IP Tunnels in the Internet Architecture
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 20, 2016.
This document discusses the role of IP tunnels in the Internet architecture. It explains their relationship to existing protocol layers and the challenges in supporting IP tunneling based on the equivalence of tunnels to links.

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1. Introduction

The Internet is loosely based on the ISO seven layer stack, in which data units traverse the stack by being wrapped inside data units one layer down. A tunnel is a mechanism for transmitting data units between endpoints by wrapping them as data units of the same or higher layers, e.g., IP in IP (Figure 1) or IP in UDP (Figure 2).

+----+----+--------------+
| IP' | IP |     Data     |
+----+----+--------------+

Figure 1 IP inside IP
This document focuses on tunnels that transit IP packets, i.e., in which an IP packet is the payload of another protocol. Tunnels provide a virtual link that can help decouple the network topology seen by transiting packets from the underlying physical network [To98][RFC2473]. For example, tunnels were critical in the development of multicast because not all routers were capable of processing multicast packets [Er94]. Tunnels allowed multicast packets to transit between multicast-capable routers over paths that did not support multicast. Similar techniques have been used to support other protocols, such as IPv6 [RFC2460].

Use of tunnels is common in the Internet. The word "tunnel" occurs in over 100 RFCs, and is supported within numerous protocols, including:

- Generic UDP Encapsulation (GUE) – IP in UDP (in IP) [He15a][He15b]
- Generic IPv6 tunneling [RFC2473]
- Generic Router Encapsulation (GRE) – an encapsulation framework allowing different messages to tunnel over a variety of tunnels, e.g., IP in GRE in IP [RFC2473][RFC2784][RFC7588][Pi15]
- IP in IP / mobile IP [RFC2003][RFC2473][RFC5944]
- IPsec – hides the original traffic destination [RFC4301]
- L2TP – Tunnels PPP over IP, used largely in DSL/FTTH access networks to extend a subscriber’s connection from an access line provider to an ISP [RFC3931]
- L2VPNs – provides a link topology different from that provided by physical links [RFC4664]
- L3VPNs – provides a network topology different from that provided by ISPs [RFC4176]
- LISP – reduces routing table load within an enclave of routers [RFC6830]
o MPLS - tunnels IP over a circuit-like path in which identifiers are rewritten on each hop, often used for traffic provisioning [RFC3031]

o NVO3 - tunnels for data center network sharing (which includes use of GUE, above) [RFC7364]

o PWE3 - tunnels to emulate wire-like services over packet-switched services [RFC3985]

o SEAL/AERO - a generic mechanism for IP in IP tunneling designed to overcome the limitations of RFC2003 [RFC5320][Te15]

o TRILL - enables L3 routing (typically IS-IS) in an enclave of Ethernet bridges [RFC5556][RFC6325]

The variety of tunnel mechanisms raises the question of the role of tunnels in the Internet architecture and the potential need for these mechanisms to have similar and predictable behavior. In particular, the ways in which packet sizes (i.e., Maximum Transmission Unit or MTU) mismatch and error signals (e.g., ICMP) are handled may benefit from a coordinated approach.

It is useful to note that, regardless of the layer in which encapsulation occurs, tunnels emulate a link. As links, they are subject to link issues, e.g., MTU discovery, signaling, and the potential utility of native support for broadcast and multicast [RFC2460][RFC3819]. They have advantages over native links, being potentially easier to reconfigure and control.

The remainder of this document describes the general principles of IP tunneling and discusses the key considerations in the design of a protocol that tunnels IP datagrams. It derives its conclusions from the equivalence of tunnels and links. Note that all considerations are in the context of existing standards and requirements.

2. Conventions used in this document

2.1. Key Words

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
2.2. Terminology

This document uses the following terminology. These definitions are given in the most general terms, but will be used primarily to discuss IP tunnels in this document. They are presented in order from most fundamental to those derived on earlier definitions:

- Messages: variable length data labeled with globally-unique endpoint IDs [RFC791]
- Endpoint: a network device that sources or sinks messages labeled from/to its IDs, also known as a host [RFC1122].
- Forwarder: a network device that relays IP messages using longest-prefix match of destination IDs and local context, when possible, also known as a gateway or router [RFC1812].
- Network node (node): an endpoint or forwarder. For Internet messages (IP datagrams), these are hosts or gateways/routers, respectively.
- Source: the origin host of a message.
- Destination: the receiving host of a message.
- Link: a communication device that transfers messages between network devices, i.e., by which a message can traverse between devices without being processed by a forwarder. Note that the notion of forwarder is relative to the layer at which message processing is considered [RFC1122][RFC1812].
- Path: a communications path by which a message can traverse between network nodes, which may or may not involve being processed by a forwarding node.
- Tunnel: a protocol mechanism that transits messages using encapsulation to allow a path to appear as a link. Note that a protocol can be used to tunnel itself (IP over IP) and that this includes the conventional layering of the ISO stack (i.e., by this definition, Ethernet is a tunnel for IP).
- Ingress: a network node that receives messages, encapsulates them according to the tunnel protocol, and transmits them into the tunnel. Note that the ingress and source can be co-located.
o **Egress**: a network node that receives messages that have finished transiting a tunnel. The egress decapsulates datagrams for further transit to the destination. Note that the egress and destination can be co-located.

o **Tunnel transit packet**: the packet arriving at a node connected to a tunnel that enters the ingress and exits the egress, i.e., the packet carried over the tunnel. This is sometimes known as the "tunneled packet", i.e., the packet carried over the tunnel.

o **Tunnel link packet**: packets that traverse from ingress to egress, in which resides all or part of a tunnel transit packet. This is sometimes known as the "tunnel packet", i.e., the packet of the tunnel itself.

o **Link MTU (LMTU)**: the largest message that can transit a link. Note that this need not be the native size of messages on the link.

o **Reassembly MTU (RMTU)**: the largest message that can be reassembled by a receiver, and is not directly related to the link or path MTU. Sometimes also referred to as "receiver MTU".

o **Path MTU (PMTU)**: the largest message that can transit a path. Typically, this is the minimum of the link MTUs of the links of the path.

o **Tunnel MTU (TMTU)**: the largest message that can transit a tunnel. Typically, this is limited by the egress reassembly MTU.

3. The Tunnel Model

A network architecture is an abstract description of a distributed communications system, its components and their relationships, the requisite properties of those components and the emergent properties of the system that result [To03]. Such descriptions can help explain behavior, as when the OSI seven-layer model is used as a teaching example [Zi80]. Architectures describe capabilities - and, just as importantly, constraints.

A network can be defined as a system of endpoints and relays interconnected by communication paths, abstracting away issues of naming in order to focus on message forwarding. To the extent that the Internet has a single, coherent interpretation, its architecture is defined by its core protocols (IP [RFC791], TCP [RFC793], UDP [RFC768]) and messages, hosts, routers, and links [Cl88][To03], as shown in Figure 3:
As a network architecture, the Internet is a system of hosts and routers interconnected by links that exchange messages when possible. "When possible" defines the Internet’s "best effort" principle. The limited role of routers and links represents the End-to-End Principle [Sa84] and longest-prefix match enables hierarchical forwarding.

Although the definitions of host, router, and link seem absolute, they are often relative as viewed within the context of one OSI layer, each of which can be considered a distinct network architecture. An Internet gateway is a Layer 3 router when it transits IP datagrams but it acts as a Layer 2 host as it sources or sinks Layer 2 messages on attached links to accomplish this transit capability. In this way, a single device (Internet gateway) behaves as different components (router, host) at different layers.

Even though a single device may have multiple roles - even concurrently - at a given layer, each role is typically static and location-independent. An Internet gateway always acts as a Layer 2 host and that behavior does not depend on where the gateway is viewed from within Layer 2. In the context of a single layer, a device’s behavior is modeled as a single component from all viewpoints in that layer.

3.1. What is a tunnel?

A tunnel can be modeled as a link in another network [To98][To01][To03]. In Figure 4, a source host (Hsrc) and destination host (Hdst) communicating over a network M in which two routers (Ra and Rd) are connected by a tunnel.
The tunnel consists of two elements (ingress I, egress E), that lie along a path connected by a (possibly different) network N. Regardless of how the ingress and egress are connected, the tunnel serves as a link to the devices it connects (here, Ra and Rb).

IP packets arriving at the ingress are encapsulated to traverse network N. We call these packets "tunnel transit packets" because they will now transit the tunnel inside one or more "tunnel link packets". Tunnel link packets use the source address of the ingress and the destination address of the egress - using whatever address is appropriate to the Layer at which the ingress and egress operate (Layer 2, Layer 3, Layer 4, etc.). The egress decapsulates those messages, which then continue on network M as if emerging from a link. To tunnel transit packets, and to the routers the tunnel connects (Ra and Rb), the tunnel acts as a link.

The model of each component (ingress, egress) and the entire system (tunnel) depends on the layer from which you view the tunnel. From the perspective of the outermost hosts (Hsrc and Hdst), the tunnel appears as a link between two routers (Ra and Rd). For routers along the tunnel (e.g., Rb and Rc), the ingress and egress appear as the endpoint hosts and Hsrc and Hdst are invisible.

When the tunnel network (N) is implemented using the same protocol as the endpoint network (M), the picture looks flatter (Figure 5), as if it were running over a single network. However, note that this appearance is incorrect - nothing has changed. From the perspective of the endpoints, Rb and Rc and network N don't exist and aren't visible, and from the perspective of the tunnel, network M doesn't exist. The fact that network N and M use the same protocol, and may traverse the same links is irrelevant.
3.2. View from the Outside

From outside the tunnel, to network M, the entire tunnel acts as a link (Figure 6). It may be numbered or unnumbered and the addresses associated with the ingress and egress are irrelevant from outside.

A tunnel is effectively invisible to the network in which it resides, except that it behaves exactly as a link. Consequently [RFC3819] requirements for links supporting IP also apply to tunnels.

E.g., the IP datagram hop count (IPv4 Time-to-Live [RFC791] and IPv6 Hop Limit [RFC2460]) are decremented when traversing a router, not by traversing a link - or thus a tunnel. Tunnels have a tunnel MTU - the largest datagram that can transit, just as links have a corresponding link MTU. A link MTU may not reflect the native link message sizes (ATM AAL5 48 byte messages support a 9KB MTU) and the same is true for a tunnel.

3.3. View from the Inside

Within network N, i.e., from inside the tunnel itself, the ingress is a source of tunnel link packets and the egress is a sink - both are hosts on network N (Figure 7). Consequently [RFC1122] Internet host requirements apply to ingress and egress nodes when Network N uses IP (and thus the ingress/egress use IP encapsulation).
Viewed from within the tunnel, the outer network (M) doesn't exist. Tunnel link packets can be fragmented by the source (ingress) and reassembled at the destination (egress), just as at any endpoint. The path between ingress and egress may have a path MTU but the endpoints can exchange messages as large as can be reassembled at the destination (egress), i.e., an egress MTU. Information about the network - i.e., regarding MTU sizes, network reachability, etc. - are relayed from the destination (egress) and intermediate routers back to the source (ingress), without regard for the external network (M).

3.4. Location of the Ingress and Egress

The ingress and egress are endpoints of the tunnel and the tunnel is a link. The ingress and egress are thus link endpoints at the network nodes the tunnel interconnects. Such link endpoints are typically described as "network interfaces".

