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Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol
Negotiation
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Abstract

This document specifies a Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] extension for the negotiation of Token Binding protocol [TBPROTO] version and key parameters.

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1. Introduction

In order to use the Token Binding protocol [TBPROTO], the client and server need to agree on the Token Binding protocol version and the parameters (signature and hash algorithm, length) of the Token Binding key. This document specifies a new TLS extension to accomplish this negotiation without introducing additional network round-trips.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Token Binding Negotiation Client Hello Extension

The client uses the "token_binding" TLS extension to indicate supported Token Binding protocol version and key parameters.

```
enum {  
    token_binding(TBD), (65535)  
} ExtensionType;
```

The "extension_data" field of this extension contains a "TokenBindingParameters" value.

```
struct {  
    uint8 major;  
    uint8 minor;  
} ProtocolVersion;  
  
enum {  
    rsa2048_pkcs1.5_sha256(0), rsa2048_pss_sha256(1), ecdsap256_sha256(2), (255)  
} TokenBindingKeyParameters;  
  
struct {  
    ProtocolVersion token_binding_version;  
    TokenBindingKeyParameters key_parameters_list<2..2^16-1>  
} TokenBindingParameters;
```

"token_binding_version" indicates the supported version of the Token Binding protocol. [TBPROTO] describes version {1, 0} of the protocol. Prototype implementations of Token Binding drafts can indicate support of a specific draft version, e.g. {0, 0} or {0, 1}.

"key_parameters_list" contains the list of identifiers of the Token Binding key parameters supported by the client, in descending order of preference.

3. Token Binding Negotiation Server Hello Extension

The server uses the "token_binding" TLS extension to indicate support for the Token Binding protocol version offered by the client and to select key parameters.

The server that supports Token Binding and receives a client hello message containing the "token_binding" extension, will include the "token_binding" extension in the server hello if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

1. The server supports the Token Binding protocol version offered by the client.
2. The server finds acceptable Token Binding key parameters on the client's list.
3. The server is also negotiating Extended Master Secret TLS extension [I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash] (see security considerations section below for more details).

The server will ignore any key parameters that it does not recognize. The "extension_data" field of the "token_binding" extension is structured the same as described above for the client "extension_data".

"token_binding_version" echos the Token Binding protocol version advertised by the client.

"key_parameters_list" contains exactly one Token Binding key parameters identifier selected by the server from the client's list.

4. Negotiating Token Binding Protocol Version and Key Parameters

It is expected that a server will have a list of Token Binding key parameters identifiers that it supports, in preference order. The server **MUST** only select an identifier that the client offered. The server **SHOULD** select the most highly preferred key parameters identifier it supports which is also advertised by the client. In the event that the server supports none of the key parameters that the client advertises, then the server **MUST NOT** include "token_binding" extension in the server hello.

The client receiving the "token_binding" extension **MUST** terminate the handshake with a fatal "unsupported_extension" alert if any of the following conditions are true:

1. The client did not include the "token_binding" extension in the client hello.
2. "token_binding_version" does not match the Token Binding protocol version advertised by the client.
3. "key_parameters_list" includes more than one Token Binding key parameters identifier.
4. "key_parameters_list" includes an identifier that was not advertised by the client.
5. Extended Master Secret [I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash] is not negotiated (see security considerations section below for more details).

If the "token_binding" extension is included in the server hello and the TLS handshake succeeds, it means that the Token Binding protocol version and key parameters have been negotiated between the client and the server and **SHALL** be definitive for the TLS session. In this case, the client **MUST** use the negotiated key parameters in the "provided_token_binding" as described in [TBPROTO].

5. IANA Considerations

This document defines a new TLS extension "token_binding", which needs to be added to the IANA "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions" registry.

This document establishes a registry for identifiers of Token Binding key parameters entitled "Token Binding Key Parameters" under the "Token Binding Protocol" heading.

Entries in this registry require the following fields:

- o Value: The octet value that identifies a set of Token Binding key parameters (0-255).
- o Description: The description of the Token Binding key parameters.
- o Specification: A reference to a specification that defines the Token Binding key parameters.

This registry operates under the "Expert Review" policy as defined in [RFC5226]. The designated expert is advised to encourage the inclusion of a reference to a permanent and readily available specification that enables the creation of interoperable implementations using the identified set of Token Binding key parameters.

An initial set of registrations for this registry follows:

Value: 0

Description: rsa2048_pkcs1.5_sha256

Specification: this document

Value: 1

Description: rsa2048_pss_sha256

Specification: this document

Value: 2

Description: ecdsap256_sha256

Specification: this document

6. Security Considerations

6.1. Downgrade Attacks

The Token Binding protocol version and key parameters are negotiated via "token_binding" extension within the TLS handshake. TLS prevents active attackers from modifying the messages of the TLS handshake, therefore it is not possible for the attacker to remove or modify the "token_binding" extension. The signature and hash algorithms and key length used in the TokenBinding of type "provided_token_binding" MUST match the parameters negotiated via "token_binding" extension.

6.2. Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS

The Token Binding protocol relies on the `tls_unique` value to associate a TLS connection with a TLS Token Binding. The triple handshake attack [TRIPLE-HS] is a known TLS protocol vulnerability allowing the attacker to synchronize `tls_unique` values between TLS connections. The attacker can then successfully replay bound tokens. For this reason, the Token Binding protocol MUST NOT be negotiated unless the Extended Master Secret TLS extension [I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash] has also been negotiated.

7. Acknowledgements

This document incorporates comments and suggestions offered by Eric Rescorla, Gabriel Montenegro, Martin Thomson, Vinod Anupam.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

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[I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash]

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[TRIPLE-HS]

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