

# Using The Delegated CoAP Authentication and Authorization Framework (DCAF) With CBOR Encoded Message Syntax

draft-bergmann-ace-dcaf-cose

Olaf Bergmann, Stefanie Gerdes  
{gerdes | bergmann}@tzi.org


Presented by **Carsten Bormann**  
cabo@tzi.org

IETF-94, ACE Meeting, 2015-11-02


# Motivation

- ▶ `draft-gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize`
  - ▶ Secure exchange of authorization information.
  - ▶ Establish DTLS channel between constrained nodes.
  - ▶ Support of class-1 devices (RFC 7228).
  - ▶ Support cross-domain, multi-owner scenarios.
- ▶ `draft-bergmann-ace-dcaf-cose`
  - ▶ Re-use light-weight DCAF messaging
  - ▶ Support for application-level security using COSE objects
  - ▶ Enable *piggybacked protected content* use-case

## Observation: DCAF Messages are not tied to DTLS



## Nor is the Ticket Data



# DCAF-Messages can be protected with COSE

## Example: Access Request



```
POST /client-authorize
Content-Format: application/cose+cbor
[ h'a1031862',          # protected { content_type: application/dcaf+cbor }
  { alg: AES-CCM-16-64-128      # unprotected
    nonce: h'd6150b90e6f0eb5be42164062c', # nonce
  },
  h'{encrypted payload w/ tag}', # encrypted DCAF payload
  # recipients:
  [ [ h'',              # protected (absent for AE algorithm)
    { alg: A128KW,      # unprotected
      kid: h'383261622e6161733432' # context identifier: "82ab.aas42"
    },
    h'52ff9ed52d...'   # encrypted session key
  ] ]
]
```

# DCAF-Messages can be protected with COSE

## Example: Access Request

```
POST /client-authorize
Content-Format: application/cose+cbor
[ h'a1031862', # protected { content_type: application/dcaf+cbor }
  { alg: AES-CCM-16-64-128 # unprotected
    nonce: h'd6150b90e6f0eb5be42164062c', # nonce
  },
  h'{encrypted payload w/ tag}', # encrypted DCAF payload
  # recipients:
  [ [ h'', # protected (absent for AE algorithm)
    { alg: A128KW, # unprotected
      kid: h'383261622e6161733432' # context identifier: "82ab.aas42"
    },
    h'52ff9ed52d...' # encrypted session key
  ] ]
]
```

# Key Derivation



## Security Association

transfer Ticket Face during setup



use session key  
from Verifier (direct  
or derived)

derive session key  
from Ticket Face and  
 $K_{S,SAM}$

# Convey Ticket Face from C to S

```
POST /authorize
Content-Format: application/cose+cbor
[ h'a1031862',      # protected { content_type: application/dcaf+cbor }
  { alg: HMAC 256/256 },      # unprotected
  h'{ SAI: [ "/s/tempC" ... ]', # DCAF payload wrapped in CBOR binary
  h'....',      # tag: HMAC(options+protected+payload, secret)
  [ [ h'', {}, h'' ] ]      # recipients
]
```



# Convey Ticket Face from C to S

```
POST /authorize
Content-Format: application/cose+cbor
[ h'a1031862',      # protected { content_type: application/dcaf+cbor }
  { alg: HMAC 256/256 },      # unprotected
  h'{ SAI: [ "/s/tempC" ... ]', # DCAF payload wrapped in CBOR binary
  h'....',          # tag: HMAC(options+protected+payload, secret)
  [ [ h'', {}, h'' ] ]      # recipients
]
```

# Creation of Security Context

```
POST /authorize
Content-Format: application/cose+cbor
[ h'a1031862',      # protected { content_type: application/dcaf+cbor }
  { alg: HMAC 256/256 },      # unprotected
  h'{ SAI: [ "/s/tempC" ... ]', # DCAF payload wrapped in CBOR binary
  h'.....',      # tag: HMAC(options+protected+payload, secret)
  [ [ h'', {}, h'' ] ]      # recipients
]
```

## 2.01 Created

```
Content-Format: application/cose+cbor
Location-Path: 238dsa29
Authorization: [ h'a1031862',      # protected
  { alg: HMAC 256/256 },      # unprotected
  h'',      # empty payload
  h'.....',      # tag: HMAC(options+protected, secret)
  [ [ h'', {}, h'' ] ]      # recipients
]
```

