

MIF Working Group
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Informational
Expires: April 02, 2015

D. Anipko, Ed.
Unaffiliated
October 01, 2014

Multiple Provisioning Domain Architecture
draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-arch-07

Abstract

This document is a product of the work of the MIF Architecture Design team. It outlines a solution framework for some of the issues experienced by nodes that can be attached to multiple networks simultaneously. The framework defines the concept of a Provisioning Domain (PvD) which is a consistent set of network configuration information. PvD aware nodes learn PvD specific information from the networks they are attached to and / or other sources. PvDs are used to enable separation and configuration consistency in presence of multiple concurrent connections.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on April 02, 2015.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components

extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	3
1.1. Requirements Language	3
2. Definitions and Types of PvDs	4
2.1. Explicit PvDs	4
2.2. Implicit PvDs and Incremental Adoption of Explicit PvDs	5
2.3. Relationship Between PvDs and Interfaces	6
2.4. PvD Identity / Naming	6
2.5. The Relationship to Dual-Stack Networks	7
3. Conveying PvD information using DHCPv6 and Router Advertisement	7
3.1. Separate Messages or One Message?	8
3.2. Securing PvD Information	8
3.3. Backward Compatibility	8
3.4. Selective Propagation	8
3.5. Retracting / Updating PvD Information	9
3.6. Conveying Configuration Information using IKEv2	9
4. Example Network Configurations	10
4.1. A Mobile Node	10
4.2. A Node with a VPN Connection	11
4.3. A Home Network and a Network Operator with Multiple PvDs	12
5. Reference Model for the PvD-aware Node	12
5.1. Constructions and Maintenance of Separate PvDs	13
5.2. Consistent use of PvDs for Network Connections	13
5.2.1. Name Resolution	13
5.2.2. Next-hop and Source Address Selection	14
5.2.3. Listening Applications	15
5.2.3.1. Processing of Incoming Traffic	15
5.2.3.1.1. Connection-oriented APIs	15
5.2.3.1.2. Connectionless APIs	16
5.2.4. Enforcement of Security Policies	16
5.3. Connectivity Tests	16
5.4. Relationship to Interface Management and Connection Manage	17
6. PvD support in APIs	17
6.1. Basic	17
6.2. Intermediate	18
6.3. Advanced	18
7. PvD Trust for PvD-Aware Node	18
7.1. Untrusted PvDs	18
7.2. Trusted PvDs	19
7.2.1. Authenticated PvDs	19
7.2.2. PvDs Trusted by Attachment	20
8. Contributors	20
9. Acknowledgments	20
10. IANA Considerations	20
11. Security Considerations	20
12. References	21
12.1. Normative References	21
12.2. Informative References	21
Author's Address	22

1. Introduction

Nodes attached to multiple networks may encounter problems from conflicting configuration between the networks, or attempts to simultaneously use more than one network. While various techniques are currently used to tackle these problems ([RFC6419]), in many cases issues may still appear. The MIF problem statement document [RFC6418] describes the general landscape and discusses many of the specific issues and scenario details.

Problems, enumerated in [RFC6418], can be grouped into 3 categories:

1. Lack of consistent and distinctive management of configuration elements associated with different networks.
2. Inappropriate mixed use of configuration elements associated with different networks during a particular network activity or connection.
3. Usage of a particular network that is not consistent with the intent of the scenario or involved parties leading to connectivity failure and / or other undesired consequences.

An example of (1) is a single, node-scoped list of DNS server IP addresses learned from different networks leading to failures or delays in resolution of names from particular namespaces; an example of (2) is an attempt to resolve the name of an HTTP proxy server learned from network A using a DNS server learned from network B; an example of (3) is the use of an employer-provided VPN connection for peer-to-peer connectivity unrelated to employment activities.

This architecture provides solutions to these categories of problems, respectively, by:

1. Introducing the formal notion of PvDs, including identity for PvDs, and describing mechanisms for nodes to learn the intended associations between acquired network configuration information elements.
2. Introducing a reference model for PvD-aware nodes that prevents the inadvertent mixed use of configuration information which may belong to different PvDs.
3. Providing recommendations on PvD selection based on PvD identity and connectivity tests for common scenarios.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this

document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. Definitions and Types of PvDs

Provisioning Domain:

A consistent set of network configuration information. Classically, all of the configuration information available on a single interface is provided by a single source (such as a network administrator) and can therefore be treated as a single provisioning domain. In modern IPv6 networks, multihoming can result in more than one provisioning domain being present on a single link. In some scenarios, it is also possible for elements of the same PvD to be present on multiple links.

Typical examples of information in a provisioning domain learned from the network are:

- * Source address prefixes for use by connections within the provisioning domain
- * IP address(es) of DNS server(s)
- * Name of HTTP proxy server (if available)
- * DNS suffixes associated with the network
- * Default gateway address

PvD-aware node:

A node that supports the association of network configuration information into PvDs and the use of these PvDs to serve requests for network connections in ways consistent with the recommendations of this architecture.

2.1. Explicit PvDs

A node may receive explicit information from the network and / or other sources conveying the presence of PvDs and the association of particular network information with a particular PvD. PvDs that are constructed based on such information are referred to as "explicit" in this document.

Protocol changes or extensions will likely be required to support explicit PvDs through IETF-defined mechanisms. As an example, one could think of one or more DHCP options carrying PvD identity and / or its elements.

A different approach could be the introduction of a DHCP option which only carries the identity of a PvD. Here, the associations between network information elements with the identity is implemented by the respective protocols, for example with a Router Discovery [RFC4861] option associating an address range with a PvD.

Another example of a delivery mechanism for PvDs are key exchange or tunneling protocols, such as IKEv2 [RFC5996] that allow the transport of host configuration information.

Specific, existing or new features of networking protocols that enable the delivery of PvD identity and association with various network information elements will be defined in companion design documents.

Link-specific and / or vendor-proprietary mechanisms for the discovery of PvD information (differing from IETF-defined mechanisms) can be used by nodes either separate from, or in conjunction with, IETF-defined mechanisms; providing they allow the discovery of the necessary elements of the PvD(s).

In all cases, nodes must by default ensure that the lifetime of all dynamically discovered PvD configuration is appropriately limited by relevant events. For example, if an interface media state change is indicated, previously discovered information relevant to that interface may no longer be valid and so need to be confirmed or re-discovered.

It is expected that the way a node makes use of PvD information is generally independent of the specific mechanism / protocol that the information was received by.

In some network topologies, network infrastructure elements may need to advertise multiple PvDs. Generally, the details of how this is performed will be defined in companion design documents. However, where different design choices are possible, the choice that requires a smaller number of packets shall be preferred for efficiency.

2.2. Implicit PvDs and Incremental Adoption of Explicit PvDs

For some time it is likely that there will be networks which do not advertise explicit PvD information as the deployment of new features in networking protocols is a relatively slow process.

When connected to networks which don't advertise explicit PvD information, a PvD-aware node shall automatically create separate PvDs for received configuration. Such PvDs are referred to in this document as "implicit".

Through the use of implicit PvDs, PvD-aware nodes may still provide benefits to their users (when compared to non-PvD aware nodes) by following the best practices described in Section 5, using the network information from different interfaces separately to consistently serve network connection request.

In mixed mode, i.e., where of multiple networks are available on an attached link only some of which advertise PvD information, the PvD-aware node shall create explicit PvDs from explicitly learned PvD information and associate other learned configuration (without an explicit PvD) with implicit PvD(s) created for that interface.