Tunnel interfaces may be physical or virtual. The interface may be implemented inside the node where the tunnel attaches, e.g., inside a host or router. The interface may also be implemented as a "bump in the wire" (BITW), somewhere along a link between the two nodes the link interconnects. IP in IP tunnels are often implemented as interfaces, where IPsec tunnels are sometimes implemented as BITW. These implementation variations determine only whether information available at the link endpoints (ingress/egress) can be easily shared with the connected network nodes.

3.5. Implications of This Model

This approach highlights a few key features of a tunnel as a network architecture construct:

- To the tunnel transit packets, tunnels turn a network (Layer 3) path into a (Layer 2) link
- To devices the tunnel traverses, the tunnel ingress and egress act as hosts that source and sink tunnel link packets
The consequences of these features are as follow:

- Like a link, a tunnel has an MTU defined by the reassembly MTU of the receiving interface (egress).

- Path MTU discovery in the network layer (i.e., outer network M) has no direct relation to the MTU of the hops within the link layer of the links (or thus tunnels) that connect its components.

- Hops remain defined as the number of routers encountered on a path or the time spent at a router [RFC1812]. Hops are not decremented solely by the transit of a link, e.g., a packet with a hop count of zero should successfully transit a link (and thus a tunnel) that connects two hosts.

- The addresses of a tunnel ingress and egress correspond to link layer addresses to the tunnel transit packet and outer network M. Many point-to-point tunnels are unnumbered in the network in which they reside (even though they must have addresses in the network they transit).

- Like network interfaces, the ingress and egress are never a direct source of ICMP messages but may provide information to their attached host or router to generate those ICMP messages.

These observations make it much easier to determine what a tunnel must do to transit IP packets, notably it must satisfy all requirements expected of a link.

4. IP Tunnel Requirements

The requirements of an IP tunnel are defined by the requirements of an IP link because both transit IP packets. A tunnel must transit the IP MTU, i.e., 68B for IPv4 and 1280B for IPv6, and a tunnel must support address resolution when there is more than one egress.

The requirements of the tunnel ingress and egress are defined by the network over which they exchange messages (tunnel link packets). For IP-over-IP, this means that the ingress MUST NOT exceed the (fragment) Identification field uniqueness requirements [RFC6864].

These requirements remain even though tunnels have some unique issues, including the need for additional space for encapsulation headers and the potential for tunnel path MTU variation.
4.1. Fragmentation

As with any link layer, the MTU of a tunnel is defined as the receiving interface reassembly MTU, and must satisfy the requirements of the IP packets the tunnel transits.

Note that many of the issues with tunnel fragmentation and MTU handling were discussed in [RFC4459], but that document described a variety of alternatives as if they were independent. This document explains the combined approach that is necessary.

An IPv4 tunnel must transit 68 byte packets without further fragmentation [RFC791][RFC1122] and an IPv6 tunnel must transit 1280 byte packets without further fragmentation [RFC2460]. The tunnel MTU interacts with routers or hosts it connects the same way as would a link MTU. In the following pseudocode, TTPsize is the size of the tunnel transit packet, and egressRMTU is the receive MTU of the egress. As with any link, the link MTU is defined not by the native path of the link (the path MTU inside the tunnel) but by the egress reassembly MTU (egressRMTU). This is because the ICMP "packet too big" message indicates failure, not preference. There is no ICMP message for "larger than I’d like, but I can still transit it".

These rules apply at the host/router where the tunnel is attached:

```plaintext
if (TTP > linkMTU) then
    if (TTP can be fragmented, e.g., IPv4 DF=0) then
        split TTP into fragments of TunMTU size
        and send each fragment into the tunnel ingress
    else
        drop TTP and send ICMP "too big" to TTP source
    endif
else
    send TTP into the tunnel "interface" (the ingress)
endif
```
These rules apply at the tunnel ingress:

if (sizeof(TTP) <= TunnelPathMTU) then
  encapsulate TTP as received and emit
else
  if (TunnelPathMTU < sizeof(TTP) <= egressRMTU) then
    fragment TTP into TunMTU chunks
    encapsulate and emit each TTP
  else
    (never happens; host/router already dropped by now)
  endif
endif

For IPv4 or IPv6 over IPv6, the tunnel path MTU is a minimum of 1280 minus the encapsulation header (40 bytes) with its options (TOptSz) and the egress reassembly MTU is 1500 minus the same amount:

if (sizeof(TTP) <= (1240 - TOptSz)) then
  encapsulate TTP as received and emit
else
  if ((1240 - TOptSz) < sizeof(TTP) <= (1460 - TOptSz)) then
    fragment TTP into (1240 - TOptSz) chunks
    encapsulate and emit each TTP
  else
    (never happens; host/router already dropped by now)
  endif
endif

This tunnel supports IPv6 transit only if TOptSize is smaller than 180 bytes, and supports IPv4 transit if TOptSize is smaller than 884 bytes. IPv6 tunnel transit packets of 1280 bytes may be guaranteed transit the outer network (M) without needing fragmentation there but they may require ongoing fragmentation and reassembly if the tunnel MTU is not at least 1320 bytes.

When using IP directly over IP, the minimum egress reassembly MTU for IPv4 is 576 bytes and for IPv6 is 1500 bytes. This means that tunnels of IPv4-over-IPv4, IPv4-over-IPv6, and IPv6-over-IPv6 are possible without additional requirements, but this may involve ingress fragmentation and egress reassembly. IPv6 cannot be tunneled directly over IPv4 without additional requirements, notably that the egress reassembly MTU or the link path MTU are at least 1280 bytes. Fragmentation and reassembly cannot be avoided for IPv6-over-IPv6 without similar requirements.
When ongoing ingress fragmentation and egress reassembly would be prohibitive or costly, larger MTUs can be supported by design and confirmed either out-of-band (by design) or in-band (e.g., using PLMTUD [RFC4821], as done in SEAL [RFC5320] and AERO [Te15]). Alternately, an ingress can encapsulate packets that fit and shut down once fragmentation is needed, but it must not continue to forward smaller packets while dropping larger packets that are still within required limits.

4.2. MTU discovery

MTU discovery enables a network path to support a larger path MTU and egress MTU than it can assume from the protocol over which it operates. There are two ways in which MTU discovery interact with tunnels: the MTU of the path over the tunnel and the MTU of the tunnel itself.

A tunnel has two different MTU values: the largest payload that can traverse from ingress to egress without further fragmentation (the tunnel path MTU) and the largest payload that can traverse from ingress to egress. The latter is defined by the egress reassembly MTU, not the tunnel path MTU, and is the tunnel MTU.

The path MTU over the tunnel is limited by the tunnel MTU (the egress reassembly MTU) but not the tunnel path MTU. There is temptation to optimize tunnel traversal so that packets are not fragmented between ingress and egress, i.e., to tune the network path MTU to the tunnel link MTU. This is hazardous for many reasons:

- The tunnel is capable of transiting packets as large as the egress reassembly MTU, which is always at least as large as the tunnel path MTU and typically is larger.
- ICMP has only one type of error message regarding large packets - "too big", i.e., too large to transit. There is no optimization message of "bigger than I’d like, but I can deal with if needed".
- IP tunnels often involve some level of recursion, i.e., encapsulation over itself [RFC4459].

Recursive tunneling occurs whenever a protocol ends up encapsulated in itself. This happens directly, as when IPv4 is encapsulated in IPv4, or indirectly, as when IP is encapsulated in UDP which then is a payload inside IP. It can involve many layers of encapsulation because a tunnel provider isn’t always aware of whether the packets it transits are already tunneled.
Recursion is impossible when the tunnel transit packets are limited to that of the native size of the tunnel path MTU. Arriving tunnel transit packets have a minimum supported size (1280 for IPv6) and the tunnel path MTU has the same size; there would be no room for the additional encapsulation headers. The result would be an IPv6 tunnel that cannot satisfy IPv6 transit requirements.

It is more appropriate to require the tunnel to satisfy IP transit requirements and enforce that requirement at design time or during operation (the latter using PLMTUD [RFC4821]). Conventional path MTU discovery (PMTUD) relies existing endpoint ICMP processing of explicit negative feedback from routers along the path via "message to big" ICMP packets in the reverse direction of the tunnel [RFC1191]. This technique is susceptible to the "black hole" phenomenon, in which the ICMP messages never return to the source due to policy-based filtering [RFC2923]. PLMTUD requires a separate, direct control channel from the egress to the ingress that provides positive feedback; the direct channel is not blocked by policy filters and the positive feedback ensures fail-safe operation if feedback messages are lost [RFC4821].

4.3. IP ID exhaustion

In IPv4, the IP Identification (ID) field is a 16-bit value that is unique for every packet for a given source address, destination address, and protocol, such that it does not repeat within the Maximum Segment Lifetime (MSL) [RFC791][RFC1122]. Although the ID field was originally intended for fragmentation and reassembly, it can also be used to detect and discard duplicate packets, e.g., at congested routers (see Sec. 3.2.1.5 of [RFC1122]). For this reason, and because IPv4 packets can be fragmented anywhere along a path, all packets between a source and destination of a given protocol must have unique ID values over a period of an MSL, which is typically interpreted as two minutes (120 seconds). These requirements have recently been somewhat relaxed in recognition of the primary use of this field for reassembly and the need to handle only fragment misordering at the receiver [RFC6864].

The uniqueness of the IP ID is a known problem for high speed devices, because it limits the speed of a single protocol between two endpoints [RFC4963]. Although this suggests that the uniqueness of the IP ID is moot, tunnels exacerbate this condition. A tunnel often aggregates traffic from a number of different source and destination addresses, of different protocols, and encapsulates them in a header with the same ingress and egress addresses, all using a single encapsulation protocol. The result is one of the following:
1. The IP ID rules are enforced, and the tunnel throughput is severely limited.

2. The IP ID rules are enforced, and the tunnel consumes large numbers of ingress/egress IP addresses solely to ensure ID uniqueness.

3. The IP ID rules are ignored.

The last case is the most obvious solution, because it corresponds to how endpoints currently behave. Fortunately, fragmentation is somewhat rare in the current Internet at large, but it can be common along a tunnel. Fragments that repeat the IP ID risk being reassembled incorrectly, especially when fragments are reordered or lost. Reassembly errors are not always detected by other protocol layers (see Sec. 4.8), and even when detected they can result in excessive overall packet loss and can waste bandwidth between the egress and ultimate packet destination.

4.4. Hop Count

This section considers the selection of the value of the hop count of the tunnel link header, as well as the potential impact on the tunnel transit header. The former is affected by the number of hops within the tunnel. The latter determines whether the tunnel has visible effect on the transit packet.

In general, the Internet hop count field is used to detect and avoid forwarding loops that cannot be corrected without a synchronized reboot. The IPv4 Time-to-Live (TTL) and IPv6 Hop Limit field each serve this purpose [RFC791][RFC2460].

The IPv4 TTL field was originally intended to indicate packet expiration time, measured in seconds. A router is required to decrement the TTL by at least one or the number of seconds the packet is delayed, whichever is larger [RFC1812]. Packets are rarely held that long, and so the field has come to represent the count of the number of routers traversed. IPv6 makes this meaning more explicit.

These hop count fields represent the number of network forwarding elements traversed by an IP datagram. An IP datagram with a hop count of zero can traverse a link between two hosts because it never visits a router (where it would need to be decremented and would have been dropped).

