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Making Multipath TCP robust for stateless webrowsers  
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Abstract

This document proposes a modification of the MPTCP handshake that allows it to work efficiently with stateless servers. We first identify the issues around stateless connection establishment using SYN-cookies. Further, we suggest an extension to Multipath TCP to overcome these issues and discuss alternatives.

As a side-effect, the proposed modification to the handshake opens the door to reduce the size of the MP\_CAPABLE option in the SYN. This reduces the growing pressure on the TCP-option space in the SYN-segment, giving space for future extensions to TCP.

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## 1. Introduction

During the establishment of a TCP connection, a server must create state upon the reception of the SYN [RFC0793]. Specifically, it needs to generate an initial sequence number, and reply to the options indicated in the SYN. The server typically maintains in-memory state for the embryonic connection, including state about what options were negotiated, such as window scale factor [RFC7323] and the maximum segment size. It also maintains state about whether SACK [RFC2018] and TCP Timestamps were negotiated during the 3-way handshake.

Attackers exploit this state creation on the server through the SYN-flooding attack. Indeed, an attacker only needs to emit SYN segments with different 4-tuples (source and destination IP addresses and port numbers) in order to make the server create the state and thus consume its memory, while the attacker itself does not need to maintain any state for such an attack [RFC4987].

A common mitigation of this attack is to use a mechanism called SYN-cookies. SYN-cookies rely on the fact that a TCP-connection echoes back certain information that the server puts in the SYN/ACK during the three-way handshake. Notably, the sequence-number is echoed back in the acknowledgment field as well as the TCP timestamp value inside the timestamp option. When generating the SYN/ACK, the server generates these fields in a verifiable fashion. Typically, servers use the 4-tuple, the client's sequence number plus a local secret (which changes over time) to generate the initial sequence number by applying a hashing function to the aforementioned fields. Further, setting certain bits either in the sequence number or the TCP timestamp value allows to encode for example whether SACK has been negotiated and what window-scaling has been received [M08]. Upon the reception of the third ACK, the server can thus verify whether the acknowledgment number is indeed the reply to a SYN/ACK it has generated (using the 4-tuple and the local secret). Further, it can decode from the timestamp echo reply the required information concerning SACK, window scaling and MSS-size.

In case the third ACK is lost during the 3-way handshake of TCP, stateless servers only work if it's the client who initiates the communication by sending data to the server - which is commonly the case in today's application-layer protocols. As the data segment includes the acknowledgement number for the original SYN/ACK as well as the TCP timestamp value, the server is able to reconstruct the connection state even if the third ACK is lost in the network. If the very first data segment is also lost, then the server is unable to reconstruct the connection state and will respond to subsequent data sent by the client with a TCP Reset.

Multipath TCP (MPTCP [RFC6824]) is unable to reconstruct the MPTCP level connection state if the third ack is lost in the network (as explained in the following section). If the first data segment from the client reaches the server, the server can reconstruct the TCP state but not the MPTCP state. Such a server can fallback to regular TCP upon the loss of the third ACK. MPTCP is also prone to the same problem as regular TCP if the first data segment is also lost.

In the following section a more detailed assessment of the issues with MPTCP and TCP SYN-cookies is presented. Section 3 then shows how these issues might get solved.

## 2. Problem statement

Multipath TCP adds additional state to the 3-way handshake. Notably, the keys must be stored in the state so that later on new subflows can be established as well as the initial data sequence number is known to both hosts. In order to support stateless servers,

Multipath TCP echoes the keys in the third ACK. A stateless server thus can generate its own key in a verifiable fashion (similar to the initial sequence number), and is able to learn the client's key through the echo in the third ACK. The generation of the key is implementation-specific. An example of such a key-generation would be: `Key_Server = Hash(5-tuple, server's subflow sequence number, local_secret)`. The reliance on the third ACK however implies that if this segment gets lost, then the server cannot reconstruct the state associated to the MPTCP connection. Indeed, a Multipath TCP connection is forced to fallback to regular TCP in case the third ACK gets lost or has been reordered with the first data segment of the client, because it cannot infer the client's key from the connection and thus won't be able to generate a valid HMAC to establish new subflows nor does it know the initial data sequence number. In the remainder of this document we refer to the aforementioned issue as "Loss of the third ACK".