2.3. Relationship Between PvDs and Interfaces

By default, implicit PvDs are limited to the network configuration information received on a single interface and by default one such PvD is formed for each interface. If additional information is available to the host (through mechanisms out of scope of this document), the host may form implicit PvDs with different granularity. For example, PvDs spanning multiple interfaces such a home network with a router that has multiple internal interfaces, or multiple PvDs on a single interface such as a network that has multiple uplink connections.

Explicit PvDs, in practice will often also be scoped only for configuration related to a particular interface. However, there are no such requirements or limitations defined in this architecture. Explicit PvDs may include information related to more than one interface if the node learns the presence of the same PvD on those interfaces and the authentication of the PvD ID meets the level required by the node policy (generally, authentication of a PvD ID may be also required in scenarios involving only one connected interface and / or PvD).

This architecture intends to support such scenarios, among others. Hence, it shall be noted that no hierarchical relationship exists between interfaces and PvDs: it is possible for multiple PvDs to be simultaneously accessible over one interface, as well as a single PvD to be simultaneously accessible over multiple interfaces.

2.4. PvD Identity / Naming

For explicit PvDs, the PvD ID is a value that is, or has a high probability of being globally unique, and is received as part of PvD information. It shall be possible to generate a human-readable form of the PvD ID to present to the end-user, either based on the PvD ID itself, or using meta-data associated with the ID. For implicit PvDs, the node assigns a locally generated ID with a high probability of being globally unique to each implicit PvD.

A PvD-aware node may use these IDs to select a PvD with a matching ID for special-purpose connection requests in accordance with node policy, as chosen by advanced applications, or to present a human-readable representation of the IDs to the end-user for selection of PvDs.

A single network provider may operate multiple networks, including networks at different locations. In such cases, the provider may chose whether to advertise single or multiple PvD identities at all or some of those networks as it suits their business needs. This architecture does not impose any specific requirements in this regard.

When multiple nodes are connected to the same link with one or more explicit PvDs available, this architecture assumes that the information about all available PvDs is made available by the networks to all the connected nodes. At the same time, connected nodes may have different heuristics, policies and / or other settings, including their configured sets of trusted PvDs. This may lead to different PvDs actually being used by different nodes for their connections.

Possible extensions, whereby networks advertize different sets of PvDs to different connected nodes are out of scope of this document.

2.5. The Relationship to Dual-Stack Networks

When applied to dual-stack networks, the PvD definition allows for multiple PvDs to be created whereby each PvD contains information relevant to only one address family, or for a single PvD containing information for multiple address families. This architecture requires that accompanying design documents describing PvD-related protocol changes must support PvDs containing information from multiple address families. PvD-aware nodes must be capable of creating and using both single-family and multi-family PvDs.

For explicit PvDs, the choice of either of these approaches is a policy decision for the network administrator and / or the node user/administrator. Since some of the IP configuration information that can be learned from the network can be applicable to multiple address families (for instance DHCP Address Selection Policy Opt [RFC7078]), it is likely that dual-stack networks will deploy single PvDs for both address families.

By default for implicit PvDs, PvD-aware nodes shall include multiple IP families into a single implicit PvD created for an interface. At the time of writing, in dual-stack networks it appears to be common practice for the configuration of both address families to be provided by a single source.

A PvD-aware node that provides an API to use, enumerate and inspect PvDs and / or their properties shall provide the ability to filter PvDs and / or their properties by address family.

3. Conveying PvD information using DHCPv6 and Router Advertisements

DHCPv6 and Router Advertisements are the two most common methods of configuring hosts. To support the architecture described in this document, these protocols would need to be extended to convey explicit PvD information. The following sections describe topic which must be considered before finalizing a mechanism to augment DHCPv6 and RAs with PvD information.

3.1. Separate Messages or One Message?

When information related to several PvDs is available from the same configuration source, there are two possible ways of distributing this information: One way is to send information from each different provisioning domain in separate messages. The second method is combining the information from multiple PvDs into a single message. The latter method has the advantage of being more efficient but could have problems with to authentication and authorization, as well as potential issues with accommodating information not tagged with any PvD information.

3.2. Securing PvD Information

DHCPv6 and RAs both provide some form of authentication to ensure the identity of the source as well as the integrity of the secured message content. While this is useful, determining authenticity does tell a node whether the configuration source is actually allowed to provide information from a given PvD. To resolve this, there must be a mechanism for the PvD owner to attach some form of authorization token to the configuration information that is delivered.

3.3. Backward Compatibility

The extensions to RAs and DHCPv6 should be defined in such a manner than unmodified hosts (i.e. hosts not aware of PvDs) will continue to function as well as they did prior to PvD information being added. This could imply that some information may need to be duplicated in order to be conveyed to legacy hosts. Similarly, PvD aware hosts need to be able to correctly utilize legacy configuration sources which do not provide PvD information. There are also several initiatives that are aimed at adding some form of additional information to prefixes [I-D.bhandari-dhc-class-based-prefix] and [I-D.korhonen-dmm-prefix-properties] and any new mechanism should try to consider co-existence with such deployed mechanisms.

3.4. Selective Propagation

When a configuration source has information regarding several PvDs, it is currently unclear whether the source should provide information about all PvDs to any host that requests this information. While this may be reasonable in some cases, it might become an unreasonable burden once the number of PvDs starts increasing. One way to restrict the propagation of information which is of no use to a specific host is for the host to indicate the PvD information they require within their configuration request. One way this could be accomplished is by using a DHCPv6 ORO containing the PvDs that are of interest. The configuration source can then respond with only the requested information.

By default, a configuration source SHOULD provide information related to all provisioning domains without expecting the client to request the PvD(s) it requires. This is necessary to ensure that hosts that do not support a selective PvD information request mechanism will work. Also, note that IPv6 neighbor discovery does not provide any functionality analogous to the DHCPv6 ORO.

In this case, when a host receives superfluous PvD information, it can simply be discarded. Also, in constrained networks such as LLNs, the amount of configuration information needs to be restricted to ensure that the load on the hosts is bearable while keeping the information identical across all the hosts.

If selective propagation is required, some form of PvD discovery mechanism needs to be specified so that hosts / applications can be pre-provisioned to request a specific PvD. Alternately, the set of PvDs that the network can provide to the host can be propagated to the host using RAs or stateless DHCPv6. The discovery mechanism may potentially support the discovery of available PvDs on a per-host basis.

3.5. Retracting / Updating PvD Information

After PvD information is provisioned to a host, it may become outdated or superseded by updated information before the hosts would normally request updates. To resolve this requires that the mechanism be able to update and / or withdraw all (or some subset) of the information related to a given PvD. For efficiency reasons, there should be a way to specify that all information from the PvD needs to be reconfigured instead of individually updating each item associated with the PvD.

3.6. Conveying Configuration Information using IKEv2

Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2 (IKEv2) [RFC5996] [RFC5739] is another widely used method of configuring host IP information. For IKEv2, the provisioning domain could be implicitly learned from the Identification - Responder (IDr) payloads that the IKEv2 initiator and responder inject during their IKEv2 exchange. The IP configuration may depend on the named IDr. Another possibility could be adding a specific provisioning domain identifying payload extensions to IKEv2. All of the considerations for DHCPv6 and RAs listed above potentially apply to IKEv2 as well.

4. Example Network Configurations


4.1. A Mobile Node

Consider a mobile node with two network interfaces: one to the mobile network, the other to the Wi-Fi network. When the mobile node is only connected to the mobile network, it will typically have one PvD, implicit or explicit. When the mobile node discovers and connects to a Wi-Fi network, it will have zero or more (typically one) additional PvD(s).

Some existing OS implementations only allow one active network connection. In this case, only the PvD(s) associated with the active interface can be used at any given time.