An IP datagram traversing a tunnel thus need not have its hopcount modified, i.e., the tunnel transit header need not be affected. A
zero hop count datagram should be able to traverse a tunnel as easily as it traverses a link. A router MAY be configured to decrement packets traversing a particular link (and thus a tunnel), which may be useful in emulating a path as if it had traversed one or more routers, but this is strictly optional. The ability of the outer network and tunnel network to avoid indefinitely looping packets does not rely on the hop counts of the tunnel traversal packet and tunnel link packet being related in any way at all.

The hop count field is also used by several protocols to determine whether endpoints are "local", i.e., connected to the same subnet (link-local discovery and related protocols [RFC4861]). A tunnel is a way to make a remote address appear directly-connected, so it makes sense that the other ends of the tunnel appear local and that such link-local protocols operate over tunnels unless configured explicitly otherwise. When the interfaces of a tunnel are numbered, these can be interpreted the same way as if they were on the same link subnet.

4.5. Signaling

In the current Internet architecture, signaling goes upstream, either from routers along a path or from the destination, back toward the source. Such signals are typically contained in ICMP messages, but can involve other protocols such as RSVP, transport protocol signals (e.g., TCP RSTs), or multicast control or transport protocols.

A tunnel behaves like a link and acts like a link interface at the nodes where it is attached. As such, it can provide information that enhances IP signaling (e.g., ICMP), but itself does not directly generate ICMP messages.

For tunnels, this means that there are two separate signaling paths. The outer network M devices can each signal the source of the tunnel transit packets, Hsrc (Figure 8). Inside the tunnel, the inner network N devices can signal the source of the tunnel link packets, the ingress I (Figure 9).
These two signal paths are inherently distinct except where information is exchanged between the network interface of the tunnel (the ingress) and its attached device (Ra, in both figures).

It is always possible for a network interface to provide hints to its attached device (host or router), which can be used for optimization. In this case, when signals inside the tunnel indicate a change to the tunnel, the ingress (i.e., the tunnel network interface) can provide information to the router (Ra, in both figures), so that Ra can generate the appropriate signal in return to Hsrc. This relaying may be difficult, because signals inside the tunnel may not return enough information to the ingress to support direct relaying to Hsrc.

In all cases, the tunnel ingress needs to determine how to relay the signals from inside the tunnel into signals back to the source. For some protocols this is either simple or impossible (such as for ICMP), for others, it can even be undefined (e.g., multicast). In some cases, the individual signals relayed from inside the tunnel may result in corresponding signals in the outside network, and in other cases they may just change state of the tunnel interface. In the
latter case, the result may cause the router Ra to generate new ICMP errors when later messages arrive from Hsrc or other sources in the outer network.

The meaning of the relayed information must be carefully translated. In the case of soft or hard ICMP errors, the translation may be obvious. ICMP "packet too big" messages from inside the tunnel do not necessarily have a direct impact on Ra unless they arrive from the egress (where they would update egressRMTU). Inside the tunnel, these messages could be used to adjust the ingress fragmentation.

In addition to ICMP, messages typically considered for translation include Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN [RFC6040]) and multicast (IGMP, e.g.).

4.6. Relationship of Header Fields

Some tunnel specifications attempt to relate the fields of the tunnel transit packet and tunnel link packet, i.e., the packet arriving at the ingress and the encapsulation header. These two headers are effectively independent and there is no utility in requiring their contents to be related.

In specific, the encapsulation header source and destination addresses are network endpoints in the tunnel network N, but have no meaning in the outer network M, even when the tunneled packet traverses the same network. The addresses are effectively independent, and the tunnel endpoint addresses are link addresses to the tunnel transit packet.

Because the tunneled packet uses source and destination addresses with a separate meaning, it is inappropriate to copy or reuse the IPv4 Identification or IPv6 Fragment ID fields of the tunnel transit packet. These fields need to be generated based on the context of the encapsulation header, not the tunnel transit header.

Similarly, the DF field need not be copied from the tunnel transit packet to the encapsulation header of the tunnel link packet (presuming both are IPv4). Path MTU discovery inside the tunnel does not directly correspond to path MTU discovery outside the tunnel.

The same is true for most other fields. When a field value is generated in the encapsulation header, its meaning should be derived from what is desired in the context of the tunnel as a link. When feedback is received from these fields, they should be presented to the tunnel ingress and egress as if they were network interfaces. The
behavior of the node where these interfaces attach should be identical to that of a conventional link.

There are exceptions to this rule that are explicitly intended to relay signals from inside the tunnel to outside the tunnel. The primary example is ECN [RFC6040], which copies the ECN bits from the tunnel transit header to the tunnel link header during encapsulation at the ingress and modifies the tunnel transit header at egress based on a combination of the bits of the two headers. This is intended to allow congestion notification within the tunnel to be interpreted as if it were on the direct path. Other examples may involve the DSCP flags. In both cases, it is assumed that the intent of copying values on encapsulation and merging values on decapsulation has the effect of allowing the tunnel to act as if it participates in the same type of network as outside the tunnel (network M).

4.7. Congestion

In general, tunnels carrying IP traffic need not react directly to congestion any more than would any other link layer [RFC5405]. IP traffic is not generally expected to be congestion reactive.

[text from David Black on ECN relaying?]

4.8. Checksums

IP traffic transiting a tunnel needs to expect a similar level of error detection and correction as it would expect from any other link. In the case of IPv4, there are no such expectations, which is partly why it includes a header checksum [RFC791].

IPv6 omitted the header checksum because it already expects most link errors to be detected and dropped by the link layer and because it also assumes transport protection [RFC2460]. When transiting IPv6 over IPv6, the tunnel fails to provide the expected error detection. This is why IPv6 is often tunneled over layers that include separate protection, such as GRE [RFC2784].

The fragmentation created by the tunnel ingress can increase the need for stronger error detection and correction, especially at the tunnel egress to avoid reassembly errors. The Internet checksum is known to be susceptible to reassembly errors that could be common [RFC4963], and should not be relied upon for this purpose. This is why SEAL and AERO include a separate checksum [RFC5320][Te15]. This requirement can be undermined when using UDP as a tunnel with no UDP checksum (as per [RFC6935][RFC6936]) when fragmentation occurs because the egress has no checksum with which to validate reassembly. For this reason,
it is safe to use UDP with a zero checksum for atomic (non-fragmented, non-fragmentable) tunnel link packets only; when used on fragments, whether generated at the ingress or en-route inside the tunnel, omission of such a checksum can result in reassembly errors that can cause additional work (capacity, forwarding processing, receiver processing) downstream of the egress.

4.9. Numbering

Tunnel ingresses and egresses have addresses associated with the encapsulation protocol. These addresses are the source and destination (respectively) of the encapsulated packet while traversing the tunnel network.

Tunnels may or may not have addresses in the network whose traffic they transit (e.g., network M in Figure 4). In some cases, the tunnel is an unnumbered interface to a point-to-point virtual link. When the tunnel has multiple egresses, tunnel interfaces require separate addresses in network M.

To see the effect of tunnel interface addresses, consider traffic sourced at router Ra in Figure 4. Even before being encapsulated by the ingress, that traffic needs a source IP network address that belongs to the router. One option is to use an address associated with one of the other interfaces of the router [RFC1122]. Another option is to assign a number to the tunnel interface itself. Regardless of which address is used, the resulting IP packet is then encapsulated by the tunnel ingress using the ingress address as a separate operation.

4.10. Multicast

[To be addressed]

Note that PMTU for multicast is difficult. PIM carries an option that may help in the Population Count Extensions to PIM [RFC6807].

IMO, again, this is no different than any other multicast link.

4.11. NAT / Load Balancing

[To be addressed]


The rules described in this document already support tunnels over tunnels, sometimes known as "recursive" tunnels, in which IP is
transited over IP either directly or via intermediate encapsulation (IP-UDP-IP).

There are known hazards to recursive tunneling, notably that the independence of the tunnel transit header and tunnel link header hop counts can result in a tunneling loop. Such looping can be avoided when using direct encapsulation (IP in IP) by use of a header option to track the encapsulation count and to limit that count [RFC2473]. This looping cannot be avoided when other protocols are used for tunneling, e.g., IP in UDP in IP, because the encapsulation count may not be visible where the recursion occurs.

5. Observations (implications)

[Leave this as a shopping list for now]

5.1. Tunnel protocol designers

Account for egress MTU/path MTU differences.

Include a stronger checksum.

Ensure that the egress MTU is always larger than the path MTU.

Ensure that the egress reassembly can keep up with line rate OR design PLMTUD into the tunneling protocol.

5.2. Tunnel implementers

Detect when the egress MTU is exceeded.

Detect when the egress MTU drops below the required minimum and shut down the tunnel if that happens - configuring the tunnel down and issuing a hard error may be the only way to detect this anomaly, and it’s sufficiently important that the tunnel SHOULD be disabled.

Do NOT decrement the TTL as part of being a tunnel. It’s always already OK for a router to decrement the TTL based on different next-hop routers, but TTL is a property of a router not a link.

5.3. Tunnel operators

Keep the difference between "enforced by operators" vs. "enforced by active protocol mechanism" in mind. It’s fine to assume something the tunnel cannot or does not test, as long as you KNOW you can assume it. When the assumption is wrong, it will NOT be signaled by the tunnel. Do NOT decrement the TTL as part of being a tunnel. It’s
always already OK for a router to decrement the TTL based on different next-hop routers, but TTL is a property of a router not a link.

Do NOT decrement the TTL as part of being a tunnel. It’s always already OK for a router to decrement the TTL based on different next-hop routers, but TTL is a property of a router not a link.

5.4. For existing standards

5.4.1. Generic UDP Encapsulation (GUE - IP in UDP in IP)

[He15a][He15b]

5.4.2. Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6

[RFC2473]

Consistent with this doc:

- Considers the endpoints of the tunnel as virtual interfaces.
- Considers the tunnel a virtual link.
- Requires source fragmentation at the ingress and reassembly at the egress.
- Includes a recursion limit to prevent unlimited re-encapsulation.
- Sets tunnel transit header hop limit independently.
- Sends ICMPs back at the ingress based on the arriving tunnel transit packet and its relation to the tunnel MTU (though it uses the incorrect value of the tunnel MTU; see below).
- Allows for ingress relaying of internal tunnel errors (but see below; it does not discuss retaining state about these).

Inconsistent with this doc:

- Decrementsthe tunnel transit header by 1, i.e., incorrectly assuming that tunnel endpoints occur at routers only and that the tunnel, rather than the router, is responsible for this decrement.

This doc goes to pains to describe the decapsulation process as if it were distinct from conventional protocol processing by the receiver (when it should not be).
Copies traffic class from tunnel link to tunnel transit header (as one variant).

Treats the tunnel MTU as the tunnel path MTU, rather than the tunnel egress MTU.

Incorrectly fragments IPv4 DF=0 tunnel transit packets that arrive larger than the tunnel MTU at the IPv6 layer; the relationship between IPv4 and the tunnel is more complex (as noted in this doc).

Fails to retain state from the tunnel based on ingress receiving ICMP messages from inside the tunnel, e.g., such as might cause future tunnel transit packets arriving at the ingress to be discarded with an ICMP error response rather than allowing them to proceed into the tunnel.

5.4.3. Geneve (NVO3)

[RFC7364][Gr15]

Consistent with this doc:

Generation of the link header fields is not discussed and presumed independent of transit packet.

Inconsistent with this doc:

Tries to match transit to tunnel path MTU rather than egress MTU.

