other words, a check that the end-user isn’t already sending traffic;

- the MA checking with the Measurement Peer (or other Measurement Agent) involved in the Measurement Task that it can handle a new Measurement Task. For example, the Measurement Peer may already be handling many Measurement Tasks with other MAs;
o sending traffic that probes the path to check it isn’t overloaded;

o checking that the device with the MA has enough resources to execute the Measurement Task reliably.

It is possible that similar checks continue during the Measurement Task, especially one that is long-running and/or creates a lot of Measurement Traffic, and might lead to it being abandoned whilst in-progress. A Measurement Task could also be abandoned in response to a "suppress" message (see Section 5.2.1). Action could include:

- For ‘upload’ tests, the MA not sending traffic
- For ‘download’ tests, the MA closing the TCP connection or sending a TWAMP (Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol) Stop control message [RFC5357].

The Controller may want a MA to run the same Measurement Task indefinitely (for example, “run the ‘upload speed’ Measurement Task once an hour until further notice”). To avoid the MA generating traffic forever after a Controller has permanently failed (or communications with the Controller have failed), the MA can be configured with a time limit; if the MA doesn’t hear from the Controller for this length of time, then it stops operating Measurement Tasks.

5.3.2. Overlapping Measurement Tasks

It is possible that a MA starts a new Measurement Task before another Measurement Task has completed. This may be intentional (the way that the Measurement System has designed the Measurement Schedules), but it could also be unintentional - for instance, if a Measurement Task has a ‘wait for X’ step which pauses for an unexpectedly long time. This document makes no assumptions about the impact of one Measurement Task on another.

The operator of the Measurement System can handle (or not) overlapping Measurement Tasks in any way they choose - it is a policy or implementation issue and not the concern of LMAP. Some possible approaches are: to configure the MA not to begin the second Measurement Task; to start the second Measurement Task as usual; for the action to be an Input Parameter of the Measurement Task; and so on.

It may be important to include in the Measurement Report the fact that the Measurement Task overlapped with another.
5.4. Report Protocol

The primary purpose of the Report Protocol is to allow a Measurement Agent to report its Measurement Results to a Collector, along with the context in which they were obtained.

```
+-----------------+                                  +-------------+
|                 |                                  | Measurement |
|   Collector     |==================================|  Agent      |
+-----------------+                                  +-------------+
          <-    Report:                  ACK    ->
[MA-ID &/or Group-ID],
[Measurement Result],
[details of Measurement Task],
[Cycle-ID]
```

The Report contains:

- the MA-ID or a Group-ID (to anonymise results)
- the actual Measurement Results, including the time they were measured. In general the time is simply the MA’s best estimate and there is no guarantee on the accuracy or granularity of the information. It is possible that some specific analysis of a particular Measurement Method’s Results will impose timing requirements.
- the details of the Measurement Task (to avoid the Collector having to ask the Controller for this information later). For example, the interface used for the measurements.
- the Cycle-ID, if one was included in the Instruction.
- perhaps the Subscriber’s service parameters (see Section 5.4.1).
- the measurement point designation of the MA and, if applicable, the MF or other MA, if the information was included in the Instruction. This numbering system is defined in [RFC7398] and allows a Measurement Report to describe abstractly the path measured (for example, "from a MA at a home gateway to a MA at a DSLAM"). Also, the MA can anonymise results by including measurement point designations instead of IP addresses (Section 8.6.2).
The MA sends Reports as defined by the Instruction. It is possible that the Instruction tells the MA to report the same Results to more than one Collector, or to report a different subset of Results to different Collectors. It is also possible that a Measurement Task may create two (or more) Measurement Results, which could be reported differently (for example, one Result could be reported periodically, whilst the second Result could be an alarm that is created as soon as the measured value of the Metric crosses a threshold and that is reported immediately).

Optionally, a Report is not sent when there are no Measurement Results.

In the initial LMAP Information Model and Report Protocol, for simplicity we assume that all Measurement Results are reported as-is, but allow extensibility so that a Measurement System (or perhaps a second phase of LMAP) could allow a MA to:

- label, or perhaps not include, Measurement Results impacted by, for instance, cross-traffic or a Measurement Peer (or other Measurement Agent) being busy
- label Measurement Results obtained by a Measurement Task that overlapped with another
- not report the Measurement Results if the MA believes that they are invalid
- detail when Suppression started and ended

As discussed in Section 6.1, data analysis of the results should carefully consider potential bias from any Measurement Results that are not reported, or from Measurement Results that are reported but may be invalid.

5.4.1. Reporting of Subscriber’s service parameters

The Subscriber’s service parameters are information about his/her broadband contract, line rate and so on. Such information is likely to be needed to help analyse the Measurement Results, for example to help decide whether the measured download speed is reasonable.

The information could be transferred directly from the Subscriber parameter database to the data analysis tools. If the subscriber’s service parameters are available to the MAs, they could be reported with the Measurement Results in the Report Protocol. How (and if) the MA knows such information is likely to depend on the device type.
The MA could either include the information in a Measurement Report or separately.

5.5. Operation of LMAP over the underlying packet transfer mechanism

The above sections have described LMAP’s protocol model. Other specifications will define the actual Control and Report Protocols, possibly operating over an existing protocol, such as REST-style HTTP(S). It is also possible that a different choice is made for the Control and Report Protocols, for example NETCONF-YANG [RFC6241] and IPFIX (Internet Protocol Flow Information Export) [RFC7011] respectively.

From an LMAP perspective, the Controller needs to know that the MA has received the Instruction Message, or at least that it needs to be re-sent as it may have failed to be delivered. Similarly the MA needs to know about the delivery of Capabilities and Failure information to the Controller and Reports to the Collector. How this is done depends on the design of the Control and Report Protocols and the underlying packet transfer mechanism.

For the Control Protocol, the underlying packet transfer mechanism could be:

  o a ‘push’ protocol (that is, from the Controller to the MA)
  o a multicast protocol (from the Controller to a group of MAs)
  o a ‘pull’ protocol. The MA periodically checks with Controller if the Instruction has changed and pulls a new Instruction if necessary. A pull protocol seems attractive for a MA behind a NAT or firewall (as is typical for a MA on an end-user’s device), so that it can initiate the communications. It also seems attractive for a MA on a mobile device, where the Controller might not know how to reach the MA. A pull mechanism is likely to require the MA to be configured with how frequently it should check in with the Controller, and perhaps what it should do if the Controller is unreachable after a certain number of attempts.
  o a hybrid protocol. In addition to a pull protocol, the Controller can also push an alert to the MA that it should immediately pull a new Instruction.

For the Report Protocol, the underlying packet transfer mechanism could be:

  o a ‘push’ protocol (that is, from the MA to the Collector)
5.6. Items beyond the scope of the initial LMAP work

There are several potential interactions between LMAP elements that are beyond the scope of the initial LMAP work:

1. It does not define a coordination process between MAs. Whilst a Measurement System may define coordinated Measurement Schedules across its various MAs, there is no direct coordination between MAs.

2. It does not define interactions between the Collector and Controller. It is quite likely that there will be such interactions, optionally intermediated by the data analysis tools. For example, if there is an "interesting" Measurement Result then the Measurement System may want to trigger extra Measurement Tasks that explore the potential cause in more detail; or if the Collector unexpectedly does not hear from a MA, then the Measurement System may want to trigger the Controller to send a fresh Instruction Message to the MA.

3. It does not define coordination between different Measurement Systems. For example, it does not define the interaction of a MA in one Measurement System with a Controller or Collector in a different Measurement System. Whilst it is likely that the Control and Report Protocols could be re-used or adapted for this scenario, any form of coordination between different organisations involves difficult commercial and technical issues and so, given the novelty of large-scale measurement efforts, any form of inter-organisation coordination is outside the scope of the initial LMAP work. Note that a single MA is instructed by a single Controller and is only in one Measurement System.

   * An interesting scenario is where a home contains two independent MAs, for example one controlled by a regulator and one controlled by an ISP. Then the Measurement Traffic of one MA is treated by the other MA just like any other end-user traffic.

4. It does not consider how to prevent a malicious party "gaming the system". For example, where a regulator is running a Measurement System in order to benchmark operators, a malicious operator could try to identify the broadband lines that the regulator was measuring and prioritise that traffic. It is assumed this is a policy issue and would be dealt with through a code of conduct for instance.
5. It does not define how to analyse Measurement Results, including how to interpret missing Results.

6. It does not specifically define an end-user-controlled Measurement System, see sub-section 5.6.1.

5.6.1. End-user-controlled measurement system

This framework concentrates on the cases where an ISP or a regulator runs the Measurement System. However, we expect that LMAP functionality will also be used in the context of an end-user-controlled Measurement System. There are at least two ways this could happen (they have various pros and cons):

1. an end-user could somehow request the ISP- (or regulator-) run Measurement System to test his/her line. The ISP (or regulator) Controller would then send an Instruction to the MA in the usual LMAP way.

2. an end-user could deploy their own Measurement System, with their own MA, Controller and Collector. For example, the user could implement all three functions onto the same end-user-owned end device, perhaps by downloading the functions from the ISP or regulator. Then the LMAP Control and Report Protocols do not need to be used, but using LMAP’s Information Model would still be beneficial. A Measurement Peer (or other MA involved in a Measurement Task) could be in the home gateway or outside the home network; in the latter case the Measurement Peer is highly likely to be run by a different organisation, which raises extra privacy considerations.

In both cases there will be some way for the end-user to initiate the Measurement Task(s). The mechanism is outside the scope of the initial LMAP work, but could include the user clicking a button on a GUI or sending a text message. Presumably the user will also be able to see the Measurement Results, perhaps summarised on a webpage. It is suggested that these interfaces conform to the LMAP guidance on privacy in Section 8.

6. Deployment considerations

6.1. Controller and the measurement system

The Controller should understand both the MA’s LMAP Capabilities (for instance what Metrics and Measurement Methods it can perform) and about the MA’s other capabilities like processing power and memory. This allows the Controller to make sure that the Measurement Schedule
of Measurement Tasks and the Reporting Schedule are sensible for each MA that it instructs.

An Instruction is likely to include several Measurement Tasks. Typically these run at different times, but it is also possible for them to run at the same time. Some Tasks may be compatible, in that they do not affect each other’s Results, whilst with others great care would need to be taken. Some Tasks may be complementary. For example, one Task may be followed by a traceroute Task to the same destination address, in order to learn the network path that was measured.

The Controller should ensure that the Measurement Tasks do not have an adverse effect on the end user. Tasks, especially those that generate a substantial amount of Measurement Traffic, will often include a pre-check that the user isn’t already sending traffic (Section 5.3). Another consideration is whether Measurement Traffic will impact a Subscriber’s bill or traffic cap.

A Measurement System may have multiple Controllers (but note the overriding principle that a single MA is instructed by a single Controller at any point in time (Section 4.2)). For example, there could be different Controllers for different types of MA (home gateways, tablets) or locations (Ipswich, Edinburgh, Paris), for load balancing or to cope with failure of one Controller.

The measurement system also needs to consider carefully how to interpret missing Results. The correct interpretation depends on why the Results are missing (perhaps related to measurement suppression or delayed Report submission), and potentially on the specifics of the Measurement Task and Measurement Schedule. For example, the set of packets represented by a Flow may be empty; that is, an Observed Traffic Flow may represent zero or more packets. The Flow would still be reported according to schedule.

6.2. Measurement Agent

The MA should be cautious about resuming Measurement Tasks if it reboots or has been off-line for some time, as its Instruction may be stale. In the former case it also needs to ensure that its clock has re-set correctly, so that it interprets the Schedule correctly.

If the MA runs out of storage space for Measurement Results or can’t contact the Controller, then the appropriate action is specific to the device and Measurement System.

The Measurement Agent could take a number of forms: a dedicated probe, software on a PC, embedded into an appliance, or even embedded
into a gateway. A single site (home, branch office etc.) that is participating in a measurement could make use of one or multiple Measurement Agents or Measurement Peers in a single measurement.

The Measurement Agent could be deployed in a variety of locations. Not all deployment locations are available to every kind of Measurement Agent. There are also a variety of limitations and trade-offs depending on the final placement. The next sections outline some of the locations a Measurement Agent may be deployed. This is not an exhaustive list and combinations may also apply.

6.2.1. Measurement Agent on a networked device

A MA may be embedded on a device that is directly connected to the network, such as a MA on a smartphone. Other examples include a MA downloaded and installed on a subscriber’s laptop computer or tablet when the network service is provided on wired or other wireless radio technologies, such as Wi-Fi.

6.2.2. Measurement Agent embedded in site gateway

A Measurement Agent embedded with the site gateway, for example a home router or the edge router of a branch office in a managed service environment, is one of better places the Measurement Agent could be deployed. All site-to-ISP traffic would traverse through the gateway. So, Measurement Methods that measure user traffic could easily be performed. Similarly, due to this user traffic visibility, a Measurement Method that generates Measurement Traffic could ensure it does not compete with user traffic. Generally NAT and firewall services are built into the gateway, allowing the Measurement Agent the option to offer its Controller-facing management interface outside of the NAT/firewall. This placement of the management interface allows the Controller to unilaterally contact the Measurement Agent for instructions. However, a Measurement Agent on a site gateway (whether end-user service-provider owned) will generally not be directly available for over the top providers, the regulator, end users or enterprises.

6.2.3. Measurement Agent embedded behind site NAT/firewall

The Measurement Agent could also be embedded behind a NAT, a firewall, or both. In this case the Controller may not be able to unilaterally contact the Measurement Agent unless either static port forwarding or firewall pin holing is configured. Configuring port forwarding could use protocols such as PCP [RFC6887], TR-069 [TR-069] or UPnP [UPnP]. To open a pin hole in the firewall, the Measurement Agent could send keepalives towards the Controller (and perhaps use these also as a network reachability test).
6.2.4. Multi-homed Measurement Agent

If the device with the Measurement Agent is single homed then there is no confusion about what interface to measure. Similarly, if the MA is at the gateway and the gateway only has a single WAN-side and a single LAN-side interface, there is little confusion - for Measurement Methods that generate Measurement Traffic, the location of the other MA or Measurement Peer determines whether the WAN or LAN is measured.

However, the device with the Measurement Agent may be multi-homed. For example, a home or campus may be connected to multiple broadband ISPs, such as a wired and wireless broadband provider, perhaps for redundancy or load-sharing. It may also be helpful to think of dual stack IPv4 and IPv6 broadband devices as multi-homed. More generally, Section 3.2 of [RFC7368] describes dual-stack and multi-homing topologies that might be encountered in a home network, [RFC6419] provides the current practices of multi-interfaces hosts, and the Multiple Interfaces (mif) working group covers cases where hosts are either directly attached to multiple networks (physical or virtual) or indirectly (multiple default routers, etc.). In these cases, there needs to be clarity on which network connectivity option is being measured.

One possibility is to have a Measurement Agent per interface. Then the Controller’s choice of MA determines which interface is measured. However, if a MA can measure any of the interfaces, then the Controller defines in the Instruction which interface the MA should use for a Measurement Task; if the choice of interface is not defined then the MA uses the default one. Explicit definition is preferred if the Measurement System wants to measure the performance of a particular network, whereas using the default is better if the Measurement System wants to include the impact of the MA’s interface selection algorithm. In any case, the Measurement Result should include the network that was measured.

6.2.5. Measurement Agent embedded in ISP network

A MA may be embedded on a device that is part of an ISP’s network, such as a router or switch. Usually the network devices with an embedded MA will be strategically located, such as a Carrier Grade NAT or ISP Gateway. [RFC7398] gives many examples where a MA might be located within a network to provide an intermediate measurement point on the end-to-end path. Other examples include a network device whose primary role is to host MA functions and the necessary measurement protocol.
6.3. Measurement Peer

A Measurement Peer participates in some Measurement Methods. It may have specific functionality to enable it to participate in a particular Measurement Method. On the other hand, other Measurement Methods may require no special functionality. For example if the Measurement Agent sends a ping to example.com then the server at example.com plays the role of a Measurement Peer; or if the MA monitors existing traffic, then the existing end points are Measurement Peers.

A device may participate in some Measurement Methods as a Measurement Agent and in others as a Measurement Peer.

Measurement Schedules should account for limited resources in a Measurement Peer when instructing a MA to execute measurements with a Measurement Peer. In some measurement protocols, such as [RFC4656] and [RFC5357], the Measurement Peer can reject a measurement session or refuse a control connection prior to setting-up a measurement session and so protect itself from resource exhaustion. This is a valuable capability because the MP may be used by more than one organisation.

6.4. Deployment examples

In this section we describe some deployment scenarios that are feasible within the LMAP framework defined in this document.

A very simple example of a Measurement Peer (MP) is a web server that the MA is downloading a web page from (such as www.example.com) in order to perform a speed test. The web server is a MP and from its perspective, the MA is just another client; the MP doesn’t have a specific function for assisting measurements. This is described in the figure below.
Another case that is slightly different than this would be the one of a TWAMP-responder. This is also a MP, with a helper function, the TWAMP server, which is specially deployed to assist the MAs that perform TWAMP tests. Another example is with a ping server, as described in Section 2.

A further example is the case of a traceroute like measurement. In this case, for each packet sent, the router where the TTL expires is performing the MP function. So for a given Measurement Task, there is one MA involved and several MPs, one per hop.

In the figure below we depict the case of an OWAMP (One-Way Active Measurement Protocol) responder acting as an MP. In this case, the helper function in addition reports results back to the MA. So it has both a data plane and control interface with the MA.
However, it is also possible to use two Measurement Agents when performing one way Measurement Tasks, as described in the figure below. Both MAs are instructed by the Controller: MA-1 to send the traffic and MA-2 to measure the received traffic and send Reports to the Collector. Note that the Measurement Task at MA-2 can listen for traffic from MA-1 and respond multiple times without having to be rescheduled.
Next, we consider Measurement Methods that meter the Observed Traffic Flow. Traffic generated in one point in the network flowing towards a given destination and the traffic is observed in some point along the path. One way to implement this is that the endpoints generating and receiving the traffic are not instructed by the Controller; hence they are MPs. The MA is located along the path with a monitor function that measures the traffic. The MA is instructed by the Controller to monitor that particular traffic and to send the Report to the Collector. It is depicted in the figure below.