As an example, the mobile network can explicitly deliver PvD information through the PDP context activation process. Then, the PvD aware mobile node will treat the mobile network as an explicit PvD. Conversely, the legacy Wi-Fi network may not explicitly communicate PvD information to the mobile node. The PvD aware mobile node will associate network configuration for the Wi-Fi network with an implicit PvD in this case.

The following diagram illustrates the use of different PvDs in this scenario:




An example of PvD use with Wi-Fi and mobile interfaces.

4.2. A Node with a VPN Connection

If the node has established a VPN connection, zero or more (typically one) additional PvD(s) will be created. These may be implicit or explicit. The routing to IP addresses reachable within this PvD will be set up via the VPN connection, and the routing of packets to addresses outside the scope of this PvD will remain unaffected. If a node already has N connected PvDs, after the VPN session has been established typically there will be N+1 connected PvDs.

The following diagram illustrates the use of different PvDs in this scenario:




An example of PvD use with VPN.

4.3. A Home Network and a Network Operator with Multiple PvDs

An operator may use separate PvDs for individual services which they offer to their customers. These may be used so that services can be designed and provisioned to be completely independent of each other, allowing for complete flexibility in combinations of services which are offered to customers.

From the perspective of the home network and the node, this model is functionally very similar to being multihomed to multiple upstream operators: Each of the different services offered by the service provider is its own PvD with associated PvD information. In this case, the operator may provide a generic / default PvD (explicit or implicit), which provides Internet access to the customer. Additional services would then be provisioned as explicit PvDs for subscribing customers.

The following diagram illustrates this, using video-on-demand as a service-specific PvD:



An example of PvD use within a home network.

In this case, the number of PVdS that a single operator could provision is based on the number of independently provisioned services which they offer. Some examples may include:

- o Real-time packet voice
- o Streaming video
- o Interactive video (n-way video conferencing)
- o Interactive gaming
- o Best effort / Internet access

5. Reference Model for the PvD-aware Node

5.1. Constructions and Maintenance of Separate PvDs

It is assumed that normally, the configuration information contained in a single PvD shall be sufficient for a node to fulfill a network connection request by an application, and hence there should be no need to attempt to merge information across different PvDs.

Nevertheless, even when a PvD lacks some necessary configuration information, merging of information associated with different PvD(s) shall not be done automatically as this will typically lead to the issues described in [RFC6418].

A node may use other sources, for example: node local policy, user input or other mechanisms not defined by the IETF for any of the following:

- o Construction of a PvD in its entirety (analogous to statically configuring IP on an interface)
- o Supplementing some, or all learned PvDs with particular configuration elements
- o Merging of information from different PvDs (if this is explicitly allowed by policy)

As an example, a node administrator could inject a DNS server which is not ISP-specific into PvDs for use on any of the networks that the node could attach to. Such creation / augmentation of PvD(s) could be static or dynamic. The specific mechanism(s) for implementing this are outside of scope of this document.

5.2. Consistent use of PvDs for Network Connections

PvDs enable PvD-aware nodes to consistently use the correct set of configuration elements to serve specific network requests from beginning to end. This section provides examples of such use.

5.2.1. Name Resolution

When a PvD-aware node needs to resolve the name of the destination for use by a connection request, the node could use one, or multiple PvDs for a given name lookup.

The node shall choose a single PvD if, for example, the node policy required the use of a particular PvD for a specific purpose (e.g. to download an MMS message using a specific APN over a cellular connection). To make this selection, the node could use a match between the PvD DNS suffix and an FQDN which is being resolved or match of PvD ID, as determined by the node policy.

The node may pick multiple PvDs, if for example, the PvDs are for general purpose Internet connectivity, and the node is attempting to maximize the probability of connectivity similar to the Happy Eyeballs [RFC6555] approach. In this case, the node could perform DNS lookups in parallel, or in sequence. Alternatively, the node may use only one PvD for the lookup, based on the PvD connectivity properties, user configuration of preferred Internet PvD, etc.

If an application implements an API that provides a way of explicitly specifying the desired interface or PvD, that interface or PvD should be used for name resolution (and the subsequent connection attempt), provided that the host's configuration permits this.

In either case, by default a node uses information obtained via a name service lookup to establish connections only within the same PvD as the lookup results were obtained.

For clarification, when it is written that the name service lookup results were obtained "from a PvD", it should be understood to mean that the name service query was issued against a name service which is configured for use in a particular PvD. In that sense, the results are "from" that particular PvD.

Some nodes may support transports and / or APIs which provide an abstraction of a single connection, aggregating multiple underlying connections. MPTCP [RFC6182] is an example of such a transport protocol. For connections provided by such transports/APIs, a PvD-aware node may use different PvDs for servicing that logical connection, provided that all operations on the underlying connections are performed consistently within their corresponding PvD(s).

5.2.2. Next-hop and Source Address Selection

For the purpose of this example, let us assume that the preceding name lookup succeeded in a particular PvD. For each obtained destination address, the node shall perform a next-hop lookup among routers associated with that PvD. As an example, the node could determine such associations via matching the source address prefixes/specific routes advertized by the router against known PvDs, or receiving an explicit PvD affiliation advertized through a new Router Discovery [RFC4861] option.

For each destination, once the best next-hop is found, the node selects the best source address according to rules defined in [RFC6724], but with the constraint that the source address must belong to a range associated with the used PvD. If needed, the node would use prefix policy from the same PvD for selecting the best source address from multiple candidates.

When destination / source pairs are identified, they are sorted using the [RFC6724] destination sorting rules and prefix policy table from the used PvD.

5.2.3. Listening Applications

Consider a host connected to several PvDs, running an application that opens a listening socket / transport API object. The application is authorized by the host policy to use a subset of connected PvDs that may or may not be equal to the complete set of the connected PvDs. As an example, in the case where there are different PvDs on the Wi-Fi and cellular interfaces, for general Internet traffic the host could use only one, preferred PvD at a time (and accordingly, advertise to remote peers the host name and addresses associated with that PvD), or it could use one PvD as the default for outgoing connections, while still allowing use of the other PvDs simultaneously.

Another example is a host with an established VPN connection. Here, security policy could be used to permit or deny application's access to the VPN (and other) PvD(s).

For non-PvD aware applications, the operating system has policies that determine the authorized set of PvDs and the preferred outgoing PvD. For PvD-aware applications, both the authorized set of PvDs and the default outgoing PvD can be determined as the common subset produced between the OS policies and the set of PvD IDs or characteristics provided by the application.

Application input could be provided on per-application, per-transport-API-object or per-transport-API-call basis. The API for application input may have an option for specifying whether the input should be treated as a preference instead of a requirement.

5.2.3.1. Processing of Incoming Traffic

Unicast IP packets are received on a specific IP address associated with a PvD. For multicast packets, the host can derive the PvD association from other configuration information, such as an explicit PvD property or local policy.

The node OS or middleware may apply more advanced techniques for determining the resultant PvD and / or authorization of the incoming traffic. Those techniques are outside of scope of this document.

If the determined receiving PvD of a packet is not in the allowed subset of PvDs for the particular application / transport API object, the packet should be handled in the same way as if there were no listener.

5.2.3.1.1. Connection-oriented APIs

For connection-oriented APIs, when the initial incoming packet is received, the packet PvD is remembered for the established connection and used for handling of outgoing traffic for that connection. While typically, connection-oriented APIs use a connection-oriented transport protocol, such as TCP, it is possible to have a connection-oriented API that uses a generally connectionless transport protocol, such as UDP.

For APIs/protocols that support multiple IP traffic flows associated with a single transport API connection object (for example, multi path TCP), the processing rules may be adjusted accordingly.

