


CGA Security Improvement

[draft-rafiie-rfc3972-bis-00](#)

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Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) – RFC 3972

- **What is CGA**

- Proof of IP address ownership by finding a binding between public key and IPv6 address of the node
 - Hash (public key | other parameters) and use 64bits of this hash as an IPv6 address of the node
 - Sent with packet: public key and other parameters signed by private key
 - Use some condition to increase the security over 64 bits limit of interface ID: sec value 0 - 7

- **Problem with CGA**

- All explained in the following documents

<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rafiiee-6man-cga-attack-02>

Problems & Solutions with CGA - I

- Problem with CGA and SeND specification document
 - Possibility to match CGA generated by sec value 0 to CGA higher sec values
 - Solution: Needs to check with source IP address and target IP address
- RSA weak key size
 - Matching CGA value generated by RSA weak key size with value generated by legitimate node
 - Legitimate node use weak key size that is easily breakable by the attacker
 - Solution: Node should discard any message with weak key sizes

Problems & Solutions with CGA - II

- Variable length prefix
 - Prefix information should be sent by router
 - Less than 64 bits interface ID has high impact on node's security and should be avoided

Question?

- Any suggestion?
- Does WG want to adopt this document?