

rfc4474bis-02

IETF 91 (Honolulu)

STIR WG

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First principles (yet again)

Separating the work into two buckets:

1) Signaling

- What fields are signed, signer/verifier behavior, canonicalization

2) Credentials

- How signers enroll, how verifiers acquire credentials, how to determine a credential's authority for identity
- rfc4474bis is our signaling solution
 - But contains guidance for specifications of (2)

What we did since -01

- Added the mandatory signature over a=fingerprint
 - Also discussed how that interacts with baiting
 - We need to discuss a little more, though
- Integrated “canon”
 - Still more thinking to do here
- Split references
- Replaced IANA stub with some actual text
- Added some hooks for STIR prob-statement and threats

Open issues: On “canon”

- Is the latitude for local policy too broad?
 - Today “further transformations MAY be made”
- Today “canon” just covers the From
 - Should it cover the To as well?
 - Is the To more likely to transform than the From?
 - Does it need to, to prevent robocalling etc.?
 - canon=t:<TN1>;f:<TN2>
- Added some text saying that auth services can alter the To and From before signing
 - Obvious, and serves a different purpose than “canon”

Open Issues: On Gatewaying

- Previously, we had discussed the possibility of non-SIP protocols tunneling this cryptographic signature
 - This was a feature of Hadriel's stir-ikes-out
- Do we still want to try to make this work?
 - SS7 UUI, XMPP, others?
 - If so, I suggest this go in some separate specification
- But what about mandatory protection for a=fingerprint?
 - Gateways will cause fail
 - Is that would should happen?

Path Forward

- Should the Date threshold be an hour, or ten minutes, or lower?
 - Text currently inconsistent
- Do we want to do a compliance example?
 - Cullen and I built implementations for 4474
 - Be nice to get something the works
- Editing still needed, big ideas now in place?
 - Surely more legacy language needs an update
 - There's probably some chaff to cut here