Stateless servers also are unable to recover connection state when the third ack and the first data segment are lost. This issue, outlined hereafter, happens even when regular TCP is being used. In case the client is sending multiple segments when initiating the connection, it might be that the third ack as well as the first data segment get lost. Thus, the server only receives the second data segment and will try to reconstruct the state based on this segment's 4-tuple, sequence number and timestamp value. However, as this segment's sequence number has already gone beyond the client's initial sequence number, it will not be able to regenerate the appropriate SYN-cookie and thus the verification will fail. The server effectively cannot infer that the sequence number in the segment has gone beyond TCP's initial sequence number. This will make the server send a TCP reset as it appears to the server that it received a segment for which no SYN cookie was ever generated.

### 3. Proposal

This section shows how the above problems might be solved in Multipath TCP.

#### 3.1. Loss of the third ACK

In order to make Multipath TCP robust against the loss of the third ACK when SYN-cookies are being deployed on servers, we must make sure that the state-information relevant to Multipath TCP reaches the server in a reliable way. If the client is initiating the data transfer to the server (this data is being delivered reliably through TCP) the state-information could be delivered together with this data and thus is implicitly reliably sent to the server - when the data reaches the server, the state-information reaches the server as well.

We achieve this by adding another variant to the MP\_CAPABLE option, differentiated by the length of it (we call this option MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK in the remainder of this document). It is solely sent on the very first data segment from the client to the server. This option serves the dual purpose of conveying the client's and server's key as well as the DSS mapping which would otherwise have been sent in a DSS option on the first data segment.

Making the MP\_CAPABLE in the third ACK reliable opens the door for another improvement in MPTCP. In fact, the client doesn't need to send its own key in the SYN anymore (it will send it reliably in the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK). Thus, the MP\_CAPABLE option in the SYN segment can avoid adding the key, reducing the option-space requirement of the MP\_CAPABLE down to 4 bytes. This is a major improvement as the option-space in the SYN segment is very limited, and allows a TCP connection to negotiate future extensions in the SYN.

As this change is a major extension to Multipath TCP, we require that the version number of the MP\_CAPABLE is increased. Further details on the negotiation are presented in Section 3.1.3. The following is a detailed description of the option format and the suggested handshake.


#### 3.1.1.1. MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK specification

We suggest to remove the key from the MP\_CAPABLE in the SYN-segment. The format of the MP\_CAPABLE remains the same (with the bits A to H as well as the version number), with the difference that the key is no more present. Hosts are able to differentiate between the different MP\_CAPABLE options through the length-field of the TCP-option.

The MP\_CAPABLE option in the SYN/ACK as well as the third ACK (which does not contain any data) remain unmodified from RFC6824.

The MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option (shown in Figure 1) contains the same set of bits A to H as well as the version number, like the MP\_CAPABLE option. Further, the option includes the data-level length as well as the checksum (in case it has been negotiated during the 3-way handshake). This allows the server to reconstruct the mapping and deliver the data to the application. It must be noted that the information inside the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK is less explicit than a DSS option. Notably, the data-sequence number, data acknowledgment as well as the relative subflow-sequence number are not part of the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK. Nevertheless, the server is able to reconstruct the mapping because the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK is guaranteed to only be sent on the very first data segment. Thus, implicitly the relative subflow-

sequence number equals 1 as well as the data-sequence number, which is equal to the initial data-sequence number.




Format of the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option.

Figure 1

The handshake (depicted in Figure 2) starts with the client sending the MP\_CAPABLE option to the server inside the SYN. The client is not required to having generated its key already at this point.

Upon reception of this SYN-segment, a stateful server generates a random key and replies with a SYN/ACK. If the server behaves in a stateless manner it has to generate it's own key in a verifiable fashion. This verifiable way of generating the key can be done by using a hash of the 4-tuple, sequence number and a local secret (similar to what is done for the TCP-sequence number [RFC4987]). It will thus be able to verify whether it is indeed the originator of the key echoed back in the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option. When generating this verifiable key, the server has to ensure that the token derived from this key is locally unique (Section 3.1 of RFC6824). If there is already an MPTCP-session with such a token, the server must fallback to regular TCP by not sending an MP\_CAPABLE in the third ACK.



The modified MPTCP-handshake only consumes 4 bytes in the SYN.

Figure 2

To complete the three-way handshake, the client has to reply with a third ACK and the MP\_CAPABLE option (with both keys as defined in RFC6824). If the client has already data to send, it can even avoid sending the third ACK, and immediately send the data together with the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK. Otherwise, the client sends the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK as soon as the application writes data on the socket.

