




Tracking Middleboxes with Tracebox

IETF93: HOPS

Korian Edeline, Benoit Donnet
University of Liège



Introduction

- 1 Middleboxes
- 2 How to detect them ?
- 3 Tracebox
- 4 Implementations




Plan

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Deployment




Box plot of middlebox deployments for small (fewer than 1k hosts), medium (1k-10k hosts), large (10k-100k hosts), and very large (more than 100k hosts) enterprise networks. Y-axis is in log scale. 1

¹Justine Sherry et al. "Making middleboxes someone else's problem: network processing as a cloud service". In: *ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review* 42.4 (2012), pp. 13–24.

²Rahul Potharaju and Navendu Jain. "Demystifying the dark side of the middle: A field study of middlebox failures in datacenters". In: *Proceedings of the 2013 conference on Internet measurement conference*. ACM, 2013, pp. 9–22.

Deployment




Box plot of middlebox deployments for small (fewer than 1k hosts), medium (1k-10k hosts), large (10k-100k hosts), and very large (more than 100k hosts) enterprise networks. Y-axis is in log scale. ¹

- The market for security-oriented middleboxes is estimated to exceed \$10B by 2016²


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
Router processing




NAT processing



ALG processing



Potential processing over the whole Internet



Plan

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TBIT

- tbit³

³Alberto Medina, Mark Allman, and Sally Floyd. “Measuring interactions between transport protocols and middleboxes”. In: *Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement*. ACM, 2004, pp. 336–341.

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 - Send forged TCP packets over raw IP sockets

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- Purpose
 - detect whether ECN, IP options, and TCP options can be safely used

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TCPEXposure

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 - Compare what was sent to what was received
- Effect
 - Detect last modification, errors
 - Differentiate inbound & outbound modifications

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TCP HICCUPS

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⁵Ryan Craven, Robert Beverly, and Mark Allman. “A middlebox-cooperative TCP for a non end-to-end internet”. In: *Proceedings of the 2014 ACM conference on SIGCOMM*. ACM. 2014, pp. 151–162.



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TCP HICCUPS

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- Lightweight TCP extension that exposes in flight packet header modification to end points
- Basic question behind TCP HICCUPS
 - did my packet arrive at the destination with the same headers as sent?


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TCP HICCUPS

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 - ISN, IPID, RWIN



TCP HICCUPS

- HICCUPS overloads 3 header fields in the TCP 3-way handshake
 - ISN, IPID, RWIN
- ... with a function of the packet header




TCP HICCUPS

- All in all, it creates an end-to-end tamper-evident seal over the packet headers
- Different than a checksum
 - if some mods occur, the packet is still accepted




Controlling both ends

- Controlling both ends allows to detect middleboxes on one path




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
Controlling both ends

- What happens with uncontrolled server(s)?
 - potentially miss a lot of middleboxes



Controlling both ends

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Tracebox

- Tracebox⁶
- Extension to traceroute
 - send TTL limited TCP probes
 - inspect incoming ICMP time-exceeded packets
 - compare the TCP probe quoted and the TCP probe sent
 - in case of difference(s), a middlebox is found along the path

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- Server-independent, "One-sided"
- Detect multiple modifications
- Purpose
 - Middlebox detection
 - Middlebox location

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Plan


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Tracebox




Sent TCP SYN:




Tracebox



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
Received ICMP Time Exceeded:



Tracebox




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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Tracebox



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


Tracebox




Sent TCP SYN:

Received ICMP Time Exceeded:



Cannot detect all changes



ICMP Payload size


- ICMP only includes the network header plus the first 8 bytes of the transport header.
 - RFC792 (ICMPv4):
"Internet Header + 64 bits of Data Datagram"
 - RFC1812 (ICMPv4):
"the ICMP datagram SHOULD contain as much of the original datagram as possible without the length of the ICMP datagram exceeding 576 bytes."
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"As much of invoking packet as possible without the ICMPv6 packet exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU"
- Maximal quoting by default on Linux, Cisco IOX, HP routers, Alcatel routers, PaloAlto Firewall, etc.