5.4.4. GRE (IP in GRE in IP)

IPv4 [RFC2784][RFC7588][Pi15]:

Consistent with this doc:

Does not address link header generation.

Non-default behavior allows fragmentation of link packet to match tunnel path MTU up to the limit of the egress MTU.

Default behavior sets link DF independently.

Shuts the tunnel down if the tunnel path MTU isn’t => 1280.

Inconsistent with this doc:

Based on tunnel path MTU, not egress MTU.
Claims that the tunnel (GRE) mechanism is responsible for generating ICMP error messages.

Default behavior fragments transit packet (where possible) based on tunnel path MTU (it should fragment based on egress MTU).

Default behavior does not support the minimum MTU of IPv6 when run over IPv6.

Non-default behavior allows copying DF for IPv4 in IPv4.

5.4.5. IP in IP / mobile IP

IPv4 [RFC2003][RFC5944]:

Consistent with this doc:

- Generate link ID independently
- Generate link DF independently when transit DF=0
- Generate ECN/update ECN based on sharing info [RFC6040]
- Set link TTL to transit to egress only (independently)
- Do not decrement TTL on entry except when part of forwarding
- Do not decrement TTL on exit except when part of forwarding
- Options not copied, but used as a hint to desired services.
- Generally treat tunnel as a link, e.g., for link-local.

Inconsistent with this doc:

- Set link DF when transit DF=1 (won’t work unless I-E runs PLMTUD)
- Drop at egress if transit TTL=0 (wrong TTL for host-host tunnels)
- Drop when transit source is router’s IP (prevents tun from router)
- Drop when transit source matches egress (prevents tun to router)

Use tunnel ICMPs to generate upper ICMPs, copying context (ICMPs are now coming from inside a link!); these should be handled by setting errors as a "network interface" and letting the attached host/router figure out what to send.
Using tunnel MTU discovery to tune the transit packet to the
tunnel path MTU rather than egress MTU.

IPv6 [RFC2473]:
Consistent with this doc:

Doesn’t discuss lots of header fields, but implies they’re set independently.

Sets link TTL independently.

Inconsistent with this doc:

Tunnel issues ICMP PTBs.

ICMP PTB issued if larger then 1280 - header, rather than egress reassembly MTU.

Fragments IPv6 over IPv6 fragments only if transit is <= 1280 (i.e., forces all tunnels to have a max MTU of 1280).

Fragments IPv4 over IPv6 fragments only if IPv4 DF=0 (misinterpreting the "can fragment the IPv4 packet" as permission to fragment at the IPv6 link header)

Considers encapsulation a forwarding operation and decrements the transit TTL.

5.4.6. IPsec tunnel mode (IP in IPsec in IP)

[RFC4301]
Consistent with this doc:

Most of the rules, except as noted below.

Inconsistent with this doc:

Writes its own header copying rules (Sec 5.1.2), rather than referring to existing standards.

Uses policy to set, clear, or copy DF (policy isn’t the issue)

Intertwines tunneling with forwarding rather than presenting the tunnel as a network interface; this can be corrected by using IPsec transport mode with an IP-in-IP tunnel [RFC3884].
5.4.7. L2TP

[RFC3931]

Consistent with this doc:

Does not address most link headers, which are thus independent.

Inconsistent with this doc:

Manages tunnel access based on tunnel path MTU, instead of egress MTU.

Refers to RFC2473 (IPv6 in IPv6), which is inconsistent with this doc as noted above.

5.4.8. L2VPN

[RFC4664]

5.4.9. L3VPN

[RFC4176]

5.4.10. LISP

[RFC6830]

5.4.11. MPLS

[RFC3031]

5.4.12. PWE

[RFC3985]

5.4.13. SEAL/AERO

[RFC5320][Te15]

5.4.14. TRILL

[RFC5556][RFC6325]

Consistent with this doc:

Puts IP in Ethernet, so most of the issues don’t come up.
Ethernet doesn’t have TTL or fragment.

Rbridge (trill) TTL header is independent of transit packet.

5.5. For future standards

Larger IPv4 MTU (2K? or just 2x path MTU?) for reassembly

Always include frag support for at least two frags; do NOT try to deprecate fragmentation.

Limit encapsulation option use/space.

Augment ICMP to have two separate messages: PTB vs P-bigger-than-optimal

Include MTU as part of BGP as a hint – SB

Hazards of multi-MTU draft-van-beijnum-multi-mtu-04

6. Security Considerations

Tunnels may introduce vulnerabilities or add to the potential for receiver overload and thus DOS attacks. These issues are primarily related to the fact that a tunnel is a link that traverses a network path and to fragmentation and reassembly. ICMP signal translation introduces a new security issue and must be done with care. ICMP generation at the router or host attached to a tunnel is already covered by existing requirements (e.g., should be throttled).

Tunnels traverse multiple hops of a network path from ingress to egress. Traffic along such tunnels may be susceptible to on-path and off-path attacks, including fragment injection, reassembly buffer overload, and ICMP attacks. Some of these attacks may not be as visible to the endpoints of the architecture into which tunnels are deployed and these attacks may thus be more difficult to detect.

Fragmentation at routers or hosts attached to tunnels may place an undue burden on receivers where traffic is not sufficiently diffuse, because tunnels may induce source fragmentation at hosts and path fragmentation (for IPv4 DF=0) more for tunnels than for other links. Care should be taken to avoid this situation, notably by ensuring that tunnel MTUs are not significantly different from other link MTUs.

Tunnel ingresses emitting IP datagrams MUST obey all existing IP requirements, such as the uniqueness of the IP ID field. Failure to
either limit encapsulation traffic, or use additional ingress/egress IP addresses, can result in high speed traffic fragments being incorrectly reassembled.

[management?]

[Access control?]

describe relationship to [RFC6169] - JT (as per INTAREA meeting notes, don’t cover Teredo-specific issues in RFC6169, but include generic issues here)

7. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA considerations. The RFC Editor should remove this section prior to publication.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


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Appendix A. Fragmentation

There are two places where fragmentation can occur in a tunnel, called Outer Fragmentation and Inner Fragmentation.

A.1. Outer Fragmentation

The simplest case is Outer Fragmentation, as shown in Figure 10. The bottom of the figure shows the network topology, where packets start at the source, enter the tunnel at the encapsulator, exit the tunnel at the decapsulator, and arrive finally at the destination. The packet traffic is shown above the topology, where the end-to-end packets are shown at the top. The packets are composed of an inner header (iH) and inner data (iD); the term "inner") is relative to the tunnel, as will become apparent. When the packet (iH,iD) arrives at the encapsulator, it is placed inside the tunnel packet structure, here shown as adding just an outer header, oH, in step (a).

When the encapsulated packet exceeds the MTU of the tunnel, the packet needs to be fragmented. In this case we fragment the packet at the outer header, with the fragments shown as (b1) and (b2). Note that the outer header indicates fragmentation (as ’ and "), the inner header occurs only in the first fragment, and the inner data is broken across the two packets. These fragments are reassembled at the encapsulator in step (c), and the resulting packet is decapsulated and sent on to the destination.
Outer fragmentation isolates Source and Destination from tunnel encapsulation duties. This can be considered a benefit in clean, layered network design, but also may result in complex decapsulator design, especially where tunnels aggregate large amounts of traffic, such as IP ID overload (see Sec. 4.3). Outer fragmentation is valid for any tunnel encapsulation protocol that supports fragmentation (e.g., IPv4 or IPv6), where the tunnel endpoints act as the host endpoints of that protocol.

Along the tunnel, the inner header is contained only in the first fragment, which can interfere with mechanisms that ‘peek’ into lower layer headers, e.g., as for ICMP, as discussed in Sec. 4.5.

A.2. Inner Fragmentation

Inner Fragmentation distributes the impact of tunneling across both the decapsulator and destination, and is shown in Figure 11. Again, the network topology is shown at the bottom of the figure, and the original packets show at the top. Packets arrive at the encapsulator, and are fragmented there based on the inner header into (a1) and (a2). The fragments arrive at the decapsulator, which removes the outer header and forwards the resulting fragments on to the destination. The destination is then responsible for reassembling the fragments into the original packet.
As noted, inner fragmentation distributes the effort of tunneling across the decapsulator and destinations; this can be especially important when the tunnel aggregates large amounts of traffic. Note that this mechanism is thus valid only when the original source packets can be fragmented on-path, e.g., as in IPv4.

Along the tunnel, the inner headers are copied into each fragment, and so are available to mechanisms that ‘peek’ into headers (e.g., ICMP, as discussed in Sec. 4.5). Because fragmentation happens on the inner header, the impact of IP ID is reduced.
APPENDIX B: Fragmentation efficiency

B.1. Selecting fragment sizes

There are different ways to fragment a packet. Consider a network with an MTU as shown in Figure 12, where packets are encapsulated over the same network layer as they arrive on (e.g., IP in IP). If a packet as large as the MTU arrives, it must be fragmented to accommodate the additional header.

```
X==================================X (MTU)
+----+----------------------+
| iH | DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD |
+----+----------------------+

(a)  +-----+-----+
      | H' | iH |
      +-----+-----+
      | DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD |
      +----------------------+

(a1) +-----+-----+-----+
      | nH' | H  | iH |
      +-----+-----+-----+
      | DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD |
      +----------------------+

(a2) +-----+
      | nH''|
      +-----+
      | DDDDD |
      +-------+

(b)  +-----+
      | H''|
      +-----+
      | DDDD |
      +-------+

(b1) +-----+
      | nH''|
      +-----+
      | H''| DDDD |
      +-------+
```

Figure 12: Fragmenting via maximum fit

Figure 12 shows this process, using Outer Fragmentation as an example (the situation is the same for Inner Fragmentation, but the headers that are affected differ). The arriving packet is first split into (a) and (b), where (a) is of the MTU of the network. However, this tunnel then traverses over another tunnel, whose impact the first tunnel ingress has not accommodated. The packet (a) arrives at the second tunnel ingress, and needs to be encapsulated again, but because it is already at the MTU, it needs to be fragmented as well,
into (a1) and (a2). In this case, packet (b) arrives at the second tunnel ingress and is encapsulated into (b1) without fragmentation, because it is already below the MTU size.

In Figure 13, the fragmentation is done evenly, i.e., by splitting the original packet into two roughly equal-sized components, (c) and (d). Note that (d) contains more packet data, because (c) includes the original packet header because this is an example of Outer Fragmentation. The packets (c) and (d) arrive at the second tunnel encapsulator, and are encapsulated again; this time, neither packet exceeds the MTU, and neither requires further fragmentation.

Figure 13 Fragmenting evenly

B.2. Packing

Encapsulating individual packets to traverse a tunnel can be inefficient, especially where headers are large relative to the packets being carried. In that case, it can be more efficient to encapsulate many small packets in a single, larger tunnel payload. This technique, similar to the effect of packet bursting in Gigabit Ethernet (regardless of whether they’re encoded using L2 symbols as delineators), reduces the overhead of the encapsulation headers.
(Figure 14). It reduces the work of header addition and removal at the tunnel endpoints, but increases other work involving the packing and unpacking of the component packets carried.

```
+-----+-----+
| iHa | iDa |
+-----+-----+
    +-----+-----+
    | iHb | iDb |
    +-----+-----+
          +-----+-----+
          | iHc | iDc |
          +-----+-----+
            +-----+-----+
            | oH | iHa | iHa | iHb | iDb | iHc | iDc |
            +-------------------+
```

Figure 14 Packing packets into a tunnel

[NOTE: PPP chopping and coalescing?]
Yang Data Model for IPIPv4 Tunnel
draft-liu-intarea-ipipv4-tunnel-yang-00.txt

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Abstract
This document defines a YANG data model for the management of IPv4 or IPv6 over IPv4 tunnels. The data model covers configuration data, operational state data and RPC execution commands.