The goal of the third ACK (with the MP\_CAPABLE) as well as the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK is to convey the client's key to the server. An indication for the client that the server received the key is when the server issues a DATA\_ACK inside the DSS-option (even if this DATA\_ACK does not acknowledge any data). Thus, as long as the client has not sent an MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK with data, it must add the MP\_CAPABLE option in each (non-data) segment sent to the server. It must do this until it either did send an MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK or until it received a DATA\_ACK from the server. The reason for this is explained in Section 3.1.2 and Section 3.1.5. Combining the MP\_CAPABLE with the DATA\_ACK will require 20 + 8 bytes, which still leaves 12 bytes for the TCP timestamp option.

Finally, the server must send a duplicate acknowledgment to the client upon reception of the client's key. This, to convey to the client that it successfully received the MP\_CAPABLE(\_ACK) option. It must be noted that this 4-way handshake does not prevent the client to send data before the reception of this fourth acknowledgment.

This mechanism of sending the MP\_CAPABLE with a DATA\_ACK until the server acknowledges it, introduces additional complexity to the handshake. However, we consider the gain of reducing the MP\_CAPABLE option in the SYN-segment as significant enough, that it is worth to accept this added complexity.

### 3.1.2. TCP Fast Open

If TCP Fast Open [RFC7413] is being used in combination with Multipath TCP [I-D.barre-mptcp-tfo], the server is allowed to send data right after the SYN/ACK, without the need to wait for the third ACK. The server sending this data cannot include a DATA\_ACK option inside the DSS option as it does not yet know the client's key. This is not an issue as the DATA\_ACK is optional in the DSS option.

However, the client receiving this data sent by the server will have to acknowledge it with a DATA\_ACK. As specified above, the client must also send an MP\_CAPABLE option on this acknowledgment as it didn't yet receive a DATA\_ACK from the server.

### 3.1.3. Negotiation

We require a way for the hosts to negotiate support for the suggested handshake. As we modify the size of the MP\_CAPABLE, our proposal relies on a new version of MPTCP. The client requests this new version of MPTCP during the MP\_CAPABLE exchange (it remains to be defined by the IETF which version of MPTCP includes the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option). If the server supports this version, it replies with a SYN/ACK including the MP\_CAPABLE and indicating this same version.

### 3.1.4. DATA\_FIN

As the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option includes the same bitfields as the regular MP\_CAPABLE, there is no space to indicate a DATA\_FIN as is done in the DSS option. This implies that a client cannot send a DATA\_FIN together with the first segment of data. Thus, if the server requests the usage of MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK through the C-bit, the client must send a separate segment with the DSS-option, setting the DATA\_FIN-flag to 1, after it has sent the data-segment that includes the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option.

### 3.1.5. Server sending data

The MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK version can only be sent by the client if it actually has data to send. One question that this raises is how the proposal will work when the server is the first one to send data to the client. In the following we describe how the handshake will still work when servers behave in a stateless and stateful manner.

For stateless servers the same issue arises as well for regular TCP. Upon loss of the third ACK, the server cannot complete the three-way handshake. Thus, stateless servers that begin the application level protocol by emitting data rely on the fact that the third ACK is



received (irregardless of whether MPTCP is used or not). Thus, this implies that the server also will receive the MP\_CAPABLE with this third ACK.

Stateful servers will retransmit the SYN/ACK until the third ACK (including the MP\_CAPABLE) has been received. This will thus provide to the server the client's key. When the client eventually sends its own first data segment to the server, it actually does not have to use the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option because the server already did send a DATA\_ACK to the client.

### 3.1.6. Middlebox considerations

Multipath TCP has been designed with middleboxes in mind and so the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option must also be able to go through middleboxes. The following middlebox behaviors have been considered and MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK acts accordingly across these middleboxes:

- o Removing MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK-option: If a middlebox strips the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option out of the data segment, the server receives data without a corresponding mapping. As defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC6824], the server must then do a seamless fallback to regular TCP.
- o Coalescing segments: A middlebox might coalesce the first and second data segment into one single segment. While doing so, it might remove one of the options (either MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK or the DSS-option of the second segment because of the limited 40 bytes TCP option space). There are two cases to consider:
  - \* If the DSS-option is not included in the segment, the second half of the payload is not covered by a mapping. Thus, the server will do a seamless fallback to regular TCP as defined by [RFC6824] in Section 3.6. This fallback will trigger because RFC6824 specifies that during the beginning of a connection (as long as the path has not been proven to let the MPTCP-options unmodified in both directions) a seamless fallback to regular TCP must be done by stopping to send DATA\_ACKs to the client.
  - \* If the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option is not present, then the DSS-option provides an offset of the TCP sequence number. As the server behaves statelessly it can only assume that the present mapping belongs to the first byte of the payload (similar to what is explained in detail in Section 3.2). As this however is not true, it will calculate an incorrect initial TCP sequence number and thus reply with a TCP-reset as the SYN-cookie is invalid. As such kind of middleboxes are very rare we consider this behavior as acceptable.