![Schematic of LMAP-based Measurement System, with a Measurement Agent monitoring traffic](image)

7. Security considerations

The security of the LMAP framework should protect the interests of the measurement operator(s), the network user(s) and other actors who could be impacted by a compromised measurement deployment. The Measurement System must secure the various components of the system from unauthorised access or corruption. Much of the general advice contained in section 6 of [RFC4656] is applicable here.

The process to upgrade the firmware in an MA is outside the scope of the initial LMAP work, just as is the protocol to bootstrap the MAs. However, systems which provide remote upgrade must secure authorised access and integrity of the process.

We assume that each Measurement Agent (MA) will receive its Instructions from a single organisation, which operates the Controller. These Instructions must be authenticated (to ensure that they come from the trusted Controller), checked for integrity (to
ensure no-one has tampered with them) and not vulnerable to replay attacks. If a malicious party can gain control of the MA they can use it to launch DoS attacks at targets, create a platform for pervasive monitoring [RFC7258], reduce the end user’s quality of experience and corrupt the Measurement Results that are reported to the Collector. By altering the Measurement Tasks and/or the address that Results are reported to, they can also compromise the confidentiality of the network user and the MA environment (such as information about the location of devices or their traffic). The Instruction Messages also need to be encrypted to maintain confidentiality, as the information might be useful to an attacker.

Reporting by the MA must be encrypted to maintain confidentiality, so that only the authorised Collector can decrypt the results, to prevent the leakage of confidential or private information. Reporting must also be authenticated (to ensure that it comes from a trusted MA and that the MA reports to a genuine Collector) and not vulnerable to tampering (which can be ensured through integrity and replay checks). It must not be possible to fool a MA into injecting falsified data and the results must also be held and processed securely after collection and analysis. See section 8.5.2 below for additional considerations on stored data compromise, and section 8.6 on potential mitigations for compromise.

Since Collectors will be contacted repeatedly by MAs using the Collection Protocol to convey their recent results, a successful attack to exhaust the communication resources would prevent a critical operation: reporting. Therefore, all LMAP Collectors should implement technical mechanisms to:

- limit the number of reporting connections from a single MA (simultaneous, and connections per unit time).
- limit the transmission rate from a single MA.
- limit the memory/storage consumed by a single MA’s reports.
- efficiently reject reporting connections from unknown sources.
- separate resources if multiple authentication strengths are used, where the resources should be separated according to each class of strength.

A corrupted MA could report falsified information to the Collector. Whether this can be effectively mitigated depends on the platform on which the MA is deployed, but where the MA is deployed on a customer-controlled device then the reported data is to some degree inherently untrustworthy. Further, a sophisticated party could distort some
Measurement Methods, perhaps by dropping or delaying packets for example. This suggests that the network operator should be cautious about relying on Measurement Results for action such as refunding fees if a service level agreement is not met.

As part of the protocol design, it will be decided how LMAP operates over the underlying protocol (Section 5.5). The choice raises various security issues, such as how to operate through a NAT and how to protect the Controller and Collector from denial of service attacks.

The security mechanisms described above may not be strictly necessary if the network’s design ensures the LMAP components and their communications are already secured, for example potentially if they are all part of an ISP’s dedicated management network.

Finally, there are three other issues related to security: privacy (considered in Section 8 below), availability and 'gaming the system'. While the loss of some MAs may not be considered critical, the unavailability of the Collector could mean that valuable business data or data critical to a regulatory process is lost. Similarly, the unavailability of a Controller could mean that the MAs do not operate a correct Measurement Schedule.

A malicious party could "game the system". For example, where a regulator is running a Measurement System in order to benchmark operators, an operator could try to identify the broadband lines that the regulator was measuring and prioritise that traffic. Normally, this potential issue is handled by a code of conduct. It is outside the scope of the initial LMAP work to consider the issue.

8. Privacy considerations

The LMAP work considers privacy as a core requirement and will ensure that by default the Control and Report Protocols operate in a privacy-sensitive manner and that privacy features are well-defined.

This section provides a set of privacy considerations for LMAP. This section benefits greatly from the timely publication of [RFC6973]. Privacy and security (Section 7) are related. In some jurisdictions privacy is called data protection.

We begin with a set of assumptions related to protecting the sensitive information of individuals and organisations participating in LMAP-orchestrated measurement and data collection.
8.1. Categories of entities with information of interest

LMAP protocols need to protect the sensitive information of the following entities, including individuals and organisations who participate in measurement and collection of results.

- Individual Internet users: Persons who utilise Internet access services for communications tasks, according to the terms of service of a service agreement. Such persons may be a service Subscriber, or have been given permission by the Subscriber to use the service.

- Internet service providers: Organisations who offer Internet access service subscriptions, and thus have access to sensitive information of individuals who choose to use the service. These organisations desire to protect their Subscribers and their own sensitive information which may be stored in the process of performing Measurement Tasks and collecting Results.

- Regulators: Public authorities responsible for exercising supervision of the electronic communications sector, and which may have access to sensitive information of individuals who participate in a measurement campaign. Similarly, regulators desire to protect the participants and their own sensitive information.

- Other LMAP system operators: Organisations who operate Measurement Systems or participate in measurements in some way.

Although privacy is a protection extended to individuals, we discuss data protection by ISPs and other LMAP system operators in this section. These organisations have sensitive information involved in the LMAP system, and many of the same dangers and mitigations are applicable. Further, the ISPs store information on their Subscribers beyond that used in the LMAP system (for instance billing information), and there should be a benefit in considering all the needs and potential solutions coherently.

8.2. Examples of sensitive information

This section gives examples of sensitive information which may be measured or stored in a Measurement System, and which is to be kept private by default in the LMAP core protocols.

Examples of Subscriber or authorised Internet user sensitive information:
- Sub-IP layer addresses and names (MAC address, base station ID, SSID)
- IP address in use
- Personal Identification (real name)
- Location (street address, city)
- Subscribed service parameters
- Contents of traffic (activity, DNS queries, destinations, equipment types, account info for other services, etc.)
- Status as a study volunteer and Schedule of Measurement Tasks

Examples of Internet Service Provider sensitive information:
- Measurement device identification (equipment ID and IP address)
- Measurement Instructions (choice of measurements)
- Measurement Results (some may be shared, others may be private)
- Measurement Schedule (exact times)
- Network topology (locations, connectivity, redundancy)
- Subscriber billing information, and any of the above Subscriber information known to the provider.
- Authentication credentials (such as certificates)

Other organisations will have some combination of the lists above. The LMAP system would not typically expose all of the information above, but could expose a combination of items which could be correlated with other pieces collected by an attacker (as discussed in the section on Threats below).

8.3. Different privacy issues raised by different sorts of Measurement Methods

Measurement Methods raise different privacy issues depending on whether they measure traffic created specifically for that purpose, or whether they measure user traffic.

Measurement Tasks conducted on user traffic store sensitive information, however briefly this storage may be. We note that some
authorities make a distinction on time of storage, and information that is kept only temporarily to perform a communications function is not subject to regulation (for example, active queue management, deep packet inspection). Such Measurement Tasks could reveal all the websites a Subscriber visits and the applications and/or services they use. This issue is not specific to LMAP. For instance, IPFIX has discussed similar issues (see section 11.8 of [RFC7011]), but mitigations described in the sections below were considered beyond their scope.

Other types of Measurement Task are conducted on traffic which is created specifically for the purpose. Even if a user host generates Measurement Traffic, there is limited sensitive information about the Subscriber present and stored in the Measurement System:

- IP address in use (and possibly sub-IP addresses and names)
- Status as a study volunteer and Schedule of Measurement Tasks

On the other hand, for a service provider the sensitive information like Measurement Results is the same for all Measurement Tasks.

From the Subscriber perspective, both types of Measurement Task potentially expose the description of Internet access service and specific service parameters, such as subscribed rate and type of access.

8.4. Privacy analysis of the communication models

This section examines each of the protocol exchanges described at a high level in Section 5 and some example Measurement Tasks, and identifies specific sensitive information which must be secured during communication for each case. With the protocol-related sensitive information identified, we can better consider the threats described in the following section.

From the privacy perspective, all entities participating in LMAP protocols can be considered "observers" according to the definition in [RFC6973]. Their stored information potentially poses a threat to privacy, especially if one or more of these functional entities has been compromised. Likewise, all devices on the paths used for control, reporting, and measurement are also observers.

8.4.1. MA Bootstrapping

Section 5.1 provides the communication model for the Bootstrapping process.
Although the specification of mechanisms for Bootstrapping the MA are beyond the initial LMAP work scope, designers should recognize that the Bootstrapping process is extremely powerful and could cause an MA to join a new or different LMAP system with a different Controller and Collector, or simply install new Metrics with associated Measurement Methods (for example to record DNS queries). A Bootstrap attack could result in a breach of the LMAP system with significant sensitive information exposure depending on the capabilities of the MA, so sufficient security protections are warranted.

The Bootstrapping process provides sensitive information about the LMAP system and the organisation that operates it, such as:

- the MA’s identifier (MA-ID)
- the address that identifies the Control Channel, such as the Controller’s FQDN
- Security information for the Control Channel

During the Bootstrapping process for an MA located at a single subscriber’s service demarcation point, the MA receives a MA-ID which is a persistent pseudonym for the Subscriber. Thus, the MA-ID is considered sensitive information because it could provide the link between Subscriber identification and Measurements Results.

Also, the Bootstrapping process could assign a Group-ID to the MA. The specific definition of information represented in a Group-ID is to be determined, but several examples are envisaged including use as a pseudonym for a set of Subscribers, a class of service, an access technology, or other important categories. Assignment of a Group-ID enables anonymisation sets to be formed on the basis of service type/grade/rates. Thus, the mapping between Group-ID and MA-ID is considered sensitive information.

8.4.2. Controller <-> Measurement Agent

The high-level communication model for interactions between the LMAP Controller and Measurement Agent is illustrated in Section 5.2. The primary purpose of this exchange is to authenticate and task a Measurement Agent with Measurement Instructions, which the Measurement Agent then acts on autonomously.

Primarily IP addresses and pseudonyms (MA-ID, Group-ID) are exchanged with a capability request, then measurement-related information of interest such as the parameters, schedule, metrics, and IP addresses of measurement devices. Thus, the measurement instruction contains sensitive information which must be secured. For example, the fact...
that an ISP is running additional measurements beyond the set reported externally is sensitive information, as are the additional Measurements Tasks themselves. The Measurement Schedule is also sensitive, because an attacker intending to bias the results without being detected can use this information to great advantage.

An organisation operating the Controller having no service relationship with a user who hosts the Measurement Agent *could* gain real-name mapping to a public IP address through user participation in an LMAP system (this applies to the Measurement Collection protocol, as well).

8.4.3. Collector <-> Measurement Agent

The high-level communication model for interactions between the Measurement Agent and Collector is illustrated in Section 5.4. The primary purpose of this exchange is to authenticate and collect Measurement Results from a MA, which the MA has measured autonomously and stored.

The Measurement Results are the additional sensitive information included in the Collector-MA exchange. Organisations collecting LMAP measurements have the responsibility for data control. Thus, the Results and other information communicated in the Collector protocol must be secured.

8.4.4. Measurement Peer <-> Measurement Agent

A Measurement Method involving Measurement Traffic raises potential privacy issues, although the specification of the mechanisms is beyond the scope of the initial LMAP work. The high-level communications model below illustrates the various exchanges to execute such a Measurement Method and store the Results.

We note the potential for additional observers in the figures below by indicating the possible presence of a NAT, which has additional significance to the protocols and direction of initiation.

The various messages are optional, depending on the nature of the Measurement Method. It may involve sending Measurement Traffic from the Measurement Peer to MA, MA to Measurement Peer, or both. Similarly, a second (or more) MAs may be involved. (Note: For simplicity, the Figure and description don’t show the non-LMAP functionality that is associated with the transfer of the Measurement Traffic and is located at the devices with the MA and MF.)
This exchange primarily exposes the IP addresses of measurement devices and the inference of measurement participation from such traffic. There may be sensitive information on key points in a service provider’s network included. There may also be access to measurement-related information of interest such as the Metrics, Schedule, and intermediate results carried in the Measurement Traffic (usually a set of timestamps).

The Measurement Peer may be able to use traffic analysis (perhaps combined with traffic injection) to obtain interesting insights about the Subscriber. As a simple example, if the Measurement Task includes a pre-check that the end-user isn’t already sending traffic, the Measurement Peer may be able to deduce when the Subscriber is away on holiday, for example.

If the Measurement Traffic is unencrypted, as found in many systems today, then both timing and limited results are open to on-path observers.
8.4.5. Measurement Agent

Some Measurement Methods only involve a single Measurement Agent observing existing traffic. They raise potential privacy issues, although the specification of the mechanisms is beyond the scope of the initial LMAP work.

The high-level communications model below illustrates the collection of user information of interest with the Measurement Agent performing the monitoring and storage of the Results. This particular exchange is for measurement of DNS Response Time, which most frequently uses UDP transport. (Note: For simplicity, the Figure and description don’t show the non-LMAP functionality that is associated with the transfer of the Measurement Traffic and is located at the devices with the MA.)

```
| DNS Server | ========= NAT ? =========*====== | User client |
|            |                                       ^       |____________|
|            |                            | Measurement Agent |
|            | <-- Name Resolution Req (MA+MP IPAddrs, Desired Domain Name) |
| Return Record | -> |
```

In this particular example, the MA monitors DNS messages in order to measure that DNS response time. The Measurement Agent may be embedded in the user host, or it may be located in another device capable of observing user traffic. The MA learns the IP addresses of measurement devices and the intent to communicate with or access the services of a particular domain name, and perhaps also information on key points in a service provider’s network, such as the address of one of its DNS servers.

In principle, any of the user sensitive information of interest (listed above) can be collected and stored in the monitoring scenario and so must be secured.

It would also be possible for a Measurement Agent to source the DNS query itself. But then there are few privacy concerns.
8.4.6. Storage and reporting of Measurement Results

Although the mechanisms for communicating results (beyond the initial Collector) are beyond the initial LMAP work scope, there are potential privacy issues related to a single organisation’s storage and reporting of Measurement Results. Both storage and reporting functions can help to preserve privacy by implementing the mitigations described below.

8.5. Threats

This section indicates how each of the threats described in [RFC6973] apply to the LMAP entities and their communication and storage of "information of interest". Denial of Service (DOS) and other attacks described in the Security section represent threats as well, and these attacks are more effective when sensitive information protections have been compromised.

8.5.1. Surveillance

Section 5.1.1 of [RFC6973] describes Surveillance as the "observation or monitoring of and individual’s communications or activities." Hence all Measurement Methods that measure user traffic are a form of surveillance, with inherent risks.

Measurement Methods which avoid periods of user transmission indirectly produce a record of times when a subscriber or authorised user has used their network access service.

Measurement Methods may also utilise and store a Subscriber’s currently assigned IP address when conducting measurements that are relevant to a specific Subscriber. Since the Measurement Results are time-stamped, they could provide a record of IP address assignments over time.

Either of the above pieces of information could be useful in correlation and identification, described below.

8.5.2. Stored data compromise

Section 5.1.2 of [RFC6973] describes Stored Data Compromise as resulting from inadequate measures to secure stored data from unauthorised or inappropriate access. For LMAP systems this includes deleting or modifying collected measurement records, as well as data theft.

The primary LMAP entity subject to compromise is the repository, which stores the Measurement Results; extensive security and privacy
threat mitigations are warranted. The Collector and MA also store sensitive information temporarily, and need protection. The communications between the local storage of the Collector and the repository is beyond the scope of the initial LMAP work, though this communications channel will certainly need protection as well as the mass storage itself.

The LMAP Controller may have direct access to storage of Subscriber information (location, billing, service parameters, etc.) and other information which the controlling organisation considers private, and again needs protection.

Note that there is tension between the desire to store all raw results in the LMAP Collector (for reproducibility and custom analysis), and the need to protect the privacy of measurement participants. Many of the compromise mitigations described in section 8.6 below are most efficient when deployed at the MA, therefore minimising the risks with stored results.

8.5.3. Correlation and identification

Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of [RFC6973] describe Correlation as combining various pieces of information to obtain desired characteristics of an individual, and Identification as using this combination to infer identity.

The main risk is that the LMAP system could unwittingly provide a key piece of the correlation chain, starting with an unknown Subscriber’s IP address and another piece of information. For example, a Subscriber utilised Internet access from 2000 to 2310 UTC, because the Measurement Tasks were deferred, or sent a name resolution for www.example.com at 2300 UTC.

If a user’s access with another system already gave away sensitive info, correlation is clearly easier and can result in re-identification, even when an LMAP conserves sensitive information to great extent.

8.5.4. Secondary use and disclosure

Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 of [RFC6973] describes Secondary Use as unauthorised utilisation of an individual’s information for a purpose the individual did not intend, and Disclosure is when such information is revealed causing other’s notions of the individual to change, or confidentiality to be violated.

Measurement Methods that measure user traffic are a form of Secondary Use, and the Subscribers’ permission should be obtained beforehand.
It may be necessary to obtain the measured ISP’s permission to conduct measurements, for example when required by the terms and conditions of the service agreement, and notification is considered good measurement practice.

For Measurement Methods that measure Measurement Traffic the Measurement Results provide some limited information about the Subscriber or ISP and could result in Secondary Uses. For example, the use of the Results in unauthorised marketing campaigns would qualify as Secondary Use. Secondary use may break national laws and regulations, and may violate individual’s expectations or desires.

8.6. Mitigations

This section examines the mitigations listed in section 6 of [RFC6973] and their applicability to LMAP systems. Note that each section in [RFC6973] identifies the threat categories that each technique mitigates.

8.6.1. Data minimisation

Section 6.1 of [RFC6973] encourages collecting and storing the minimal information needed to perform a task.

LMAP results can be useful for general reporting about performance and for specific troubleshooting. They need different levels of information detail, as explained in the paragraphs below.

For general results, the results can be aggregated into large categories (the month of March, all subscribers West of the Mississippi River). In this case, all individual identifications (including IP address of the MA) can be excluded, and only relevant results are provided. However, this implies a filtering process to reduce the information fields, because greater detail was needed to conduct the Measurement Tasks in the first place.

