

DNS Cookies

Are People Hungry Enough Yet?
(With material on BIND Beta feature)

draft-eastlake-dnsex-cookies-05.txt

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
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DNS Cookies (Yummy!)

- An OPT option that provides weak protection against off path DNS denial of service, traffic amplification, and poisoning attacks.
 - Clients include a 64-bit cookie in queries and check it in responses. Typically a pseudo-random function of the server IP and a client secret.
 - Servers include a variable size (minimum 64-bit) cookie in responses and check it in future queries. Typically a pseudo-random function of the client IP, a server secret, and (to be sure to distinguish clients behind a NAT) the client cookie. Other material such as a time-stamp or nonce can be included.

DNS Cookies (Yummy!)

- Proposed OPT option:



DNS Cookies (Yummy!)

- Clients and servers only need to recognize their own cookies.
- If not implemented or not enabled, no cookie in requests, servers respond as they do now.
- When implemented and enabled:
 - Client includes a COOKIE OPT in requests with a client cookie and a server cookie if they know a cookie for the server.

DNS Cookies (Yummy!)

- When implemented and enabled (cont.):
 - Server looks for COOKIE OPT in requests:
 - If none or malformed, server can
 1. Discard request.
 2. Return a minimal length error.
 3. Process request normally.
 - Cookie OK except for bad/absent server cookie:
 1. Discard request.
 2. Return a minimal length error.
 3. Process request normally and return with a COOKIE OPT with a distinctive error code in it.
 - » Must take choice 2 or 3 occasionally for bootstrap.
 - Good COOKIE OPT including good server cookie OK: Process normally.

DNS Cookies (Yummy!)

- When implemented and enabled (cont.):
 - Client looks for COOKIE OPT in responses:
 - If good COOKIE OPT with good client cookie in response, client caches server cookie and processes response normally.
 - If no/malformed cookie or one with bad client cookie, client discards the response.
 - If response has a good client cookie but a COOKIE OPT error code indicating that the server received the request with a bad server cookie, then the client should retry immediately with the new server cookie it just received.

DNS Cookies (Yummy!)

- Miscellaneous:
 - See draft for full details including factoring in whether request is over TCP which provides similar weak protection.
 - Resolver and server secrets periodically rolled over, old secret remembered for a little while for verification only.
 - Compatible with forgery resistance mechanisms in RFC 5452.

BIND Source Identity Token

- **In BIND 9.10.0b1**
- Based on DNS Cookies
 - No error code field
 - Variable length sever cookie
 - Uses Experimental EDNS OPT 65,001
 - <http://www.isc.org/downloads/>

BIND Source Identity Token

- Token Format:
 - Client Cookie (64 bit hash)
 - Server Cookie: 128-bits as follows:
 - Nonce (32 bits), Time (32 bits), Hash (64 bits)
- Tokens are valid for 1 hour with 300 seconds of clock skew supported for server clusters.
- DNS Server Cookies have infinite life times with the only control being to change the secret.

BIND Source Identity Token

- Hash Computation Methods:
 - AES
 - HMAC-SHA1
 - HMAC-SHA256
- `hash = trunc(hmacX(secret,
client|nonce|when|address), 8);`