MIF protocol drafts

draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-dhcp-support-02
draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-ndp-support-02
draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-id-01

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Status

• Drafts completed working group
• Received low volume of reviews
• Reviews from Ian Farrer, Steven Barth, Tommy Pauly and Lorenzo Colitti (Thanks!!)
Signature

• Do we want to keep the authentication parts of the container options?
  – Section 3.2 of RFC7556 requires authentication for the source and the integrity of the message
    • Do we still want this?

• Comments mentioned that they are complicated and not very useful
  – They also break some deployment models (e.g. homenet) as a side effect
Editorial and clarity issues

- There are some issues raised with unclear wording in the drafts
- These will be put into an issue tracker and resolved
  - If some issues require substantive changes will gate on WG input
DHCPv6
Allowable options

• Which of the DHCPv6 options are allowable inside the container
  – All possible DHCPv6 options
    • Future proof but vague and error prone
  – Make an allowed list
    • Issues with future expansion
  – Make a IANA registry with a list of allowed options
    • Overhead of checking
Replay protection

• The authentication options as defined today lack any built-in replay protection

• Do we need replay protection?
  – What *actually* breaks?

• This can be built in but it would require frequent updates from the originator of the configuration to the entity sending out the configuration information

• What does the WG think is the right compromise?
Nesting

• Is nesting allowed or not?
  – i.e. PVD inside PVD

• We recommend not having it
  – Anyone against?
Neighbor Discovery
Space efficiency

• Authentication information can make the RAs very large
• Potential duplication of information inside PVDs exacerbates this further
• Should we limit contents of containers to a core set of options?
Usage of info inside container

• Should the mif drafts specify how hosts handle information received inside containers?
  – Given that other configuration information definitions don’t do this, should we?
Security

• Hosts have no mechanism to specify that they do not want authenticated containers

• What do we want to do?
  – Short of defining a content negotiation feature for ND, not sure what we can do
One ID type (or) Many

• The discussion seems to be converging towards having a single fixed length ID type instead of having different types

• Does the WG think that a single ID type is sufficient
  – What length should it be?
  – Should it be of a specific type (UUID, ULA etc.) or just an opaque quantity
Metadata

• None of the drafts offer a mechanism for conveying metadata
  – E.g. Human readable name, metering, characteristics etc.

• Do we want to add such metadata?
  – If so, where?
    • The protocol documents or in the ID