5.2.3.1.2. Connectionless APIs

For connectionless APIs, the host should provide an API that PvD-aware applications can use to query the PvD associated with the packet. For outgoing traffic on this transport API object, the OS should use the selected outgoing PvDs, determined as described above.

5.2.4. Enforcement of Security Policies

By themselves, PvDs do not define, and cannot be used for communication of, security policies. When implemented in a network, this architecture provides the host with information about connected networks. The actual behavior of the host then depends on the host's policies (provisioned through mechanisms out of scope of this document), applied taking received PvD information into account. In some scenarios, e.g. a VPN, such policies could require the host to use only a particular VPN PvD for some / all of the application's traffic (VPN 'disable split tunneling' also known as 'force tunneling' behavior), or apply such restrictions only to selected applications and allow the simultaneous use of the VPN PvD together with the other connected PvDs by the other or all applications (VPN 'split tunneling' behavior).

5.3. Connectivity Tests

Although some PvDs may appear as valid candidates for PvD selection (e.g. good link quality, consistent connection parameters, etc.), they may provide limited or no connectivity to the desired network or the Internet. For example, some PvDs provide limited IP connectivity (e.g., scoped to the link or to the access network), but require the node to authenticate through a web portal to get full access to the Internet. This may be more likely to happen for PvDs which are not trusted by a given PvD-aware node.

An attempt to use such a PvD may lead to limited network connectivity or application connection failures. To prevent the latter, a PvD-aware node may perform a connectivity test for the PvD before using it to serve application network connection requests. In current implementations, some nodes already implement this e.g., by trying to

reach a dedicated web server (see [RFC6419]).

Section 5.2 describes how a PvD-aware node shall maintain and use multiple PvDs separately. The PvD-aware node shall perform a connectivity test and, only after validation of the PvD, consider using it to serve application connections requests. Ongoing connectivity tests are also required, since during the IP session, the end-to-end connectivity could be disrupted for various reasons (e.g. L2 problems, IP QoS issues); hence, a connectivity monitoring function is needed to check the connectivity status and remove the PvD from the set of usable PvDs if necessary.

There may be cases where a connectivity test for PvD selection may not be appropriate and should be complemented, or replaced, by PvD selection based on other factors. For example, this could be realized by leveraging some 3GPP and IEEE mechanisms, which would allow the exposure of some PvD characteristics to the node (e.g. 3GPP Access Network Discovery and Selection Function (ANDSF) [TS23402], IEEE 802.11u [IEEE802.11u]/ANQP).

5.4. Relationship to Interface Management and Connection Managers

Current devices, such as mobile handsets make use of proprietary mechanisms and custom applications to manage connectivity in environments with multiple interfaces and multiple sets of network configuration. These mechanisms or applications are commonly known as connection managers [RFC6419].

Connection managers sometimes rely on policy servers to allow a node that is connected to multiple networks to perform network selection. They can also make use of routing guidance from the network (e.g. 3GPP ANDSF [TS23402]). Although connection managers solve some connectivity problems, they rarely address network selection problems in a comprehensive manner. With proprietary solutions, it is challenging to present coherent behavior to the end user of the device, as different platforms present different behaviors even when connected to the same network, with the same type of interface, and for the same purpose. The architecture described in this document should improve the hosts behavior by providing the hosts with tools and guidance to make informed network selection decisions.

6. PvD support in APIs

For all levels of PvD support in APIs described in this chapter, it is expected that the notifications about changes in the set of available PvDs are exposed as part of the API surface.

6.1. Basic

Applications are not PvD-aware in any manner and only submit connection requests. The node performs PvD selection implicitly, without any application participation, based purely on node-specific administrative policies and / or choices made by the user from a user interface provided by the operating environment, not by the application.

As an example, PvD selection can be done at the name service lookup step by using the relevant configuration elements, such as those described in [RFC6731]. As another example, PvD selection could be made based on application identity or type (i.e., a node could always use a particular PvD for a VOIP application).

6.2. Intermediate

Applications indirectly participate in PvD selection by specifying hard requirements and soft preferences. As an example, a real time communication application intending to use the connection for the exchange of real time audio / video data may indicate a preference or a requirement for connection quality, which could affect PvD selection (different PvDs could correspond to Internet connections with different loss rates and latencies).

Another example is the connection of an infrequently executed background activity, which checks for application updates and performs large downloads when updates are available. For such connections, a cheaper or zero cost PvD may be preferable, even if such a connection has a higher relative loss rate or lower bandwidth. The node performs PvD selection based on applications' inputs and policies and / or user preferences. Some / all properties of the resultant PvD may be exposed to applications.

6.3. Advanced

PvDs are directly exposed to applications for enumeration and selection. Node policies and / or user choices may still override the applications' preferences and limit which PvD(s) can be enumerated and / or used by the application, irrespective of any preferences which the application may have specified. Depending on the implementation, such restrictions (imposed by node policy and / or user choice) may or may not be visible to the application.

7. PvD Trust for PvD-Aware Node

7.1. Untrusted PvDs

Implicit and explicit PvDs for which no trust relationship exists are considered untrusted. Only PvDs which meet the requirements in Section 7.2 are trusted; any other PvD is untrusted.

In order to avoid the various forms of misinformation that could occur when PvDs are untrusted, nodes that implement PvD separation cannot assume that two explicit PvDs with the same identifier are actually the same PvD. A node that makes this assumption will be vulnerable to attacks where, for example, an open Wifi hotspot might assert that it was part of another PvD and thereby attempt to draw traffic intended for that PvD onto its own network.

Since implicit PvD identifiers are synthesized by the node, this issue cannot arise with implicit PvDs.

Mechanisms exist (for example, [RFC6731]) whereby a PvD can provide configuration information that asserts special knowledge about the reachability of resources through that PvD. Such assertions cannot be validated unless the node has a trust relationship with the PvD; therefore, assertions of this type must be ignored by nodes that receive them from untrusted PvDs. Failure to ignore such assertions could result in traffic being diverted from legitimate destinations to spoofed destinations.

7.2. Trusted PvDs

Trusted PvDs are PvDs for which two conditions apply: First, a trust relationship must exist between the node that is using the PvD configuration and the source that provided that configuration; this is the authorization portion of the trust relationship. Second, there must be some way to validate the trust relationship. This is the authentication portion of the trust relationship. Two mechanisms for validating the trust relationship are defined.

It shall be possible to validate the trust relationship for all advertised elements of a trusted PvD, irrespective of whether the PvD elements are communicated as a whole, e.g., in a single DHCP option, or separately, e.g., in supplementary RA options. The feasibility of mechanisms to implement a trust relationship for all PvD elements will be determined in the respective companion design documents.

7.2.1. Authenticated PvDs

One way to validate the trust relationship between a node and the source of a PvD is through the combination of cryptographic authentication and an identifier configured on the node. In some cases, the two could be the same; for example, if authentication is by a shared secret, the secret would have to be associated with the PvD identifier. Without a PvD Identifier / shared key tuple, authentication would be impossible, and hence authentication and authorization are combined.

However, if authentication is done using a public key mechanism such as a TLS certificate or DANE, authentication by itself is not enough since theoretically any PvD could be authenticated in this way. In addition to authentication, the node would need configuration to trust the identifier being authenticated. Validating the authenticated PvD name against a list of PvD names configured as trusted on the node would constitute the authorization step in this case.

7.2.2. PvDs Trusted by Attachment

In some cases, a trust relationship may be validated by some means other than those described in Section 7.2.1 simply by virtue of the connection through which the PvD was obtained. For instance, a handset connected to a mobile network may know through the mobile network infrastructure that it is connected to a trusted PvD. Whatever mechanism was used to validate that connection constitutes the authentication portion of the PvD trust relationship. Presumably, such a handset would be configured from the factory (or else through mobile operator or user preference settings) to trust the PvD, and this would constitute the authorization portion of this type of trust relationship.