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1. Introduction

This document defines two options for the YANG [RFC6020] data model for the management of IPv6/4-in-IPv4 tunnels. The two options will be discussed in IETF WG, only one of them will be final solution. It covers the following tunnel types.

- IPv4 in IPv4, related concepts are defined in [RFC1853]
- IPv6 in IPv4 manual tunnel, related concepts are defined in [RFC2003]
- IPv6 to IPv4 tunnel, related concepts are defined in [RFC3056]

The model option 1 is about using separate resource pool for different types of tunnels. The model option 2 is about use one resource pool for all the types of tunnels which are listed in this document.

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. Tree Diagrams

A simplified graphical representation of the data model is used in this document. The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is as follows:

- Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.
- Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration (read-write), and "ro" means state data (read-only).
- Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!" means a presence container, and "*" denotes a list and leaf-list.
- Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also marked with a colon (":").
- Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not shown.

2. IPv4 Tunnel Model [01]

This document defines two options for the YANG model "ietf-ipipv4-tunnel". Each of them includes two modules, one for configuration and one for state. This section lists the first option.

2.1. Data Model

The data model has the following tree diagram for the IPv4 tunnels:

```
module: ietf-ipipv4-tunnel

  +--rw tunnels
    | +--rw ip-in-ip* [name]
    |   | +--rw name        string
    |   | +--rw description? string
    |   | +--rw bind-interface? if:interface-ref
    |   | +--rw clear-df?    empty
    |   | +--rw shutdown?    empty
    |   | +--rw tmtu?        uint16
```
Internet-Draft    Yang Data Model for IPIPv4 Tunnel        October 2015

| | ---rw mirror-destination?  string
| | ---rw hop-limit?            uint8
| | ---rw tos?                  int8
| | ---rw peer-end-point
| |   ---rw local?              inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
| |   ---rw remote?             inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
| |   ---rw routing-instance?   rt:routing-instance-ref
| | ---rw ipv6to4* [name]
| |   ---rw name                string
| |   ---rw description?        string
| |   ---rw bind-interface?     if:interface-ref
| |   ---rw clear-df?           empty
| |   ---rw shutdown?           empty
| |   ---rw tmtu?               uint16
| | ---rw mirror-destination?  string
| | ---rw hop-limit?            uint8
| | ---rw tos?                  int8
| | ---rw peer-end-point
| |   ---rw local?              inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
| | ---rw ipv6v4-manual* [name]
| |   ---rw name                string
| |   ---rw description?        string
| |   ---rw bind-interface?     if:interface-ref
| |   ---rw clear-df?           empty
| +--rw shutdown?             empty    |
| +--rw tmtu?                 uint16   |
| +--rw mirror-destination?   string   |
| +--rw hop-limit?            uint8    |
| +--rw tos?                  int8     |
| +--rw peer-end-point        |
|   +--rw local?              inet:ipv4-address-no-zone |
|   +--rw remote?             inet:ipv4-address-no-zone |
|   +--rw routing-instance?   rt:routing-instance-ref |

++-ro tunnel-state
   +--ro ip-in-ip*
      | +--ro name?                     string   |
      | +--ro local-ip?                 inet:ipv4-address-no-zone |
      | +--ro remote-ip?                inet:ipv4-address-no-zone |
      | +--ro state?                    enumeration |
      | +--ro bind-interface?           if:interface-state-ref |
      | +--ro user-configured?          boolean   |
      | +--ro routing-instance?         rt:routing-instance-ref |
      | +--ro tmtu?                     uint16   |
      | +--ro clear-df?                 empty    |
      | +--ro down-reason?              string    |
      | +--ro resolved-interface-name?  string    |
      | +--ro hop-limit?                uint32   |
      | +--ro tos?                      int32
++--ro ipv6to4*
  | ++--ro name? string
  | ++--ro local-ip? inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
  | ++--ro remote-ip? inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
  | ++--ro state? enumeration
  | ++--ro bind-interface? if:interface-state-ref
  | ++--ro user-configured? boolean
  | ++--ro routing-instance? rt:routing-instance-ref
  | ++--ro tmtu? uint16
  | ++--ro clear-df? empty
  | ++--ro down-reason? string
  | ++--ro resolved-interface-name? string
  | ++--ro hop-limit? uint32
  | ++--ro tos? int32
++--ro ipv6v4-manual*
  | ++--ro name? string
  | ++--ro local-ip? inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
  | ++--ro remote-ip? inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
  | ++--ro state? enumeration
  | ++--ro bind-interface? if:interface-state-ref
  | ++--ro user-configured? boolean
  | ++--ro routing-instance? rt:routing-instance-ref
  | ++--ro tmtu? uint16
  | ++--ro clear-df? empty
2.2. YANG Model

<CODE BEGINS>
module ietf-ipipv4-tunnel {

   namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ipipv4-tunnel";
   prefix "v4tln";

   import ietf-interfaces {
      prefix "if";
   }

   import ietf-inet-types {
      prefix inet;
   }

   import ietf-routing {
      prefix "rt";
   }

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Internet-Draft    Yang Data Model for IPIPv4 Tunnel        October 2015

organization

"IETF NETMOD (NETCONF Data Modeling Language) Working Group.";

contact

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description

"This YANG model defines the configuration data
and operational state data for generic IPv4/6-in-IPv4 tunnel.
It includes the IPv4 in IPv4, IPv6 to IPv4
auto and IPv6 over IPv4 manual tunnels.";

revision 2015-10-14 {

description

"Update model based on comments.";

reference

"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for IPv4 Tunnel.";
}

revision 2015-07-20 {

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[Page 8]
description

"This version adds the following new items:
- hop-limit
- tos
- tunnel-type

This version changes 'ipv6to4-auto' to 'ipv6to4';"

reference

"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for IPv4 Tunnel."

}

revision 2015-05-27 {

description

"Initial revision."

reference

"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for IPv4 Tunnel."

}

/* Typedefs */
typedef tunnel-type {

type enumeration {
	enum ip-ip {


description

"IPv4-in-IPv4 tunnel interface."

}
enum ipv6v4-manual {
        description
        "IPv6v4-manual tunnel interface."
    }
enum ipv6to4 {
        description
        "The 6to4 tunnel interface."
    }

description
    "Indicate the type of the IP tunnel."
}

/* Grouping for tunnel */
grouping tunnel-components {
        description
        "Specify the IP addresses of the local and remote tunnel endpoint interfaces. Bind the tunnel circuit interface to the tunnel. Enable the tunnel."
    leaf name {
        type string;
        description
        "Name of the tunnel.";
    }
leaf description {
  type string {
    length "1..255";
  }
  description
    "Textual description for a tunnel. Can be any "+
    "alphanumeric string, including spaces, not to exceed "+
    "255 ASCII characters.";"
}

leaf bind-interface {
  type if:interface-ref;
  description
    "Bind to an interface.";
}

leaf clear-df {
  type empty;
  description
    "If clear-df is absent, it means that fragmentation of 
tunnel packets are permitted. If clear-df is present, 
it means that fragmentation of tunnel packets are not 
permitted.";
}

leaf shutdown {
type empty;
description
"Disable/enable the tunnel."
}

leaf tmtu {

type uint16 {
    range "256..16384";
}
description
"Sets the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) size for
packets sent in a tunnel. The default MTU is the MTU
for the interface to which the tunnel is bound.";
}

leaf mirror-destination {
    type string;
description
"Designate the name of a tunnel as a circuit
mirror destination. ";
}

leaf hop-limit {
    type uint8 {
        range "0|1..255";
    }
description
"The IPv4 TTL or IPv6 Hop Limit which is used in the outer IP header. A value of 0 indicates that the value is copied from the payload’s header."

leaf tos {
  type int8 {
    range "-1..63";
  }
  description
    "The method used to set the high 6 bits (the differentiated services codepoint) of the IPv4 TOS or IPv6 Traffic Class in the outer IP header. A value of -1 indicates that the bits are copied from the payload’s header. A value between 0 and 63 inclusive indicates that the bit field is set to the indicated value.";
}

/*Configuration Data*/
container tunnels {
  description
    "Configuration data for tunnels.";
  list ip-in-ip {
    key "name";
  }
}
description
"Configuration of ip-in-ip tunnel."
uses tunnel-components;
container peer-end-point {
  description
  "Assigns IP addresses to tunnel endpoints.";
  leaf local {
    type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
    description
    "IP address of the local end of the tunnel.";
  }
  leaf remote {
    type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
    description
    "IP address of the remote end of the tunnel.";
  }
  leaf routing-instance {
    type rt:routing-instance-ref;
    description
    "Name of the reference routing instance.";
  }
}
list ipv6to4 {
key "name";
description
   "Configuration of the 6to4 model tunnel.";
uses tunnel-components;
container peer-end-point {
    description
       "Assigns IP addresses to tunnel endpoints.";
    leaf local {
        type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
        description
           "IP address of the local end of the tunnel.";
    }
}
list ipv6v4-manual {
    key "name";
    description
       "Configuration of IPv6-over-v4 manual model tunnel.";
    uses tunnel-components;
    container peer-end-point {
        description
           "Assigns IP addresses to tunnel endpoints.";
        leaf local {
            type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
description
    "IP address of the local end of the tunnel."
}]
leaf remote {
    type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
    description
    "IP address of the remote end of the tunnel."
}
leaf routing-instance {
    type rt:routing-instance-ref;
    description
    "Name of the reference routing instance."
}

/*Operational state data*/
grouping tunnel-state-components {
    description
    "The basic tunnel information to be displayed.";

    leaf name {
        type string;
    }
}
description
   "Name of the tunnel."
}

leaf local-ip {
    type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
    description
       "IP address of the local end of the tunnel."
}

leaf remote-ip {
    type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
    description
       "IP address of the remote end of the tunnel."
}

leaf state {
    type enumeration {
        enum Down {
            description
               "Tunnel down state."
        }
        enum Up {
            description
               "Tunnel up state."
        }
    }
}
enum Shutdown {
    description
        "Tunnel shutdown state.";
}

leaf bind-interface {
    type if:interface-state-ref;
    description
        "Bind to an interface.";
}

leaf user-configured {
    type boolean;
    description
        "Indicate the tunnel is user-configured or dynamic.
        False is for dynamic.";
}

leaf routing-instance {
    type rt:routing-instance-ref;
    description
        "Name of the reference routing instance. ";
}
leaf tmtu {
    type uint16;
    description
    "The Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) size for
    packets sent in a tunnel.";
}
leaf clear-df {
    type empty;
    description
    "Indicate that the DF bit is cleared.";
}
leaf down-reason {
    type string;
    description
    "The reason of the tunnel is down.";
}
leaf resolved-interface-name{
    type string;
    description
    "The egress interface name of the tunnel.";
}
leaf hop-limit {
    type uint32;
    description
"The IPv4 TTL or IPv6 Hop Limit which is used in the outer IP
header. A value of 0 indicates that the value is copied from
the payload’s header.";

leaf tos {
  type int32;
  description
  "The high 6 bits (the differentiated
  services codepoint) of the IPv4 TOS or IPv6 Traffic Class in
  the outer IP header. A value of -1 indicates that the bits are
  copied from the payload’s header. A value between 0 and 63
  inclusive indicates that the bit field is set to the indicated
  value.";
}

container tunnel-state {
  config "false";
  description
  "Contain the information currently configured tunnels.";
  list ip-in-ip {
    description
    "Operational state data of ip-in-ip tunnel.";
    uses tunnel-state-components;
    
  }

}
list ipv6to4 {
    description
    "Operational state data of the 6to4 tunnel.";
    uses tunnel-state-components;
}

list ipv6v4-manual {
    description
    "Operational state data of IPv6v4-manual tunnel.";
    uses tunnel-state-components;
}

//Augment operational state data of IP interfaces
augment "/if:interfaces-state/if:interface" {
    when "if:type = 'ianaift:tunnel'" {
        description
        "Augment IP interface.";
    }
    description
    "Augment operational state data of IP interfaces.";

    leaf tunnel-protocol {
        type tunnel-type;
        description
        "Operational state data of IPv6v4 tunnel.";
    }
}
"Indicate the type of the IP tunnel interface.";
}
}
} // end of module ietf-ipipv4-tunnel

<CODE ENDS>

3. IPv4 Tunnel Model [02]

This document defines two options for the YANG model "ietf-ipipv4-tunnel". Each of them includes two modules, one for configuration and one for state. This section lists the second option.