# Creation of Security Context

```
POST /authorize
Content-Format: application/cose+cbor
[ h'a1031862', # protected { content_type: application/dcaf+cbor }
  { alg: HMAC 256/256 }, # unprotected
  h'{ SAI: [ "/s/tempC" ... ]', # DCAF payload wrapped in CBOR binary
  h'.....', # tag: HMAC(options+protected+payload, secret
  [ [ h'', {}, h'' ] ] # recipients
]
```

used as security  
context identifier

2.01 Created

```
Content-Format: application/cose+cbor
```

```
Location-Path: 238dsa29
```

```
Authorization: [ h'a1031862', # protected
  { alg: HMAC 256/256 }, # unprotected
  h'', # empty payload
  h'.....', # tag: HMAC(options+protected, secret
  [ [ h'', {}, h'' ] ] # recipients
]
```

new option

derived from  
Ticket Face and  
 $K_{S,SAM}$

# Usage of Security Context

## without payload

```
GET /r
Authorization: [ h'',                                # protected (empty)
  { alg: HMAC 256/256,                               # unprotected
    kid: h'3233386473613239'                         # context identifier: "238dsa29"
  },
  nil,                                                # payload (empty)
  h'.....',                                          # tag: HMAC(options+protected, secret)
  [ [ h'', {}, h'' ] ]                               # recipients
]
```

# Usage of Security Context

without payload

```
GET /r
Authorization: [ h'',
  { alg: HMAC 256/256,
    kid: h'3233386473613239'
  },
  nil,
  h'.....',
  [ [ h'', {}, h'' ] ]
]
```

```
# protected (empty)
# unprotected
# context identifier: "238dsa29"

# payload (empty)
# tag: HMAC(options+protected, secret)
# recipients
```

as returned in  
Location-Path

# Usage of Security Context

with payload

```
GET /r
Authorization: [ h'',
  { alg: HMAC 256/256,
    kid: h'3233386473613239'
  },
  nil,
  h'.....',
  [ [ h'', {}, h'' ] ]
]
# protected (empty)
# unprotected
# context identifier: "238dsa29"
# payload (empty)
# tag: HMAC(options+protected, secret)
# recipients

PUT /r
Content-Format: application/cose+cbor
[ h'a10300',
  { alg: HMAC 256/256,
    kid: h'3233386473613239'
  },
  h'48656c6c6f20576f726c6421',
  h'.....',
  [ [ h'', {}, h'' ] ]
]
# protected { content_type: text/plain }
# unprotected
# context identifier: "238dsa29"
# payload: "Hello World!\n"
# tag: HMAC(options+protected+payload, secret)
# recipients
```

as returned in  
Location-Path

# Usage of Security Context

with payload

```
GET /r
Authorization: [ h'',                               # protected (empty)
                { alg: HMAC 256/256,               # unprotected
                  kid: h'3233386473613239'         # context identifier: "238dsa29"
                },
                nil,                                # payload (empty)
                h'.....',                          # tag: HMAC(options+protected, secret)
                [ [ h'', {}, h'' ] ]               # recipients
              ]
]
PUT /r
Content-Format: application/cose+cbor
[ h'a10300',                                       # protected { content_type: text/plain }
  { alg: HMAC 256/256,                             # unprotected
    kid: h'3233386473613239'                       # context identifier: "238dsa29"
  },
  h'48656c6c6f20576f726c6421',                    # payload: "Hello World!\n"
  h'.....',                                       # tag: HMAC(options+protected+payload, secret)
  [ [ h'', {}, h'' ] ]                             # recipients
]
```

as returned in  
Location-Path

# Open Issues

- ▶ protection of changeable CoAP options (-> CoRE WG)
- ▶ describe how to apply key derivation methods from `draft-ietf-cose-msg`



# Summary

- ▶ DCAF-COSE supports application-level security using COSE objects
- ▶ use plain COSE as described in `draft-ietf-cose-msg`
- ▶ two new CoAP options:
  - ▶ `Authorization`: convey authorization information
  - ▶ `Authorization-Format`: allow for future extensions

# DCAF-COSE vs. OSCOAP

	<b>DCAF-COSE</b>	<b>OSCOAP</b>
Changes to COSE	use COSE as is (-06) no changes required	invent "Secure Message format" (COSE-profile in Appendix A) invent "COSE Optimizations" that are not COSE-compatible (new message types, remove unprotected header, alg ...)
Security Context	use parameter kid (identifies auth info and session key)	invent new parameter cid (identifies cipher suite, keys, alg-specific parameters, different for client and server: "typically identifies the sending party")
Replay protection	use parameter nonce (-> local time)	invent new parameter seq (-> sequence number, no freshness information)
Re-key	Server sends SAM Information Message	"out of scope" (Section 7.1)
Signaling	use existing payload types two new options (not critical due to usual content-format handling)	implicit, new payload type  new critical option
Handling of unknown options	COSE extension parameter to signal required options	not supported
RFC 7252, 7641 options block-wise	needs more work in CoRE WG	