8. Contributors

The following individuals contributed to this document (listed in no specific order): Alper Yegin (alper.yegin@yegin.org), Aaron Yi Ding (yding@cs.helsinki.fi), Zhen Cao (caozhenpku@gmail.com), Dapeng Liu (liudapeng@chinamobile.com), Dave Thaler (dthaler@microsoft.com), Dmitry Anipko (dmitry.anipko@microsoft.com), Hui Deng (denghui@chinamobile.com), Jouni Korhonen (jouni.nospam@gmail.com), Juan Carlos Zuniga (JuanCarlos.Zuniga@InterDigital.com), Konstantinos Pentikousis (k.pentikousis@huawei.com), Marc Blanchet (marc.blanchet@viagenie.ca), Margaret Wasserman (margaretw42@gmail.com), Pierrick Seite (pierrick.seite@orange.com), Suresh Krishnan (suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com), Teemu Savolainen (teemu.savolainen@nokia.com), Ted Lemon (ted.lemon@nominum.com) and Tim Chown (tjc@ecs.soton.ac.uk).

9. Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank (in no specific order) Ian Farrer, Marcus Stenberg and Mikael Abrahamsson for their review and comments.

10. IANA Considerations

This memo does not include any IANA requests.

11. Security Considerations

There are at least three different forms of attacks that can be performed using configuration sources that support multiple provisioning domains.

Tampering with provided configuration information: An attacker may attempt to modify information provided inside the PvD container option. These attacks can easily be prevented by using message integrity features provided by the underlying protocol used to carry the configuration information. E.g. SEND [RFC3971] would detect any form of tampering with the RA contents and the DHCPv6 [RFC3315] AUTH option that would detect any form of tampering with the DHCPv6 message contents. This attack can also be performed by a compromised configuration source by modifying information inside a specific PvD, in which case the mitigations proposed in the next subsection may be helpful.

Rogue configuration source: A compromised configuration source, such as a router or a DHCPv6 server, may advertise information about PvDs that it is not authorized to advertise. e.g. A coffee shop WLAN may advertise configuration information purporting to be from an enterprise and may try to attract enterprise related traffic. The only real way to prevent this is for the PvD related configuration container to contain embedded authentication and authorization information from the owner of the PvD. This provides the client with a way of detecting the attack by verifying the authentication and authorization information provided inside the PvD container option, after verifying its trust of the PvD owner (e.g. a certificate with a well-known / common trust anchor).

Replay attacks: A compromised configuration source or an on-link attacker may try to capture advertised configuration information and replay it on a different link, or at a future point in time. This can be avoided by including a replay protection mechanism such as a timestamp or a nonce inside the PvD container to ensure the validity of the provided information.

12. References

12.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

12.2. Informative References

[I-D.bhandari-dhc-class-based-prefix]
Systems, C., Halwasia, G., Gundavelli, S., Deng, H., Thiebaut, L., Korhonen, J. and I. Farrer, "DHCPv6 class based prefix", Internet-Draft draft-bhandari-dhc-class-based-prefix-05, July 2013.

[I-D.korhonen-dmm-prefix-properties]
Korhonen, J., Patil, B., Gundavelli, S., Seite, P. and D. Liu, "IPv6 Prefix Mobility Management Properties", Internet-Draft draft-korhonen-dmm-prefix-properties-03, October 2012.

- [IEEE802.11u] IEEE, "IEEE Standard 802.11u-2011 (Amendment 9: Interworking with External Networks)", 2011.
- [RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C. and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
- [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B. and P. Nikander, "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
- [RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W. and H. Soliman, "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861, September 2007.
- [RFC5739] Eronen, P., Laganier, J. and C. Madson, "IPv6 Configuration in Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 5739, February 2010.
- [RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y. and P. Eronen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 5996, September 2010.
- [RFC6182] Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., Barre, S. and J. Iyengar, "Architectural Guidelines for Multipath TCP Development", RFC 6182, March 2011.
- [RFC6418] Blanchet, M. and P. Seite, "Multiple Interfaces and Provisioning Domains Problem Statement", RFC 6418, November 2011.
- [RFC6419] Wasserman, M. and P. Seite, "Current Practices for Multiple-Interface Hosts", RFC 6419, November 2011.
- [RFC6555] Wing, D. and A. Yourtchenko, "Happy Eyeballs: Success with Dual-Stack Hosts", RFC 6555, April 2012.
- [RFC6724] Thaler, D., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A. and T. Chown, "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 6724, September 2012.
- [RFC6731] Savolainen, T., Kato, J. and T. Lemon, "Improved Recursive DNS Server Selection for Multi-Interfaced Nodes", RFC 6731, December 2012.
- [RFC7078] Matsumoto, A., Fujisaki, T. and T. Chown, "Distributing Address Selection Policy Using DHCPv6", RFC 7078, January 2014.
- [TS23402] 3GPP, "3GPP TS 23.402; Architecture enhancements for non-3GPP accesses; release 12", 2014.

Author's Address

Anipko

Expires April 02, 2015

[Page 22]

Dmitry Anipko, editor
Unaffiliated

Phone: +1 425 442 6356
Email: dmitry.anipko@gmail.com

DHC Working Group
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: March 2, 2015

S. Krishnan
Ericsson
J. Korhonen
Broadcom
S. Bhandari
Cisco Systems
August 29, 2014

Support for multiple provisioning domains in DHCPv6
draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-dhcp-support-00

Abstract

The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple networks. One part of the solution requires associating configuration information with provisioning domains. This document details how configuration information provided through DHCPv6 can be associated with provisioning domains.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on March 2, 2015.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	2
2. Terminology	2
3. PVD Container option	3
4. PVD Identity option	3
5. PVD Authentication and Authorization option	4
6. Set of allowable options	5
7. Behaviour of DHCPv6 entities	5
7.1. Client and Requesting Router Behavior	5
7.2. Server and Delegating Router Behavior	6
8. Security Considerations	6
9. IANA Considerations	7
10. Acknowledgements	7
11. Normative References	7
Authors' Addresses	8

1. Introduction

The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple networks based on the Multiple Provisioning Domains (MPVD) architecture work [I-D.anipko-mif-mpvd-arch]. One part of the solution requires associating configuration information with provisioning domains. This document describes a DHCPv6 mechanism for explicitly indicating provisioning domain information along with any configuration that will be provided. The proposed mechanism uses a DHCPv6 option that indicates the identity of the provisioning domain and encapsulates the options that contain the configuration information as well as any accompanying authentication/authorization information.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. PVD Container option

The PVD container option is used to encapsulate and group together all the configuration options that belong to the explicitly identified provisioning domain. The PVD container option **MUST** encapsulate exactly one `OPTION_PVD_ID`. The PVD container option **MAY** occur multiple times in the same message, but each of these PVD container options **MUST** have a different PVD identity specified under its PVD identity option. The PVD container option **SHOULD** contain exactly one `OPTION_PVD_AUTH`.




Figure 1: PVD Container Option

- o option-code: `OPTION_PVD` (TBA1)
- o option-length: Length of encapsulated options
- o encapsulated-options: options associated with this provisioning domain.

4. PVD Identity option

The PVD identity option is used to explicitly indicate the identity of the provisioning domain that is associated with the configuration information encapsulated by the PVD container option.




Figure 2: PVD ID Option

- o option-code: OPTION_PVD_ID (TBA2)
- o option-length: Length of PVD identity information
- o PVD identity information: The provisioning domain identity. The contents of this field is defined in a separate document [PVDIDS].