3.1. Data Model

The data model has the following tree diagram for the IPv4 tunnels:

```yang
module: ietf-ipipv4-tunnel-02
   +--rw Tunnels
      |   +--rw Tunnel* [name]
      |      |   +--rw name                      string
      |      |   +--rw description?             string
      |      |   +--rw bind-interface?          if:interface-ref
      |      |   +--rw clear-df?                empty
      |      |   +--rw shutdown?                empty
      |      |   +--rw tmtu?                    uint16
      |      |   +--rw mirror-destination?      string
      |      |   +--rw hop-limit?               uint8
      |      |   +--rw tos?                     int8
      |      |   +--rw {tunnel-type}?           
      |      |      |   +--:(tunnel-ipinip)
```

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---ro clear-df?   empty
---ro down-reason?   string
---ro resolved-interface-name?   string
---ro hop-limit?   uint32
---ro tos?   int32

augment /if:interfaces-state/if:interface:
    ---ro tunnel-protocol?   tunnel-type

3.2. YANG Model

<CODE BEGINS>
module ietf-ipipv4-tunnel-02{

    namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ipipv4-tunnel-02";
    prefix "v4tln";

    import ietf-interfaces {
        prefix "if";
    }

    import ietf-inet-types {
        prefix inet;
    }

    import ietf-routing {
        prefix "rt";
    }

Liu                     Expires April 15, 2016                [Page 24]
description

"This YANG model defines the configuration data and operational state data for generic IPv4/6-in-IPv4 tunnel. It includes the IPv4 in IPv4, IPv6 to IPv4 auto and IPv6 over IPv4 manual tunnels.";

revision 2015-10-15 {

description

"Initial revision.";

reference

"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for IPv4 Tunnel.";

}

/* Typedefs */
typedef tunnel-type {
  type enumeration {
    enum ip-ip {
      description
      "IPv4-in-IPv4 tunnel interface.";
    }
    enum ipv6v4-manual {
      description
      "IPv6v4-manual tunnel interface.";
    }
    enum ipv6to4 {
      description
      "The 6to4 tunnel interface.";
    }
  }
  description
  "Indicate the type of the IP tunnel.";
}

/* Grouping for tunnel */
grouping tunnel-components {
  description
  "Specify the IP addresses of the local and remote tunnel endpoint interfaces. Bind the
tunnel circuit interface to the tunnel. Enable the tunnel.

leaf name {
  type string;
  description
  "Name of the tunnel."
}

leaf description {
  type string {
    length "1..255";
  }
  description
  "Textual description for a tunnel. Can be any "+
  "alphanumeric string, including spaces, not to exceed "+
  "255 ASCII characters."
}

leaf bind-interface {
  type if:interface-ref;
  description
  "Bind to an interface."
}

leaf clear-df {
  type empty;
  description
"If clear-df is absent, it means that fragmentation of tunnel packets are permitted. If clear-df is present, it means that fragmentation of tunnel packets are not permitted."
}
leaf shutdown {
  type empty;
  description
      "Disable/enable the tunnel."
}
leaf tmtu {
  type uint16 {
      range "256..16384";
  }
  description
      "Sets the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) size for packets sent in a tunnel. The default MTU is the MTU for the interface to which the tunnel is bound."
}
leaf mirror-destination {
  type string;
  description
      "Designate the name of a tunnel as a circuit mirror destination. "
}
leaf hop-limit {
    type uint8 {
        range "0|1..255";
    }
    description
    "The IPv4 TTL or IPv6 Hop Limit which is used in the outer IP
    header. A value of 0 indicates that the value is copied from
    the payload’s header."
}
leaf tos {
    type int8 {
        range "-1..63";
    }
    description
    "The method used to set the high 6 bits (the differentiated
    services codepoint) of the IPv4 TOS or IPv6 Traffic Class in
    the outer IP header. A value of -1 indicates that the bits are
    copied from the payload’s header. A value between 0 and 63
    inclusive indicates that the bit field is set to the indicated
    value."
}
/*Configuration Data*/
container Tunnels{
  description
  "Configuration data for tunnels.";
  list Tunnel{
    key name;
    description
    "Configuration data for tunnels.";
    uses tunnel-components;
    choice tunnel-type{
      description
      "Peer end points configuration for tunnel.";
      case tunnel-ipinip{
        container ip-in-ip{
          description
          "The peer end points configuration of IP in IP tunnel.";
          leaf local {
            type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
            description
            "IP address of the local end of the tunnel.";
          }
        }
        leaf remote {
          type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
          description
          "IP address of the remote end of the tunnel.";
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
leaf routing-instance {
  type rt:routing-instance-ref;
  description
    "Name of the reference routing instance. ";
}

}
manual tunnel; 
leaf local {
    type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
    description
    "IP address of the local end of the tunnel.";
}
leaf remote {
    type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
    description
    "IP address of the remote end of the tunnel.";
}
leaf routing-instance {
    type rt:routing-instance-ref;
    description
    "Name of the reference routing instance. ";
}

/*Operational state data*/
grouping tunnel-state-components {

description
"The basic tunnel information to be displayed."

leaf name {
  type string;
  description
  "Name of the tunnel."
}

leaf local-ip {
  type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
  description
  "IP address of the local end of the tunnel."
}

leaf remote-ip {
  type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
  description
  "IP address of the remote end of the tunnel."
}

leaf state {
  type enumeration {
    enum Down {
      description
      "Tunnel down state."
    }
  }
}
enum Up {
    description
    "Tunnel up state.";
}

enum Shutdown {
    description
    "Tunnel shutdown state.";
}

description
"Indicate the state of the tunnel.";

leaf bind-interface {
    type if:interface-state-ref;
    description
    "Bind to an interface.";
}

leaf user-configured {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Indicate the tunnel is user-configured or dynamic.
    False is for dynamic.";
}
leaf routing-instance {
  type rt:routing-instance-ref;
  description
    "Name of the reference routing instance. ";
}

leaf tmtu {
  type uint16;
  description
    "The Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) size for packets sent in a tunnel.";
}

leaf clear-df {
  type empty;
  description
    "Indicate that the DF bit is cleared.";
}

leaf down-reason {
  type string;
  description
    "The reason of the tunnel is down.";
}

leaf resolved-interface-name{
  type string;
  description
leaf hop-limit {
    type uint32;
    description
        "The IPv4 TTL or IPv6 Hop Limit which is used in the outer IP
header. A value of 0 indicates that the value is copied from
the payload’s header.";
}

leaf tos {
    type int32;
    description
        "The high 6 bits (the differentiated
services codepoint) of the IPv4 TOS or IPv6 Traffic Class in
the outer IP header. A value of -1 indicates that the bits are
copied from the payload’s header. A value between 0 and 63
inclusive indicates that the bit field is set to the indicated
value.";
}

container tunnel-state {
    config "false";
    description
        "The egress interface name of the tunnel.";
}
"Contain the information currently configured tunnels."

list tunnels {
    description
        "Operational state data of tunnels."
    uses tunnel-state-components;
}

// Augment operational state data of IP interfaces
augment "/if:interfaces-state/if:interface" {
    when "if:type = 'ianaift:tunnel'" {
        description
            "Augment IP interface."
    }
    description
        "Augment operational state data of IP interfaces."
    leaf tunnel-protocol {
        type tunnel-type;
        description
            "Indicate the type of the IP tunnel interface."
    }
}

}// end of module ietf-ipipv4-tunnel-02

<CODE ENDS>
4. Security Considerations
   This document does not introduce any new security risk.

5. IANA Considerations
   This document makes no request of IANA.

6. Acknowledgements
   The authors would like to thank Xufeng Liu, Samuel Chen, In-Wher Chen for their contributions to this work.

7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


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IP over Intentionally Partially Partitioned Links
draft-nordmark-intarea-ippl-05

Abstract
IP makes certain assumptions about the L2 forwarding behavior of a multi-access IP link. However, there are several forms of intentional partitioning of links ranging from split-horizon to Private VLANs that violate some of those assumptions. This document specifies that link behavior and how IP handles links with those properties.

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1. Introduction

IPv4 and IPv6 can in general handle two forms of links; point-to-point links when only have two IP nodes (self and remote), and multi-access links with one or more nodes attached to the link. For the multi-access links IP in general, and particular protocols like ARP and IPv6 Neighbor Discovery, makes a few assumptions about transitive and reflexive connectivity i.e., that all nodes attached to the link can send packets to all other nodes.

There are cases where for various reasons and deployments one wants what looks like one link from the perspective of IP and routing, yet the L2 connectivity is restrictive. A key property is that an IP subnet prefix is assigned to the link, and IP routing sees it as a regular multi-access link. But a host attached to the link might not be able to send packets to all other hosts attached to the link. The motivation for this is outside the scope of this document, but in summary the motivation to preserve the subnet view as seen by IP routing is to conserve IP(v4) address space, and the motivation to restrict communication on the link could be due to (security) policy or potentially wireless connectivity approaches.
This intentional and partial partition appears in a few different forms. For DSL [TR-101] and Cable [DOCSIS-MULPI] the pattern is to have a single access router on the link, and all the hosts can send and receive from the access router, but host-to-host communication is blocked. A richer set of restrictions are possible for Private VLANs (PVLAN) [RFC5517], which has a notion of three different ports i.e. attachment points: isolated, community, and promiscuous. Note that other techniques operate at L2/L3 boundary like [RFC4562] but those are out of scope for this document.

The possible connectivity patterns for PVLAN appears to be a superset of the DSL and Cable use of split horizon, thus this document specifies the PVLAN behavior, shows the impact on IP/ARP/ND, and specifies how IP/ARP/ND must operate to work with PVLAN.

If private VLANs, or the split horizon subset, has been configured at layer 2 for the purposes of IPv4 address conservation, then that layer 2 configuration will affect IPv6 even though IPv6 might not have the same need for address conservation.

