# **DHCP Privacy Considerations**

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#### Problem statement


- DHCP is susceptible to surveillance
- DHCP can be used to track users and devices
- Users' mobility patterns may be revealed
- Users' personal information may be revealed


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## Examples

- When moving to a new location, the client sends Confirm with addresses that reveal previous location
- You may be identified by MAC, link-local, DUID, FQDN and many others
- Your device can be fingerprinted by options presence, options content, options order, and behavior
- IA\_TA (temporary addresses) will help, but only a little. (corresponding servers can track me => my DHCP server can track me)

# Privacy vs security





Is WG interested in working on DHCP privacy?

Do we want to focus on...



Is WG interested in working on DHCP privacy?

Do we want to focus on...

DHCPV6 only

DHCPV4 and DHCPV6

What should our goal be?

Analyse

Analyse and change protocol if needed

Analyse and decide what to do next

How much would you like this work to proceed?

Not much (honestly I don't care)

A bit (I will discuss and review)

A lot (I volunteer for this work)

#### Scope of work

- Part of a bigger picture
  - Much bigger problem than just DHCP
  - Need to limit the analysis to DHCP aspects only
- Problem analysis
- Discussion of possible solutions
- Review existing drafts and comment on privacy implications

### Next steps?

# Further reading

| No. | Title                                      | Reason  |
|-----|--|---|
| 1.  | RFC7258: Pervasive monitoring is an attack | Why pervasive monitoring is a problem                                   |
| 2.  | dhc-v4-threat-analysis-03                  | What are the potential attacks in DHCPv4                                |
| 3.  | dhc-sedhcpv6-03                            | Proposed strong protection against attacks, privacy degradation (certs) |
| 4.  |  |   |
|     |  |   |
|     |  |   |