5. PVD Authentication and Authorization option

The PVD authentication and authorization option contains information that could be used by the DHCPv6 client to verify whether the configuration information provided was not tampered with by the DHCPv6 server as well as establishing that the DHCPv6 server was authorized to advertise the information on behalf of the PVD per OPTION_PVD basis. The contents of the authentication/authorization information is provided by the owner of the provisioning domain and is completely opaque to the DHCPv6 server that passes along the information unmodified. Every OPTION_PVD option SHOULD contain at most one OPTION_PVD_AUTH option. The OPTION_PVD_AUTH option MUST be the last option inside the OPTION_PVD option.




Figure 3: PVD Auth Option

- o option-code: OPTION_PVD_AUTH (TBA3)
- o option-length: Length of the Auth info
- o name-type: Names the algorithm used to identify a specific X.509 certificate using the method defined for the Subject Key Identifier (SKI) extension for the X.509 certificates. The usage and the Name Type registry aligns with the mechanism defined for SeND [RFC6494][RFC6495]. Name Type values starting

from 3 are supported and an implementation MUST at least support SHA-1 (value 3).

- o key-hash: A hash of the public key using the algorithm identified by the Name Type. The procedure how the Key Hash is calculated is defined in [RFC3971] and [RFC6495]
- o digital-signature: A signature calculated over the encapsulating OPTION_PVD including all option data from the beginning of the option while setting the digital-signature field to zero. The procedure of calculating the signature is identical to the one defined for SeND [RFC3971].

[TODO: There may be some alignment considerations here for some implementations as DHCPv6 options are not aligned.]

6. Set of allowable options

The PVD container option MAY be used to encapsulate any allocated DHCPv6 options but MUST NOT be used to encapsulate another OPTION_PVD option. [TODO: Should we add any other exclusions?]

7. Behaviour of DHCPv6 entities

This section describes role of DHCPv6 entities involved in requesting and receiving DHCPv6 configuration or prefix and address allocation.

7.1. Client and Requesting Router Behavior

DHCPv6 client or requesting router can request for configuration from provisioning domain in the following ways:

- o In the SOLICIT message it MAY include OPTION_PVD_ID requesting configuration for the specific PVD ID indicated in the OPTION_PVD_ID option. It can include multiple OPTION_PVD_ID options to indicate its preference for more than one provisioning domain. The PVD ID it requests is learnt via configuration or any other out of band mechanism not defined in this document.
- o In the SOLICIT message include an OPTION_ORO option with the OPTION_PVD option code to request configuration from all the PVDs that the DHCPv6 server can provide.

The client or requesting router parses OPTION_PVD options in the response message. The Client or Requesting router MUST then include all or subset of the received OPTION_PVD options in the REQUEST message so that it will be responsible for the configuration information selected.

If DHCPv6 client or requesting router receives OPTION_PVD options but does not support PVD, it SHOULD ignore the received option(s).

7.2. Server and Delegating Router Behavior

If the Server or Delegating router supports PVD and it is configured to provide configuration data in one or more provisioning domains, it selects configuration for the PVD based allocation in the following way:

- o If OPTION_PVD option code within OPTION_ORO is not present in the request, it MUST NOT include provisioning domain based configuration. It MAY select configuration and prefix allocation from a default PVD defined.
- o If OPTION_PVD_ID is included, it selects information to be offered from that specific PVD if available.
- o If OPTION_PVD option code within OPTION_ORO is included, then based on its configuration and policy it MAY offer configuration from the available PVD(s).

When PVD information and configuration are selected for address and prefix allocation the server or delegating router responds with an ADVERTISE message after populating OPTION_PVD.

If OPTION_PVD is not included, then the server or delegating router MAY allocate the prefix and provide configuration as specified in [RFC3315] and [RFC3633] and MUST NOT include OPTION_PVD option in the response.

If OPTION_ORO option includes the OPTION_PVD option code but the server or delegating router does not support PVD, then it SHOULD ignore the OPTION_PVD and OPTION_PVD_ID options received.

If both client/requesting router and server/delegating router support PVD but cannot offer configuration with PVD for any other reason, it MUST respond to client/requesting router with appropriate status code as specified in [RFC3315] and [RFC3633].

8. Security Considerations

An attacker may attempt to modify the information provided inside the PVD container option. These attacks can easily be prevented by using the DHCPv6 AUTH option [RFC3315] that would detect any form of tampering with the DHCPv6 message contents.

A compromised DHCPv6 server or relay agent may insert configuration information related to PvDs it is not authorized to advertise. e.g. A coffee shop DHCPv6 server may provide configuration information purporting to be from an enterprise and may try to attract enterprise related traffic. The only real way to avoid this is that the PVD container contains embedded authentication and authorization information from the owner of the PVD. Then, this attack can be detected by the client by verifying the authentication and authorization information provided inside the PVD container option after verifying its trust towards the PVD owner (e.g. a certificate with a well-known/common trust anchor).

A compromised configuration source or an on-link attacker may try to capture advertised configuration information and replay it on a different link or at a future point in time. This can be avoided by including some replay protection mechanism such as a timestamp or a nonce inside the PVD container to ensure freshness of the provided information.

9. IANA Considerations

This document defines three new DHCPv6 options to be allocated out of the registry at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/>

- OPTION_PVD (TBA1)
- OPTION_PVD_ID (TBA2)
- OPTION_PVD_AUTH (TBA3)

10. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the members of the MIF architecture design team for their comments that led to the creation of this draft.

11. Normative References

- [I-D.anipko-mif-mpvd-arch]
Anipko, D., "Multiple Provisioning Domain Architecture",
draft-anipko-mif-mpvd-arch-05 (work in progress), November
2013.

- [PVDIDS] Krishnan, S., Korhonen, J., Bhandari, S., and S. Gundavelli, "Identification of provisioning domains", draft-kkbg-mpvd-id-00 (work in progress), February 2014.
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
- [RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
- [RFC3633] Troan, O. and R. Droms, "IPv6 Prefix Options for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) version 6", RFC 3633, December 2003.
- [RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, July 2005.
- [RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.
- [RFC6494] Gagliano, R., Krishnan, S., and A. Kukec, "Certificate Profile and Certificate Management for SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 6494, February 2012.
- [RFC6495] Gagliano, R., Krishnan, S., and A. Kukec, "Subject Key Identifier (SKI) SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) Name Type Fields", RFC 6495, February 2012.

Authors' Addresses

Suresh Krishnan
Ericsson
8400 Decarie Blvd.
Town of Mount Royal, QC
Canada

Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871
Email: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com

Jouni Korhonen
Broadcom Communications
Porkkalankatu 24
FIN-00180 Helsinki
Finland

Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com

Shwetha Bhandari
Cisco Systems
Cessna Business Park, Sarjapura Marathalli Outer Ring Road
Bangalore, KARNATAKA 560 087
India

Phone: +91 80 4426 0474
Email: shwethab@cisco.com

mif Working Group
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: March 2, 2015

S. Krishnan
Ericsson
J. Korhonen
Broadcom
S. Bhandari
Cisco Systems
S. Gundavelli
Cisco
August 29, 2014

Identification of provisioning domains
draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-id-00

Abstract

The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple networks. This document describes several methods of generating identification information for provisioning them and a format for carrying such identification in configuration protocols.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on March 2, 2015.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents

carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	2
2. Terminology	2
3. Provisioning domain identity format	2
4. Security Considerations	3
5. IANA Considerations	3
6. Acknowledgements	4
7. Normative References	4
Authors' Addresses	4