For troubleshooting, so that a network operator or end user can identify a performance issue or failure, potentially all the network information (IP addresses, equipment IDs, location), Measurement Schedule, service configuration, Measurement Results, and other information may assist in the process. This includes the information needed to conduct the Measurements Tasks, and represents a need where the maximum relevant information is desirable, therefore the greatest protections should be applied. This level of detail is greater than needed for general performance monitoring.

As regards Measurement Methods that measure user traffic, we note that a user may give temporary permission (to enable detailed...
troubleshooting), but withhold permission for them in general. Here
the greatest breadth of sensitive information is potentially exposed,
and the maximum privacy protection must be provided. The Collector
may perform pre-storage minimisation and other mitigations (below) to
help preserve privacy.

For MAs with access to the sensitive information of users (e.g.,
within a home or a personal host/handset), it is desirable for the
results collection to minimise the data reported, but also to balance
this desire with the needs of troubleshooting when a service
subscription exists between the user and organisation operating the
measurements.

8.6.2. Anonymity

Section 6.1.1 of [RFC6973] describes a way in which anonymity is
achieved: "there must exist a set of individuals that appear to have
the same attributes as the individual", defined as an "anonymity
set".

Experimental methods for anonymisation of user identifiable data (and
so particularly applicable to Measurement Methods that measure user
traffic) have been identified in [RFC6235]. However, the findings of
several of the same authors is that "there is increasing evidence
that anonymisation applied to network trace or flow data on its own
is insufficient for many data protection applications as in [Bur10]."
Essentially, the details of such Measurement Methods can only be
accessed by closed organisations, and unknown injection attacks are
always less expensive than the protections from them. However, some
forms of summary may protect the user’s sensitive information
sufficiently well, and so each Metric must be evaluated in the light
of privacy.

The techniques in [RFC6235] could be applied more successfully in
Measurement Methods that generate Measurement Traffic, where there
are protections from injection attack. The successful attack would
require breaking the integrity protection of the LMAP Reporting
Protocol and injecting Measurement Results (known fingerprint, see
section 3.2 of [RFC6973]) for inclusion with the shared and
anonymised results, then fingerprinting those records to ascertain
the anonymisation process.

Beside anonymisation of measured Results for a specific user or
provider, the value of sensitive information can be further diluted
by summarising the results over many individuals or areas served by
the provider. There is an opportunity enabled by forming anonymity
sets [RFC6973] based on the reference path measurement points in
[RFC7398]. For example, all measurements from the Subscriber device
can be identified as "mp000", instead of using the IP address or other device information. The same anonymisation applies to the Internet Service Provider, where their Internet gateway would be referred to as "mp190".

Another anonymisation technique is for the MA to include its Group-ID instead of its MA-ID in its Measurement Reports, with several MAs sharing the same Group-ID.

8.6.3. Pseudonymity

Section 6.1.2 of [RFC6973] indicates that pseudonyms, or nicknames, are a possible mitigation to revealing one’s true identity, since there is no requirement to use real names in almost all protocols.

A pseudonym for a measurement device’s IP address could be an LMAP-unique equipment ID. However, this would likely be a permanent handle for the device, and long-term use weakens a pseudonym’s power to obscure identity.

8.6.4. Other mitigations

Data can be de-personalised by blurring it, for example by adding synthetic data, data-swapping, or perturbing the values in ways that can be reversed or corrected.

Sections 6.2 and 6.3 of [RFC6973] describe User Participation and Security, respectively.

Where LMAP measurements involve devices on the Subscriber’s premises or Subscriber-owned equipment, it is essential to secure the Subscriber’s permission with regard to the specific information that will be collected. The informed consent of the Subscriber (and, if different, the end user) may be needed, including the specific purpose of the measurements. The approval process could involve showing the Subscriber their measured information and results before instituting periodic collection, or before all instances of collection, with the option to cancel collection temporarily or permanently.

It should also be clear who is legally responsible for data protection (privacy); in some jurisdictions this role is called the 'data controller'. It is always good practice to limit the time of personal information storage.

Although the details of verification would be impenetrable to most subscribers, the MA could be architected as an "app" with open source-code, pre-download and embedded terms of use and agreement on
measurements, and protection from code modifications usually provided by the app-stores. Further, the app itself could provide data reduction and temporary storage mitigations as appropriate and certified through code review.

LMAP protocols, devices, and the information they store clearly need to be secure from unauthorised access. This is the hand-off between privacy and security considerations (Section 7). The Data Controller has the (legal) responsibility to maintain data protections described in the Subscriber’s agreement and agreements with other organisations.

Finally, it is recommended that each entity in section 8.1, (individuals, ISPs, Regulators, others) assess the risks of LMAP data collection by conducting audits of their data protection methods.

9. IANA considerations

There are no IANA considerations in this memo.

10. Acknowledgments

This document originated as a merger of three individual drafts: draft-eardley-lmap-terminology-02, draft-akhter-lmap-framework-00, and draft-eardley-lmap-framework-02.

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11. History

First WG version, copy of draft-folks-lmap-framework-00.

11.1. From -00 to -01

o new sub-section of possible use of Group-IDs for privacy
o tweak to definition of Control protocol
o fix typo in figure in S5.4

11.2. From -01 to -02

o change to INFORMATIONAL track (previous version had typo’d Standards track)
o new definitions for Capabilities Information and Failure Information
o clarify that diagrams show LMAP-level information flows. Underlying protocol could do other interactions, eg to get through NAT or for Collector to pull a Report
o add hint that after a re-boot should pause random time before re-register (to avoid mass calling event)
o delete the open issue "what happens if a Controller fails" (normal methods can handle)
o add some extra words about multiple Tasks in one Schedule
o clarify that new Schedule replaces (rather than adds to) and old one. Similarly for new configuration of Measurement Tasks or Report Channels.
o clarify suppression is temporary stop; send a new Schedule to permanently stop Tasks
o alter suppression so it is ACKed
o add un-suppress message
o expand the text on error reporting, to mention Reporting failures (as well as failures to action or execute Measurement Task & Schedule)
o add some text about how to have Tasks running indefinitely
- add that optionally a Report is not sent when there are no Measurement Results
- add that a Measurement Task may create more than one Measurement Result
- clarify /amend /expand that Reports include the "raw" Measurement Results - any pre-processing is left for lmap2.0
- add some cautionary words about what if the Collector unexpectedly doesn’t hear from a MA
- add some extra words about the potential impact of Measurement Tasks
- clarified various aspects of the privacy section
- updated references
- minor tweaks

11.3. From -02 to -03

- alignment with the Information Model [burbridge-lmap-information-model] as this is agreed as a WG document
- One-off and periodic Measurement Schedules are kept separate, so that they can be updated independently
- Measurement Suppression in a separate sub-section. Can now optionally include particular Measurement Tasks &/or Schedules to suppress, and start/stop time
- for clarity, concept of Channel split into Control, Report and MA-to-Controller Channels
- numerous editorial changes, mainly arising from a very detailed review by Charles Cook

11.4. From -03 to -04

- updates following the WG Last Call, with the proposed consensus on the various issues as detailed in http://tools.ietf.org/agenda/89/slides/slides-89-lmap-2.pdf. In particular:
o tweaked definitions, especially of Measurement Agent and Measurement Peer

o Instruction - left to each implementation & deployment of LMAP to decide on the granularity at which an Instruction Message works

o words added about overlapping Measurement Tasks (Measurement System can handle any way they choose; Report should mention if the Task overlapped with another)

o Suppression: no defined impact on Passive Measurement Task; extra option to suppress on-going Active Measurement Tasks; suppression doesn’t go to Measurement Peer, since they don’t understand Instructions

o new concept of Data Transfer Task (and therefore adjustment of the Channel concept)

o enhancement of Results with Subscriber’s service parameters - could be useful, don’t define how but can be included in Report to various other sections

o various other smaller improvements, arising from the WGLC

o Appendix added with examples of Measurement Agents and Peers in various deployment scenarios. To help clarify what these terms mean.

11.5. From -04 to -05

o clarified various scoping comments by using the phrase "scope of initial LMAP work" (avoiding "scope of LMAP WG" since this may change in the future)

o added a Configuration Protocol - allows the Controller to update the MA about information that it obtained during the bootstrapping process (for consistency with Information Model)

o Removed over-detailed information about the relationship between the different items in Instruction, as this seems more appropriate for the information model. Clarified that the lists given are about the aims and not a list of information elements (these will be defined in draft-ietf-information-model).

o the Measurement Method, specified as a URI to a registry entry - rather than a URN
o MA configured with time limit after which, if it hasn’t heard from Controller, then it stops running Measurement Tasks (rather than this being part of a Schedule)

o clarified there is no distinction between how capabilities, failure and logging information are transferred (all can be when requested by Controller or by MA on its own initiative).

o removed mention of Data Transfer Tasks. This abstraction is left to the information model i-d

o added Deployment sub-section about Measurement Agent embedded in ISP Network

o various other smaller improvements, arising from the 2nd WGLC

11.6. From -05 to -06

o clarified terminology around Measurement Methods and Tasks. Since within a Method there may be several different roles (requester and responder, for instance)

o Suppression: there is now the concept of a flag (boolean) which indicates whether a Task is by default gets suppressed or not. The optional suppression message (with list of specific tasks /schedules to suppress) over-rides this flag.

o The previous bullet also means there is no need to make a distinction between active and passive Measurement Tasks, so this distinction is removed.

o removed Configuration Protocol - Configuration is part of the Instruction and so uses the Control Protocol.

11.7. From -06 to -07

o Clarifications and nits

11.8. From -07 to -08

o Clarifications resulting from WG 3rd LC, as discussed in https://tools.ietf.org/agenda/90/slides/slides-90-lmap-0.pdf, plus comments made in the IETF-90 meeting.

o added mention of "measurement point designations" in Measurement Task configuration and Report Protocol.
11.9. From -08 to -09
  o Clarifications and changes from the AD review (Benoit Claise) and
    security directorate review (Radia Perlman).

11.10. From -09 to -10
  o More changes from the AD review (Benoit Claise).

11.11. From -10 to -11
  o More changes from the AD review (Benoit Claise).

11.12. From -11 to -12
  o Fixing nits from IETF Last call and authors.

11.13. From -12 to -13
  o IESG changes.

11.14. From -13 to -14
  o Fixing Figure 1.

12. Informative References

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Abstract

This Information Model applies to the Measurement Agent within a Large-Scale Measurement Platform. As such it outlines the information that is (pre-)configured on the Measurement Agent or exists in communications with a Controller or Collector within an LMAP framework. The purpose of such an Information Model is to provide a protocol and device independent view of the Measurement Agent that can be implemented via one or more Control and Report protocols.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 23, 2017.
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1. Introduction

A large-scale measurement platform is a collection of components that work in a coordinated fashion to perform measurements from a large number of vantage points. A typical use case is the execution of broadband measurements [RFC7536]. The main components of a large-scale measurement platform are the Measurement Agents (hereafter MAs), the Controller(s) and the Collector(s).

The MAs are the elements actually performing the measurements. The MAs are controlled by exactly one Controller at a time and the
Collectors gather the results generated by the MAs. In a nutshell, the normal operation of a large-scale measurement platform starts with the Controller instructing a set of one or more MAs to perform a set of one or more Measurement Tasks at a certain point in time. The MAs execute the instructions from a Controller, and once they have done so, they report the results of the measurements to one or more Collectors. The overall framework for a large-scale measurement platform as used in this document is described in detail in [RFC7594].

A large-scale measurement platform involves basically three types of protocols, namely, a Control protocol (or protocols) between a Controller and the MAs, a Report protocol (or protocols) between the MAs and the Collector(s) and several measurement protocols between the MAs and Measurement Peers (MPs), used to actually perform the measurements. In addition some information is required to be configured on the MA prior to any communication with a Controller.

This document defines the information model for both Control and the Report protocols along with pre-configuration information that is required on the MA before communicating with the Controller, broadly named as the LMAP Information Model. The measurement protocols are out of the scope of this document.

As defined in [RFC3444], the LMAP Information Model defines the concepts involved in a large-scale measurement platform at a high level of abstraction, independent of any specific implementation or actual protocol used to exchange the information. It is expected that the proposed information model can be used with different protocols in different measurement platform architectures and across different types of MA devices (e.g., home gateway, smartphone, PC, router). A YANG data model implementing the information model can be found in [I-D.ietf-lmap-yang].

The definition of an Information Model serves a number of purposes:

1. To guide the standardisation of one or more Control and Report protocols and data models

2. To enable high-level inter-operability between different Control and Report protocols by facilitating translation between their respective data models such that a Controller could instruct sub-populations of MAs using different protocols

3. To form agreement of what information needs to be held by an MA and passed over the Control and Report interfaces and support the functionality described in the LMAP framework
4. To enable existing protocols and data models to be assessed for their suitability as part of a large-scale measurement system

2. Notation

This document uses a programming language-like notation to define the properties of the objects of the information model. An optional property is enclosed by square brackets, [ ], and a list property is indicated by two numbers in angle brackets, <m..n>, where m indicates the minimal number of values, and n is the maximum. The symbol * for n means no upper bound.

The object definitions use a couple of base types that are defined as follows:

- **int**
  A type representing signed or unsigned integer numbers. This information model does not define a precision nor does it make a distinction between signed and unsigned number ranges. This type is also used to represent enumerations.

- **boolean**
  A type representing a boolean value.

- **string**
  A type representing a human-readable string consisting of a (possibly restricted) subset of Unicode and ISO/IEC 10646 [ISO.10646] characters.

- **datetime**
  A type representing a date and time using the Gregorian calendar. The datetime format MUST conform to RFC 3339 [RFC3339].

- **uuid**
  A type representing Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) as defined in RFC 4122 [RFC4122]. The UUID values are expected to be unique within an installation of a large-scale measurement system.

- **uri**
  A type representing a Uniform Resource Identifier as defined in STD 66 [RFC3986].

- **ip-address**
  A type representing an IP address. This type supports both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.

- **counter**
  A non-negative integer that monotonically increases. Counters may have discontinuities and they are not expected to persist across restarts.

- **credentials**
  An opaque type representing credentials needed by a cryptographic mechanism to secure communication. Data
models must expand this opaque type as needed and required by the security protocols utilized.

**data**

An opaque type representing data obtained from measurements.

Names of objects are generally assumed to be unique within an implementation.

### 3. LMAP Information Model

The information described herein relates to the information stored, received or transmitted by a Measurement Agent as described within the LMAP framework [RFC7594]. As such, some subsets of this information model are applicable to the measurement Controller, Collector and any device management system that pre-configures the Measurement Agent. The information described in these models will be transmitted by protocols using interfaces between the Measurement Agent and such systems according to a Data Model.

The information model is divided into six aspects. Firstly the grouping of information facilitates reader understanding. Secondly, the particular groupings chosen are expected to map to different protocols or different transmissions within those protocols.

1. **Pre-Configuration Information.** Information pre-configured on the Measurement Agent prior to any communication with other components of the LMAP architecture (i.e., the Controller, Collector and Measurement Peers), specifically detailing how to communicate with a Controller and whether the device is enabled to participate as an MA.

2. **Configuration Information.** Update of the pre-configuration information during the registration of the MA or subsequent communication with the Controller, along with the configuration of further parameters about the MA (rather than the Measurement Tasks it should perform) that were not mandatory for the initial communication between the MA and a Controller.

3. **Instruction Information.** Information that is received by the MA from the Controller pertaining to the Measurement Tasks that should be executed. This includes the task execution Schedules (other than the Controller communication Schedule supplied as (pre)configuration information) and related information such as the Task Configuration, communication Channels to Collectors and schedule Event and Timing information. It also includes Task Suppression information that is used to over-ride normal Task execution.
4. Logging Information. Information transmitted from the MA to the Controller detailing the results of any configuration operations along with error and status information from the operation of the MA.

5. Capability and Status Information. Information on the general status and capabilities of the MA. For example, the set of measurements that are supported on the device.

6. Reporting Information. Information transmitted from the MA to one or more Collectors including measurement results and the context in which they were conducted.

In addition the MA may hold further information not described herein, and which may be optionally transferred to or from other systems including the Controller and Collector. One example of information in this category is subscriber or line information that may be extracted by a task and reported by the MA in the reporting communication to a Collector.

It should also be noted that the MA may be in communication with other management systems which may be responsible for configuring and retrieving information from the MA device. Such systems, where available, can perform an important role in transferring the pre-configuration information to the MA or enabling/disabling the measurement functionality of the MA.

The granularity of data transmitted in each operation of the Control and Report Protocols is not dictated by the Information Model. For example, the Instruction object may be delivered in a single operation. Alternatively, Schedules and Task Configurations may be separated or even each Schedule/Task Configuration may be delivered individually. Similarly the Information Model does not dictate whether data is read, write, or read/write. For example, some Control Protocols may have the ability to read back Configuration and Instruction information which have been previously set on the MA. Lastly, while some protocols may simply overwrite information (for example refreshing the entire Instruction Information), other protocols may have the ability to update or delete selected items of information.

The information modeled by the six aspects of the information model is supported by a number of common information objects. These objects are also described later in this document and comprise of:

a. Schedules. A set of Schedules tells the MA to execute Actions. An Action of a Schedule leads to the execution of a Task. Without a Schedule no Task (including measurements or reporting
Schedules are used within the Instruction to specify what tasks should be performed, when, and how to direct their results. A Schedule is also used within the pre-Configuration and Configuration information in order to execute the Task or Tasks required to communicate with the Controller. A specific Schedule can only be active once. Attempts to start a Schedule while the same Schedule is still running will fail.

b. Channels. A set of Channel objects are used to communicate with a number of endpoints (i.e., the Controller and Collectors). Each Channel object contains the information required for the communication with a single endpoint such as the target location and security details.

c. Task Configurations. A set of Task Configurations is used to configure the Tasks that are run by the MA. This includes the registry entries for the Task and any configuration parameters, represented as Task Options. Task Configurations are referenced from a Schedule in order to specify what Tasks the MA should execute.

d. Events. A set of Event objects that can be referenced from the Schedules. Each Schedule always references exactly one Event object that determines when the schedule is executed. An Event object specifies either a singleton or series of events that indicate when Tasks should be executed. A commonly used kind of Event objects are Timing objects. For Event objects specifying a series of events, it is generally a good idea to configure an end time and to refresh the end time as needed to ensure that MAs that loose connectivity to their controller do not continue executing Schedules forever.

