

# **IPv6 Segment Routing Security Considerations**

draft-vyncke-6man-segment-routing-security-02

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## Changes in -02

- Segment Routing Header (SRH) has changed in -06
  - Need to update text
- Reworded a lot of text
  - RFC 5095
  - Clearer on 'within a single ISP network'
  - Not enabled by default
  - ICMP generation
  - BCP-38
  - Added David as co-author (thanks for HMAC fixes RFC 2104)

## What RFC 5095 Says

"The severity of this threat is considered to be sufficient to warrant deprecation of RHO entirely. A side effect is that this also eliminates benign RHO use-cases;

however, such applications may be facilitated by future Routing Header specifications."

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
December 2007

Deprecation of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6
RFC 5095

IETF92 – Dallas, March 2015

### SRH: HMAC Coverage

- Source Address (not shown): as it is immutable and to prevent SR service stealing
- First Segment: offset in the SRH, not including the first 8 octets and expressed in 16-octet units, pointing to the last element of the Segment List
- Flags:
  - bit-0: cleanup
  - bit-1: rerouted packet
  - bits 2 and 3: reserved
  - bits 4 to 15: policy flags
- HMAC Key ID:
- Segment List[n]: all segments



## Segment Routing Security

- Addresses concerns of RFC 5095
  - HMAC field to be used at ingress of a SR domain in order to validate/authorize the SRH
  - Inside SR domain, each node trust its brothers (RPL/RH-3 model)
- HMAC requires a shared secret (controller & SR-domain ingress routers)
  - Outside of current discussions
  - Pretty much similar to BGP session security or OSPFv3 security

## Questions?

Ask: Becoming a WG document?

SPRING are WG doc

Working implementationS

## Thanks!