SIDR and BGPSEC

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BGPSEC and SIDR

- The SIDR work has two parts:
 - Origin Validation basics done and published
 - No changes to BGP protocol
 - Prefix/ASN certificates (RPKI), route origin authorization (ROA)
 - Path Validation BGPSEC finishing up
 - Builds on origin validation and RPKI certificates
 - Prevents fiddling with the AS_PATH
 - Prevents adding valid origin to bogus AS_PATH
 - Changes to BGP protocol

IDR Attention Requested

- BGPSEC adds a new attribute to BGP
 - Protecting AS_PATH means dealing with the core of BGP
- This needs a serious look from BGP experts (you)
 - Some IDR experts have participated
 - More eyes would be good
- If you need background
 - Try the architecture (RFC6480), origin operation (RFC7511) and route validation (RFC6483 and RFC6811) and the bgpsec overview draft-ietf-sidrbgpsec-overview