Figure 1 illustrates the structure in which these common information objects are referenced. The references are achieved by each object (Task Configuration, Event) being given a short textual name that is used by other objects. The objects shown in parenthesis are part of the internal object structure of a Schedule. Channels are not shown in the diagram since they are only used as an option by selected Task Configurations but are similarly referenced using a short text name.
The primary function of an MA is to execute Schedules. A Schedule, which is triggered by an Event, executes a number of Actions. An Action refers to a Configured Task and it may feed results to a Destination Schedule. Both, Actions and Configured Tasks can provide parameters, represented as Action Options and Task Options.

Tasks can implement a variety of different functions. While in terms of the Information Model, all Tasks have the same structure, it can help conceptually to think of different Task categories:

1. Measurement Tasks measure some aspect of network performance or traffic. They may also capture contextual information from the MA device or network interfaces such as the device type or interface speed.

2. Data Transfer Tasks support the communication with a Controller and Collectors:
   A. Reporting Tasks report the results of Measurement Tasks to Collectors
   B. Control Task(s) implement the Control Protocol and communicate with the Controller.

3. Data Analysis Tasks can exist to analyse data from other Measurement Tasks locally on the MA

4. Data Management Tasks may exist to clean-up, filter or compress data on the MA such as Measurement Task results
Figure 1 indicates that Actions can produce data that is fed into Destination Schedules. This can by used by Actions implementing Measurement Tasks to feed measurement results to a Schedule that triggers Actions implementing Reporting Tasks. Data fed to a Destination Schedule is consumed by the first Action of the Destination Schedule if the Destination Schedule is using sequential or pipelined execution mode and it is consumed by all Actions of the Destination Schedule if the Destination Schedule is using parallel execution mode.

3.1. Pre-Configuration Information

This information is the minimal information that needs to be pre-configured to the MA in order for it to successfully communicate with a Controller during the registration process. Some of the Pre-Configuration Information elements are repeated in the Configuration Information in order to allow an LMAP Controller to update these items. The pre-configuration information also contains some elements that are not under the control of the LMAP framework (such as the device identifier and device security credentials).

This Pre-Configuration Information needs to include a URL of the initial Controller from where configuration information can be communicated along with the security information required for the communication including the certificate of the Controller (or the certificate of the Certification Authority which was used to issue the certificate for the Controller). All this is expressed as a Channel. While multiple Channels may be provided in the Pre-Configuration Information they must all be associated with a single Controller (e.g., over different interfaces or network protocols).

Where the MA pulls information from the Controller, the Pre-Configuration Information also needs to contain the timing of the communication with the Controller as well as the nature of the communication itself (such as the protocol and data to be transferred). The timing is represented as an Event that invokes a Schedule that executes the Task(s) responsible for communication with the Controller. It is this Task (or Tasks) that implement the Control protocol between the MA and the Controller and utilises the Channel information. The Task(s) may take additional parameters, as defined by a Task Configuration.

Even where information is pushed to the MA from the Controller (rather than pulled by the MA), a Schedule still needs to be supplied. In this case the Schedule will simply execute a Controller listener Task when the MA is started. A Channel is still required for the MA to establish secure communication with the Controller.
It can be seen that these Channels, Schedules and Task Configurations for the initial MA-Controller communication are no different in terms of the Information Model to any other Channel, Schedule or Task Configuration that might execute a Measurement Task or report the measurement results (as described later).

The MA may be pre-configured with an MA ID, or may use a Device ID in the first Controller contact before it is assigned an MA ID. The Device ID may be a MAC address or some other device identifier expressed as a URI. If the MA ID is not provided at this stage, then it must be provided by the Controller during Configuration.

3.1.1. Definition of ma-preconfig-obj

object {
    [uuid               ma-preconfig-agent-id;]
    ma-task-obj         ma-preconfig-control-tasks<1..*>;
    ma-channel-obj      ma-preconfig-control-channels<1..*>;
    ma-schedule-obj     ma-preconfig-control-schedules<1..*>;
    [uri                ma-preconfig-device-id;]
    credentials         ma-preconfig-credentials;
} ma-preconfig-obj;

The ma-preconfig-obj describes information that needs to be available to the MA in order to bootstrap communication with a Controller. The ma-preconfig-obj consists of the following elements:

ma-preconfig-agent-id: An optional uuid uniquely identifying the measurement agent.

ma-preconfig-control-tasks: An unordered set of task objects.

ma-preconfig-control-channels: An unordered set of channel objects.

ma-preconfig-control-schedules: An unordered set of scheduling objects.

ma-preconfig-device-id: An optional identifier for the device.

ma-preconfig-credentials: The security credentials used by the measurement agent.

3.2. Configuration Information

During registration or at any later point at which the MA contacts the Controller (or vice-versa), the choice of Controller, details for the timing of communication with the Controller or parameters for the
communication Task(s) can be changed (as captured by the Channels, Schedules and Task Configurations objects). For example the pre-configured Controller (specified as a Channel or Channels) may be over-ridden with a specific Controller that is more appropriate to the MA device type, location or characteristics of the network (e.g., access technology type or broadband product). The initial communication Schedule may be over-ridden with one more relevant to routine communications between the MA and the Controller.

While some Control protocols may only use a single Schedule, other protocols may use several Schedules (and related data transfer Tasks) to update the Configuration Information, transfer the Instruction Information, transfer Capability and Status Information and send other information to the Controller such as log or error notifications. Multiple Channels may be used to communicate with the same Controller over multiple interfaces (e.g., to send logging information over a different network).

In addition the MA will be given further items of information that relate specifically to the MA rather than the measurements it is to conduct or how to report results. The assignment of an ID to the MA is mandatory. If the MA Agent ID was not optionally provided during the pre-configuration then one must be provided by the Controller during Configuration. Optionally a Group ID may also be given which identifies a group of interest to which that MA belongs. For example the group could represent an ISP, broadband product, technology, market classification, geographic region, or a combination of multiple such characteristics. Additional flags control whether the MA ID or the Group ID are included in Reports. The reporting of a Group ID without the MA ID may allow the MA to remain anonymous, which may be particularly useful to prevent tracking of mobile MA devices.

Optionally an MA can also be configured to stop executing any Instruction Schedule if the Controller is unreachable. This can be used as a fail-safe to stop Measurement and other Tasks being conducted when there is doubt that the Instruction Information is still valid. This is simply represented as a time window in seconds since the last communication with the Controller after which an Event is generated that can trigger the suspension of Instruction Schedules. The appropriate value of the time window will depend on the specified communication Schedule with the Controller and the duration for which the system is willing to tolerate continued operation with potentially stale Instruction Information.

While Pre-Configuration Information is persistent upon device reset or power cycle, the persistency of the Configuration Information may be device dependent. Some devices may revert back to their pre-
configuration state upon reboot or factory reset, while other devices may store all Configuration and Instruction information in persistent storage. A Controller can check whether an MA has the latest Configuration and Instruction information by examining the Capability and Status information for the MA.

3.2.1. Definition of ma-config-obj

object {
    uuid                ma-config-agent-id;
    ma-task-obj         ma-config-control-tasks<1..*>;
    ma-channel-obj      ma-config-control-channels<1..*>;
    ma-schedule-obj     ma-config-control-schedules<1..*>;
    credentials         ma-config-credentials;
    [string              ma-config-group-id;]
    [string              ma-config-measurement-point;]
    [boolean             ma-config-report-agent-id;]
    [boolean             ma-config-report-group-id;]
    [boolean             ma-config-report-measurement-point;]
    [int                 ma-config-controller-timeout;]
} ma-config-obj;

The ma-config-obj consists of the following elements:

ma-config-agent-id: A uuid uniquely identifying the measurement agent.

ma-config-control-tasks: An unordered set of task objects.

ma-config-control-channels: An unordered set of channel objects.

ma-config-control-schedules: An unordered set of scheduling objects.

ma-config-credentials: The security credentials used by the measurement agent.

ma-config-group-id: An optional identifier of the group of measurement agents this measurement agent belongs to.

ma-config-measurement-point: An optional identifier for the measurement point indicating where the measurement agent is located on a path (see [RFC7398] for further details).
ma-config-report-agent-id: An optional flag indicating whether the agent identifier (ma-config-agent-id) is included in reports. The default value is true.

ma-config-report-group-id: An optional flag indicating whether the group identifier (ma-config-group-id) is included in reports. The default value is false.

ma-config-report-measurement-point: An optional flag indicating whether the measurement point (ma-config-measurement-point) should be included in reports. The default value is false.

ma-config-controller-timeout: A timer is started after each successful contact with a controller. When the timer reaches the controller-timeout (measured in seconds), an event is raised indicating that connectivity to the controller has been lost (see ma-controller-lost-obj).

3.3. Instruction Information

The Instruction information model has four sub-elements:

1. Instruction Task Configurations
2. Report Channels
3. Instruction Schedules
4. Suppression

The Instruction supports the execution of all Tasks on the MA except those that deal with communication with the Controller (specified in (pre-)configuration information). The Tasks are configured in Instruction Task Configurations and included by reference in the Actions of Instruction Schedules that specify when to execute them. The results can be communicated to other Schedules or a Task may implement a Reporting Protocol and communicate results over Report Channels. Suppression is used to temporarily stop the execution of
new Tasks as specified by the Instruction Schedules (and optionally to stop ongoing Tasks).

A Task Configuration is used to configure the mandatory and optional parameters of a Task. It also serves to instruct the MA about the Task including the ability to resolve the Task to an executable and specifying the schema for the Task parameters.

A Report Channel defines how to communicate with a single remote system specified by a URL. A Report Channel is used to send results to a single Collector but is no different in terms of the Information Model to the Control Channel used to transfer information between the MA and the Controller. Several Report Channels can be defined to enable results to be split or duplicated across different destinations. A single Channel can be used by multiple (reporting) Task Configurations to transfer data to the same Collector. A single Reporting Task Configuration can also be included in multiple Schedules. E.g., a single Collector may receive data at three different cycle rates, one Schedule reporting hourly, another reporting daily and a third specifying that results should be sent immediately for on-demand measurement tasks. Alternatively multiple Report Channels can be used to send Measurement Task results to different Collectors. The details of the Channel element is described later as it is common to several objects.

Instruction Schedules specify which Actions to execute according to a given triggering Event. An Action extends a Configured Task with additional specific parameters. An Event can trigger the execution of a single Action or it can trigger a repeated series of Actions. The Schedule also specifies how to link Tasks output data to other Schedules.

Measurement Suppression information is used to over-ride the Instruction Schedule and temporarily stop measurements or other Tasks from running on the MA for a defined or indefinite period. While conceptually measurements can be stopped by simply removing them from the Measurement Schedule, splitting out separate information on Measurement Suppression allows this information to be updated on the MA on a different timing cycle or protocol implementation to the Measurement Schedule. It is also considered that it will be easier for a human operator to implement a temporary explicit suppression rather than having to move to a reduced Schedule and then roll-back at a later time.

It should be noted that control schedules and tasks cannot be suppressed as evidenced by the lack of suppression information in the Configuration. The control schedule must only reference tasks listed as control tasks (i.e., within the Configuration information).
A single Suppression object is able to enable/disable a set of Instruction Tasks that are tagged for suppression. This enables fine grained control on which Tasks are suppressed. Suppression of both matching Actions and Measurement Schedules is supported. Support for disabling specific Actions allows malfunctioning or mis-configured Tasks or Actions that have an impact on a particular part of the network infrastructure (e.g., a particular Measurement Peer) to be targeted. Support for disabling specific Schedules allows for particularly heavy cycles or sets of less essential Measurement Tasks to be suppressed quickly and effectively. Note that Suppression has no effect on either Controller Tasks or Controller Schedules.

Suppression stops new Tasks from executing. In addition, the Suppression information also supports an additional Boolean that is used to select whether on-going tasks are also to be terminated.

Unsuppression is achieved through either overwriting the Measurement Suppression information (e.g., changing ‘enabled’ to False) or through the use of an End time such that the Measurement Suppression will no longer be in effect beyond this time.

The goal when defining these four different elements is to allow each part of the information model to change without affecting the other three elements. For example it is envisaged that the Report Channels and the set of Task Configurations will be relatively static. The Instruction Schedule, on the other hand, is likely to be more dynamic, as the measurement panel and test frequency are changed for various business goals. Another example is that measurements can be suppressed with a Suppression command without removing the existing Instruction Schedules that would continue to apply after the Suppression expires or is removed. In terms of the Controller-MA communication this can reduce the data overhead. It also encourages the re-use of the same standard Task Configurations and Reporting Channels to help ensure consistency and reduce errors.

3.3.1. Definition of ma-instruction-obj

```plaintext
object {
    ma-task-obj     ma-instruction-tasks<0..*>;
    ma-channel-obj  ma-instruction-channels<0..*>;
    ma-schedule-obj ma-instruction-schedules<0..*>;
    [ma-suppression-obj ma-instruction-suppressions<0..*>;]
} ma-instruction-obj;
```

An ma-instruction-obj consists of the following elements:

- **ma-instruction-tasks**: A possibly empty unordered set of task objects.
ma-instruction-channels:  A possibly empty unordered set of channel objects.

ma-instruction-schedules: A possibly empty unordered set of schedule objects.


3.3.2. Definition of ma-suppression-obj

object {
    string ma-suppression-name;
    [ma-event-obj ma-suppression-start;]
    [ma-event-obj ma-suppression-end;]
    [string ma-suppression-match<0..*>;]
    [boolean ma-suppression-stop-running;]
} ma-suppression-obj;

The ma-suppression-obj controls the suppression of schedules or actions and consists of the following elements:

ma-suppression-name:  A name uniquely identifying a suppression.

ma-suppression-start: The optional event indicating when suppression starts. If not present, the suppression starts immediately, i.e., as if the value would be ‘immediate’.

ma-suppression-end: The optional event indicating when suppression ends. If not present, the suppression does not have a defined end, i.e., the suppression remains for an indefinite period of time.

ma-suppression-match: An optional and possibly empty unordered set of match patterns. The suppression will apply to all schedules (and their actions) that have a matching value in their ma-schedule-suppression-tags and all actions that have a matching value in their ma-action-suppression-tags. Pattern matching is done using glob style pattern (see below).
ma-suppression-stop-running: An optional boolean indicating whether suppression will stop any running matching schedules or actions. The default value for this boolean is false.

Glob style pattern matching is following POSIX.2 fnmatch() [POSIX.2] without special treatment of file paths:

*        matches a sequence of characters
?        matches a single character
[seq]    matches any character in seq
[!seq]   matches any character not in seq

A backslash followed by a character matches the following character. In particular:

\*        matches *
\?        matches ?
\\       matches \

A sequence seq may be a sequence of characters (e.g., [abc]) or a range of characters (e.g., [a-c]).

3.4. Logging Information

The MA may report on the success or failure of Configuration or Instruction communications from the Controller. In addition further operational logs may be produced during the operation of the MA and updates to capabilities may also be reported. Reporting this information is achieved in exactly the same manner as scheduling any other Task. We make no distinction between a Measurement Task conducting an active or passive network measurement and one which solely retrieves static or dynamic information from the MA such as capabilities or logging information. One or more logging tasks can be programmed or configured to capture subsets of the Logging Information. These logging tasks are then executed by Schedules which also specify that the resultant data is to be transferred over the Controller Channels.

The type of Logging Information will fall into three different categories:

1. Success/failure/warning messages in response to information updates from the Controller. Failure messages could be produced due to some inability to receive or parse the Controller communication, or if the MA is not able to act as instructed. For example:
* "Measurement Schedules updated OK"
* "Unable to parse JSON"
* "Missing mandatory element: Measurement Timing"
* "'Start' does not conform to schema - expected datetime"
* "Date specified is in the past"
* "'Hour' must be in the range 1..24"
* "Schedule A refers to non-existent Measurement Task Configuration"
* "Measurement Task Configuration X registry entry Y not found"
* "Updated Measurement Task Configurations do not include M used by Measurement Schedule N"

2. Operational updates from the MA. For example:
* "Out of memory: cannot record result"
* "Collector ‘collector.example.com’ not responding"
* "Unexpected restart"
* "Suppression timeout"
* "Failed to execute Measurement Task Configuration H"

3. Status updates from the MA. For example:
* "Device interface added: eth3"
* "Supported measurements updated"
* "New IP address on eth0: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx"

This Information Model document does not detail the precise format of logging information since it is to a large extent protocol and MA specific. However, some common information can be identified.
3.4.1. Definition of ma-log-obj

object {
    uuid ma-log-agent-id;
    datetime ma-log-event-time;
    int ma-log-code;
    string ma-log-description;
} ma-log-obj;

The ma-log-obj models the generic aspects of a logging object and consists of the following elements:

ma-log-agent-id: A uuid uniquely identifying the measurement agent.

ma-log-event-time: The date and time of the event reported in the logging object.

ma-log-code: A machine readable code describing the event.

ma-log-description: A human readable description of the event.

3.5. Capability and Status Information

The MA will hold Capability Information that can be retrieved by a Controller. Capabilities include the device interface details available to Measurement Tasks as well as the set of Measurement Tasks/Roles (specified by registry entries) that are actually installed or available on the MA. Status information includes the times that operations were last performed such as contacting the Controller or producing Reports.

3.5.1. Definition of ma-capability-obj

object {
    string ma-capability-hardware;
    string ma-capability-firmware;
    string ma-capability-version;
    [string ma-capability-tags<0..*>;]
    [ma-capability-task-obj ma-capability-tasks<0..*>;]
} ma-capability-obj;

The ma-capability-obj provides information about the capabilities of the measurement agent and consists of the following elements:

ma-capability-hardware: A description of the hardware of the device the measurement agent is running on.
ma-capability-firmware: A description of the firmware of the device the measurement agent is running on.

ma-capability-version: The version of the measurement agent.

ma-capability-tags: An optional unordered set of tags that provide additional information about the capabilities of the measurement agent.

ma-capability-tasks: An optional unordered set of capability objects for each supported task.

