

Token Binding over HTTPS

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
Overview

1. Recap (for newcomers)
2. Changes to tokbind-https
3. Threat model (or: Should there be a Sec- prefix?)
4. Requirements for federation

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Recap: The Token Binding Header



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```
provided_token_binding: {  
  signature(tls_unique),  
  public_keyexample.com  
}
```


Client

- client proves to server that it controls a key pair
- client uses different key pair for different servers

example.com


Example: Binding Cookies

- Server can then bind tokens to Token Binding key



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diff tokbind-https-00 tokbind-https-01

- Header: Token-Binding \Rightarrow Sec-Token-Binding
- Clarification: what should you bind to?
(public key, not Token Binding ID)
- Learned how to spell “true”
- Removed any mention of DOM APIs, which were meant to support federation
(left the HTTP redirect approach in the document)

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Intent

**server verifies
public-key signature
in token binding** \Rightarrow **client (and nobody else)
controls corresponding
private key**

(Why? Because binding a token to private key should ensure that the token can be used only by corresponding client, and nobody else.)

Threats

server verifies public-
key signature in
token binding

⇒

client (and nobody else)
controls corresponding
private key

1. Attacker uses victim's private key
2. Victim "uses" attacker's private key
(client is tricked into sending attacker-controlled token-binding header)

Threats

server verifies public-
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client (and nobody else)
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1. Attacker uses victim's private key
 - countermeasure: keep private key secret
2. Victim “uses” attacker's private key
(client is tricked into sending attacker-controlled token-binding header)

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


Reason for Sec- prefix


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
Federation




Federation




Federation




Federation




Federation




Federation with HTTP Redirects




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
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
Federation with POSTs




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
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
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
Federation with XHRs




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
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
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
Federation with postMessage()




Federation with postMessage()



Federation with postMessage()



Federation with postMessage()



How to Trigger Referred Token Bindings?

Redirect-based

```
302 Moved Temporarily  
Location: https://idp.com/rp-login  
Include-Referer-Token-Binding-Id: true
```

POST-based

```
<form id="f" action="https://idp.com/rp-login"  
      refererTokenBinding="true">...</form>  
<script><script>document.forms["f"].submit()</script>
```

XHR-based

```
fetch('https://idp.com/rp-login',  
      {'mode': 'cors', 'credentials': 'include',  
       'refererTokenBinding': 'include'}).then({...});
```

postMessage()-based

???

Where to Specify Referred Token Bindings?

Redirect-based

```
302 Moved Temporarily  
Location: https://idp.com/rp-login  
Include-Referer-Token-Binding-Id: true
```

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POST-based

```
<form id="f" action="https://idp.com/rp-login"  
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```

XHR-based

```
fetch('https://idp.com',  
      {'mode': 'cors', 'credentials': 'include',  
       'refererTokenBinding': 'include'}).then({...});
```

**Should be
discussed
elsewhere.**

postMessage()-based

???

Decisions to make

- Sec-Token-Binding vs. Token-Binding
- Extent of federation support spelled out in spec