2. Keywords and Terminology

The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The following terms from [RFC4861] are used without modifications:

- **node**: a device that implements IP.
- **router**: a node that forwards IP packets not explicitly addressed to itself.
- **host**: any node that is not a router.
- **link**: a communication facility or medium over which nodes can communicate at the link layer, i.e., the layer immediately below IP. Examples are Ethernets (simple or bridged), PPP links, X.25, Frame Relay, or ATM networks as well as Internet-layer (or higher-layer) "tunnels", such as tunnels over IPv4 or IPv6 itself.
- **interface**: a node’s attachment to a link.
- **neighbors**: nodes attached to the same link.

This document defines the following set of terms:

- **bridge**: a layer-2 device which implements 802.1Q
- **port**: a bridge’s attachment to another bridge or to a node.
3. Private VLAN

A private VLAN is a structure which uses two or more 802.1Q (VLAN) values to separate what would otherwise be a single VLAN, viewed by IP as a single broadcast domain, into different types of ports with different L2 forwarding behavior between the different ports. A private VLAN consists of a single primary VLAN and multiple secondary VLANs.

From the perspective of both a single bridge and a collection of interconnected bridges there are three different types of ports use to attach nodes plus an inter-bridge port:

- **Promiscuous**: A promiscuous port can send packets to all ports that are part of the private VLAN. Such packets are sent using the primary VLAN ID.
- **Isolated**: Isolated VLAN ports can only send packets to promiscuous ports. Such packets are sent using an isolated VLAN ID.
- **Community**: A community port is associated with a per-community VLAN ID, and can send packets to both ports in the same community VLAN and promiscuous ports.
- **Inter-bridge**: A port used to connect a bridge to another bridge.

3.1. Bridge Behavior

Once a bridge or a set of interconnected bridges have been configured with both the primary and isolated VLAN ID, and zero or more community VLAN IDs associated with the private VLAN, the following forward behaviors apply to the bridge:

- A packet received on an isolated port MUST NOT be forwarded out an isolated or community port; it SHOULD (subject to bandwidth/resource issues) be forwarded out promiscuous and inter-bridge ports.
- A packet received on a community port MUST NOT be forwarded out an isolated port or a community port with a different VLAN ID; it SHOULD be forwarded out promiscuous and inter-bridge ports as well as community ports that have the same community VLAN ID.
- A packet received on a promiscuous port SHOULD be forwarded out all types of ports in the private VLAN.
- A packet received on an inter-bridge port with an isolated VLAN ID should be forwarded as a packet received on an isolated port.
- A packet received on an inter-bridge port with a community VLAN ID should be forwarded as a packet received on a community port associated with that VLAN ID.
- A packet received on an inter-bridge port with a promiscuous VLAN ID should be forwarded as a packet received on a promiscuous port.
In addition to the above VLAN filtering and implied MAC address learning rules, the packet forwarding is also subject to the normal 802.1Q rules with blocking ports due to spanning-tree protocol etc.

4. IP over IPPL

When IP is used over Intentionally Partially Partitioned links like private VLANs the normal usage is to attached routers (and potentially other shared resources like servers) to promiscuous ports, while attaching other hosts to either community or isolated ports. If there is a single host for a given tenant or other domain of separation, then it is most efficient to attach that host to an isolated port. If there are multiple hosts in the private VLAN that should be able to communicate at layer 2, then they should be assigned a common community VLAN ID and attached to ports with that VLAN ID.

The above configuration means that hosts will not be able to communicate with each other unless they are in the same community. However, mechanisms outside of the scope of this document can be used to allow IP communication between such hosts e.g., by having firewall or gateway in or beyond the routers connected to the promiscuous ports. When such a policy is in place it is important that all packets which cross communities are sent to a router, which can have access-control lists or deeper firewall rules to decide which packets to forward.

5. IPv6 over IPPL

IPv6 Neighbor Discovery [RFC4861] can be used to get all the hosts on the link to send all unicast packets except those send to link-local destination addresses to the routers. That is done by setting the L-flag (on-link) to zero for all of the Prefix Information options. Note that this is orthogonal to whether SLAAC (Stateless Address Auto-Configuration) [RFC4862] or DHCPv6 [RFC3315] is used for address autoconfiguration. Setting the L-flag to zero is RECOMMENDED configuration for private VLANs.

If the policy includes allowing some packets that are sent to link-local destinations to cross between different tenants, then some form of NS/NA proxy is needed in the routers, and the routers need to forward packets addressed to link-local destinations out the same interface as REQUIRED in [RFC2460]. If the policy allows for some packets sent to global IPv6 address to cross between tenants then the routers would forward such packets out the same interface. However, with the L=0 setting those global packets will be sent to the default router, while the link-local destinations would result in a Neighbor Solicitation to resolve the IPv6 to link-layer address binding.
Handling such a NS when there are multiple promiscuous ports hence multiple routers risks creating loops. If the router already has a neighbor cache entry for the destination it can respond with an NA on behalf of the destination. However, if it does not it MUST NOT send a NS on the link, since the NA will be received by the other router(s) on the link which can cause an unbounded flood of multicast NS packets (all with hoplimit 255), in particular of the host IPv6 address does not respond. Note that such an NS/NA proxy is defined in [RFC4389] under some topological assumptions such as there being a distinct upstream and downstream direction, which is not the case of two or more peer routers on the same IPPL. For that reason NS/NA packet proxies as in [RFC4389] MUST NOT be used with IPPL.

IPv6 includes Duplicate Address Detection [RFC4862], which assumes that a link-local IPv6 multicast can be received by all hosts which share the same subnet prefix. That is not the case in a private VLAN, hence there could potentially be undetected duplicate IPv6 addresses. However, the DAD proxy approach [RFC6957] defined for split-horizon behavior can safely be used even when there are multiple promiscuous ports hence multiple routers attached to the link, since it does not rely on sending Neighbor Solicitations instead merely gathers state from received packets. The use of [RFC6957] with private VLAN is RECOMMENDED.

The Router Advertisements in a private VLAN MUST be sent out on a promiscuous VLAN ID so that all nodes on the link receive them.

6. IPv4 over IPPL

IPv4 [RFC0791] and ARP [RFC0826] do not have a counterpart to the Neighbor Discovery On-link flag. Hence nodes attached to isolated or community ports will always ARP for any destination which is part of its configured subnet prefix, and those ARP request packets will not be forwarded by the bridges to the target nodes. Thus the routers attached to the promiscuous ports MUST provide a robust proxy ARP mechanism if they are to allow any (firewalled) communication between nodes from different tenants or separation domains.

For the ARP proxy to be robust it MUST avoid loops where router1 attached to the link sends an ARP request which is received by router2 (also attached to the link), resulting in an ARP request from router2 to be received by router1. Likewise, it MUST avoid a similar loop involving IP packets, where the reception of an IP packet results in sending a ARP request from router1 which is proxied by router2. At a minimum, the reception of an ARP request MUST NOT result in sending an ARP request, and the routers MUST either be configured to know each others MAC addresses, or receive the VLAN tagged packets so they can avoid proxying when the packet is received.
Any proxy ARP approach MUST work correctly with Address Conflict Detection [RFC5227]. ACD depends on ARP probes only receiving responses if there is a duplicate IP address, thus the ARP probes MUST NOT be proxied. These ARP probes have a Sender Protocol Address of zero, hence they are easy to identify.

When proxying an ARP request (with a non-zero Sender Protocol Address) the router needs to respond by placing its own MAC address in the Sender Hardware Address field. When there are multiple routers attached to the private VLAN this will not only result in multiple ARP replies for each ARP request, those replies would have a different Sender Hardware Address. That might seem surprising to the requesting node, but does not cause an issue with ARP implementations that follow the pseudo-code in [RFC0826].

If the two or more routers attached to the private VLAN implement VRRP [RFC5798] the routers MAY use their VRRP MAC address as the Sender Hardware Address in the proxied ARP replies, since this reduces the risk nodes that do not follow the pseudo-code in [RFC0826]. However, if they do so it can cause flapping of the MAC tables in the bridges between the routers and the ARPing node. Thus such use is NOT RECOMMENDED in general topologies of bridges but can be used when there are no intervening bridges.

7. Multiple routers

In addition to the above issues when multiple routers are attached to the same PVLAN, the routers need to avoid potential routing loops for packets entering the subnet. When such a packet arrives the router might need to send an ARP request (or Neighbor Solicitation) for the host, which can trigger the other router to send a proxy ARP (or Neighbor Advertisement). The host, if present, will also respond to the ARP/NS. This issue is described in [PVLAN-HOSTING] in the particular case of HSRP.

When multiple routers are attached to the same PVLAN, whether they are using VRRP, HSRP, or neither, they SHOULD NOT proxy ARP/ND respond to a request from another router. At a minimum a router MUST be configurable with a list of IP addresses to which it should not proxy respond. Thus the user can configure that list with the IP address(es) of the other router(s) attached to the PVLAN.
8. Multicast over IPPL

Layer 2 multicast or broadcast is used by protocols like ARP [RFC0826], IPv6 Neighbor Discovery [RFC4861] and Multicast DNS [RFC6762] with link-local scope. The first two have been discussed above.

Multicast DNS can be handled by implementing using some proxy such as [I-D.ietf-dnssd-hybrid] but that is outside of the scope of this document.

IP Multicast which spans across multiple IP links and that have senders that are on community or isolated ports require additional forwarding mechanisms in the routers that are attached to the promiscuous ports, since the routers need to forward such packets out to any allowed receivers in the private VLAN without resulting in packet duplication. For multicast senders on isolated ports such forwarding would result in the sender potentially receiving the packet it transmitted. For multicast senders on community ports, any receivers in the same community VLAN are subject to receiving duplicate packets; one copy directly from layer 2 from the sender and a second copy forwarded by the multicast router.

For that reason it is NOT RECOMMENDED to configure outbound multicast forwarding from private VLANs.

9. DHCP Implications

With IPv4 both a static configuration and a DHCPv4 configuration will assign a subnet prefix to any hosts including those attached to the isolated or community ports. Hence the above robust proxy ARP is needed even in the case of DHCPv4.

With IPv6 static configuration, or SLAAC (Stateless Address Auto-Configuration) [RFC4862] or DHCPv6 [RFC3315] can be used to configure the IPv6 addresses on the interfaces. However, when DHCPv6 is used to configure the IPv6 addresses it does not configure any notion of an on-link prefix length. Thus in that case the on-link determination comes from the Router Advertisement. Hence the above approach of setting L=0 in the Prefix Information Option will result in packets being sent to the default router(s).

Hence no special considerations are needed for DHCPv4 or DHCPv6.
10. Redirect Implications

ICMP redirects can be used for both IPv4 and IPv6 to indicate a better first-hop router to hosts, and in addition for IPv6 can be used to indicate the direct link-layer address to use to send to a node which is on the link. ICMP redirects to another router which attached to a promiscuous port would work since the host can reach it. However, communication will fail if that port is not promiscuous. In addition, the IPv6 redirect to an on-link host is likely to be problematic since a host is likely to be attached to an isolated or community port.

For those reasons it is RECOMMENDED that the sending of IPv4 and IPv6 redirects is disabled on the routers attached to the IPPL.

11. Security Considerations

In general DAD is subject to a Denial of Service attack since a malicious host can claim all the IPv6 addresses [RFC3756]. Same issue applies to IPv4/ARP when Address Conflict Detection [RFC5227] is implemented.

12. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA actions needed for this document.

13. Acknowledgements

The author is grateful for the comments from Mikael Abrahamsson, Fred Baker, Wes Beebee, Hemant Singh, Dave Thaler, and Sowmini Varadhan.