3.5.2. Definition of ma-capability-task-obj

object {
  string ma-capability-task-name;
  ma-registry-obj ma-capability-task-functions<0..*>;
  string ma-capability-task-version;
} ma-capability-task-obj;

The ma-capability-task-obj provides information about the capability of a task and consists of the following elements:

ma-capability-task-name: A name uniquely identifying a task.

ma-capability-task-functions: A possibly empty unordered set of registry entries identifying functions this task implements.

ma-capability-task-version: The version of the measurement task.

3.5.3. Definition of ma-status-obj

object {
  uuid ma-status-agent-id;
  [uri ma-status-device-id;]
  datetime ma-status-last-started;
  ma-status-interface-obj ma-status-interfaces<0..*>;
  [ma-status-schedule-obj ma-status-schedules<0..*>;]
  [ma-status-suppression-obj ma-status-suppressions<0..*>;]
} ma-status-obj;

The ma-status-obj provides status information about the measurement agent and consists of the following elements:

ma-status-agent-id: A uuid uniquely identifying the measurement agent.
ma-status-device-id: A URI identifying the device.

ma-status-last-started: The date and time the measurement agent last started.

ma-status-interfaces: An unordered set of network interfaces available on the device.

ma-status-schedules: An optional unordered set of status objects for each schedule.

ma-status-suppressions: An optional unordered set of status objects for each suppression.

3.5.4. Definition of ma-status-schedule-obj

object {
    string ma-status-schedule-name;
    string ma-status-schedule-state;
    int ma-status-schedule-storage;
    counter ma-status-schedule-invocations;
    counter ma-status-schedule-suppressions;
    counter ma-status-schedule-overlaps;
    counter ma-status-schedule-failures;
    datetime ma-status-schedule-last-invocation;
    [ma-status-action-obj ma-status-schedule-actions<0..*>;]
} ma-status-schedule-obj;

The ma-status-schedule-obj provides status information about the status of a schedule and consists of the following elements:

ma-status-schedule-name: The name of the schedule this status object refers to.

ma-status-schedule-state: The state of the schedule. The value 'enabled' indicates that the schedule is currently enabled. The value 'suppressed' indicates that the schedule is currently suppressed. The value 'disabled' indicates that the schedule is currently disabled. The value 'running' indicates that the schedule is currently running.

ma-status-schedule-storage: The amount of secondary storage (e.g., allocated in a file)
system) holding temporary data allocated to the schedule in bytes. This object reports the amount of allocated physical storage and not the storage used by logical data records. Data models should use a 64-bit integer type.

ma-status-schedule-invocations  Number of invocations of this schedule. This counter does not include suppressed invocations or invocations that were prevented due to an overlap with a previous invocation of this schedule.

ma-status-schedule-suppressions  Number of suppressed executions of this schedule.

ma-status-schedule-overlaps  Number of executions prevented due to overlaps with a previous invocation of this schedule.

ma-status-schedule-failures  Number of failed executions of this schedule. A failed execution is an execution where at least one action failed.

ma-status-schedule-last-invocation: The date and time of the last invocation of this schedule.

ma-status-schedule-actions: An optional ordered list of status objects for each action of the schedule.

3.5.5. Definition of ma-status-action-obj
object {
    string ma-status-action-name;
    string ma-status-action-state;
    int ma-status-action-storage;
    counter ma-status-action-invocations;
    counter ma-status-action-suppressions;
    counter ma-status-action-overlaps;
    counter ma-status-action-failures;
    datetime ma-status-action-last-invocation;
    datetime ma-status-action-last-completion;
    int ma-status-action-last-status;
    string ma-status-action-last-message;
    datetime ma-status-action-last-failed-completion;
    int ma-status-action-last-failed-status;
    string ma-status-action-last-failed-message;
} ma-status-action-obj;

The ma-status-action-obj provides status information about an action of a schedule and consists of the following elements:

ma-status-action-name: The name of the action of a schedule this status object refers to.

ma-status-action-state: The state of the action. The value ‘enabled’ indicates that the action is currently enabled. The value ‘suppressed’ indicates that the action is currently suppressed. The value ‘disabled’ indicates that the action is currently disabled. The value ‘running’ indicates that the action is currently running.

ma-status-action-storage: The amount of secondary storage (e.g., allocated in a file system) holding temporary data allocated to the action in bytes. This object reports the amount of allocated physical storage and not the storage used by logical data records. Data models should use a 64-bit integer type.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ma-status-action-invocations</td>
<td>Number of invocations of this action. This counter does not include suppressed invocations or invocations that were prevented due to an overlap with a previous invocation of this action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ma-status-action-suppressions</td>
<td>Number of suppressed executions of this action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ma-status-action-overlaps</td>
<td>Number of executions prevented due to overlaps with a previous invocation of this action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ma-status-action-failures</td>
<td>Number of failed executions of this action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ma-status-action-last-invocation:</td>
<td>The date and time of the last invocation of this action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ma-status-action-last-completion:</td>
<td>The date and time of the last completion of this action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ma-status-action-last-status:</td>
<td>The status code returned by the last execution of this action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ma-status-action-last-message:</td>
<td>The status message produced by the last execution of this action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ma-status-action-last-failed-completion:</td>
<td>The date and time of the last failed completion of this action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ma-status-action-last-failed-status:</td>
<td>The status code returned by the last failed execution of this action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ma-status-action-last-failed-message:</td>
<td>The status message produced by the last failed execution of this action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5.6. Definition of ma-status-suppression-obj

object {
    string ma-status-suppression-name;
    string ma-status-suppression-state;
} ma-status-suppression-obj;

The ma-status-suppression-obj provides status information about that status of a suppression and consists of the following elements:

ma-status-suppression-name: The name of the suppression this status object refers to.

ma-status-suppression-state: The state of the suppression. The value ‘enabled’ indicates that the suppression is currently enabled. The value ‘active’ indicates that the suppression is currently active. The value ‘disabled’ indicates that the suppression is currently disabled.

3.5.7. Definition of ma-status-interface-obj

object {
    string ma-status-interface-name;
    string ma-status-interface-type;
    [int ma-status-interface-speed;]
    [string ma-status-interface-link-layer-address;]
    [ip-address ma-status-interface-ip-addresses<0..*>;]
    [ip-address ma-status-interface-gateways<0..*>;]
    [ip-address ma-status-interface-dns-servers<0..*>;]
} ma-status-interface-obj;

The ma-status-interface-obj provides status information about network interfaces and consists of the following elements:

ma-status-interface-name: A name uniquely identifying a network interface.

ma-status-interface-type: The type of the network interface.

ma-status-interface-speed: An optional indication of the speed of the interface (measured in bits-per-second).
ma-status-interface-link-layer-address: An optional link-layer address of the interface.

ma-status-interface-ip-addresses: An optional ordered list of IP addresses assigned to the interface.

ma-status-interface-gateways: An optional ordered list of gateways assigned to the interface.

ma-status-interface-dns-servers: An optional ordered list of DNS servers assigned to the interface.

3.6. Reporting Information

At a point in time specified by a Schedule, the MA will execute tasks that communicate a set of measurement results to the Collector. These Reporting Tasks will be configured to transmit task results over a specified Report Channel to a Collector.

It should be noted that the output from Tasks does not need to be sent to communication Channels. It can alternatively, or additionally, be sent to other Tasks on the MA. This facilitates using a first Measurement Task to control the operation of a later Measurement Task (such as first probing available line speed and then adjusting the operation of a video testing measurement) and also to allow local processing of data to output alarms (e.g., when performance drops from earlier levels). Of course, subsequent Tasks also include Tasks that implement the reporting protocol(s) and transfer data to one or more Collector(s).

The Report generated by a Reporting Task is structured hierarchically to avoid repetition of report header and Measurement Task Configuration information. The report starts with the timestamp of the report generation on the MA and details about the MA including the optional Measurement Agent ID and Group ID (controlled by the Configuration Information).

Much of the report Information is optional and will depend on the implementation of the Reporting Task and any parameters defined in the Task Configuration for the Reporting Task. For example some Reporting Tasks may choose not to include the Measurement Task Configuration or Action parameters, while others may do so dependent on the Controller setting a configurable parameter in the Task Configuration.
It is possible for a Reporting Task to send just the Report header (datetime and optional agent ID and/or Group ID) if no measurement data is available. Whether to send such empty reports again is dependent on the implementation of the Reporting Task and potential Task Configuration parameter.

The handling of measurement data on the MA before generating a Report and transfer from the MA to the Collector is dependent on the implementation of the device, MA and/or scheduled Tasks and not defined by the LMAP standards. Such decisions may include limits to the measurement data storage and what to do when such available storage becomes depleted. It is generally suggested that implementations running out of storage stop executing new measurement tasks and retain old measurement data.

No context information, such as line speed or broadband product are included within the report header information as this data is reported by individual tasks at the time they execute. Either a Measurement Task can report contextual parameters that are relevant to that particular measurement, or specific tasks can be used to gather a set of contextual and environmental data at certain times independent of the reporting schedule.

After the report header information the results are reported grouped according to different Measurement Task Configurations. Each Task section optionally starts with replicating the Measurement Task Configuration information before the result headers (titles for data columns) and the result data rows. The Options reported are those used for the scheduled execution of the Measurement Task and therefore include the Options specified in the Task Configuration as well as additional Options specified in the Action. The Action Options are appended to the Task Configuration Options in exactly the same order as they were provided to the Task during execution.

The result row data includes a time for the start of the measurement and optionally an end time where the duration also needs to be considered in the data analysis.

Some Measurement Tasks may optionally include an indication of the cross-traffic although the definition of cross-traffic is left up to each individual Measurement Task. Some Measurement Tasks may also output other environmental measures in addition to cross-traffic such as CPU utilisation or interface speed.

Whereas the Configuration and Instruction information represent information transmitted via the Control Protocol, the Report represents the information that is transmitted via the Report Protocol. It is constructed at the time of sending a report and
represents the inherent structure of the information that is sent to the Collector.

3.6.1. Definition of ma-report-obj

```plaintext
object {
    datetime          ma-report-date;
    [uuid             ma-report-agent-id;]
    [string           ma-report-group-id;]
    [string           ma-report-measurement-point;]
    [ma-report-result-obj ma-report-results<0..*>;]
} ma-report-obj;
```

The ma-report-obj provides the meta-data of a single report and consists of the following elements:

- **ma-report-date:** The date and time when the report was sent to a collector.
- **ma-report-agent-id:** An optional uuid uniquely identifying the measurement agent.
- **ma-report-group-id:** An optional identifier of the group of measurement agents this measurement agent belongs to.
- **ma-report-measurement-point:** An optional identifier for the measurement point indicating where the measurement agent is located on a path (see [RFC7398] for further details).
- **ma-report-results:** An optional and possibly empty unordered set of result objects.

3.6.2. Definition of ma-report-result-obj
object {
  string ma-report-result-schedule-name;
  string ma-report-result-action-name;
  string ma-report-result-task-name;
  [ma-option-obj ma-report-result-options<0..*>;]
  [string ma-report-result-tags<0..*>;]
  datetime ma-report-result-event-time;
  datetime ma-report-result-start-time;
  [datetime ma-report-result-end-time;]
  [string ma-report-result-cycle-number;]
  int ma-report-result-status;
  [ma-report-conflict-obj ma-report-result-conflicts<0..*>;]
  [ma-report-table-obj ma-report-result-tables<0..*>;]
} ma-report-result-obj;

The ma-report-result-obj provides the meta-data of a result report of a single executed action. It consists of the following elements:

ma-report-result-schedule-name: The name of the schedule that produced the result.

ma-report-result-action-name: The name of the action in the schedule that produced the result.

ma-report-result-task-name: The name of the task that produced the result.

ma-report-result-options: An optional ordered joined list of options provided by the task object and the action object when the action was started.

ma-report-result-tags: An optional unordered set of tags. This is the joined set of tags provided by the task object and the action object and schedule object when the action was started.

ma-report-result-event-time: The date and time of the event that triggered the schedule of the action that produced the reported result values. The date and time does not include any added randomization.

ma-report-result-start-time: The date and time of the start of the action that produced the reported result values.
ma-report-result-end-time: An optional date and time indicating when the action finished.

ma-report-result-cycle-number: An optional cycle number derived from ma-report-result-event-time. It is the time closest to ma-report-result-event-time that is a multiple of the ma-event-cycle-interval of the event that triggered the execution of the schedule. The value is only present in an ma-report-result-obj if the event that triggered the execution of the schedule has a defined ma-event-cycle-interval. The cycle number is represented in the format YYYYMMDD.HHMMSS where YYYY represents the year, MM the month (1..12), DD the day of the months (01..31), HH the hour (00..23), MM the minute (00..59), and SS the second (00..59). The cycle number is using Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).

ma-report-result-status: The status code returned by the execution of the action.

ma-report-result-conflicts: A possibly empty set of conflict actions that might have impacted the measurement results being reported.

ma-report-result-tables: An optional and possibly empty unordered set of result tables.

3.6.3. Definition of ma-report-conflict-obj

object {
    string ma-report-conflict-schedule-name;
    string ma-report-conflict-action-name;
    string ma-report-conflict-task-name;
} ma-report-conflict-obj;

The ma-report-conflict-obj provides the information about conflicting action that might have impacted the measurement results. It consists of the following elements:

ma-report-result-schedule-name: The name of the schedule that may have impacted the result.
ma-report-result-action-name: The name of the action in the schedule that may have impacted the result.

ma-report-result-task-name: The name of the task that may have impacted the result.

3.6.4. Definition of ma-report-table-obj

object {
    [ma-registry-obj ma-report-table-functions<0..*>;]
    [string] ma-report-table-column-labels<0..*>;
    [ma-report-row-obj ma-report-table-rows<0..*>;]
} ma-report-table-obj;

The ma-report-table-obj represents a result table and consists of the following elements:

ma-report-table-functions: An optional and possibly empty unordered set of registry entries identifying the functions for which results that are reported.

ma-report-table-column-labels: An optional and possibly empty ordered list of column labels.

ma-report-table-rows: A possibly empty ordered list of result rows.

3.6.5. Definition of ma-report-row-obj

object {
    data ma-report-row-values<0..*>;
} ma-report-row-obj;

The ma-report-row-obj represents a result row and consists of the following elements:

ma-report-row-values: A possibly empty ordered list of result values. When present, it contains an ordered list of values that align to the set of column labels for the report.

3.7. Common Objects: Schedules

A Schedule specifies the execution of a single or repeated series of Actions. An Action extends a Configured Task with additional specific parameters. Each Schedule contains basically two elements:
an ordered list of Actions to be executed and an Event object
triggering the execution of the Schedule. The Schedule states what
Actions to run (with what configuration) and when to run the Actions.
A Schedule may optionally have an Event that stops the execution of
the Schedule or a maximum duration after which a schedule is stopped.

Multiple Actions contained as an ordered list of a single Measurement
Schedule will be executed according to the execution mode of the
Schedule. In sequential mode, Actions will be executed sequentially
and in parallel mode, all Actions will be executed concurrently. In
pipelined mode, data produced by one Action is passed to the
subsequent Action. Actions contained in different Schedules execute
in parallel with such conflicts being reported in the Reporting
Information where necessary. If two or more Schedules have the same
start time, then the two will execute in parallel. There is no
mechanism to prioritise one schedule over another or to mutex
scheduled tasks.

As well as specifying which Actions to execute, the Schedule also
specifies how to link the data outputs from each Action to other
Schedules. Specifying this within the Schedule allows the highest
level of flexibility since it is even possible to send the output
from different executions of the same Task Configuration to different
destinations. A single Task producing multiple different outputs is
expected to properly tag the different result. An Action receiving
the output can then filter the results based on the tag if necessary.
For example, a Measurement Task might report routine results to a
data Reporting Task in a Schedule that communicates hourly via the
Broadband PPP interface, but also outputs emergency conditions via an
alarm Reporting Task in a different Schedule communicating
immediately over a GPRS channel. Note that task-to-task data
transfer is always specified in association with the scheduled
execution of the sending task – there is no need for a corresponding
input specification for the receiving task. While it is likely that
an MA implementation will use a queue mechanism between the Schedules
or Actions, this Information Model does not mandate or define a
queue. The Information Model, however, reports the storage allocated
to Schedules and Actions so that storage usage can be monitored.
Furthermore, it is recommended that MA implementations by default
retain old data and stop the execution of new measurement tasks if
the MA runs out of storage capacity.

When specifying the task to execute within the Schedule, i.e.,
creating an Action, it is possible to add to the Action option
parameters. This allows the Task Configuration to determine the
common characteristics of a Task, while selected parameters (e.g.,
the test target URL) are defined within as option parameters of the
Action in the schedule. A single Tasks Configuration can even be
used multiple times in the same schedule with different additional parameters. This allows for efficiency in creating and transferring the Instruction. Note that the semantics of what happens if an option is defined multiple times (either in the Task Configuration, Action or in both) is not standardised and will depend upon the Task. For example, some tasks may legitimately take multiple values for a single parameter.

Where Options are specified in both the Action and the Task Configuration, the Action Options are appended to those specified in the Task Configuration.

Example: An Action of a Schedule references a single Measurement Task Configuration for measuring UDP latency. It specifies that results are to be sent to a Schedule with a Reporting Action. This Reporting Task of the Reporting Action is executed by a separate Schedule that specifies that it should run hourly at 5 minutes past the hour. When run this Reporting Action takes the data generated by the UDP latency Measurement Task as well as any other data to be included in the hourly report and transfers it to the Collector over the Report Channel specified within its own Schedule.

Schedules and Actions may optionally also be given tags that are included in result reports sent to a Collector. In addition, schedules can be given suppression tags that may be used to select Schedules and Actions for suppression.