ICMPv4 Payload size

- RFC1812-compliant routers (2013, 72 PL VPs to Alexa 5000)



ICMPv4 Payload size


- RFC1812-compliant routers (2013, 72 PL VPs to Alexa 5000)




- 80 % of Internet paths contains at least one RFC1812-capable router

ICMPv4 Payload size


- RFC1812-compliant routers location (2013, 72 PL VPs to Alexa 5000)





ICMP detection limitation




ICMP detection limitation





RECEIVED ICMP PAYLOADS:



ICMP detection limitation




RECEIVED ICMP PAYLOADS:



Use cases

- Testing new protocols deployability
 - MPTCP, TCP FO, TCP EDO, ...
- Testing new hardware/configurations
 - CGN deployment, ...
- Locating an issue
- Network management/debugging



Output Example

```
sudo scamper -c 'tracebox -v -t -p IP/TCP/MSS(1880)/MPCAPABLE/SACKP/ECE/WSCALE(14)' -i 75.103.119.15
tracebox standard mode from 139.165.223.26 to 75.103.119.15
result: success
1: 139.165.223.1 (full)
2: 193.190.252.233 (8B) IP::TTL(1) IP::Checksum(8c82)
3: 193.190.252.249 (8B) IP::TTL(1) IP::Checksum(8c82)
4: 193.190.252.97 (full) IP::TTL(1) IP::Checksum(8c82)
5: 193.190.252.43 (8B) IP::TTL(1) IP::Checksum(8c82)
6: 193.191.10.19 (8B) IP::TTL(1) IP::Checksum(8c82)
7: 193.191.16.37 (8B) IP::TTL(1) IP::Checksum(8c82)
8: 212.3.237.13 (8B) IP::TTL(1) IP::Checksum(8c82)
9: 4.69.138.196 (8B) IP::TTL(1) IP::Checksum(8c82)
10: 63.146.26.5 (8B) IP::TTL(1) IP::Checksum(8c82)
11: *
12: *
13: 63.148.218.166 (8B) IP::TTL(1) IP::Checksum(8c82)
14: 216.197.122.66 (8B) IP::TTL(1) IP::Checksum(8c82)
15: 216.119.120.118 (full) IP::TTL(1) IP::Checksum(8c82) TCP::SeqNumber(b26437fe) TCP::Options::MSS(05b4)
16: 75.103.119.15 TCP::Options::MSS(05b4) TCP::Options::WSOPT-WindowScale(08) -TCP::Options::MPCapable
```

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Output Example


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sudo scamper -c 'tracebox -v -t -p IP/TCP/MSS(1880)/MPCAPABLE/SACKP/ECE/WSCALE(14)' -i 75.103.119.15
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Output Example


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What about cellular networks ?

- There are middleboxes too⁷:



⁷Zhaoguang Wang et al. "An untold story of middleboxes in cellular networks". In: *A SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review* 41.4 (2011), pp. 374–385.

TraceboxAndroid⁸

- On-demand & Background probing

⁸Valentin Thirion, Korian Edeline, and Benoit Donnet. "Tracking Middleboxes in the Mobile World with TraceboxAndroid". In: *Traffic Monitoring and Analysis*. Springer, 2011. pp. 79–91.

Korian Edeline, Benoit Donnet — **Tracking Middleboxes with Tracebox** IETF93: HOPS
Slide 61/70



TraceboxAndroid⁸

- On-demand & Background probing
- A rooted version
 - Require to root the phone

⁸Valentin Thirion, Korian Edeline, and Benoit Donnet. "Tracking Middleboxes in the Mobile World with TraceboxAndroid". In: *Traffic Monitoring and Analysis*. Springer, 2011. pp. 79–91.

TraceboxAndroid⁸

- On-demand & Background probing
- A rooted version
 - Require to root the phone
- A non-rooted version
 - Non-rooted traceroutes to retrieve path-level information
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 - Non-rooted traceroutes to retrieve path-level information
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 - Troubleshooting incentives
- Interested ?

