



# Segment Routing IPv6

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
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
## Where is Traffic Engineering (TE) ?

- TE requires RSVP to install state in every the core routers
  - => 'low' convergence
  - => TE not widely deployed mainly because of scaling and complexity issues




## What Can We Do for Efficient/Flexible TE?

- Leverage IPv6 flexibility
  - Overload routing header, i.e. install state in the data packet
- Remove state in the core
  - Push state at the edge or SDN controller
  - Simplification of the core




# “End-to-End Traffic Engineering” from CPE/Set-up Box?

- What about mobile node away from SP network?



# Segment Routing in a Nutshell

- Segment Routing:
  - **Source based routing model** where the source chooses a path and encodes it in the packet header as an ordered list of segments
    - Removes routing states from any node other than the source
  - A segment is an instruction applied to the packet
    - Instruction can be of any type: IGP, BGP, Service, Locator, Egress link, ...
  - Segment Routing leverages the source routing architecture defined in RFC2460 for IPv6



Source: [wikimedia](#)

# Current SR-IPv6 Drafts

- draft-filsfils-spring-segment-routing
  - Describes the overall Segment Routing architecture
- draft-ietf-spring-ipv6-use-cases
  - describes the SR-IPv6 use cases
- draft-previdi-6man-segment-routing-header
  - describes a new type of the Routing Header (SRH)
- draft-vyncke-6man-segment-routing-security
  - describes the security mechanisms applied to the SRH

# Segment Routing Header (SRH)

# Segment Routing for IPv6 Dataplane

- A Segment is identified through its IPv6 address
  - No mapping needed between Segment IDs (SIDs) and node's addresses
  - Simplifies signaling, address == SID
- New Routing Extensions Header type
  - Segment Routing Header (SRH)
  - Contains Segment List, Policy List, and a few other bits...




# SRH

- **Next Header:** 8-bit selector. Identifies the type of header immediately following the SRH
- **Hdr Ext Len:** 8-bit unsigned integer. Defines the length of the SRH header in 8-octet units, not including the first 8 octets
- **Type:** TBD by IANA (SRH)
- **Next Segment:** index, in the Segment List, of the next active segment in the SRH
- **Last Segment:** index, in the Segment List, of the last segment of the path
- **Flags:** 16 bits of flags. *See SPRING WG presentation.*



# SRH

- **Segment List[n]**: 128-bit IPv6 addresses representing each segment of the path
- **Policy List[n]**: See SPRING WG presentation
- **HMAC**: SRH authentication (optional)



# Myth #1: Ext Hdr are dropped on the Internet

- draft-gont-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-in-real-world
  - About 20-40% of packets with Ext Hdr are dropped over the Internet
- SRH works only within one administrative domain
  - => not an issue as operator set the security/drop policy
- Test on your own: <http://www.vyncke.org/sr.php>
  - And let us know !

# Myth 2: RH has been deprecated

- RFC 5095 only deprecates RH-0
  - Amplification / reflection attacks
- RH-2, mobile IPv6 is OK
  - Only one segment
- RH-3, RPL is also OK
  - Within a single administrative domain, not on the Internet

# Segment Routing Security

- Addresses concerns of RFC5095
  - HMAC field to be used at ingress of a SR domain in order to validate/authorize the SRH
  - Inside SR domain, each node trust its brothers (RPL model)
- HMAC requires a shared secret (SDN & SR ingress routers)
  - Outside of current discussions
  - Pretty much similar to BGP session security or OSPFv3 security

# Implementations

- Multiple implementations exist and interoperability has been demonstrated during IETF-90
  - Cisco,  
Comcast,  
Ecole Polytechnique (Paris),  
UCLouvain (LLN, Belgium)
- Demonstrated interoperability between multiple, independent IPv6 Segment Routing implementations (routers and hosts)
- Illustrate interoperability between SR and non-SR capable routers and hosts
- Illustrate how SR can be leveraged for video content delivery through SR capable caches

# Questions?

Ask: Becoming a WG document?  
(SPRING are WG doc)

# Thanks!