3.7.1. Definition of ma-schedule-obj

object {
    string ma-schedule-name;
    ma-event-obj ma-schedule-start;
    [ma-event-obj ma-schedule-end];
    [int ma-schedule-duration];
    ma-action-obj ma-schedule-actions<0..*>;
    string ma-schedule-execution-mode;
    [string ma-schedule-tags<0..*>];
    [string ma-schedule-suppression-tags<0..*>];
} ma-schedule-obj;

The ma-schedule-obj is the main scheduling object. It consists of the following elements:

ma-schedule-name: A name uniquely identifying a scheduling object.
ma-schedule-start: An event object indicating when the schedule starts.

ma-schedule-end: An optional event object controlling the forceful termination of scheduled actions. When the event occurs, all actions of the schedule will be forced to terminate gracefully.

ma-schedule-duration: An optional duration in seconds for the schedule. All actions of the schedule will be forced to terminate gracefully after the duration number of seconds past the start of the schedule.

ma-schedule-actions: A possibly empty ordered list of actions to invoke when the schedule starts.

ma-schedule-execution-mode: Indicates whether the actions should be executed sequentially, in parallel, or in a pipelined mode (where data produced by one action is passed to the subsequent action). The default execution mode is pipelined.

ma-schedule-tags: An optional unordered set of tags that are reported together with the measurement results to a collector.

ma-schedule-suppression-tags: An optional unordered set of suppression tags that are used to select schedules to be suppressed.

3.7.2. Definition of ma-action-obj

```
object {
    string ma-action-name;
    string ma-action-config-task-name;
[ma-option-obj ma-action-task-options<0..*>;
[ma-option-obj ma-action-destinations<0..*>;
[ma-option-obj ma-action-tags<0..*>;
[ma-option-obj ma-action-suppression-tags<0..*>;
}
```

The ma-action-obj models a task together with its schedule specific task options and destination schedules. It consists of the following elements:
ma-action-name: A name uniquely identifying an action of a scheduling object.

ma-action-config-task-name: A name identifying the configured task to be invoked by the action.

ma-action-task-options: An optional and possibly empty ordered list of options (name-value pairs) that are passed to the task by appending them to the options configured for the task object.

ma-action-destinations: An optional and possibly empty unordered set of names of destination schedules that consume output produced by this action.

ma-action-tags: An optional unordered set of tags that are reported together with the measurement results to a collector.

ma-action-suppression-tags: An optional unordered set of suppression tags that are used to select actions to be suppressed.

3.8. Common Objects: Channels

A Channel defines a bi-directional communication mechanism between the MA and a Controller or Collector. Multiple Channels can be defined to enable results to be split or duplicated across different Collectors.

Each Channel contains the details of the remote endpoint (including location and security credential information such as a certificate). The timing of when to communicate over a Channel is specified by the Schedule which executes the corresponding Control or Reporting Task. The certificate can be the digital certificate associated to the FQDN in the URL or it can be the certificate of the Certification Authority that was used to issue the certificate for the FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) of the target URL (which will be retrieved later on using a communication protocol such as TLS). In order to establish a secure channel, the MA will use its own security credentials (in the Configuration Information) and the given credentials for the individual Channel end-point.

As with the Task Configurations, each Channel is also given a text name by which it can be referenced as a Task Option.
Although the same in terms of information, Channels used for communication with the Controller are referred to as Control Channels whereas Channels to Collectors are referred to as Report Channels. Hence Control Channels will be referenced from Control Tasks executed by a Control Schedule, whereas Report Channels will be referenced from within Reporting Tasks executed by an Instruction Schedule.

Multiple interfaces are also supported. For example the Reporting Task could be configured to send some results over GPRS. This is especially useful when such results indicate the loss of connectivity on a different network interface.

Example: A Channel used for reporting results may specify that results are to be sent to the URL (https://collector.example.org/report/), using the appropriate digital certificate to establish a secure channel.

3.8.1. Definition of ma-channel-obj

```plaintext
object {
  string ma-channel-name;
  url ma-channel-target;
  credentials ma-channel-credentials;
  [string ma-channel-interface-name;]
} ma-channel-obj;
```

The ma-channel-obj consists of the following elements:

- **ma-channel-name**: A unique name identifying the channel object.
- **ma-channel-target**: A URL identifying the target channel endpoint.
- **ma-channel-credentials**: The security credentials needed to establish a secure channel.
- **ma-channel-interface-name**: An optional name of the network interface to be used. If not present, the IP protocol stack will select a suitable interface.

3.9. Common Objects: Task Configurations

Conceptually each Task Configuration defines the parameters of a Task that the Measurement Agent (MA) may perform at some point in time. It does not by itself actually instruct the MA to perform them at any particular time (this is done by a Schedule). Tasks can be
Measurement Tasks (i.e., those Tasks actually performing some type of passive or active measurement) or any other scheduled activity performed by the MA such as transferring information to or from the Controller and Collectors. Other examples of Tasks may include data manipulation or processing Tasks conducted on the MA.

A Measurement Task Configuration is the same in information terms to any other Task Configuration. Both measurement and non-measurement Tasks may have registry entries to enable the MA to uniquely identify the Task it should execute and retrieve the schema for any parameters that may be passed to the Task. Registry entries are specified as a URI and can therefore be used to identify the Task within a namespace or point to a web or local file location for the Task information. As mentioned previously, these URIs may be used to identify the Measurement Task in a public namespace [I-D.ietf-ippm-metric-registry].

Example: A Measurement Task Configuration may configure a single Measurement Task for measuring UDP latency. The Measurement Task Configuration could define the destination port and address for the measurement as well as the duration, internal packet timing strategy and other parameters (for example a stream for one hour and sending one packet every 500 ms). It may also define the output type and possible parameters (for example the output type can be the 95th percentile mean) where the measurement task accepts such parameters. It does not define when the task starts (this is defined by the Schedule element), so it does not by itself instruct the MA to actually perform this Measurement Task.

The Task Configuration will include a local short name for reference by a Schedule. Task Configurations may also refer to registry entries as described above. In addition the Task can be configured through a set of configuration Options. The nature and number of these Options will depend upon the Task. These options are expressed as name-value pairs although the ‘value’ may be a structured object instead of a simple string or numeric value. The implementation of these name-value pairs will vary between data models.

An Option that must be present for Reporting Tasks is the Channel reference specifying how to communicate with a Collector. This is included in the task options and will have a value that matches a channel name that has been defined in the Instruction. Similarly Control Tasks will have a similar option with the value set to a specified Control Channel.

A Reporting Task might also have a flag parameter, defined as an Option, to indicate whether to send a report without measurement results if there is no measurement result data pending to be
transferred to the Collector. In addition many tasks will also take as a parameter which interface to operate over.

In addition the Task Configuration may optionally also be given tags that can carry a Measurement Cycle ID. The purpose of this ID is to easily identify a set of measurement results that have been produced by Measurement Tasks with comparable Options. This ID could be manually incremented or otherwise changed when an Option change is implemented which could mean that two sets of results should not be directly compared.

3.9.1. Definition of ma-task-obj

```plaintext
object {
  string              ma-task-name;
  ma-registry-obj     ma-task-functions<0..*>;
  [ma-option-obj       ma-task-options<0..*>;]
  [string              ma-task-tags<0..*>;]
} ma-task-obj;
```

The ma-task-obj defines a configured task that can be invoked as part of an action. A configured task can be referenced by its name and it contains a possibly empty set of URIs to link to registry entries. Options allow the configuration of task parameters (in the form of name-value pairs). The ma-task-obj consists of the following elements:

- **ma-task-name:** A name uniquely identifying a configured task object.
- **ma-task-functions:** A possibly empty unordered set of registry entries identifying the functions of the configured task.
- **ma-task-options:** An optional and possibly empty ordered list of options (name-value pairs) that are passed to the configured task.
- **ma-task-tags:** An optional unordered set of tags that are reported together with the measurement results to a collector.

3.9.2. Definition of ma-option-obj

```plaintext
object {
  string              ma-option-name;
  [object              ma-option-value;]
} ma-option-obj;
```
The ma-option-obj models a name-value pair and consists of the following elements:

ma-option-name: The name of the option.
ma-option-value: The optional value of the option.

The ma-option-obj is used to define Task Configuration Options. Task Configuration Options are generally task specific. For tasks associated with an entry in a registry, the registry may define well-known option names (e.g., the so-called parameters in the IPPM metric registry [I-D.ietf-ippm-metric-registry]). Control and Reporting Tasks need to know the Channel they are going to use. The common option name for specifying the channel is "channel" where the option's value refers to the name of an ma-channel-obj.

3.10. Common Objects: Registry Information

Tasks and actions can be associated with entries in a registry. A registry object refers to an entry in a registry (identified by a URI) and it may define a set of roles.

3.10.1. Definition of ma-registry-obj

object {
  uri ma-registry-uri;
  [string ma-registry-role<0..*>;]
} ma-registry-obj;

The ma-registry-obj refers to an entry of a registry and it defines the associated role(s). The ma-registry-obj consists of the following elements:

ma-registry-uri: A URI identifying an entry in a registry.
ma-registry-role: An optional and possibly empty unordered set of roles for the identified registry entry.

3.11. Common Objects: Event Information

The Event information object used throughout the information models can initially take one of several different forms. Additional forms may be defined later in order to bind the execution of schedules to additional events. The initially defined Event forms are:

1. Periodic Timing: Emits multiple events periodically according to an interval time defined in seconds
2. Calendar Timing: Emits multiple events according to a calendar based pattern, e.g., 22 minutes past each hour of the day on weekdays

3. One Off Timing: Emits one event at a specific date and time

4. Immediate: Emits one event as soon as possible

5. Startup: Emits an event whenever the MA is started (e.g., at device startup)

6. Controller Lost: Emits an event when connectivity to the controller has been lost

7. Controller Connected: Emits an event when connectivity to the controller has been (re-)established

Optionally each of the Event options may also specify a randomness that should be evaluated and applied separately to each indicated event. This randomness parameter defines a uniform interval in seconds over which the start of the task is delayed from the starting times specified by the event object.

Both the Periodic and Calendar timing objects allow for a series of Actions to be executed. While both have an optional end time, it is best practice to always configure an end time and refresh the information periodically to ensure that lost MAs do not continue their tasks forever.

Startup events are only created on device startup, not when a new Instruction is transferred to the MA. If scheduled task execution is desired both on the transfer of the Instruction and on device restart then both the Immediate and Startup timing needs to be used in conjunction.

The datetime format used for all elements in the information model MUST conform to RFC 3339 [RFC3339].

3.11.1. Definition of ma-event-obj
object {
    string ma-event-name;
    union {
        ma-periodic-obj ma-event-periodic;
        ma-calendar-obj ma-event-calendar;
        ma-one-off-obj ma-event-one-off;
        ma-immediate-obj ma-event-immediate;
        ma-startup-obj ma-event-startup;
        ma-controller-lost-obj ma-event-controller-lost;
        ma-controller-connected-obj ma-event-controller-connected;
    } ma-event-obj;

    [int ma-event-random-spread;]
    [int ma-event-cycle-interval;]
}

The ma-event-obj is the main event object. Event objects are identified by a name. A generic event object itself contains a more specific event object. The set of specific event objects should be extensible. The initial set of specific event objects is further described below. The ma-event-obj also includes an optional uniform random spread that can be used to randomize the start times of schedules triggered by an event. The ma-event-obj consists of the following elements:

ma-event-name: The name uniquely identifies an event object. Schedules refer to event objects by this name.

ma-event-periodic: The ma-event-periodic is present for periodic timing objects.

ma-event-calendar: The ma-event-calendar is present for calendar timing objects.

ma-event-one-off: The ma-event-one-off is present for one-off timing objects.

ma-event-immediate: The ma-event-immediate is present for immediate event objects.

ma-event-startup: The ma-event-startup is present for startup event objects.

ma-event-controller-lost: The ma-event-controller-lost is present for connectivity to controller lost event objects.
ma-event-controller-connected: The ma-event-controller-connected is present for connectivity to a controller established event objects.

ma-event-random-spread: The optional ma-event-random-spread adds a random delay defined in seconds to the event object. No random delay is added if ma-event-random-spread does not exist.

ma-event-cycle-interval: The optional ma-event-cycle-interval defines the duration of the time interval in seconds that is used to calculate cycle numbers. No cycle number is calculated if ma-event-cycle-interval does not exist.

3.11.2. Definition of ma-periodic-obj

object {
    [datetime            ma-periodic-start;]
    [datetime            ma-periodic-end;]
    int                 ma-periodic-interval;
} ma-periodic-obj;

The ma-periodic-obj timing object has an optional start and an optional end time plus a periodic interval. Schedules using an ma-periodic-obj are started periodically between the start and end time. The ma-periodic-obj consists of the following elements:

ma-periodic-start: The optional date and time at which Schedules using this object are first started. If not present it defaults to immediate.

ma-periodic-end: The optional date and time at which Schedules using this object are last started. If not present it defaults to indefinite.

ma-periodic-interval: The interval defines the time in seconds between two consecutive starts of tasks.

3.11.3. Definition of ma-calendar-obj

Calendar Timing supports the routine execution of Schedules at specific times and/or on specific dates. It can support more flexible timing than Periodic Timing since the execution of Schedules
does not have to be uniformly spaced. For example a Calendar Timing
could support the execution of a Measurement Task every hour between
6pm and midnight on weekdays only.

Calendar Timing is also required to perform measurements at
meaningful times in relation to network usage (e.g., at peak times).
If the optional timezone offset is not supplied then local system
time is assumed. This is essential in some use cases to ensure
consistent peak-time measurements as well as supporting MA devices
that may be in an unknown timezone or roam between different
timezones (but know their own timezone information such as through
the mobile network).

The calendar elements within the Calendar Timing do not have defaults
in order to avoid accidental high-frequency execution of Tasks. If
all possible values for an element are desired then the wildcard * is
used.

object {
[datetime            ma-calendar-start;]
[datetime            ma-calendar-end;]
[datetime            ma-calendar-months<0..*>;]
[datetime            ma-calendar-days-of-month<0..*>;]
[datetime            ma-calendar-hours<0..*>;]
[datetime            ma-calendar-minutes<0..*>;]
[datetime            ma-calendar-seconds<0..*>;]
[int                 ma-calendar-timezone-offset;]
} ma-calendar-obj;

ma-calendar-start: The optional date and time at which
Schedules using this object are first
started. If not present it defaults to
immediate.

ma-calendar-end: The optional date and time at which
Schedules using this object are last
started. If not present it defaults to
indefinite.

ma-calendar-months: The optional set of months (1-12) on
which tasks scheduled using this object
are started. The wildcard * means all
months. If not present, it defaults to
no months.

ma-calendar-months: The optional set of days of a week
("Mon", "Tue", "Wed", "Thu", "Fri",

"Sat", "Sun") on which tasks scheduled using this object are started. The wildcard * means all days of the week. If not present, it defaults to no days.

**ma-calendar-days-of-month:** The optional set of days of a months (1-31) on which tasks scheduled using this object are started. The wildcard * means all days of a months. If not present, it defaults to no days.

**ma-calendar-hours:** The optional set of hours (0-23) on which tasks scheduled using this object are started. The wildcard * means all hours of a day. If not present, it defaults to no hours.

**ma-calendar-minutes:** The optional set of minutes (0-59) on which tasks scheduled using this object are started. The wildcard * means all minutes of an hour. If not present, it defaults to no hours.

**ma-calendar-seconds:** The optional set of seconds (0-59) on which tasks scheduled using this object are started. The wildcard * means all seconds of an hour. If not present, it defaults to no seconds.

**ma-calendar-timezone-offset:** The optional timezone offset in hours. If not present, it defaults to the system’s local timezone.

If a day of the month is specified that does not exist in the month (e.g., 29th of February) then those values are ignored.

### 3.11.4. Definition of ma-one-off-obj

```plaintext
object {
    datetime ma-one-off-time;
} ma-one-off-obj;
```

The ma-one-off-obj timing object specifies a fixed point in time. Schedules using an ma-one-off-obj are started once at the specified date and time. The ma-one-off-obj consists of the following elements:
ma-one-off-time: The date and time at which Schedules using this object are started.

3.11.5. Definition of ma-immediate-obj

object {
    // empty
} ma-immediate-obj;

The ma-immediate-obj event object has no further information elements. Schedules using an ma-immediate-obj are started as soon as possible.

3.11.6. Definition of ma-startup-obj

object {
    // empty
} ma-startup-obj;

The ma-startup-obj event object has no further information elements. Schedules or suppressions using an ma-startup-obj are started at MA initialization time.

3.11.7. Definition of ma-controller-lost-obj

object {
    // empty
} ma-controller-lost-obj;

The ma-controller-lost-obj event object has no further information elements. The ma-controller-lost-obj indicates that connectivity to the controller has been lost. This is determined by a timer started after each successful contact with a controller. When the timer reaches the controller-timeout (measured in seconds), an ma-controller-lost-obj event is generated. This event may be used to start a suppression.

3.11.8. Definition of ma-controller-connected-obj

object {
    // empty
} ma-controller-connected-obj;

The ma-controller-connected-obj event object has no further information elements. The ma-controller-connected-obj indicates that connectivity to the controller has been established again after it was lost. This event may be used to end a suppression.
4. Example Execution

The example execution has two event sources E1 and E2 and three schedules S1, S2, and S3. The schedule S3 is started by events of event source E2 while the schedules S1 and S2 are both started by events of the event source E1. The schedules S1 and S2 have two actions each and schedule S3 has a single action. The event source E2 has no randomization while the event source E1 has the randomization r.

Figure 2 shows a possible timeline of an execution. The time T is progressing downwards. The dotted vertical line indicates progress of time while a dotted horizontal line indicates which schedule are triggered by an event. Tilded lines indicate data flowing from an action to another schedule. Actions within a schedule are named A1, A2, etc.
Figure 2: Example Execution

Note that implementations must handle possible concurrency issues. In the example execution, action A1 of schedule S3 is consuming the data that has been forwarded to schedule S3 while additional data is arriving from action A2 of schedule S2.

5. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request of IANA.

Note to the RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an RFC.
6. Security Considerations

This Information Model deals with information about the control and reporting of the Measurement Agent. There are broadly two security considerations for such an Information Model. Firstly the Information Model has to be sufficient to establish secure communication channels to the Controller and Collector such that other information can be sent and received securely. Additionally, any mechanisms that the Network Operator or other device administrator employs to pre-configure the MA must also be secure to protect unauthorized parties from modifying pre-configuration information. These mechanisms are important to ensure that the MA cannot be hijacked, for example to participate in a distributed denial of service attack.

