

Approaches to HTTPs-based Request Routing and Delegation for Interconnected CDNs

draft-slovetskiy-cdni-https-delegation-approaches-00

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Background

- › At IETF 92 in Dallas, we agreed to look at HTTPS traffic delegation
- › Concluded that there was a problem and an interest
- › Next steps
 - Write an internet-draft
 - Reach out to the list to invite interested people
 - Have I-D discuss problems and potentials solutions

Use Case(s)

- › Start with simple basic Use Case:
 - User Agent request is redirected from Origin CSP (Content Service Provider) to CDN surrogate
- › Expand to classic CDNI Use Case:
 - uCDN is delegating delivery of encrypted traffic (HTTPS) to a dCDN
- › Map to request routing mechanisms:
 - DNS-based
 - HTTP-based
 - URI rewriting
 - ...
- › HTTP version:
 - HTTP 1.1 now
 - HTTP/2 in the future (e.g. alt-svc)?

Houston, we have a problem...

› Or do we really?

- Assumption: "Request redirects do not (always?) work over TLS"

› Lets' explore:

- HTTP to HTTPS is **NOT OK**
- HTTPS to HTTPS: **seems OK** but... is it enough? See e.g. [1]:
"Problems with the certificate model appear to be more challenging, including among others: design and implementation issues in the CA/Browser (CA/B) trust model leading to fragility (compromise of a single CA can, at least temporarily, undermine system-wide security) and lack of trust agility, poor support for certificate revocation, a reduction in CA diligence in certificate issuance, and user interface challenges related to reliably signalling to end-users, in ways not ignored or spoofed, security indicators and site authentication information."

- DNS-based is **NOT OK** [2]




© NASA - <http://history.nasa.gov/SP-350/i13-1.jpg>

[1]: J. Clark and P. C. van Oorschot, "SoK: SSL and HTTPS: Revisiting Past Challenges and Evaluating Certificate Trust Model Enhancements," , 2013 IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy

[2] J. Liang, J. Jiang, H. Duan, K. Li, T. Wan, and J. Wu, "When HTTPS Meets CDN: A Case of Authentication in Delegated Service," , 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Solution Strawman: HTTPS-based Redirection


- › Let's pass the Token:
 - Token binds CSP's and CDN's certificates
 - Signed by CSP
 - Signals "hardened" redirect to UA
 - UA validates
 - Synergies with URI Signing



Solution Strawman: DNS-based Redirection

› Example from [1] using DANE

- CSP binds its certificate with CDN certificate in TLSA record
- Additional DNS query
- UA validates
- Infrastructure requirement: DNSSEC and DANE



[1] J. Liang, J. Jiang, H. Duan, K. Li, T. Wan, and J. Wu, "When HTTPS Meets CDN: A Case of Authentication in Delegated Service," 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Conclusion

- › Where do we go from here?
 - Additional Use Cases?
 - Additional redirection considerations?
 - Solution mechanisms / proposals?
 - Dependency on UA
 - Dependency on infrastructure
 - Consider HTTP/2?