14. Appendix: Layer 2 Implications

While not in scope for this document, there are some observations relating to the interaction of IPPL (and private VLANs in particular) and layer 2 learning which are worth mentioning. Depending on the details of how the deployed Ethernet bridges perform learning, a side effect of using a different .1Q tag for packets sent from the routers than for packets sent towards the routers mean that the 802.1Q learning and aging process in intermediate bridges might age out the MAC address entry for the routers MAC address. If that happens packets sent towards the router will be flooded at layer two. The observed behavior is that an ARP request for the router’s IP address will result in re-learning the MAC address. Thus some operators work around this issue by configuring the ARP aging time to be shorter than the MAC aging time.
15. References

15.1. Normative References


15.2. Informative References

Cheshire, S., "Hybrid Unicast/Multicast DNS-Based Service Discovery", draft-ietf-dnssd-hybrid-03 (work in progress), February 2016.


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GRE Tunnel Level Fragmentation
draft-templin-intarea-grefrag-04.txt

Abstract
GRE tunnels use IP fragmentation for delivery packets that exceed the path MTU. However, IP fragmentation has been shown to be susceptible to reassembly errors at high data rates, and IP fragments may be unconditionally dropped by some middleboxes. This document therefore introduces GRE tunnel level fragmentation, which overcomes these issues.

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1. Introduction

GRE is specified in the following RFCs: [RFC1701][RFC2784][RFC2890][RFC7676]. GRE fragmentation considerations are further discussed in [RFC7588]. In its current manifestation, GRE allows for fragmentation of the payload packet only if it is an IPv4 packet with the Don’t Fragment (DF) bit set to 0. GRE also allows for IP fragmentation of the delivery packet, but IP fragmentation has been shown to be susceptible to reassembly errors at high data rates [RFC4963] and IP fragments may be unconditionally dropped by some middleboxes [I-D.taylor-v6ops-fragdrop].

A third option (introduced here) is for the GRE tunnel to perform "tunnel level" fragmentation and reassembly on the payload packet at the GRE layer. In this way, the ingress can fragment the payload packet (while treating the payload packet’s headers as ordinary data) and encapsulate each fragment in a separate delivery header. The GRE header requires a new fragment header field to support this.

This tunnel level fragmentation method was first suggested in Section 3.1.7 of [RFC2764], and also appears in more recent works [I-D.templin-aerolink] [I-D.herbert-gue-fragmentation]. [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels] provides the architectural background for tunnel fragmentation and reassembly.
2. GRE Fragmentation Header

Figure 1 shows the GRE header as specified in [RFC1701] but with a new optional "Fragment Header" and a new control bit "F":

```
|C|R|K|S|s|Recur|F| Flags | Ver |         Protocol Type         |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|      Checksum (optional)      |       Offset (optional)       |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                         Key (optional)                        |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                 Sequence Number (optional)                   |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                         Fragment Header (Optional)            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                         Routing (optional)                    |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

**Figure 1: GRE Header with Fragment Header**

In this format, when the "F" bit (i.e., bit 8) is set to 1 the GRE header includes a Fragment header formatted as follows:

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|       Fragment offset   |Res|M|  Reserved(2)  |               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+               +
|                        Identification                        |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

**Figure 2: GRE Fragmennt Header Format**

The fields of the option are:

- **Fragment offset**: This field indicates where in the datagram this fragment belongs. The fragment offset is measured in units of 8 octets (64 bits). The first fragment has offset zero.

- **Res**: Two bit reserved field. Must be set to zero for transmission. If set to non-zero in a received packet then the packet MUST be dropped.

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[Page 3]
o M: More fragments bit. Set to 1 when there are more fragments following in the datagram, set to 0 for the last fragment.

o Reserved(2): Eight bit reserved field. Must be set to zero for transmission. If set to non-zero in a received packet then the packet MUST be dropped.

o Identification: 40 bits. Identifies fragments of a fragmented packet.

Note that these formats are the same as specified in [I-D.herbert-gue-fragmentation] with the exception that the Reserved(2) field replaces the "Original Type" field since the GRE header already includes a Protocol Type.

3. GRE Tunnel Level Fragmentation and Reassembly

GRE tunnel level fragmentation treats the entire GRE payload packet (including the payload headers) as opaque data. The GRE tunnel ingress breaks the payload packet into N fragments and encapsulates each fragment in a separate GRE header and GRE delivery header. For the first fragment, the ingress writes the IEEE802 protocol number in the Protocol Type field the same as for any GRE packet. For other fragments, the ingress instead writes the length of the fragment in the Protocol Type field. This value MUST be no larger than 1500, which the egress will interpret as a length instead of a protocol type. (This implies that the maximum size for a non-initial fragment is 1500 bytes.) The GRE tunnel ingress then sends each fragment to the GRE tunnel egress.

When the GRE tunnel egress receives the fragments, it reassembles the GRE payload packet by concatenating the data portions of each fragment according to their offsets. In order to support this tunnel level fragmentation and reassembly procedure, the GRE tunnel ingress must know the maximum sized packet the GRE tunnel egress is capable of reassembling, i.e., the Maximum Reassembly Unit (MRU). In order to avoid interactions with Path MTU Discovery, the GRE tunnel egress MUST configure a minimum MRU of 1500 bytes plus the GRE delivery encapsulation overhead, and MAY configure a larger MRU.

4. IANA Considerations

This document introduces no IANA considerations.
5. Security Considerations

Security considerations for GRE apply also to this document.

6. Implementation Status

The SEAL proposal uses tunnel level fragmentation in the same way as proposed here for GRE. Both SEAL and GRE fragmentation can be implemented through simple modifications of the widely-available, well understood and well-tested IP fragmentation code bases.

An implementation of SEAL fragmentation and reassembly has been published and is available at the following URL:

http://linkupnetworks.org/seal/sealv2-1.0.tgz

7. Acknowledgements

The following are acknowledged for their helpful comments: Tom Herbert, Carlos Pignataro, Joe Touch.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References

[I-D.herbert-gue-fragmentation]

[I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels]

[I-Dtemplin-aerolink]


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Yang Data Model for Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)
draft-zheng-intarea-gre-yang-00.txt

Abstract

This document defines a YANG data model that can be used to configure and manage Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE).

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

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1. Introduction

Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) [RFC2784] specifies a protocol for encapsulation of an arbitrary network layer protocol over another arbitrary network layer protocol. YANG [RFC6020] is a data definition language that was introduced to define the contents of a conceptual data store that allows networked devices to be managed using NETCONF [RFC6241]. This document defines a YANG data model that can be used to configure and manage GRE.

The rest of this document is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the scope of this document. Section 3 provides the design of the GRE configuration data model in details. Section 4 presents the complete data hierarchy of GRE YANG model. Section 5 specifies the YANG module and section 6 lists examples which conform to the YANG module specified in this document. Finally, security considerations are discussed in Section 7.

2. Scope

The fundamental protocol of GRE is defined in [RFC2784]. [RFC2890] describes extensions by which two fields, Key and Sequence Number, can be optionally carried in the GRE Header. [I-D.ietf-intarea-gre-ipv6] specifies GRE procedures for IPv6, used
as either the payload or delivery protocol. [I-D.ietf-intarea-gre-mtu] describes how vendors have solved the GRE fragmentation problem. These RFCs and documents are considered in this Yang Module.

3. Design of the Data Model

This YANG data model is defined to be used to configure and manage Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE). Under the top level container is the list gre-tunnel, the leaf tunnel-name is used as the key for the list. Under the list, nodes are defined to enable the tunnel encapsulation configuration when either IPv4 or IPv6 is used as the delivery protocol. Nodes are also defined to enable the checksum bit set, tunnel fragmentation, Path MTU Discovery, Key and Key value set, and Sequence Number configuration respectively, based on various GRE RFCs and documents which are summarized in Section 2.

4. Data Hierarchy

The complete data hierarchy of GRE YANG model is presented below.

module: ietf-gre
  +-rw gre-tunnel
    +-rw gre-tunnel* [tunnel-name]
      +-rw tunnel-name               string
      +-rw (delivery-protocol)?
        |  +-:(ipv4)
        |     +-rw source-ipv4-address?      inet:ipv4-address
        |     +-rw dest-ipv4-address?        inet:ipv4-address
        +-:(ipv6)
          +-rw source-ipv6-address?      inet:ipv6-address
          +-rw dest-ipv6-address?        inet:ipv6-address
          +-rw pmtud-enable?             boolean
          +-rw fragmentation-enable?     boolean
          +-rw checksum-enable?          boolean
          +-rw key-enable?               boolean
          +-rw key?                      uint32
          +-rw sequence-number-enable?   boolean

5. GRE Yang Module

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-gre@2015-07-02.yang"
module ietf-gre {  
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-gre";  
  //namespace to be assigned by IANA  
  prefix "gre";
  import ietf-inet-types {
prefix "inet";
}
organization "IETF INTAREA Working Group";
contact "draft-zheng-intarea-gre-yang";
description "This module contains the YANG definition for GRE parameters as per RFC2784, RFC2890, draft-ietf-intarea-gre-ipv6 and draft-ietf-intarea-gre-mtu";
revision "2015-07-02" {
  description "Initial revision.";
  reference "draft-zheng-intarea-gre-yang";
}

container gre-tunnel {
  description "Top level container";
  list gre-tunnel {
    key "tunnel-name";
    description "GRE tunnel";
    leaf tunnel-name {
      type string {
        length "1..63";
      }
      description "GRE tunnel name";
    }
    choice delivery-protocol {
      case ipv4 {
        leaf source-ipv4-address {
          type inet:ipv4-address;
          description "Source IP address";
        }
        leaf dest-ipv4-address {
          type inet:ipv4-address;
          description "Destination IP address";
        }
      }
      case ipv6 {
        leaf source-ipv6-address {
          type inet:ipv6-address;
          description "Source IP address";
        }
        leaf dest-ipv6-address {
          type inet:ipv6-address;
          description "Destination IP address";
        }
      }
    }
    description "Delivery protocol";
  }
  leaf pmtud-enable {

type boolean;
    description "Enable tunnel PMTU discovery";
}
leaf fragmentation-enable {
    type boolean;
    description "Enable delivery packets fragmentation";
}
leaf checksum-enable {
    type boolean;
    description "Enable GRE tunnel checksum verification";
}
leaf key-enable {
    type boolean;
    description "Enable optional GRE tunnel Key";
}
leaf key {
    when "/gre-tunnel/gre-tunnel/key-enable == 'true'" {
        description "When key-enable is true";
    }
    type uint32;
    description "GRE tunnel key value";
}
leaf sequence-number-enable {
    type boolean;
    description "Enable optional GRE tunnel Sequence Number";
}
}

6. Examples

Examples of using Yang module to configure and manage GRE will be given here in the update when the Yang module is stable.

7. Security Considerations

The configuration and state data defined in this document is designed to be accessed via the NETCONF protocol [RFC6241]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is SSH [RFC6242]. The authors recommend to implement the NETCONF access control model [RFC6536] to restrict access for particular NETCONF users to a pre-configured subset of all available NETCONF protocol operations and content.

There are a number of config true nodes defined in the YANG module which are writable/creatable/deletable. These data nodes may be
considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations.

8. IANA Considerations

The IANA is requested to assign a new namespace URI from the IETF XML registry.

URI:TBA

9. Acknowledgements

We would also like to thank XXX.

10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


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