The second consideration is that no mandated information items should pose a risk to confidentiality or privacy given such secure communication channels. For this latter reason items such as the MA context and MA ID are left optional and can be excluded from some deployments. This may, for example, allow the MA to remain anonymous and for information about location or other context that might be used to identify or track the MA to be omitted or blurred. Implementations and deployments should also be careful about exposing device-ids when this is not strictly needed.

An implementation of this Information Model should support all the security and privacy requirements associated with the LMAP Framework [RFC7594]. In addition, users of this Information Model are advised to choose identifiers for Group IDs, tags or names of information model objects (e.g., configured tasks, schedules or actions) that do not reveal any sensitive information to people authorized to process measurement results but who are not authorized to know details about the Measurement Agents that were used to perform the measurement.

7. Acknowledgements

Several people contributed to this specification by reviewing early versions and actively participating in the LMAP working group (apologies to those unintentionally omitted): Vaibhav Bajpai, Michael Bugenhagen, Timothy Carey, Alissa Cooper, Kenneth Ko, Al Morton, Dan Romascanu, Henning Schulzrinne, Andrea Soppera, Barbara Stark, and Jason Weil.

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8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Change History

Note to the RFC Editor: this section should be removed on publication as an RFC.

A.1. Non-editorial changes since -17

- The information model is subdivided into aspects and not sections.
- Changes to address the GEN-ART review comments.

A.2. Non-editorial changes since -16

- Addressing Alissa Cooper's review comments.

A.3. Non-editorial changes since -15

- The reference to the framework is now informational.

A.4. Non-editorial changes since -14

- Clarified that the cycle number is in UTC.
A.5. Non-editorial changes since -13
  o Removed the ma-config-device-id from the ma-config-obj.
  o Added ma-config-report-group-id and clarified how two flags ma-config-report-agent-id and ma-config-report-group-id work.

A.6. Non-editorial changes since -12
  o Renamed the ma-metrics-registry-obj to ma-registry-obj since tasks may refer to different registries (not just a metrics registry).
  o Clarifications and bug fixes.

A.7. Non-editorial changes since -11
  o Clarifications and bug fixes.

A.8. Non-editorial changes since -10
  o Rewrote the text concerning the well-known "channel" option name.
  o Added ma-report-result-event-time, ma-report-result-cycle-number, and ma-event-cycle-interval.
  o Added ma-capability-tags.
  o Added a new section showing an example execution.
  o Several clarifications and bug fixes.

A.9. Non-editorial changes since -09
  o Added ma-status-schedule-storage and ma-status-action-storage.
  o Removed suppress-by-default.
  o Moved ma-report-result-metrics of the ma-report-result-obj to ma-report-table-metrics of the ma-report-table-obj so that the relationship between metrics and result tables is clear.
  o Added ma-report-conflict-obj.
  o Added ma-report-result-status to ma-report-result-obj.
  o Several clarifications and bug fixes.
A.10. Non-editorial changes since -08

- Refactored the ma-report-task-obj into the ma-report-result-obj.
- Introduced the ma-report-table-obj so that a result can contain multiple tables.
- Report schedule, action, and task name as part of the ma-report-result-obj.
- Report conflicts per ma-report-result-obj and not per ma-report-row-obj.
- Report the start/end time as part of the ma-report-result-obj.

A.11. Non-editorial changes since -07

- Added ma-schedule-end and ma-schedule-duration.
- Changed the granularity of scheduler timings to seconds.
- Added ma-status-suppression-obj to report the status of suppressions as done in the YANG data model.
- Added counters to schedule and action status objects to match the counters in the YANG data model.
- Using tags to pass information such as a measurement cycle identifier to the collector.
- Using suppression tags and glob-style matching to select schedules and actions to be suppressed.

A.12. Non-editorial changes since -06

- The default execution mode is pipelined (LI12)
- Added text to define which action consumes data in sequential, pipelines, and parallel execution mode (LI11)
- Added ma-config-measurement-point, ma-report-measurement-point, and ma-config-report-measurement-point to configure and report the measurement point (LI10)
- Turned ma-suppression-obj into a list that uses a start event and a stop event to define the start and end of suppression; this unifies the handling of suppression and loss of controller connectivity (LI09)
o Added ma-controller-lost-obj and ma-controller-ok-obj event objects (LI09)

o Added ma-status-schedule-obj to report the status of a schedule and refactored ma-task-status-obj into ma-status-action-obj to report the status of an action (LI07, LI08)

o Introduced a common ma-metric-registry-obj that identifies a metric and a set of associated roles and added this object to expose metric capabilities and to support the configuration of metrics and to report the metrics used (LI06)

o Introduced ma-capability-obj and ma-capability-task-obj to expose the capabilities of a measurement agent (LI05)

o Use ‘ordered list’ or ‘unordered set’ instead of list, collection, etc. (LI02)

o Clarification that Actions are part of a Schedule (LI03)

o Deleted terms that are not strictly needed (LI04)

A.13. Non-editorial changes since -05

o A task can now reference multiply registry entries.

o Consistent usage of the term Action and Task.

o Schedules are triggered by Events instead of Timings; Timings are just one of many possible event sources.

o Actions feed into other Schedules (instead of Actions within other Schedules).

o Removed the notion of multiple task outputs.

o Support for sequential, parallel, and pipelined execution of Actions.

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REST Style Large Measurement Platform Protocol
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Abstract

This document defines and implements a LMAP protocol based on YANG Model and Rest-style http for control and report in Large Scale Performance Measurement (LMAP).

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1. Introduction
With the rapid development of Internet technology and the increasing complexity of broadband network architecture, it is quite difficult to do large scale network measurements due to the lack of the unified measurement system and cooperative protocols. Therefore, the Large-Scale Measurement of Broadband Performance (LMAP) working group is formed to standardize a large scale measurement system for performance measurements of all kinds of broadband access methods.

There are 3 main entities proposed in the LMAP architecture: [I-D.ietf-lmap-framework]

- The Measurement Agents (MAs): implemented in network to perform measurement tasks;

- Controller: responsible for creating and assigning the measurement tasks;

- Collector: in charge of collecting and storing measurement results.

This document presents REST-style protocols for LMAP based on the YANG model from [I-D.ietf-lmap-information-model]. Section 2 defined terminology for REST-style LMAP protocol. Section 3 introduce the considerations on LMAP protocol along with the session’s establishment sequence consideration. Section 4 and Section 5 discuss and introduce the design and implementation of the Control Protocol and Report Protocol based on REST-style.
2. Terminology

This section defines terminology for REST-style LMAP protocol. Please note that defined terms are capitalized.

- **Data model**: For control protocol and Report protocol, Data model is required for carrying instructions and report results between Controller-MA and MA-Collector. In this draft, the data model is defined in [I-D.ietf-lmap-information-model].

Other terms used in this document are defined in [I-D.ietf-lmap-framework]. We include the definition of key component in this document which play important roles during implementation.

- **Bootstrap**: A process that integrates a Measurement Agent into a Measurement System.

- **Channel**: A bi-directional logical connection that is defined by specific Controller and MA, or Collector and MA, plus associated security.

- **Collector**: A function that receives a Report from a Measurement Agent.

- **Controller**: A function that provides a Measurement Agent with its Instruction.

- **Control Channel**: A Channel between a Controller and a MA over which Instruction Messages and Capabilities, Failure and Logging Information are sent.

- **Control Protocol**: The protocol delivering Instruction(s) from a Controller to a Measurement Agent. It also delivers Capabilities, Failure and Logging Information from the Measurement Agent to the Controller. It can also be used to update the MA’s Configuration. It runs over the Control Channel.

- **Data Model**: The implementation of an Information Model in a particular data modelling language [RFC3444].

- **Instruction**: The description of Measurement Tasks for a MA to perform and the details of the Report for it to send. It is the collective description of the Measurement Task configurations, the configuration of the Measurement Schedules, the configuration of the Report Channel(s), the configuration of Report Schedule(s), and the details of any suppression.
- Measurement Agent (MA): The function that receives Instruction Messages from a Controller and operates the Instruction by executing Measurement Tasks (using protocols outside the initial LMAP work scope and perhaps in concert with one or more other Measurement Agents or Measurement Peers) and (if part of the Instruction) by reporting Measurement Results to a Collector or Collectors.

- Measurement Peer (MP): The function that assists a Measurement Agent with Measurement Tasks and does not have an interface to the Controller or Collector.


- Measurement Task: The action performed by a particular Measurement Agent that consists of the single assessment of a Metric through operation of a Measurement Method role at a particular time, with all of the role’s Input Parameters set to specific values.

- Measurement Traffic: the packet(s) generated by some types of Measurement Method that involve measuring some parameter associated with the transfer of the packet(s).

- Report: The set of Measurement Results and other associated information (as defined by the Instruction). The Report is sent by a Measurement Agent to a Collector.

- Report Channel: A Channel between a Collector and a MA over which Report messages are sent.


- Report Schedule: the schedule for sending Reports to a Collector.

- Subscriber: An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a subscription with a service provider.

In this draft the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
3. Protocol Consideration

This section discusses considerations on design and the architecture of LAMP protocol along with some implementation considerations. Meanwhile, discuss the advantages of choosing REST-Style in LMAP protocol implementation.

3.1. Data Model Overview

YANG [RFC6020] is a data modeling language used to model configuration and state data manipulated by the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) and YANG is used to model the operations and content layers of NETCONF. So we can use YANG to illustrate the data model of CP and RP. Some work can refer to [[I-D.ietf-lmap-yang-00]].

3.2. Control Session Initiation Consideration

A LMAP network should contain at least one Controller, one Collector and many Measurement Agents (MA). The control protocol is allowed the Controller to configure the MA with an Instruction to offer Measure Task, Job Schedule, and Results Report process. The MA receives the Control Instruction and acts autonomously. Also, the Controller can update the MA's configuration by using the Control Protocol.

In the implementation of the control protocol, it SHOULD consider which side between Controller and MA should act to initiate the Control Session. It is feasible that the control session can be initiated from either Controller side or MA side. Meanwhile in this draft, it is proposed that the control session should be initiated from the Controller to MA based on the following reasons:

a) If the initiation is from the Controller side, the session can be started almost instantly, without considering the polling time of all the MAs, and making a lot effort to synchronize the start moment.

b) If the initiation is from the MA side, when the session can be started is decided by the status of the Controller, such as high load or light load.

c) Since the Controller initiates the session, it can periodically poll the MA to detect the activation state. However, when the corresponding MA locates behind a NAT/FW while the Controller is
located outside of the NAT/FW, the NAT/FW traversal techniques should be employed such as STUN/TURN or port forwarding.

3.3. Report Session Initiation Consideration

According to the LMAP framework [draft-ietf-lmap-framework-13], the report protocol is very simple: the MA sends a report and gets a ACK, there is no more interaction between the MA and the Collector. It is proposed that the report session can be initiated by the MA [RP-MUST-1, draft-starkcarey-lmap-protocol-criteria-01], so the report can be sent in real time when the report get ready by the MA. If the session is initiated by the Collector, it must periodically poll the MA thus increase the complexity of the protocol, so the way is not recommended.

3.4. REST-Style LMAP Implement Consideration

This document follows the REST style in designing both the control and report protocols for LMAP, for the following considerations:

First, REST is much easier to be implemented the other methods such as SOAP, most of open source web service developing packages support REST, to deploy a REST application can be as easy as a few lines of code [CP-DIFF-7, CP-DIFF-9, CP-DIFF-10, RP-DIFF-10, RP-DIFF-11, draft-starkcarey-lmap-protocol-criteria-01]. Second, no special requirement for the client, any browser or http client can visit the REST application. Last, REST has clear resource annotation and finite operations, all of those are readable, and easy to understand [CP-MUST-4, RP-MUST-3, draft-starkcarey-lmap-protocol-criteria-01].

4. Control Protocol

This section discuss design and implementation of Control Protocol based on REST style. The Control Protocol is being used between Controller and MA to delivers Instruction Message. Control Protocol SHOULD basically have three functions. First of all, it carries instruct information from Controller to MA. Secondly, the Control Protocol enable the MA to inform the Controller about its Capabilities and Failure and Logging Information. Thirdly, carrying update information from Controller to MA.

The section fellows introduce the design and implementation of Configure Update, Instruction Assignment and Capability and Status Feedback between Controller and MA.
4.1. Control Protocol Element

The Measurement Agents (MAs): implemented in network to perform measurement tasks.

-Controller: responsible for creating and assigning the measurement tasks.

4.2. Control Protocol Function

The Control Protocol is in charge for delivers Instruction Messages from Controller to MA. In this case, the Controller in response for initiate the session. In this draft, it use Controller as the https client to initiate the conversation to MA which is the server. This design brings follow advantages: Firstly, it’s more effectiveness that Controller initiate the session at any time as it won’t need a pool of MAs to check on Controller for new message. Secondly, It’s much simple when new MA added as it only need to configure the Controller instead of start a pre-configuration session on MA.

4.2.1. Controller Behavior

Controller is responsible for creating and assigning the measurement tasks. Specifically, there are two main Controller behaviors: Firstly, the Controller initiate the session and assign the instruction to MA. Secondly, as new task is assign, the Controller update the configuration to MA.

In the protocol implementation, it’s recommended to setup a state machine in the Controller to handle the communication and failure.

4.2.2. MA Behavior

The Measurement Agents (MAs) is responsible for implemented in network to perform measurement tasks. As new instruction receive from controller, MA will send a feedback message to controller.

4.3. Control Protocol Process

4.3.1. Configuration Update from Controller to MA

Configuration allows the Controller to update the MA about some or all of the information that it obtained during the bootstrapping process: the MA-ID, the (optional) Group-ID and the Control Channel. The configuration update REST-style protocol is defined to convey the
configuration information from the Controller to the MA, via a HTTP PUT, as described below.

Update the configuration from controller to MA

```
PUT /ma/config/ HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang.data+json
```

4.3.1.1. Request parameters

The following are JSON parameters defined for the configuration update using YANG model Tree is shown as follow:

```
module: ietf-lmap-control
  +-rw ma-config
     |  +-rw ma-agent-id
     |  |   +-rw ma-control-tasks* [ma-task-name]
     |  |   |   |-rw ma-task-name
     |  |   |   |   +-rw ma-task-registry-entry
     |  |   +-rw ma-control-channels* [ma-channel-name]
     |  |   |   |-rw ma-channel-name
     |  |   |   |   +-rw ma-channel-target
     |  |   |   |   |   +-rw ma-channel-credentials
     |  |   |-rw ma-control-schedules* [ma-schedule-name]
     |  |   |   |-rw ma-schedule-name
     |  |   |   |   +-rw ma-schedule-task-name
     |  |   |   |   |   +-rw ma-schedule-task-source-channel-names
```

ma-schedule-task-source-channel-names
ma-schedule-channel-interface-selection
ma-schedule-timing* [ma-timing-name]
ma-timing-name
ma-timing-calendar
ma-timing-random-spread
ma-credentials
  ma-agent-id: the assigned ID of the MA.
  ma-control-tasks: the configuration of the control channel to be used between the Controller and the MA, which includes the following parameters:
    ma-task-name: the string name of the task
    uri: the uri of the task
    ma-channel-name: the string name of the channel.
    ma-channel-target: the URL of the Controller to be contacted by the MA.
    ma-channel-credentials: the channel credentials object.
  ma-control-schedules: the MA schedule object.
  ma-schedule-name: the string name of the schedule.
  ma-schedule-tasks: the MA schedule task object.
  ma-schedule-task-name: the string name of the MA schedule task.
  ma-schedule-task-datasets: the MA schedule task object.
  ma-schedule-task-channel-names: the string name of task channel.
  ma-schedule-timing: the MA timing object.
  ma-timing-name: the string name of the MA timing.
o ma-timing-calendar: the MA timing calendar object.
o ma-calendar-minutes: minutes number.
o ma-calendar-seconds: seconds number.
o ma-timing-random-spread: the random spread of the MA timing.
o ma-credentials: the MA credentials object.

4.3.1.2. YANG Model Schema

The YANG model Schema is show as below:

module ietf-lmap-control {
    namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-lmap-control";
    prefix "lmapc";
    import ietf-yang-types {
        prefix yang;
    }
    import ietf-inet-types {
        prefix inet;
    }
    import ietf-interfaces {
        prefix if;
    }
    contact
        "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/lmap/>
        WG List: <mailto:lmap@ietf.org>
        ";
    description
"This module defines a data model for controlling measurement agents that are part of a Large-Scale Measurement Platform (LMAP).";

revision "2015-05-04" {
  description
    "Initial version";
  reference
    "RFC 6020";
}

container ma-config {
  leaf ma-agent-id {
    type yang:uuid;
  }
  list ma-control-tasks {
    key ma-task-name
    leaf ma-task-name {
      type string;
    }
    leaf ma-task-registry-entry {
      type inet:uri;
    }
  }
  list ma-control-channels {
  }
}
key ma-channel-name
leaf ma-channel-name {
    type string;
}
leaf ma-channel-target {
    type string;
}
leaf ma-channel-credentials {
    type string
}

list ma-control-schedules {
    key ma-schedule-name;
    leaf ma-schedule-name {
        type string;
    }
    list ma-schedule-tasks {
        key ma-schedule-task-name;
        leaf ma-schedule-task-name {
            type string;
        }
    }
    list ma-schedule-tasks {
        key ma-schedule-task-name;
        leaf ma-schedule-task-name {
            type string;
        }
    }
}
type string;
}

list ma-schedule-channels {
  key ma-schedule-task-source-channel-name
  leaf ma-schedule-task-source-channel-names {
    type string;
  }
  leaf ma-schedule-channel-interface-selection {
    type string;
  }
}

list ma-schedule-timing {
  key ma-timing-name;
  leaf ma-timing-name {
    type string;
  }
  leaf ma-timing-calendar {
    type string;
  }
  leaf ma-time-random-spread {
    type int32;
  }
}
leaf ma-credentials {
    type string;
}

4.3.1.3. Response Codes

Normal Response Codes: 204
Error Response Codes: 404

4.3.1.4. JSON Content

The following is an example of JSON format for an HTTP PUT request for MA configuration.