Send me an email at **korian.edeline@ulg.ac.be** to be notified when the new version is released.

⁸Valentin Thirion, Korian Edeline, and Benoit Donnet. "Tracking Middleboxes in the Mobile World with TraceboxAndroid". In: *Traffic Monitoring and Analysis*. Springer, 2011. pp. 79–91.

Plan

- 1 Middleboxes
- 2 How to detect them ?
- 3 Tracebox
- 4 Implementations



Tracebox implementations

- Standalone Tracebox
- Scamper



Standalone Tracebox

- Uses the previous mechanism to detect middleboxes.
- Implemented in C++ with Lua embedded.
- Libcrafter allows for efficiently describe probes as Scapy.
- Open source
- Supports Linux and Mac OSX.
- <http://github.com/tracebox/tracebox>
- <http://www.tracebox.org/>
- More details:⁹

⁹Gregory Detal et al. "Revealing middlebox interference with tracebox". In: *Proceedings of the 2013 conference on Internet measurement conference*. ACM, 2013, pp. 1–8.

Standalone Tracebox

- Uses the previous mechanism to detect middleboxes.
- Implemented in C++ with Lua embedded.

Basic use of the Lua API

When run, the scripts have preset global variables and function, listed in [Globals](#). The most basic script is made of 3 parts:

- Probe packet definition, using successive concatenation of packet layers, see [Globals](#).

```
pkt = ip{dst='185.31.18.133'} / tcp{dst=80}
```

- Callback function definition, which will be called after each probe packet has been echoed back by intermediate routers on the path, see [Globals:tracebox_callback](#).

```
function cb(ttl, r_ip, probe, rcv, mod)
    print('At hop ' .. ttl)
    print('Received: ' .. tostring(rcv))
end
```

- tracebox() function call, see [Globals:tracebox](#), with the created probe packet and callback function, which will run tracebox and call the callback with the detected packet modifications and return the final received packet received from the target, if any.

```
result = tracebox(pkt, {callback='cb'})
print(tostring(result))
```

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Scamper

- All-around parallelized topology/performance analyzing tool.
- Implements various simple and complex measurement methods (ping, traceroute, dealias, tbit, ...).



Scamper

TRACEBOX OPTIONS

The tracebox command can be used to detect middleboxes on a path to a specified host. It supports the standard tracebox method alongside other middleboxes detection techniques. The following options are available for the scamper tracebox command:

```
tracebox [-6] [-u] [-s] [-r] [-t] [-v] [-p probe] [-d dport] [--frags]
[--statefull] [--proxy] [--proxy-secondary-dport]
```

-6 uses IPV6 probes.

-u uses UDP probes.

-v print values of modified fields.

-s uses simplified display mode. Ignore IP::TTL, IPV6::HopLimit and IP::Checksum fields.

-r outputs the observed RTT values for each packet sent.

-t outputs the observed icmp quote size for each received icmp message.

-p probe characterizes the probe. Fields marked with a * can have their value specified using parentheses (e.g.: TCP(18) sets the TCP flags to SYN/ACK).

- Protocols: IP, IPV6, TCP*, UDP
 - IP fields: ECT, CE, DSCP*, IPID*/IPFLOW
 - TCP fields or options: ECE, MSS*, WSCALE*, MPCAPABLE, MPJOIN, SACK, SACKP, TIMESTAMP, MD5, TCPAO
- Example: -p IPV6/TCP/MSS/WSCALE/SACKP

-d dport specifies the destination port for the packets being sent. Defaults to 80.

Scamper

- Native output format: warts.
- IPv6 support
- Open source
- Supports FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, Linux, MacOS X, Solaris, Windows, and more.
- <http://www.caida.org/tools/measurement/scamper/>
- Debian/Ubuntu packages, FreeBSD ports, ...
- More details:¹¹

¹¹Matthew Luckie. “Scamper: a scalable and extensible packet prober for active measurement of the internet”. In: *Proceedings of the 10th ACM SIGCOMM conference Internet measurement*. ACM. 2010, pp. 239–245.

Thank you !