1. Introduction

The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple networks based on the Multiple Provisioning Domains (MPVD) architecture work [I-D.ietf-mif-mpvd-arch]. This document describes a format for carrying identification information along with a few alternatives for reasonable sources for PVD identification. Since the PVD IDs are expected to be unique, the identification sources provide some level of uniqueness using either a hierarchical structure (e.g. FQDNs and OIDs) or some form of randomness (e.g. UUID and ULAs). Any source that does not provide either guaranteed or probabilistic uniqueness is probably not a good candidate for identifying provisioning domains.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Provisioning domain identity format

The identity of the PVD is independent of the configuration protocol used to communicate it and is formatted as follows.

```

0                               1                               2                               3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|   id-type   |   id-length   |                                     |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

```

+               PVD identity information               +
.               (variable length)                       .
+-----+

```

PVD ID Option

- o id-type: Describes the type of identification information.
This document defines six types of PVD identity information
 - 0x01: UUID [RFC4122]
 - 0x02: UTF-8 string
 - 0x03: OID [OID]
 - 0x04: NAI Realm [RFC4282]
 - 0x05: FQDN
 - 0x06: ULA Prefix [RFC4193]
 Further types can be added by IANA action.
- o id-length: Length of the PVD identification in octets
not including the id-type and id-length fields.
- o PVD identity information: The PVD identification that is
based on the id-type.

4. Security Considerations

An attacker may attempt to modify the PVD identity provided in a configuration protocol. These attacks can be prevented by using the configuration protocol mechanisms such as SEND [RFC3971] and DHCPv6 AUTH option [RFC3315] that detect any form of tampering with the configuration.

A compromised configuration source, on the other hand, cannot easily be detected by a configuration client. The only real way to avoid this is that the PVD identification is directly associable to some form of authentication and authorization information from the owner of the PVD (e.g. an FQDN can be associated with a DANE cert). Then, this attack can be detected by the client by verifying the authentication and authorization information provided inside the PVD container option after verifying its trust towards the PVD owner (e.g. a certificate with a well-known/common trust anchor that).

5. IANA Considerations

This document creates a new registry for PVD id types. The initial values are listed below