{
    "ma-config": {
        "ma-agent-id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
        "ma-control-tasks": [
            {
                "ma-task-name": "Controller configuration",
                "ma-task-registry-entry": "urn:ietf:lmap:control:http_Controller_configuration"
            },
            {
                "ma-task-name": "Controller status and capabilities",
                "ma-task-registry-entry": "urn:ietf:lmap:control:http_Controller_status_and_capabilities"
            }
        ]
    }
}
"ma-task-name": "Controller instruction",
"ma-task-registry-entry": "urn:ietf:lmap:control:http_Controller_instruction"
]
]
"ma-control-channels": [
{
"ma-channel-name": "Controller instruction",
"ma-channel-target": "http://www.example.com/lmap/Controller",
"ma-channel-credentials": { } }
]
]}
"ma-control-schedules": [
{
"ma-schedule-name": "Controller schedule",
"ma-schedule-tasks": [
{
"ma-schedule-task-name": "Controller configuration",
"ma-schedule-channels": [
{
"ma-schedule-channel-interface-selection": [1],

"Liu, et al." Expires November 6, 2015 [Page 16]
"ma-schedule-task-source-channel-names":
["Controller channel"]
}

,
{
"ma-schedule-task-name": "Controller status and capabilities",
"ma-schedule-channels": [
{
"ma-schedule-channel-interface-selection": [1],
"ma-schedule-task-source-channel-names":
["Controller channel"]
}
]
}

,
{
"ma-schedule-task-name": "Controller instruction",
"ma-schedule-channels": [
{
"ma-schedule-channel-interface-selection": [1],
"ma-schedule-task-source-channel-names":
["Controller channel"]
}
]
4.3.2. Instruction Assignment from Controller to MA

The Instruction is the description of the Measurement Tasks for a Measurement Agent to do and the details of the Measurement Reports for it to send, which is realized by a HTTP POST transaction.

Send measurement instruction from controller to MA

POST /ma/ins/ HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang.data+json

4.3.2.1. Request parameters

module:ietf-lmap-control-assign

"ma-schedule-timing": {
  "ma-timing-name": "hourly randomly",
  "ma-timing-calendar": {
    "ma-calendar-minutes": ["00"],
    "ma-calendar-seconds": ["00"]
  }
  "ma-timing-random-spread": "3600000"
}

"ma-credentials": {}
---rw ma-task

  ---rw ma-task-name
  ---rw ma-task-registry
  ---rw ma-task-operation
  ---rw ma-task-cycle-id

---rw ma-schedule

  ---rw ma-schedule-name
  ---rw ma-schedule-task* [ma-task-name]

    ---rw ma-task-name
    ---rw ma-task-registry
    ---rw ma-task-options
    ---rw ma-task-cycle-id

  ---rw ma-schedule-timing
  ---rw ma-timer-periodic
  ---rw ma-timer-randomness

---rw ma-channel

  ---rw ma-channel-name
  ---rw ma-channel-target
  ---rw ma-channel-certificate
  ---rw ma-channel-interface-name
  ---rw ma-channel-connect-always

---rw ma-supression

  ---rw ma-suppression-enabled
  ---rw ma-suppression-start
ma-tasks: the list of measurement tasks contained in the instruction, where each measurement task contains the following four parameters:

- ma-task-name: the string name for a specific measurement task, to be used as reference in other places, such as measurement schedules and suppressions.

- ma-task-registry: the URN Uniform Resource Name) of the measurement task as defined by [I-D.draft-ippm-registry].

- ma-task-options: the list of input parameters that are to be used when performing the measurement task, which are specific to each measurement task in question and defined by [I-D.draft-ippm-registry].

- ma-task-cycle-id(optional): the identification ID for a group of measurement tasks with comparable options, which is manually incremented when an Option change is implemented which could mean that two sets of results should not be directly compared.

ma-schedules: the list of measurement schedules in the instruction, where each measurement schedule contains the following parameters:

- ma-schedule-name: the string name for a specific measurement schedule, to be used as reference in other places, such as suppressions.

- ma-schedule-tasks: the list of measurement tasks to be performed for this schedule, where each scheduled measurement task contains the following parameter in addition to its name, options and cycle-id:

- ma-schedule-task-reports: the report channel settings for the measurement reporting, which in turn contains an optional filter configuration for a specified group (default is all) of measurement output to a named report channel.

- ma-channel: the report channel to be used by the measurement schedules to configure the measurement reporting for the instruction,
which is also used to define the control channel by configuration request from Controller to the MA.

ma-channel-name: the string name of the channel.

ma-channel-target: the URL of the Controller to be contacted by the MA.

ma-channel-timing: the timing arrangements indicating when to contact the Controller by the MA, whose in turn includes the following parameters:

ma-timing- name(optional): the string name of the time setting.

ma-timing- arrangement: the arrangements for the timing of Controller communications, whose value can be one of the following parameters:

ma-timing-periodic: the periodic timing arrangement for the Controller communications, which in turn includes the following parameters:

ma-periodic-start(optional): the time of the day (in milliseconds) when the communication starts. If absent, the period starts immediately.

ma-periodic-end(optional): the time of day (in milliseconds) when the communication ends. If absent, the communication is not stopped unless the MA is otherwise instructed.

ma-periodic-interval: the interval time (in milliseconds) of periodic communications.

ma-timing-calendar: the communication happens according to a calendar-like timing arrangements.

ma-timing-one-off: the communication happens once and for all.

ma-timing-immediate: the communication happens immediately.

ma-timing-randomness: the randomness configuration to be added onto each communication event.

ma-channel-interface-name: the name of MA’s interface to be used when contacting the Controller.
ma-channel-connect-always: the indicator whether or not to keep the connection to the Controller. If absent, the connection is reopened whenever new communication is pending and closed when it is over.

ma-suppression: the measurement tasks/schedules to be suppressed by the instruction. In addition to the lists of measurement tasks/schedules, it also contains the following parameters:

ma-suppression-enabled(optional): The bool indicator of whether or not to enable the local suppression by the MA. For example, a later unsuppression to an earlier suppression instruction can be achieved by setting this indicator to 'false'. Default is false.

ma-suppression-start(optional): The time when to start the suppression action. Default is immediate.

ma-suppression-end(optional): The time when to end the suppression action. Default is infinite.

4.3.2.2. YANG Model Schema

container ma-task {

  leaf ma-task-name {
    type string;
  }

  leaf ma-task-registry{
    type string;
  }

  leaf ma-task-operation{
    type string;
  }

  ma-task-cycle-id {
    type string;
  }

}
list ma-schedule {
    key ma-schedule-name
    leaf ma-schedule-name {
        type string;
    }
}

list ma-schedule-task {
    key ma-task-name;
    leaf ma-task-name{
        type string;
    }
    leaf ma-task-registry {
        type inet:uri;
    }
    leaf ma-task-options {
        type string;
    }
    leaf ma-task-cycle-id {
        type string;
    }
    container schedule-timing {
        leaf ma-timer-periodic {
            type int32;
        }
        leaf ma-timer-randomness {

type int32;
}

}

}

container ma-channel {
  leaf ma-channel-name {
    type string;
  }

  leaf ma-channel-target {
    type string;
  }

  leaf ma-channel-certificate {
    type string;
  }

  leaf ma-channel-interface-name {
    type string;
  }

  leaf ma-channel-connect-always {
    type boolean;
  }
}

container ma-supression {
  leaf ma-suppression-enabled {
    type boolean;
  }
}
leaf ma-suppression-start {
    type yang:date-and-time;
}

leaf ma-suppression-end {
    type yang:date-and-time;
}

list ma-suppression-task-names {
    key name;
    leaf name {
        type string;
    }
}

list ma-suppression-schedule-names {
    key name;
    leaf name {
        type string;
    }
}
4.3.2.3. Response codes

Normal Response Codes: 201

Error Response Codes: 400

4.3.2.4. JSON Content

{
  "ma-task": {
    "ma-task-name": "",
    "ma-task-registry": "",
    "ma-task-options": "",
    "ma-task-cycle-id": ""
  },
  "ma-schedule": {
    "ma-schedule-name": "",
    "ma-schedule-tasks": [{
      "ma-task-name": "",
      "ma-task-registry": "",
      "ma-task-options": "",
      "ma-task-cycle-id": ""
    },
    {
      "ma-task-name": "",
      "ma-task-registry": "",
      "ma-task-options": "",
      "ma-task-cycle-id": ""
    }]
  }
}

...

"ma-schedule-timing":{
    "ma-timing-periodic":"",
    "ma-timing-randomness":""
}

"ma-channel":{
    "ma-channel-name":"",
    "ma-channel-target":"",
    "ma-channel-certificate":"",
    "ma-channel-timing":"",
    "ma-channel-interface-name":"",
    "ma-channel-connect-always":""
}

"ma-suppression":{
    "ma-suppression-enabled":"",
    "ma-suppression-start":"",
    "ma-suppression-end":"",
    "ma-suppression-task-names":[
        { "task-name":""},
        { "task-name":""},
        ...
    ],

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"ma-suppression-schedule-names": [
    
    {
      "schedule-name":"
    
    {
      "schedule-name":"
    ...

    
    }

    
    }

4.3.3. Feedback from MA to Controller

The Control Protocol enable Capabilities Failures and Status information feedback from MA to Controller whenever requested.

For the failures information, it must consider two typical failure scenes:

1. Communication failure: the communication with the Controller, MP.

2. Capability failure: disability for implementing the measurement task etc.

Each failure has a unique code. For the status information, the MA will send its current status or some own events log information to the Controller. That status information like 'keep alive' can be defined in CP for ensuring to notify the Controller that MA is in good condition now. The event log information can include such events (not limited): beginning measurement, finishing measurement, recovery from failure.

Capability and status feedback is returned to the Controller from the MA whenever requested, which is implemented by an HTTP Get transaction.

4.3.3.1. Request

GET /ma/capabilities HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Accept: application/yang.data+json
Get failure information API: GET /ma/failure
Get logging information API: GET /ma/logging

4.3.3.2. Feedback Parameters

modules: ietf-lmap-state

|--ro ma-status-and-capabilities
   |--ro ma-agent-id
   |--ro ma-device-id
   |--ro ma-hardware
   |--ro ma-firmware
   |--ro ma-version
   |--ro ma-interfaces* [ma-interface-name]
      |--ro ma-interface-name
      |--ro ma-interface-type
   |--ro ma-last-measurement
   |--ro ma-last-report
   |--ro ma-last-instruction
   |--ro ma-last-configuration
   |--ro ma-supported-tasks* [ma-task-name]
      |--ro ma-task-name
      |--ro ma-task-registry

4.3.3.3. Response Code

Code 200 for success.
Code 400 for failure.
4.3.3.4. Response YANG Model

YANG Model

module ietf-lmap-state {
  prefix "lmapc";
  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix yang;
  }
  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
  }
  import ietf-interfaces {
    prefix if;
  }
  contact
    "WG Web:  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/lmap/>"
    "WG List:  <mailto:lmap@ietf.org>"
    ";
  description
    "This module defines a data model for controlling measurement
    agents that are part of a Large-Scale Measurement Platform
    (LMAP).";
  revision "2015-05-04" {
    description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC 6020";
}

container ma-status-and-capabilities {
  leaf ma-agent-id {
    type yang:uuid;
  }
  leaf ma-DEVICE-id {
    type inet:uri;
  }
  leaf ma-hardware {
    type string;
  }
  leaf ma-firmware {
    type string;
  }
  leaf ma-version {
    type string;
  }
  list ma-interfaces {
    key ma-interface-name;
    leaf ma-interface-name {
      type string;
    }
  }
}
leaf ma-interface-type {
    type string;
}

leaf ma-last-measurement {
    type string;
}

leaf ma-last-report {
    type string;
}

leaf ma-last-instruction {
    type string;
}

leaf ma-last-configuration {
    type string;
}

list ma-supported-tasks {
    key ma-task-name;
    leaf ma-task-name {
        type string;
    }
    leaf ma-task-registry {
        type inet:uri;
    }
}
4.3.3.5. JSON Content

{
    "ma-status-and-capabilities": {
        "ma-agent-id": "",
        "ma-device-id": "",
        "ma-hardware": "",
        "ma-firmware": "",
        "ma-version": "",
        "ma-interfaces": [
            {
                "ma-interface-name": "",
                "ma-interface-type": ""
            }
        ],
        "ma-last-measurement": "",
        "ma-last-report": "",
        "ma-last-instruction": "",
        "ma-last-configuration": "",
        "ma-supported-tasks": [
        
        ]
    }
}
The response of get failure information API is in JSON format:

```json
{
   "ma-task-name": "",
   "ma-task-registry": ""
}
```
The response of get logging information API is as follows:

```json
{
    "ma-log-agent-id": "",
    "ma-log-event-time": "",
    "ma-log-code": "",
    "ma-log-description": ""
}
```

5. Report Protocol

This section discuss design and implementation of Report Protocol based on REST-style. The Report Protocol is being used between Collector and MA to report Measurement Results.


5.1. Report Protocol Element

The Measurement Agents (MAs): implemented in network to perform measurement tasks.

Collector: in charge of collecting and storing measurement results.
5.2. Report Protocol Function

Report Protocol is response for delivering Report(s) from MA to Collector which runs over the Report Channel. In Report Protocol, the MA as the Http client to initiate session to Collector which as the server.

5.2.1. Collector Behavior

The Collector accepts measurement task report from MA.

5.2.2. MA Behavior

The MA report measurement task report to collector.

5.3. Report Protocol Process

5.3.1. Report from MA to Controller

5.3.1.1. Report Request

Request API:

POST /collector/report/ HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang.operation+json

5.3.1.2. Report parameters using YANG tree

modules: ietf-lmap-report

---ro ma-report
  ---ro ma-report-date
  ---ro ma-report-agent-id
  ---ro ma-report-group-id
  ---ro ma-report-tasks* [ma-task-name]
    ---ro ma-task-name
    ---ro ma-task-registry
module ietf-lmap-report {
    prefix "lmapc";
    import ietf-yang-types {
        prefix yang;
    }
    import ietf-inet-types {
        prefix inet;
    }
}

5.3.1.3. YANG Model Schema
import ietf-interfaces {
    prefix if;
}

contact
    "WG Web:  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/lmap/>
    WG List:  <mailto:lmap@ietf.org>
    ";

description
    "This module defines a data model for controlling measurement
    agents that are part of a Large-Scale Measurement Platform
    (LMAP).";

revision "2015-05-04" {
    description
        "Initial version";
    reference
        "RFC 6020";
}

container ma-report {
    leaf ma-report-date {
        type yang:date-and-time;
    }

    leaf ma-report-agent-id {
        type yang:uuid;
    }
}
leaf ma-report-group-id {
    type string;
}

list ma-report-tasks {
    key ma-task-name;
    leaf ma-task-name {
        type string;
    }
    leaf ma-task-registry {
        type inet:uri;
    }
}

list ma-task-options {
    key name;
    leaf name {
        type string;
    }
    leaf value {
        type string;
    }
}

leaf ma-task-suppress-by-default {
    type boolean;
}

leaf ma-task-cycle-id {
    type string;
}

list ma-report-task-column-labels {
    key ma-task-name
    leaf ma-task-name {
        type string;
    }
}

list ma-report-column-label {
    key name;
    leaf name {
        type string;
    }
}

list ma-report-task-rows {
    key ma-task-name
    leaf ma-task-name {
        type string;
    }
    leaf ma-report-report-time {
        type string;
    }
    leaf ma-report-conflicting-tasks {
...
5.3.1.4. Response Code

Code 200 for success.

Code 400 for failure.

5.3.1.5. Response JSON content:

```json
{
    "ma-report-date": "",
    "ma-report-agent-id": "",
    "ma-report-group-id": "",
    "ma-report-tasks": [
        
```
"ma-report-task-config": {
  "ma-task-name": "",
  "ma-task-registry": "",
  "ma-task-options": [
    {
      "name": "",
      "value": ""
    },
    {
      "name": "",
      "value": ""
    }
  ]
},
"ma-task-suppress-by-default": "",
"ma-task-cycle-id": "",
"ma-report-task-column-labels": [ ],
"ma-report-task-rows": [
  {
    "ma-report-result-time": "",
    "ma-report-conflicting-tasks": "",
    "ma-report-result-cross-traffic": ""
  }
]
"ma-report-result-values": ""
}
]
}
}

6. Security Considerations

The REST API could be protected by several ways. One common solution is to provide authentication mechanism for all the HTTP request. Encryption mechanism could also be provided by HTTPS, the credential can be employed for authentication.

7. IANA Considerations

There is no IANA action in this document.

8. Conclusions

This draft introduced a protocol achieving LMAP along with implementation using RESTconf and YANG model.

9. References

9.1. Normative References


10. Acknowledgments

This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.

11. Appendix A. Reply to Protocol Criteria

Control Protocol Criteria

Mandatory Criteria

[CP-MUST-1]-Yes, the Controller as HTTP client to initiate the session to MA which as HTTP server.

[CP-MUST-2]-Yes, MA can initiate Feedback to Controller.

[CP-MUST-3]-Yes, credential employed for authentication by HTTPS.

[CP-MUST-4]-Yes by YANG.
Comparative Criteria

[CP-DIFF-1] 1
[CP-DIFF-2] 1
[CP-DIFF-3] Yes
[CP-DIFF-4] JSON and REST over HTTPs
[CP-DIFF-5] Header contain about 100bytes(host\content type\accept)
[CP-DIFF-6] Header contain about 100bytes(host\content type\accept)
[CP-DIFF-7] Restful widely used. Meantime, Chinacache has been used it as a trial.
[CP-DIFF-8] Test tools for JSON. More is under developed.
[CP-DIFF-9] yes on Github
[CP-DIFF-10] JSON and HTTPs, also we developed open source program.
[CP-DIFF-11] yes
[CP-DIFF-12] yes
[CP-DIFF-13] JSON

Report Protocol Criteria

Mandatory Criteria

[RP-MUST-1] Yes, the MA as HTTP client to initiate the session to Collector which as HTTP server.
[RP-MUST-2] JSON and RESTful over HTTPs
[RP-MUST-3] Yes by YANG

Comparative Criteria

[RP-DIFF-1] TCP
[RP-DIFF-2] Yes
[RP-DIFF-3] 1