- o Splitting segments: A TCP segmentation offload engine (TSO) might split the first segment in smaller segments and copy the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option on each of these segments. Thanks to the data-length value included in the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option, the server is able to detect this and correctly reconstructs the mapping. In case the first of these splitted segments gets lost, the server finds itself in a situation similar to the one described in Section 2. The TCP sequence number doesn't allow anymore to verify the SYN-cookie and thus a TCP reset is sent. This behavior is the same as for regular TCP.
- o Payload modifying middlebox: In case the middlebox modifies the payload, the DSS-checksum included in the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option allows to detect this and will trigger a fallback to regular TCP as defined in [RFC6824].


### 3.2. Loss of the first data segment

Section 2 described the issue of losing the first data segment of a connection while TCP SYN-cookies are in use. The following outlines how Multipath TCP actually allows to fix this particular issue.

Consider the packet-flow of Figure 3. Upon reception of the second data segment, the included data sequence mapping allows the server to actually detect that this is not the first segment of a TCP connection. Indeed, the relative subflow sequence number inside the DSS-mapping is actually 100, indicating that this segment is already further ahead in the TCP stream. This allows the server to actually reconstruct the initial sequence number based on the sequence number in the TCP-header  $((X+100) - 100)$  that has been provided by the client and verify whether its SYN-cookie is correct. Thus, no TCP-reset is being sent - in contrast to regular TCP, where the server cannot verify the SYN-cookie. The server knows that the received segment is not the first one of the data stream and thus it can store it temporarily in the out-of-order queue of the connection. It must be noted that the server is not yet able to fully reconstruct the MPTCP state. In order to do this it still must await the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option that is provided in the first data segment.

The server responds to the out-of-order data with a duplicate ACK. The duplicate ACK may also have SACK data if SACK was negotiated. However, if this duplicate ACK does not have an MPTCP level Data ACK, the client may interpret this as a fallback to TCP. This is because the client cannot determine if an option stripping middlebox removed the MPTCP option on TCP segments after connection establishment. So even though the server has not fully recreated the MPTCP state at this point, it should respond with a Data ACK set to the Data Sequence Number  $Y-100$ . The client's TCP implementation may

retransmit the first data segment after a TCP retransmit timeout or it may do so as part of an Early Retransmit that can be triggered by an ACK arriving from the server.



Multipath TCP's DSS option allows to handle the loss of the first data segment as the host can infer the initial sequence number.

Figure 3

#### 4. Alternative solutions

An alternative solution to creating the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK option would have been to emit the MP\_CAPABLE-option together with the DSS-option on the first data segment. However, as the MP\_CAPABLE option is 20 bytes long and the DSS-option (using 4-byte sequence numbers) consumes 16 bytes, a total of 36 bytes of the TCP option space would be consumed by this approach. This option has been dismissed as it would prevent any other TCP option in the first data segment, a constraint that would severely limit TCP's extensibility in the future.

#### 5. IANA Considerations

Our proposal requires the change of the MPTCP-version number.

#### 6. Security Considerations

Sending the keys in a reliable way after the three-way handshake implies that there is a larger window during which an on-path attacker might modify the keys that are being sent in the MP\_CAPABLE\_ACK. However, we do not think that this can actually be

considered as a security issue. If an attacker modifies the keys, the outcome will be that the client and the server won't agree anymore on the data-sequence numbers. The data-flow will thus stall. Considering that the attacker has to be an active on-path attacker to launch this attack, he has already other means of interfering with the connection. Thus, this attack is considered as irrelevant.

Further, if servers implement the proposal from Section 3.2, to handle the scenario where the first data-segment is lost, the incoming segments need to be stored in the out-of-order queue. The server will store these segments without having verified the key that the client provides in the MP\_CAPABLE option. This might be considered as a security risk where an attacker could consume buffer space in the server. It must be noted however that in order to achieve this, the attacker needs to correctly guess the SYN-cookie so that the verification described in Section 3.2 is successful. As MPTCP does not try to be more secure than regular TCP, this thread can be considered acceptable, as it uses the same level of security as regular TCP's SYN-cookies. Nevertheless, servers are free to avoid storing those segments in the out-of-order queue if the thread is considered important enough.

## 7. Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Olivier Bonaventure, Yoshifumi Nishida and Alan Ford for their comments and suggestions on this draft.

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