```

0x01: UUID [RFC4122]
0x02: UTF-8 string

```

0x03: OID [OID]
0x04: NAI Realm [RFC4282]
0x05: FQDN
0x06: ULA Prefix [RFC4193]

6. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the members of the MIF architecture design team, Ted Lemon, Brian Carpenter, Bernie Volz and Alper Yegin for their contributions to this draft.

7. Normative References

- [I-D.ietf-mif-mpvd-arch]
Anipko, D., "Multiple Provisioning Domain Architecture", draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-arch-03 (work in progress), August 2014.
- [OID] IANA, "PRIVATE ENTERPRISE NUMBERS", SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Codes, <http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers/enterprise-numbers>, March 2013.
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
- [RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
- [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
- [RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, July 2005.
- [RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.

Authors' Addresses

Suresh Krishnan
Ericsson
8400 Decarie Blvd.
Town of Mount Royal, QC
Canada

Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871
Email: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com

Jouni Korhonen
Broadcom Communications
Porikkalankatu 24
FIN-00180 Helsinki
Finland

Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com

Shwetha Bhandari
Cisco Systems
Cessna Business Park, Sarjapura Marathalli Outer Ring Road
Bangalore, KARNATAKA 560 087
India

Phone: +91 80 4426 0474
Email: shwethab@cisco.com

Sri Gundavelli
Cisco
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA

Email: sgundave@cisco.com

IPv6 Maintenance
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: March 2, 2015

J. Korhonen
Broadcom
S. Krishnan
Ericsson
S. Gundavelli
Cisco Systems
August 29, 2014

Support for multiple provisioning domains in IPv6 Neighbor Discovery
Protocol
draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-ndp-support-00

Abstract

The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple networks. One part of the solution requires associating configuration information with provisioning domains. This document details how configuration information provided through IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol can be associated with provisioning domains.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on March 2, 2015.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents

carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	3
2. Terminology	3
3. PVD Container option	3
4. PVD Identity option	6
5. Set of allowable options	7
6. Security Considerations	7
7. IANA Considerations	7
8. Acknowledgements	8
9. References	8
9.1. Normative References	8
9.2. Informative References	8
Appendix A. Examples	9
A.1. One implicit PVD and one explicit PVD	9
Authors' Addresses	11

1. Introduction

The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple networks based on the Multiple Provisioning Domains (MPVD) architecture work [I-D.ietf-mif-mpvd-arch]. One part of the solution requires associating configuration information with Provisioning Domains (PVD). This document describes an IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) [RFC4861] mechanism for explicitly indicating provisioning domain information along with any configuration that will be provided. The proposed mechanism uses an NDP option that indicates the identity of the provisioning domain and encapsulates the options that contain the configuration information as well as any accompanying authentication/authorization information. The solution defined in this document aligns as much as possible with the existing IPv6 Neighbor Discovery security, namely with Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) [RFC3971].

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. PVD Container option

The PVD container option (PVD_CO) is used to mark the start of the configuration options that belong to the explicitly identified provisioning domain. The PVD container option MUST encapsulate exactly one PVD identifier option (PVD_ID, see Section 4). The PVD container option MAY occur multiple times in the same NDP message but each of these PVD container options MUST have a different PVD identity specified under its PVD identity option. The PVD container options MUST NOT be nested.

A PVD container is intended to be used in IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA) NDP messages. However, including a PVD container or identity options inside a Router Solicitation (RS) NDP messages is also possible (actually, in this way a host can solicit for information from a specific provisioning domain). The PVD container option MUST NOT be included in a NDP message without accompanying PVD identity option (see Section 4). If, for some reason, the NDP message does not include the accompanying PVD identity option, then the implementation MUST ignore the PVD container option and SHOULD log the event. The PVD container MUST NOT be fragmented i.e., should the IPv6 packet be fragmented, the PVD container and the accompanying PVD

identity MUST both be inside the same fragment.

Since implementations are required to ignore any unrecognized options [RFC4861], the backward compatibility and the reuse of existing NDP options is implicitly enabled. Implementations that do not recognize the PVD container option plain ignore it and also skip PVD container option "encapsulated" NDP options normally without associating them into any provisioning domain (since the implementation has no notion of provisioning domains). For example, the PVD container could "encapsulate" a Prefix Information Option (PIO), which would mark that this certain advertised IPv6 prefix belongs and originates from a specific provisioning domain. However, if the implementation does not understand provisioning domains, then this specific PIO is also skipped and not configured to the interface.

The optional security for the PVD container is based on X.509 certificates [RFC6487] and reuses mechanisms already defined for SeND [RFC3971] [RFC6495]. However, the use of PVD containers does not assume or depend on SeND being deployed or even implemented. The PVD containers SHOULD be signed per PVD certificates, which provides both integrity protection and proves that the configuration information source is authorized for advertising the given information. See [RFC6494] for discussion how to enable deployments where the certificates needed to sign PVD containers) belong to different administrative domains i.e. to different provisioning domains.




Figure 1: PVD Container Option

Type

PVD Container; Set to TBD1.

Length

Length of the PVD_CO. The actual length depends on the number of "encapsulated" NDP options, the length of the PVD identifier option and the optional Key Hash/Digital Signature/Padding.

S

Security enabled/disabled flag. If S=0 then security (signing) of the PVD_CO is disabled. If S=1 then security (signing) is enabled.

Name Type

Names the algorithm used to identify a specific X.509 certificate using the method defined for the SubjectKey Identifier (SKI) extension for the X.509 certificates. The usage and the Name Type registry aligns with the mechanism defined for SeND [RFC6495]. Name Type values starting from 3 are supported and an implementation MUST at least support SHA-1 (value 3). Note that if S=0 the Name field serves no use.

Key Hash

This field is only present when S=1. A hash of the public key using the algorithm identified by the Name Type. The procedure how the Key Hash is calculated is defined in [RFC3971] and [RFC6495].

Digital Signature

This field is only present when S=1. A signature calculated over the PVD_CO option including all option data from the beginning of the option until to the end of the container. The procedure of calculating the signature is identical to the one defined for SeND [RFC3971]. During the signature calculation the contents of the Digital Signature option MUST be treated as all zero.

Implementations MUST ensure that the PVD container option meets the 8 octets NDP option alignment requirement. This MAY imply adding padding zero octets to the tail of the PVD container option until the alignment requirement has been met. The padding is independent of the 'S' flag setting.

If the PVD_CO does not contain a digital signature, then other means to secure the integrity of the NDP message SHOULD be provided, such as utilizing SeND. However, the security provided by SeND is for the entire NDP message and does not allow verifying whether the sender of the NDP message is actually authorized for the information for the provisioning domain.

If the PVD_CO contains a signature and the verification fails, then the whole PVD_CO, PVD_ID and other NDP options MUST be silently ignored and the event SHOULD be logged.

4. PVD Identity option

The PVD identity option (PVD_ID) is used to explicitly indicate the identity of the provisioning domain that is associated with the configuration information encapsulated by the PVD container option. A PVD container option MUST have exactly one PVD identity option. However, the PVD identity option MAY also be included in a NDP message without the PVD container option. In this case it merely serves as a hint of provisioning domain and could, for example, be used in an RS message to solicit information from specific provisioning domains.




Figure 2: PVD_ID Option

Type

PVD identifier; Set to TBD2.

Length

Length of the PVD_ID.

Identity

The provisioning domain identity. The contents of this field is defined in a separate document [I-D.kkbg-mpvd-id]. Note that the Identity field may need to be zero padded at the tail to meets the natural NDP options' alignment.

If the receiver of the PVD identity option does not understand any of

the ID-Types, then anything belonging to this provisioning domain MUST be silently discarded. This would mean the PVD identity option, the PVD container option and all other options.

5. Set of allowable options

The PVD container option MAY be used to encapsulate any allocated IPv6 NDP options, which may appear more than once in a NDP message. The PVD container option MUST NOT be used to encapsulate other PVD_CO option(s).

6. Security Considerations

An attacker may attempt to modify the information provided inside the PVD container option. These attacks can easily be prevented by using SeND [RFC3971] or per PVD container signature that would detect any form of tampering with the IPv6 NDP message contents.

A compromised router may advertise configuration information related to provisioning domains it is not authorized to advertise. e.g. A coffee shop router may provide configuration information purporting to be from an enterprise and may try to attract enterprise related traffic. The only real way to avoid this is that the provisioning domain container contains embedded authentication and authorization information from the owner of the provisioning domain. Then, this attack can be detected by the client by verifying the authentication and authorization information provided inside the PVD container option after verifying its trust towards the provisioning domain owner (e.g. a certificate with a well-known/common trust anchor).

A compromised configuration source or an on-link attacker may try to capture advertised configuration information and replay it on a different link or at a future point in time. This can be avoided by including some replay protection mechanism such as a timestamp or a nonce inside the PVD container to ensure freshness of the provided information. This specification does not define a replay protection solution. Rather it is assumed that if replay protection is required, the access network and hosts also deploy existing security solutions such as SeND [RFC3971].

7. IANA Considerations

This document defines two new IPv6 NDP options into the "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Option Formats" registry. The options TBD1 and TBD2 are described in Section 3 and Section 4.

8. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the members of the MIF architecture design team for their comments that led to the creation of this draft.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

- [I-D.kkbg-mpvd-id]
Krishnan, S., Korhonen, J., Bhandari, S., and S. Gundavelli, "Identification of provisioning domains", draft-kkbg-mpvd-id-00 (work in progress), February 2014.
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
- [RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861, September 2007.
- [RFC6494] Gagliano, R., Krishnan, S., and A. Kukec, "Certificate Profile and Certificate Management for SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 6494, February 2012.
- [RFC6495] Gagliano, R., Krishnan, S., and A. Kukec, "Subject Key Identifier (SKI) SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) Name Type Fields", RFC 6495, February 2012.

9.2. Informative References

- [I-D.ietf-mif-mpvd-arch]
Anipko, D., "Multiple Provisioning Domain Architecture", draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-arch-03 (work in progress), August 2014.
- [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
- [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012.

Appendix A. Examples

A.1. One implicit PVD and one explicit PVD

Figure 3 shows how the NDP options are laid out in an RA for one implicit provisioning domain and one explicit provisioning domain. The example does not include security (and signing of the PVD container). The assumption is the PVD identity consumes 14 octets.

The explicit provisioning domain ("starducks.example.com" in a NAI Realm format) contains a specific PIO for 2001:db8:abad:cafe::/64 and the MTU of 1337 octets. The implicit provisioning domain configures a prefix 2001:db8:cafe:babe::/64 and the link MTU of 1500 octets. There are two cases: 1) the host receiving the RA implements provisioning domains and 2) the host does not understand provisioning domains.

1. The host recognizes the PVD_CO and "starts" a provisioning domain specific configuration. Security is disabled, thus there are no Key Hash or Digital Signature fields to process. The prefix 2001:db8:abad:cafe::/64 is found and configured on the interface. Once the PVD_ID option is located the interface prefix configuration for 2001:db8:abad:cafe::/64 and the MTU of 1337 octets can be associated to the provisioning domain found in the PVD_ID option.

The rest of the options are parsed and configured into the implicit provisioning domain since there is no encapsulating provisioning domain. The interface is configured with prefix 2001:db8:cafe:babe::/64. The implicit provisioning domain uses the link MTU of 1500 octets, whereas the "starducks.example.com" provisioning domain uses the MTU of 1337 octets (this means when packets are sourced using 2001:db8:abad:cafe::/64 prefix the link MTU is different than when sourcing packets using 2001:db8:cafe:babe::/64 prefix).

2. The host ignores the PVD_CO (including the PVD_ID and other options) and ends up configuring one prefix on its interface (2001:db8:cafe:babe::/64) with a link MTU of 1500 octets.

```

0                               1                               2                               3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|      134      |      0      |      Checksum      |      |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Cur Hop Limit |0|1|  Reserved |      Router Lifetime      |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     Reachable Time          |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     Retrans Timer           |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Type=PVD_CO   |      10      |0|  Reserved   |      0      | <+
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     0                       |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|      3      |      4      |      64      |1|1| Reserved1 |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     Valid Lifetime          | P
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ V
|                                     Preferred Lifetime      | D
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     Reserved2                |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     2001:db8:abad:cafe::      ~
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Type=PVD_ID   |      4      | id-type=4   |      21      |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| ~ "starducks.example.com", '\0', '\0', '\0', '\0', '\0', '\0', '\0'
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|      5      |      1      |      Reserved      |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     1337                    |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ <+
|      3      |      4      | Prefix Length |1|1| Reserved1 |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     Valid Lifetime          |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     Preferred Lifetime      |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     Reserved2                |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     2001:db8:cafe:babe::      ~
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|      5      |      1      |      Reserved      |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     1500                    |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

Figure 3: An RA with one implicit PVD and one explicit PVD

Authors' Addresses

Jouni Korhonen
Broadcom
Porkkalankatu 24
FIN-00180 Helsinki
Finland

Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com

Suresh Krishnan
Ericsson
8400 Decarie Blvd.
Town of Mount Royal, QC
Canada

Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871
Email: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com

Sri Gundavelli
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA

Email: sgundave@cisco.com

